|
|||||
UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
|
|
As discussed at the beginning of this subsection on OHRM mismanagement,
for the first half-century of its operations, the UN was noticeable for a
slow, careless, very bureaucratic and rather easily-manipulated personnel
service. It was and perhaps
still is gravely lacking in the elements of a modern personnel system (as
has now been discussed in the immediately-preceding subsections) and had
been consistently and severely criticized by top management, staff, member
states, and outsiders for decades without any real change taking place,
other than adding the "human resources management"
title. The Thornburgh report
of 1993 was particularly succinct in describing its failings and negative
impact: "Current problems in what you have
correctly identified as 'the present outmoded system of personnel
management' constitute a major stumbling block to true reform within the
Organization. Defects exist in nearly every
aspect of present personnel practice. Recruitment has been undertaken on
a more or less haphazard basis and consumes an inordinate amount of
time. Training programmes are
insufficient. Promotion
exercises have become inordinately complicated to the point of being
nearly unworkable
Discipline and dismissal procedures are encumbered by seemingly
interminable appeals processes.
The result is too much 'deadwood'
doing too little work and too few good staff members doing too much,
over-extending themselves sometimes to the point where they have become
counter-productive." Dick
Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management,
"Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations," 1 March
1993, pp. 8-9. In response to such
criticisms and the General Assembly's pivotal insistence on a new system
of management accountability, the Secretariat had no alternative but to
offer a clear (for the UN) mea culpa: "[This report] outlines a strategy
to modernize and re-energize human resources management in the [UN
Secretariat]
[While the UN's role and mandates
have expanded], commensurate changes and modernization in human resources
management have not occurred.
As a result, [such] management has been fragmented, bureaucratic
and incapable of dealing expeditiously with ever-changing demands
The Office of Human Resources
Management [hereinafter "OHRM"]
has been largely unable to address properly [its essential]
planning and management functions.
[This in turn has] partially
contributed to the slow deployment of field missions, inadequate people
management, low staff morale, and insufficient mobility. Thus, the time is overdue
to
introduce changes to maximize the contribution of [UN] human resources."
"A strategy for the management of the human
resources of the Organization: Revised estimates
: Report of the Secretary-General ", UN document
A/C.5/49/5 of 21 October 1994, paras. 1 and 23.
Even more
dramatically, the Secretary-General went on to firmly declare his
commitment to drastic and critical changes: "
[UN staff and managers'
capacity and expertise at all levels] must correspond to the
responsibility assigned and authority delegated and must be balanced
by full accountability through appropriate accountability mechanisms. An efficient organizational
oversight machinery will monitor the operation of the system and conduct
audits, inspections, evaluations and investigations
The systematic
control of the interrelated processes
will provide the key to
success
and contribute to the Organization's effectiveness and
efficiency. "In the establishment of [the new
system one must consider the difficulties involved]
in particular the
need to change attitudes and established and well-entrenched bureaucratic
habits.
the
Organization must transform itself. In so doing, the utmost care
should be taken to develop a real 'management culture', to put measures in
place that will encourage improved performance and higher levels of
productivity and ensure quality work.
In short, the objective
should be the creation of a mission-driven and result-oriented
Organization
" "Establishment of a transparent and effective
system of accountability and responsibility: Report of the
Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/49/1 of 5 August 1994, paras. 12 and 109.
[emphasis added] Thus began the attempt
to magically, and swiftly, convert a very mature and stubborn frog (namely
"the OHRM") into an accountability prince, which would guide the UN's
"most precious resource," its staff, into a turbulent 21st century. Almost immediately, there were
doubts from long-time observers, as expressed by the International
Documents Review: "A strategy was presented to the
General Assembly in a document of atrociously low quality, even by UN
standards. The writing is
crusty with jargon, repetitive, and structured like a multi-jointed
creature out of Dr. Seuss.
It makes the rather startling
revelation that [OHRM] does not have a planning component. It does not
explain why this is so, or how the Office has managed to operate for
nearly five decades without planning its activities. As if enunciating a new discovery,
the report says that 'Planning is essential
" [Its] absence
has contributed
significantly to current OHRM management weaknesses.
