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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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12. AN ANACHRONISTIC JIU The
eleven performance weaknesses already summarized above only disguise
this last, and basic JIU flaw: it is an anachronism. The original idea --
a few "management wise men" traveling around to help resolve management
problems in a UN system within a very underdeveloped UN system management
culture -- made sense in 1968 when the Unit was created on a temporary
basis. But in the ensuing 35 years this tiny unit simply could not keep up
with a world in which UN system operations have grown from some $600
million when JIU was founded to up to $15 billion today; from quiet
conferences, meetings and research tasks to urgent field programmes
involving more than 50,000 people worldwide; and from small administrative
units to highly professional internal and external management audit,
evaluation, and investigation units working in every agency.
The
JIU in fact is much like a cat with nine lives, and it seems to have
already expended eight of them on narrow escapes from blunt outside
assaults, as discussed in the preceding material: 1. The 1974 US GAO
report urging that a single well-staffed oversight UN system body be
created instead of the temporary little JIU, which the US Congress wanted
but the US Department of State (and other Member States)
ignored; 2.
The permanent statute given to the JIU in 1976, despite serious agency
doubts about the quality of the Inspectors' work and the weak cost/benefit
and results obtained; 3.
The Canadian (and a US proposal) in 1979 to subordinate the JIU to a new
UN Auditor-General's office, which was supported by some Member States
but rejected by others who
feared such a powerful and independent unit; 4. The very detailed
US GAO report in 1986 analyzing serious JIU operational and report quality
problems, and limited impact (which still continue almost 20 years later),
which was also brushed aside by the US Department of State and others as
JIU continued its downward path; 5. An attempt by the
UN system agencies in 1988 to reduce or downgrade JIU professional staff
during a financial crisis, to force Inspectors to do their own work, which
was also eventually blocked by JIU diplomatic pressure in New
York; 6. A critical
Assembly-mandated study of JIU work by the ACABQ, in 1992, which was
critical but merely recommended postponing JIU requests for extra
staff; 7.
Most drastically, the UN system agencies as a group (in ACC) from
1995-1997 who sought an outside experts' review of JIU operations and
delaying the appointment of new Inspectors: the non-appointment of
Inspectors was narrowly averted by JIU intervention at the last minute in
1997; 8.
the outside independent review idea, vigorously debated in the General
Assembly's Fifth Committee from 1997 through 1999, foundered on the
question of who should review JIU, and finally settled for a weak resolution urging, once more,
JIU "self-reform" and dutifully endorsing JIU again as "the only
independent system-wide oversight body." But
the new pressures of 2003 and 2004 show that the JIU "cat" is now fighting
for its ninth life, and the situation this time is so serious that the
Unit itself even contemplates having less than 11 Inspectors, and opening
up the overall JIU Statute to revision. Yet, this ninth (and last?) time,
five critical factors need to be considered, all of which suggest that the
JIU should, slowly but steadily, be shut down in favor of truly
professional oversight functions. FIRST,
while the JIU has stood still, there have been tremendous changes,
particularly in the 1990s, in upgrading and professionalizing the work of
the many other management and oversight organizations, units, and groups
available inside, across, and outside the UN system. Most
importantly, the external auditors have added management
audit work to their financial audit activities, including -- ever since
1996 -- analysis and concern
with fraud matters which was much welcomed by the General Assembly;
expanding their own audit work and auditing work across the UN system; and
new professional initiatives and joint efforts of the national audit
organizations in 170 countries around the world through
INTOSAI: [Note: for further information on the excellent "fit" between the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) INTOSAI and the UN and UN system audit needs, only partially realized for so long, see For INTOSAI, www.intosai.org/ For the UN Board of Auditors, see www.unsystem.org/auditors/#top For the Panel of External Auditors, see www.unsystem.org/auditors/external.htm
The Panel's current members are South Africa (Chairman), Canada, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, the Phillipines, and India}, And for important group efforts see "Fraud awareness", Audit Guide 204, United Nations, adopted by the Panel of External Auditors of the United Nations, the specialized agencies and the IAEA, December 1996, and the INTOSAI working group on audits of
international organizations, see http://www.riksrevisjonen.no/Default.asp?Application=Riksrevisjonen_Engelsk .]
