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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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SUBSECTION TABLE OF
CONTENTS: -- Mobility -- Monitoring The Office of Human
Resources Management is not a traditional "oversight" body, but, after
decades of somnolence as a modest personnel office, it has been given
major responsibilities by the General Assembly during the past decade for
monitoring and ensuring the full and proper application of personnel
policies and accountability matters, and in particular to be the overall
and day-to-day guarantor of the UN Charter's mandate for staff, namely
that of "securing the highest
standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity
"
This evolving role OHRM role has been
defined by the General Assembly and in the Secretary-General's related
reports, as indicated in the following quotes: "[The General Assembly}
reiterates the role, authority, and responsibility of the [OHRM] of the
Secretariat in establishing human resources policies and guidelines as
well as in ensuring compliance with recruitment, placement,
and career development procedures
throughout the Secretariat; Decides that the [OHRM] shall
remain the central authority for the monitoring and approval of the
recruitment and placement of staff and for the interpretation of the
regulations and rules of the Organization and their enforcement;
Recognizes the central role of the
[OHRM] in ensuring the full implementation of basic human resources
mandates set by the General Assembly in the context of recruitment
and placement processes;"
"Human resources management," General
Assembly resolution 53/221 of 23 April 1999, section II, Role of
the Office of Human Resources Management of the Secretariat". [emphasis added.]
"IV. Delegation of authority and
accountability
3.
[The General Assembly]
also notes that no comprehensive system of
accountability and responsibility has been established;
10.
Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General [see
para. II.2 of resolution 51/226] to enhance managerial accountability with
respect to human resources management decisions, including imposing
sanctions in case of demonstrated mismanagement of staff and willful
neglect of or disreard for established rules and procedures, while
safeguarding the right of due process of all staff members, including
managers." "Human
resources management," General Assembly resolution 53/221 of 23 April
1999, paras. II.6 and IV. 3, 10.
[emphasis added.]
"VII.2 [The
General Assembly]
Emphasizes that the administrative and managerial
discretionary powers of the Secretary-General should be in conformity with
the relevant provisions of the Charter; 3.
Reiterates that every staff member
shall be responsible
and accountable to the Secretary General, in accordance with financial rule 114.1 and
staff 112.3; 4.
Emphasizes that any delegation of authority should be in accordance
with the Charter and the regulations and rules
; 5.
Stresses that rules and regulations governing separation from
service shall be followed strictly; 7.
Requests the Secretary-General to continue to improve
accountability and responsibility
and monitoring and
control mechanisms
and
report on the implementation of his proposals [in 2002]
8.
Report
[in 2002]
on the progress achieved, including with regard to management
irregularities;; 10.
Decides to further consider the issue of a robust monitoring
capacity in the Office of Human Resources Management
and
[requests] an analytical and thorough report thereon [in 2002].
" "Human resources management," General Assembly
resolution 55/258 of 14 June 2001, "Section VII., Delegation of
authority and accountability."
[emphasis added.]
As decision-making authority is
devolved to programme managers, the roles and responsibilities of
the central service provider, the Department of Management [which contains
OHRM]
will need to be reviewed. Action 32.
In order to continue efforts to improve
management: (a) a thorough review will be
conducted of delegated authority in order to increase the capacity and
flexibility of managers to manage
(b) The roles and
responsibilities of [DAM}
will be redefined in order to support the
increased delegation of authority; (c) Training of managers will be
strengthened across the Organization
" "Strengthening of the United Nations: An agenda for further change: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/57/387 of 9 September 2002, paras. 188-190. [emphasis added.] "4. [The General Assembly requests the
Secretary-General to report to it in 2004]
in a comprehensive manner on
the achievements of the human resources management reform, when sufficient
information will be available on the experiences of the Secretariat with
implementation
; 5.
conduct a study [by the OIOS]
on the impact of
[the reforms], in particular on the improvement of
recruitment, placement, promotion and training, including an assessment of
the role of the central review bodies and mobility
; 6.
ensure that all future
reports on the implementation of [these]
reforms focus on the results of
such measures; 10.
