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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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A single process -- the choice of the second head of OIOS in late 1999 and
early 2000 -- underscores basic doubts about the
professionalism, seriousness and credibility of the UN's new internal
oversight and corruption-fighting body. The 1994 General Assembly resolution establishing the OIOS emphasized that the OIOS head should be an expert in oversight work. As noted in the preceding subsection, a set of excellent, highly-professional, and experienced candidates worldwide was readily available and well-known to the UN through the more than 170 national audit institutions in INTOSAI, many of whose top officials in turn know the UN programmes well from having served as external auditors for UN System organizations in the past. Yet
the first OIOS head chosen was a German diplomat, and the second a banker and civil
servant, Dileep Nair of Singapore, in a selection process which has
many gross flaws. This
extremely disappointing choice process was succinctly revealed, in at
least five distinct ways, in a single excellent article on this high-level
UN leadership change: (a) Succession planning was
very poor. Mr. Paschke ended
his five-year term in November 1999, but his successor was chosen by the
Secretary-General only in February 2000. He assumed his office in April,
leaving the post vacant for five months with no overlap or orderly
transition. {The article
observed that "OIOS has been leaderless since November
[and] there has been widespread concern over the lapse in
leadership.)" (b) The UN's top legal
official (and its "chief prosecutor" in staff "internal justice" appeals
cases), Mr. Hans Corell of Sweden, was chosen to "fill in" as the interim
head of OIOS, including the Investigation Section and its confidential
records. This raises serious conflict-of-interest issues that may have
compromised the "independent" and "arms length" OIOS status and its
responsibilities to protect staff confidentiality. (c) Some UN officials
asserted that the job requires a "deft diplomatic touch", a skill not
required by the Assembly resolution, nor emphasized in the audit
literature, but certainly a criterion quite helpful to the many diplomatic
candidates who lusted after this high-profile, Under-Secretary-General
post. (d)
UN officials also asserted that the UN USG salary (dubiously stated as
being "only" $95,000 a year), was too paltry to attract well-qualified
public or private sector candidates. This sour and cynical stance ignores
that UN salaries are linked to the highest-paid national civil service
worldwide, and is also a crude insult to existing UN staff as second-rate
people. (Contemporary articles noted that Secretary-General Kofi Annan, only two levels
above a USG, earned a very handsome $270,000 or so in annual total
remuneration, tax-free], while another contemporary UN job announcement
for a junior Director in New York, three levels below USG, offered a
starting net salary of $98,000-107,000, plus substantial additional
benefits.) [The
comparative salary information is from "Global fat cats", The
Economist, September 23d, 2000, p. 106,
and "Chief, D-1,
Information management
Humanitarian Affairs", The Economist,
September 2000. ] e) While there were
reputedly "some two dozen" candidates to head OIOS, there was little
transparency. Only the single
nominee chosen by Secretary-General Annan -- who is inter alia the chief UN administrative
officer whose programmes are subject to OIOS review -- was identified to
the General Assembly for its rubber-stamp approval. Betsy Pisik, "Annan
picks Singaporean for U. N. Inspector-General's job", Washington
Times, February 22, 2000. All
these elements grossly undermine the legitimacy of the UN's senior-level
appointments process (but fit firmly within defective methods for choosing
other UN senior officials).
Experts have repeatedly urged that such leaders be chosen not primarily on political
considerations but by finding and choosing among the best-qualified candidates
worldwide, in a transparent and publicly-scrutinized selection process.
Although
Secretary-General Annan has publicly stated that choosing the
"highest-calibre" people is his goal, senior-level appointments such as
that of Mr. Nair at the OIOS, are made under his discretionary power, with
no vacancy announcement, no publicized job descriptions, and no standard
recruitment or promotion procedures.
