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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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The
gravest danger of OIOS and its unreported and unexamined results and
impact is that in fact the OIOS "fig leaf" allows the UN barons to operate
with even more impunity. The UN and the OIOS itself, as discussed above,
have never yet attempted to set up
a determined plan of action to prevent waste, fraud, and
mismanagement such as that addressed by UNEP above (the quote of 28
October 1997.) Inspectors
general too are only human, and may -- and do -- themselves sometimes turn
out to be "the enemy." A U.S.
Congressional subcommittee in 1990 reported
that: "
some
of the [U.S. inspectors general] --
the persons supposed to be sounding the alarm about federal
wrongdoing -- have become 'lapdogs' instead of watchdogs for their
agencies. [the]
panel found
15 cases involving 10 inspectors general, past and present, who abused
their authority, harassed or exposed whistle-blowers or thwarted probes
into waste and fraud. The officials
represent 40% of the 25 federal
inspector generals." "People watch," USA
Today, September 30, 1990. Two
much more recent articles show how such units can go seriously wrong:
"The question is as
old as Ancient Rome: quis custodiet ipsos custodies? (Who will
guard the guards?)
[At the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)] there are growing
allegations of wrongdoing
In place of seasoned
and senior investigators
a growing
'good-old-boy' network
[is] systematically
giving Congress misleading information about the scope and success of
those inquiries it conducts.
Scores of documents
suggest senior
officials who have engaged in chronic wrongdoing."
[In a confidential
letter a dozen top current and former IG officials]
say current
leadership of the HUD IG office 'cannot be trusted' [and]
engage in cover-ups,
'abuse their office to remain in power, ruthlessly crush all dissent and
resist any external accountability.'" Martin
Edwin, "Investigative report: Who is guarding the HUD guards",
Insight, The Washington Times, March 18-31, 2003, pp.
34-35. "Good government and environmental
activists from three continents have written to Inter-American Development
Bank president Enrique Iglesias to complain about a 'general lack of
transparency and effectiveness' in the bank's Independent Investigation
Mechanism (IIM). The creation of IIM, the letter
notes, was meant to
ensure
that due diligence has been exercised by the bank
in projects. Unfortunately, the IIM operates
with limited transparency and no clear timelines
The complaints came amid growing
concerns heard about the effectiveness off the IDB auditor-general's
office in investigating wrongdoing, and an apparent showdown between bank
management and
the evaluations-department head credited with restoring
the integrity of that office.
The letter points to 'consistent'
procedural problems revealing 'systemic flaws' in the body's operations
that prevent it from becoming an 'effective accountability
mechanism." "Watchers of the world turn their eyes to IDB", Insight,
The Washington Times,
March 18-31, 2003, pp. 10 (and 4-5). IO
Watch doubts that OIOS operations are as troubled as those at the
Inter-American Development Bank, but the cited cases do emphasize that the
performance of even inspector generals' offices must be carefully
overseen, especially since they have so much power, and procedures to
guard their independence. In
the OIOS situation, only two studies have been done. The UN Board of Auditors, as
discussed previously, examined OIOS internal procedures and systems and
noted a need to improve working papers and (more relevant here) a lack of
guidelines for closing out investigations.
"Report of the OIOS",
UN document A/57/451 of 4 October
2002, p.
8. Similarly,
the US General Accounting Office made a review in 1997 that found that
OIOS efforts "provided a framework" for a good internal oversight
mechanism in the UN. However,
GAO's lack of direct audit authority and access to records meant that the
GAO could not test whether OIOS actually exercised its authority and
implemented its procedures in an independent manner. US General Accounting
Office, "United Nations: Status of internal oversight services," Letter
report, GAO NSIAD-98-9, 11/19/97.
