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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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On "Military weapons, including a …
500-pound bomb, were used to blow up part of the UN compound here, the
[US] FBI's special agent in Iraq said Wednesday.
… [A truck, driven by a suicide
bomber] had been driven up beside the wall. He said a similar vehicle was used
in the attack on the Jordanian Embasy here 13 days ago tht killed 17
people … Rescue workers were still digging
through the rubble of the UN compound Wednesday in the belief that more
bodies might be found. The official toll stood at 20
dead, in addition to the bomber, three missing and more than 100 wounded
… … there were signs that [Sérgio]
de Vieira de Mello had been the target of the attack. The explosion happened just
beneath his third-floor office. If anarchy was the goal, it was
anarchy that unfolded. Screams and moans rose from the
dozens of bloodied UN workers who lay across the courtyard, as American
soldiers pulled the living from ruins. … … a UN spokeswoman said the
bombing was the deadliest attack on the organization in its
history." Neil
MacFarquhar and Dexter Filkins, "Military bombs used in attack against UN
",
"As grief at the devastating
destruction of the UN compound in Baghdad cascaded through the
organization's headquarters [in New York], a few officials and diplomats
began to raise troubling questions about the
incident. Was the United Nations trying to
do too much with too little support -- and particularly too little
security? And why has
what one official called its 'moral shield' become so porous? Excluding peacekeepers, about 240
civilian UN workers have died in the line of duty since 1992 in places
like Rwanda, East Timor, Somalia and Kosovo."
Felicity Barringer, "At the UN, a time for taking
stock", International
Herald Tribune,
"Grief among Western officials
here was intense after the bombing Tuesday and unease widespread. Many feel helpless. They are not sure who to blame --
pointing the finger alternately at Islamic militant groups and Iraq's own
neighbors … After a bombing at the Jordanian
embassy last week, senior U.S. officials warned that other soft targets might be
next. But the United Nations
deliberately avoided sealing itself off because it feared such barriers
would send the wrong message to Iraqis seeking help.
… The United Nations has been
targeted before. Three
employees were killed over the past few months in shooting attacks.
…" Neil
MacFaquhar, "Western aides grieve and express concern", International Herald
Tribune, August 21,
2003. "American investigators looking
into the deadly suicide bombing of the United Nations compound [in
Baghdad] are focusing on the possibility that the attackers were assisted
by Iraqi security guards who worked there … The American official … said that
all of the security guards [there] were agents of the Iraqi services, to
whom they regularly reported on UN activities prior to the war. The UN continued to employ the
security guards after the war was over … [He] said when investigators began
questioning the guards, two of them said they were entitled to 'diplomatic
immunity' and refused to cooperate. … 'We believe the UN's security was
seriously compromised', the official said. … the American official said he
was surprised that the UN had continued to employ the guards after
Hussein's government was destroyed. American officials said this week
that UN administrators had turned down an American offer to provide
greater security around the building. The possibility that the Iraqi
security guards cooperated in the attack has increased the suspicion that
Sérgio de Vieira de Mello was a target of the attack. The truck pulled up just below de
Mello's office while he was inside meeting with American
officials." Dexter
Filkins, "Inside job suspected in Baghdad UN blast," International Herald
Tribune, August 22,
2003.
"As the United Nations searched
for ways to improve security after the bombing of its Baghdad
headquarters, Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that both the United
States and the world body had made mistakes in Iraq and added pointedly
that security was the
responsibility of the occupying power. Speaking Wednesday on his return
to the United Nations … Annan said he had been surprised by reports that
the United Nations turned down an offer of security from U.S.-led
coalition forces. … 'I don't know if
the UN did turn down an offer for protection,' he said, 'but if it did, it
was not correct and they should have not been allowed to turn it down.
That kind of decision should not be left to the protected. It is those
with responsibility for security and law and order, who have intelligence,
which determines what action is taken.'" "Annan calls security responsibility of the U.S.", International Herald Tribune, August 22, 2003.
