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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments |
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The Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) was
created following the recommendations of a high-level UN management
reform
committee in 1968 as: "
a small inspection unit, consisting of a limited
number of specialists highly qualified in financial and administrative
matters.
These officials would visit the different services of the United
Nations organizations
to examine the way in which they operate and to propose any reforms they
deem necessary." "Second report of the
Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to examine the
finances of the United Nations and the specialized agencies," UN document
A/6343 of 19 July 1966, paras. 60-67. The eight Inspectors, functioning at first on an
experimental basis renewed at two-year intervals by the General Assembly,
began preparing reports. However, in 1973 the US Congress, which has
played a significant role in scrutinizing the JIU over the years,
specifically
sought an independent review and evaluation group for the UN
system, without success, under its Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. A 1974
review by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that: " [existing
oversight] groups do not seem particularly well suited to providing
[Member States] the information needed. Only the JIU seems to possess a broad
enough mandate to meet this need. [The Department of] State, however, in choosing to
promote the Unit rather than establishing a new body
has not been able to reform and strengthen it. The Unit's
independence can still be questioned
Moreover, inspectors are not bound by any central guidance within their
own group.
This, coupled with the Unit's small size and lack of professional
diversification, renders it incapable of adequately covering the range of
programs and activities which should be continuously reviewed and reported
on." "Numerous
improvements still needed in managing U.S. participation in international
organizations," US General Accounting Office, B - 168767 of July 18, 1974. UN system agencies agreed to convert the JIU to
permanent status beginning in 1978. But they expressed concern with the
very uneven quality of JIU reports and a lack of impact. It was agreed
that the JIU should have significant additional professional and clerical
staff in order to perform in-depth evaluation work, but alert diplomats in
New York engineered a last-minute substitution of three more Inspectors
instead. This greatly hindered any serious JIU evaluation work, but
certainly expanded the attractiveness of the JIU for job-seeking
diplomats. "Continuation of the
[JIU] and proposed terms of reference: Report of the Secretary-General:
Addendum," UN document A/31/75/Add. 1 of 21 April
1976, and
"Possible changes in
the mandate of the Joint Inspection Unit which would enable it to asist in
carrying out external evaluation: Report of the Secretary-General, UN
document A/C.5/31/21 of 1 October 1976. The official JIU Statute of 1978 at least laid down
some specific guidance for the eleven Inspectors, who are assisted by an
"Executive Secretary" and a small Secretariat, with half-a-dozen-plus
professional and half-a-dozen-plus clerical staff. The Unit is based in
Geneva, to be closer to the UN system specialized agencies in Europe. The
UN Secretariat provides administrative support to the JIU, on behalf of
all system agencies who "participate in" [i.e. pay for] the JIU. The JIU
Statute provides that the Inspectors:
shall have the broadest powers of investigation
shall provide an independent view through inspection and evaluation
shall satisfy [themselves] that the [UN system
activities]
are carried out in the most economical manner and that optimum use is made
of resources available
may propose reforms or make recommendations .. [but]
shall not have the power of decision
Acting singly or in small groups,
shall make on-the-spot inquiries and
investigations
shall discharge their duties in full independence and in the sole interest
of the organizations.
shall determine standards and procedures for
[their work];
shall draw up, over their own signature, reports for which they are
responsible
[stating] their findings and propos[ing] solutions to problems
to submit to the [governing bodies of the]
organizations concerned." "Joint Inspection
Unit Statute", United Nations, Geneva, 1978,
Articles
5-8, 11, 16-20. Since 1978, public sector oversight work has become
much more professional, both worldwide and in the UN system, emphasizing
management audits, internal evaluation systems, and, as part of
increasing inspector general functions worldwide, expert investigations
of fraud, waste, and abuse. The JIU, however, never established a clear
professional role for itself, resisting the above disciplines and instead
carrying out a mishmash of "inquiries" which are often mere "mission
reports," with some desk work added. Further, the JIU has, over the past
decade, averaged only about eight brief reports each year (i.e., not even
one report for each of the eleven Inspectors). The JIU
reports usually have limited relevance and validity, use poor
methodologies, and therefore have little impact, as discussed in the
following analysis. Thus, the JIU does not exercise
effective oversight, and in fact detracts from an accountable and
effective UN (and UN system) by blocking the establishment of a truly
dynamic, credible, and professional system-wide oversight unit. The JIU's "Achilles heel" is the process for
appointing its Inspectors. The JIU Statute specifies that the Inspectors,
all of whom must be from different countries: "
shall be chosen from among members of national
supervision or inspection bodies, or from among persons of a similar
competence on the basis of their special experience in national
administrative and financial matters, including management questions
[and] shall serve in their personal capacity." "Joint Inspection
Unit Statute", United Nations, Geneva, 1978,
Article 2. [Note: almost all the
JIU Inspectors have come from the extremely vague "similar competence"
category, with "special experience" being their years of UN mission or
other diplomatic service.] The Statute also specifies that Member States
[actually the various "regional groups"] shall select countries to propose
candidates. This is actually a long-established process of dividing up
general UN advisory or other "posts" among the Member States in the
regional groups. A cursory review by senior UN officials follows before
the new candidates' names are submitted to the General Assembly for
appointment. The process is very non-transparent, and provides little if
any careful scrutiny of nominees' expertise, related achievements, and
professional fitness for the posts. Unfortunately, the selection of JIU Inspectors has
been almost entirely "diplomatized." The selection criteria quoted above
provide giant loopholes. Many Inspectors have cast themselves as "experts"
because they served on UN advisory bodies like the ACABQ or the CPC. But in those
bodies they are merely part of a large group expressing opinions, rather
than professional oversight specialists actually conducting in-depth
management reviews. If the candidates lack even this advisory background,
they simply but very loosely assert that they are "administration and
management" people, by virtue of their many years of service spent within
their national diplomatic corps or foreign ministry. Maurice Bertrand, who actually was the only fully
professional and effective member of the JIU during its long history,
observed in a broader context the pervasiveness of this "diplo/manager"
mind set at the UN: "A distinguished professor of international law once
deplored the fact that 'the League of Nations has been abandoned to the
diplomats', but the UN Secretariat is much more dependent on the national
diplomatic bureaucracies. They derive invaluable flexibility and
power from having additional posts as their disposal
to confer favors but also to displace unwanted staff.
