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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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In
July 1994, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 48/218 B, which
established a new, and operationally independent, Office of Internal
Oversight Services (OIOS), to be headed by an Under-Secretary-General. He
or she would serve for one five-year term, and be responsible for
monitoring, internal audit, evaluation, and a new investigations function,
and could also support and advise managers. The OIOS submits reports to
the Secretary-General providing "insight" on the effective utilization and
management of UN resources and protection of its assets, which the
Secretary-General in turn submits to the General
Assembly. General Assembly resolution 48/218 B, In its new and
final form, the OIOS had changed from the interim, no-nonsense title of
"Office of Inspections and Investigations" to one providing a set of much
less threatening "Services."
Equally importantly, while its head had risen from Assistant- to
Under-Secretary-General, he was not the much talked about, and
one-and-only "Inspector-General," but merely one among some two
dozen
or
more USG-level UN officials (i.e., just a "face in the crowd") However,
even now the OIOS head is still often informally referred to as the "UN
inspector-general" by many people for the simple reason that those are his
powers and functions.
The
modifications that were made in the titles of the office and of its head
reflected great unease among the UN "barons" (and their colleagues in many
Member State delegations) about the powerful new oversight regime that had
been forced upon the UN. This
unease was evident in the great interest in the choice of the first head
of OIOS. Julia Preston, "UN
corruption cop: New man on a very political beat," International Herald
Tribune, 29 March 1995.
Fortunately, the
UN had a readily available pool of high-level experts from which to choose
a first OIOS head to undertake the Herculean task of helping reform the
defective UN management culture. The International
Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions
(INTOSAI) is a long-established professional group with members in over
170 countries who audit government accounts and operations. INTOSAI provides them with
extensive programmes and cooperative activities. INTOSAI members and the
UN system know each other very well: a dozen or so national audit offices
provide external auditors in rotation for all the UN system organizations,
in accord with the best professional practices. "International Organization of
Supreme Audit Institutions" (INTOSAI), at www.intosai.org , "INTOSAI - An overview",
and Accountability, management
improvement, and oversight in the United Nations System", Joint Inspection
Unit, UN document A/50/503,
1995, Chapter VII,
"External system-wide oversight bodies", paras. 208-215.
IO Watch has
already noted Childers and Urquhart's observation
that: "After decades of periodic
suggestions for an Inspector General to be attached directly to the Office
of the Secretary-General, this issue is now being actively pressed. This may, on balance, be helpful
but not really effective if the IAD remains so grossly understaffed. To carry maximum
credulity and universal confidence the appointee must be of impeccable
repute and with top-calibre qualifications for such
work." Erskine
Childers, with Brian
Urquhart, "Renewing the United Nations system", Development
Dialogue, 1994:1, Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden,
1994, pp. 146-147. [emphasis
added.]
Unfortunately, UN Secretary-General
Boutros Ghali chose to make the new OIOS head just another traditional UN
political appointment. Instead of a senior audit professional from
INTOSAI, many of whom would have been happy to accept the professional
challenge, prestige (and high pay) involved, he chose, with minimal
consultation and little evidence of a serious search process, Mr.
Karl-Theodor Paschke, a German diplomat. (At the time Germany was becoming
a major UN contributor, but
held few senior posts.) Mr. Paschke was
appointed for a five-year term beginning in November 1994. But the accompanying press
release, while noting that he had at least some managerial experience in
his national diplomatic service, did not mention that he had any
professional auditing or
investigative credentials, expertise, experience, or accomplishments, nor
does it appear that any evidence was ever provided to validate the
legitimacy of this pivotal UN "accountability
appointment." "Karl Theodor
Paschke to assume post of Under-Secretary-General for Oversight Services
on 15 November." UN document SG/SM/94/126 of 25 August 1994.
Mr Paschke, as
befits a former press spokesman for his country's foreign minister and a
talented jazz saxophonist (much like former US President Bill Clinton),
quickly proved a very visible spokesman, traveling actively around the
world and giving many press conferences to "show the flag" of new UN
oversight (including posing playing his sax in front of the UN
Headquarters building in New York for a major German magazine.) But while he proved to be a
watchdog with a lot of "bark," he provided very little bite. "Jazz at the UN:
Karl blows the whistle
," UN Staff Report, December
1994, p. 3, and Mario R.
Dederichs, "Vereinte Nationen: Neue Tφne im Hochhaus der Verschwendung:
Ein Deutscher soll die Weltorganization von ihren Lastern
kurieren
.," Stern (Germany),
1995.
Mr. Paschke made
several sweeping pronouncements on his arrival which shaped the new OIOS
in a harmful way. First, he immediately declared his whole-hearted desire
to "work closely with managers" and avoid confrontation, thereby
jeopardizing the "arms length" independence and firm "watchdog" attitude
that credible and professional auditors must have. His attitudes
undermined the firm focus of the General Assembly's still nascent
management accountability resolution of 1993, the Thornburgh and Childers
and Urquhart emphasis on the pivotal role of the new Inspector General,
and his predecessor (Mohamed Aly Niazi's) conclusions on the importance of
management sanctions for the UN's many careless managers. Instead, Mr. Paschke informed the
Fifth Committee in December 1994 that: "
permit me to tell
you briefly my basic philosophy for the fulfillment of my duties
in general and for
the [OIOS] in particular. First of all, I do
not consider myself an antagonistic type of person.