ensure the accountability of
programme managers in the staff selection process, in close collaboration
with the [OHRM], and to report thereon [in 2004 ];"
"Human resources management," General Assembly
resolution 57/305 of 1 May 2003, Sections I and II. The
UN's major resource and expenditure is not buildings or tangible products,
but the quality of, and the services provided by, its staff. However, from
its very first days, ambiguity over comparative educational credentials
worldwide, the requirements and great interest in equitable geographic
distribution of posts, and the UN's always highly-politicized nature, have
led the Secretariat to hire people largely by nationality, and too often
to let Member State diplomatic missions actually select staff. This
process was also combined with the "Noblemaire" principle, which states
that all UN staff shall receive the salary and benefits of the
highest-paid national civil service (traditionally the USA). For many countries, this means UN
salaries and benefits that are many times greater than those available in
their national diplomatic or civil service. When combined with vague job
duties and a non-transparent and soft personnel system, almost anyone with
the right connections could (and has) gotten into the UN Secretariat to
relax alongside the working UN staff. The noble aims of the
UN Charter with respect to the staff (the first quote) were undermined by
a tawdry set of 'behind the scenes" UN personnel practices. They date back to the UN's
beginnings but gradually became thoroughly entrenched, as indicated by the
six quotes which follow. "Article 100.
2. Each Member of the United Nations
undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the
responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to
influence them in the discharge of their
responsibilities. Article
101. 1. The staff shall be appointed by
the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General
Assembly.
3. The paramount consideration in the
employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of
service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of
efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the
importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as
possible." Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Articles 97, 100, and 101. "In 1946 the [UN] Secretariat had
to be constituted. It had an
initial core, which was the staff of the Preparatory Commission, numbering
about 350 officials
. From
that nucleus, it expanded within six months to about 3,000. As noted by W.R. Crocker:
'All but a tiny
minority had been appointed by the end of August, and most were appointed
between April and July. Where did this swarm come from? Some of them
had had, like most Assistant Secretaries-General, been delegates or on
delegation staffs in the early days. Some were friends of delegates, and got
through [by] what is known in international secretariats as political
pressure
--
which can easily be repulsed if the authorities have the will. Some -- and possible
the largest number -- found their way through the
friendship of a senior officer.'" Walter R. Crocker, "Some notes on the United Nations Secretariat", International Organization, Vol. IV, No. 4, November 1950, pp. 609-610, as discussed in Henri Reymond, "Some unresolved problems of the international civil service", Public Administration Review (US), May/June 1970, pp. 225-236, [238].
"The uncontested
establishment of [US government screening and approving personnel for UN
service in the early 1950s] nullified the Charter concept of an
independent and effective civil service, inflicting untold damage on the
potential of the United Nations. Other governments would thenceforth [and
aggressively] also install their nominees in virtually all significant,
and in many insignificant, U. N. posts. Hundreds of meaningless and costly
positions would be created throughout the leadership of the U. N. system
for the sole purpose of accommodating national candidates -- some of
whom [were] devoid of qualifications
. Unwanted in their homelands
.
[or] trailing rumors of incompetence or scandal. The useful work of
field missions would, on occasion, be similarly encumbered by such
superfluous emissaries, dispatched to lucrative senior field assignments
. In 1978
[Secretary-General] Waldheim would inform his unhappy staff that 'the
General Assembly has made it clear the
. geographical distribution of the
staff is the over-riding factor' -- without reference to the contrary
mandate of the Charter. By the
nineteen-eighties, the Times would report the
view of 'one Western ambassador' that 'You try to get as many posts as
possible for your own nationals. This is wrong, but everybody does
it.'"
Shirley Hazzard, on
the UN in the 1950s, in "Breaking Faith, Part
I", The New Yorker, September 25, 1989, pp.
63-99, p. 74.
"A distinguished professor of international law once
deplored the fact that 'the League of Nations has been abandoned to the
diplomats', but the UN Secretariat is much more dependent on the national
diplomatic bureaucracies. They derive invaluable flexibility and
power from having additional posts at their disposal
to confer favors but also to displace unwanted staff.
the incentives are all the greater because many UN posts, especially the
senior ones, are much sought after because of the [high] scales of pay
and the prestige they carry. A diplomatic ideology
has even developed at the UN, [that] there is no higher dignity than that
of Ambassador, holders of this title being by definition capable of taking
up any high-ranking post, even in a technical field. This naturally
generates a bias in favor of 'generalists' at the expense of other
professionals." Maurice Bertrand, "The
recruitment policy of United Nations staff", in de Cooker, Chris, ed., International Administration: Law and Management
Practice in International Organisations, UNITAR, Martinus Nijhoff,
Dordrecht, the Netherlands, 1989, II.2/1-9, pp.