--
as shown in JIU and other survey reports, all the organizations of the UN
system have made significant advances in strengthening and
professionalizing their internal oversight functions, that
is, management audit, evaluation (except for the UN itself) and especially
the newer investigation units, including regular system-wide joint
meetings and ongoing activities; [see inter alia Joint Inspection Unit,
"Accountability, management improvement, and oversight in the United
Nations System", JIU/REP/95/2, UN document A/50/503, 1995, Part I,
Chapter II, "Internal oversight units", and Part II, Tables 2, 3, and
4, (JIU/REP/95/2) and
Joint Inspection Unit, "Strengthening the
investigations function in the United Nations system organizations",
JIU/REP/2000/9: both
can be viewed and downloaded at www.unsystem.org/jiu/new/home.htm .]
-- the UN system interagency
committees in human resource, financial, and technical areas are
also very important. They are
not "independent", but they are in effect "professional associations" of
agency experts who have made major contributions to UN system
accountability and management systems quality and harmonization through
their joint efforts over the last 20 years. They provide both a practical and
action-oriented focus, and deep and pragmatic knowledge of agency
operations and coordination needs, especially under the new Chief
Executives Board of agency heads and its High-Level Committee on
Management, that the JIU could never provide: Joint Inspection Unit, "Accountability, management
improvement, and oversight in the United Nations System", JIU/REP/95/2, UN
document A/50/503, 1995, Part I, Chapter VI, "Inter-agency
activities", and Part II,
esp. Table 10, but also Tables 5-9,
under JIU/REP/95/2 at www.unsystem.org/jiu/new/home.htm
, and "Proposed programme budget
2004-2005", UN document
A/58/6 of 25 March 2003,
Section 31C., "Chief Executives Board for Coordination", pp. 12-18, and Proposed strategic
framework for the period 2006-2007: Part two: biennial programme plan,
Programme 26: C. United
Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination", UN document A/59/6
(Prog. 26), 30 April 2004, pp.4-6.
.
--
new or improved legislative oversight activities and bodies
have been and are emerging throughout the UN system (but most definitely
not in the UN itself), particularly in specific subcommittees and
reduced-membership Executive Boards over the past decade in response to
increasing needs for focused attention to accountability, audit,
operational, and performance
policies and results; [Note: IO Watch is not aware of any
recent system-wide summaries, but a full picture of progress was already
provided in the mid-1990s, in Joint Inspection Unit, "Accountability, management
improvement, and oversight in the United Nations System", JIU/REP/95/2, UN
document A/50/503, 1995, Part I, Chapter VIII, "Oversight governing
bodies," and Part II, esp. Tables 12-14, at www.unsystem.org/jiu/new/home.htm
, and see also Nordic
UN Project, The, The United Nations in development: Reform issues in
the economic and social fields: A Nordic perspective: Final report,
Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1991,
and Nordic UN Project 1996 in the Economic and Social
Fields, The, The United Nations in development: Strengthening the UN
through change: Fulfilling its economic and social mandate, GCSM AS,
Oslo, December 1996. -- and finally, although the JIU
tries to ignore it, global management consulting firms ,
with field offices worldwide and employing management experts from many
countries, who are increasingly used for special management studies by UN
system agencies. SECOND,
the UN is presently under growing pressure to improve its oversight,
performance, and anti-corruption activities and overcome various
management scandals in many areas, as discussed in this archive, which the
JIU can do little to correct or even address. The most relevant archive
subsections on these current UN problems, scandals, and needs are: ? Investigation efforts: Is the OIOS a fig leaf? ? Legislative and Other Oversight ? Management culture deterioration ? Top corruption fighter corrupted ? Baghdad headquarters bombing ? A real UN fraud prevention programme ?
External
experts oversight review and ? General Assembly audit subcommittee THIRD, the only UN oversight body performing effectively
and enjoying full respect is the UN Board of Auditors. CNMA believes
that there are very major benefits to phasing the JIU down and out, and
turning its resources over to the Board (and system-wide Panel) of
Auditors: 1. There is presently much discussion
about revising the JIU Inspectors' job descriptions, but Member States
have always resolutely ignored this guidance. The JIU
Statute (Article 2, para. 1) clearly specifies, first and foremost, people
"chosen from among members of national supervision or inspection
bodies".
Clearly, national audit staff fit this requirement perfectly, but
only France has ever figured this out in selecting Inspectors. Why not
give all the JIU work directly to these professionals? 2. The national audit people are fully qualified,
independent, practicing, certified, educated, and experienced
auditors.