These problems have been well-analysed
in: Brian Urquhart, and Erskine Childers, A world in
need of leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations: A fresh appraisal,
revised second edition, Dag Hammarskjold Foundation and Ford Foundation,
Uppsala, Sweden, 1996, and Joint Inspection
Unit, "Senior-level appointments in the United Nations, its programmes and
funds", UN document A/55/423,
2000, "Executive
Summary" and pp. 2-10. The
second selection to head OIOS also clearly undermined, again, the
insistence of experts in the early 1990s that a strong "Inspector General"
was needed. As Childers and
Urquhart stated: "To carry maximum credulity
and universal confidence the appointee must be of impeccable repute and
with top-calibre qualifications for such
work." Erskine Childers, with Brian Urquhart, "Renewing
the United Nations system", Development Dialogue, 1994:1, Dag
Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1994, pp. 146-147. [emphasis
added]
Experts
in democratization say that it is the second election in a country that
shows whether meaningful reform has really taken hold. The UN's first choice to head the
new OIOS in 1994 was dubious.
But the second choice process and outcome in 2000 (however
excellent a person Mr. Nair may be) was even worse in indicating serious
disdain for proper, transparent, and professional selection of an
oversight expert. Yet once again, no one raised any serious objections,
and it appears that the selection of unqualified "diplomat
Inspector-Generals" may well continue on in the future. (A new head of OIOS is due to be
appointed in 2005.) Mr. Nair's OIOS
largely carried on as it did under Mr. Paschke. However, the pivotal incident in
Mr. Nair's term may well have occurred early on, in September 2000. An article in the Observer (UK)
reported that: "The United
Nations has been hit by an unprecedented wave of fraud, waste and
corruption. Officials at its
antifraud investigation unit say they are expecting to have to run more
than 350 inquiries by the end of the year -- nearly twice the total for
1998, and a 50 per cent increase on last year. Thousands of staff, contractors,
and consultants have been interviewed in scores of countries.
The revelations
will embarrass Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, who is to welcome
national leaders
to the 'Millenium Summit' in New York next
week.
Annan is hoping to convince
skeptical heads of state that the UN has provided value for money and that
its role should be expanded.
One senior
investigator said last week that the UN investigations unit's workload was
greater than ever. 'We are seeing more and more frauds and abuses of
authority.'
The OIOS's
annual report, due out next month, will reveal cases of sloppy management,
lax enforcement, harassment and outright criminality.
OIOS is
working with dozens of interntional police forces -- including Scotland Yard -- on
inquiries into the activities of UN
personnel." Jason
Burke, et. al., "UN rocked by flood of fraud cases: Officials were
'addicted to luxury," The Observer International (UK), September
3, 2000. [Note: any such
interviews with OIOS staff seem to have come to an abrupt end thereafter,
as discussed in the subsection on OIOS investigations which follows.] The OIOS annual report
for 2000, the first under Mr. Nair, was issued only a month later. It
lacked the "fire" of the interview, but did indeed state impressively
that: "The Investigations Section investigated 38 cases which were
presented for administrative or disciplinary action: 22 of those cases
were recommended for criminal prosecution by national law enforcement
authorities." "Report of the OIOS", UN document A/55/436 of 2 October 2000, para. 156. The
2000 OIOS annual report also cited increasing workloads, declining cost
savings, no new staff, and oversight work that was overly-centralized in
New York rather than out in the field. The 2001 report was more upbeat.
It discussed new arrangements to make overall assessments of the
implementation of critical OIOS recommendations. OIOS reorganized, in
order to gather monitoring, inspection, evaluation and consulting units
into a new division to "leverage" the limited OIOS resources in a more
integrated approach, and for: "improved management
consulting services to client departments and offices." "Report of the OIOS", UN document A/55/436 of 2 October 2000,
"Report of the OIOS", UN document A/56/381 of 19
September 2001,
and "UN's
internal oversight office launches refocused annual report at Headquarters
", Press release ORG/1139 of 24 October 2001.
In
2002 the OIOS "responded with determination to calls by Member States for
better use of [UN resources] by focusing its services to instil a greater
sense of accountability throughout the Organization." It continued a strategy focused on
three objectives: qualified staff, a culture of continuous improvement,
and improved client relations.
It introduced new initiatives of risk assessment; prioritizing
investigative assignments to handle the increasing caseload; applying its
internal management consultants to meet demands for services; supporting
self-evaluation by program managers; and upgrading its performance
management information systems.
To meet these new tasks, the office appealed to Member States for
extra-budgetary resources for a "Trust Fund for Enhancing Professional
Capacities for Internal Oversight" that it established in 2001.
"Report of
the OIOS", UN document A/57/451 of 4 October, 2002, "Preface", pp. 7-9.