II/2 and /3. "The conventional
wisdom in Third World upmarket employment circles is that the best job
opportunities in these recessionary days are still available in the United
Nations system
--
a bewildering alphabet soup rich in countless commissions,
subcommissions, fact-finding missions, agencies, expert groups,
blue-ribbon panels and blue-helmet peacekeeping operations. For the most
part, it is a sprawling secretive system, where many modern-day rajahs
reign with conspicuous disregard for accountability
." Pranay Gupte, "United Nations shenanigans", Newsweek International, May 24, 1993, p. 6. "For months, [US
presidential candidate John Kerry] has advocated broader international
oversight [in Iraq] that might open the door to additional peacekeeping
contributions and generate some real support for nation-building there.
Now he has begun to elaborate on how that oversight should be structured,
drawing sensible lessons from successes and failures of the recent past.
Kerry recognizes that
the United Nations cannot offer any magic bullet solutions for Iraq, and
that working with the UN Secretary general, Kofi Annan, and his special
representative Lakhdar Brahimi, cannot be a substitute for broad
cooperation with all the major powers represented in the Security Council.
Kerry also proposes designating an international high commissioner for
Iraq whose office would be outside the barely functional, patronage-driven
UN personnel system. That would permit the recruitment of a
capable staff and create some safeguards against the kind of wholesale
corruption that is alleged to have vitiated the UN's oil-for-food program
in Iraq. Kerry's ideas
would
be extremely hard to carry out now
but they at least reflect a realistic
view of what the United Nations -- and the United States -- can and cannot
do." "Kerry's vision for Iraq," International Herald Tribune, May 7, 2004 .
The damaging consequences of these accumulating,
unofficial UN personnel policies have continued on now for almost six
decades, as shown by a compilation of major system facets and
procedures: -- the UN has a complex system of
"geographic distribution" (i.e., a quota system, applying to less and less
posts as UN staffing has expanded and became more temporary, but always
there in spirit) to share important professional and above UN "posts"
among all countries, under elaborate formulas and detailed statistics and
published listings which highlight the battle by every country, region,
and grouping to ensure that they are getting their "fair share" of these
UN jobs, on a unit-by-unit basis; -- a tradition of recruiting people
not by expert qualifications or even by people, but simply by country, as
shown by the often-repeated story of the man who, when asked what his job
was in the UN Secretariat, stated simply "I am a Saudi Arabian"; As cited in Aamir Ali, "The
international civil service: The idea and the reality", in Chris De Cooker, ed., International administration: Law and management
practice in international organisations, UNITAR, Martinus Nijhoff,
Dordrecht, the Netherlands, 1989, pp. II.2 1-9.
-- a long-standing reliance on Member State
missions to the UN to provide candidates for UN jobs which, despite
various efforts to make the process more open and competitive, is still
an-often cozy insider process favoring diplomats and their friends and
relatives; -- published UN job announcements, which
apparently
require an impressive list of detailed professional qualifications,
but include an "or other similar experience" loophole which very often
becomes the precise category on which the actual choice is made (or an
announcement artfully listing extremely specific and "tailor-made"
requirements that ensure selection of a candidate who has already been
chosen); -- a detailed hiring and promotion
system which, until very recently, required many cumbersome consultations,
reviews and rules, but also did and still does allow UN personnel
officials to exercise the "Secretary-General's discretion" (while also
purportedly monitoring the integrity of the personnel system for the
General Assembly) to make "exceptions" to the rules, particularly in
personnel decisions when posts are at stake and political passions are
high; -- the overall mind-numbing obsession with
political games, balancing, rivalry, competition, and posturing in UN
Secretariat staffing decisions and day-to-day operations (as one veteran
put it, in personnel selection "the UN hires a country, not an
individual.") UN
personnel activities were in hibernation for the first 50 years of the
Organization's history, and have spent the past decade slowing waking up.