I believe in
consensus-seeking.
Results
are better achieved thorough dialogue and quiet reasoning, in an
atmosphere of mutual trust.
above all, I see
myself as an adviser to the Secretary-General and to senior officials, and
as a counsel to line managers and to the Organization as a whole, for
better management.
My approach will not be primarily that of a critic. OIOS
should offer
assistance to managers in implementing our
recommendations
[and] to
give
advice on putting
into practice the measures we propose.
I understand that
the primary responsibility for programme implementation rests with
programme managers. The role
of OIOS is to ensure that adequate systems for monitoring are in place in
each department and office.
I hope to encourage
greater concern by managers throughout the United Nations with the results
of their activities
" "Statement by
Karl Th. Paschke
to the Fifth Committee," 5 December
1994, pp. 4-5, 7-8.
[emphasis added.] [Note: the key
missing words in Mr. Paschke's last two sentences were that the role of
OIOS would not be merely to ensure that monitoring systems were in place, but would be "used,
by OIOS and others, to ensure management accountability," not a process of "encouraging" greater managerial
concern with results.]
Second, Mr. Paschke
made clear his limited interest in the rest of the UN staff, proclaiming
only four months after his arrival that they should reduced by up to 20
percent. But his most destructive step was to express his strong distaste
for staff who might use the new OIOS "hotline" mechanism, which the
General Assembly had insisted on in considerable detail, to report UN
fraud and mismanagement. The
General Assembly had in fact called for establishing whistleblower and
hotline processes in considerable specific detail in Resolution 48/218 B,
and it was expanded upon in a Secretary-General's Bulletin
(ST/SGB/273). Yet Mr. Paschke
told the Fifth Committee that: "As part of the
investigation function, we now have procedures for receiving confidential
information
I will
guarantee complete confidentiality to all those who wish to provide us
with information on problems.
Having said this
I must add immediately that I am not comfortable with receiving
anonymous messages, and will certainly do nothing to encourage this
practice. In any case, this should be seen as a system of last
resort. The first, and by far
the most important way, for staff to voice complaints and make suggestions
must be to and through their immediate
supervisors. When I was told I
would have to take anonymous tips into account in my new job I was
reminded of
Hamlet,
who was given a
suggestion by a ghost
[and] then proceeded
to procrastinate. He was a
rational man and had his doubts about acting on the advice of ghosts. I hope I am not put in a similar
situation myself too often."
"Establishment of
the Office of Internal Oversight Services," UN document ST/SGB/273 of 7
September 1994, para. 13.
"Statement by
Karl Th. Paschke
to the Fifth Committee," 5 December
1994, pp. 11-12 , and "Paschke speaks
his mind: Calls for staff reduction," UN Staff Report (NY),
March 1995, p. 3.
A
close observer of UN goings-on in New York made an acerbic assessment of
Mr. Paschke's initial performance: "Karl T. Paschke's introductory remarks to the Fifth Committee
reveal a man curiously laid-back for a job that requires cracking down on
waste, abuse, and corruption.
Could it be that Paschke is finessing? True, coming on like
gangbusters would have been a mistake, given the well-known misgivings in
the higher echelons of the Secretariat about the whole enterprise. So Paschke went out of his way to
acknowledge that Butros Boutros-Ghali still is boss in the house, although
his emphasis on his own role as 'adviser' may have been a bit exaggerated.
Paschke does not
invite anonymous tips and would prefer that staffers go through their
immediate supervisors with complaints. If meant seriously, that's perhaps
a little naοve. Supervisors
like to have a tidy shop and who among them would look kindly on a
subordinate whistleblower. As
long as guarantees of confidentiality can be maintained, far better
[that staff] pass it
along through the dedicated telephone line
" "Diplomatic
pouch" by Petronius, Diplomatic World Bulletin (NY), December 12,
1994.
Third,
and despite his lack of expertise and experience in corruption-fighting, Mr. Paschke
asserted early on, and often, that the UN had no more corruption problems
than other organizations.
When a correspondent asked the question in a 1996 press briefing,
Mr. Paschke responded that: "He had been asked
that question before, and would repeat his answer now. He believed that the United
Nations was certainly no worse than other comparable institutions.
