|
|||||
UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
|
|
As discussed at the end of the preceding subsection, the OIOS, a decade
after its establishment, has become well-established and relatively
successful. It has perhaps spread itself too thinly among many competing
oversight activities, and is quite reliant on the "kindness of strangers"
-- half its funding and posts
come from temporary and voluntary extra-budgetary sources. This funding
situation suggests a UN Secretariat and some (many?) Member States are
still rather fearful and cautious about this potentially powerful new
actor, as was emphasized at the time of its formal establishment in
1994. In
fact, the major failure of OIOS work seems to be its timid and low-profile
commitment (except for a few cops-and-robbers stories) to the only new,
and the very important, element of its 1994 mandate -- an investigations unit. Rather than becoming a decisive
group to fight corruption, mismanagement, and abuse, IO Watch believes
that this unit has become largely a fig leaf, which provides the
appearance of UN corruption-fighting, but actually only punishes
lower-level staff miscreants while posing no threat to UN managers and
barons. As discussed in
the Corruption
subsection which introduces the overall section on UN Management Accountability
Struggles, corruption is not just
a fact of life, but "a worldwide phenomenon [which] in recent years has
reached unprecedented levels." Ever since the late 1980s, global and
regional conferences, the development of global comparative corruption
indexes, and organizations such as Transparency International, the World
Bank, and the OECD, have increasingly targeted corruption as a process
that poisons governments, economies, and organizations. Such corruption
not only undermines democratic governance, but also highlights the
importance of establishing and maintaining transparency and trust. Robert Klitgaard, Controlling
corruption, University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif., and
London, 1988, Joseph G. Jabbra and O. P.
Dwivedi,, Eds., Public service accountability: A comparative
perspective, Kumarian Press, West Hartford, Conn., USA,
1989, Samuel
Paul, Strengthening public service accountability: A conceptual
framework, World Bank Discussion Paper 136, Washington, D.C.,
1991,
www.transparency.org/ , Transparency International,
and, more recently,
Fredrick Galtung, "A global network to curb corruption: The
experience of Transparency International," in Florini, Ann M., Ed., The third force: The rise of
transnational civil society,
Carnegie Endowment, Tokyo and Washington DC,
2000, Kimberly Ann Elliott, Ed.,
Corruption and the global economy, Institute for International
Economics, Washington, DC, June 1997, Paul Heywood, "Political corruption: Problems
and perspectives," Political studies 45 (Special Issue), 1997, pp.
417-36.
"Stop the rot: A new treaty … is just the beginning of the fight against
corruption", and "A global war against bribery", The Economist,
January 16, 1999, pp. 19-23,25, Stuart Gilman, "An idea whose time
has come: The international experience of the U.S. Office of Government
Ethics in developing anticorruption systems", Public Integrity,
Spring 2000, pp. 135-155,
and
www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/
, the "Anti-Corruption
Resource Center" of the World Bank Group. ,
The war on corruption," The Journal of Public Inquiry, A
Publication of the Inspectors General of the United States, Fall/Winter
2001, pp. 1- 63, and Gerald E. Caiden, O. P.
Dwivedi, and Joseph Jabbra, eds., Where corruption lives, Kumarian, Bloomfield, Conn., USA,
2001. The General Assembly
had pressed in the late 1980s and early 1990s for new Secretariat
mechanisms to combat waste, fraud and mismanagement. Pressure from others,
such as the "Thornburgh report" of 1993, and Childers and Urquhart, Niazi,
and the JIU, also helped lead to creation of the OIOS with an
investigations section and a "hot-line" mechanism to receive confidential
reports from staff whistle-blowers. The
General Assembly also sought repeatedly to enlist (and protect) UN staff
in combating waste and corruption. It requested in 1985 that the
Secretary-General study the establishment of an “ombudsman.” It has repeatedly sought reform to
provide a “just,
transparent, simple, impartial and efficient system of internal
justice”. In 1990 it specifically called for
consideration of effective
ways to facilitate staff reporting of any improper resource use, and in
1991 it sharpened and directed this focus towards actually implementing
such measures. Joint Inspection Unit,
"Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN
document A/48/420,
1993, paras. 74-79.
The
Secretariat had argued in 1992 that existing rules and procedures for
mismanagement and disciplinary action were adequate, and cautioned that it
would be quite difficult to protect UN whistleblowers from
retaliation. However, the
General Assembly expressly called in 1994 for OIOS to establish procedures
to permit staff to report perceived cases of misconduct, and to protect
individual rights, staff anonymity, due process for all parties concerned,
fairness during investigations, clearing falsely-accused staff, and prompt
disciplinary proceedings where the Secretary-General considers it
necessary. "Measures to facilitate reporting by staff
members of inappropriate uses of the resources of the organization: …. :
Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/47/510 of October 8,
1992, paras. 9-14, 5-13, and "Review of the administrative and
financial functioning of the United Nations", General Assembly resolution
48/218 B of 29 July 1994, section (iv) and paras. 6 and 7.