Yet
the evidence presented throughout this (and subsequent) sections of this
archive indicates that Mr. Paschke and Mr. Nair, however excellent they
may be as individuals, are not the right men for the "inspector general's"
job, by training or by nature. The OIOS situation, after a decade of
operation, seems sadly to be more that found in a corrupt and
non-transparent organization than a corruption-fighting one, according to
a template developed a quarter of a century ago. Note: see the Corruption subsection of the
archive section on UN Management Accountability
Struggles , first introductory quote, and the
Corruption
characteristicssubsection,
from Gerald
E. Caiden and Naomi J. Caiden, "Administrative corruption", originally
published in Public Administration Review (USA). 37:3, (May-June
1977), 301-309. IO
Watch wishes to recall the original important objectives for the OIOS,
which clearly remain unfulfilled. Several wise observations underscored
what is required for a truly responsible and effective OIOS. The UN Secretariat itself had
clearly marked the path to ensuring accountability in two reports, the
first in 1994, the second in 2000: "
[UN staff and managers'
capacity and expertise at all levels] must correspond to the
responsibility assigned and authority delegated and must be balanced by
full accountability through appropriate accountability
mechanisms. An efficient
organizational oversight machinery will monitor the operation of the
system and conduct audits, inspections, evaluations and investigations
The systematic control of the interrelated processes
will provide the
key to success
and contribute to the Organization's
effectiveness and efficiency. "Establishment of a transparent and effective
system of accountability and responsibility: Report of the
Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/49/1 of 5 August 1994, paras. 12 and 109.
[emphasis added] "The
chain of accountability 1. Specifying responsibility,
authority and results to be achieved
2. Providing guidance and
support
3. Monitoring and assessing the
exercise of responsibility and authority
4. Taking appropriate
action Follow-up must be
capable of distinguishing between and dealing appropriately
with the
following (a)
Excellent or satisfactory execution of responsibility and
authority; (b)
Unsatisfactory execution of responsibility and authority as
a result of carelessness or ignorance; (c)
Unacceptable exercise of responsibility and authority due to
deliberate flouting of policies, rules and regulations, or exceeding the
limits of authority; (d)
Misconduct or
fraud."
"Accountability and
responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/55/270 of
3 August 2000, Annex II.
[emphasis added] The
UN did establish the OIOS as the appropriate mechanism to monitor the
system and conduct oversight.
But when the Secretariat pulled on the "chain of accountability,"
nothing happened because, or so IO Watch believes, the OIOS
cannot or will not take "appropriate action" to address deliberate
flouting of rules, exceeding authority, misconduct, or fraud, at least as
it concerns those recognized as most likely to commit those acts --
programme managers and senior
officials. Why
did this leadership choice go so awry? IO Watch would cite: ?
failure to appoint a top-flight professional to take the lead;
?
Member states' failure to "oversee the overseer";
?
OIOS failure to investigate misconduct systematically, rather than
selectively; ?
Secretariat inability to promptly prosecute and apply sanctions
(concerning which, see particularly the Major Ongoing Flaws subsection
under Where is the Rule of Law? later in
this archive; and ? reliance on a "diplomatic culture"
approach to investigation, instead of the strong figure dedicated to
independent investigation no matter who is
involved. Once
again, the five following quotations help tell the tale of what competent
and effective investigation and oversight
require: "After decades of periodic
suggestions for an Inspector General to be attached directly to the Office
of the Secretary-General, this issue is now being actively pressed. This may, on balance, be helpful
but not really effective if the IAD remains so grossly understaffed. To carry maximum credulity
and universal confidence the appointee must be of impeccable repute and
with top-calibre qualifications for such
work." Erskine
Childers, with Brian
Urquhart, "Renewing the United Nations system", Development
Dialogue, 1994:1, Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden,
1994, pp. 146-147. [emphasis
added.] "
The United Nation's fiscal and management inadequacies are
serious, and
'reform is not popular' in the UN Secretariat.
It is to the credit of President Clinton's policy team that it
overcame [the suspicion of American motives] and forged consensus on
an independent and objective inspector general.
The United Nations now will have what many in Washington have long
argued for: an independent office to oversee its fiscal and management
operations. As Congress does
with U.S. inspectors general, U. N. member states will have to keep
a watchful eye on its performance, safeguard its independence and
aggressively follow up on its findings. A serious, workable instrument is
in place." Sherman M. Funk and Jeffrey
Laurenti, "Watch-dog for the U.N.", Washington Post, August 8,
1994.
[emphasis
added.] "Taking action against
wrongdoing "Taking action against
violation of standards is the shared responsibility of managers and
external investigative bodies.
