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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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The first three black holes of
UN non-accountability -- corruption cover-up, whistle-blower suppression,
and non-transparency -- have obstructed UN management accountability since
1993. However, especially
during the UN's decade under Secretary-General Kofi Annan, those efforts
were all supported by the most audacious of all the black holes, because
it is so subversive -- to free the UN's incompetent
managers. The efforts of the Secretariat
leadership to evade the General Assembly's 1993 call for establishing
management accountability have continued into 2006. This fourth Black Hole
discussion summarizes the major behind-the-scenes struggles that have
occurred. -- In subsection A, IO Watch examines
the "Free the managers" efforts from 1993 to 2004, as a Secretariat
counter-strategy to evade managerial accountability. -- Subsection B explores the
counter emphasis of many UN expert observers and staff on the very weak
and debilitating UN management culture, and the urgent need for a
management accountability system to overcome it. -- Subsection C explores the flood of serious management
scandals in the Secretariat from 2004 onward, and the ensuing UN senior
leadership attempts (much less successful than before) to persist in
protecting incompetent UN managers despite all that has gone
wrong. A. The "free the managers" campaign,
1993-2004 The Secretariat's "free the
managers" campaign began, literally, with a half-baked idea, based on
strong criticisms of UN management from the departing top manager in 1993.
As part of his discussion of the UN's severe budget, financial and
management problems, he concluded that: "Current problems in what you
[Secretary-General Butros Butros-Ghali] have correctly identified as 'the
present outmoded system of personnel management' constitute a major
stumbling block to true reform within the Organization.
Defects exist in nearly every
aspect of present personnel practice. Recruitment has been undertaken on
a more or less haphazard basis and consumes an inordinate amount of time.
The result is too much
'deadwood' doing too little work and too few good staff members doing too
much, over-extending themselves sometimes to the point where they have
become counter-productive.
More flexibility should be granted to
managers to manage, while they are, of course, held strictly
accountable for their adherence to clear policy goals and priorities
properly established by Member States through the General Assembly." [emphasis
added] The Secretariat jumped on the
first nine underscored words above as its slogan for self-preservation
ever since, conveniently ignoring the "of course" while being held
strictly accountable to Member States through the General Assembly. In a subsequent 1993 report
intended to fend off the General Assembly's management accountability
resolution, the Secretary General made a long and windy formal proposal on
accountability and responsibility of managers: "
Many heads of departments
and offices feel that the financial and personnel management procedures of
the Organization are unduly cumbersome and hinder expeditious response[s]
A recurrent theme is that
managers in the Secretariat must be given sufficient discretion to manage,
and
entrusted with considerable discretionary control over the
resources, human and financial, required to produce them.
"The
more complicated and increased demands by Member States, coupled with
greater managerial discretion, may require adjustments in [Secretariat
regulations and rules}
in
the context of the new realities.
Ad hoc adjustments will not
address the central problem of [balancing] the need for a greater degree
of managerial discretion by senior staff and
the ultimate
responsibilities
to Member States." The Secretary-General's report thus highlighted an
image of UN managers suffering under the yoke of heavy centralized
controls.
However, the UN leadership was championing the same group of
officials (itself) cited throughout this IO Watch archive for its lack of
managerial skills, often reckless and abusive performance, and ability to
easily evade management controls. Not surprisingly, the Assembly was not
impressed. In December 1993, it "regretted" the inadequacy of the above
report, and in a very unusual, decisive, and specific demand, called for
the establishment of the transparent and effective system of Secretariat
management accountability no later than 1 January 1995.
In 1994 the Secretariat admitted the poor personnel
management in the past and dutifully talked about (very gradually)
installing "basic elements" of the required accountability system (the
"managers" part was downplayed.) Much more actively, however, the new
human resources strategy pushed hard for the next several years to
implement a "managed system of increased delegation of
authority to
programme managers", as indicated by the following 1994 quote.
"There is now an urgent need
for considerable
deregulation in the Secretariat
to enhance the
capacity of managers, to allow them greater flexibility
[and encourage
them] -- in brief to manage better.