This is shown by their designations: first as a lowly "personnel
administration" group, then a renaming to the more positive title of
"Office of Personnel Services (OPS), and finally, and -- at the
premature insistence of the "Group of 18" experts -- as the
"Office of Human Resources Management" (OHRM) from 1986 onward. A
staff report urging the reform of staffing processes and conditions in
1971 summarized the sorry situation nicely: "Few would dispute
the fact that conditions of service in the Secretariat are no longer
adequate to secure a reasonable supply of staff of the quality described
in the UN Charter. In addition there have been weaknesses
in the recruitment process itself: inattention to candidates' levels of
training, responsibility and experience, artificially restricted choice of
candidates, failure to use properly the probation period
submission to
pressure from delegations, personal bias, delay and uncertainty in offers
to candidates, absence of a coherent career policy and of effective
in-service training. All these factors are prejudicial to
high quality recruitment. Internal selection committees have
tended to fall into disrepute and have permitted practices to flourish
which encourage the view of the staff that the International Civil Service
is in a process of decline." Recommendations for the reform
of UN staff conditions made by the Council of the Federation of
International Civil Servants Associations in December 1971, as quoted in Shirley Hazzard, Defeat of an ideal: A study of
the self-destruction of the United Nations, Macmillan, London, 1973,
p. 113.
A 1971 JIU report by Maurice Bertrand found a strong
general dissatisfaction among Member States, management, and staff about
personnel problems, and particularly a recruitment crisis. The report
detailed reforms which would address serious gaps in long-term forecasting
of personnel needs, a detailed personnel policy, in-service training,
assignment planning, and much-improved recruitment machinery, all of which
could finally lead
toward a "modernized" personnel office. Joint Inspection
Unit, "Report of the [JIU] on personnel problems in the United Nations,"
A/8454 (Parts I and II), 5 October 1971, pp.
1-18, 486.
Considerable reform efforts were indeed made during
the 1970s, but beneath the surface not much changed. In 1986 the "Group of
18" report finally launched a new reform impetus. It found
that: "Personnel policy and
management in the United Nations has suffered as a result of the
considerable political and other pressures that have influenced the
selection of staff. The Secretary-General should exercise greater
leadership in personnel matters and ensure that the selection of staff is
done strictly in accordance with the principles of the Charter. He
should improve the management of human resources, protect the authority of
the official in charge of personnel and instruct all other senior
officials to refrain from influencing the selection of staff.
" Report of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental
Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial
Functioning of the United Nations, UN document A/41/49, 1986, Recommendation 41.
[emphasis added]
In 1992 new Secretary-General Butros Butros-Ghali
confronted
a situation not much different than that of 1971, as cited
above.
"He concluded that
the organization had 'been operating in slow motion.' It required
'optimum use of its human resources, 'new ways of thinking', 'modern
management practices' to enhance its operations, and introduction of 'an
integrated approach to all the interrelated managerial issues.' But it could
not do these things over the long term without 'fundamental changes in the
present outmoded system of personnel management." "Secretary-General's statement
to the Fifth Committee, ST/IC/1992/73 of 12
November 1992, p. 8, as summarized in Joint Inspection
Unit, "Advancement of the status of women in the United Nations
Secretariat in an era of 'human resources management' and
'accountability'": A new beginning?," UN document A/49/176, 1994. The
outgoing UN top manager, Richard Thornburgh, stated in his departing
report of March 1993 to the Secretary-General that: "Current problems in
what you have correctly identified as 'the present outmoded system of
personnel management' constitute a major stumbling block to true reform
within the Organization. Defects exist in
nearly every aspect of present personnel practice. Recruitment
has been undertaken on a more or less haphazard basis and consumes an
inordinate amount of time. Training programmes are
insufficient.
Promotion exercises have become inordinately complicated to the
point of being nearly unworkable
Discipline and dismissal procedures are
encumbered by seemingly interminable appeals processes. The result is too
much 'deadwood' doing too little work and too few good staff members doing
too much, over-extending themselves sometimes to the point where they have
become counter-productive." Dick Thornburgh,
Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations," 1 March
1993, pp. 8-9. In 1994 the JIU reported that while modern
organizations must plan human resource needs strategically, the UN
Secretariat was still locked into the old "personnel administration" stage
of operations.