' [The report then states that] 'It
is intended that [UN] senior management be involved in the planning
process and party to all important decision-making relating to human
resources planning and change.' (Traditionally, senior management
has considered OHRM a generally unnecessary encumbrance, to be
called into action only to fend off unsuitable offerings of personnel from
pushy ambassadors. Its powers
of locating competent staff for recruitment are held in such low esteem
that no senior manager in his right mind would initiate a request without
having someone already identified, or even on board as a consultant or
short-term contract employee.)" "Strategy to improve UN staff management and quality explained in
atrociously written report," International Documents Review (New
York), 7 November 1994, pp. 4-5. The Secretariat
manfully declared its determination in 1996 to carry through in its new
forceful role: "The Secretary-General's Strategy
for modernizing the management of the Organization's human resources
has
been the corner stone on which the Secretariat has worked to build a
performance-driven, service-oriented culture and supportive work
environment that encourages improved managerial skills, increased
managerial responsibility and effectiveness through increased delegated
authority, responsibility and accountability as well as optimal individual
staff performance and, thereby, improved organizational
performance." "Implementation of the strategy for
the management of the Organization's human resources: Report of the
Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/51/1 of 16 August 1996,
Summary. But the early results
were not encouraging. In
April 1997 the General Assembly reaffirmed that the UN staff was an
"invaluable asset" and recalled the integrated strategy for human
resources management.
However, it then regretted "with deep concern" that further
progress in implementing the strategy had not been achieved and that
efforts to develop a management culture had been "unsuccessful." It
therefore called on the Secretary-General to fully implement the
strategy: II. Reaffirming its
resolution 48/218A of 23 December 1993, in particular the request therein
for a mechanism ensuring that programme managers are accountable for the
effective management of human resources allocated to
them, Reiterating the authority
and responsibility of the [OHRM] of the Secretariat to enforce
recruitment, placement and promotion policies throughout the
Secretariat;
1. Recognizes the role of the [OHRM]
as the primary representative of the Secretary-General in establishing
human resources policies and guidelines, and strongly requests the
Secretary-General to maintain its central policy
authority; 2.
Requests the Secretary-General to enhance managerial accountability
with respect to human resources management decisions, including
imposing sanctions in cases of demonstrated mismanagement of staff
and willful neglect of or disregard for established rules and
procedures, while safeguarding the due process rights of all staff
members, including managers; 3.
Also requests the Secretary-General to issue
specific administrative instructions to establish clearly the
responsibility and accountability of programme managers for proper use of
human resources, as well as sanctions in accordance with staff
rule 112.3 for any financial loss suffered by the United Nations as
a result of gross negligence, including improper motivation, willful
violation of or reckless disregard for the staff Regulations and Rules and
established policies regulating recruitment, placement and
promotion; 4.
Deplores the high number of exceptions to the established
procedures for the recruitment, placement, and promotion of staff, in
particular in the Office of Human Resources Management;
6.
Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to streamline
administrative procedures and eliminate duplication, in relation to human
resources management, through delegation of authority to programme
managers, and requests him to ensure, before delegating such
authority, that well-designed mechanisms of accountability, including the
necessary internal monitoring and control procedures, as well as training,
are put in place, and to report to the General Assembly at its
fifth-third session;
" "Human resources management", General Assembly resolution 51/226 of 25 April 1997, Part I, paras. 2-4, Part II, 1st and 3d preambular paras., and paras. 1-4, and 6. [emphasis added.] [Note: item 4. above is obviously
very disturbing. When the
General Assembly itself must publicly deplore the aggressive application
of the notorious
personnel "exceptions"
by the personnel office itself, what hope can there be that that office
can effectively serve as the guardian and enforcer "of personnel policies
throughout the Secretariat," and prevent -- rather than practice -- the
corruption of personnel processes?] In the next two years,
the delegation of authority from OHRM to managers throughout the
Secretariat continued apace, while accountability reform implementation
lagged (although with promises that the process might be accomplished by
2003.) In late 1999 the
General Assembly reaffirmed its own determination to thoroughly analyse
and approve posts, financial resources, and human resources policy
implementation. It also repeated that: "the [OHMR] shall remain the
central authority for the monitoring and approval of the recruitment and
placement of staff and for the interpretation of the regulations and rules
of the Organization and their enforcement." "Human
resources management," General Assembly resolution 53/221 of 23 April
1999, Section I, "Principles," and Section II "Role of the [OHRM],"
paras. 1 and 2.