" … the UN's
long-time headquarters at the Canal Hotel did its best to look like a
neutral body in a country at peace. The barbed-wire and barricades that
surround coalition facilities were eschewed, in favour of a plain concrete
wall.
And the UN refused all but token American military presence at the
site. Shots had
previously been fired at a UN convoy in Mosul, and possibly at the Canal
Hotel itself.
Other organizations in Iraq have also been targeted, including the
International Red Cross … " "The Iraqi bombs: Why the United Nations is vulnerable," The Economist, August 23d, 2003., pp. 29-30. " … the UN has
evacuated nearly two-thirds of its 600 non-Iraqi staff [to Amman,
Jordan].
Since the attack on August 19th on the UN headquarters in Baghdad,
foreign aid workers of all descriptions have fled Iraq … The war-hardened
International Committee of the Red Cross, known in the aid world as first
in, last out, has cut its international staff by two-thirds, citing
specific threats of attack. Oxfam, a British-based charity, has
pulled its foreign staff out of Iraq, as has the Dutch arm of Médecins
Sans Frontières and the Swedish Rescue Service Agency. Both
Solidarité, a French NGO, and Mercy Corps, an American one, have come
under attack. … The perception that
foreigners, soldiers and civilians alike, are considered fair game by the
anti-American resistance is taking its toll." "Iraq and the
United Nations", The Economist, August 30th 2003, pp. 29-30. "[A] bomber
detonated himself in a powerful blast that killed him and [a] police
officer, in the parking lot of the UN compound, a month after another
suicide bomber killed 23 people … … a spokeswoman
said the agency would again review its operations in Iraq for the safety
of its workers … … But she said the
improved security measures since the first bombing -- rows of
barbed wire and big barriers of dirt and concrete that have gone up …
appeared to be working. 'It's outrageous
that an Iraqi policeman died and many others were injured,' she said. 'But it's true
security has improved massively.' In fact, … it did
not appear that the bomber got within 200 or 300 yards of the compound, a
former hotel." Ian Fisher,
"Suicide bomb attack kills 2 in Baghdad: Second strike at the UN
compound,
International Herald Tribune, September 23, 2003. "Saying that the United
Nations had come to a fork in the road, Secretary-General Kofi Annan
argued Tuesday that fundamental weakness in the architecture of the
institution must be remedied for it to retain any effectiveness in
combatting genocide, terrorism and nuclear proliferation. … He was stern and
passionate Tuesday as he lectured the assembled delegates from 191
nations, saying that the institution and its more than 9,000 employees
belong to them, and they must do a better job of protecting them. 'Excellencies, you
are the United Nations.' he said. 'The staff who was
killed and injured in the attack on our Baghdad headquarters were your
staff.
You had given them a mandate to assist the suffering Iraqi people,
and to help Iraq recover their sovereignty.' He added, 'We must
take more effective measures to protect the security of our staff. I count on
your full support -- legal, political, and financial." Felicity Barringer, "Annan puts urgency in his call for UN reform," International Herald Tribune, September 24, 2003. "An independent
panel [appointed by Mr. Annan and led by Martti Ahtisaari, a former
president of Finland] said today that the UN's security systems were
'dysfunctional'
… Mr. Ahtisaari
said, 'Everybody bears responsibility, the Member States, who are asking
the UN … [to act] and of course the Secretary-General himself -- the buck
stops always with the Secretary-General.' [The report said] …
UN management and staff [failure] to comply with standard security
regulations and directives left the UN open and vulnerable … … [and] failed
adequately to analyze and utilize [threat] information …
[performance was] sloppy and non-compliance with security rules
commonplace.' 'The main
conclusion … is that the current security management system is
dysfunctional.