the incentives are all the greater because many UN posts, especially the
senior ones, are much sought after because of the [high] scales of pay
and the prestige they carry. A diplomatic ideology
has even developed at the UN, [that] there is no higher dignity than that
of Ambassador, holders of this title being by definition capable of taking
up any high-ranking post, even in a technical field. This naturally
generates a bias in favor of 'generalists' at the expense of other
professionals." Maurice Bertrand, "The recruitment policy of United Nations staff", in Chris de Cooker, ed., International Administration: Law and Management Practice in International Organisations, UNITAR, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, the Netherlands, 1989, II.2/1-9, pp. II/2 and /3. [Note: Mr. Bertrand
served as a JIU Inspector from 1968-1985.] In fact, of the some 60 JIU Inspectors since 1978, it
appears that only two, both from France, and especially Mr. Bertrand, who
did much influential work on UN personnel, programming, and reform matters
as cited in preceding sections, were fully-qualified professionals "from
national supervision or inspection bodies" as the JIU Statute
specifies. The majority of Inspectors have produced little during
their five- or ten-year stays, arriving in the Unit near retirement age,
and viewing the JIU as a handsome financial preparation for their "golden
years", a VIP post to enjoy, and a "reward" for long years of work in
their national diplomatic service. The JIU Inspectors are not UN staff members (and thus
not subject to its rules and code of conduct), but serve at the UN senior
Director level.
They earn some $200,000 in salary and allowances per year
(specifics vary according to currency and cost-of-living fluctuations) --
thus amounting to some $2 million each, in total, for their usual ten-year
tour, plus a handsome pension, excellent medical coverage, a large travel
allowance, other allowances, home leave travel every two years, and
residence in Geneva. Inspector posts are therefore avidly sought. However,
the JIU is undoubtedly the
highest-paid and most expensive unit in the entire UN system on a
per-capita basis. Criticisms of JIU performance have been made time and
time again by expert observers, the organizations who pay for the JIU, and
the General Assembly itself for more than a quarter of a century. The JIU
Inspectors basically operate as an eleven-member "Board of Directors,"
rather ludicrously supervising the work of half-a-dozen professional staff. In 1977
Yves Beigbeder provided the first of his three assessments of JIU
operational progress and value. He noted that: "[In choosing Inspectors, the selection] criteria have
seldom been met.
In 1968, 3 of the inspectors were former diplomats, and the other
five former national civil servants. Only the French inspector belonged to a
"national supervision or inspection body." In 1978, there were eight diplomats, two
education specialists, and the same French Inspector.
if this situation is allowed to continue, the Unit will lose the character
of a body of trained and experienced specialists in management, public
administration and finances.
The Unit published 74 reports between 1968 and 1972.
It can take up to three years for a [JIU] recommendation to be approved by
the governing body and another two years before it is implemented.
The full impact of the Unit cannot be assessed until
a systematic evaluation process is implemented. The [JIU] is a unique control instrument in the U.N.
system.
Neither the dissatisfaction of most Secretariats about the Unit nor the
general support
of most member States is based on a cost/benefit analysis. Most
Secretariats resent the interference and the increasing demands of the
Unit
" "The Joint Inspection
Unit of the United Nations: The first ten years (1968-1978)," International Journal of Government Auditing, July 1979, pp. 11-14, 20. [Note: see also his
further assessments of 1987 and 1997 below.]
The US GAO issued its second report to the U.S.
Congress on strengthening UN audits and evaluations in 1979. Again it
stressed that an independent unit for UN-wide review and evaluation, of
appropriate size and competence, should be established. It noted the
JIU's new permanent status achieved in 1978, but concluded that the JIU's
limited staff could not provide the capability needed, and that the UN
system organizations overall had not progressed far with their own
internal evaluation work. US General Accounting
Office, "Improving financial management in the United Nations by
strengthening audits and evaluations," ID-79-56 of September 24 1979. However, in 1979 a momentous change in UN system
oversight happened -- almost. Canada, then a member of the UN Board of
Auditors, made sweeping proposals to modernize UN audit functions,
including establishment of an Auditor General, enhanced audit scope, a
systems-based audit approach with highly professional staffing, and making
the UN Board of Auditors an audit committee on behalf of the General
Assembly, which would also "coordinate" its work with the work of the
JIU. "Note verbale dated
14 September from
Canada to the United
Nations
Secretary-General," UN document A/C.5/34/L.3 of 17 September 1979. In a UN system only beginning to establish modern
oversight methods, this reasonable proposal for UN accountability sent
shock waves far and wide, and in 1981 it was squelched in favor of the status quo. In 1981 the Secretary-General, the Board
of Auditors (Canada had finished its term on the Board), and the JIU all
expressed their firm (and vested interest) belief that gradual changes to
the status quo would be a far better
solution.
Twenty-five years later, the UN General Assembly still does not
have the fundamental mechanisms of an Auditor General and an audit
committee to guide, utilize, and encourage UN system oversight work. "Organization and
professional practices of the Board of Auditors: Report of the
Secretary-General," UN document A/35/175 and /176 of 19 June and 21 September 1981.
Meanwhile, not all UN system organizations had
accepted the JIU Statute and participation in paying for its work. An assessment
provided for the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) stated in
1981 that: "
[the JIU emphasizes] the independence of individual
Inspectors and [does not have] an agreed basic philosophy of inspection.