Although public service managers have the primary responsibility for initiating disciplinary measures in their agencies in a timely manner, they may also receive assistance from specific external institutions. These external institutions are the primary instruments for investigating and prosecuting misconduct in the public service. These bodies have the power to bring suspected cases of corruption directly to court in all OECD countries. Moreover, two-thirds of countries have procedures and mechanisms to enable the public to signal wrongdoing to bodies exercising independent scrutiny on public service activities." "Annex
I: OECD public management policy brief on building public trust: Ethics
measures in OECD countries," in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Public sector transparency and accountability: Making it
happen, OECD, Paris, 2002, p. 192.
[emphasis added] "The effectiveness of
an oversight office depends to a large extent on how senior officers
perceive their roles. The
concept of management accountability in the United Nations has not been
consistently applied.
no system of accountability will be effective without the
assurance that sanctions will be promptly applied when violations
occur. I strongly recommend
that any new system of accountability and responsibility include specific
penalties or sanctions for United Nations managers and other staff who
disregard United Nations regulations and rules or who are negligent in the
conduct of their duties and responsibilities.
A vast amount of work
remains to be done
. " "Report of the Office of
Inspections and Investigations", UN document A/49/449, 28 September
1994, "Letter of transmittal", pages 5-6. [emphasis
added] [Note: the letter was prepared by
Mohamed Aly Niazi, a very experienced senior UN internal auditor, who
served as head of the transitional oversight unit which preceded the OIOS
in 1993-1994.] "
the sine qua non
is a power figure dedicated to independent investigation of an
allegation on its merits, who will protect the anti-corruption authority
from improper pressures or will allow it
to resist and ignore
threats of career retaliation." "Crime prevention and criminal
justice
:
Practical measures against corruption: Manual prepared by the [UN]
Secretariat," Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders," Havana, Cuba, UN document A/CONF.144/8 of
29 May 1990, paras. 36-38.
Please
contrast this wise guidance, and particularly the last item above on the
requirement of a strong power figure, with Mr. Paschke's basic philosophy
of his role as an Inspector General (which now seems to have fit Mr. Nair
as well): "
permit me to tell
you briefly my basic philosophy for the fulfillment of my duties
in general and for
the [OIOS] in particular. First of all, I do
not consider myself an antagonistic type of person.
I believe in
consensus-seeking.
Results
are better achieved thorough dialogue and quiet reasoning, in an
atmosphere of mutual trust.
above all, I see
myself as an adviser to the Secretary-General and to senior officials, and
as a counsel to line managers and to the Organization as a whole, for
better management.
My approach will
not be primarily that of a critic. OIOS
should offer
assistance to managers in implementing our recommendations
[and give]
advice on putting
into practice the measures we propose.
I understand that
the primary responsibility for programme implementation rests with
programme managers. The role
of OIOS is to ensure that adequate systems for monitoring are in place in
each department and office.
I hope to encourage
greater concern by managers throughout the United Nations with the results
of their activities
" "Statement by
Karl Th. Paschke [first head of the new OIOS]
to the Fifth Committee," 5 December
1994, pp. 4-5, 7-8. [emphasis
added] In
fact, two recent articles on a major corruption scandal and subsequent
reform efforts in Germany underscore and help explain Mr. Paschke"s
leadership failure even more clearly: "Call it Europe's
Enron. For the financial
scandal [of]
Bankgesellschaft
Berlin is every bit as breathtaking as its American counterpart
[except that] in
Germany the response
has been
almost the opposite -- public indifference and
[attempts]
to shroud the case
in 'extreme secrecy', according to corruption watchdog group Transparency
International.
It is a very
Continental tale of cronyism
[that]
highlights not only
a massive failure of oversight, but the continuing immunity of large
state-protected sectors
to public
control.
[which is] the very heart of the
so-called "German disease." 'Germany is a country
without sanctions," says [one observer]
[A Transparency International
official calls it] the 'unholy Prussian tradition' of corporate and
bureaucratic secrecy. German
confidentiality laws make it extremely difficult
to penetrate white-collar crime
A German court last
month strengthened employers' rights to fire whistleblowers for 'breach of
loyalty.'