They come into UN system agencies each year on a contracted basis,
do their work (all around the world, not sitting in Geneva), and then
return to their national services. They also know each organization well,
since they are already auditing its financial and other operations. 3. As noted above, JIU adds perhaps $1
million a year to its own $4 million annual cost through detailed
information requests made to the agencies, requiring many
headquarters meetings and consultations, and most of all demanding that
the agencies process, comment and, most onerously, follow up on JIU
reports, which wind up having little impact anyway. The external auditors,
however, already report regularly to the governing bodies of each agency
with reports that are given respect and attention. They could
easily expand and incorporate added work into their ongoing audit services
and reporting, and reduce the many JIU "interface" requirements and
demands considerably. 4. No new funding would be required. JIU is
supported by apportioned costs paid by all the UN system agencies who
participate. They, and the UN, should simply switch the funds that they
each presently provide for JIU to their external auditors. Most important of all, however, the external auditors
would be much more cost-effective than the JIU. The 1995 JIU system-wide report on
accountability and oversight matters included a table on external
system-wide oversight bodies. It revealed that the JIU provided 19
Inspectors and professional-and-above staff (11 + 8) at an annual total
cost of about $4 million. The external auditors provided about 71
staff years (i.e., total annualized contractual work-months provided, on
assignment from their national audit services) per year, at a total
estimated cost of about $7 million annually. Joint Inspection
Unit, "Accountability, management improvement, and oversight in the United
Nations System", JIU/REP/95/2, UN document A/50/503, 1995, Part II, Table 11, p. 23, at www.unsystem.org/jiu/new/home.htm .]
Thus, the auditors provide 10 professional auditors
per each $1 million spent for oversight each year, while the JIU provides
less than 5 diplo/auditors per $1 million. (The cost difference, of course, is due
to the very high salaries of the 11 Inspectors (and their Executive
Secretary, and all the perquisites and emoluments that they, and the JIU
staff, receive, versus the contractual assignments of the external
auditors.) Twice as many (highly-qualified) professionals
substituted for amateurs, at the same price, is a very wise use of
resources which the General Assembly should finally insist upon. For the
UN system as a whole, shifting JIU's $4 million to the external auditors
would provide 40 or more staff years of additional PROFESSIONAL audit work
per year at no new cost, at a time when the UN and the UN system very much
need all the professional oversight expertise they can obtain for their
performance credibility. Phasing out the JIU, therefore, would, above all,
provide the UN and the UN system with much more value-for-money, not least
because the external auditors have been concerned with the critical new
area of UN fraud-fighting for more than a decade, while JIU has never even
started this important work. "Fraud awareness", Audit Guide 204, United Nations,
adopted by the Panel of External Auditors of the United Nations, the
specialized agencies and the IAEA, December
1996.
A JIU phase-out is also not difficult to do. The JIU
Statute (Article 4, para. 4)says that an Inspector can be "terminated" for
noncompliance with the JIU Statute only if all other Inspectors so decide,
and the General Assembly "confirms" that conclusion. That process would be almost impossible, but there is
another route. In the late 1980s a UN interagency committee, whose members
pay and are consulted on JIU's budget, first proposed cutting JIU staff to
pressure Inspectors to do their own work. Similarly, the 1993 Thornburgh
report (and Beigbeder in 1997) noted that the Secretary-General could
simply forego appointing or reappointing new Inspectors, since the Statute
specifies only "not more than eleven Inspectors" (Article 2, para.
1). Both efforts to reduce JIU operations failed at the
time, but they could be employed now to swiftly redeploy JIU staff, except
for a few people to answer phones and do administrative paperwork. More
gradually over the next several years, the current Inspectors could be
allowed to finish their terms (but at least be forced to prepare, or find
someone on their own to prepare) their reports, with no new Inspectors
appointed.