The 2003 OIOS annual
report highlighted its new approach of identifying key risk areas for
oversight in its annual work plan: the highest risks were safety and
security, procurement, and peacekeeping. It hoped to get managers involved
in identifying the most serious risks in their operations, using as well
the combined expertise of the OIOS staff, and to work in collaboration
with Member States and other oversight bodies. "Report of the OIOS", UN document A/58/364 of 11
September 2003,
and "United Nations internal office
reports potential savings of $37 million identified in work of
organization," Press release ORG/1398 of 16 October
2003. [Note: these annual reports and
press releases are available at The 2004-2005 United Nations Proposed Programme Budget
showed that the OIOS has become robust and well-established. It now has
overall resources for the biennium of some $21 million plus estimated
extra-budgetary resources of another $23 million, and thus total expenses
which amount to about $22 million per year. OIOS has grown to 128
professional-and-above posts, plus 55 general service and local ones, for
a total of 183 posts. About half the posts are temporary ones,
either regular budget or extra-budgetary. OIOS headquarters are in New
York, with units in Geneva and Nairobi, and a much-expanded presence
(including some resident auditors) in field operations as well. "Proposed programme budget for the biennium 1994-1995, UN document A/58/6 (Sect. 30) of 17 March 2003, and "United Nations internal
oversight," booklet, available at the OIOS website. The OIOS website also highlighted its results in
combating waste and fraud during 2004 on its website, as a lead element of
its achievements: "Financial
benefits:
Since 1995, OIOS has exposed waste and fraud in the Organization
totaling some $290 million, of which $130 million was recovered and saved.
"
[Available at www.un.org/Depts/oios/ ]
Specifying cost savings is a tricky business,
involving estimates of possible savings, savings actually achieved, and
also waste stopped and therefore not continuing on in future years. However, at
least three overall points should be noted. ?
First, in its 10 years since the temporary unit began
in 1993, OIOS operations have cost some $170 million (10 x about $17
million per year). This is less than the total waste and fraud exposed,
but more than that recovered and saved. A good audit and investigation
unit should definitely more than pay for itself. ?
Second, the very large "waste and fraud" amounts
appear to be mostly waste, especially from careless financial management
errors involving benefits and claims. For instance, an OIOS audit in 2001 of
mission subsistence allowance rates of selected peacekeeping missions led
to recommendations which, if implemented, could save about $45 million
per year. ?
It
can take years to recover what can be recovered or to realize cost savings
identified, requiring, as OIOS notes, determined follow-up actions by
itself and UN programme managers. Meanwhile, a very high-profile new "integrity
initiative" was also cited in the 2003 OIOS annual report: "
in May 2003, the United
Nations launched the organizational integrity initiative, a three-year
programme aimed at strengthening integrity and professional ethics in the
Organization
funded by a generous contribution from the Government of
Norway
[and resulting from] cooperation between OIOS and United Nations
departments (including [OHRM])
The initiative consists of ethics
training, staff perception surveys and outreach activities aimed at
raising awareness about the importance of integrity in the workplace. A related
objective is to enhance the
profile of the United Nations integrity-building and corruption-control
efforts just as Member States gather in Mexico to sign the United
Nations Convention against Corruption at the end of the year. The United Nations itself must
lead by example and ensure that integrity and professional ethics guide
all its work." "Report of the OIOS", UN document A/58/364 of 11 September 2003, "Preface," p.3 [emphasis added.]
The OIOS biennual programme plan for 2005-2006 stated
that OIOS assists the Secretary-General in fulfilling his internal
oversight responsibilities, with operational independence under his
authority, and the authority itself to undertake any action it considers
necessary to fulfill its responsibilities. These actions include protection of
assets, compliance of programmes with UN resolutions and rules, preventing
and detecting waste and mismanagement, and improving programme
delivery.
The OIOS strategy is to ensure an effective and transparent system
of accountability in place and to help identify, assess and mitigate risks
and threats to achieving its objectives. "Proposed strategic framework for the period
2006-2007: Programme 25: Internal oversight", UN document A/59/6 (Prog.