The obstacles to
prosecuting white-collar crime, the almost complete lack of sanctions
against politicians and managers, the Berlin government's willingness to
keep [paying for BGB] and other failed public companies
'Our ethic of protecting
society from future harm is not developed," says [a]
German
scholar." Stefan Theil,
"Europe's Enron: A lurid corporate scandal highlights the weaknesses in
the German system. Too bad no one seems to care," Newsweek International, June 7/June 14, 2004, pp. 32-33. [emphasis
added.] What century do
Germanys corporate boards think this is? Certainly not the 21st. A voluntary code has been in effect for
more than two years, but
Germany, Inc., experts say, has a habit of paying lip
service to good governance while violating it in spirit and practice.
supervisory
boards often fail to control or sanction management even for disastrous
results; conflicts of interest abound; and boards disregard voluntary
guidelines
[for many actions]. But German companies
staunch resistance
is about to backfire. Angry politicians, shareholder
activists, and corporate-governance experts are mounting an offensive,
drafting laws that will mandate better behavior.
One way to close
these gaps is to make shareholder suits easier. Two draft laws
will increase executives and board members liability for negligence and
for disseminating false information.
Germany Inc. might have one
last change to thwart the legal onslaught: by racing to implement best
corporate-governance practices before the countrys legislators do it for
them. Gail Edmondson,
Germany, Inc.: Come clean or else, Business Week
Europe, October 25, 2004.
[emphasis added] Germany apparently is still not ready for the new UN
Convention against Corruption, and Mr. Paschke indeed seems to have
brought along this German attitude to the worst possible location: a
high-level leadership post as the UN's first corruption fighter. Yet UN Member
States are also indifferent or "asleep at the switch", as the abusive and
incompetent UN managers who were to become the "sanctioned" for any poor
performance in 1993 have since become the "sanctioners" in the new
millenium. It
is useful to conclude this analysis of OIOS investigative weaknesses by
first setting Mr. Nair's objectives for investigation in 2001 against the
UN corruption and scandals situation which prevailed at the end of
2004. An article on Mr. Nair's work, apparently
coincidentally, provided an interesting contrast of UN selective
application of "the rules" concerning a highly-publicized case of
mismanagement and improprieties by a very senior manager, in contrast to
the treatment given a hapless and severely punished lesser staff member in
Nairobi: "[Mr. Nair] noted [OIOS's] strong criticism of the
management of the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention in
Vienna, which was investigated [note: in the spring of 2001] after
allegations of fraud and mismanagement. Last month, the United Nations announced
that Pino Arlacchi, who heads the office will leave his post in mid-2002.
In northwest Somalia, investigators said allegations
of corruption and mismanagement were unfounded, but the audit discovered
that a senior U.N. officer had not strictly adhered to U.N. rules. The [OIOS]
recommended that he should be held strictly accountable for approximately
$50,000 in losses as a result of his actions." Edith M. Lederer, "UN
watchdog agency suggests savings," Associated Press, October 24, 2001. In
2004 the situation seems to have spun out of control, particularly because
of the inadequacy of the investigative resources devoted to combating the
UN's mounting scandals over the past decade, but also because of the very
dubious quality of some of the "investigations" made, as indicated by the
following assessments of the many allegations and charges that have
emerged. "Uday [Hussein
explained
that]
the Iraqi government would [let Luguev buy]
Iraqi oil at
below-market prices. He could
sell [it] .. at a higher
price, and pocket the profits.
the deals were entirely legal under
the Oil for Food program
the money Luguev paid
would be
used to feed
starving Iraqi kids. [Lugaev paid $60,000,
with part to go to the Husseins, but they simply kept his money.] Luguev
did something remarkable: he [filed]
a formal
complaint to the United Nations. Luguev's allegations provide, for the
first time, hard evidence of how Saddam has cleverly used
oil profits
to bypass the sanctions imposed on his regime
United Nations
officials, who are now investigating the charges, could hardly pretend to
be shocked
For years it had been an open secret that Saddam was
plundering the Oil for Food program
U.S. government figures estimate that
Iraq has received at least $2.3 billion in oil-contract kickbacks since
1997.
Yet
U.N. officials in charge of policing the oil sales instead
unwittingly approved corrupt deals
[and] Western countries
seemed willing
to
ignore the dubious trade.
" Mark Hosenball,
"Iraq's black gold: How Saddam skimmed oil profits while the United
Nations looked the other way," Newsweek
International, November 11, 2002, pp.
37-40.