In the first two
years of his work he had come to the conclusion that fraud was not
the main concern of the OIOS, but rather administrative weakness
and a very limited administrative expertise, with many people handling
sizeable amounts of money. It
was, therefore, also a problem of enhancing management expertise and
management savvy
" "Press briefing
by Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services," UN, New York,
31 October 1996.
[emphasis added]
In
his first annual report in 1995, Mr. Paschke did indeed try to cite some
critical UN management problems: the complicated and numerous UN rules and
regulations which confused rather than guided staff; the cumbersome personnel system
which hindered the hiring of new talent while not terminating
non-performers; a lack of good managers which necessitated urgent training
programmes; poor
communication and dialogue which led UN staff at all levels to "shun
responsibility and accountability"; poor institutional memory and files;
and far-flung UN duty stations in the field that "clearly lead a life of
their own." In particular, and
forcefully, he stated in this first report, with regard to accountability,
that:
"I believe that some of the deficiencies and weaknesses which an
increasingly critical public nowadays seems to detect in the United
Nations have something to do with the traditionally weak oversight
functions: the bureaucracy has grown without pruning for too many years
efforts must be made
to do away with the widespread tendency of staff, even in key
positions, to shun responsibility and accountability. OIOS backs measures taken by the
[DAM] to achieve this goal and will focus its own recommendations to
management accordingly.
Many UN managers are not used to and seem to be quite reluctant
to accept criticism, particularly when it comes to applying accountability
criteria rather than settling for the
promise that some specific problems won't recur. This feature of the United
Nations culture must be changed if we are ever to develop staff
awareness and acceptance of responsibility and accountability. United Nations managers must stop
being defensive and enter into a critical dialogue with OIOS. In order to make oversight
effective, we offer ourselves as partners, not
adversaries." "Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the [OIOS]", UN document A/50/459, 2 October 1995,
"Preface."
[emphasis added]
Unfortunately,
however, any attempts by Mr. Paschke to tackle misbehaviour and reverse
this severe accountability deficit in partnership with his fellow UN
senior managers foundered, beginning with a single telling failure. In 1995, OIOS found a manager who
had appointed a "close personal friend" as his assistant with special
allowances. This favoritism
lowered staff morale. OIOS
recommended that a staff rule which prohibited such cozy appointments for
relatives be expanded to cover "lovers and friends" as well. OHRM
promised to amend the rule, but never did so. UN barons ridiculed this
attempt and Mr. Paschke then abandoned the effort. That is unfortunate, since
cronyism, nepotism, sexual harassment, and manipulations of posts for
"friends and lovers" are very real, entrenched, disruptive, and
morale-busting UN personnel problems which continue merrily on today.
"Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the [OIOS]", UN document A/50/459, 2 October 1995,
para. 89.
Eventually,
Mr. Paschke realized the seriousness of the fraud investigations and due
process procedures he was responsible for. He told Fifth Committee
delegations in late 1995 that "much more had to be done
to ferret out waste and inefficiency" and that
"no amount of mismanagement and fraudulent activity could ever be
tolerated." In a 1996 staff
journal article: "He
reiterated the fact that any staff who come forward with complaints,
criticisms and information on mismanagement, waste and abuse, will be
proected by his office. He
has no difficulty in approaching supervisors directly to ensure that staff
do not suffer reprisals for providing OIOS with information." "Interview with USG/OIOS," What's New, Staff Union
journal (NY), August 21,
1996, p. 4.
[Text quote is from "Press briefing by OIOS", 29 October
1995. ]
This
belated conversion did not convince staff, inside observers, or skeptical
press people at the UN, (although it did eventually give a general broader
impression to outsiders that the UN had acquired a no-nonsense
"crime-fighting" head inspector). A 1996 assessment observed wryly
that: "Halfway
through his term and answerable only to Member States, [Mr. Paschke] can
look forward to a comfortable couple of years
But United
Nations observers are beginning to ask what has been achieved in exchange
for
a free hand for Paschke. The answer is not encouraging.
the original
conception of Paschke's post was a combination of Grand Inquisitor and
Super Sleuth. The final
product, insiders say, falls far short of either.
"The problem is that half the OIOS
staff do not know anything about the UN" we are told, "and the other half
know everything there is to know but are part of the establishment and
they are not going to make waves."
The results of OIOS's travails are paltry indeed
. There are whispers
that senior staff need not fear their peccadilloes will be exposed.
Paschke's Finest, it is said, will rake no muck above a certain level of
political or bureaucratic influence."
"Diplomatic
pouch", Diplomatic World Bulletin, July29-August 6, 1996, p.
10.
Similarly,
a 1997 article on the new battle against UN corruption observed that, for
staff: "UN employees -- who request anonymity because they fear they will
suffer more professional harm than the corrupt officials they want to
expose -- have provided numerous accounts of officials' being transferred
rather than dismissed after being caught breaking the
rules. This happens
frequently in cases of sexual harassment, nepotism, and occasionally
violence, according to these accounts. Whistle-blowers are neither
encouraged nor rewarded." Barbara
Crossette, "In war on corruption, UN confronts well-entrenched foe,"
International Herald Tribune, November 3, 1997.
Two
awkward personal incidents also clearly weakened Mr. Paschke's stature and
image as the UN's first top "corruption fighter." In 1996 he reacted very
angrily when some OIOS staff expressed public concerns about his
professional staffing policies in the OIOS. He threatened to expose and deal
with the ringleaders, but made no evident response to the serious charges
and issues of staff quality and recruitment propriety that they had
raised, as observed in a staff journal on the hazards of people who live
in glass houses and throw stones.