It provides little guarantee of security to UN staff in Iraq or
other high-risk environments and needs to be reformed,' the panel
said. The panel labelled
as a major deficiency a 'lack of accountability for the decisions and
positions taken by UN managers with regard to the security of UN
staff.' 'The United
Nations', it said, 'needs a new culture of accountability in security
management.' … In his briefing,
Mr. Ahtisaari said … "We need a much more professional approach, a
professional staff …'" "Iraqi bombing panel finds UN security systems dysfunctional, in need of reform," UN News Service, 22 October 2003. [Note: it is
important to recognize that Mr. Ahtisaari is a former UN Under-
Secretary-General for management and served the UN in the field as
well.] "The security of
the staff has been the constant concern of the Secretary-General and the
Organization.
There have been many previous evaluations of the United Nations
Security Coordination System but following the attacks on UN staff on 19
August, the Secretary-General decided that there should be an independent
investigation and asked Mr. Marti Ahtisaari to head it. The reports
of three earlier investigations were made available to his team. Mr. Ahtisaari's
report, while focusing on the attack of 19 August and security conditions
in Iraq, has concluded with Findings and Recommendations regarding
security in the wider UN system. The report will be closely studied and
steps take to ensure early implementation of its main Recommendations.
The
Secretary-General is very grateful to Mr. Ahtisaari for having accepted
this assignment despite other demands on his time." "Statement
attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on the Report of
the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq,"
New York, 22 October 2003.
"The United Nations
failed to respond to security threats before the August bombing of its
Baghdad headquarters and rejected protection by U.S.-led coalition forces,
a U.N.-appointed panel said. … The U.N. staff
union called the report a 'damning indictment' of the organization's
attitude toward the security of its employees. 'While it points to
gross negligence and massive shortcomings … it fails to hold anyone
accountable,' the union said in a statement. 'The real
problem lies in the failures of management to adhere even to the existing
security system.' [A truck had
exploded,] killing 22 people … and injuring more than 150 others. The report said
U.N. senior management in Baghdad asked coalition forces -- the only
credible security force in the country -- on several occasions to remove military
positions and equipment from the vicinity of the hotel, apparently because
they wanted to distance the United Nations from the occupying force. … Antisaari … said
the United Nations must address the issue of accountability." Barbara Borst,
"Panel: U.N. missed security threat", AP, October 23, 2004. "Secretary-General
Kofi Annan said Friday the United Nations 'will have to change our way of
doing business' after a highly critical report blamed 'dysfunctional'
security for unnecessary casualties in the August bombing … But Annan -- speaking to
reporters after returning from a Madrid, Spain, donors conference for
Iraq
--
sidestepped a question on whether he deserved or accepted blame for
the security failures cited by the U.N.-appointed panel, saying he needed
more time to study the report. 'Obviously, that is
one issue
--
of accountability, what happened, who did what or did not do what,'
he said. … Annan said the
United Nations' security system worked well for the past 50 years. 'But the world has
changed, and we will have to change …to protect our staff around the
world,' he said. … The
secretary-general is scheduled to discuss security issues at a meeting
next week with senior U.N. executives." Edith M. Lederer, "Annan will act on U.N. security criticism", Associated Press, October 24, 2003. "Secretary-General
Kofi Annan said the withdrawal of international UN staff was almost
finished … Annan ordered the
pullout last week … He said that … UN
officials were reviewing the [Ahtisaari] report, which said 'sloppy and
dysfunctional' security may have contributed to the casualty toll of the
August attack.' … 'We are going
through the details … and we are going to be making some changes', he
said. In an open letter
to UN staff last week, Annan vowed to 'review the responsibilities of key
individuals,' after the release of the report, which found that security
procedures were routinely ignored. It also found
confusion and mismanagement, particularly over an offer of free
blastproofing for the UN's windows which was turned down because a bidding
process to buy the window material had already begun. Shards from the
truck bombing are believed to have contributed to the casualty toll. …
more than 150 people were injured, many of them seriously. Annan has also
ordered security management to be reorganized by his deputy, Louise
Frechette, who was among the UN officials blamed in the report for the
systematic failures in the security chain of command." "Annan vows changes
as UN moves ahead with Iraq pullout", AFP, November 3, 2003.
