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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments |
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It is generally known that UN Member State financial
assessments differ, but not that the differences are so extreme. An analysis
by Klaus Hόfner of UN regular budget data for 2000 presented Member
States' contributions grouped by percentage of total obligatory
contributions paid:
Dennis Dijkzeul,
and Yves Beigbeder, eds., Rethinking
international organizations: Pathology and promise, Berghahn, New York
and Oxford, 2003, pp. 29-53. [Note: (Once again,
UN financial reporting hampers the analysis: these regular budget figures
are to some extent also the basis for the large assessed contributions for
peacekeeping, but the much larger mass of voluntary contribution levels
varies widely, with some smaller developed countries paying a much higher
percentage share than some of the biggest countries.)
One of the fundamental principles of the legislative
branch of any government is the "power of the purse" -- the legislature
decides how much money to raise and spend and where to spend it. However, as
the above shows, this principle is meaningless in the UN, because of the
"ability to pay" principle which governs contributions for developed and
developing Member States. Six countries -- the USA, Japan, Germany, France,
Italy and the United Kingdom -- pay 72 percent
of the total regular budget. The top 16 countries paid almost 88
percent. In contrast, the 136 countries who pay the least, up to 0.06
percent each, in total pay only about 1.3
percent of the UN regular budget. (The actual dollar range recently
was from $300 million for the USA as the biggest donor, to many at the
minimal level of about $12,500.) IO Watch makes this assessment solely for
accountability purposes. All UN Member Countries are "stakeholders", who
hopefully believe in and support the UN. But in fact only a few actually pay a
significant amount of funds. For those who pay the least, the dues
cover only perhaps 1-2 months salary for one of their citizens serving in
the UN, not a significant motivator. For the top six countries, the
contributions were from $300 million down to $54 million each (again,
regular budget only, but much more when voluntary funding is added
in.) The
power of the purse concept for the UN overall, therefore, is relatively
meaningless. Yet the bigger countries do have some greater
influence through their funding (particularly their voluntary
contributions), and even more importantly a strong and direct fiduciary
responsibility to their taxpayers for the wise use of those funds. To reflect this situation, 14 developed countries
belong to the so-called "Geneva Group", which, since 1964, has been an
important consultation mechanism of "democratic" UN Member states
contributing at least 1 percent of the UN regular budget. This 40-year old group continues to be quite active. A UN interagency website gave the flavour of their recent preoccupations and conceptual projects, as an: "integrated package
of policy guidelines and tools encompassing: Strategic budgeting
a continuous process of planning, approval, implementation, evaluation,
and feedback
Budget constraint
not an end in itself, but a practical benchmark
Efficiency in
programme delivery
to ensure that maximum resources are allocated to
priority program activities
Tools for
assessment of value for money
a strategic budgeting approach
evaluations should be made at all levels
Other measures to
promote better budget presentation
full cost attribution
greater
transparency of resource allocations
"
[Note: This document was posted online under the old ACC material on the Internet, before it became the Chief Executives Board in 2001.]
For
years Western governments have complained about the lack of
accountability prevailing in UN organizations, but in practice they have
tolerated a degree of opacity that would be
considered totally unacceptable for any civil service in a
democracy. The Geneva Groups zero-growth policy
has been the nearest they have come to sanctions, [but it]
has had only
limited success in compelling secretariats to cooperate in discussing
management practices and opening the books. Inadequate internal auditing and
slipshod evaluation procedures have not only shielded inefficiency, waste,
maladministration, and downright fraud; they have deprived the UNs member
states of the information they need to identify the organizations
weaknesses -- and strengths.
[No] amount of
exhortation as the years have proved can compensate for the lack of
routine inspection under established rules of open government. Evaluation
would require
built-in procedures requiring the UN bureaucracies to
respond to criticisms. So ingrained is the collusion between
the permanent representatives to these organizations and the secretariats
that a majority for such an initiative among the UN membership would be
difficult though not impossible to muster. But many UN staff members would welcome
more rigorous scrutiny
Rosemary Righter,
Utopia lost: The United Nations and world
order, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1995, pp. 280-281.