It is difficult to assess the results achieved by the
Unit [since]
neither the Unit nor the participating organizations seem to have kept a
record of the Unit's recommendations or of action taken thereon.
it is not evident that [after twelve years]
the Unit, with its present functions
and method of operation, is of any real value to organizations whose tasks
are highly specialized and clearly defined
and subject to close supervision by their governing organs
the contribution that WIPO would have to pay, and the staff time that WIPO
would have to devote to the Unit's activities
would be justified only if WIPO could expect real and substantial benefits
Since this does not appear to be the case, it would
appear to be preferable for WIPO to remain one of the seven organizations
which are not formally associated with the Unit." "The Joint Inspection
Unit: Memorandum prepard , at the request of the Director General, by
Harry Wilmot," WIPO Governing Body document AB/XII/2, Annex M, 1981, paras. 21, 19, 42 and 46. [Note: Mr. Wilmot was
extremely familiar with the JIU, having served as the Executive Secretary
in charge of the JIU Secretariat in the 1970s] Two basic, and very troubling, flaws of actual JIU
work processes also came into public view. In testimony before the Fifth Committee
of the General Assembly in 1981, the Chairman of the JIU stated that the
JIU had sought an upgrading of its professional staff posts because of the
very complex work to be done, and that: "The tasks of JIU staff were those of Research
Officers.
In addition to possessing extensive knowledge and abilities in
various different fields
the Officers [were]
backed up by the Inspectors in their work and drafted studies themselves, giving their own views on
the most important aspects of administrative and financial
issues. What was more, the Unit comprised only a very limited
number of Inspectors. Not having a great deal of time to work
with, they had to be able to
rely on a highly capable and competent staff which could cope
unfailingly with its heavy responsibilities." "Summary record,
Fifth Committee," UN document A/C.5/36/SR.24, 1981, paras. 16-17. [emphasis
added] [Note: The answer to
"who does the work?" in the JIU has not changed ever since, as shown by
recent JIU budget documentation discussed later in this JIU
subsection]
Second, in 1985 a Swedish Employers' spokesman at the
International Labour Organization's Governing Body stated that: "
[concerning the JIU report on ILO] recruitment policy
he
wished to make a statement to be
recorded fully in the minutes
the report was incomplete
the only consultation with the [International Labour] Office had been of
the most perfunctory kind, and in consequence there many errors of fact in
the report.
The description of the situation within the Office was biased, to
put it mildly.
What was more serious was that
the Inspectors exceeded their authority. It was not for them to question the
rules and policies officially adopted
by the ILO
but only to see whether these rules were being efficiently and
economically implemented
Unfortunately [this report was]
not an isolated incident. Earlier in the year
another [JIU] report
dealt with the ILO's major programme on
social security.
The author of that
report -- it was only one person outside the Unit -- had
recommended that more resources be allocated to [that programme.]
the JIU was out of order in this case too and the precedent set of the
Unit questioning budgets and budget priorities was a very dangerous
one. Only two of the 11 Inspectors had
experience of the kind required by the statute
and one had [some] previous experience. Otherwise all
of them were exactly the kind of persons one met in United Nations
delegations.
The Unit's composition was decided by governments.
Their average age was 56; only one was under 50. The ILO had received little if any return on all the
money it had spent on this Unit. An overhaul of the JIU and its present
procedures was obviously needed if similar occurrences were to be avoided
in future.
Unless there was such a review
the Employers thought that ILO acceptance of the JIU statute should be
withdrawn.
" "Minutes of the 228th
Session," ILO document GB 228/PV, November 1984, pp.
XI/3 - XI/6.
[emphasis added] The JIU had also become the butt of public jokes. At an FAO
Conference in 1985, the Deputy Director-General, in a farewell speech,
told the following story: "
I am well aware, as Shakespeare said, in effect, that
if everybody got what they deserve no one would escape being whipped. Which brings
me to my final FAO Conference story. I
was once on a mission on a boat -- you will not find it in the official
records -- together with high officials of the other organizations of the
UN system
The boat was captured by pirates. Despite our claims to diplomatic
immunity, they announced that they were going to whip us and then throw us
into the shark-infested sea, but they said that out of respect for our age
and rank we could, before being whipped, have one thing of our own choice
put on our backs to mitigate the pain. The man from the [WHO] asked for some
medicinal oil
The man from the WFP [World Food
Programme] asked for some reconstituted butter
The man from the United Nations proposed
to have all the General Assembly resolutions on coordination
The man from the UNDP asked for
the latest catalogue of
projects.
The UNESCO man asked to be wrapped in a copy of the Washington Post. The JIU Inspector, who happened to be
with us on the same boat, protested, however, that he was different from
the rest of us, and in fact had a license of his own to whip us! The pirates,
however, were not impressed.
so the JIU inspector then shouted out that he was independent of everyone
and would not feel any pain whatever anyone did. Quickly I
said, 'Him.' 'What do you mean, him?' said the
chief pirate. 'Him, the JIU inspector' -- who
was still shouting 'You can't touch me, you can't hurt me.' 'It's him I
want on my back,' I said. Laughter Since you laughed,
the story is not quite finished. We were then thrown to the sharks. Afterwards,
the JIU inspector's colleagues, who had admired his holy and chaste life,
prayed to have a vision of him wherever he was now. They were
granted their wish. They were amazed to see him sitting in
an armchair caressing a beautiful blond lady from the FAO Secretariat who
was sitting in his lap. They expressed their shock and
disapproval of such behaviour by a JIU inspector, but he protested, 'No,
no, you don't understand. She is not my reward. I am her
punishment!' I have been your
punishment long enough and it is time for me to go." [Minutes, First
Draft],
FAO Conference, Twenty-Third Session, Plenary, 19th meeting, FAO
document C 85/PV/19 of 25 November 1985. In June 1986 the US GAO issued a third report, which
was the most in-depth assessment ever made of the JIU. It concluded
that: "
While some of its reports have been useful, the
Unit's credibility has been harmed by uneven report quality.
JIU does not
systematically follow up on its report recommendations
the
responsibility of [the] agencies for addressing JIU reports is unclear and
fragmented.
Consequently, the agencies have tended to set aside reports without
taking specific action.