"The U.N. security
coordinator and acting head of the U.N. mission in Iraq are stepping down
while independent experts assess responsibility for lapses in the bombing
of U.N. headquarters in Baghdad … On Tuesday,
Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a team of four experts to determine
accountability at all managerial levels at headquarters and in the field'
for the security failures which led to so many casualties … Tun Myat of
Myanmar,
… [the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of UN] security since July
2002, and Ramiro Lopes da Silva of Portugal, the acting head
of the U.N. mission who was responsible for security at the time of the
bombing 'have asked to be relieved of their present responsibilities while
the team conducts its work', said a [UN spokesman.] … In a letter to more
than 25,000 UN staffers worldwide …, Annan promised to take immediate
action to implement recommendations of the … [highly critical Ahtisaari
report.] Annan told the
staff he was 'gravely concerned' at the findings of the Ahtisaari panel
and was reviewing 'the serious weaknesses' in the management of the UN
security system. …" Edith M. Lederer, "U.N. security chief asked to step aside", Associated Press, November 4, 2003. "The UN put two of
its senior officials on special leave on Tuesday following a scathing
report on safety precautions before the deadly August bombing of U.N.
offices in Baghdad. … Annan also ordered
a 'strategic reorganization' of security management to be led by Deputy
Secretary-General Louise Frechette, herself faulted in the Ahtisaari
report for heading a group that blurred the chain of command on
security. [A spokesman] said
Annan had 'full confidence' in Frechette, a Canadian." Evelyn Leopold,
"Two top officials put on leave over Iraq safety", Reuters, November 4,
2003.
" … Later this week
Secretary-General Kofi Annan is expected to appoint a team of experts to
assess who was to blame for the lapses [in Baghdad security] … In the
meantime, Tun Myat, a lawyer from Myanmar, is to go on leave until the
probe is completed … Myat, 61, joined
the United Nations in 1979 and was the U.N. humanitarian coordinator in
Iraq before being [put] in charge of global security in July 2002. "UN security chief put on leave over Iraq", Reuters, add, November 4, 2003.
"Acting on a
damning report of UN security failures in the bombing of its Baghdad
headquarters last August, Secretary-General Kofi Annan fired his chief of
global security, demoted a second senior official, penalized three staff
members and received -- but did not accept -- the
resignation of his own deputy, according to his spokesman. The deputy
secretary general, Louise Frechette of Canada, offered her resignation in
response to a letter to her from Annan expressing disappointment over the
security lapses, the spokesman, Fred Eckhard, said Monday. But Annan declined it, deeming the failures
'collective and not the responsibility of any one individual.'
… The report, from an
outside panel commissioned by Annan, said UN officials had been 'blinded
by the conviction that UN personnel and installations would not become a
target of attack, despite the clear warnings to the contrary.'" Warren Hoge, "UN security chief fired over Iraq bombing", International Herald Tribune, March 31, 2004. [emphasis added] [Note: the UN document acknowledging the long list of security mistakes and shortcomings in Iraq, and the actually very modest sanctions then enacted, is presented in "Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on the Report of the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel", 29 March 2004, New York.]
IO Watch believes that the above extremely awkward
and terribly unsatisfying -- at least to some people -- story of UN
leaders' attempts to sanction themselves is a classic example of the UN
barons' fundamental inability to enforce accountability. This case
involved not just gross mismanagement (as with the case of the UN Top corruption fighter
corrupted (and his successor?) as discussed in
that subsection above, but also the deaths of 22 UN staff, including an
outstanding and courageous fellow senior official, and injuries to more
than 150 others. IO Watch wishes to note just a few more important
aspects of this weak, but at least on-the-public-record, attempt at
enforcing accountability of UN senior managers: -- A decade ago Childers and Urquhart highlighted the
need for the UN to not be "blinded by convictions" and instead to
recognize that its humanitarian and emergency field staff were targets, as
cited by the UN humanitarian assistance coordinator in 1993: "Additional
measures for respect of humanitarian aid and for protection of relief
personnel are now necessary. The blue ensign of the United Nations
and the symbols of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent, and of
other relief agencies, no longer provide sufficient protection." UN Under-Secretary Jan Eliasson, in an address at the Carter Center, 0n 17 February, 1993, as quoted in Erskine Childers,
with Brian Urquhart, "Renewing the United Nations System", Development Dialogue, 1994:1, Dag Hammarskjold
Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1994, p.