Managers must have
the flexibility they need,
[with incentives] to achieve
economies, and then
the freedom to utilize the resources released
"
The General Assembly was well aware of what was going
on. In
1997 it regretted with deep concern the lack of progress and reaffirmed
its 1993 management accountability resolution. It called on
the Secretary General to enhance such accountability, including sanctions
for demonstrated mismanagement of staff; specific administrative
instructions; and ensuring that well-designed accountability mechanisms,
internal controls, and training were established before
delegating authority. It repeated these strong admonishments
in 1999 and 2001.
Meanwhile, a strong new exponent of freeing the
managers, Kofi Annan, became Secretary-General in 1997. As a veteran
senior official in 1995, he had already publicly and optimistically stated
that "The days of gifted amateurism are over" in UN management (most
people would agree on "amateurism", certainly not many on "gifted.") In 2000, he
dispensed with the 1993 management accountability resolution entirely
(without ever citing it). Mr. Annan reported grandly to the General Assembly
that "the comprehensive system of accountability now in place ensures that
accountability mechanisms are effectively used, are seen to be used, and
ensure that staff at all levels are accountable for their actions and
inaction." [Thus, the central focus on managers'
accountability in the UN Secretariat was gone, at least for the next few
years. However, this coverup was finally blown apart in May 2005 when the
Deputy Secretary-General was forced to publicly announce the need to
"immediately reform" the "critical areas of management, oversight, and
accountability."]
From the time he took office in early 1997,
Secretary-General Annan had made many forceful statements on the need for,
and merits of, freeing Secretariat managers to manage. They included
the following. "Previous management measures Programme
Managers have been empowered to take
action in their areas of responsibility, thus reducing layers of
centralized administration." [1997, emphasis added]
"I am pleased to submit
what I believe to be the
most extensive and far-reaching reforms in the fifty-two year history of
the Organization.
The Organization needs to be significantly
reconfigured to do better
also to realize significant administrative
efficiencies.
The report seeks
on my own
initiative, nothing less than to transform the leadership and management
structure of the Organization.
" [1997]
"The prime
responsibility for taking action to remedy accidental and intentional
performance failures will lie with supervisors and managers at all
levels.
In addition the Department of Management
is considering the setting up of transparent
accountability mechanisms
" [1998, emphasis added]
"'We are too complicated and too slow. We are over-administered
and have too many rules and too many regulations'
[Mr.
Annan] told staff on 29 October. [He called] for
simpler procedures and
more authority for managers
Managers have limited responsibility over their human
and financial resources. This leads directly to the erosion of
accountability at all levels of the Organization
"
[1998] "I think we should be allowed to focus on our work and
not face constant harassment of reform, reform, reform. We have done
enough.
It is an ongoing process. We want to focus on our essential
tasks."
[1998, Mr. Annan's year-end press confence.] "New initiatives are intended to
rejuvenate the
Organization [and] further empower managers;
The measures described
add up to a very different way of doing business
One of my priorities in my first term was to
improve the Organization's professional capacity
We have made significant strides
I am confident that the new system of recruitment, by
giving managers primary responsibility for staff selection, will lead to a
new level of accountability and empowerment.
I intend to adopt additional measures to cut
unnecessary layers of bureaucracy. At present, the Organization recruits highly qualified
individuals, for management functions -- yet its procedures do not allow
them to manage
Action 32. In order to continue efforts to improve
management: (a) a thorough review will be conducted of delegated
authority
to increase the capacity and flexibility of managers to manage
" [2002, emphasis
added]
"The capacity of managers to deliver mandated
programmes will be strengthened through management training and
greater
delegation of authority, with accountability ensured through systematic
monitoring, evaluation and greater transparency in decision-making.
Offices away from headquarters
will be given greater
authority to respond to the requirements of their offices."
Expected accomplishments of the Secretariat [strategy
for 2006-2007]: "(a) Enhanced capacity of programme managers
to manage and administer their own department's human, financial and
material resources, through adoption of new policies and procedures.
