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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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A central factor underlying accountability and oversight processes is
personal accountability of managers and staff for their performance. The crucial tool for this purpose
is systematic and periodic staff performance
ratings. The
UN's weak personnel selection policies are both long-standing and
widely-known. At any point
along the way since 1945, they could have been counteracted and corrected
by carefully assessing staff
performance to identify and reward high-achievers while weeding out
unsatisfactory staff.
Far
back in the 1950s the General Assembly required a detailed study of the efficiency
of UN Secretariat operations.
In the 1970s major efforts were urged to compare programme results
to budgeted intentions, and in 1985 the Secretariat agreed, after sharp
criticism from Member States, to finally begine to determine, and report
on, "what has been done, to what effect." But all these efforts foundered
on stultifying budgetary procedures, elaborate six-year medium term plans,
and other input rituals. Even
more fundamentally, of course, IO Watch believes that the situation also
reflects the very strong unwillingness of the Administration to subject
its barons, time-servers and "deadwood" to a frank, systematic, and
periodic assessment of their non-performance. Ever
since the 1970s, and particularly from the 1990s onward, much serious and
productive work has been done around the world to establish performance
management and measurement systems in private and public organizations,
and to replace rigid control systems with new management cultures which
seek continuous improvement of performance and
results. Marc Holzer and Arie
Halachmi, "Measurement as a means of accountability", International
Journal of Public Administration, 19(11/12), 1996, pp.
1921-1944,
"Mini-forum: Results act
results", The Public Manager (USA) , 29(1), Spring 2000, pp. 17-32,
Andy Neely, Measuring
business performance, The Economist Books, London, 1998, pp.
1-7, Public
Performance & Management Review (formerly Public Productivity and
Management Review) (USA), Sage Publications, affiliated with Rutgers
University, AASPA, and AACPM, 1976-present.
Other United Nations system
agencies have undertaken related efforts to establish integrated strategic
planning, performance management, and accountability systems, in order to
make themselves more responsive to rapid change and to their clienteles'
changing needs. "Accountability, management
improvement, and oversight in the United Nations system", Joint Inspection
Unit, UN document A/50/507,
1995, Chapter VI, pp. 29-36.
The
UN, however, while making some progress on broader performance management,
has held on tightly to its one and only fully-established performance
management component -- a 50-year old system of periodic
performance ratings for staff (now called "performance appraisal"). The
traditional reports over the decades were always focused on personal
attributes rather than on work done, and the system was always very
carelessly implemented and poorly monitored. The
Thornburgh report of 1993 expressed discouragement at the continuing poor
performance ratings system. "One of the major
disappointments of my tenure was our failure to devise a new performance
evaluation system. The
present scheme is virtually useless as 'ratings inflation" has produced
positive assessments for anearly all (90 per cent) of our staff
members. The present practice
thus deprives the Organization of both the ability to reward superior
performance and to sanction sub-standard performance. A system where all are rated
superior is one where none are superior." Dick Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations" ["The Thornburgh report"], 1 March 1993, pp. 10-11. Despite
no less than five attempts at reforming it, his successor as the UN's
senior manager, herself a former junior UN staff member, commented in 1993
that "The performance
evaluation system absolutely must be changed. I can't even find a polite word to
describe it. It's an insult
to both the people rating and the people being rated." "Former staffer comes in as
UN's top manager", Secretariat News (New York), July-August
1993, page 7, as described in
"Toward a new system of
performance appraisal in the United Nations Secretariat: Requirements for
successful implementation", Joint Inspection Unit, UN document A/49/219, 1994, para 66. A
1993 JIU report had also noted the sharp criticisms of the performance
appraisal processes from all sides, the "Group of 18" calls for an annual
Secretary-General's report on this topic, and the Secretary-General's
report of 1990 stating that a new system with numerical ratings to permit
comparisons would be introduced in 1991. However, in 1993 discussions on
this effort were still continuing.
The JIU concluded that: "Thus,
criticism continues that the Secretariat has too much 'deadwood' doing too
little work and too few good staff doing too much. The performance
appraisal system gives positive assessments for nearly all (90) percent of
staff, thereby depriving the Organization of the ability to reward
superior performance and to sanction sub-standard performance. Therefore, establishing a new
system should be a 'high priority.' [A] 1993 ICSC report observed that
while most performance processes in the United Nations system are
now task/performance-based (i.e., accomplishments and results) or
moving in that direction, the United Nations clings to a subjective
personality trait/professional-conduct type system (i.e.,
'dependability,' 'oral expression,' 'competence.' In addition, the existing
Secretariat system provides no performance appraisal for senior
Directors and policy-making officials of the Secretariat (D-2 level and
above.)" Joint Inspection Unit,
"Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN
document A/48/420,
1993 , paras.