The
Secretary-General issued a Bulletin elaborating on these matters. They were further reflected in an
OIOS mission pamphlet and a detailed Investigations Section Manual. OIOS also issued, rather tardily
in light of the importance and sensitivity of the situation, a circular to
all staff in April 1996 on OIOS investigations, either on its own or based
on staff reports, of "mismanagement, misconduct, waste of resources, and
abuse of authority". The official guidance emphasized
(contrary to Mr. Paschke's early dismissive views) that the new OIOS
hotline mechanism and staff reporting processes were a very serious
matter. "Establishment of the Office of
Internal Oversight Services", Secretary-General's Bulletin, ST/SGB/273 of
7 September 1994, "The Office of Internal Oversight
Services of the United Nations: Its genesis, its mission, its working
methods, its impact", UN Dept. of Public Information, February
1996, "United Nations [OIOS]
Investigations Section, Manual",
www.unhq/depts/oios/ismanual and "Terms of reference for
investigations by the [OIOS]: Mismanagement, misconduct, waste of
resources and abuse of authority", ST/IC/1996/29 of 25 April
1996.
The
General Assembly's establishment of "hotline" and "whistleblower"
mechanisms was part of the growing recognition worldwide that fraud and
abuse cost organizations billions of dollars every year. It is very
important that all types of organizations, both public and private, have
strong programmes to detect, deter, and prevent fraud (particularly asset
misappropriation), corruption, and fraudulent statements. According to an
extensive survey in the USA in 1996, the average company loses 6
percent of its total annual revenue to fraud and abuse committed by its
own employees, but the most serious abuses are those committed by
managers, because of their greater organizational power.
Joseph T. Wells, Occupational fraud and
abuse, Obsidian, US, 1997, esp. pp. 33-51. An
employee hotline for anonymous reporting, staffed with professional
investigators and protecting these "whistle- blowers", is very important
to help audit and investigation units identify problems and curb waste and
losses. An effective hotline can also reduce
occupational abuse and harassment, improve employee productivity, enhance
employee morale, and demonstrate that an organization is trust-worthy and
acts to correct its mistakes and problems. Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), and its EthicsLine at www.FraudInfo.com . The 1993 and 1994
General Assembly initiatives added important new provisions and
protections for staff involved in investigations. But underlying
principles and staff responsibilities have long been "on the books" in the
UN rules and staff guidance, even if they received little
recognition: -- the UN standards of
conduct for staff of 1954, 1965 and 1982 gave staff the duty
to question an apparent irregular situation and the right to record their
views in the official files, and called on supervisors to exercise
“scrupulous care” in allowing those views to be heard, particularly where
those views are opposed to their own. However, the revised UN Staff
Rules issued in December 1998 unfortunately omit this clear and forceful
language from the new rules, despite much broad general discussion and
commentary on the principles of proper staff conduct and integrity; -- Staff Regulation 1.2(e) states
that "By accepting appointment, UN staff members pledge themselves to
discharge their functions and regulate their conduct with the interests of
the Organization only in view” (once again, this revised staff guidance is
less forceful and more vague than the old rule, former staff regulation
1.9 that it replaced); and -- Article 101, paragraph
3 of the UN Charter, which underlies the Staff rules and regulations,
emphasizes that the “paramount consideration in staff matters shall be
“the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency,
competence, and integrity”, all core values which are certainly
involved in the new procedure allowing staff to report allegations of
waste and mismanagement. "Report on the standards of conduct in the international civil service 1954", International Civil Service Advisory Board, COORD/CIVIL SERVICE/5, October 1954, reprinted May 1986, United Nations, [ and reprinted as Annex V of the initial, 1998 UN Code of Conduct), and "Status, basic rights and duties of
United Nations staff members", ST/SGB/292002/13 of 1 November 2002,
inter alia Regulations 1.1 (d)., 1.2 (b), 1.2 (e) and their Commentaries.
[emphasis added]
[Note: it is interesting that in
2003, 58 years after the UN Charter called for the highest standards of
integrity, the Secretariat finally launched a grand three-year "integrity
initiative", as discussed in the preceding subsection. Better late than never.] However, the OIOS --
and not merely the OIOS, but UN managers as well, as discussed further
under the archive subsection on Manager/investigators?
-- have now been endowed with quite major — and presently unmonitored and
unchecked — power within the UN, in some respects even broader than that
of the long-established US federal government Inspector Generals. As Mr. Paschke explained it to
Member State representatives in 1996: " …selecting, among the large
number of complaints which we receive, those cases which are the most
serious ones and are of greatest significance to the Organization … I
consider as one of the elements of my operational independence. … there has to be some managerial
discretion as to where we set our day-to-day priorities … not only when we
react to complaints which we receive, but also if we take the initiative
to investigate a certain issue and thus assume the proactive role
[assigned to us] … I can assure you that … we make these decisions … in
the best interests of the Organization as a whole." "Statement … by Mr. Karl Th.