[emphasis added] The excellent management accountability initiative of
the General Assembly in 1993 is long gone. The holy grail of UN
performance management stretches ever further outward into the distant
future, and the UN managers have been given unprecedented freedom with
little accountability. Yet the Geneva Group has not taken
hold, and moved decisively, to ensure that the resources of its member
countries are in fact being used wisely. Another decade has been lost, and the
new eagerly anticipated "prince" of an OIOS seems to have turned out to be
just another "frog". IO Watch suggests that the Geneva Group too needs to
finally shift gears from "best practices" concepts, to engage in UN
management reform discussions in a much more business-like, professional,
and results-oriented way, and to propose and insist on pragmatic and
feasible corrective actions. (This could most effectively be done in
conjunction with the proposed External experts oversight
review and the General Assembly audit
subcommittee proposed in the preceding
subsections.) The Geneva Group members might hopefully consider the
following solutions as tangible, already-proposed but never tried, and
"doable" elements to install independent mechanisms to counter UN
managers' long-standing impunity with firm accountability requirements,
the rule of law, and professional oversight in the 21st century. To
recapitulate, efforts are urgently needed to : -- establish a real fraud prevention
programme; -- revise the code of conduct; -- bring experts in to examine and reform or
enhance internal justice, oversight, and human resource management
performance; -- establish a strong and independent human rights
ombudsman; -- focus efforts on a clear, pragmatic,
and coherent UN (or UN system) strategy; -- establish, finally, a Fifth Committee
audit subcommittee and annual reporting on UN programme results and on
human and financial resource status and use; all in active conjunction with other Member States,
but as a firm assertion of real Geneva Group "due diligence" for the
billions of UN and UN system funds from their taxpayers that the UN
expends each and every year. The UN staff integrity survey of June 2004; the US
GAO assessments of dawdling UN performance management efforts in 2000 and
again in February 2004; and the Iraq oil-for-food programme scandal, all
suggest a need for urgent remedial action in day-to-day UN management and
operations.
UN Member States and their diplomatic missions -- not just the
Secretariat top leadership and managers, the Security Council, the General
Assembly and its Fifth Committee, and the OIOS -- have a clear fiduciary
duty to uphold as well. The need for a "democratic caucus" to finally
intervene and firmly hold the UN to account to meet global challenges was
very succinctly stated by Michael Moore, former head of the WTO, in a 2003
article. "Challenges that
must be globally managed keep popping up: genetic engineering, AIDS, and
global terrorist networks. Yet
the global landscape has
dramatically changed in the last 50 years, but the institutions serving
the world have not. The institutions
cannot reform themselves. Two generations of institutional
contamination and tenured self-interest ensure that this deadlock
continues.
But this lack of coherence damages their collective credibility,
frustrates their donors and owners, and gives rise to public
cynicism.
There is a consensus that something must be done, but no consensus
on how to go about it.
. It's time
for a small group of national leaders to take on the challenge of
reforming and rebuilding
global governance. They should build this effort around the issue of the
democratic deficit in multilateral institutions. The
leadership must come from the top.
. Otherwise, endless seminars and
conferences will inevitably bog down the process in the name of consensus
." Similarly, [senior officials in national legislatures] should
form a democratic caucus to provide systematic oversight of international
institutions, focusing particularly on increasing the transparency of
these institutions.
. [This informal] caucus would strengthen
national governments in their role in holding these agencies to
account." Mike Moore,
"Multilateral meltdown", Foreign Policy, March/April 2003, p. 75. [Note: Mr. Moore was Director General of the World Trade Organization from 1999 to 2002 and a former Prime Minister of New Zealand. He is the author of A world without walls: Freedom, development, free trade, and global governance, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK, 2003.]
Rosemary Righter's set of options, presented at the
beginning of this "Answers" subsection, suggested that the governments who
"pay the bills" could finally make the UN more relevant and useful by
departing from mere structural reform and continued "faηade management"
(as with the OIOS). Instead, they should use "positive
discrimination" and the West's power of the purse (there is still
some), organizational abilities, and political influence to build up those
UN units capable of doing good work, while letting its worst units wither
on the vine. The accountability actions proposed above would be a key to
help finally expose a UN culture of management immunity and impunity to
firm accountability discipline, and much needed transparency in its
operational and policy processes. Rosemary Righter,
"Introduction: The United Nations at a watershed," in Utopia lost: The United Nations and world order,
Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1995, particularly
pp. 5-10. At least in December 2004 the General Assembly firmly
noted the failure of Secretary-General Annan to establish sound and
effective accountability mechanisms, despite having had eight years and
much prodding to do so. "The General Assembly
6. Emphasizes the importance of establishing real,
effective and efficient mechanisms for responsibility and
accountability; 7. Regrets that despite previous information provided by
the Secretary-General on the establishment of accountability
mechanisms, including the accountability panel, such
mechanisms are not in place, thereby affecting the efficient and effective
functioning of the Organization;" "Review of the implementation of General Assembly
resolutions 48/218B and 54/244: Report of the Fifth Committee", UN
document A/59/649 of 22 December 2004, and "Review of the implementation of General Assembly
resolutions 48/218B and 54/244", General Assembly resolution 59/272 of 23 December 2004, paras. 6-7.