118.
-- The Office of the United Nations Security
Coordinator was created in 1998, but was only "strengthened" to become a
grand new UN-style bureaucracy led by a full-time Assistant
Secretary-General [Mr. Tun Myat] in August 2002, just in time to head
toward its Baghdad disaster. It has an annual budget of some $40 million,
with about 40 administrative staff and 300 field staff for its worldwide
operations.
"Jointly financed administrative activities", in "Proposed programme budget for 2004-2005, UN document A/58/6 of 25 March 2003, Part X, Section 31, pp. 18-32. -- The General Assembly has
long been concerned about protecting UN staff in the field, and the
Secretariat prepared a very impressive report on UN security and
protection measures in August 2002, followed by a specific report on
progress in implementing a "framework for accountability"
for the UN field security management system in July 2003, most all of
which was swept away only one month later by the Baghdad bombing and the
urgent call by the Ahtisaari report two months after that for "a much more
professional approach, a professional staff … . "Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/57/300 of 15 August 2002, and "Inter-organizational security measures: framework
for accountability for the United Nations field security management
system: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/58/188 of 23 July 2003. -- UN staff have been dying in field operations for
years, in (to name only some of the worst incidents): 11 in Cambodia in
1993; 25 Pakistani soldiers in Somalia in 1993; more than 60 UN staff,
most of them local, in Rwanda in 1994; 4 members of an observer mission in
Tajikistan in an ambush in 1998; and 7 Kenyan peacekeepers in Sierra Leone
in May 2000. "The UN: Always
facing danger", New York Times, International Herald Tribune, August 21, 2003.
[Annexes I and II
to the Secretariat 2002 report cited above showed 10 civilian staff who
had lost their lives to gunshot wounds or helicopter accidents during the
preceding year, and another 39 UN system staff under arrest or detention
or missing as of mid-2002. ] -- Perhaps as bad or in some ways even
worse than the Baghdad tragedy was that of a small, isolated group aware
of their impending deaths: three UN staff members (from Puerto Rico,
Ethiopia, and Croatia) who were attacked and killed by a mob of militiamen
at a UN refugee office in West Timor in September 2002, during the week of
the grand UN Millenial Assembly celebration in New York in September
2002. As
one of them e-mailed out shortly before the attack: "You should see this
office. Plywood on the windows, staff peering out through openings in the
curtains hastily installed a few minutes ago. We are
waiting for this enemy. We sit here like bait, unarmed, waiting
for [the] wave to hit. … I just hope I will be able to leave
tomorrow." Christopher S.
Wren, "3 U.N. aid workers killed in attack in West Timor", New York Times, September 7,
2000.