25), 20 April 2004, paras. 25.1-25.4. The annual report of the OIOS for 2004,
the fifth and final report submitted to the General Assembly by Mr. Nair,
marked the end of a full decade of OIOS work. It included an
Office-wide self evaluation, citation of its operational independence and
the need to ensure its independence as a cornerstone of good governance,
and the need for a proper delegation of authority to OIOS for this
end. IO
Watch will explore this OIOS self-evaluation in more detail at a later
date, recognizing that it is better (more professional) than the standard,
self-serving UN self-evaluations, in light of concurrent developments
during 2004. "Report of the Office of
Internal Oversight Services" Note by the Secretary-General", UN document
A/59/359 of 13 September 2004, Preface. In
fact, during 2004 the central issues and tensions of the operational
"independence" of the OIOS under the authority of the Secretary-General,
and its role in ensuring "an effective and transparent system of
accountability in place", were thrown into sharp relief in what became a
most interesting -- and very troubling year. Mr. Paschke had ended his five year term expressing
considerable pride in what he had achieved, citing much critical
accountability and oversight work still to be done (as if he had been an
observer rather than the key responsible official), and with unequivocal
accolades from Secretary-Annan, who stated in his covering note to the 1999 annual report
that: "The
Secretary-General concurs with the observations of the
Under-Secretary-General [of OIOS] in his preface that the independence of
the Office has never been compromised during his tenure. He has enjoyed
the complete support of the Secretary-General." "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document A/54/393, of
23 September 1999, Covering
Note,
para. 2. IO
Watch believes that overall the OIOS of Mr. Nair did a much better job
than that of Mr. Paschke. It became regularly involved in (instead of
avoiding) broad management audits of key areas such as peacekeeping, human
resources management, and management systems. It performed
more, and more substantive, investigations of fraud and mismanagement
scandals in the Secretariat, even those involving some senior officials
(although only after the stories hit the media), and generally upgrading
the quality of OIOS work and financial support to expand its
activities. But there were continuing fundamental problems as
well. The
OIOS took its eye off the key task of putting a transparent and effective
accountability system in place, choosing instead to work closely
to help and support managers. In addition, the OIOS was hampered
because the General Assembly continued to be rather awkward and
inconsistent in handling and acting on substantive OIOS reports, a major
continuing failing which this archive explores further with calls for
annual results and status reporting to the General Assembly and especially
the creation of a General Assembly audit subcommittee under Recent
Developments . Above all, the actual "independence" of this internal
oversight unit under the authority of the Secretary-General was called
into severest question. Six key developments occurred (plus the
fundamental weakness of OIOS as an investigative "fig leaf", which is
discussed in the next subsection). FIRST,
as already noted, in 2003 the OIOS established a three-year Organizational
Integrity Initiative, funded by Norway, to strengthen integrity and
professional ethics in the UN and enhance United Nations
integrity-building and corruption-control efforts alongside the new United
Nations Convention against Corruption established in late 2003. The OIOS
also joined with Harvard University in establishing an Executive Programme
on Corruption Control and Organizational Integrity designed for executives
from the public, private and not-for-profit sectors around the world. And
in addition, the UN underscored that it too must exemplify these processes
in its own operations. As a message from Secretary-General
Annan informed a Global Forum in 2003: [Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, in a statement to a global forum on Fighting Corruption and
Safeguarding Integrity, in Seoul, Korea in May 2003] .. emphasized that
corruption facilitates organized crime, human trafficking, and terrorism
and asked the delegates to support the
pending UN Convention on
Anti-Corruption.
'For too long, the
world has looked the other way while corrupt elites looted their countries
of hundreds and even billions of dollars
' Mr. Annan said. Continuing, he said,
'The United Nations itself has launched an Organizational Integrity
Initiative designed to promote professional ethics, improve accountability
and better protect our resources and reputation.
After all, if United Nations agencies are advocating
integrity and good governance, we ourselves have a duty to lead by example
and practice what we preach.' "Global Forum III: Ongoing challenges, shared
responsibilities", US Agency for International Development, Newsletter of
the Americas' Accountability/Anti-Corruption Project (AAA), No. 33, p.