OHRM had had a policy unit earlier, but abolished it during a
financial crisis in 1987. The JIU argued that it must restore a
strategic "brain" and drastically upgrade professional skills in OHRM,
since only a few OHRM staff had university training in personnel matters
or previous personnel experience before joining the Office. Accountability
improvements were also urgently needed: "At present,
accountability for personnel improvement actions is often given to 'OHRM
and programme managers.' Unfortunately, accountability assigned
to everyone usually means the accountability of no one.
A central element of
accountability is performance and progress measures.
{A] biennial human
resources report
must provide analysis and carefully-chosen statistics
which show
where the real problems and bottlenecks are. Constructive,
informed dialogue can then take place and informed solutions can be
developed.
for example
the average length of time that professional
posts remain vacant [and analysis of why]
what percentage of staff have
had their performance evaluated [as required, and where do the problems
occur and why]
[and] how many staff members have been trained in what
specific fields
Careful
performance
results data and statistics should be developed and maintained on human
resources
[and] highlight successes, problems, or constraints
lessons
learned, or corrective actions should follow.
[a
systematic biennial report would]
clearly demonstrate that the
Secretariat is determined to provide firm management accountability and
disciplined improvement in all facets of the 'most precious asset' managed
by its personnel office and programme managers." Joint Inspection Unit, Ch. V.,
"A proper human resources approach," in "Advancement of the status of
women in the United Nations Secretariat in an era of 'human resources
management' and 'accountability': A new beginning?", UN document A/49/176,
1994, paras. 127-134, 141, 146, 153, 84-89.
[emphasis added. ]
At last, in 1994,
under heavy General Assembly pressure, a Secretary-General's report had to
make the humiliating but unavoidable admission that: "[This report]
outlines a strategy to modernize and re-energize human resources
management in the [UN Secretariat]
[While the UN's role
and mandates have expanded], commensurate changes and modernization in
human resources management have not occurred. As a result,
[such] management has been fragmented, bureaucratic and incapable of
dealing expeditiously with ever-changing demands
The Office of
Human Resources Management has been largely unable to address properly
[its essential] planning and management functions.
[This in turn has]
partially contributed to the slow deployment of field missions, inadequate
people management, low staff morale, and insufficient mobility. Thus, the time
is overdue
to introduce changes to maximize the contribution of [UN]
human resources." "A strategy for the management of the human resources
of the Organization: Revised estimates
: Report of the
Secretary-General ", UN document A/C.5/49/5 of 21
October 1994, paras. 1 and 23.
However, the rest of the report labored to explain and
expand upon this frank mea culpa. An incisive
assessment by the International Documents
Review of this report stated that: "A strategy was
presented to the General Assembly in a document of atrociously low
quality, even by UN standards. The writing is crusty with jargon,
repetitive, and structured like a multi-jointed creature out of Dr. Seuss.
It makes the rather
startling revelation that [OHRM] does not have a planning component. It
does not explain why this is so, or how the Office has managed to operate
for nearly five decades without planning its activities. As if
enunciating a new discovery, the report says that 'Planning is essential
" [Its]
absence
has contributed significantly to current OHRM management
weaknesses.
' [The report then
states that] 'It is intended that [UN] senior management be involved in
the planning process and party to all important decision-making relating
to human resources planning and change.' (Traditionally, senior management has considered OHRM a
generally unnecessary encumbrance, to be called into action only to fend
off unsuitable offerings of personnel from pushy ambassadors. Its powers of
locating competent staff for recruitment are held in such low esteem that
no senior manager in his right mind would initiate a request without
having someone already identified, or even on board as a consultant or
short-term contract employee.)" "Strategy to improve UN staff
management and quality explained in atrociously written report," International Documents Review (New York), 7 November 1994, pp. 4-5.