From analyzing 25 reports issued
during 1983 and 1984, GAO concluded that 19, or 76 percent, did not fully
satisfy standards that [the Department of] State has identified as
necessary for quality assurance.
[Member States] have regarded inspectors'
qualifications as an important factor influencing the quality of the
Unit's work.
However, appointed inspectors continue to lack experience in the
inspection and evaluation fields.
U.N. system officials cite inadequately supported and
vague recommendations as reasons that many are not implemented. A follow-up review of 6 of the
25 reports mentioned above showed that only one of 51 recommendations
had been implemented. JIU and US officials contend that well-researched
reports containing sound recommendations have been set aside without
substantive action. GAO found this as well as long delays in
responding.
Since 1980 the Unit
has not conducted any evaluations, i.e. studies designed to determine the
relevance, effectiveness, and impact of activities in light of their
objectives. GAO recommends that the Secretary of State
instruct U.S. representatives to engender support to
require JIU to provide the
General Assembly with a multi-year work programme
develop and implement comprehensive written guidelines
for conducting inspections and evaluations and drafting reports,
establish a formal recommendation follow-up system and
expand JIU's annual report to include sections on
accomplishments
United States General
Accounting Office, More can be done to strengthen
the U.N. Joint Inspection Unit, GAO/NSIAD-86-141 of June 1986, "Executive Summary."
[emphasis added.] The "Group of 18" high-level experts cited the
importance of monitoring, evaluation and inspection in their 1986
report.
They noted that the work performed by the JIU and some of the
reports should be improved upon, and urged Member States to select as
inspectors people qualified in personnel management, public
administration, inspection and evaluation. The group specifically
recommended that JIU do more evaluation work and be renamed "The Joint
Inspection and Evaluation Unit" and its statute revised accordingly. United Nations, Report of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental
Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial
Functioning of the United Nations, A/41/49, 1986, pp. 24-25, and Recommendation 63. [Note: the
recommendation failed, reportedly due to a stubborn South American
delegate who insisted instead that the Unit should simply be
abolished.] An article by Ghιbali in 1986 explored how the JIU, an
instrument so rich in potential, had become so dulled after two decades.
He emphasized in particular the "diplomatisation" of its membership, its
sparse evaluation efforts, and the weak follow-up of JIU recommendations,
which made the JIU an organization searching for its "second wind." He
concluded with the hope that the decline of its effectiveness and
credibility would not be irreversible. Victor-Yves Ghιbali,
"L'evolution du corps commun d'inspection des nations unies," Annuaire francais de droit international, XXII, 1986, pp. 439-453.
In 1987 Yves Beigbeder made his second assessment of
JIU performance. He observed that, a decade later, the UN system
specialized agencies still had doubts about JIU usefulness. While the
organizations probably felt that the JIU was not needed, most member
states supported it, but with criticisms and suggestions for improvement.
In particular, JIU reports had uneven relevance and quality, and were
prepared by individual inspectors with uneven qualifications. There were
also problems in implementing JIU recommendations. He concluded
that: "Consideration should also be given to joining
external auditors and inspectors into one expanded panel
This would require that all inspectors possessed the
same high level of professional expertise (in management) as external
auditors (in auditing.)
The UN organizations need the services of a competent,
influential, and credible JIU. To this end, JIU should become what it
was meant to be: a high quality body of independent management
experts." Yves
Beigbeder, Management problems in United
Nations organizations: Reform or decline?, Chapter 6 , "Management
review: the Inspectors," Frances Pinter, London, 1987, pp. 65-78. The General Assembly, although supporting the JIU
concept,
was very much a part of this pressure process during the 1980s and
early 1990s.
It urged, variously: ? improvement in report quality and effectiveness; ? a more collective approach by the Inspectors; ? making the reports more timely; ? reporting annually on the implementation of the JIU's
recommendations; ? putting less narrative and more analysis into the
reports; ? doing more evaluation work and providing evaluation
advice; and ? giving greater attention to priority issues of
governing bodies and to management, budgetary and administrative
questions.
"Joint Inspection
Unit," General Assembly resolutions, inter
alia, 39/242 of 18 December 1984, 40/259 of
18 December 1985, 42/218 of 21 December 1987, 43/221 of 21 December 1988, 44/184 of 19 December 1989, 47/201 of 22 December 1992, and 48/221 of 23 December 1993. These were important and valid points. However, it
was ludicrous to hear the General Assembly earnestly lecturing Member
States (i. e., themselves) to no avail, as in 1988, that it: "Underlines the importance of applying the highest
standards in selecting candidates for appointment as inspectors
[as required by the JIU statute] and of giving
special emphasis to experience in national or international financial
matters, including management questions, and, where possible, knowledge of
the United Nations or other international organizations; Also underlines, in this respect, the importance of
the consultations process for reviewing the qualifications of the proposed
candidates [in accordance with the JIU statute.]" "Joint Inspection
Unit," General Assembly resolution 43/221 of 121 December 1988 , paras. 13-14. [Note: Even the
General Assembly had apparently given up any hope of achieving the first
and foremost qualification clearly expressed in the JIU Statute, since it
did not even bother to cite Article 2, "members of national supervision or
inspection bodies."] A 1987 JIU "evaluation" of its work,
required by the Gneral Assembly (eight pages in its annual report) was
extremely superficial. The Unit asserted that it had made "internal
studies" since 1982 of "immense value," but the report did not discuss
them further.
