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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments |
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The Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) was
created following the recommendations of a high-level UN management
reform
committee in 1968 as: "
a small inspection unit, consisting of a limited
number of specialists highly qualified in financial and administrative
matters.
These officials would visit the different services of the United
Nations organizations
to examine the way in which they operate and to propose any reforms they
deem necessary." "Second report of the
Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to examine the
finances of the United Nations and the specialized agencies," UN document
A/6343 of 19 July 1966, paras. 60-67. The eight Inspectors, functioning at first on an
experimental basis renewed at two-year intervals by the General Assembly,
began preparing reports. However, in 1973 the US Congress, which has
played a significant role in scrutinizing the JIU over the years,
specifically
sought an independent review and evaluation group for the UN
system, without success, under its Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. A 1974
review by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that: " [existing
oversight] groups do not seem particularly well suited to providing
[Member States] the information needed. Only the JIU seems to possess a broad
enough mandate to meet this need. [The Department of] State, however, in choosing to
promote the Unit rather than establishing a new body
has not been able to reform and strengthen it. The Unit's
independence can still be questioned
Moreover, inspectors are not bound by any central guidance within their
own group.
This, coupled with the Unit's small size and lack of professional
diversification, renders it incapable of adequately covering the range of
programs and activities which should be continuously reviewed and reported
on." "Numerous
improvements still needed in managing U.S. participation in international
organizations," US General Accounting Office, B - 168767 of July 18, 1974. UN system agencies agreed to convert the JIU to
permanent status beginning in 1978. But they expressed concern with the
very uneven quality of JIU reports and a lack of impact. It was agreed
that the JIU should have significant additional professional and clerical
staff in order to perform in-depth evaluation work, but alert diplomats in
New York engineered a last-minute substitution of three more Inspectors
instead. This greatly hindered any serious JIU evaluation work, but
certainly expanded the attractiveness of the JIU for job-seeking
diplomats. "Continuation of the
[JIU] and proposed terms of reference: Report of the Secretary-General:
Addendum," UN document A/31/75/Add. 1 of 21 April
1976, and
"Possible changes in
the mandate of the Joint Inspection Unit which would enable it to asist in
carrying out external evaluation: Report of the Secretary-General, UN
document A/C.5/31/21 of 1 October 1976. The official JIU Statute of 1978 at least laid down
some specific guidance for the eleven Inspectors, who are assisted by an
"Executive Secretary" and a small Secretariat, with half-a-dozen-plus
professional and half-a-dozen-plus clerical staff. The Unit is based in
Geneva, to be closer to the UN system specialized agencies in Europe. The
UN Secretariat provides administrative support to the JIU, on behalf of
all system agencies who "participate in" [i.e. pay for] the JIU. The JIU
Statute provides that the Inspectors:
shall have the broadest powers of investigation
shall provide an independent view through inspection and evaluation
shall satisfy [themselves] that the [UN system
activities]
are carried out in the most economical manner and that optimum use is made
of resources available
may propose reforms or make recommendations .. [but]
shall not have the power of decision
Acting singly or in small groups,
shall make on-the-spot inquiries and
investigations
shall discharge their duties in full independence and in the sole interest
of the organizations.