FOURTH, IO Watch believes that one particularly troubling
item must be noted. During 1994 discussions on "strengthening external
oversight mechanisms", which as always led nowhere (except for the
creation of the OIOS), the JIU emphasized that: "Owing to the increased complexity and cost of the
United Nations, particular attention should be paid to ensuring that those who are
appointed to oversight functions possess the necessary high professional
qualifications and experience. This applies equally to elected or
appointed members, as well as to supporting staff." "Report of the Joint
Inspection Unit", UN document A/49/34, 1994,
para. 79. This statement was mere hypocrisy from the Inspectors,
but two years later they went "over the line" by making this claim for
themselves in official documents. The Unit had been pressured by the
General Assembly, not for the first time, to specify the standards and
guidelines for its work. It presented them in the 1996 JIU annual
report to the Assembly and all other system governing bodies. In addition
to asserting the deep involvement of Inspectors in all aspects of
planning, data-gathering and analysis, drafting, and review of JIU
reports, with scarcely a mention of any JIU staff roles, it made the
following three specific comments: "The Unit has considered it useful to attach
these
standards and guidelines to [this report] in order to allow the Member
States, other expert bodies, and the secretariats of [the
agencies] to gain a better
understanding of how the Unit fulfills its mandate." … "Competence. The Inspectors, Executive
Secretary, and concerned staff must possess the required and relevant
qualifications and competencies … "At the conclusion of
each inspection, evaluation, or investigation, a written report … will be prepared by the
Inspector(s) …" "Report of the Joint
Inspection Unit", UN document A/49/34, 1996,
para 27 and Annex, paras 33(b) and 40.
[emphasis added.]
The Inspectors thus made it very clear that the
guidelines were to allow everyone to understand how the JIU fulfills its
mandate. The second phrase, however, is clearly untrue, as anyone can
easily determine by viewing the lack of relevant credentials, education,
training, certification, and management analysis experience revealed by
the current JIU Inspectors' backgrounds presented on their website. The
third quote is belied by both the JIU budget presentations on the
report-writing duties of JIU professional and even clerical staff, and by
confirmation by the many past and present JIU staff.
[Note: see www.unsystem.org/jiu/new/home.htm ] The Inspectors, of course, were only copying standards
from the professional literature. But in claiming them as their own, they
consciously misrepresented their operations. In most national governments,
such acts are considered very serious matters, often leading to
resignations.
Among other things, they violate yet another standard which the JIU
presented in its 1996 annual report: "Integrity. The
Inspectors, Executive Secretary, and concerned staff must possess the
highest standard of integrity for performing their duties." "Report of the Joint Inspection
Unit", UN document A/49/34, 1996, para 27 and
Annex, paras 33(c).
In February 2002 a General Assembly resolution again
raised the issue of the JIU standards, stating in its resolution on the
JIU that it: "Requests the
Chairman of the Unit … to ensure compliance by the Unit with the
provisions of its statute as well as the internal standards, guidelines,
and procedures as approved by the Unit …" "Joint Inspection Unit",
General Assembly resolution 56/245 of 5 February
2002, para. 10.
In response, the Unit's first of three "reform"
reports of September 2003 stated that, in order to address concerns of
report quality and better selection of its reviews, it had revised its
internal standards and guidelines and added internal working procedures to
complement them, all aimed, inter alia, at
ensuring that: " … All provisions of the statute
and the internal standards and guidelines are complied with, and
the Chairman is empowered to ensure such compliance as he/she is requested
to provide in General Assembly resolution 56/245, paragraph
10." "Report of the [JIU] on the
preliminary review of its statute and working methods: Note by the
Secretary-General", UN document A/58/343 of 5
September 2003, para. 3. Once again, a comparison of the JIU with the external
auditors is most instructive. The UN Panel of External Auditors
website, under a section on "Additional Guidance on Standards: Ethics",
states that: "Integrity,
objectivity, and independence The External Auditor
should be straightforward and honest in performing professional work. …
The External Auditor should be independent in fact and appearance. … Professional
Competence and Due Care The External Auditor in agreeing to provide
professional services implies that there is a level of competence
necessary to perform professional services
and that the knowledge, skill, and experience of the External Auditor will
be aplied with reasonable care and diligence. Auditors should therefore
refrain from performing any services, which they are not competent to
carry out unless advice and assistance is obtained to ensure that
the services are performed satisfactorily."
[Note: see www.unsystem.org/auditors/external.htm ]
In the preceding pages IO Watch has presented the
major elements of JIU performance problems and the reform "showdown" that
was to occur in 2004: the General Assembly's renewed calls in 2002 and
2003 for serious JIU performance, not rhetoric; the Unit's extensive
self-examination in three special reports of 2003 and 2004; twelve major
aspects which summarize the many criticisms of JIU as an oversight body
over the years, which continue on; and five critical factors that
underscore why the bumbling old JIU should be shut down in favour of
expended, very professional and focused oversight work by the Board of
Auditors.