[emphasis added] Even more decisively,
this General Assembly resolution repeated its admonition that no
comprehensive system of accountability and responsibility had been
established, and also repeated its request for sanctions for demonstrated
mismanagement of staff and disregard for rules and procedures. It then stated that
it: "Emphasizes that any delegation of
authority should be in accordance with the Charter and regulations and
rules of the Organization and should entail clear lines of authority
and accountability as well as improvement in the administration of
justice, taking into account the central role played by the [OHRM] in
setting the policies and guidelines in respect of the human resources
management of the Organization and monitoring their observance and
implementation." "Human
resources management," General Assembly resolution 53/221 of 23 April
1999, Section IV, "Delegation of authority and accountability," esp.
paras. 8 and 10. [emphasis added] The
Secretary-General's report on human resources management reform in August
2000 stated that the OHRM would undergo major changes in its role and
functions. In principle, all
day-to-day personnel administration would be undertaken by the
departments, and a shift to electronic processing would also "enhance the
Office's capacity to monitor and report." OHRM would henceforth concentrate
on developing policy, providing guidance (upon request) to programme
managers on difficult issues, and providing more professional human
resources services. Buried
among these activities was vague talk of monitoring functions, but
no mention whatsoever of sanctions or enforcement in cases
where managers were abusive or violated rules and
procedures. "Human
resources management reform: Report of the Secretary-General," UN
document A/55/253 of 1
August 2000, section III, "Role of the [OHRM]", paras. 76-79. In the same report,
the Secretary-General noted that "considerable concern" had been expressed
about programme managers taking over direct recruitment decision-making on
their staff, and agreed that specific accountability mechanisms would be
critical. In case of any problems found by newly-structured central review
bodies, they would be swiftly considered, and OHRM or the Department of
Management would act as the "final decision makers in case of dissension
between programme managers and the central review body." "Human resources management reform:
Report of the Secretary-General", A/55/253 of 1 August 2000, paras.
33-37 and Annex II,
paras. 1-8, 25. [Note:
This careful phrasing implies only a rather delicate and potential OHRM
role of applying sanctions to enforce the rules.] In response to the
Secretary-General's report, a General Assembly resolution in June 2001
reaffirmed for the third time its concerns with well-designed mechanisms
of accountability.
It
also added some new fundamental cautions that are rather unusual (and
would not seem necessary) for an organization that had already been
operating for 55 years: "VII.2
Emphasizes that the administrative and managerial discretionary
powers of the Secretary-General should be in conformity with the relevant
provisions of the Charter; 3.
Reiterates that every staff member
shall be responsible
and accountable to the Secretary General, in accordance with financial rule 114.1 and
staff 112.3; 4.
Emphasizes that any delegation of authority should be in accordance
with the Charter and the regulations and rules
; 5.
Stresses that rules and regulations governing separation from
service shall be followed strictly; 7.
Requests the Secretary-General to continue to improve
accountability and responsibility
and monitoring and
control mechanisms
and
report on the implementation of his proposals [in 2002]
8.
Report
[in 2002]
on the progress achieved, including with regard to management
irregularities;
10.
Decides to further consider the issue of a robust monitoring
capacity in the Office of Human Resources Management for the
monitoring of all relevant activities in the Secretariat, regardless of
the source of their funding, and requests the Secretary-General to provide an analytical and
thorough report thereon [in 2001]. " "Human resources
management," General Assembly resolution 55/258 of 14 June 2001,
"Section VII., Delegation of authority and accountability."
[emphasis added] In
his 2002 report, Mr. Annan assured the General Assembly, with regard to
all the above concerns, that the Secretariat was making "every effort" to
ensure accountability in the reforms underway, and was "further enhancing"
OHRM's monitoring capacity, as part of his plan for "a comprehensive and
integrated monitoring capacity" in OHRM, as explained in his separate
report to the Assembly. "Human resources management reform: Report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/57/293 of 8 August 2002, paras. 87-89. The "detailed report"
of the Secretary-General on OHRM monitoring capacity, after all the
reminders from the General Assembly, was still quite tentative. After giving some definitions,
principles, and an overview of various monitoring mechanisms in place, he
then switched to a discussion of building a more comprehensive system,
within OHRM, with departments, and within departments, all in terms of a
set of "will be's." OHRM would develop a
series of methodological actions: tracking all areas of human resources
management, especially delegation of authority, and with periodic reviews;
setting and monitoring standards, norms, and targets; and then [rather
weakly] making "recommendations" to managers to help ensure their
compliance, and identify remedial action where "lapses have
occurred." Further mechanisms
and tools "under development" will include reporting tools, review
missions, focal points, providing monitoring tools, and consultations.