1,
at www.respondanet.com/english . However, in the midst of all this enthusiasm, the OIOS
and the UN got far ahead of themselves. A UN Organizational Integrity survey
responded to by some 6,000 UN staff and issued in June 2004 showed some
quite negative findings within the Organization itself on unaddressed
integrity and accountability problems. "A new survey of
[UN integrity perceptions] has found that while structures for
reporting and combating corruption exist, most staff members are
either unaware of how to use them or afraid to do so for fear of high-level
retaliation. 'The UN has a 'phone book' of rules and regulations
which are totally useless as they are never practiced', a staff member
is quoted as saying
[Another says,] 'Senior
leaders caught in serious breaches of ethics should be punished, not
promoted as usual.'
[The study] is being made public at a time when Secretary-General Kofi
Annan has been forced by the widespread publicity [about corruption in the
Iraq oil-for-food program] to appoint a high-level panel to look into
them.
The new study records relatively high levels of worker
satisfaction
but its most negative
findings have to do with ingrown leadership and the lack of response to
reports of corruption. 'Get rid of the old boy network,' one staff member
[says.]
'That network is wide, tenacious and powerful.
So long as you can wind
your way into that network, you are OK.
Opposing the network is certainly the end of a UN
career.'" Warren Hoge, "Report criticizes
the way UN fights corruption", International Herald
Tribune, June 16, 2004.
[emphasis added.] [Note: The actual survey, based
on responses from some 6,000 UN staff, is "United Nations organizational integrity
survey", Final Report, prepared by Deloitte Consulting LLP, June 2004. It can be found at http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/index.shtml
. It is also
interesting to note, in comparing this 2004 survey with a similar one in
1995, that things have indeed gone downhill -- staff in both surveys
sought better management, but in 2004, even after a decade of "management
reform", UN staff were much more concerned with, and disturbed by, senior
management accountability issues.] These quite surprising survey findings led
Secretary-General Annan to issue the integrity survey results with a
placating cover letter, which stated inter alia
that: "
According to the
survey, staff generally
perceive that breaches of integrity and ethical conduct are insufficiently
and inequitably addressed by the disciplinary system. At the same
time, they voice concern about the consequences of 'whistle-blowing' or
reporting on misconduct, and certainly about the mechanisms for such
reporting.
Clearly
these need to be better known and made more
accessible to staff at large. We will inform all staff about the means
available to them for reporting on suspected misconduct. We will also develop measures
to reinforce formal protection for whistle-blowers, while ensuring
that they are not used to cloak false accusations.
it is interesting to note
that, while the great majority of staff believe that their own
immediate supervisors demonstrate integrity and uphold the United Nations'
values, the general view of
senior leaders is less positive. The survey rightly emphasizes the need for senior leaders to
lead by example, living up to the commitments they make in their annual
compact with me.
I will therefore be directing my senior
colleagues to make much greater efforts in this area
" Kofi A. Annan, "Dear
colleagues", letter of 4 June 2004 , p. 3. An
equally strong admonishment came from staff representatives before the
Fifth Committee of the General Assembly in October 2004. "Rosemarie Waters,
President of the United Nations Staff Union, said that the measures
introduced in the past six years had had a profound and sometimes
deleterious effect on the staff of the Organization.
management
had been reforming itself and increasing management authority, while
reducing accountability. The Staff Union had the greatest respect for
the Secretary-General's vision for the Organization and had supported the
goals of his reform programme. It could not, however, support the erosion of staff
rights and dissolution of oversight mechanisms as a means of
implementation, and it could not continue legitimizing actions in which
staff, through their elected representatives, had no meaningful role to
play.
The organization had
yet to establish concrete measures for individual accountability, she
continued.
It was essential that areas with expanded delegation of authority
for personnel decisions
should be carefully examined, and, if abuses
were found, such delegation should be revoked. The
[OHRM]
had informed staff representatives of its inability to enforce
accountability because they lacked central authority. The Fifth
Committee may wish to recommend that concrete individual accountability be
developed, in consultation with staff representatives, on a priority
basis." "UN staff committee
representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in management
reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of 29 October 2004, pp. 2-3.