"Dear
colleagues," a letter from Mr. Paschke of 31 March 1997, and
"OIOS and a whistle blower",
UN Staff Report (NY), 1997. Equally
seriously, media articles in March 1998 disclosed that Mr. Paschke had
accepted some 563,000 DM (about $325,000) in extra payments from the
German government, a practice specifically and repeatedly forbidden for UN
civil servants. Unlike
a fellow senior German and UN colleague who returned his money after the
story made "front-page news" in Germany for a week, with strong criticism
from opposition politicians and trade unions, Mr. Paschke apparently did
not promptly and publicly (or at all?) repay the money to his
government.
"UN environment chief will return
half-million marks to Germany", AP, Bonn Germany, 16 March 1998, and
related articles from dpa, afp, Bild am Sonntag, Schwaebische
Zeitung, AFP, and Reuters, March
1998.
Such
scandals are not new.
Even though they undermine the UN Charter, they have been accepted
for decades. "[In the 1970s and 1980s] the
salaries of senior members of the U. N. service would in a number of cases
be supplemented, in another reversal of the Charter articles, by large
subsidies from their respective governments (one official receiving, for
instance, a U. N. salary of a hundred and twenty thousand dollars a year
while accepting from her government an additional annual payment of eighty
thousand dollars.) Each
ensuing violation has been condoned by successive Secretaries-General,
whose sworn obligation and public claim it is to defend the Secretariat
from just such interventions.
('This book is my religion', the fifth Secretary-General, Javier
Pιrιz de Cuellar, told the Times in 1982, pointing to the
Charter.)" Hazzard, Shirley, on UN top
salaries in the 1980s, in "Breaking Faith, Part I", The New
Yorker, September 25, 1989,
pp. 63-99, [ 74].
However,
a more recent forceful prohibition of such extra governmental payments to
UN staff was detailed in a 1992 UN internal guidance
document: "
staff regulation 1.6
[contains] a
critical injunction against the acceptance of 'any honour,
or remuneration'
from any Government
. The regulation leaves no
discretion of the part of the Secretary-General to approve such
acceptance.
The prohibition
flows from Article
100, paragraph 1 of the [UN Charter]
also reflected in
the Staff Rules and in the oath of office taken by all staff
members. Receipt of any [such]
supplement
fundamentally compromises the independence of individuals involved.
The practice of
national subsidies
is unacceptable.
and as requested by the General Assembly [in resolution 45/241 of 21 December
1990] it is necessary to take urgent measures to put an end to it. Accordingly, all staff members who might be receiving
a supplement
from a Government should immediately [arrange]
to discontinue receipt of such supplement.
receipt by any staff member of a governmental supplement will be
considered as constituting misconduct within staff regulation 10.2 leading
to the imposition of disciplinary measures in accordance with staff rule
110.3.
the [OHRM] will develop procedures by which staff members will be required
to attest regularly that they are not receiving any supplement from any
Government to their emoluments." "Acceptance of
payments from governments to supplement United Nations emoluments," UN
document ST/AI/380 of 23 December 1992.
Under these rules, Mr. Paschke, the chief
"independent" enforcer of UN rules, was himself in violation of a very
clear-cut UN rule. He never should have accepted his
supplemental payments, or should at least have returned them after the
scandal broke). Since he did neither, Secretary-General Annan should have
charged him with misconduct in 1998, and invoked UN disciplinary
measures.
In the world of the UN, of course, and despite the UN
oratory about its global "moral leadership" role in the 1990s, nothing
happened. The German government maintained the payments were not improper,
and that those to Mr. Paschke were a lump-sum "prepayment" made to him
before he assumed his UN office. However, that huge payment represented
rental supplements for an expensive New York apartment, spread at about
10,000 DM (or $5,800) per month over his five-year term. Mr. Paschke
apparently did nothing. But although he remained technically untouched,
this incident clearly compromised his independence and his basic stature
as the most visible symbol and enforcer of UN rules. "UN environment chief
will return half-million marks to Germany", AP, Bonn Germany, 16 March
1998, and related articles from dpa, Bild am
Sonntag, Schwaebische Zeitung, AFP, and
Reuters, March 1998.
Further, in apparent response to the scandal,
Secretary-General Annan "recalled" in March 1998 that such payments were
not permitted.
He said, however, and in contradiction to the requirements of the
UN Charter as stated above, that he was "concerned" that the UN could not
attract top staff worldwide. He asked the head of DAM to review the
question so that the Secretary-General might "pursue" it with the General
Assembly in revising the UN code of conduct. Ultimately, the subject
Regulation did not change, but Mr. Annan subsequently made an unusual
public and personal attestation that Mr. Paschke's independence
"had never been compromised" during his five-year term [see item thereon
of 23 September 1999 at the end of this subsection.] "Secretary-General
says government subsidies to UN staff not permitted under regulations
adopted by General Assembly," UNIS/SG/1870 of 19
March 1998.
Despite this bumpy personal start by Mr. Paschke, the
new OIOS went to work. The dominant OIOS activity is auditing, with modest
inspection work, less evaluations, and even less investigation
activity.