Paschke [OIOS]", 2 December 1996, and Sherman M. Funk and Jeffrey
Laurenti, "Watch-dog for the U.N.," The Washington Post, 8
August 1994. Indeed, the OIOS
investigation functions, with their professional, in-depth reviews; the
system for staff reporting of wrongdoing; and the dramatic new possibility
(and reality) of criminal charges against UN staff before national court
systems could thus have a great and hopefully decisive impact on UN
operations and staff conduct. Of course, the OIOS power conveys quite
heavy responsibilities -- well beyond those of UN staff -- as the UN's professional and
full-time "corruption fighter": -- finding and helping put a stop to
waste, fraud, and mismanagement in the multi-billion dollar annual UN
programmes conducted worldwide; -- identifying, analyzing, and
addressing issues of misconduct, abuse of authority, and poor management
which undermine effective performance and implementation of programmes
mandated by the General Assembly; and -- protecting and enhancing the
credibility of the UN as an organization that carefully and professionally
monitors, assesses, and ensures the proper handling of public funds made
available to it, and is seen to do so. This is particularly important since the
UN also serves as a leader
and advisor to national governments in the fight against corruption
worldwide, and is a self-proclaimed international “moral authority” on
behalf of all mankind (for more on the hypocrisy that this entails, see
the concluding Recent Developments section of this
archive.) Despite
this clear background and potential, Mr. Paschke quickly and publicly
expressed to the General Assembly's Fifth Committee his mistrust and even
contempt for staff "whistle-blowers:" "As part of the
investigation function, we now have procedures for receiving confidential
information … I will
guarantee complete confidentiality to all those who wish to provide us
with information on problems. … Having said this I
must add immediately that I am not comfortable with receiving anonymous
messages, and will certainly do nothing to encourage this practice. In any
case, this should be seen as a system of last resort. The first, and by far the most
important way, for staff to voice complaints and make suggestions must be
to and through their immediate supervisors. When I was told I
would have to take anonymous tips into account in my new job I was
reminded of …
Hamlet,… who was given a
suggestion by a ghost … [and] then proceeded
to procrastinate. He was a
rational man and had his doubts about acting on the advice of ghosts. I hope I am not put in a similar
situation myself too often."
"Statement by Karl Th. Paschke
… to the Fifth
Committee," 5 December 1994, pp. 11-12. Mr.
Paschke's image of those reporting waste and misconduct as "sneaks"
instead of law-abiding, responsible, people who report wrongdoing was
highly improper for a senior official tasked with running a confidential
"hotline" and reporting system.
He later realized his specific responsibilities, and the
credibility which auditors anywhere must have. He made various corrective public
statements about staff reporting misconduct, assuring that he would "protect
them fully", "would not hesitate to intervene personally" with difficult
managers, and would not tolerate violation of UN rules.
"Interview with USG/OIOS",
What's New, Staff Journal, New York, WN/3 of 21 August 1996,
p. 4,
"Answer of Mr. Karl Th. Paschke", UN Special, December
1996, p. 42, "L'ONU
continue de souquer ferme pour tenir la cadence des reformes", Tribune
de Genève (Geneva), April 1997, p.
14,
"UN investigating more fraud
cases", Reuters, International Herald Tribune, 4 September
1997, and
"L'ONU enquete sur plusieurs
cas de fraude", Tribune de Genève (Geneva), 3 October 1997, p. 14.
Nevertheless, the new
Investigations Unit got off to a very slow and low-key start. In a press briefing in February
1996, a full sixteen months after his arrival, Mr. Paschke told reporters
that: "The Investigations Unit of the
Office was to some extent still under construction in terms of staffing
and establishing appropriate procedures … The Unit addressed cases
submitted to it mostly through the so-called "hot-line." The Unit's work was mostly
involved with staff who had personnel grievances and believed that
the Unit was another appeals board.
That was not true, but the grievances were analyzed and
referred to the appropriate part of the Administration.
… "Press briefing by [OIOS], " 8 February 1996. [emphasis
added] The investigations
staff grew painfully slowly.
In early 1996 the Unit had only four professional staff, with two
added later in the year. A recruiting freeze prevented hiring more people,
and the section could not clear the backlog of cases that it had from
1994-1995. In addition, the
1996 OIOS annual report stated that "The lack of experienced investigators
is a major problem facing the Investigations section." Even in 1999, when Mr. Paschke
left the UN, the OIOS investigations section had just 15 staff, twelve in
New York and three in Nairobi, but continued to struggle with a very heavy
caseload and a sharp increase in reports received. "Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the OIOS", UN document A/51/432, 1996, para. 116, and
"Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the OIOS", UN
document A/54/393 of 23 September 1999, paras.
123-128.]
Another reason for the
slow start may come from still other
statements by Mr. Paschke.
First, from the start he took a very collegial approach to the
acknowledged accountability problems of his fellow UN managers, in
contrast to his aggressiveness about staff reporting
misconduct: … Many UN managers are not used to and seem to be quite reluctant
to accept criticism, particularly when it comes to applying accountability
criteria rather than settling for the
promise that some specific problems won't recur. This feature of the United
Nations culture must be changed if we are ever to develop staff
awareness and acceptance of responsibility and accountability. United Nations managers must stop
being defensive and enter into a critical dialogue with OIOS. In order to make oversight
effective, we offer ourselves as partners, not
adversaries." "Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the [OIOS]", UN document A/50/459, 2 October 1995,
"Preface."
[emphasis added] And despite his lack
of a professional auditing background, Mr.
Paschke asserted early on, and often, that the UN had no more corruption
problems than other organizations. When a correspondent asked a question
about UN corruption problems in a 1996 press briefing, Mr. Paschke
responded that: "He believed that the
United Nations was certainly no worse than other comparable institutions.