shall determine standards and procedures for
[their work];
shall draw up, over their own signature, reports for which they are
responsible
[stating] their findings and propos[ing] solutions to problems
to submit to the [governing bodies of the]
organizations concerned." "Joint Inspection
Unit Statute", United Nations, Geneva, 1978,
Articles
5-8, 11, 16-20. Since 1978, public sector oversight work has become
much more professional, both worldwide and in the UN system, emphasizing
management audits, internal evaluation systems, and, as part of
increasing inspector general functions worldwide, expert investigations
of fraud, waste, and abuse. The JIU, however, never established a clear
professional role for itself, resisting the above disciplines and instead
carrying out a mishmash of "inquiries" which are often mere "mission
reports," with some desk work added. Further, the JIU has, over the past
decade, averaged only about eight brief reports each year (i.e., not even
one report for each of the eleven Inspectors). The JIU
reports usually have limited relevance and validity, use poor
methodologies, and therefore have little impact, as discussed in the
following analysis. Thus, the JIU does not exercise
effective oversight, and in fact detracts from an accountable and
effective UN (and UN system) by blocking the establishment of a truly
dynamic, credible, and professional system-wide oversight unit. The JIU's "Achilles heel" is the process for
appointing its Inspectors. The JIU Statute specifies that the Inspectors,
all of whom must be from different countries: "
shall be chosen from among members of national
supervision or inspection bodies, or from among persons of a similar
competence on the basis of their special experience in national
administrative and financial matters, including management questions
[and] shall serve in their personal capacity." "Joint Inspection
Unit Statute", United Nations, Geneva, 1978,
Article 2. [Note: almost all the
JIU Inspectors have come from the extremely vague "similar competence"
category, with "special experience" being their years of UN mission or
other diplomatic service.] The Statute also specifies that Member States
[actually the various "regional groups"] shall select countries to propose
candidates. This is actually a long-established process of dividing up
general UN advisory or other "posts" among the Member States in the
regional groups. A cursory review by senior UN officials follows before
the new candidates' names are submitted to the General Assembly for
appointment. The process is very non-transparent, and provides little if
any careful scrutiny of nominees' expertise, related achievements, and
professional fitness for the posts. Unfortunately, the selection of JIU Inspectors has
been almost entirely "diplomatized." The selection criteria quoted above
provide giant loopholes. Many Inspectors have cast themselves as "experts"
because they served on UN advisory bodies like the ACABQ or the CPC. But in those
bodies they are merely part of a large group expressing opinions, rather
than professional oversight specialists actually conducting in-depth
management reviews. If the candidates lack even this advisory background,
they simply but very loosely assert that they are "administration and
management" people, by virtue of their many years of service spent within
their national diplomatic corps or foreign ministry. Maurice Bertrand, who actually was the only fully
professional and effective member of the JIU during its long history,
observed in a broader context the pervasiveness of this "diplo/manager"
mind set at the UN: "A distinguished professor of international law once
deplored the fact that 'the League of Nations has been abandoned to the
diplomats', but the UN Secretariat is much more dependent on the national
diplomatic bureaucracies. They derive invaluable flexibility and
power from having additional posts as their disposal
to confer favors but also to displace unwanted staff.
the incentives are all the greater because many UN posts, especially the
senior ones, are much sought after because of the [high] scales of pay
and the prestige they carry. A diplomatic ideology
has even developed at the UN, [that] there is no higher dignity than that
of Ambassador, holders of this title being by definition capable of taking
up any high-ranking post, even in a technical field. This naturally
generates a bias in favor of 'generalists' at the expense of other
professionals." Maurice Bertrand, "The recruitment policy of United Nations staff", in Chris de Cooker, ed., International Administration: Law and Management Practice in International Organisations, UNITAR, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, the Netherlands, 1989, II.2/1-9, pp. II/2 and /3. [Note: Mr. Bertrand
served as a JIU Inspector from 1968-1985.] In fact, of the some 60 JIU Inspectors since 1978, it
appears that only two, both from France, and especially Mr. Bertrand, who
did much influential work on UN personnel, programming, and reform matters
as cited in preceding sections, were fully-qualified professionals "from
national supervision or inspection bodies" as the JIU Statute
specifies. The majority of Inspectors have produced little during
their five- or ten-year stays, arriving in the Unit near retirement age,
and viewing the JIU as a handsome financial preparation for their "golden
years", a VIP post to enjoy, and a "reward" for long years of work in
their national diplomatic service. The JIU Inspectors are not UN staff members (and thus
not subject to its rules and code of conduct), but serve at the UN senior
Director level.