[emphasis added] SECOND,
the UN indeed had a wave of major corruption and scandal allegations and
findings which emerged during the last half of 2004. They are
discussed in many places in this archive, including in particular the
subsections on Late 2004: A "tipping point" for the
UN? , Refugee Sexual
Abuses , the Iraq oil-for-food
programme , Corruption in the
UN , Corruption
characteristics , and in the next
subsection on Investigation efforts: Is the OIOS a fig
leaf? . THIRD, a major case of sexual harassment allegations involving a top UN official emerged in 2004 and was then eventually snuffed out. The development of the case is discussed more fully under the archive subsection on Anti-harassment efforts , and is noted here only in the following brief quotes which underscore the issues of OIOS independence versus the Secretary-General's ultimate authority to overrule any findings. "Ruud Lubbers, the
high commissioner for refugees [UNHCR]
confirmed
a sexual harassment
complaint filed against him by a staff member. Lubbers, 65, a former
Dutch prime minister, denied the allegations.
The woman
said the
incident occurred at the end of a meeting as she, Lubbers and five male
staff members were leaving the room. The woman told other staff members that
she was "shocked and horrified," associates said. Lubbers said Dileep
Nair, chief of the [OIOS} had told him of the complaint
filed
four
months after the alleged harassment took place. Two UN investigators
were sent
to Geneva by OIOS
" Fiona Fleck, "Harassment
complaint lodged against UN official", International Herald Tribune, May 19, 2004. "[Mr. Lubbers] has
written a staff member who formally accused him of sexual harassment,
asking that she drop the case and promising to protect her from reprisals,
people familiar with the case said. The charge has been
under investigation by [the OIOS].
[Lubbers received]
the investigators' final report in June
[which was] in New York awaiting
official action.
In the May 28 staff
message, Lubbers acknowledged an incident with the
staffer but disputed
its interpretation as abuse.
he concluded, 'I'm really sorry for
that.' Fiona Fleck and Warren Hoge,
"UN official is said to ask for dropping of sex case", International Herald Tribune, May 19, 2004. "One of the UN's most
senior figures has been cleared of sexual harassment by Secretary-General
Kofi Annan.
Mr. Annan found that
the complaint against [High Commissioner for Refugees Ruud Lubbers] 'could
not be sustained by the evidence,' [a UN spokesman] said. However, Mr. Annan
said in a letter to staff of the [UNHCR] that he had written to Mr.
Lubbers 'conveying in the strongest terms my concerns about the incident
which gave rise to the complaint.' Mr. Annan's spokesman said
the matter was now 'considered closed' and that efforts were being made to
'rebuild trust and confidence' among UNHCR staff.'" "Lubbers cleared of UN sex claim", BBC NEWS, July 15,
2004.
"A senior UN official
[Ruud Lubbers] was cleared of sexual harassment earlier this year because
the secretary general rejected the verdict of an internal watchdog.
But a revised report
issued by UN watchdogs on Thursday revealed that investigators supported
the allegation
[and recommended appropriate action.]. Mr. Annan refused to
take action, saying the allegations were 'not sustainable.'
Despite the
recommendation, Mr. Annan dismissed the complaint, but instead wrote to
Mr. Lubbers stressing his concerns 'in the strongest terms.' UN spokesman Fred
Eckhard attempted to explain the secretary-general's verdict on Thursday,
asserting that Mr. Annan decided the allegations were unsustainable after
seeking legal advice on the matter. 'He did not say there
was no evidence.
He said he found the evidence unsustainable on a legal basis', Mr.
Eckhard said."
"Kofi Annan
'vetoed UN sex claim'", BBC News, October 28,
2004. The lawyer for the
[UN] staff member who brought sexual harassment charges [at UNHCR]
has
said that [Secretary-General Annans admission]
of having overruled his
own investigators in clearing [Ruud] Lubbers would spur an appeal
the admission that
UN investigators had found the womans complaint valid and had recommended
punishment emerged this past week in the [OIOS] annual report
[which
restored this damning disclosure in a last-minute restoration]
A senior UN official
had said earlier that if the claims against Lubbers were found to be true,
he would be obliged to resign.
When he cleared
Lubbers of the formal charges in July, Annan
did not reveal the negative
findings of his own investigators
and said that the complaint against
Lubbers could not be sustained.