… In the first two
years of his work he had come to the conclusion that fraud was not
the main concern of the OIOS, but rather administrative weakness
and a very limited administrative expertise, with many people handling
sizeable amounts of money. It
was, therefore, also a problem of enhancing management expertise and
management savvy …" "Press briefing
by Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services," UN, New York,
31 October 1996.
[emphasis added] In those first few
critical years of operation, as the February 1996 quote above indicates,
the OIOS dismissed many of the large number of initial staff reports made
to it as mere "personnel grievances" (a categorization decided on by the
Office itself) and turned them over to OHRM, or judged (again, within its
powers but with no contact with the person reporting and no objection
possible) that many of them provided “insufficient evidence” for action.
In still other cases, and much more seriously, OIOS apparently classed
such reports as "internal
matters” to be turned back to the hapless staff member's bosses for them
to handle by “normal procedures.” It
must also be recognized that all documentation on UN whistle-blowing
activity is locked away in OIOS files to "protect" staff, a legitimate
procedure but also one that further and forever removes the cases from any
scrutiny of how they were actually handled (or ignored, or disclosed) by
OIOS officials, i.e., it "protects" them very nicely too. (In a rare look at OIOS operations
half-a-dozen years later the UN Board of Auditors concentrated mostly on
improving OIOS information system technology and information systems audit
capacity, and the need to better document its work and make its reports
more timely. However, the
auditors also stated that the Office should "define the criteria when
reports should be prepared in respect of closed investigation cases,"
implying that many are casually handled.)
"Report
of the the OIOS", UN document A/57/451 of 4 October 2002, p. 8. UN
staff are not stupid. OIOS
may of course receive "crank" or poorly documented complaints, but it
seems to reject a very high number of submissions (although its annual
reporting is much too vague to determine this with any precision.) An
early insider assessment in 1996 had noted that: "Paschke's finest" had
investigative results that were "paltry indeed", because its staff were
either experienced UN veterans who would not "make waves", or newcomers woefully innocent about
the UN. It observed wryly that: "Halfway
through his term and answerable only to Member States, [Mr. Paschke] can
look forward to a comfortable couple of years … But United
Nations observers are beginning to ask what has been achieved in exchange
for … a free hand for Paschke. The answer is not encouraging.
… the original
conception of Paschke's post was a combination of Grand Inquisitor and
Super Sleuth. The final
product, insiders say, falls far short of either. … "The problem is that half the OIOS
staff do not know anything about the UN" we are told, "and the other half
know everything there is to know but are part of the establishment and
they are not going to make waves."
The results of OIOS's travails are paltry indeed …. There are whispers
that senior staff need not fear their peccadilloes will be exposed.
Paschke's Finest, it is said, will rake no muck above a certain level of
political or bureaucratic influence." "Diplomatic pouch", Diplomatic
World Bulletin, July 29-August 6, 1996, p. 10, and
"Wake up, Paschke", Foreign Report (UK),
Jane's, London, Sept. 12th, 1996, p.5
[emphasis added.] Similarly,
a 1997 article on the emerging problems and serious levels of UN
corruption observed that: "UN employees -- who request anonymity because they fear they will
suffer more professional harm than the corrupt officials they want to
expose -- have provided numerous accounts of officials' being transferred
rather than dismissed after being caught breaking the
rules. This happens
frequently in cases of sexual harassment, nepotism, and occasionally
violence, according to these accounts. Whistle-blowers are neither
encouraged nor rewarded." Barbara Crossette, "In war on corruption and waste, UN confronts
well-entrenched foe", International Herald Tribune, 3 November
1997. Other
troubling events suggest that the OIOS was and is dragging its feet on
whistleblower investigations, just as the Secretariat did with the overall
1993 management accountability reforms. For instance, Mr. Paschke angrily
and flatly refused to respond to serious anonymous charges made about his
decisions in staffing his own Office, while threatening whichever OIOS
staff had made them. Yet in
an appearance before the Fifth Committee just months before, and under
some pressure concerning his relationship with staff and commitment to
investigations matters, he responded, again testily, to a delegate's
questions that: " … I categorically
reject the suggestion that I would in any way discriminate against a staff
member who reports problems or uncovers fraud." "Statement to the
Fifth Committee by Karl Th. Paschke, [USG for OIOS]," December 2, 1996 , and "Dear colleagues"
letter from Mr. Paschke of 31 March 1997. [Note: UN staff
members who had been or were being "sold out" by Mr. Paschke even as he
made this public statement were not impressed.]
The UN staff grapevine, as already noted, contains
many stories of failed reporting to OIOS, or information fed back to
bosses on "someone" making allegations about problems in their unit, with
quite unpleasant results. And a 1995 book on the "real UN" observed sagely
that: "Introduction: A good
idea fallen among thieves The UN has the media
relations of a 1950s state bureaucracy. It doesn't like reporters
looking into its inner workings, and it threatens dire penalties to staff
found leaking information to the media. Time and time again, when journalists have exposed
scandals in the UN, senior officials set up an enquiry -- into who leaked!"