They earn some $200,000 in salary and allowances per year
(specifics vary according to currency and cost-of-living fluctuations) --
thus amounting to some $2 million each, in total, for their usual ten-year
tour, plus a handsome pension, excellent medical coverage, a large travel
allowance, other allowances, home leave travel every two years, and
residence in Geneva. Inspector posts are therefore avidly sought. However,
the JIU is undoubtedly the
highest-paid and most expensive unit in the entire UN system on a
per-capita basis. Criticisms of JIU performance have been made time and
time again by expert observers, the organizations who pay for the JIU, and
the General Assembly itself for more than a quarter of a century. The JIU
Inspectors basically operate as an eleven-member "Board of Directors,"
rather ludicrously supervising the work of half-a-dozen professional staff. In 1977
Yves Beigbeder provided the first of his three assessments of JIU
operational progress and value. He noted that: "[In choosing Inspectors, the selection] criteria have
seldom been met.
In 1968, 3 of the inspectors were former diplomats, and the other
five former national civil servants. Only the French inspector belonged to a
"national supervision or inspection body." In 1978, there were eight diplomats, two
education specialists, and the same French Inspector.
if this situation is allowed to continue, the Unit will lose the character
of a body of trained and experienced specialists in management, public
administration and finances.
The Unit published 74 reports between 1968 and 1972.
It can take up to three years for a [JIU] recommendation to be approved by
the governing body and another two years before it is implemented.
The full impact of the Unit cannot be assessed until
a systematic evaluation process is implemented. The [JIU] is a unique control instrument in the U.N.
system.
Neither the dissatisfaction of most Secretariats about the Unit nor the
general support
of most member States is based on a cost/benefit analysis. Most
Secretariats resent the interference and the increasing demands of the
Unit
" "The Joint Inspection
Unit of the United Nations: The first ten years (1968-1978)," International Journal of Government Auditing, July 1979, pp. 11-14, 20. [Note: see also his
further assessments of 1987 and 1997 below.]
The US GAO issued its second report to the U.S.
Congress on strengthening UN audits and evaluations in 1979. Again it
stressed that an independent unit for UN-wide review and evaluation, of
appropriate size and competence, should be established. It noted the
JIU's new permanent status achieved in 1978, but concluded that the JIU's
limited staff could not provide the capability needed, and that the UN
system organizations overall had not progressed far with their own
internal evaluation work. US General Accounting
Office, "Improving financial management in the United Nations by
strengthening audits and evaluations," ID-79-56 of September 24 1979. However, in 1979 a momentous change in UN system
oversight happened -- almost. Canada, then a member of the UN Board of
Auditors, made sweeping proposals to modernize UN audit functions,
including establishment of an Auditor General, enhanced audit scope, a
systems-based audit approach with highly professional staffing, and making
the UN Board of Auditors an audit committee on behalf of the General
Assembly, which would also "coordinate" its work with the work of the
JIU. "Note verbale dated
14 September from
Canada to the United
Nations
Secretary-General," UN document A/C.5/34/L.3 of 17 September 1979. In a UN system only beginning to establish modern
oversight methods, this reasonable proposal for UN accountability sent
shock waves far and wide, and in 1981 it was squelched in favor of the status quo. In 1981 the Secretary-General, the Board
of Auditors (Canada had finished its term on the Board), and the JIU all
expressed their firm (and vested interest) belief that gradual changes to
the status quo would be a far better
solution.
Twenty-five years later, the UN General Assembly still does not
have the fundamental mechanisms of an Auditor General and an audit
committee to guide, utilize, and encourage UN system oversight work. "Organization and
professional practices of the Board of Auditors: Report of the
Secretary-General," UN document A/35/175 and /176 of 19 June and 21 September 1981.
Meanwhile, not all UN system organizations had
accepted the JIU Statute and participation in paying for its work. An assessment
provided for the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) stated in
1981 that: "
[the JIU emphasizes] the independence of individual
Inspectors and [does not have] an agreed basic philosophy of inspection.