JIU's "impressive array" of subjects yielded reports that were
difficult to assess with any confidence. The Unit had learned, however, that a
good report may not be enough. Nevertheless, organizations could help
by suggesting more topics. JIU reports, of course, must be clear,
objective, cogent, and precise, and must determine, analyse, and examine
situations. The JIU would nonetheless make some changes, and would "reach
out" to its collaborators to meet them halfway. "Report of the Joint
Inspection Unit," Chapter VI, "An assessment of the results of the
activities of the Joint Inspection Unit," UN document A/42/34, 1987. The General Assembly received this collection of
truisms, and further pressed the Unit to report the guidelines for its
work, as specifically required by its Statute, which the JIU did, very
cryptically, in 1988. The Assembly also urged the Unit to greatly improve
its individual reports and to follow up systematically on actions taken on
its recommendations. The Unit attempted follow-up assessments for several
years, but with diminishing enthusiasm, and in the mid-1990s it simply
announced that it would end such reporting. It now produces perhaps the most
non-transparent and uninformative annual reports to be found in any public
organization anywhere in the world (as discussed further in the subsection
which follows. "Report of the Joint
Inspection Unit," Annex, "Guidelines of the Joint Inspection Unit," UN
document A/43/34, 1988. The annoyance of the UN system organizations with the
JIU was also increasing. A budgetary committee of the UN system's
Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC, now the Chief Executive's
Board) met in 1988 to discuss severe budget cuts and austerity measures
required in the organizations. Although the JIU objected, they felt
that jointly-financed units, too, should make reductions. The CCAQ
proposed (unsuccessfully) that the JIU staff be reduced by four
professionals, and that: "
ACC invite the General Assembly to re-examine the
number of Inspectors serving at any time, with a view to progressively
reducing their number from the maximum of 11 now permitted under the
Statute to eight, as provided for at the time of the Unit's
inception.
Concurrently, the supporting staff could be further
reduced." "Report of the
sixty-ninth session of the Consultative Committee of on Administrative
Questions (Financial and Budgetary Questions)," document ACC/1988/13 of 28 September 1988, paras. 6-14. Klaus Hόfner commented in 1990 that the Group of 18
and US GAO reports definitely showed that the JIU could be strengthened,
and that a "de-diplomatisation" was required as well, as proposed by
Ghιbali.
He also criticized the very inadequate and extremely defensive
self-evaluation made by the JIU in 1987 (see above), which made clear that
the external criticisms of the JIU were justified. Klaus Hufner, "JIU -
Joint Inspection Unit" in Handbuch Vereinte
Nationen, Rόdiger Wolfrum, C.H. Beck, Mόnchen, 1991, pp. 393-399. Another European analysis in 1991 identified some very
important questions posed by the JIU inadequacies: "
The JIU has produced 274 reports and notes
Nevertheless,
[its] work has been repeatedly criticized. In some [reports, problems include] lack
of clarity
of analyses and recommendations which are often superficial
[which] further affects the Unit's credibility as a research body
producing efficient and solid work. The paradox of the JIU is that while it was originally
created to improve
financial matters
a number of additional problems were engendered by it.
from an administrative and managerial point of view, [its recommendations]
are frequently not implemented or deferred. In addition,
report follow-ups are not systematic. Pιricles Gasparini
Alves, "United Nations Joint Inspection Unit: A critical analysis,"
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 6 May 1991. The General Assembly requested the ACABQ to examine
JIU functioning and make recommendations for improving its productivity
and performance in 1992. The brief ACABQ report criticized JIU
reports as research rather than action-oriented documents. It noted
criticisms of limited JIU value from many UN system agencies, and
suggested that JIU should provide more relevant reports and management
analysis.
It also stated that JIU performance should be carefully followed to
determine progress, before providing the additional staff resources that
JIU sought. It cited in particular the significant criticism by several
participating organizations that: "
in many instances either the recommendations
contained
in the JIU reports were too general or their implementation would
entail financial resources not available. Thus even when a recommendation was
[accepted], implementation is either difficult to
measure in specific terms, or not always possible due to financial
constraints." "Joint Inspection Unit: Report of the
Advisory Committee on Administratrive and Budgetary Questions," UN document
A/47/755 of 7 December 1992.
The ACABQ also requested data from the JIU on the
implementation rate of its recommendations. The Unit informed the Committee that,
since inception, it had produced some 275 reports and notes with a total
of some 1,400 recommendations. The Unit stated that it could not
determine the extent to which all these recommendations had been
implemented.
But
in a feeble attempt, the Unit provided the ACABQ with: "
JIU Report Implementation Sheets in respect of nine
JIU reports.
In three cases, the Unit noted that some implementation (less than
50 per cent) had taken place; in two instances, the category "other" (e.
g. hard to tell)" was checked. In three cases the major recommendations
had been approved by the intergovernmental bodies but no implementation
had occurred yet. In one case more than 50 per cent of the
recommendations contained in the report had been implemented." "Joint Inspection Unit: Report of the
Advisory Committee on Administratrive and Budgetary Questions," UN document
A/47/755 of 7 December 1992. A series of in-depth Washington
Post articles on UN problems in 1992 included one on the difficulties
of eliminating worthless or redundant activities. The article cited former
UN senior official Brian Urquhart as observing that "There are huge vested
interests there," and concluded that abolishing units is one thing that
the UN had proven chronically unable to do. In that context, the report included a
section on the JIU and a candid discussion with a JIU Inspector. It stated
that: "The inspection unit
itself has come in for its share of criticism. In fact,
according to officials who monitor UN management, [Siegfried] Schumm is
the only current inspector whose reports have been of any real value.
[the Unit's]
mandate is to check on efficiency in the U.N. system and the proper use of
resources.
But it hasn't been an aggressive watchdog, critics say.
Last year it issued [only] four reports
[A] study, currently
being prepared by a Polish inspector, examines how the U.N. Secretariat
takes care of its artwork. In a telephone
interview, Schumm acknowledged criticism that 'we're not very efficient'
and said a U.N. cost-benefit analysis of the Unit was 'disastrous for
us.' He
said it was up to member states to put forward better-qualified and
younger candidates. 'I have nothing
against ambassadors and such people, but I have serious doubts whether
they're equipped to deal with technical problems,' said Schumm, a former
German treasury official. 'You can't ask some people who are over
70 to do highly technical jobs.' In a meeting with
U.N. budget analysts in June, participants said, the inspectors lobbied
for a salary increase." Branigan, William, "North and South stand worlds apart on reform: U.N. record on change fuels skepticism," Washington Post, September 23, 1992.