So how did this decisive battle to -- for the ninth
time -- really reform the JIU go during 2004? As one might
well expect from a UN organization bound in a web of inertia and
increasingly unable to establish serious management accountability and
professional oversight leadership, not well. The JIU annual report on its work for 2003, issued in
2004, had less empty space than its predecessors, but still was cryptic.
One page was devoted to the JIU's internal "in-depth review" efforts as
already described above. A welcome change was actual information, although
very brief, on the content of the seven JIU reports issued during
2003. JIU
also noted that, after a decade of ponderous effort, some agencies were
actually beginning to take some actions on some of its reports, and
expressed hope that others would eventually follow (the UN however,
continued to beg for cessation of its annual reporting on some actions
taken on some past JIU reports). The JIU provided as well modest information on actual
followup on is past recommendations, citing some actions taken, others to
be considered, and what it called the "unmistakable impact" of some JIU
work to be discerned in the discussions at some governing body meetings.
The usual "boiler plate" information on JIU did include the interesting
information that the UN and its major programmes (particularly the UNDP,
WFP, and UNICEF, pay a dominant 69 percent share of the total $4 million
JIU budget every year. "Report of the Joint Inspection
Unit", UN document A/59/34, 2004.
[available on the JIU website], and The UN report referred to is
"Implementation of the recommendations of the JIU: Report of the
Secretary-General", UN document A/59/349 of 10
September 2004.
In its 2004 work programme, the JIU emphasized as so
often in the past that it would strive to meet the General Assembly's
repeated urgings that it report on high-priority topics with
action-oriented reports that improve programmes and savings system wide,
but it then had little new to offer. -- On system-wide issues, the JIU proposed yet another
review on patching up the defective administrative justice system, one
more of many studies on system coordination mechanisms (three by JIU alone
since 1996), collaboration of UN agencies in Africa, developing a common
payroll system, management of the UN "laissez-passer" travel documents,
and -- amazingly for a group of aging diplomats -- a review of the
highly-technical topic of open-source software potential in the UN
system. -- JIU management and administration reviews for 2004
would examine management in a WHO regional office, a UN convention to
combat desertification, another review of the UN Office in Geneva (the
JIU's home base), and a note on "knowledge management", no less, for the
ILO. -- The JIU explained, as a main criteria for selection
of its work topics, that it would seek to avoid duplication of
effort.
Perhaps the above list of uninspired and low-priority JIU topics
underscores indeed that the serious oversight work of ensuring effective
programme implementation in the UN system is being done by the external
auditors, the enhanced internal oversight bodies, the Chief Executives
Board system of committees, and true expert outside management consultants
(as already discussed), and not by the JIU. -- In actual fact, none of these "high-priority" topic
reviews which the JIU programmed for 2004 (except the one on the
administration of justice) was issued in 2004. "Joint Inspection Unit: Note by
the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/75 of 22
April 2004. [available on the JIU
website].
As part of the new UN "strategic framework" process,
the JIU also provided its biennial programme plan for 2006-2007. The JIU
stressed its "unique position … as a catalyst" for preparing and
disseminating best managerial practices in the organizations, accompanied
by "harmonized and concrete solutions." Its accomplishments would be improving
governing body oversight (evidenced by recommendations presented and
approved), improving managerial practices and compliance (by adopted
resolutions implemented), and (quite bizarre) increased coordination and
information sharing among the organizations (measured by "the number of
best practices shared with participating organizations." Proposed strategic
framework for the period 2006-2007: Part two: biennial programme plan,
Programme 26:
B.
Joint Inspection Unit", UN document A/59/6 (Prog. 26), 30 April 2004, pp. 3-4.