Ian Williams, The UN for beginners, Writers and Readers, New
York, 1995, p. 1. A careful reading of the OIOS annual reports also
indicates a persistent bias toward managers, particularly in the steadily-
repeated desires to work closely and supportively with them, but also in
an eagerness to assuage any managerial fears. In his last annual report,
in 1999, Mr. Paschke stated that there had been "misapprehension and fear"
about OIOS, and emphasized again his desire to be a partner rather than an
adversary of management. He then gave a rather detailed account
of a manager whom OIOS cleared of very serious accusations, while
punishing the person [an auditor] who had reported the problem. He concluded
that
staff (read "managers") should realize the "valuable" OIOS
investigations function of clearing those individuals who have been
wrongly accused.
"Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services" A/54/393 of 23 September 1999, paras.
56-57. [in the context of
the second-to-last sentence, please see Mr. Paschke's statement of
December 2, 1996 above.] However, Mr. Paschke in fact went much, much farther,
not merely protecting managers from allegations of wrongdoing but working
closely with UN managers themselves, despite their total lack of
professional skills in this field, to decide who, whether, when, and how
to conduct investigations in their own operations. In his 1996
annual report Mr. Paschke stated that: "It is … my
observation that the [Investigations Section] is increasingly seized with
more and more complex
investigation matters, many of which are raised with us by programme
managers … This
year … major commitments to investigate [such cases] were made by the
Governments of Kenya and Switzerland. There is also substantive and
consistent commitment to [such cases] by the concerned programme managers
in … Geneva and Nairobi. … These decisions by programme managers to seek criminal
prosecutions, in order to send a message that criminal conduct can
result in criminal prosecution … represent hard evidence of the
realization of the Secretary-General's determination to increase
accountability as part of his reform programme. " "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", A/53/428, 23 September 1998, Preface, para. 8, and para. 121. In contrast to the noticeably "laid-back" and
collegial attitude of Mr. Paschke to UN corruption problems, however, the
General Assembly was becoming increasingly concerned at the persistence of
corruption problems, especially because OIOS had been in operation for
several years (and based on the forceful reporting provided to it by the
UN external auditors): "The General
Assembly, … Expressing deep concern about the persistence of
problems and defects observed by the Board of Auditors in the financial
administration and management of the United Nations; … 11. Notes with deep concern the incidents of fraud and
presumed fraud reported by the Board of Auditors; 12. Requests the Secretary-General and the executive
heads … to take the disciplinary actions necessary in cases of proven
fraud and to enhance the individual accountability of United Nations
personnel, including through stronger managerial control; … 15. Emphasizes the need for greater transparency and
stricter controls for trust funds … 17. Notes … that further work needs to be done in the
biennium 1996-1997 to bring the financial statements fully in line with
the United Nations common accounting standards, and requests the
Secretary-General and the executive heads … to pursue their efforts to
ensure full compliance with those standards." "Financial reports and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors," General Assembly resolution 51/225 of 16 May 1997. Yet Mr. Paschke actually managed to complete his
five-year term with somewhat of an image as a "crime-buster," based
apparently on the few high-profile corruption cases that he reported on
(compared to almost none in preceding UN history), and his very polished
public relations skills. In a "farewell interview" of November 15, 1999,
it was stated that he: " … leaves office,
having uncovered millions of dollars of fraud or abuse. For the first time, the United Nations began
dismissing employees quickly, recovering losses by confiscating their
pensions and property, and turning over criminal cases to public trials in
national courts rather than allowing malfeasance to disappear quietly. In
the international legal limbo of the United Nations system, offenders may
still be transferred rather than disciplined, but Mr. Paschke hopes this
will be less likely in the future." Barbara Crossette, "A
U.N. watchdog exits to applause," New York
Times, November 15, 1999. But a second article sounded much less impressive,
recognizing that most of the dollars saved came from catching "waste and
mistakes", and reducing the frauds to a dozen schemes, some quite small,
over a five-year period. This article, published as Mr. Paschke's
successor, Dileep Nair, was chosen, stated that: "Within the last five
years, the inspector-general's office has identified $120 million in waste
and mistakes, and recovered $70 million through settlements and
court-ordered reimbursements. But its proponents
say the real value of OIOS is its role as a deterrent. The Office has unearthed more than a dozen schemes to
defraud the international organization, ranging in size from relatively
minor education reimbursements to million-dollar conspiracies to embezzle
peacekeeping and travel expenses." Betsy Pisik, "Annan
picks Singaporean for U. N. Inspector-General's job", Washington Times, February
22, 2000.
In 2000, after a year of consultations, the General
Assembly passed a resolution with its required "evaluation" of OIOS work
after five years of operation [and it is scheduled to make another such
"evaluation" in 2004.] In a section dealing with OIOS investigations work,
the Assembly expressed its sense that something was wrong. It stressed
that the Secretary-General should provide procedures to protect individual
rights of staff, including whistle-blowers, in OIOS investigations, and
called on him to submit a report to the Assembly on OIOS procedures to
ensure fairness and avoid possible abuse in the investigation
process.
"Review of the
implementation of General Assembly 48/218 B," General Assembly resolution
54/244 of 31 January 2000. [The resulting report
was "Rules and procedures to be applied for the investigation functions performed by the Office of Internal Oversight Services," UN document A/55/469 of 11 October 2000. This report merely reiterated existing OIOS protective procedures, but did help open a whole "can of worms" about bizarre new Secretariat investigations, as discussed in the subsection on Manager/investigators under the archive section on Recent Developments .] At the same time, the Secretariat was approaching the
pivotal event of its corruption-fighting efforts, at the end of Mr. Nair's
first year. In September 2000, a news article reported dramatically
that: "The
United Nations has been hit by an unprecedented wave of fraud, waste and
corruption.