During his first few years Mr. Paschke focused OIOS audit
priorities on peacekeeping and humanitarian field programmes, procurement,
and new organization functions (like war crimes tribunals). In 1998, OIOS
adopted a risk assessment process and a plan which seeks to normally audit
all parts of the UN on a cycle of no more than four years. "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document
A/51/432,
25 September 1996, para. 8, "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document
A/53/428,
23 September 1998, para. 84. The audit work results in
more than 100 audit assignments every year, yielding more than 1,000
recommendations for corrective action. In fact, there were 6,675 total
recommendations made by OIOS to UN management during Mr. Paschke's term,
93 percent by the auditors, with more than half of those devoted to only
five programmes -- the Departments of peacekeeping, management, and
economic and social affairs, the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP), and
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document
A/54/393,
23 September 1999,
"Preface."
Unfortunately, and in
considerable part due to the continuing small size and limited resources
of the OIOS, these hundreds of annual OIOS audits each year seem to be
much more narrow compliance, "office work", and "process" reviews rather
than true management audits with an explicit performance component. While
they have produced some significant cost savings, apparently due largely
to correction of bookkeeping errors, the OIOS thus lost an important
opportunity to apply systematic "accountability audits" and the rigorous
performance reviews which the very weak UN management culture certainly
needs.
The tremendous volume of detailed audit work also kept
OIOS from firmly addressing the UN's dysfunctional management culture. Mr.
Paschke's predecessor, Mr. Niazi, had emphasized that no system of
management accountability would be effective without sanctions promptly
applied when violations occur. Yet, OIOS preoccupation with detailed audit
"busy work" details helped keep the OIOS from confronting the three
ever-present gross defects of UN day-to-day operations all around it -- deadwood
staff and their cronies, abuse of allowances and privileges, and "floater"
staff in a very uncontrolled personnel and post system, as discussed
throughout this website. Mr. Paschke himself had clearly identified this
central problem in his first annual report, and had pointed out the
critical need to hold managers accountable (see the citation of 2 October
1995 above.)
In the preface to his 1997 annual report he returned again, but
only briefly, to the problem: "
new initiatives aiming at decentralization and
delegation of authority
cannot be achieved just by issuing a few new administrative instructions
the decentralization
[must ensure] that the factors that are essential for its success are in
place.
This
[requires] an effective monitoring mechanism to ensure that the authority
delegated is being exercised prudently and judiciously.
The
[regulations and rules] and
administrative issuances
have too often protected staff members from being held accountable for
their actions
and have done too little to protect the interests of the United Nations.
" "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document
A/524/426,
22 October 1997,
"Preface."
Yet in the same report preface he also stated that he
would stand aside from the ongoing management reform processes: "
in view of the
independence of the OIOS function
I feel strongly that I should not be
involved in any management decisions that I may be expected to scrutinize
later on from an oversight point of view." "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document
A/524/426,
22 October 1997,
"Preface." In IO Watch's opinion, this was doubly
confusing and wrong. First, the OIOS had already taken its
enthusiasm for working with managers very far. Although resolution 48/218
B and the OIOS terms of reference state very briefly that OIOS "may"
support and advise managers, OIOS had magnified that activity by labeling
its major division "Audit and Management Consulting" and prided itself on
being entwined and working closely with managers and their programmes
throughout the Organization. (This close cooperation has only
increased under the second head of OIOS, as discussed in the next
subsection.) In fact, the current Enron and related corporate
scandals and accounting and auditing policy struggles worldwide emphasize
that the provision of both management consulting and audit services to its
clients is a fundamental and serious conflict of interest, since auditors
may wind up auditing systems and processes that they help establish. As in
so many other areas, however, the UN remains blithely oblivious to basic
management issues in the world around it. Among many such
articles, "Auditing firms under fire: U.S. agency seeks to curb potential
conflicts," International Herald Tribune, June 28,
2000. Second, and most importantly, the 1993 requirements
for a management accountability system given by General Assembly
resolution 48/218 A were clear and fundamental. Mr. Paschke himself
emphasized the need for "an effective monitoring mechanism to ensure that
the authority delegated is being exercised prudently and judiciously" in
his 1997 annual report, and in later reports he cited the lack
of accountability as an ongoing problem. Further, the OIOS terms of reference state clearly that the
Office shall: "undertake management audits, reviews, and surveys to
improve the Organization's structure and responsiveness to the
requirements of
legislative mandates
[and]
evaluate the efficiency and
effectiveness of the implementation of
[those] legislative
mandates."
"Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document
A/524/426,
22 October 1997, "Preface," "Review of the
administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations", General
Assembly resolution 48/218 B, 29 July 1994, and
especially "Establishment of the
Office of Internal Oversight Services," UN document ST/SGB/273 of 7 September 1994, paras. 13-14.