It is difficult to assess the results achieved by the
Unit [since]
neither the Unit nor the participating organizations seem to have kept a
record of the Unit's recommendations or of action taken thereon.
it is not evident that [after twelve years]
the Unit, with its present functions
and method of operation, is of any real value to organizations whose tasks
are highly specialized and clearly defined
and subject to close supervision by their governing organs
the contribution that WIPO would have to pay, and the staff time that WIPO
would have to devote to the Unit's activities
would be justified only if WIPO could expect real and substantial benefits
Since this does not appear to be the case, it would
appear to be preferable for WIPO to remain one of the seven organizations
which are not formally associated with the Unit." "The Joint Inspection
Unit: Memorandum prepard , at the request of the Director General, by
Harry Wilmot," WIPO Governing Body document AB/XII/2, Annex M, 1981, paras. 21, 19, 42 and 46. [Note: Mr. Wilmot was
extremely familiar with the JIU, having served as the Executive Secretary
in charge of the JIU Secretariat in the 1970s] Two basic, and very troubling, flaws of actual JIU
work processes also came into public view. In testimony before the Fifth Committee
of the General Assembly in 1981, the Chairman of the JIU stated that the
JIU had sought an upgrading of its professional staff posts because of the
very complex work to be done, and that: "The tasks of JIU staff were those of Research
Officers.
In addition to possessing extensive knowledge and abilities in
various different fields
the Officers [were]
backed up by the Inspectors in their work and drafted studies themselves, giving their own views on
the most important aspects of administrative and financial
issues. What was more, the Unit comprised only a very limited
number of Inspectors. Not having a great deal of time to work
with, they had to be able to
rely on a highly capable and competent staff which could cope
unfailingly with its heavy responsibilities." "Summary record,
Fifth Committee," UN document A/C.5/36/SR.24, 1981, paras. 16-17. [emphasis
added] [Note: The answer to
"who does the work?" in the JIU has not changed ever since, as shown by
recent JIU budget documentation discussed later in this JIU
subsection]
Second, in 1985 a Swedish Employers' spokesman at the
International Labour Organization's Governing Body stated that: "
[concerning the JIU report on ILO] recruitment policy
he
wished to make a statement to be
recorded fully in the minutes
the report was incomplete
the only consultation with the [International Labour] Office had been of
the most perfunctory kind, and in consequence there many errors of fact in
the report.
The description of the situation within the Office was biased, to
put it mildly.
What was more serious was that
the Inspectors exceeded their authority. It was not for them to question the
rules and policies officially adopted
by the ILO
but only to see whether these rules were being efficiently and
economically implemented
Unfortunately [this report was]
not an isolated incident. Earlier in the year
another [JIU] report
dealt with the ILO's major programme on
social security.
The author of that
report -- it was only one person outside the Unit -- had
recommended that more resources be allocated to [that programme.]
the JIU was out of order in this case too and the precedent set of the
Unit questioning budgets and budget priorities was a very dangerous
one. Only two of the 11 Inspectors had
experience of the kind required by the statute
and one had [some] previous experience. Otherwise all
of them were exactly the kind of persons one met in United Nations
delegations.
The Unit's composition was decided by governments.
Their average age was 56; only one was under 50. The ILO had received little if any return on all the
money it had spent on this Unit. An overhaul of the JIU and its present
procedures was obviously needed if similar occurrences were to be avoided
in future.
Unless there was such a review
the Employers thought that ILO acceptance of the JIU statute should be
withdrawn.
" "Minutes of the 228th
Session," ILO document GB 228/PV, November 1984, pp.
XI/3 - XI/6.
[emphasis added] The JIU had also become the butt of public jokes. At an FAO
Conference in 1985, the Deputy Director-General, in a farewell speech,
told the following story: "
I am well aware, as Shakespeare said, in effect, that
if everybody got what they deserve no one would escape being whipped. Which brings
me to my final FAO Conference story. I
was once on a mission on a boat -- you will not find it in the official
records -- together with high officials of the other organizations of the
UN system
The boat was captured by pirates. Despite our claims to diplomatic
immunity, they announced that they were going to whip us and then throw us
into the shark-infested sea, but they said that out of respect for our age
and rank we could, before being whipped, have one thing of our own choice
put on our backs to mitigate the pain. The man from the [WHO] asked for some
medicinal oil
The man from the WFP [World Food
Programme] asked for some reconstituted butter
The man from the United Nations proposed
to have all the General Assembly resolutions on coordination
The man from the UNDP asked for
the latest catalogue of
projects.