In the key measure of performance, however, the JIU
fell well short of these grand aims in 2004. It produced
nine more reports, slightly more than average but all issued in the last
four months of the year and during (rather than in advance of) the General
Assembly session. Half were the old carryover 2003 topics
noted above: a follow-up on multilingualism and on administration of
justice, headquarters agreements, management at UNHCR, and system
procurement practices. Most importantly, however, four 2004 reports, on
managing for results in the UN system, showed the new JIU direction and
strategy for the future. Having continued to demonstrate its
inability to assess concrete programme performance results and performance
and combat waste, fraud and abuse (because of its amateurish staffing),
the JIU has decided, as stated in its overview report on the topic, that
it would establish the pillars of a grand results-based management system
(RBM), with a list of "critical success factors" to provide UN system
agencies with a "benchmarking framework" or "scorecard" which they can use
to measure progress toward RBM. "Overview of the series of
reports on managing for results in the United Nations System",
JIU/REP/2004/5, 2004,
"Introduction." [all four
reports are available on the JIU website] IO Watch concludes that the JIU has thus reinvented
itself in a most comfortable way. At a time when the UN confronts admitted
management crises, as discussed at length in the section on Late 2004: A "tipping
point"? , the JIU is positioning
itself as an observer, who will "keep score" on how the UN agencies are
doing, without engaging itself in the complex, challenging, day-to-day,
in-depth process of analysing and helping solve UN performance problems
through professional evaluations, audits, and investigations. Once again, the JIU diplomat/Inspectors are
concentrating on sweeping concepts rather than the "proper use of funds",
by disseminating a grand package of "received wisdom" from the management
literature and discussions with agencies. This conceptual package of good
management practice cost the UN and Member States some $2 million -- at
least half the total cost of JIU operations for 2004 (six Inspectors and
more staff involved, and amounting to four of the nine total JIU reports)
and something a top-notch consultant could have prepared for much
less. How did the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly
respond to this latest JIU gambit to preserve its cozy situation, in light
of its firmly-expressed (and not new) concerns for JIU reports that would
be timely, high-priority, concrete and action-oriented? It
capitulated, and rather quickly. In late December 2004, as it raced to adjourn, and
before it had time to seriously consider the new JIU reports, and in
marked contrast to drawn-out "JIU preservation" battles of the past, the
Fifth Committee's usual "informal consultations" produced a rambling but
soft three pages of exhortations for the JIU. As so often in the past, it
duly noted the JIU's latest reform efforts, and then urged it to "fully
implement" and be in "strictly in accordance with" the terms of its
Statute, most importantly: "Urges Member States
… to propose candidates for [Inspector] … to strictly adhere to the
qualifications and experience outlined in … the Statute"; Stresses the
importance of ensuring that candidates [for Inspector] have experience in
at least one of [thirteen fields, including "management" and "monitoring]
… as well as knowledge of the United Nations system and its role in
international relations; …. Decides that the Unit
shall mainly focus on identifying means to improve management and to
ensure that optimum use is made of available resources, as stipulated in …
the Statute …; … as part of its
focus on management issues, [the JIU] should assess the development and
application in participating organizations of the principle of
accountability in its relevant reports; … decides that
the Unit shall undertake inspections with a sharp focus …; Decides to consider the implementation of the …
present resolution … at its sixty-first session [i.e., in late
2006]." "Joint Inspection Unit: Report
of the Fifth Committee", UN Document A/59/646 of 23
December 2004, and "Reports of the Joint Inspection Unit", General
Assembly resolution 59/267 of 23 December 2004,
introduction and paras. 5-7, 12, [18, 20, 21and 29.] The General Assembly thus spares the Inspectors once
again. Like the Inspectors, it shows much solemn concern for full
application of the JIU Statute and a more effective JIU. But this time
it even eases the already weak qualifications for an Inspector: not any
"highest standards" of a distinguished career as a professional oversight
expert, but a rephrasing so that any eager diplomat can claim "experience"
in "management" or "monitoring" as a participant, among hundreds of
others, in the Fifth Committee itself. IO Watch also finds it particularly troubling that the
General Assembly has also now positioned the JIU -- a dreadful example of
an unaccountable unit -- to lecture all the organizations of the UN system
on accountability matters. And after all this, the Assembly stated
in its resolution that it would not consider JIU performance again for
another two years. IO Watch concludes that this rapid decision and posturing reflects poorly on the Fifth Committee, the body that sets the tone for the entire UN through its central "accountability for accountability" responsibilities. As discussed elsewhere in this archive, in the midst of the "annus horribilis" and management crises which the UN encountered in 2004 and faces in 2005, not only in the oil-for-food programme but in other scandals and major problems as well, the Fifth Committee and the Assembly (and of course the JIU) seem amazingly oblivious to what is going on, and thereby ensure | |||