Indicators of achievement:
(a) (ii) Increase in the
percentage of programme managers indicating satisfaction with delegated
authority and support provided." [2004]
Two other aspects must be noted in this Secretariat
leadership effort to block and evade management accountability, the first
being successful obstructive battles in other management areas. The
leadership's success in blocking effective programming systems was
achieved by creating ponderous multi-year plans and budgets which no one
read, and ensuring that almost 30 years of efforts to establish monitoring
and evaluation systems would be stifled by managers refusing to cooperate,
as discussed in the preceding "Black Holes" subsection on
non-transparency. UN managers also took a very direct and active role in
conducting the new Secretariat investigations processes, rather than being
subject to it themselves. The Secretariat leadership long ignored
international standards for internal controls as well, until the
independent study on UN oversight and governance of 2006 insisted that
they must be firmly applied. And it kept the personnel department in
a subservient status, rather then fulfilling the important role of
monitoring and enforcing staff rules that the General Assembly assigned to
it. These
three topics are discussed further in the next Black Holes subsection on
non-independent oversight. The second additional aspect of freeing the managers
was that the Secretariat not only delegated authority without the required
accountability, but did it badly. An external review in 2000 found that
delegation had been
conducted ad hoc, lacked a
well-thought-out strategy, and was mostly a "dumping of clerical tasks",
with much confusion and a good deal of discontent among all parties
concerned.
The report recommended a comprehensive action plan, revised rules,
clarity and transparency, firm guidance, performance evaluation
mechanisms, and sanctions for failures. It also urged central control to
help ensure a modern management culture and proper delegation. Years later,
few of these actions seem ever to have been taken.
B.
The management accountability forces fight back, 1993-2004 At this point, the IO Watch analysis switches away
from the determined efforts of Secretariat senior officials to free
themselves, which did successfully preserve their immunity and impunity by
blocking management accountability processes throughout the 1993-2004
period.
Instead, IO Watch now shifts to the other side of the coin --
Member States' (and staff, and outside observers) fundamental concerns
with the continuing failure to establish basic UN management
accountability during that period. A centrally important, and still fully relevant, set
of insights by a group of UN expert insiders in 1997 summarized clearly
the very different attitudes of the UN Secretariat and UN Member States
toward each other. "Sins of member states: Secretariat staff resent
member state interference
in
their daily work
[their micromanagement of] the hiring and promotion of
Secretariat personnel
[and
of] Secretariat budgeting
too often seeking to control the minor
details of spending
allocations.
Secretariat staff members are also frustrated by lack
of clear direction from
intergovernmental bodies. Too often member states fail to agree on
how best to confront global problems.
Moreover, mandates are frequently
assigned to the Secretariat with
little thought as to the resources needed for their
implementation. Sins of the Secretariat:
. Member states contend that
ineffective -- some would say nonexistent -- managerial
practices throughout the Secretariat have led to inefficient use of the
[UN resources]
; a staff unaccountable for its
actions and prone to delegate upwards; insufficient
program coordination
; and wasteful duplication of efforts. There has been
a lack of transparency in Secretariat decision making [on] policy issues,
personnel, and budget expenditures.
much of the information that is
provided is not timely or readable.
Overall, inefficiency and lack
of accountability within the Secretariat, whether perceived or real, have
invited member state micromanagement. " There is no doubt that the General Assembly is in many
ways dysfunctional. This is inherent and unavoidable because
of its 191 disparate Member States, each with its own agenda and interests
and able to speak out on any item at any time, as well as the poor
organization of its oversight and policy formulation work. Nevertheless,
on the fundamental issue of management accountability, the General
Assembly resolutions have been unified and consistent for more than a
decade. The (literally) irresponsible Secretariat position on
management accountability, however, is clearly the weaker and more
reformable one, as detailed throughout this IO Watch website. That weak
position is accentuated by the UN's long-entrenched management culture, as
cited years ago by the most astute observer of the UN's dysfunctional
operations, which also still applies. "Accountability, that source of institutional health,
had been excluded from United Nations experience; and, along with it,
indivisibly, the stimulus of direct public engagement and response. 'It is not a
United Nations Organization', Aleksander Solzhenitsyn was to say, in his
Nobel address of 1972, 'but a United Governments Organization.' In
offering itself as the mere creature of its member governments, the United
Nations system entered a state of arrested moral development, marked by the
habitual emblems of immaturity: demands for approval, and incapacity
for individual or collective self-questioning." Subsection A above explored the Secretariat's
determined and aggressive efforts to beat back the General Assembly
management accountability requirements from 1993-2004. This
subsection presents a sampling of the many countervailing criticisms
during these years about the grave UN operational problems caused by a
non-managerial, non-accountable Secretariat leadership. Far back in 1968, a UN study had emphasized the "vital
importance" of selecting well qualified personnel for UN service and not
letting standards deteriorate. An observer noted in 1977 that highly
qualified UN staff had to support "a great many parasitic 'deadwood'
employees" and political appointees. In 1978 an advisory committee had
noted the lack of management training to create a
management climate. Finally, In 1986, the Secretary-General stated the
need for improved management "at all levels", and his task to "ensure in
future that management skills are given high priority in recruitment and
training." But such training only began in 1992, and
has remained modest. It was certainly long overdue: a 1993
expert survey found that the UN was distinctive because so many untrained
people were placed in UN management positions, even though they were
"entirely unfamiliar" with basic management principles.