The UNESCO man asked to be wrapped in a copy of the Washington Post. The JIU Inspector, who happened to be
with us on the same boat, protested, however, that he was different from
the rest of us, and in fact had a license of his own to whip us! The pirates,
however, were not impressed.
so the JIU inspector then shouted out that he was independent of everyone
and would not feel any pain whatever anyone did. Quickly I
said, 'Him.' 'What do you mean, him?' said the
chief pirate. 'Him, the JIU inspector' -- who
was still shouting 'You can't touch me, you can't hurt me.' 'It's him I
want on my back,' I said. Laughter Since you laughed,
the story is not quite finished. We were then thrown to the sharks. Afterwards,
the JIU inspector's colleagues, who had admired his holy and chaste life,
prayed to have a vision of him wherever he was now. They were
granted their wish. They were amazed to see him sitting in
an armchair caressing a beautiful blond lady from the FAO Secretariat who
was sitting in his lap. They expressed their shock and
disapproval of such behaviour by a JIU inspector, but he protested, 'No,
no, you don't understand. She is not my reward. I am her
punishment!' I have been your
punishment long enough and it is time for me to go." [Minutes, First
Draft],
FAO Conference, Twenty-Third Session, Plenary, 19th meeting, FAO
document C 85/PV/19 of 25 November 1985. In June 1986 the US GAO issued a third report, which
was the most in-depth assessment ever made of the JIU. It concluded
that: "
While some of its reports have been useful, the
Unit's credibility has been harmed by uneven report quality.
JIU does not
systematically follow up on its report recommendations
the
responsibility of [the] agencies for addressing JIU reports is unclear and
fragmented.
Consequently, the agencies have tended to set aside reports without
taking specific action.
From analyzing 25 reports issued
during 1983 and 1984, GAO concluded that 19, or 76 percent, did not fully
satisfy standards that [the Department of] State has identified as
necessary for quality assurance.
[Member States] have regarded inspectors'
qualifications as an important factor influencing the quality of the
Unit's work.
However, appointed inspectors continue to lack experience in the
inspection and evaluation fields.
U.N. system officials cite inadequately supported and
vague recommendations as reasons that many are not implemented. A follow-up review of 6 of the
25 reports mentioned above showed that only one of 51 recommendations
had been implemented. JIU and US officials contend that well-researched
reports containing sound recommendations have been set aside without
substantive action. GAO found this as well as long delays in
responding.
Since 1980 the Unit
has not conducted any evaluations, i.e. studies designed to determine the
relevance, effectiveness, and impact of activities in light of their
objectives. GAO recommends that the Secretary of State
instruct U.S. representatives to engender support to
require JIU to provide the
General Assembly with a multi-year work programme
develop and implement comprehensive written guidelines
for conducting inspections and evaluations and drafting reports,
establish a formal recommendation follow-up system and
expand JIU's annual report to include sections on
accomplishments
United States General
Accounting Office, More can be done to strengthen
the U.N. Joint Inspection Unit, GAO/NSIAD-86-141 of June 1986, "Executive Summary."
[emphasis added.] The "Group of 18" high-level experts cited the
importance of monitoring, evaluation and inspection in their 1986
report.
They noted that the work performed by the JIU and some of the
reports should be improved upon, and urged Member States to select as
inspectors people qualified in personnel management, public
administration, inspection and evaluation. The group specifically
recommended that JIU do more evaluation work and be renamed "The Joint
Inspection and Evaluation Unit" and its statute revised accordingly. United Nations, Report of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental
Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial
Functioning of the United Nations, A/41/49, 1986, pp. 24-25, and Recommendation 63. [Note: the
recommendation failed, reportedly due to a stubborn South American
delegate who insisted instead that the Unit should simply be
abolished.] An article by Ghιbali in 1986 explored how the JIU, an
instrument so rich in potential, had become so dulled after two decades.
He emphasized in particular the "diplomatisation" of its membership, its
sparse evaluation efforts, and the weak follow-up of JIU recommendations,
which made the JIU an organization searching for its "second wind." He
concluded with the hope that the decline of its effectiveness and
credibility would not be irreversible. Victor-Yves Ghιbali,
"L'evolution du corps commun d'inspection des nations unies," Annuaire francais de droit international, XXII, 1986, pp. 439-453.