[The lawyer, Edward
Patrick] Flaherty, argued that the doctored document strengthened his
clients case
This demonstrates
that there are two sets of [UN] rules
Flaherty said. One for the
protected class and one for the rest. Mr. Lubbers is part of the protected
class. My
client is not. The appeal
cites 12
instances of Lubbers alleged attempts to intimidate the complainant
Fiona Fleck and Warren Hoge, Appeal is expected in UN
sex case: Lawyer cites Annans overruling of his own investigators, International Herald Tribune, November 1, 2004. This very serious set of allegations of sexual
harassment by Mr. Lubbers was thus "put to rest", but in a very
heavy-handed and damaging way. Not only did Secretary-General Annan
overrule the findings and recommendations of the in-depth study made by
his investigators, but the Secretariat then withheld the release of the
OIOS annual report to the General Assembly to attempt to cover up the
actions he took.
Saving an "old boy" had a heavy cost in top leadership credibility
(and directly confirmed the staff suspicions of self-serving old boy
manipulations as expressed in the Integrity Survey of June 2004. FOURTH,
however, there was still much more to come. Even as Mr. Nair and his OIOS staff
investigated the serious allegations in the UNHCR and battled with
Secretariat officials over the OIOS annual report release, Mr. Nair
himself was enmeshed in a scandal of mismanagement allegations within his
OIOS, as shown by the following quotes.
"The United Nation's
anti-corruption department has been rocked by accusations that the office
itself is corrupt. The head of the
[OIOS]
, Dileep Nair, has been accused of promoting and recruiting
people in ways that are not consistent with U. N. rules and
regulations.
Also, a senior investigator has been suspended and there have been
accusations of financial and sexual misconduct. The scrutiny of Nair
and his division comes at a delicate time, as the United Nations is under
intense scrutiny for alleged abuse of the Iraqi oil-for-food program. Nair has been accused
of covering up abuses [in that]
program.
Other allegations of
impropriety include charges that some inside the OIOS received financial
kickbacks in return for promoting people and that some people were
promoted in exchange for sexual favors." Jonathan Hunt, Watching the UN's watchdog", Fox News, June 16,
2004.
"Former top civil
servant and banker Dileep Nair has been accused of violating UN
regulations in the way he promoted and recruits people.
The United Nations
Staff Union has asked UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to establish an
independent investigation of the OIOS, alleging that personnel decisions
made by Mr. Nair
'violated the rights of staff members.'
The union has also
expressed concern over the possibility that Mr. Nair suspended Mr.
Francois Pascal, a senior investigator in his organisation, 'because he
was making waves over controversial recruitment and promotion decisions
Nair had made.' Mr. Annan -- who
handpicked the Singaporean for the job four years ago -- has asked Mr.
Nair for an explanation. Fox News reported
that Mr. Nair, currently on sick leave, denied all the allegations made
against him. He stressed that he
had done nothing wrong and would step down if the investigations found
problems in the OIOS. Said Mr. Nair: 'That goes
without question because that would mean my integrity is impugned and the
only thing I work upon in this office is integrity and the credibility
that people have in this office
'" Lee Ching Wern, "S'porean UN
anti-graft unit chief under probe", newstoday.com.sg , June 19,
2004. Several months passed, with much attention devoted to
the UNHCR sexual harassment allegations. Then, in mid-November, after the blocked
OIOS report on the Lubbers case had finally been issued, the UN announced
the results of its "investigation" of the allegations concerning Mr. Nair
and the OIOS.
The reaction was quick and fierce. "An exhaustive probe
has cleared the head of [the UN's OIOS] of alleged staff rules violations
and has found no credible information to back corruption and other charges
against him, a UN spokesman said today. The investigation was
ordered after the UN Staff Council
[reported allegations against Mr.
Nair]
of violations of appointments and promotion in OIOS, as well as
allegations of corrupt practices in the Office and 'other misconduct' by
Mr. Nair. Spokesman Fred
Eckhard said
'a thorough review' conducted by [UN top manager] Catherine
Bertini found that "no staff regulations or rules were violated
, and
that the relevant personnel procedures were followed.' With regard to the
other allegations, the investigation did not receive 'credible information
on which to follow-up and, therefore, recommended that no further action
was necessary in the matter', the spokesman said. He added that Mr.
Annan had accepted the investigation's findings and recommendations
[and
that he told] Mr. Nair 'that he had every confidence that the
good
work of the [OIOS] under his leadership would
continue." "Thorough probe finds no
evidence of wrongdoing by UN official", UN News Service, 16 November 2004. | |||