133-136, "Report of the Group of
High-Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the
Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations," UN document A/41/49, 1986,
Recommendation 51,
amd "Analytical report of the
Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution
41/213", UN document A/45/226 of 17 April 1990, para. 188. The
General Assembly showed its continuing concern in 1993. It called on the Secretary-General
"to undertake without delay a complete review of the performance
evaluation system," in consultation with ICSC, in order to develop it into
"an effective system that accurately assesses staff performance and
improves staff accountability."
It also requested him to ensure that staff regulations concerning
separation from service will be effectively applied to staff members whose
performance evaluations are consistently poor [that is, to fire them,
which apparently has never occurred in the UN ratings process, in
the past or at present.]
"Personnel questions,"
General Assembly resolution 47/226 of 30 April 1993, Part I.B,
paras. 3, 7. In
February 1994 a staff task force emphasized an "overwhelming consensus"
that the existing system was not working and "is no longer acceptable to
anyone." It stated
that: Managers
find it: -- a meaningless chore which obliges
them to give inflated evaluations either to avoid confrontation or the
lengthy rebuttal system; -- an inadequate tool for performance
management; -- lacking any guiding standards for
the written narrative required to accompany
ratings. Staff
find it: -- based on standards and
expectations of which they are not made
aware; -- an insufficient instrument for
providing performance feedback; -- a poor measure of their
performance as no real distinction is made between excellent and poor
performers. The
Administration finds it: -- of limited usefulness as a
measure of performance for comparative
purposes; -- a
poor - although essential - basis for a number of personnel
decisions/administrative actions; --
lacking an element of managerial performance/not providing for management
accountability; -- too often resulting in
costly, tie-consuming and counterproductive rebuttal
procedures." "Introduction of a new
design for a performance evaluation system," a memorandum from the USG,
DAM to heads of UN departments/offices of 17 February 1994, as
described in Joint Inspection Unit, "Toward a
new system of performance appraisal in the United Nations Secretariat:
Requirements for successful implementation", UN document A/49/219, 1994, p. 17.
The
1994 JIU report on UN performance appraisal devoted almost half its text
to the requirements for successful implementation of the new system to be
established. They included a
broader accountability system; top management leadership; the critical
role of managers; work programmes and standards; ratings, comparisons,
rewards, and sanctions; responsibility for system implementation; and the
critical constraints and adjustments -- training, timing, and
resources. It concluded
that: "
organizations, like people, must strive to learn from their
mistakes. Sound and
transparent performance appraisal and performance management are central
elements in establishing a more effective United Nations and bolstering
the organization's credibility.
Having failed to effectively implement such a system in the past,
the Secretariat must now demonstrate convincingly that, this time, it can
establish and apply accountability and high-quality performance as
day-to-day priorities throughout the
Organization. The new performance
appraisal system is all the more important
to make a fundamental change
in the organizational climate throughout the United Nations
Secretariat. Under the old
performance evaluation system, good or bad performance simply had no
consequences. Now,
performance, results, and fulfillment of programme mandates and objectives
must become the central elements of the work of staff at all
levels." Joint Inspection Unit, "Toward
a new system of performance appraisal in the United Nations Secretariat:
Requirements for successful implementation", UN document A/49/219, 1994, p.
17. Secretariat
actions since this challenge was issued have not been very impressive. In
1996, after an elaborate preparation process, OHRM introduced the sixth
attempt to fix this problem, a new Performance Appraisal System
(PAS). Its original
cumbersome design foundered badly and alienated staff and managers. After serious remodeling, it was
reissued and has gradually become routine, and the new procedures have
even been praised by some outsiders. "PAS: Unloved and unneeded",
UN Staff Report (New York),
December 1996, p. 8, "System to assess staff
performance, introduced as key to management culture, seems slated for
oblivion", International Documents Review, 16 June 1997, p.
2, and "Open revolt: Evaluation
mutiny", excerpted from Washington Times, by Betsy Pisic, June 16,
1997, in UN Special, July-August 1997, p.
6,
As
always in the UN, implementation of the new system is not as simple as
proclaiming it and formulating its policies. The Secretary-General's 2002
reform progress report noted that the system had been revised again, with
all units "expected" to use the system by April 2003, i.e., seven long
years after the system was introduced. The PAS system had been also been
revised, for instance, to require that all reporting officers must
complete appraisals for all staff prior to their departure to a new job (a
seemingly obvious duty in any normal organization, but one that had been
ignored in the UN for decades). The
2002 Secretariat report stated that, in future, OHRM would develop "an
expanded ability" to do qualitative as well as quantitative analyses of
PAS implementation, would link PAS data to other electronic systems (an
action which had first been recommended to no effect in 1988), and would
develop "support guides" for staff and managers. "Human resources management
reform: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/57/293 of 8
August 2002, paras. 51-54.