Yet Mr. Paschke (and his successor) and the OIOS never
examined whether and how well the General Assembly's 1993 management
accountability resolution was being implemented. IO Watch believes that the gradual disappearance of
the General Assembly's accountability reform and the failure to implement
it may well have been due, at least in part, to Mr. Paschke's failure to
act decisively as a forceful oversight figure, in accord with the OIOS
mandate, on this critical issue. In addition, as already noted, Mohamed Aly Niazi, the
first head of the transitional unit that preceded the OIOS, had extensive
"hands-on" UN audit experience. In his report in September 1994 on the
pre-OIOS unit's first year, he had specifically warned that: "During this first
year, [this Office] has addressed symptoms but has not yet been able to
address the root causes of
many [UN] problems. I refer to such issues as recruitment and promotion policies, the administration
of justice, management reporting systems, staffing and financing of
peacekeeping operations and contract management. A
vast amount of work remains to be done before the United Nations has
management structures and a management culture adequate to the great tasks
entrusted to it
.
"
"Report of the Office
of Inspections and Investigations", UN document A/49/449, 28 September 1994, pages 5-6.
[emphasis added.]
However, only
when the General Assembly itself identified several important areas for
more oversight attention, in particular problems in human resources
management, did OIOS begin some important, but very tardy, work on these
subjects in 1998. Mr. Paschke then at least gradually joined others to
urge such important actions as reform of defective UN internal control
systems, completion of a ponderous modernization of UN information
technology systems, and correction of grave personnel processing problems
(but not the key underlying issues of personnel selection quality and
fairness.) As he put it in his 1998 annual report: "Internal oversight has matured since its inception in
1994
In fact improving management in the United Nations is the central concern
of OIOS.
In its internal oversight work
,
the OIOS has focused on the substantive activities of the
Organization
peacekeeping missions and humanitarian affairs
,
along with procurement and new United Nations bodies. While these areas
will continue to deserve our scrutiny, I believe that we must now
gradually shift our attention to some of the more systemic -- or pervasive
deficiencies of the Organization, phenomena which affect the way in which
the United Nations does business across the board. This will
sometimes call for a horizontal approach in looking, for example, at
common services and how they function in different duty stations, a
project scheduled for the fall of 1998." "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document A/53/428, 1998, Preface, paras. 2 and 6, 14-15.
This new OIOS activity finally undertook some of the
kind of investigative work that it could and should have been doing all
along. As
cited (and commented on) by the International
Documents Review in 1998, the closest observer of what UN documents
actually have to say -- and also not say -- the OIOS had
found "a selection of scandals": "
the [OIOS} report is a guide to a variety of UN
scandals, most of them unknown beyond the walls of the Secretariat because
of entrenched traditions of secrecy. Senior UN
officials do not seem to understand -- or perhaps they understand only too
well --
the role of transparency in avoiding waste and fraud. As we have
noted before, the bidding process for the award of multimillion dollar UN
contracts is entirely secret. Even the opening of bids from
contractors, which UN regulations require to be 'public,' takes place
behind closed doors, and information is released neither to the Press nor
to any intergovernmental body. According to corridor talk, things are
set to become worse: a new directive on ''information security' is said to
prescribe dire penalties for staff members who talk to the Press or
delegations." "The Second UN Conference on Human Settlements
is perhaps the crown jewel among the scandals
recorded by OIOS. This is not because of its legacy, an uncovered deficit
in the range of $2 million
[but] because of the all-round incompetence involved. The
secretariat [hired] consultants at a total cost of $2.5 million without
competitive bidding. The [conference] Secretary-General
incurred travel costs of $370,000
The Conference 'never submitted a cost plan for the use of the $8.2
million in voluntary contributions
accounting for donor contributions was incomplete
and financial statements [were] delayed. OIOS does not
address the question of how this situation developed and was allowed to
continue.
How was Mr. N'dow picked to organize a major UN conference? What were his
credentials?
Why was nothing done when the first alarm bells went off?" "OIOS has
investigated several cases of fraud. One of which we have written before
involves an UNCTAD staff member (a United States citizen of Cuban origin)
who bilked the agency of over $600,000 by claiming travel and per diem
expenses for non-existent experts attending imaginary meetings. OIOS does not record the fact that this imaginative
individual was caught only because he was hospitalized for a time and
could not keep up the charade. This is surely material for a Hollywood
comedy." "OIOS has just begun to study the management of human
resources at the UN, and the findings so far underline the
never-never-land quality of the bureaucracy. The
Organization takes, on average, 460.5 days to recruit a new staff member.
OIOS found that the recruitment process 'lacked
transparency and was cumbersome
"
It was characterized by 'inadequate methods for identifying qualified
candidates [and] inefficient pre-employment clearances
Reforms, 'while headed in the right direction, lacked sufficient
institutional support.
'" "Reviewing 3+ years
of work, [OIOS] sees continuing problems - but reforms are afoot," International Documents Review, 2 November 1998, pp. 1-4.
The 1998 OIOS annual report also showed that Mr.