In 1987 Yves Beigbeder made his second assessment of
JIU performance. He observed that, a decade later, the UN system
specialized agencies still had doubts about JIU usefulness. While the
organizations probably felt that the JIU was not needed, most member
states supported it, but with criticisms and suggestions for improvement.
In particular, JIU reports had uneven relevance and quality, and were
prepared by individual inspectors with uneven qualifications. There were
also problems in implementing JIU recommendations. He concluded
that: "Consideration should also be given to joining
external auditors and inspectors into one expanded panel
This would require that all inspectors possessed the
same high level of professional expertise (in management) as external
auditors (in auditing.)
The UN organizations need the services of a competent,
influential, and credible JIU. To this end, JIU should become what it
was meant to be: a high quality body of independent management
experts." Yves
Beigbeder, Management problems in United
Nations organizations: Reform or decline?, Chapter 6 , "Management
review: the Inspectors," Frances Pinter, London, 1987, pp. 65-78. The General Assembly, although supporting the JIU
concept,
was very much a part of this pressure process during the 1980s and
early 1990s.
It urged, variously: ? improvement in report quality and effectiveness; ? a more collective approach by the Inspectors; ? making the reports more timely; ? reporting annually on the implementation of the JIU's
recommendations; ? putting less narrative and more analysis into the
reports; ? doing more evaluation work and providing evaluation
advice; and ? giving greater attention to priority issues of
governing bodies and to management, budgetary and administrative
questions.
"Joint Inspection
Unit," General Assembly resolutions, inter
alia, 39/242 of 18 December 1984, 40/259 of
18 December 1985, 42/218 of 21 December 1987, 43/221 of 21 December 1988, 44/184 of 19 December 1989, 47/201 of 22 December 1992, and 48/221 of 23 December 1993. These were important and valid points. However, it
was ludicrous to hear the General Assembly earnestly lecturing Member
States (i. e., themselves) to no avail, as in 1988, that it: "Underlines the importance of applying the highest
standards in selecting candidates for appointment as inspectors
[as required by the JIU statute] and of giving
special emphasis to experience in national or international financial
matters, including management questions, and, where possible, knowledge of
the United Nations or other international organizations; Also underlines, in this respect, the importance of
the consultations process for reviewing the qualifications of the proposed
candidates [in accordance with the JIU statute.]" "Joint Inspection
Unit," General Assembly resolution 43/221 of 121 December 1988 , paras. 13-14. [Note: Even the
General Assembly had apparently given up any hope of achieving the first
and foremost qualification clearly expressed in the JIU Statute, since it
did not even bother to cite Article 2, "members of national supervision or
inspection bodies."] A 1987 JIU "evaluation" of its work,
required by the Gneral Assembly (eight pages in its annual report) was
extremely superficial. The Unit asserted that it had made "internal
studies" since 1982 of "immense value," but the report did not discuss
them further.
JIU's "impressive array" of subjects yielded reports that were
difficult to assess with any confidence. The Unit had learned, however, that a
good report may not be enough. Nevertheless, organizations could help
by suggesting more topics. JIU reports, of course, must be clear,
objective, cogent, and precise, and must determine, analyse, and examine
situations. The JIU would nonetheless make some changes, and would "reach
out" to its collaborators to meet them halfway. "Report of the Joint
Inspection Unit," Chapter VI, "An assessment of the results of the
activities of the Joint Inspection Unit," UN document A/42/34, 1987. The General Assembly received this collection of
truisms, and further pressed the Unit to report the guidelines for its
work, as specifically required by its Statute, which the JIU did, very
cryptically, in 1988. The Assembly also urged the Unit to greatly improve
its individual reports and to follow up systematically on actions taken on
its recommendations. The Unit attempted follow-up assessments for several
years, but with diminishing enthusiasm, and in the mid-1990s it simply
announced that it would end such reporting. It now produces perhaps the most
non-transparent and uninformative annual reports to be found in any public
organization anywhere in the world (as discussed further in the subsection
which follows. "Report of the Joint
Inspection Unit," Annex, "Guidelines of the Joint Inspection Unit," UN
document A/43/34, 1988. The annoyance of the UN system organizations with the
JIU was also increasing. A budgetary committee of the UN system's
Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC, now the Chief Executive's
Board) met in 1988 to discuss severe budget cuts and austerity measures
required in the organizations. Although the JIU objected, they felt
that jointly-financed units, too, should make reductions. The CCAQ
proposed (unsuccessfully) that the JIU staff be reduced by four
professionals, and that: "
ACC invite the General Assembly to re-examine the
number of Inspectors serving at any time, with a view to progressively
reducing their number from the maximum of 11 now permitted under the
Statute to eight, as provided for at the time of the Unit's
inception.