"
the UN has
[examined the]
Secretariat's perception of its own integrity.
[The Integrity Survey
politely explains there are concerns about accountability]
More directly ,,,,
[the report notes (p. 11)
that] 'Staff members feel unprotected from reprisals for reporting
violations of the codes of conduct. This is not a perception confined to a
few staff in remote locales and/or dangerous circumstances. Forty-six
percent (46%) gave unfavourable response to this item, whiles only 12%
gave favourable responses.' This is of course
just one of the U.N.'s various investigations into itself. Best-known
this season is the investigation into Oil-for-Food
Beyond that, there is
an entire division [the OIOS]
which produces in-house investigations
An April 14 U. N. Staff Union resolution expresses concern 'over recent
events regarding an OIOS investigation into its own investigators
' Someone needs to help
this institution, and it is not a consulting team
nor a batch of
investigators operating under terms defined by the U.N.
I'm working around to
the belief that in the matter of reforming the U.N., the only thing worse
than having the U.N. ignore a problem is to have the U.N. investigate
it." Claudia Rosett, "The
problem with the Secretariat", The Wall Street
Journal, June 16, 2004.
[emphasis added]
"
Staff [in the
Integrity Survey] believe that not enough action is taken to investigate
and address instances of unethical behaviour, and that those who expose
such breaches may put themselves at risk of reprisal. Staff also
perceive that the disciplinary process is applied unevenly,
that the
outcome of the process is generally not known.
[and] that breaches
of integrity and ethical conduct are insufficiently and inequitably
addressed by the disciplinary system. At the same time, they voice concern
about the consequences of 'whistle-blowing' or reporting on misconduct,
and uncertainty about the mechanisms for such reporting.
The [OIOS and
Office of Ombudsman channels]
need to be better known and made more
accessible to staff at large. We will inform all staff about the means
available to them for reporting on suspected misconduct. We will also
develop measures to reinforce formal protection for whistle-blowers, while
ensuring that they are not used to cloak false accusations." "Dear colleagues",
letter from Secretary-General Annan to UN staff on the findings of the
Integrity Survey, of 4 June 2004, pp. 2-3. Having [found]
that
Secretariat staff don't trust the top management and are afraid to speak
out for fear of reprisals, Mr. Annan's response will be to convene a group
of top managers and invite staff members to speak out.
Does anyone see a
problem here? The basic flaws are
simple: Anytime you create a large institution, accord it great privileges
of secrecy, give it a big budget and have it run immune from any sane
standard of accountability, you are likely to get a corrupt organization.
The problem with the
Secretariat isn't 'tone' at the top. It's accountability at the top and
secrecy throughout.
[A real solution]
would probably require setting up a competing international institution,
based on openness and accountability." Claudia Rosett, "The
problem with the Secretariat", The Wall Street
Journal, June 16, 2004. "The United Nation's
anti-corruption department has been rocked by accusations that the office
itself is corrupt. The head of the
[OIOS]
, Dileep Nair, has been accused of promoting and recruiting
people in ways that are not consistent with U. N. rules and
regulations.
Also, a senior investigator has been suspended
The scrutiny
comes
at a delicate time, as the UN is under intense scrutiny for alleged abuse
of the Iraqi oil-for-food program.
[Nair's office] has
carried out 55 audits of the [oil-for-food] process.
[The UN Staff Union
urged Secretary-General] Annan in April to
make an independent
investigation of OIOS. Annan recently wrote
to Nair asking him to answer the allegations
Nair, who is
currently on sick leave from his position, denied all the accusations to
Fox News. Asked if he would
resign if any of the charges are proven true, Nair said, "of course."
Other allegations of
impropriety include charges that some inside the OIOS received financial
kickbacks in return for promoting people and that some people were
promoted in exchange for sexual favors. Nair, a former banker
and civil servant from Singapore, was picked by Annan in 2000."
Jonathan Hunt, Watching the UN's watchdog", Fox News, June 16, 2004. "Fraud awareness, prevention plan and policy
The United Nations has,
to some extent, an established framework on this issue. However, in terms
of implementation, it did
not have a comprehensive internal anti-fraud and anti-corruption
infrastructure, and did not include anti-corruption and anti-fraud
elements in the various rules, procedures and internal controls,
which means that such internal risks may not be properly addressed.