Subsequently, the discretionary exceptions and lack of
transparency about system functioning, and problems with controlling UN
posts, have continued on. Matters (and control) have become even
more complicated, since half or more of UN Secretariat staff are now
"extra-budgetary" staff, or temporary or short-term staff to meet
fluctuating programme levels, in particular in UN peacekeeping,
humanitarian, and other field operations around the world. This ad hoc and perpetually "temporary" process has put
very heavy additional pressure on OHRM to administer staff increasingly
scattered at isolated field locations and assignments, and requiring
frequent contract-renewal decisions. In 1995, Secretary-General Annan, then the head of UN peacekeeping and himself a former personnel chief, optimistically and publicly asserted that "the days of gifted amateurs are over." In contrast and in fact, however, in late 1997 the United States Ambassador to the UN casually offered former US presidential intern Monica Lewinsky a UN job (but she reportedly turned it down, saying she preferred to switch to the private sector). This certainly suggests that the days of grossly ungifted amateurs finding jobs in the UN continue on, presumably with the active participation of all 190-some UN Member States. "Inspectors score U.N. staff recruitment procedures",
Diplomatic World Bulletin, March 20-27, 1995, p. 1, and Goldstein, Amy, and John Mintz, "The high-level job
hunt for intern:
Colleagues were unimpressed by Lewinsky, so why the effort?", International Herald Tribune, 1998.
A very detailed two-part report by the JIU in 1995 and
1997 certainly found many serious problems in OHRM implementation of its
major functions.
A first report on recruitment discussed a list of major
deficiencies: lack of objective criteria, an absence of planning, obsolete
methods, long delays, and improper "regularization" of short-term
staff. It
cited unacceptable practices, such as favouritism, circumvention of the
principle of competitiveness, and interference with OHRM authority. The JIU reports also emphasized that it would be
premature and counter-productive to delegate such essential functions as
"hire", "fire," and "promote" before the necessary conditions were
created, all personnel procedures were reviewed and improved as the
General Assembly had required, and appropriate mechanisms for reporting,
accountability, and follow-up were put in place. Joint Inspection Unit,
"Inspection of the application of United Nations recruitment, placement,
and promotion policies", Part I, "Recruitment", UN document A/49/845, 1995, "Summary", pp. 5-7.
The second part of the JIU report, on placement and
promotions, found that in the impressive new human resources management
reforms the challenge, as always, lay in implementation, and that the new
system suffered most of the flaws and deficiencies of the old one. The report
observed that:
"
there are no systematic means for ensuring that equally
qualified people fill the same or comparable posts within the various
occupational groups. And since there exist no clear
across-the-board criteria for advancement in the proffessional grades,
promotions may be granted either on a rigorous or open-handed basis, which
depends not only on the individual supervisor but also on the presence or
absence of powerful patrons elsewhere, both in and outside the
organization.
it is not clear whether programme managers are accountable [under
the General Assembly's 1993 management accountability reform]
It may be
observed, for instance, that both the number of placement- and
promotion-related grievances and the proportions of decisions by the
internal justice bodies in appellants' favour are high. To date, it is
the Organization, and not respective managers, who is paying the price,
including financial compensation, for failure to follow the relevant
policy decisions." Joint Inspection Unit,
"Inspection of the application of United Nations recruitment, placement,
and promotion policies", Part II, "Placement and Promotions", UN document
A/51/656, 1997, "Summary", pp. iv -
vi.
In an angry resolution
in early 1997, the General Assembly underscored these implementation
problems, deploring in particular (see the last item) the poor performance
in following proper human resource procedures in the OHRM itself. "Recalling"
the Secretary-General's grand new strategy, the Assembly stated that
it: "I.2. Regrets with deep concern that
further progress in the implementation of the adopted strategy has not
been achieved, and urges the Secretary-General to take the
necessary action to ensure its full implementation
; 3. Regrets the unsuccessful
efforts to develop a management environment and culture in the
Organization that enables staff members to contribute their maximum
potential, effectiveness, and efficiency; 2.
Requests the
Secretary-General to enhance managerial accountability with
respect to human resources management decisions, including imposing sanctions in cases of
demonstrated mismanagement of staff and willful neglect of or disregard
for established rules and procedures, while safeguarding the due
process rights of all staff members, including managers;
4.
Deplores the high
number of exceptions to the established procedures for the recruitment,
placement, and promotion of staff, in particular in the Office of Human
Resources Management;" "Human resources management",
General Assembly resolution 51/226 of 25 April
1997, Part I, paras. 2-3, Part II, paras.2 and-4. [emphasis added]
During the late 1990s, the OHRM nevertheless attempted
to leave behind its role as a lowly servant attending to allowances, benefits, and
assignments.