-- And finally, the actions that Mr. Annan took after
the Baghdad disaster were very mild: the "show" of Ms. Frechette's
resignation offered and refused, with Mr. Annan only "disappointed" in
her, and citing the old mantra that argues that collective guilt means
that no individual can be held responsible, plus the "firing" of Mr. Tun
Myat (a UN staff member for 24 years and already past retirement age
[61]), and minor penalties for others. This punishment pattern copies the
discriminatory traditions found in many national armies, whereby a soldier
who commits offense "X" gets a year of "hard time" in the stockade
(prison) while an officer committing the same offense gets a letter of
reprimand in his file (in a gentleman's world, the letter itself is
considered a blow of bitter shame.] IO Watch wonders what more decisive moment there
could have been for Mr. Annan to show that, in this terrible tragedy,
he would
finally and firmly sanction a senior manager by accepting (at the very
least) Ms. Frechette's resignation, and giving Mr. Tun Myat and his
immediate associates summary dismissal. Mr. Annan's statement that the UN
"must change our way of doing business" in the aftermath of the Baghdad
bombing and the Ahtisaari report does not seem to have extended to
enforcing UN management accountability for what happened. One further reflection, made on the first anniversary
of the Baghdad bombing tragedy, is also important in the UN management
context: "[Sergio Vieira de
Mello's death a year ago in Baghdad] … along with 22 of his colleagues … stunned the
United Nations and its staff … Why is the United
Nations short on competent personnel to lead complex peacekeeping and
political missions? … The answer is that
there is a human resources crisis in the United Nations. An entrenched
bureaucracy, fueled by counterproductive quotas, nepotism and outlandishly
generous tenure policies, impedes the rise of talent and excellence
through the ranks. … … This is why Annan
was repeatedly compelled to rely on de Mello … to undertake the three most
delicate UN missions in recent times, sending him to Kosovo,
East Timor and Iraq, all in a period of less than four years. [The UN needs
outstanding staff] .. with the requisite experience, competence, stature
and charisma to manage the UN's presence in situations where thousands if
not millions of lives and livelihoods are at stake. With the support of
the Security Council, Annan must thoroughly reshape his work force to
improve its caliber and reward talent. Only then could he be sure of a
reliable pool of crisis managers …"
Ludovic Hood, "Remembering de Mello: The UN must let talent rise", International Herald Tribune, August 13, 2004. [Note: Mr. Hood served with the UNDP in East Timor from 2001-2004, and his article was a personal comment.] Meanwhile, the wounds of the Baghdad tragedy continue
on within the UN, as shown by the following “old boy” accusations and a
very measured and reasonable staff response. “A dangerous
outgrowth of the … [UN headquarters bombing in Baghdad in 2003] has been
an orgy of outrage and self-pity that has increasingly paralyzed the UN’s
capacity to respond meaningfully to needs in Iraq … Grief and rage
among the staff ran deep, and I share their mourning … At first, the
response seemed normal, but … internal criticism of Secretary-General Kofi
Annan and his senior staff for allowing a UN deployment to Baghdad grew
… Staff members
seemed to want the world to feel sorry for them, the survivors, and to
punish Annan for seeking to forge a bridge in support of Iraqi needs …
Is the UN
leadership now running scared of staff attitudes that have become
dysfunctional? … Annan was initially
lionized by his secretariat colleagues. He was one of them … But after
excessive adulation has come irrational rejection … If Annan’s margin
for diplomatic and operational maneuver is to be constrained by staff
challenges to his judgment, the UN will be significantly weakened…. While the UN needs
to adopt better security precautions, its staffers are wrong to display
unwonted self-regard and to invite pity for their plight. The UN needs
to move on.” David Malone, “UN anger over Iraq: Nobody said it would be safe”, International Herald Tribune, October 1, 2004. [Note: Mr. Malone
is a former Canadian ambassador to the UN, and head of the International
Peace Academy in New York, which works closely with the UN.]
“The United Nations
Staff Union [wishes to respond to Mr. Malone’s article] … Malone correctly
points out that staff have become outraged. [They] are increasing[ly] becoming
targets and are incensed over the lack of accountability of senior
officials, the failure of the organization to adhere to minimum
operational standards in many field offices and the lack of progress to
address the serious flaws in our security management system. The staff union has
always recognized that UN missions carry inherent risks … But at the same
time the union demands that staff be protected from undue risks. We do not want the
world to feel sorry for us, but we do ask that our leaders …. fulfill
their obligations and commitments to provide the necessary resources and
environment to do our jobs. Many UN staff work in dangerous and
hostile environments and are right to demand that last year’s errors are
corrected and that tangible measures are taken to improve security. Malone is right to
say that the United Nations must move on -- but in what direction? If we do not
learn from our past mistakes, the tragedy that happened last year in
Baghdad will certainly be repeated.” Rosemarie Waters, president, UN Staff Union, “Letters: UN staff in Iraq”, The International Herald Tribune, October 7, 2004.