Owing to the lack of
a comprehensive internal fraud plan, a large number of United Nations system offices, funds
and programmes have: (a) No sufficient framework
for prevention, detection, resolution, and reporting; (b) No decentralized
corruption and fraud risk-assessment mechanisms and no corruption and
fraud-prevention committee; (c) No appropriate
resolution mechanisms for reported and detected incidents and allegations
of corruption and fraud (although reliance is placed on the [OIOS] in this
regard." "Financial reports
and audited financial statements for the biennium ended 31 December 2003
and Report of the Board of Auditors", Vol. I, UN document A/59/5 of 22 July 2004, p. 12, item (u), paras. 15(f) and
344-346.
[emphasis added]
"The Board [of
Auditors] recommends that the Administration (i) implement a comprehensive
and well-communicated corruption and fraud prevention plan in the United
Nations system, (ii) establish a corruption and fraud prevention committee
that would serve as an effective framework and coordination point for a
United Nations system corruption and fraud prevention mechanism, (iii)
conduct ethics, corruption and fraud-awareness training sessions and
workshops among managers, international and local employees and other
stakeholders, (iv) develop appropriate resolution mechanisms for reported
and detected incidents and allegations of corruption and fraud, and (v)
review the investigation processes at Offices away from Headquarters." "Financial reports and audited financial statements for the biennium ended 31 December 2003 and Report of the Board of Auditors", Vol. I, UN document A/59/5 of 22 July 2004, p. 12, item (u), paras. 15(f) and 349. [Note: The
Administration airily responded that "some of the Board's comments may give the mistaken
impression to the uninitiated reader that the potential for large-scale
fraudulent and corrupted activities is widespread. The
Administration assigns high priority to the issues of fraud and corruption
"
[emphasis added] "First report on the
implementation of the recommendations of the Board of Auditors
for the
financial period ended 31 December 2003: Report of the Secretary General",
UN document A/59/318 of 1 September 2004,
paras. 124-126. Toward the end of
2000, when Saddam Husseins skimming from the oil-for-food program for
Iraq kicked into high gear, reports spread quickly to the programs
supervisors at the United Nations.
In the halls of the
UN, the programme became a battleground for the competing commercial
interests and political agendas of the 15 individual nations that made up
the Security Council [who also served on the sanctions committee],
diplomats said.
While the diplomats
were deadlocked over how to address violations of the sanctions, money and
contracts continued to flow through the Office of the Iraq Program
The
work of that office, and its former director Benon Sevan, are the focus of
a UN investigation of mismanagement and corruption in the program
Sevan
has said in a
statement that his office was not responsible for ferreting out
corruption.
Evidence of fraud passed from office to office in a round robin
ending nowhere.
While UN auditors
produced 55 reports on the program, several diplomats on the sanctions
committee said in interviews that they never even saw them. In the end, a
complicated set of political and financial pressures kept the program ripe
for corruption. Susan Sachs and Judith Miller, Saddams oil-food fraud: UN let him do it, International Herald Tribune, August 13, 2004.
"Rosemarie Waters,
[the UN Staff Union President], said that
in the last six years, [UN]
management had been reforming itself and increasing managerial authority,
while reducing accountability. The Staff Union [had great respect for the
Secretary-General's vision and reform programme goals.]
It could not support, however, the
erosion of staff rights and dissolution of oversight mechanisms as
a means of implementation, [or legitimize]
actions in which staff,
through their elected representatives, had no meaningful role to play.
The [integrity
survey]
revealed that staff
feared reprisals for exposing breaches of
ethics, and they perceived that the disciplinary process was
applied unevenly. Their view of integrity among senior
managers was less than positive.. The Organization had yet to
establish concrete measures for individual
accountability, she continued. It was essential that areas with
expanded delegation of authority for personnel decisions should be
carefully examined and, if abuses were found, such delegation should be
revoked.
The [OHRM] had informed staff representatives of its inability
to enforce accountability because they lacked central authority. The Fifth Committee may wish to
recommend that concrete individual accountability be developed, in
consultation with staff representatives, on a priority basis."
"UN staff committee
representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in management
reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of 29 October 2004, pp. 2-3.