Paschke's faith that managers could develop and apply their own
performance and monitoring systems was naοve. Just as was
the case with programme performance reporting in the pre-OIOS days, the
Office found that: "The quality of departmental submissions received by
OIOS for the 1996-1997 programme performance period clearly indicates
that, in many departments
and offices, there is still inadequate commitment to oversight,
and, consequently no coordination or managerial mechanism that collects
and analyses on a routine basis information on the progress made and
results achieved under the various activities and programmes. Many
departments still do not have either a senior planning and coordination
function
or a unit to provide coordinated feedback on the success and shortfalls in
programme implementation. [Progress requires that programme
managers recognize]
such systems as basic management tools for improving efficiency and
effectiveness of implementation." "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document A/53/428, 23 September 1998, Preface, para. 184.
[emphasis added.]
As the above excerpts show,
any sense of the overall work of OIOS is at best obtained by a careful
reading of the items in its lengthy annual reports. They do
provide many interesting accounts of specific mismanagement and waste
cases, in a way that was never done before. Yet their ad hoc character is a fundamental reporting flaw.
An effective inspector-general's report should provide a systematic
overview and analysis of existing, emerging, and longer-term patterns,
trends, risks, and areas of emphasis, together with results obtained,
follow-up, and the overall impact of oversight work, all in response to
changing management and accountability needs. Light, Paul C., Monitoring government: Inspectors General and the
search for accountability, Chapter 10 "Measuring the impact of IGs",
Brookings Institution/Governance Institute, Washington, D.C., USA, 1993,
pp. 204-220. The OIOS annual reports fall far short of these basic
standards. They rely primarily on anecdotal "stories" of selected
high-profile reviews. They provide quantitative statistics which focus on
massive annual process "activities" (hundreds of audits completed,
thousands of recommendations made and many "accepted", and hundreds of
staff reports about operational problems made to the OIOS
investigations unit.) Not only are these raw statistics not arranged,
analyzed, and interpreted, they are difficult to compare and relate to
other information, or to each other, in a meaningful way from year to
year.
They
provide the General Assembly and the public with little or no
transparency and sense of the all-important broader patterns of UN
organizational performance, effectiveness, management systems, and impact;
a clear sense of where the major specific problems lie; or indications of
new action steps needed, let alone those being taken. The annual reports show other limitations as
well of OIOS work since its inception: -- as required by the General Assembly,
they contain elaborate tables of recommendations made, accepted, and acted
upon (or not), but essentially on a purely quantitative basis; -- they discuss cost savings identified and
realized, but reflect the fact that each year OIOS can only examine about
$1 billion or less of the $6-10 billion that the UN spends, and average
only about $20-40 million of annual savings, most of which come from
bookkeeping errors rather than detection of fraud and waste, and -- in
total --
represent a very small 1.5% of the resources looked at in any particular
year (as discussed further in the subsection following on OIOS
investigations work and impact); -- clearly more staff are needed for the
OIOS (and especially for investigations, perhaps a doubling or more), as
foreseen before the Office was created, and very necessary if UN fraud,
waste, and abuse are to be truly held in check; -- Mr. Paschke spoke often of the high
professionalism of his staff but, even when pressed by Member State
representatives, he apparently did not provide details on the critical
audit measures of OIOS staff professionalism -- how many have
appropriate professional certifications, degrees, prior experience, and
continuing training for their work, and how many possess the legal and
investigative specialties needed, or up-to-date computerized auditing
skills; -- in addition, OIOS has spent considerable
time and effort helping other UN funds and programmes, and other UN system
agencies improve their internal oversight efforts, particularly
investigation work: this is a nice gesture, but counterproductive when the
OIOS has more work than it can handle inside the UN Secretariat. There have been other signs of problems with OIOS
work. A
General Assembly resolution in 1997 noted "with deep concern the incidents
of fraud and presumed fraud" reported not by the OIOS, but by the UN
external auditors. The Assembly called on the
Secretary-General to take necessary disciplinary action on cases of proven
fraud and to "enhance the individual accountability of United Nations
personnel, including through stronger managerial control." "Financial reports and
audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors",
General Assembly resolution 51/225 of 16 May
1997, paras. A.11 and 12.
In addition, a 1997 assessment by the UN Commission on
International Trade Law found a 1997 OIOS study to be "seriously flawed
and not of the quality one would expect from an organization of the UN's
stature." OIOS subsequently had an independent review made of the
situation and promised new "quality assurance" procedures for its work.
"UN defeats a charge
of business vendetta", International
Herald Tribune, July 12,
1999, p.5, and "Report of the
Secretary-General on activities of the OIOS", UN document A/54/393, 1999, Preface, 5th para., paras. 67-68,
95.
The General Assembly has not been much help in
actually using
and improving OIOS work, although it is supposed to be the major
"customer," and provide guidance to, the Office. The Fifth Committee has
passed some resolutions on the separate and annual reports which the OIOS
submits to the General Assembly, which largely only "take note of" the
OIOS reports, with perhaps a request for a particular study. In fact, the Committee generally seems not quite sure
what to do with OIOS reports. Mr. Paschke observed in his last annual
report in 1999 that: "As I write these
lines, three previous annual reports, as well as several individual
reports of OIOS, transmitted and introduced a long time ago, have still
received no formal response from the Fifth Committee, although they have
been thoroughly discussed and commented upon in that forum. I
can only express my hope that this impasse will eventually be overcome and
that the value added to the work of the United Nations by independent
internal oversight will be recognized by all stakeholders. " "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document
A/54/393,
23 September 1999,
"Preface."