Suddenly, it was to become a manager, a strategist, and a
supporter, monitor, and facilitator. There is considerable and continuing
uncertainty about whether and how well the OHRM is fulfilling this very
important function, as discussed in the subsection on Monitoring which ends this
OHRM subsection.
Nevertheless, the OHRM was then, and is still now, to be the
overall and day-to-day guarantor of the UN Charter's mandate for staff,
namely that of "securing the highest standards of efficiency,
competence, and integrity
"
Unfortunately, OHRM was called on to undertake its new leadership role, and especially its new planning and monitoring activities, at the very same time that the new Secretary-General, Kofi Annan and the Secretariat launched and largely achieved the prime strategy of delegating authority to newly-liberated UN managers, as discussed previously in the archive subsection on The Winner: "Free the managers". These conflicts were also revealed in an article in
early 1998 on a project which the new head of OHRM was undertaking for a
"thorough review" of UN staff matters. She sought delegation of 'maximum
responsibility' to line managers, because central control is
'excessive.'
She stated that: "OHRM will convene
a task force of experts [to make a] 'clear delineation of
responsibilities' [which] is expected to lead to a reduction in
micro-management. [The IDR then notes that] Micromanagement by intergovernmental bodies is an
index of the lack of trust between the majority of delegations and the
UN Secretariat.
[If this trend is to be reversed]
there must be a much clearer conceptualization of change, a balanced
explanation of implications, and an absolute sincerity of
purpose.
The current perception of the Secretariat among many delegations is
that in terms of personnel policy it is confused, does not understand the
full implications of what is proposed, and has a hidden agenda.
In pushing for
reorientation, Ms. Salim speaks some home truths
'We can no longer assume
that a [20-year] staff member has developed the necessary managerial and
supervisory skills'
there is 'widespread staff distrust of management'
and the UN's 'organizational culture is one in which advancement is
generally expected on the basis of longevity rather than
performance.'" "UN personnel chief reviewing
all aspects of management in bid to simplify controls, delegate
authority,", International Documents Review, 16 February 1998, p. 2. In
1998, OHRM stated that "A fundamental reorientation of human resources
management is a formidable task," and that there were still very major
shortcomings that impeded the effective use of staff resources and had to
be attended to. It argued that: "Managers have
limited responsibility over their human and financial resources. This leads
directly to the erosion of accountability at all levels of the
Organization; Complicated rules and
procedures have served to discourage the recruitment, advancement, and
mobility of staff, affecting the UN's capacity to move the right person to
the right place at the right time. This is essential in a global
organization which is increasingly expected to act quickly to address
complex crises and changing priorities; Inadequate human resources
planning has impaired the UN's ability to identify short and
longer-term staffing needs of the Organization; Insufficient
investment has been made in building the UN's substantive and managerial
capacity. Systematic development programmes for
managers have only been put in place very recently." "Staff become focus of United
Nations modernization: New management culture key to revitalization,"
United Nations Focus Series, No. 4, November
1998, p. 2. [emphasis
added.]
In
April 1999 the General Assembly biennial resolution on human resources
management noted that the management accountability system had still not
been established; the Secretary-General's intention to further
"streamline" procedures and delegate authority to managers; and repeated
the need for an accountability mechanism and sanctions for misbehaving
managers. The Assembly also reaffirmed a series of its other
resolutions of the 1990s on human resources matters, and then emphasized
its own role in thoroughly analyzing and approving posts and financial
resources to fully implement mandated programmes, and that human resources
management reforms should conform to the UN Charter and the rules. It concluded
as well that the OHRM was responsible for "
ensuring
compliance with recruitment, placement, and career development
procedures
throughout the Secretariat;
the central
authority for the monitoring and approval of the recruitment and placement
of staff and for the interpretation of the regulations and rules of the
Organization and their enforcement;; [and]
ensuring the
full implementation of basic human resources mandates set by the General
Assembly in the context of recruitment and placement
processes;"
"Human resources management," General Assembly resolution 53/221 of 23 April 1999, sections I and II.