Officials at its antifraud investigation unit say they are
expecting to have to run more than 350 inquiries by the end of the year --
nearly twice the total for 1998, and a 50 per cent increase on last
year.
Thousands of staff, contractors, and consultants have been
interviewed in scores of countries. … The
revelations will embarrass Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, who is to
welcome national leaders …
to the 'Millenium Summit' in New York next week. … Annan is hoping to convince
skeptical heads of state that the UN has provided value for money and that
its role should be expanded. … One
senior investigator said last week that the UN investigations unit's
workload was greater than ever. 'We are seeing more and more frauds and
abuses of authority.' …
The
OIOS's annual report, due out next month, will reveal cases of sloppy
management, lax enforcement, harassment and outright criminality.
… OIOS is working with dozens
of interntional police forces -- including Scotland Yard -- on
inquiries into the activities of UN personnel." Jason Burke, et. al.,
"UN rocked by flood of fraud cases: Officials were 'addicted to luxury,"
The Observer International (UK), September 3, 2000. The OIOS annual report for
2000 was issued only a month later. It lacked the fire of the interview, but
did indeed state impressively that: "The Investigations
Section investigated 38 cases which were presented for administrative or
disciplinary action: 22 of those cases were recommended for criminal
prosecution by national law enforcement authorities." "Report of the OIOS", UN
document A/55/436 of 2 October
2000,
para. 156. The interview may or may not have "embarrassed" the
Secretary-General at his grand Millenium Assembly in New York, as the
above article suggested. However, since that time, and especially
in the OIOS annual reports, the OIOS Investigations Section and its
"crime-fighting" work have almost vanished from sight. It seems an
interesting possibility that, with Mr. Paschke gone, OIOS staff may have
felt that they could finally become much more aggressive in their
investigations work. Subsequent events, however, suggest that because of
the "wave of fraud" article, OIOS investigative work now receives greatly
reduced priority, commitment, and publicity. It has almost disappeared
from OIOS reporting, except for the occasional stories of some major fraud
cases which still attract attention to UN crime-fighting prowess. Thus
-- and
sadly --
it seems that investigations, and the fight against "fraud, waste, and
abuse", the only new elements of UN internal oversight that were installed
in 1994, have almost vanished as a priority in UN management reform. The 2001 OIOS annual report, suddenly and
conspicuously, had very little to say about investigative actions and
results.
It showed a big increase in "cases received" and backlog, but made
little mention of major fraud cases found or prosecuted, funds saved,
whistleblower activity and actions taken thereon, the number of cases sent
to national courts in the 2001 reporting year, or the results obtained in
those courts. In 2002 the OIOS annual report did not include a
separate commentary on the Investigations Section. Indeed,
although some "crowd-pleasing" investigation results [the fig leaf
referred to in this subsection's title] were featured prominently in the
preface, the word "investigations" was nowhere to be found in the report's
table of contents. The 2003 annual report provided more stories of "hot
cases," but only one item on investigation work, "Rationalizing the
services of investigations and prioritization of cases." It was not very
reassuring, since it stated that the [newly upgraded] Investigations
Division had received some 630 "new matters" to be investigated, and had a
standing backlog of some 200 items. It stated reassuringly (but not very
convincingly) that every one of them was "carefully assessed" with a
"thorough review."
"Report of the OIOS",
UN document A/56/381 of 19 September
2001,
"Report of the OIOS", UN document A/58/364 of 11 September 2003, paras. 136-139. The 2004 OIOS annual report showed little change. It
again provided no separate section focusing on overall Investigations
Division work. The OIOS self-evaluation gave investigations work three
paragraphs, calling the Division "a highly professional entity" which had
matured to investigate allegations of all types of fraud, waste and
mismanagement, with a rising caseload every year, as more staff and
managers "feel encouraged to make reports" (the latter assertion, of
course, is belied by the findings of the Integrity Survey of June 2004,
see below).