All the human
resources initiatives were being developed concurrently, so for monitoring
as well the Secretary-General said he would take a "phased approach" to
implementation. His report
concluded in painfully conditional UN-speak that his intention was to
continue current monitoring activities (within the constraints of
available resources): "
so as to develop
organizational capacity to fully meet the goal of achieving the
comprehensive approach for monitoring." "Monitoring capacity in the [OHRM}; Report of the
Secretary-General," UN document A/57/276 of 17 September 2002, pp.
8-11. The OHRM
"comprehensive monitoring" role has remained a moving target, a work still
very much "under construction."
The General Assembly endorsed this "more robust" capacity effort in
May 2003 and dutifully emphasized its need for further development. As
always, the intentions were good, but the implementation a sometime
thing. However, complex
matters -- such as the grand worldwide mobility initiative -- loom
ominously on the horizon. Is
the often-criticized OHRM really ready to be the firm monitor and enforcer
of UN staff rules and regulations and procedures as required by the
General Assembly? A key General Assembly
resolution, 57/305 of 2003, on human resources management, began by
reaffirming its principles concerning human resources management and the
OHRM role therein, and stating that it: "requests the Secretary-General to
ensure that United Nations staff members adhere fully to the United
Nations code of conduct as approved
in conformity with paragraph 1.2 of
the [UN staff regulations] and
the principle [of its resolution 53/221]
concerning the integrity and independence of the international civil
service.
endorses the
[Secretary-General's approach]
to developing a more robust monitoring
capacity in the [OHRM and]; Emphasizes the importance of the
monitoring of policies, guidelines, and practices by [the OHRM]
and
requests
a report thereon
." "Human resources management," General Assembly resolution 57/305 of 1 May 2003, Sections I and IV. The resulting report,
in August 2004, was an "activities" report resembling the one of 2002. It
spoke of developing a methodology, tools and instruments, a comprehensive
programme of implementation, and the "progressive creation" of a
specialized capacity in OHRM and departments and offices. Some on-sight
monitoring missions and ongoing support had begun to advise and guide,
interpret rules, review and approve exceptions, resolve conflicts,
identify training needs, and identify "trends, oversights or deviations
from established rules for purposes of correction, and the implementation
of measures to avoid their recurrence." "Human resources management reform: Report of the
Secretary-General", UN
document A/59/263 of 13 August 2004, paras.
161-164. OHRM concluded that
(seemingly as always) it was too early to assess monitoring impact, but
reported a few successes such as reducing delays in processing education
grant claims, or "sensitizing" offices on good management practice and
accountability. It also stated that: "While OHRM approaches monitoring
as a partner-based endeavour, experience has shown that building trust and
partnership with departments needs further and sustained
effort." "Human resources management reform: Report of the
Secretary-General", UN
document A/59/263 of 13 August 2004, paras.
161-171. While OHRM continues
on with its "velvet revolution" of building trust with managers, growing
staff concern with an evident lack of accountability in practice was noted
not only by the Integrity Survey of June 2004 discussed in the
introduction to this OHRM section, but in a telling comment from a staff
representative in a statement to the General Assembly's Fifth
(Administrative) Committee. "Rosemarie Waters, President
of the United Nations Staff Union, said that the measures introduced in
the past six years had had a profound and sometimes deleterious effect on
the staff of the Organization.
management had been reforming itself and increasing management
authority, while reducing accountability.
The Staff Union had the greatest respect for the
Secretary-General's vision for the Organization and had supported the
goals of his reform programme.
It could not, however, support the erosion of staff rights and
dissolution of oversight mechanisms as a means of implementation, and it
could not continue legitimizing actions in which staff, through their
elected representatives, had no meaningful role to play.
The organization had yet to
establish concrete measures for individual
accountability, she
continued. It was essential
that areas with expanded delegation of authority for personnel decisions
should be carefully examined, and, if abuses were found, such delegation
should be revoked.