As
usual, however, there are major "holes" in Secretariat implementation,
which suggest that monitoring and enforcement of this process still leave
much to be desired. -- The US GAO report in 2000 on UN
efforts to establish human resource management reforms (which found that
the process was only about 25 percent complete) also found that under the
new PAS system only 0.1 percent -- i.e. one out of every thousand -- Secretariat staff were
"unsatisfactory" performers, an unbelievably small number, especially in
an organization with so many recognized performance problems as the UN.
-- Similarly, a major feature
insisted on by the General Assembly in the new system was that the
"barons," for the first time ever, would also be rated on their own
performance. But a JIU report
on senior officials in 2000 (four years after the overall system was
established) found that only one Under- and one
Assistant-Secretary-General (out of dozens in total) had ever had their
performance evaluated. -- As discussed in
the Staff Rights?
subsection under Where is the Rule of
Law? in this archive, the
right to rebut performance ratings has always been one of the most
important staff rights and protections against abusive managers. However,
there are stories that UN staff are strongly discouraged from contesting
ratings and filing rebuttals under the PAS, in order to make this new
system appear to be a "success story" after 50 years of crushing failures
in rating staff performance, which is of course a major victory for
abusive UN managers if true. -- There are also stories that
some units are accorded favored treatment under the PAS to bolster their
repute, such as extra high ratings for the staff in the much-maligned
peace-keeping department, a manipulation which of course undermines the
entire merit basis and credibility of the PAS
system. -- Finally, there seems to be little
if any reporting provided to the General Assembly or anyone else on the
ratings patterns and results, even though, as noted above, the "Group of
18" report of 1986 had called for reporting on this topic to be made
annually by the Secretary-General. US General Accounting
Office, "United Nations: Reforms are progressing, but overall objectives
have not been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-169, May 10, 2000
, Joint Inspection Unit,
"Senior-level appointments in the United Nations, its funds, and
programmes," , UN document A/55/423, 2000,
and "Report of the Group of
High-Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the
Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations," A/41/49,
1986, recommendation 51.
The
issue of proper, consistent, and transparent ratings of UN staff on their
performance is the key not only to the entire system of performance
management, but to staff rights, a merit-based system, and the credibility
and integrity of the UN itself. IO Watch will continue to
report on the UN Secretariat's sorry past record and ongoing activities in
this area.
For
the time being, however, two reports provide very useful overviews and
detailed analysis of this issue, the first covering the long past UN
history of failed attempts and the specific elements required for
successful implementation of the new PAS, the second, of 2003, providing
an update on the PAS situation and its implications. They will be expanded upon at a
later date in this subsection of the archive. Joint Inspection Unit,
"Toward a new system of performance appraisal in the United Nations
Secretariat: Requirements for successful implementation", UN document A/49/219, 1994, and
Houshang Ameri, Fraud, waste and abuse: Aspects of U.N. management and personnel policies, University Press of America, Lanham, MD (USA), June 2003, Chapter IV, "Performance appraisal in the United Nations."
Two excellent
quotations summarize the centrally-important staff issues involved in UN
staff performance ratings.
They were made in the International Documents Review in late
1995, but still illustrate clearly the dangers that UN staff face
today. The first involved an
impasse in staff-management negotiations: "The joyless nature of the United
Nations 50th anniversary was underlined this week by a public spat between
the Staff Union and Management [on appeals of poor performance ratings
which]
could have far-reaching implications for the international civil
service.
The [staff-management joint]
agreement that the performance rating resulting from a staff member's
challenge to a low evaluation would be binding, was [subsequently] changed
by [management with] the addition of a proviso that it was without
prejudice to the ultimate authority of the Secretary-General as
Chief Administrative Officer. In effect, Management could ignore
a finding in favour of a staff member by invoking the Secretary-General's
ultimate authority.
('You know how many people speak in the name of the
Secretary-General in this house?' says Staff Committee President
Mohammed Oummih, underlining why the change is unacceptable.
A general meeting of staff on 10
October endorsed the [related] Staff Council resolution by a vote of 730
to 0 with one abstention
and said the new performance rating processes]
ran 'counter to the provisions of Article 101 of the [UN Charter]
'
" "Staff-management spat with possible serious impact reflects a
joyless 50th anniversary," International Documents Review, 16
October 1995, pp. 1-2. The IDR editor then
made very perceptive further comments on the hazards that UN staff face
versus their managers. IO
Watch therefore hopes that the reader will bear with all the "emphasis
added": "In considering
the account
above, it is worth noting that
a critical question has been
avoided: what is the
rationale for increasing the vulnerability of staff to unfair and/or
arbitrary judgements by administrators? The pat answer to that -- it will allow 'managers to
manage' -- is unconvincing because the most serious problem affecting the
efficiency and effectiveness of the UN Secretariat has been bad
management.