IO Watch believes that the above exchange reflects
very legitimate UN staff concerns about the stumbling but protected “old
boy network” of UN senior officials, as expressed in the worldwide UN
Integrity Survey in 2004, as well as by the half-century history of an
autocratic and unaccountable UN leadership, which is discussed in detail
under the Where is the Rule of Law?
section of this archive. The excellent Ahtisaari report of October 2003
cited very serious UN mismanagement, but once again efforts to actually
hold the senior UN officials who were responsible “accountable” for their
actions or inactions were very feeble. Further recent articles indicate that the UN
Secretariat is "reforming" security work yet again after its ineffective
efforts of 2002 and 2003 cited above, this time seeking greatly expanded
funding to cope with security issues for UN staff worldwide as the threats
and risks of field work multiply as well. “The United Nations
is appealing for almost $100 million … to overhaul its outdated security
system, amid growing warnings that its current arrangements are grossly
inadequate to cope with the rise in direct threats against UN staff. … the UN faces
unprecedented new threats as it is asked to staff increasing numbers of
humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in countries still at war, or
subject to persistent insecurity. The UN has been in
particular crisis since …[the 2003 Baghdad bombing, followed by] a damning
report by Martti Ahtisaari, [who] found the UN’s security system to be
dysfunctional, and subject to widespread mismanagement. … [The UN seeks] … to protect its staff … but without
undermining its avowed impartiality … [with a system] that would cut it
off from the people it is meant to help. Mr. Ahtisaari
warned ‘the UN could in theory be the target of attacks anywhere at any
time, from Baghdad to Kabul, Nairobi, Jakarta, Geneva or New York.’ … [Mr. Annan’s
report] is calling for a new UN Directorate of Security, with ‘significant
new capabilities in the areas of security threat and risk assessment’, and
many more dedicated centrally-funded UN security personnel in the
field.”
Mark Turner, “UN
appeals for $100 million to fund overhaul of global security”, Financial Times, October
13, 2004. [emphasis
added] “[Secretary-General] Kofi Annan … has launched an
all-out campaign to rebuild the UN’s dysfunctional security system,
prompting a debate that could determine the organisation’s capacity to
operate in dangerous countries for years to come. Over the coming
days, UN budget experts will discuss a $97 million … appeal for a
fundamental [security] overhaul … to be paid from the UN’s core
budget. ‘The United Nations
today faces a security environment of unprecedented risk’, Mr. Annan told
the budget committee … … Political
questions could prove [very] important. … Developed countries
are seeking new ways to deal with [threats of terrorism] … and some are
pushing for the right of preemptive action as well as ‘humanitarian
intervention’ in countries that do not protect their civilians. … Developing
countries are demanding a renewed focus on poverty. Many analysts
think any reform will entail a ‘grand bargain’ between ‘northern’ security
concerns and ‘southern’ financial worries. … According to one
official, the simple fact was that the UN could no longer fulfil its
mandate in development without security. This, said the official, led to a
simple decision: ‘They’ve got to make up their minds whether they want to
send us there or not.’” Mark Turner, “Annan
launches drive to boost UN security”, Financial
Times (UK), November 4, 2004. [Note: Will another UN political ‘grand bargain’ mean severe delays in improving security while haggling goes on, followed by more half-hearted security for UN field operations and reduced funding for poverty reduction?] "The apparent
murder in Iraq of Margaret Hassan, head of CARE International in Baghdad …
underlines the fact that aid work is one of the most dangerous professions
in the world.