The
[OHRM] had informed staff representatives of its
inability to enforce accountability because they lacked central
authority. The Fifth
Committee may wish to recommend that concrete individual accountability be
developed, in consultation with staff representatives, on a priority
basis." "UN
staff committee representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in
management reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of
29 October 2004, pp. 2-3.
[emphasis added] OHRM thus excused its
inaction to UN staff representatives by stating that it does not have
"central authority" to enforce accountability where serious allegations of
mismanagement and abuse have been made. It took this position despite the
Fifth Committee's repeated and express mandates in its resolutions 51/226,
53/221, and 57/305 (discussed above) , especially that the
Secretary-General ensure that United Nations staff members adhere fully to
the United Nations code of conduct as approved. This
non-implementation stance rings true to many UN staff who have sought and
failed to obtain OHRM intervention in many cases of serious UN management
problems. The UN's personnel offices have many competent mid- and
lower-level staff who do their best and are always as helpful as possible
in responding to staff problems and concerns. But the OHRM leadership, in the
past and -- it clearly seems -- at present are far more interested in
close and supportive relationships with the managers than in fulfilling
their express duty to enforce proper accountability and conduct throughout
the Secretariat.
So much for the rule of law within the UN in the new millennium. IO Watch
concludes that the top UN leadership, the Department of Management, the
Office of Legal Affairs, the General Assembly, and even the OIOS all defer
to the OHRM to enforce accountability, but that office excuses itself from
this responsibility while boasting of grand methodologies and tools
(processes, not implementation actions) that it is developing for this
purpose. The UN foxes (senior management) are in total control of the
chicken coop, with mounting problems for basic UN accountability,
credibility, staff morale, and performance. In May 2005, pressed
by the Iraq oil-for-food programme revelations and other crises, the
Secretariat released a new management reform document for "real action
now" and immediate reform, "particularly in the critical areas of
management, oversight and accountability." It further
stated that 'Perhaps the most obvious
shortcomings identified by the Volcker Inquiry and other crises are in the
area of oversight and accountability. The current 'control'
systems for monitoring management performance and preventing fraud and
corruption are insufficient and must be significantly
enhanced', the [Deputy Secretary-General
said." "Frιchette unveils UN
reforms responding to Volcker panel's criticisms", UN News Service,
17 May 2005, Despite the repeated
General Assembly attention to, and calls for, a strong monitoring capacity
in OHRM, the Secretariat apparently now also admits OHRM ineptitude in
handling this responsibility.
The reform plan did not mention OHRM at all, but did create a new
body: "In order to ensure a rigourous
monitoring of individual offices and managers, a Management Performance
Board (MPB) has been created.
It will systematically assess the performance of senior managers,
bring to the Secretary-General's attention instances which require his
attention and advise him on suggested corrective action, where
necessary. Status:
The Deputy
Secretary-General will chair the Board and comprise two sitting
Under-Secretaries-General and one former senior official. The heads of the Department of
Management and the [OIOS] will serve as ex officio members. The first meeting will be convened
before the end of June." "UN management reforms 2005: Management reform
measures to strengthen accountability, ethical conduct and management
performance", May 17, 2005,
pp. 2-3, available at www.un.org/reform/reform_update.html.
Unfortunately, the
"new" solution -- establishing a very high-level committee of senior
officials to "systematically" provide "rigorous monitoring" throughout the
Secretariat -- is quite probably no real answer either. This step is an old ploy used over
and over by Secretariat top management. The history of UN reform is
littered with many such committees, to show the earnest intent of the "old
boys" to roll up their sleeves, take charge, and fix the current
mess. But in fact such
committees subsequently do not seem to meet much, do not produce any
notable results, and are eventually replaced by still other such
committees as the newest management crisis-and-response cycle begins. IO Watch will monitor
these monitoring developments with interest, to see if this impressive new
Management Performance Board actually produces any significant and
tangible results and reports on them transparently. More likely, it will remain just
another "cosmetic" reform to calm the critics and wait until "things blow
over". At least this time,
however, the Secretariat has had to admit its present grave inadequacies
in monitoring management performance and preventing fraud and corruption,
and thereby confirm the failure of its cosmetic reform efforts over the
past decade.
|
|||