Not surprisingly, external reports, staff, and expert
observers, including those of some of Secretary-General Annan's strongest
supporters, made quite negative criticisms and analyses of continuing
Secretariat non-accountability during the 1993-2004 period. The following
quotes give the tenor of these comments. "Problems in the UN management culture arise from: -- an organizational culture that
increasingly values control over facilitation, 'process' over outcomes,
hierarchy over collaboration, and personal power over collective purpose,
all in a highly sensitive multicultural context; -- complex and cumbersome managerial
systems and controls which limit managers' discretion but nevertheless
permit abuses of authority;
-- bending hiring and promotion rules
to allow personal and political objectives to supercede those of the
Organization;
-- controlling offices more concerned with preventing
failure than with encouraging success or improving systems to make them
better serve their users and the Organization. [1993,
the abovementioned expert survey]
"
The concept of management accountability in the
United Nations has not been consistently applied.
no system of accountability will be effective without
the assurance that sanctions will be promptly applied when violations
occur. I
strongly recommend that any new system of accountability and
responsibility include specific penalties or sanctions for United Nations
managers and other staff who disregard United Nations
regulations and rules or who are negligent in the conduct of their duties
and responsibilities.
A vast amount of work remains to be
done before the United Nations has management structures
and a management culture adequate to the great tasks entrusted to it
. " [1994, the UN's first,
interim, "inspector general", emphasis added]
"[A worldwide survey of UN staff found that] when it
comes to organization and supervision, [43 percent] consider that their
supervisor's performance is inadequate
or downright bad. Professional staff are the most
concerned.
On the whole, staff members want better -- i.e.,
qualified -- managers, more accountability within the Organization and
more personal initiative and responsibility." [1995, emphasis
added]
"[The argument to]
"allow managers to manage" is
unconvincing because the most serious problem affecting the efficiency and
effectiveness of the UN Secretariat has been bad management.
The Secretariat reforms proposed by the Secretary-General would remove a range of checks and balances built into the international civil service for the very obvious reason that in a multicultural, multinational context, justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. To weaken it would be to reduce the integrity of the entire structure.]' [1995, emphasis added] "'United Nations management' has been termed an
oxymoron, a juxtaposition of incompatibles. [Recently]
a professional staff member complained to
a senior administrative assistant about their new Director's almost total
lack of involvement in 'his' unit's work, and she responded, with earnest
disbelief, 'But Directors are not supposed to do any work. '
The current [top UN manager] recently observed that he
could not forget the 'tremendous burst of applause' at a 1995
meeting he had with staff in Geneva when a staff member denounced the low
quality of management. He cited this incident as a 'defining
moment' in his relationship with the [UN], and recognized the right of
staff to good leadership and his obligation to give it to them." [1995, an
external report]
"
Efforts must be
made to do away with the
widespread tendency of staff, even in key positions, to shun
responsibility and accountability. OIOS backs measures taken by the [DAM]
to achieve this goal and will focus its own recommendations to management
accordingly.
Many UN managers are not used to and seem
to be quite reluctant to accept criticism, particularly when it comes to
applying accountability criteria rather than settling for the promise that some
specific problems won't recur. This
feature of the United Nations culture must be changed if we
are ever to develop staff awareness and acceptance of responsibility and
accountability.
United Nations managers must stop being
defensive and enter into a critical dialogue with OIOS. In order to
make oversight effective, we offer ourselves as partners, not
adversaries." [1995,
emphasis added]
"Micromanagement by intergovernmental bodies is an
index of the lack of trust between the majority of delegations and the UN
Secretariat.
[If this trend is to be reversed] there must be a much
clearer conceptualization of change, a balanced explanation of
implications, and an absolute sincerity of purpose. The current perception of the Secretariat among many
delegations is that in terms of personnel policy it is confused, does
not understand the full implications of what is proposed, and has a hidden agenda.