… In the past decade,
more than 200 of the United Nations' civilian staff have been killed by
'malicious acts' in 45 countries … [and] hundreds of other unarmed aid
workers have been killed, maimed, abducted and assaulted as they have
tried to help people in some of the world's most benighted places. Humanitarian
outfits have long been used to being caught in the crossfire. What is new
is the deliberate way they are now being targeted, particularly in Iraq
and Afghanistan. … Until the early
1990s, the UN's blue flag and the ICRC's red cross almost guaranteed
protection against attack. No longer. … As a result, say
the aid people, the neutral 'humanitarian space' in which they seek to
operate has drastically shrunk. They are now regarded as semi-official
distributors of western government relief [aid] … The United Nations
'cannot succumb to a bunker mentality' says Kofi Annan … Brave words. But will they
prove any more effective against targeted attacks than the blue flag?" "Aid agencies: More dangerous work than ever", The Economist, November 20th, 2004, pp. 42-43. "Sir David Vennis …
is to become the head of security at the United Nations … as part of a
thorough overhaul of the organisation's outdated security system. … In the wake of the
[deadly attack on the UN's Baghdad headquarters in August 2003 the
Ahtisaari report found] … the UN's security system to be dysfunctional and
subject to widespread mismanagement. The appointment of
Sir David is also happening within the broader context of personnel
reforms within the UN as it reels from scandals in Iraq and Congo … Sir David … [has]
spent the last 10 years as commander of the most important specialist
squads at Scotland Yard with responsibility for diplomatic and royal
protection, security, and counter terrorism. His operational
experience and organizational skills have earned him respect around the
world. … His appointment marks the first time the UN has had a
counter-terrorist professional in charge of its security … After the inquiry
into the Baghdad bombing, the then UN security chief Tun Myat was forced
to resign." Jimmy Burns and Mark Turner, "UN raids Scotland Yard for new security chief", Financial Times (UK), January 7, 2005. [emphasis added] [Note: The
appointment of a top expert is needed in many areas of UN management
instead of an "old boy", so this step is of extra significance and
hopefully will be repeated again and again.]
Despite these efforts, however, the UN determination
to continue to be “open” in its future operations in severe crisis zones
and the aggressive “old boy” criticisms of staff attitudes raised by Mr.
Malone
highlight a fundamental responsibility for UN senior officials
sending UN staff “in harms way.” The situation is eloquently outlined by
not only by the above November 20th 2004 quote, but also by a long-time
veteran of dangerous field situations: “In the last few
years, expatriate and local staff working for … [the UN and NGOs] have been
murdered in … failed or failing states, [which] are the most dangerous
places on earth. Donors [such as the EU, UN agencies, and others] …
have a moral obligation to ensure that humanitarian work is not being done
at the expense of innocent lives. The people who run aid agencies should
not allow their idealism or need for visibility and funds to compromise
the safety of their staff. [A code of conduct
for humanitarian aid], states that ‘when we give humanitarian aid it is
not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such.’ That was then, this
is now, when the lines of humanitarian and military action are blurred.
… The code of conduct
needs to be radically overhauled with the involvement of governments …to
speak to the obligations of warring parties to respect humanitarian
workers, and it must
obligate aid agencies to exercise due diligence in the deployment of
qualified staff in conflict areas, and to desist from doing so if they
cannot ensure their safety.” Denis McClean,
“Hostages in Iraq: Aid agencies shouldn’t take unnecessary risks”, International Herald Tribune, September 14, 2004.
[emphasis added] [Note: Mr. McClean is a journalist for the Irish Times who worked for 14 years with the International Federation of the Red Cross in Africa, the Americas, and Asia.] In the opinion of IO Watch, the UN leadership must be
held fully accountable for its future field staffing and security
management decisions in crisis zones, in accord with the sad historical
adage that “Wars are made by old men for young men (and now women) to die
in.” Or,
as an excellent portrayal of such experience, first published in 1930 but
reissued in 2004, states it, “Generals die in bed”. [Generals die in bed, by Charles Yale Harrison,
Annick, Toronto, 2004.] IO Watch also believes
that the Baghdad headquarters bombing marks a pivotal point in UN field
operations, and underscores many central, urgent, and long-term
ramifications for UN management accountability and staffing. This topic
will be pursued here and also elsewhere in this archive, particularly
under the archive subsection on Mobility , and in the subsections
on peacekeeping, humanitarian and nation-building under UN Performance Problems. |
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