Yet it is IO Watch's opinion that Secretary-General
Annan, rather than taking time to consolidate the major changes of his
1997 efforts to "free the managers" and firmly ensure that the old habits
of political favoritism and manipulation of personnel policies had truly
been vanquished by a solid set of management accountability processes and
sanctions, forged ahead vigorously to establish new levels of managerial
freedom. In
his 2000 report on human resources management reform, he set out ten
"building blocks" of reform for the next stage of reform, beginning with
human resources planning, streamlined rules, and a very detailed section
and annex on changes in recruitment, placement and promotion. He stated that
the latter processes were complex and slow, were mistrusted by staff, and
that managers "found it paper-intensive." He argued that "diffuse
decision-making" led to lack of personal accountability of managers, and
proposed therefore that, henceforth, rationalized and "streamlined"
processes should be applied, and managers should take the final decision
on the selection of their staff. [Mentioned only briefly amd bluntly was
that the fact that a long-standing tradition, staff appointment and
promotion bodies, had been abolished: "Staff involvement in
the actual selection of candidates would cease." "Human resources management reform: Report of the
Secretary-General", A/55/253 of 1 August 2000,
paras. 33-37 and Annex II, esp. para.
8.
The Secretary-General noted that "considerable
concern" had been expressed about programme managers taking over these
functions, and agreed that specific accountability mechanisms would be
critical. In case of any problems found by newly-structured central review
bodies, they would be swiftly considered, and OHRM or the Department of
Management would act as the "final decision makers in case of dissension
between programme managers and the central review body."
"Human resources management reform: Report of the
Secretary-General", A/55/253 of 1 August 2000,
paras. 33-37 and Annex II, paras. 1-8,
25.
In
a separate section, Mr. Annan observed that the new stages of reform
implied major changes in the role and functions of OHRM, as well as those
of managers and administrative offices, which would now take over
day-to-day personnel functions. This would eliminate duplication and allow
OHRM to concentrate on policy, guidance and assistance to managers (if
requested), and monitoring compliance. In a related section, he cited a "human
resources action plan" as the key accountability mechanism for
intervention where needed Secretariat-wide on personnel actions, including
an "exceptions log" in which all decisions to approve exceptions are
recorded and explained [a notable improvement, if true.] "Human resources management reform: Report of the
Secretary-General", A/55/253 of 1 August 2000,
paras.76-79, and Annex I, paras. 9-10.. In
2002, the Secretary-General cited the progress made in implementing the
ten "building blocks" of reform he had laid out in 2000, and stated that
evidence of cultural change "is already beginning to be seen." For the
future, he said that system improvement would continue, with still more
changes, seeking to enable the UN: "to attract, develop,
and retain staff of the highest quality [but also to] continue to improve
accountability and responsibility in
human resource management, as well
as monitoring mechanisms." "Human resources management
reform: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/57/293 of 8 August 2002, paras. 2-12. His report also stated that the new staff selection
system that integrates recruitment, placement, managed mobility and
promotion was implemented in Nay 2002, after extensive consultations. The next steps
would concentrate on completing the institutionalization of the new
system, including the strengthening and implementation of mechanisms for
the delegation of human resources authority and its monitoring. "Human resources management
reform: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/57/293 of 8 August 2002, paras. 26-34.
However, Mr. Annan added more "fuel to the fire" of
managerial liberation in his "agenda for further change" of 2002, in which
he stated that: "Improving the
quality of management was a priority of my first term. I have put
great emphasis on establishing clear lines of responsibility and ensuring
that managers are held accountable
I am confident that [our] new system of recruitment,
by giving managers primary responsibility for staff selection, will lead
to a new level of accountability and empowerment.
I intend to
adopt additional measures to cut unnecessary layers of bureaucracy. At present, the Organization
recruits highly qualified individuals, for management functions -- yet its
procedures do not allow them to manage a budget, procure what they
need for everyday activities or authorize travel for their staff. As decision-making
authority is devolved to programme managers, the roles and
responsibilities of the central service provider, the Department of
Management [which contains OHRM]
will need to be reviewed. Action 32.
In order to continue efforts to improve management: (a) a thorough review will be
conducted of delegated authority in order to increase the capacity and
flexibility of managers to manage
(b) The roles and
responsibilities of [DAM}
will be redefined in order to support the
increased delegation of authority; (c) Training of
managers will be strengthened across the Organization
" "Strengthening of the United
Nations: An agenda for further change: Report of the Secretary-General,"
UN document A/57/387 of 9 September 2002, paras.
188-190.
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