In pushing for reorientation, [the personnel chief]
speaks some home truths
' We can no longer assume that a [20-year] staff
member has developed the necessary managerial and supervisory skills'
there is 'widespread staff distrust of management' and the UN's
'organizational culture is one in which advancement is generally expected
on the basis of longevity rather than performance.' " [1998,
an expert observer, emphasis added]
"The quality of departmental submissions received by
OIOS for the 1996-1997 programme performance period clearly indicates
that, in many departments and offices, there is still
inadequate commitment to oversight
Many departments still do not
have either a senior planning or coordination function
[Progress requires that programme managers recognize]
such systems as basic management tools for improving
efficiency and effectiveness of implementation." [1998,
OIOS]
" ...No amount of money or resources can substitute
for the significant changes that are urgently needed in the
culture of the [United Nations].
Wide disparities in staff quality exist and those in
the system are the first to acknowledge it; better performers are given
unreasonable workloads to compensate for those who are less capable. Unless the United Nations takes steps to become a true
meritocracy, it will not be able to reverse the alarming trend of
qualified personnel
leaving the Organization.
Unless
managers at all levels, beginning with the Secretary-General and his
senior staff, seriously address this problem on a priority basis, reward excellence and remove
incompetence, additional resources will be wasted and lasting
reform will become impossible." [2000, a prestigious
external report, emphasis added]
"The United Nations has substantially restructured its
leadership and operations and partly implemented a merit-based and
performance-oriented human capital system
However,
the
overall objectives of the reform have not yet been achieved.
Specifically, the United Nations has not yet
implemented reforms to focus its programming and budgeting on managing the Secretariat's performance. These initiatives
would enable Member States to hold the Secretariat accountable for
results and are key to the success of
the overall reform because they institutionalize a shift in
the organization's focus from carrying out activities to accomplishing
missions.
the U.N. reform is an interrelated process and
requires that all core elements be in place to succeed." [2000, an
in-depth external expert report, emphasis added]
"The United Nations has been hit by an unprecedented
wave of fraud, waste and corruption. Officials at its antifraud investigation
unit say they are expecting to have to run more than 350 inquiries by the
end of the year -- nearly twice the total for 1998
The revelations will embarrass Kofi Annan, the UN
Secretary-General, who is to welcome national leaders
to the 'Millennium
Summit' in New York next week.
Annan is hoping to convince skeptical
heads of state that the UN has provided value for money and that its role
should be expanded.
One senior investigator said last week that the UN
investigations unit's workload was greater than ever. 'We are seeing more and more frauds and abuses of
authority.'"
[2000, emphasis added]
"An extraordinary thing is happening this week at the
United Nations.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan is to be re-elected virtually by
acclamation.
Within the UN system his reforms have been important
although limited by the perennial self-interest of the members.
The personnel system is still a disaster, which he
must now tackle resolutely." [2001, an Annan supporter,
emphasis added]
"Kofi Annan's election to a second and last term
should normally allow him to help establish the United Nations as the centerpiece of
an emerging system of global management that is efficient, just and
accepted as legitimate by all
Decisive action should not continue to be postponed in
regaining the motivation and professional quality of the United Nations in
its earlier years
Also, much would be achieved if UN programme
managers were allowed to manage -- yes, manage -- their own budgets
and personnel.
Not only would their motivation increase immediately, but they could be held
accountable for failure to achieve agreed objectives."
[2001, an Annan supporter and former senior official, emphasis
added]
"An independent panel
said today that the UN's
security systems were 'dysfunctional' [after the deadly bombing of UN
headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003]
UN management and staff [failure] to
comply with standard security regulations and directives left the UN open
and vulnerable
[performance was] sloppy and non-compliance with security
rules commonplace.' '
The current security
management system is dysfunctional. It provides little guarantee of
security to UN staff in Iraq or other high-risk environments and needs to
be reformed,' the panel said. The panel labelled as a major deficiency a 'lack of
accountability for the decisions and positions
taken by UN managers with regard to the security of UN staff.' 'The United Nations', it said, 'needs a new culture of
accountability in security management.'