In the mid-1990s the criticisms of the JIU became even
more blunt.
The Thornburgh report to Secretary-General Butros Ghali of March
1993 emphasized the inadequacy of Secretariat means to combat fraud,
waste, and abuse, and observed that: "
While the internal and external audit functions,
sometimes but not always co-ordinated, are understaffed, the Joint
Inspection Unit (JIU) drains off nearly $4 million a year into such questionable
efforts as the recently completed study on "Managing Works of Art in the
United Nations." I realize that the
JIU is a creature of the General Assembly and has become, in large part, a
convenient patronage "dumping ground," but surely some sense of proportion must
be maintained when it comes to dealing with serious integrity problems
within the Organization. In the short run, this dilemma could be
addressed by your simply foregoing the opportunity to nominate further JIU
members, thereby de facto phasing out their
operations over a period of time, as I recommended to you last year. This, of
course, requires a political judgement beyond the scope of this
report."
"Report to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations", by Dick Thornburgh,
Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, 1 March 1993, p. 30. Two distinguished experts and Secretariat veterans,
Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, discussed the JIU in the context of
UN finance and management issues in 1994, and concluded with clear
suggestions (which were never adopted) for accountability to overcome the
weak appointment process for JIU inspectors: "At its best, the JIU, developed by its pioneering
first Chief Inspector Maurice Bertrand, has provided invaluable service,
for example in reports
on Personnel and Accountability and Oversight in the Secretariat. The problem is
that the quality of its reports has been far too uneven, seriously eroding
its repute and the attention which organizations
may give its findings. This problem lies squarely and indisputably with
member-governments, in recurring neglect of their own stipulations for the
Inspectors as people
[from] national or international inspection bodies or [with] equivalent
experience, i. e., in personnel and management .
Presidents of the General Assembly should routinely
attach, to every [inspector] nomination
,
a copy of the JIU Statute Article 2 which stipulates the minimum
qualifications.
The Secretary-General is consulted during the nomination process
and thus shares in responsibility. 'Old boy networking' not withstanding,
member-states should be held accountable for any failure to find, among
184 countries' administrations and large corporations, top-quality people
for these valuable eleven posts." Erskine Childers,
with Brian Urquhart, "Renewing the United Nations system", Development Dialogue 1994:1, Dag Hammarskjold
Foundation and Ford Foundation, Upsala, Sweden, 1994, pp. 147-148. Another former senior UN official, Ronald Spiers, also
found the JIU wanting. He stated succinctly that: In addition to basic reforms to
increase efficiency, an Inspector General is needed to uncover the waste,
fraud, and abuse that occurs in any large organization. The existing
Joint Inspection Unit has often done useful work, but it is generally
employed as a sinecure for
superannuated ambassadors seeking high pay and travel in exchange for
occasional papers on marginal subjects. As a result,
it is not very effective. Ronald I. Spiers, "Reforming the United Nations," in Roger A. Coate, ed., U.S. policy and the future of the United Nations, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1994, pp.19-40 [22.] [emphasis added.] [Note: Mr. Spiers
served an Under-Secretary General of the United Nations in New York in the
early 1990s.] In 1995 an International
Documents Review article briefly discussed six current JIU reports,
and noted five more current and several older JIU reports that were
"before the Assembly." But, in a description that captured the
JIU's plight of lost credibility with its main masters -- Member
States in the Fifth Committee, it stated that: "Pathetic debate The debate on the JIU reports was pathetic. After the
introduction of the reports on 28 November, just one country, Algeria,
took the floor.
other delegations were heard on 4 December. Very little of substance was
said.
Algeria spoke of the need for greater support of the JIU
Japan
urged studies on streamlining, contracting and restructuring
The Norwegian delegate also expressed
support and called on the Fifth Committee to guide JIU. The
United States pointed out that in general member States gave "scant
attention" to JIU reports
and called for more reports on reform.
Azerbaijan focused entirely on the fact that [a JIU] report on cooperation
with regional organizations had not made clear that Nagorny Karabakh was
an integral part of its territory." "Joint Inspection
Unit, only system-wide oversight body, raps knuckles all around -- even
its own," International Documents Review (New
York), 11 December 1995, p. 4. [Note: as is the case
with such tepid annual discussions of JIU work in the Fifth Committee,
most of the few speakers (except Norway and Azerbaijan in this case) come,
by no coincidence, from the JIU Inspectors' home
countries.
In fact, the home country of the Inspector who is serving a
one-year term as JIU Chairman, in this case Algeria, followed a tradition
of delivering effusive compliments to JIU and its leadership. In marked contrast,
it should also be noted that the Fifth Committee regularly has very
animated discussions on the reports, recommendations, and follow-up
actions of the Board of Auditors.] In her excellent analysis of United Nations
operational realities in 1995, Rosemary Righter also noted that: For years Western
governments have complained about the lack of accountability prevailing in
UN organizations, but in practice they have tolerated a degree of opacity
that would be considered totally unacceptable for any civil service in a
democracy Regular but far from
comprehensive external auditing is carried out by national auditing
offices
[but their reports]
of mismanagement and malpractice
have
frequently been ignored.
The UNs Joint Inspection Unit
has
made some inroads on bureaucratic malpractice. But the JIU, a
creature of the UN General Assembly which appoints its staff of
inspectors, is too small and too amateur, since the General Assembly has
taken to offering inspectorates as plums to retiring diplomats rather
than to experts in finance or administration -- to provide the kind of
service that would restore public confidence in the UNs running of its
affairs.
Its best reports are formidable, but the worst
have made the JIU
itself a target for reform. Rosemary Righter, Utopia lost: The United Nations and world order,
Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1995, pp.
280-281.