[emphasis added] "James O. C. Jonah,
[who worked at the UN for three decades]
and served as head of personnel
from 1979 through 1982,
recalled that [when the Fifth Committee
initiated reforms in the late 1970s],
a staff-management consultation
process was established, and it was decided that staff representatives
should be allowed to appear before the Committee. Now, it was sad to see
the erosion of the international civil service in the United Nations. That had
serious implications. The Committee should also have a serious
look at the results of the integrity study. Never had the staff perception of
integrity been so low.
In some respects, the reforms had weakened the
Secretariat considerably. When he served as
head of personnel, his biggest fight had been with programme managers, who
were most resistant to reform
. He could not believe that such measures
as giving authority to programme managers would strengthen the
international civil service. What had been said about the lack of
authority of the OHRM was true. Without a strong personnel office,
however, there would be no uniformity of rules and fairness in the
system.
Governments should not take what was happening lightly." "UN staff committee
representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in management
reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of 29 October 2004, p. 4. "Integrity sponsor
unit 35: The staff
council: [Recalling its April
2004 request that the Secretary-General establish an independent
investigation of violations of the delegation of authority in the OIOS]
Regrets the decision
of the Secretary-General to accept the findings of an incomplete
investigation;
Further considers
that the failure to fully investigate the allegations
upholds the
findings of the [staff integrity survey] that there is a lack of integrity
particularly at the higher levels of the organization; Recalls that the
Secretary-General declined to accept the honourable action of the deputy
Secretary-General who tendered her resignation as a result of the Baghdad
bombing of a UN compound that resulted in 22 staff members perishing, to
hold accountable the head of UNHCR for alleged sexual harassment and to
hold accountable the chef de cabinet whose son was employed by the
Secretariat in contravention of staff rules; Decides that the
senior management no longer displays the level of integrity expected of
all employees of the organization; Requests: i. The president
to convey this vote of no confidence to the Secretary-General and
president of the General Assembly
iv. to the staff at
large and; v. to issue a
press release." "Raw data: U.N. staff
resolution", Fox News (US) website, November 19, 2004. Note: Fox News stated
that the above was the text of a UN staff resolution which it received,
calling for a vote of no confidence in Kofi Annan. "U. N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan said yesterday he was disappointed in his son
for accepting payments from a key contractor in the oil-for-food programme
for more than four years longer than
previously acknowledged.
But the appearance of
a payoff to the Secretary-General's son was just the latest
of
revelations about the Iraqi oil-for-food program
While the
organization scrambles to respond to oil-for-food inquiries, other
troubles are piling up at the organization's doorstep. ... The U.N. peacekeeping
program is wracked by accusations of rape, sexual harassment and extortion
by blue helmets and civilians in the U.N. mission in Congo.
International
pressure also is building on the United Nations and the Security Council
to do more to protect civilians in Darfur, Sudan.
Internally, a [staff]
group seeks to reopen an investigation of [the head of the OIOS]
over
charges of sexual harassment and favoritism
The U.N. staff union
also has criticized Mr. Annan's willingness to exonerate Deputy
Secretary-General Louise Frechette for failing to protect U.N. staff
members in Iraq
[Mr. Annan] also
threw out an internal report finding merit in a [recent] sexual harassment
complaint against
[UNHCR head] Ruud Lubbers." Betsy Pisik, "Another
oil-food scandal emerges", The Washington
Times, November 29, 2004. "Imagine if U.S.
troops were accused of sexually exploiting children in impoverished
nations
a U.S. Cabinet Secretary were accused of
groping a female subordinate, [but then exonerated]
by the president
. [an
agency head]
and the president's own offspring stood accused of
complicity in [a massive embezzlement racket]
[These things
happened in the UN this year.] Where's the outrage?
Why didn't the mainstream
devote more attention to these scandals? Far
from demanding high-level resignations, they are circling the wagons. The U.N.'s friends
are doing
no favors with this knee-jerk defense. Even [Kofi]
Annan recognizes [the problems with his 1997 and 2002 management reform
attempts, and reports on Rwanda, Bosnia, and general peacekeeping
failures.]
[Yet] all the reformistas' efforts founder on the rocks of
apathy and inertia.
Most of the U.N.'s 191 member states
[and] 49,000
employees
have other priorities. | |||