[The panel head] said
"We need a much more
professional approach, a professional staff
'"
[2003, emphasis added]
The United Nations Staff Union notes [reports that UN
staff have become outraged about poor security management] [They] are increasing[ly] becoming targets and are incensed over the lack of accountability of senior
officials, the failure of the organization to adhere to minimum
operational standards in many field offices and the lack of progress to
address the serious flaws in our security management system. We do not want the world to feel sorry for us, but we
do ask that our leaders
. fulfill their obligations and commitments to
provide the necessary resources and environment to do our jobs. Many UN staff
work in dangerous and hostile environments and are right to demand that
last years errors are corrected and that tangible measures are taken to
improve security. [2004, emphasis added]
"'The UN has a 'phone book' of rules and regulations
which are totally useless as they are never practiced', a staff member
is quoted as saying
[in a worldwide UN organizational
integrity survey. Another says]
'Senior leaders
caught in serious breaches of ethics should be punished, not promoted as
usual.'
[The study] is being made public at a time when
Secretary-General Kofi Annan has been forced by the widespread publicity
[about corruption in the Iraq oil-for-food program] to appoint a
high-level panel to look into them.
The new study records relatively high levels of worker
satisfaction
but its most negative
findings have to do with ingrown leadership and the lack of response to
reports of corruption. 'Get rid of the old boy network,' one staff member
[says.] 'That network
is wide, tenacious and powerful.
So long as
you can wind your way into that network, you are OK.
Opposing the network is certainly the end of a UN
career.'" [2004, emphasis
added] "Fraud awareness, prevention plan and policy
The United Nations has, to some extent, an
established framework on this issue. However, in terms of implementation,
it did not have a comprehensive internal anti-fraud and anti-corruption
infrastructure, and did not include anti-corruption and anti-fraud
elements in the various rules, procedures and internal
controls," [2004, the UN external
auditors]
"[The UN Staff Union
President], said that
in the last six years, [UN]
management had been
reforming itself and increasing managerial authority, while reducing
accountability. The Staff Union
could not support
the erosion of
staff rights and dissolution of oversight mechanisms as a means of
implementation
The [integrity survey]
revealed that staff
feared
reprisals for exposing breaches of ethics, and they perceived that the
disciplinary process was applied unevenly. Their view of integrity among senior
managers was less than positive.. The Organization had yet to establish concrete
measures for individual accountability, she continued. It was essential that areas with
expanded delegation of authority for personnel decisions should be
carefully examined and, if abuses were found, such delegation should be
revoked.
" [2004, emphasis added]
"[A former, three-decade, UN veteran told the Fifth
Committee that ]
never had the staff perception
of integrity been so low.
When he served as head of personnel, his biggest fight
had been with programme managers, who were most resistant to reform
. He could not believe that such measures as giving
authority to programme managers would strengthen the international civil
service.
Without a strong personnel office
there would be no uniformity of
rules and fairness in the system. Governments
should not take what was happening lightly." [2004, emphasis
added]
"In 2002, the
[OIOS] found that program managers
and department and office heads were not complying with U.N.
regulations.
nearly half of program managers were not regularly monitoring and
evaluating program performance. In addition, program managers were not held
accountable for meeting program objectives
because U.N. regulations prevent linking program effectiveness and impact
with program managers' performance. U.N. officials told us that a more
mature program monitoring and evaluation system is needed before
program managers can be held responsible for program
performance. We found that there were a variety of problems
Most
programs do not have comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plans
Overall, evaluation findings were not
used
The
Secretary-General tasked the
OIOS to develop a strategy to
systematically evaluate and monitor programme results and to introduce
information systems needed
and expects to have a complete system by
2006." [2004, an internal expert report,
emphasis added]
"The U.N. Secretary General launched two reform
agendas, in 1997 and 2002, to address the U.N.'s core management
challenges -- poor leadership of the Secretariat, duplication
[of]
offices and programs, and the lack of accountability for staff
performance.
In 2000, GAO reported that the reforms
were not yet complete.
UN reform faces several challenges. For example,
the Secretariat does not conduct comprehensive assessments of the status
and impact of U.N. reforms.
Other challenges include resistance to change from program
managers and possible resource constraints.
The
Secretariat is providing training to all departments to assist
managers and staff
to comply with performance-oriented
budgeting and overcome
resistance. Managers' support is critical for the
institutionalization of reforms in the long term."
[2004, the above expert report,
emphasis added]
Note: The "Interested in more details?" box for this
Black Holes subsection is provided at the end of the "Free the [incompetent] managers"
II section, which follows.
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