Leon Gordenker, another incisive and long-time UN
observer, found much to criticize in the JIU and related UN external
oversight bodies. (This topic will eventually be greatly expanded on in
the subsequent subsection of this archive on External "expert" bodies
.) At a
press conference, Gordenker introduced his new report on UN management
reform, which called for the pruning of UN structures that were redundant,
obsolete, or wasteful. He found that: "
the composition of the [ACABQ, JIU, ICSC], and the
Board of Auditors, manned by governmental nominees, suggested that they
lacked objectivity and neutrality and 'these structures have an obvious
aura of redundance and perhaps also hidden agendas.'
Professor Gordenker said that his report provided some
criteria for simplifying the Organization, something that many reports on
reform had not made explicit. For instance, he listed some
deficiencies which could make an organization a candidate for elimination:
if it was corrupt, disreputable, free-wheeling, too costly, obsolete,
redundant and if it had a hidden agenda. Using those criteria
some organizations could be eliminated [which] would lead to some savings.
Speaking on oversight and the budget, he said that
there were several bodies involved. 'The question is whether this really
contributes to anything except an ability for governments to slow down the
whole process of work.' The bodies include the [CPC,] ACABQ,
JIU, Board of Auditors, and the ICSC. They duplicated each other's work or
activities carried out elsewhere." "Press conference
sponsored by United States on report by World Peace Federation on UN
reform," UN, 21 November 1996.
[Note: the report
itself, discussed elsewhere in this website, is Leon Gordenker, The UN tangle: policy formation, reform, and
reorganization, WPF Reports number 12, The World Peace Foundation,
Cambridge, Mass., 1996.] The General Assembly was also increasingly unhappy
with the JIU.
A 1996 resolution requested the Unit to report again on its
internal standards and guidelines, to concentrate its work programme on
the efficiency of services and proper use of funds, and to make "practical
and concrete" recommendations and to follow up on those of that were
approved by the organizations, It also -- for the
umpteenth time
--
urged Member States to pay "special attention to the selection of
qualified inspectors." "Joint Inspection
Unit," General Assembly resolution 50/233 of 31
July 1996. The most serious threat to the Inspectors' continued
enjoyment of "the good life," however, came in a unanimous rebellion by
the JIU's direct customers, the Secretariats and executive heads of the UN
system organizations. Their joint committees on financial and
budgetary
matters had long been critical of JIU performance. In 1995, in
calling for cuts in JIU budgeted travel and other expenditures, they
stated that: "Organizations were concerned about the cost benefits
of many of the Unit's studies and believed that the output of an average
of seven to ten reports per year did not justify the large
investment." "Report of the 82d
session of the Consultative Committee on Administrative questions
(Financial and Budgetary," 13-17 February 1995,
document ACC/1995/6, paras. 24-28.
In 1996 the ACC's operational subcommittee noted, in
much more detail, its past concerns about JIU functioning: inadequate
consultations with agencies on choice, timing, and practicality of its
reviews; the costs to the agencies of responses to JIU review requests for
information, data and comments; the need for JIU to use its resources
cost-effectively to address priority concerns of the system; and concern
that JIU was duplicating the work of other internal and external oversight
bodies.
Members also noted their concern with: "
the quality
of JIU reports and recommendations.
superficial [JIU] recommendations of little value since they did not
reflect a clear appreciation of the issues
[and] the time lag incurred by JIU in taking up a subject, which made the
resulting study of little use
There was general agreement that the work of the JIU
did not currently justify the level of investment by the system to its
budget, to the resources required for responding to JIU studies, and to
the subsequent cycle of consultations with governing bodies and
reporting.
Whereas the mandate of the JIU remained relevant, its structure and
functioning required serious review
" "Report of the
Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational Questions on its Ninth
Session," document ACC/1996/16 of 26 September
1996, paras. 86-91. [Note: the data issue
was particularly annoying because the agencies had dutifully responded to
many massive requests from JIU for detailed data and analysis, only to
learn later that the JIU scarcely considered them in its resulting
reports, or that the reviews had simply been abandoned for one reason or
another.] Most importantly, in a "high-level" meeting of
September 1996, the CCAQ reiterated criticisms of JIU made at a 1995
meeting: poor quality reports; an inadequate process for selecting
Inspectors; dubious relevance of JIU studies; an emphasis on research
rather than evaluative or management audit content; problematic working
methods; duplication with other bodies; and a top-heavy structure. They added
that: "Moreover, the Committee considered that the impact of
the JIU recommendations
on the proper use of funds and the improvement of efficiency
was negligent or non-existent, especially when compared with an average
cost of
$400,000 [per JIU report.] Considerable changes in [UN system oversight
mechanisms]
over 30 years
had often rendered JIU services superfluous. The excessive time and resources tied up
in interaction with the JIU aggravated
'oversight overload,'
particularly since many reports were irrelevant to organizations'
mandates. Notwithstanding the
political dimension involved in the selection and appointment of
Inspectors, the Committee considered that the Member States must apply the same standards of
professionalism, competence and efficiency to the appointment of
Inspectors as were applied to other auditing functions. Noting the urgent need for reappraisal of the role and
function of JIU not least in the
light of
the number of discussions taking place in organizations considering
withdrawal from the JIU and in light of the above
the Committee
[proposed] to ACC that: The Chairman of ACC
recommend to the President of the General Assembly that the five
forthcoming vacancies in the JIU be frozen pending the review referred to
below
ACC should request the General Assembly to institute
an independent review [focused on]
the relevance, effectiveness, and cost-efficiency of JIU studies
[leading to] recommendations to the General Assembly on the future role of
JIU, the optimal resources needed to fulfill that role, and the
opportunities provided by outsourcing studies. Such a review
might be carried out by a
group of Auditor-Generals or former Auditor-Generals of selected Member
States." "High-level meeting
of CCAQ as a whole: Summary conclusions," document CCAQ/W/1996/10 of 23 September 1996, paras. 14-20.