The Secretariat reforms proposed
by the Secretary-General would do little to improve management. They would, however, remove a
range of checks and balances built into the international civil service
for the very obvious reason that in in a multicultural, multinational
context, justice must not only be done but must be seen to be
done. While the
integrity of the rebuttal process might seem an arcane
matter to outsiders, it is the only recourse for a staff member
victimized by a bad manager.
To weaken it would be to reduce the integrity of the
entire structure
The United Nations will clearly
[face]
wrenching changes in the period ahead, and it would be both
unfair and counterproductive to do away now with the only means staff have
to hold managers accountable." "Staff-management spat with possible serious impact reflects a joyless 50th anniversary," International Documents Review, 16 October 1995, p. 3. [emphasis added] One final article from
1999 suggests the ugly recent realities concerning "the only means staff
have to hold managers accountable."
M. L. Fayache analyzed a Geneva case of non-renewal of a fixed-term
contract in which the main element was the lack of valid performance
evaluation reports. The case was lost, but Fayache called to the attention
of the Geneva JAB not only the need for training JAB members in UN
administrative law exhibited by the case, but a seemingly total
unawareness of UNAT judgments, and therefore precedents, dealing with the
PER process. He then listed UNAT judgments where staff were successful in
contesting improper PER's, including inter
alia: "138 (PEYNADO): '
'the right of rebuttal of any
part of a periodical report and
the procedure prescribed for handling such rebuttals afford a
valuable protection to the staff member against prejudicial assessment
(VI).' 200 (FRACYON): '
the periodic report
was prepared after the decision
not to renew the Applicant's appointment
The Tribunal orders
that the
said periodic report be excluded from the Applicant's status file
(XXI).' 225 (SANDYS): '
for a supervisor to make
periodic reports which describe a staff member's performance in
unjustifiably favorable terms, which are subsequently retracted, is
reprehensible
[this action]
displays a measure of insincerity on the part of the Principal Officer
which, if tolerated by the Administration, would undermine the very
purpose of the
periodic reports (IV).' 362 (de FRANCHIS): '
the fair and impartial
assessment of performance must be considered an essential right of all
staff members and that,
consequently, the Administration should not spare any means to secure an
unimpeachable report.
[in this case] to have the Applicant's performance
assessed by an officer with whom there existed such an extremely strained
relationship seriously affected the Applicant's right to have his
performance assessed in an impartial way (VIII).' 457 (ANDERSON): 'The Tribunal attaches great
importance to the integrity of the PER system and in particular its
candour and honesty
(III).' 569 (ZOUARI): '
The rebuttal panel
concluded
that the rules governing PER's had not been fully observed. The Administration took no action
regarding this report. The
Tribunal finds that the Applicant has suffered considerably as a
consequence of numerous irregularities (VIII. )'
772 (ZEID): 'The performance review process
was tainted b y the failure to identify those persons consulted. In this respect the Applicant has
been denied due process.' 800 (MERA RODRIGUEZ): 'As a matter of equal treatment
for all staff, an evaluation system such as the PER is efficient only when
everyone complies with its procedures. In terms of accountability, and to
avoid any favouritism or arbitrariness, management has the duty to ensure
that no decision, such as . .
. is taken without the
assessment of a staff member's performance covering recent years (page
8).'
[This statement is from a memorandum from no less than USG Joseph
Connor (then the UN's top manager) himself.] 826 (BELIAYEV): 'Because the
evaluation of the Applicant's performance was a factor, it is unacceptable
that the decision as to her future was taken before the rebuttal procedure
was finalized. The Tribunal
does not accept as reasonable DPI's position that the completion of the
rebuttal procedure was not material to its decision not renew the
applicant's appointment. To
accept this proposition would be to render the Organization's entire
rebuttal procedure redundant.'" M. L. Fayache, "List of UNAT cases dealing with PER: To the Presiding Officer of the Joint Appeals Board," UN Special (Geneva), fιvrier 1999, pp. 19-20. [Note:
In all of these cases the JAB and the Administration ignored and denied
that dubious performance ratings had been made. Years later, the staff members
finally got some recompense from the UNAT, but the uncorrected damage that
the improper rating had imposed certainly damaged or destroyed the
victims' UN careers.]
If the UN Secretariat
is indeed now suppressing or "strongly discouraging" staff rebuttals to
performance ratings, and the "internal justice" system process continues
to ignore them in any way, it could truly become a death blow to the basic
rights of UN staff, and to the integrity of UN performance
management. |
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