The Division was also working "proactively" with other enforcement
agencies and authorities, but UN offices away from New York noted the
"many demands on a small staff" and the need for investigators at duty
stations on a permanent basis, to provide a deterrent effect. Overall, "feedback indicated
that OIOS should provide more information about investigations and OIOS in
general." "Report of the OIOS",
UN document A/59/359 of 13 September 2004,
paras. 117-119. The OIOS biennial programme plan for 2005-2006 does
not offer much encouragement about a more dynamic and transparent
role. The
OIOS overall objective and investigations subprogramme are: "focused on ensuring
that the Organization has an effective and transparent system of
accountability in place and on developing the capacity of the Organization
to [foresee and handle] … the risks and threats which might prevent it
from achieving its objectives." "[Investigations]
Objective of the Organisation: To mitigate risks caused by violations of
the United Nations regulations and rules through professional
investigations and increased risk awareness." "Proposed strategic framework for the period 2006-2007: Part two: Biennial program plan: Programme 25, Internal Oversight", UN document A/59/6/ (Prog. 25), 20 April 2004, p. 5. [Note: The
2005-2006 plan then sets out "Expected Accomplishments of "better
compliance with regulations and rules", to be evidenced by more
recommendations accepted and implemented, and increased understanding of
and "mitigation action" on, trends and risks. In the midst of the multi-billion dollar
scandal allegations from the UN-administered oil-for-food programme in
Iraq, the Integrity Survey, and the many troubling senior management
problems of 2004 as set out in the preceding subsection, the OIOS
certainly has much work to do to fulfil this quite upbeat and cheerful
assessment of its past work and future intentions. In fact, IO Watch concludes that the weak
investigative work of the OIOS as the leading Secretariat bulwark against
serious fraud, waste, and mismanagement problems in the $6 to $10 billion
of annual UN operations -- and its cosy relationship with UN managers --
represent avery serious failure to properly implement OIOS basic and
unique watchdog responsibilities (and to challenge the efforts of the UN
leadership and Secretariat overall), and to establish the "effective and transparent
system of accountability and responsibility" called for by the
General Assembly in its resolution 48/218A of December 1993. OIOS shortcomings are also the result of its
diplomat-led, management-consulting preoccupations, and its reporting
timidity and debilities built up over the past decade of work. The OIOS is
clearly better than the weak, fragmented, non-reporting internal oversight
units that it replaced, but "better than bad" does not mean good. An excellent 1993 book provided key factors and
questions which can be used to use to determine the oversight
effectiveness of inspector generals. "
… defining effectiveness in purely organizational or
dollar terms is far too narrow. Effectiveness also rests in what is best
for government. …
Using this broader definition of effectiveness prompts at least five
questions of IG operations: (1) How professional are the offices? (2) How deep is
the coverage?
(3)
How great are the savings? (4) How good are the cases? (5) How visible
are the results?
The first two questions deal with inputs …
the final three …
with outputs which in turn give at least some sense of the impacts on
fraud, waste, and abuse. … [Yet} Iin the final analysis, an IG's effectiveness
involves much more than …
[the above …] an IG also must focus on department or
agency performance. It is simply not enough to catch the bad
guys. The
long-run success of the IG concept can be measured only by the quality of
life produced by government. This value can be inferred by four
simple, if imperfect, questions regarding interest, trust, vulnerability,
and value added. Is anyone
listening? Is the public more
trusting? Is the government
less vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse? Is the government
producing outcomes of greater public value?" Paul C. Light, Monitoring government: Inspectors General and the search for accountability, Brookings, Washington, D.C., 1993, pp. 204, 220-223. In the context of this guidance, IO Watch finds
multiple concerns about OIOS work, especially in fulfilling its unique and
critically important investigation responsibilities. -- Despite a number of queries from
the press and delegates over the years, the professional competence of
OIOS staff has not been clearly documented or reported upon, or
updated
--
just asserted. -- OIOS clearly does not have nearly
enough staff to oversee the $6-10 billion of UN funds spent annually in
its worldwide operations, but it has not pressed for a significant
increase in its investigative staff. -- Most of the OIOS cost savings
claimed have involved bookkeeping or allowances adjustments
due to careless management (the "mistakes" quoted above). A dozen or
so small
fraud cases (as of 1999, certainly more now but still modest) is not very
impressive in a multi-billion dollar organization with widely-recognized
management problems and inadequacies in its hectic field programmes
worldwide. -- OIOS reports make no mention of any
"abuse" cases in the UN (to complete the "waste, fraud and abuse" litany)
and despite staff rules which say that such actions "will not be
tolerated." IO Watch speculates that perhaps no abuse is reported because
those doing the abusing would very likely be UN managers, since they have
the most power to engage in such things. -- The fraud cases (and some $130 million
of overall cost
recovery) found by the OIOS are also a tiny, tiny fraction of the
$60 to $100 billion
(at $6 to 10 billion per year) that the UN has expended in a decade under
Mr. Paschke's and Mr. Nair's supposedly watchful eyes, and any savings may
be totally obliterated by the $5 to $10 billion that has "gone missing" in
the UN-administered oil-for-food programme in Iraq (as discussed in the
concluding Recent Developments section
under Other Major Problems .) -- The enthusiastic efforts led by
OIOS for an "integrity" initiative may well be useful. But the heavy and
seemingly ever-expanding emphasis on OIOS as a management consultant and
"change agent" with managers undermine the most important reason for
establishing OIOS in the first place -- to systematically combat fraud, waste,
and abuse, which OIOS has consistently placed far down the priority
list. -- Given the solicitous approach of
the OIOS leadership to its managerial colleagues over the past decade (but
not to mere UN staff), one has to wonder if the UN has ever yet sanctioned
a misperforming manager (other than the 2003 Baghdad bombing tragedy,
which an outside report made unavoidable) as the General Assembly
repeatedly called for, and if so, how. -- In addition, OIOS has failed to go
beyond "cops and robbers" work to serious and systematic anti-fraud
efforts and analysis, some of which is apparently due to the resistance
and timidity of some Member States in the General Assembly in this
area. An
obscure Secretary-General's letter to the Fifth Committee in 1997,
however, noted that at least one UN programme and its overseers had
jointly agreed to act decisively: "… the Governing Council of UNEP [the United Nations
Environmental Programme], in a May 1995 decision, decided] … to work
closely with the Office and … the Executive Director to formulate and enact … a
specific plan of action to prevent waste, fraud and
mismanagement. The Secretary-General welcomes these
developments to confirm that [UN] funds and programmes have recognized the
necessity to strengthen their internal oversight functions." "Letter dated 23
October 1997 from the Secretary-General addressed to the Chairman of the
Fifth Committee," UN document A/C.5/52/12 of 28
October 1997, p. 5. --
A recent article on combating global corruption notes that anti-corruption
coalitions "on paper" will not be effective without enforcement in
fact.