[emphasis added] The mention of "organizations considering withdrawal
from the JIU" included two major agencies -- the ILO and UNESCO. The ILO
proposed withdrawing in 1995 (to take affect with a two-year delay in late
1997, as required by the JIU Statute), while UNESCO sought in 1996 to
"significantly reduce" its contributions to the JIU budget for the next
biennium. "Other financial and
general questions", ILO document GB265/143.3.E96/v.4, 1996, and "Summary of
conclusions of the [ACC] at its first regular session of 1997", ACC/1997/4
of 29 April 1997, para. 87.
In late 1996, the heads of all the UN system
organizations, meeting as the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination
(ACC), noted the CCAQ meeting's conclusions. They requested the UN to
invite the General Assembly to institute an independent review of JIU by a
group of national auditors-general. Pending the outcome of that review, the
UN would also consult on possible cost-containment measures, including
postponing elections of Inspectors at the then-current General Assembly,
since they would only take effect in 1998. "Summary of conclusions of
the [ACC] at its first regular session of 1997", ACC/1996/20 of 3 December 1996, para. 54. The Inspectors roused themselves from their usual
torpor under all these assaults, and focused on their own "home field
advantage" with their diplomatic colleagues in the General Assembly's
Fifth Committee. In May 1996, the head of the JIU Secretariat, a former,
longtime, diplomat in New York, criticized several Member States and the
Secretary-General's position on JIU budget requests, and -- in contrast --
thanked the "Group of 77" developing countries for supporting the JIU's
refusal to join a then-urgent UN austerity programme. The representative of Canada intervened immediately to
object to the JIU's representative sitting in judgment on Member States,
and hoped that the JIU would eventually join the cost-cutting effort (it
later did have to acquiesce.) The exchange showed,
however, how aggressively JIU would seek to mobilize its political
support. "Budget committee
," Fifth Committee, UN press release
GA/AB/3078 of 17 May 1996. The JIU followed with a report to the General Assembly
arguing that an earlier (but unspecific) agreement had been struck to
"strengthen" the Unit as a political quid pro
quo for the establishment of a strong OIOS. While paying lip service
to the need for better Inspectors, this JIU report launched a stunning set
of tu quoque attacks. The Unit
blamed Member States for tepid support of the JIU; UN system organizations
for not helping to choose JIU review topics and for not properly using JIU
reports sent to them; and stated that the JIU should not be "singled out"
for poor oversight coordination. In particular, the JIU report urged that it be given "
the right to select its own staff in order to assure their "loyalty to the
JIU" (which ignores these staff's UN oath of office to "serve the United
Nations only.") It also asserted that it had "suffered" from difficulties
in recruiting, and an inability to choose well-qualified staff with the
mix of skills it required. More JIU independence was needed. "Note by the
Secretary-General: Note from the JIU
containing its views
on the strengthening of external oversight mechanisms
," UN
document A/51/674 of 13 November 1996, paras.
1-18, 30-32 ,
"Statement by the
Chairman of the [JIU," Fifth Committee, 22 October
1997, and "Fifth Committee
concludes discussing budget section," Fifth Committee, UN document release
GA/AB/3182 of 3 November 1997. In March 1997 the JIU launched a full-scale political
counterattack at the resumed General Assembly session: "[The representative of Tanzania, on behalf of the
"Group of 77" developing countries and China] said that the [UN] Board of
Auditors should be constituted to better reflect the composition of the
General Assembly and enable the participation of different accounting
systems
[He] also said that any resolution [on strengthening
oversight] should
present proposals for strengthening all oversight bodies.
On the JIU, he said immediate action should be taken
to ensure its operational and budgetary independence. More details
would be proposed in informal consultations.
[The representative of Cuba] said that the {Board of
Auditors' membership should be expanded to represent all regional groups
and auditing systems in the world.
The Board should supervise the [OIOS], especially in the case of fraud or
mismanagement.
The Assembly should adopt specific measures on the composition and
selection of the inspectors of the JIU, as well as on the strengthening of
the Unit." "Board of auditors
Committee reviews UN efficiency, oversight
mechanisms", Fifth Committee, UN document GA/AB/3138 of 17 March 1997. [emphasis
added.] These sudden and sweeping proposals ignored three
important facts. There was no required UN report on the administrative and
financial implications involved in the proposed actions; the proposals
would require changes in the JIU Statute, opening an enormous "Pandora's
box" of complications which no one would want; and worst of all, the above
sweeping changes in oversight certainly could not and should not have been
resolved in a non-transparent, "informal consultations" process. "United Nations
Finance manual," Article XIII. Regulation 13.1 (and Rule 113.1) "Resolutions
involving expenditures." Subsequent negotiations (with heavy direct
participation and "corridor diplomacy" by the JIU) continued on in 1997
and 1998.
Meanwhile, the UN's top manager reported to the ACC that he had
conveyed its conclusions to the President of the General Assembly.
However, by then the General Assembly had already invited five countries
to put forth candidates (four of whom were already serving Inspectors),
and therefore the elections could not be postponed. However, the
proposal for an external review of JIU functioning was "being actively
pursued."
ACC then reiterated the need for an independent review of the
JIU. "Summary of conclusions of the [ACC] at its first
regular session of 1997", ACC/1997/4 of 29 April
1997, para. 87.
There was a final try to make the JIU accountable at
the General Assembly session in the autumn of 1997, with some quite
specific proposals to improve its operations. However, no overall
consensus could be reached on who should conduct a thorough review of the
JIU. Some
favored another study by the ACABQ, some wanted a panel of "independent
experts," and almost no one favored a proposal by the JIU that (once
again) it should review itself. The issue was eventually postponed and
then dropped.
Finally, in November 1999, the General Assembly
adopted a new, and very brief and capitulatory resolution on the JIU. It reaffirmed
the status of the JIU as "the only independent system-wide [oversight]
body," and stressed again the new self-serving mantra that JIU impact is a
"shared responsibility of the Member States, the Unit and the
participating organizations." The resolution also took note "with
appreciation" of the Unit's recent annual reports and work programmes, and
endorsed the vague "improvements made" in JIU
functioning. "Joint Inspection
Unit," General Assembly resolution 54/16 of 19
November 1999. |
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