In 1998, the General Assembly launched a 5-year
evaluation of OIOS performance that had been mandated by its resolution
48/218 B of 1994. However, after discussing various
guidance and improvement issues for over a year, particularly concerning
investigation work, informal consultations bogged down. The Assembly
finally passed a very dry resolution in early 2000 composed mainly of
procedural cautions and only recognizing the "importance" of the
OIOS.
The Assembly stated that it would "evaluate" the OIOS again
(presumably in the same rather toothless fashion) in the year 2004.
"Review of the
implementation of General Assembly resolution 48/218 B", General Assembly
resolution 54/244 of 31 January 2000.
As his five-year term drew towards its close, Mr.
Paschke became more reflective about unfinished business, including
accountability measures. In his 1998 annual report he stated that "
the new management culture has shown significant improvements over the
reporting period; Far-reaching initiatives are under way to introduce
increased delegation of authority and accountability, but in this regard a
lot more needs to be done.
Better guidance, precise instructions, and more management training must
be provided.
Equally crucial but infinitely more complex will be the efforts to
instil a sense of accountability among staff members." "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document A/53/428 of
23 September 1998, "Preface", 3d and 4th
paras.
[Note: It is telling
that when Mr. Paschke spoke firmly, he was directing his words to "staff
members."
When he wanted to be understanding, cooperative, and reassuring, he
was speaking to managers. IO Watch believes that there was little doubt
about whose team he was playing on.] In his last annual report in 1999, Mr. Paschke further, and
rather sanctimoniously, observed that many fundamental accountability and
management systems issues and reforms, which he himself had largely
ignored or only very belatedly begun to examine, needed to be addressed --
as if he had not been directly involved and expected to be a key figure in
solving them: "The United Nations of today
is a better Organization in many respects than, say, five years ago, and
enhanced oversight has played its part in that change. However, further improvement
is still necessary in many ways. Internal controls are not strong enough
yet; accountability
continues to be blurred and misunderstood; delegation of authority
must be effectively executed; and human resources management is in need of
further reform
" "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document A/54/393, of
23 September 1999, 3d from last
para.
[emphasis added.] In the preface to the 1999 annual report, Mr. Paschke
also asserted that "The independence of
[OIOS] is its most important and indispensable asset. I am proud to
say that this independence has never been compromised during my
tenure." "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document
A/54/393,
23 September 1999,
"Preface."
Secretary-General Annan himself felt impelled to put
his reputation on the line in support of Mr. Paschke, stating in his
covering note to the 1999 annual report that: "The
Secretary-General concurs with the observations of the
Under-Secretary-General [of OIOS] in his preface that the independence of
the Office has never been compromised during his tenure. He has enjoyed
the complete support of the Secretary-General." "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document A/54/393, of
23 September 1999, Covering
Note,
para. 2. In late 1999, Mr. Paschke left the UN, "exiting to
applause" in at least some quarters. He resumed the role of
corruption-fighter which he had consistently downplayed during his
five-year tenure, and in most of the OIOS work. A very
positive
article cited some dramatic examples of fraud and mismanagement
that had occurred and concluded that: "Five years ago
the General Assembly created a watchdog office to fight corruption and
mismanagement within the Organization. On Friday,
Karl Theodor Paschke ended his
[term] having uncovered millions of dollars of fraud or abuse. For the first time,
the United Nations began dismissing employees quickly, recovering losses
by confiscating their pensions and property, and turning over criminal
cases to public trials in national courts rather than allowing malfeasance
to disappear quietly. In Washington, there was parting praise for Mr.
Paschke
[who] had taken on an enormous job in trying to reform "a very
dysfunctional institution"
Mr. Paschke has worked against a backdrop of
unrelenting criticism from a group of developing nations, which objected
to the appointment of an inspector general from an industrial nation and
has blocked approval of several of his major reports. But two of his
biggest cases of fraud involved Americans.
Clearly no one can accuse me of blurred vision,' Mr.
Paschke said of critics in the developing world.
'Reform does not
happen overnight,' he said. 'But we have been an agent for
change." Barbara Crossette, "A
U.N. watchdog exits to applause," New York
Times, November 15, 1999.
IO Watch begs to differ. After noting continuing
struggles (and very modest investigative efforts) in the second five years
of OIOS existence in the next subsection, a final subsection examines much
more closely alternative views and assessments of what OIOS has done, and
more importantly not done, as a "corruption fighter." The negative legacy of managerial permissiveness left
behind by the UN's first two diplomat/inspectors is pursued further
in
subsections on Unleashed
managers and Disappearing
whistle-blowers under UN Management Accountability
Struggles , and as a central
element of continuing UN accountability problems and needed reforms in the
concluding Recent
Developments section of this
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