This requires, first and foremost: -- an independent and competent
judiciary; -- adequate prosecutorial capabilities;
and -- whistle blower protections. Richardson, Peter,
"The global assault on corruption", The Journal of
Public Inquiry, Fall/Winter 2001, p.
6.
[Note: in the UN, the
second element is apathetic, the first is totally missing, and the third
is meaningless, as discussed in the archive subsection on Disappearing whistle-blowers
.] -- Another unfortunate trend of OIOS work is an increasing
tendency for OIOS investigations to "whitewash" serious allegations, as
reported in the media, that involve senior UN officials. One involved two
successive UN top "corruption fighters" in 2001 and 2003, and another
cases of refugee sexual abuse in West Africa involving UNHCR. Both are
discussed further under Other Major Problems subsection in the
concluding section of this archive. IO Watch will in the future also
explore a number of past cases in which it appears that major scandals
arose in UN programs, or even recurred, shortly after OIOS had made
management audit or related reports which found no such problems. -- Criminal court cases initiated by OIOS
would indeed be an important measure of OIOS investigative success. But what
happened to the 22 staff cases that the OIOS reported that it had
recommended for criminal prosecution in national courts in 2000, now four
years later?
To earlier cases? How many cases in total have been sent,
and with what results? What is the trend? How much money
has been recovered, and how much not? Above all, what was the quality of the
UN cases sent to national courts, in terms of convictions, and the
cost-benefit of the cases handled? This leads to the essential issue of proper reporting,
and the transparency of OIOS work. Is it so difficult to report
systematically on organizational investigaton work in the UN Secretariat
and its results?
It doesn't seem so, as indicated clearly by the following two
examples. In its 1993 report on accountability, the JIU managed
to piece together the following chart from Secretariat records, which
already goes far beyond what OIOS reports: "The United Nations
is not exempt from [worldwide] … waste, fraud, abuse and corruption
problems … UN [audit officials] acknowledged that investigations of
complaints of violations are neither centralized or organized. … The only firm data …
come from personal grievances and managerial disciplinary actions appealed
to [OHRM] … [they] show a very disturbing recent increase in …
mismanagement and fraud cases as field operations have rapidly expanded
worldwide: First
half of
1990 1991 1992 1993 Total new cases
referred
28
30
40
70 subtotal:
mismanagement/fraud
15
17
13
45 leading to: dismissal
of staff
2
4
4
1
appropriate action 8
10
4
3
lack of evidence
4 2
5
29
other
1
1
1
13 The biennial reports
by the Board of Auditors include some information … [but] cover only the
1986-1991 period, [and thus] … do not reflect fraud problems [from the
vast] … expansion of [UN] operational activities. Meanwhile,
partial [internal audit] statistics on recovery against fraud, which is the
responsibility of the managers concerned, show serious problems. Between 1988
and mid-1993, the internal auditors recommended $3,500,000 for recovery,
but only $85,000, a mere 2 percent of the total, had actually been
recovered." Joint Inspection
Unit, "Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN
document
A/48/420,
1993, p. 14.
[emphasis added] Other organizations seem to have no problem in making
clear and succinct reports on their overall patterns of waste, fraud and
abuse cases. The World Bank, for example, provided an excellent example,
as cited in a 1999 article on its staff problems: "World Bank Complaints Misconduct cases
investigated by the World Bank's Office of
Professional ethics in 1997 TYPE OF CASE
NUMBER Tax related
57
Misuse of facilities
or property
54 Harassment -
nonsexual
36 Benefits related
30 Abuse or negligence
of authority or
position
22 Fraud
21 Harassment -
sexual
8 Criminal charges
3 Other misconduct
*
77 TOTAL
308 * Other misconduct includes defaults on loans, favoritism in hiring, conflict of interest,
abusive behaviour toward security, plagiarism, bribe solicitation, and overtime discrepancies" Glenn R. Simpson,
"World Bank, under attack, concedes staff problems," Wall Street Journal, March
19, 1999. WHY CAN THE PURPORTEDLY HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL AND
ACCOUNTABLE OIOS NOT PRESENT SUCH A SIMPLE STATISTICAL REPORT, AS A BASIC
STARTING POINT,
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY EVERY YEAR? IO Watch concludes that until it does present such
reporting and careful analysis, and for every year of its existence going
back to 1994, all its reporting and grand statements and conceptual
efforts regarding investigation practice and results are just so much
show, and its credibility as well. The UN can certainly not claim that such statistics
and analysis are not necessary because it is corruption-free, particularly
in light of recent scandals in the Iraq oil-for-food programme. In fact, the
Secretariat numbers might prove to be awesome, particularly for the
"other" misconduct areas mentioned in the footnote in the World Bank chart
above, which in fact describe a whole raft of cases which occur over and
over in the UN, untracked and totally "under the radar." |
|||