Concurrently, the supporting staff could be further
reduced." "Report of the
sixty-ninth session of the Consultative Committee of on Administrative
Questions (Financial and Budgetary Questions)," document ACC/1988/13 of 28 September 1988, paras. 6-14. Klaus Hόfner commented in 1990 that the Group of 18
and US GAO reports definitely showed that the JIU could be strengthened,
and that a "de-diplomatisation" was required as well, as proposed by
Ghιbali.
He also criticized the very inadequate and extremely defensive
self-evaluation made by the JIU in 1987 (see above), which made clear that
the external criticisms of the JIU were justified. Klaus Hufner, "JIU -
Joint Inspection Unit" in Handbuch Vereinte
Nationen, Rόdiger Wolfrum, C.H. Beck, Mόnchen, 1991, pp. 393-399. Another European analysis in 1991 identified some very
important questions posed by the JIU inadequacies: "
The JIU has produced 274 reports and notes
Nevertheless,
[its] work has been repeatedly criticized. In some [reports, problems include] lack
of clarity
of analyses and recommendations which are often superficial
[which] further affects the Unit's credibility as a research body
producing efficient and solid work. The paradox of the JIU is that while it was originally
created to improve
financial matters
a number of additional problems were engendered by it.
from an administrative and managerial point of view, [its recommendations]
are frequently not implemented or deferred. In addition,
report follow-ups are not systematic. Pιricles Gasparini
Alves, "United Nations Joint Inspection Unit: A critical analysis,"
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 6 May 1991. The General Assembly requested the ACABQ to examine
JIU functioning and make recommendations for improving its productivity
and performance in 1992. The brief ACABQ report criticized JIU
reports as research rather than action-oriented documents. It noted
criticisms of limited JIU value from many UN system agencies, and
suggested that JIU should provide more relevant reports and management
analysis.
It also stated that JIU performance should be carefully followed to
determine progress, before providing the additional staff resources that
JIU sought. It cited in particular the significant criticism by several
participating organizations that: "
in many instances either the recommendations
contained
in the JIU reports were too general or their implementation would
entail financial resources not available. Thus even when a recommendation was
[accepted], implementation is either difficult to
measure in specific terms, or not always possible due to financial
constraints." "Joint Inspection Unit: Report of the
Advisory Committee on Administratrive and Budgetary Questions," UN document
A/47/755 of 7 December 1992.
The ACABQ also requested data from the JIU on the
implementation rate of its recommendations. The Unit informed the Committee that,
since inception, it had produced some 275 reports and notes with a total
of some 1,400 recommendations. The Unit stated that it could not
determine the extent to which all these recommendations had been
implemented.
But
in a feeble attempt, the Unit provided the ACABQ with: "
JIU Report Implementation Sheets in respect of nine
JIU reports.
In three cases, the Unit noted that some implementation (less than
50 per cent) had taken place; in two instances, the category "other" (e.
g. hard to tell)" was checked. In three cases the major recommendations
had been approved by the intergovernmental bodies but no implementation
had occurred yet. In one case more than 50 per cent of the
recommendations contained in the report had been implemented." "Joint Inspection Unit: Report of the
Advisory Committee on Administratrive and Budgetary Questions," UN document
A/47/755 of 7 December 1992. | |||