[emphasis added] However, can the UN General Assembly, and
particularly the Geneva Group members who provide (and supposedly
carefully oversee) the vast majority of funds to a faltering Secretariat,
finally take decisive corrective action instead of such mere
complaining?
Well, a recent very pessimistic assessment quite accurately
summarizes the legislative impotence and inaction which was on display at
the 2004 General Assembly session, as indeed it has been for decades. "[In my view,]
the UN is constitutionally incapable
of conducting any operation efficiently or honestly. Ideally the
UN, foreshadowing a future world government, ought to be run by a global
meritocracy -- rule by the best. In practice, it is the opposite. Any
state that can be legally defined as one can join the UN -- it is a club
having no rules of probity or morals.
The result is failure and graft. UN
officials are not answerable to bodies like Congress or the U.K.'s
Parliament, which would be sure to track down, expose and punish gross
abuses and manifest failures. No senior UN official has ever gone to
jail.
It's rare for anyone to be sacked or removed. The top brass
resist any kind of investigation, on principle. The
oil-for-food inquiry is unique in that it has taken place at all and seems
to be garnering results. But will any punishment be meted out? Will any
serious reforms be pushed through? Of course not.
" Paul Johnson, "The UN is for talk, not actions," Forbes (US), March 14,
2005. [Note: Mr. Johnson is an "eminent British historian
and author."] To
overcome this pessimistic assessment, Member States and first and foremost
the Geneva Group members who provide most of the $10 billion the UN spends
each year must respond to some fundamental truths, instead of regarding
the UN as a "unique" institution above the rule of law and accountability
for its performance. Recent research has provided excellent guidance on
proper legislative oversight responsibilities and transparency worldwide,
and in 2005 Secretary-General Annan himself has underscored this duty as
well, as shown by the following sequence of quotes. "The latter half of the 20th century saw the
increasing dominance of the executive branch of government over the policy
process
More recently, a wave of organizational and procedural reforms
[have sought to modernize] public administration
[However,] the law
making assemblies which formulate the policies which public administrators
are charged with implementing [have remained relatively unscathed.].
The power to legislate is largely meaningless if the
legislature lacks the ability to ensure that public policy is administered
in accordance with legislative intent. Also, and more fundamentally
[o]nly
by monitoring the implementation process, can members of the legislature
uncover any statutory defects and act to correct agency misinterpretation
or maladministration. In this sense, oversight exists as an
essential corollary to the lawmaking function." Peter Falconer, Colin Smith, and C. William R.
Webster, eds., Managing parliaments in the 21st
century, EGPA Yearbook, Volume 16, International Institute of
Administrative Sciences Monographs, IOS and Ohmsha, Amsterdam, 2001, pp. 1-2.
[emphasis added.]
"Public scrutiny of state affairs and access to
information are key phases in the current debate on the development of
democracy
The two concepts are interdependent, since one cannot play its part under
the rule of law without the other. There can be no public scrutiny without
access to information.
It is even possible to conclude
that the level of democracy attained by a country should now be measured
in terms of the volume and quality of the information in circulation.
it should now be clear that it is not possible to fight corruption in the absence
of a culture of transparency. Building such a culture can begin with
a legislative commitment to the public that breaks with the many years of
concealment and the persecution of those who take an interest in public
affairs.
Legislation of this type must
overcome
the huge temptation to control access to information as a means of
maintaining the conditions under which an authoritarian state can achieve
its objectives.
It must also overcome a culture of blatant isolation, behind which
administrations have long sheltered in an effort to avoid 'undesirable'
interference in their affairs." Alfredo Chirino Sαnchez, "The right of access to
information and public scrutiny: Transparency as a democratic control
instrument," in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Public sector transparency and
accountability: Making it happen, OECD,
[emphasis added] "Today I shall be presenting my report, "In Larger
Freedom" to the United Nations General Assembly.
I wanted to remind the governments of the world, who
put me in my job and to whom I am accountable, that they are in the UN
to represent not themselves but their peoples, who expect them to work for
the [UN Charter's]
aims
The UN
can be a much more effective instrument if
its governing body, the General Assembly, is better organized
and gives clearer directives to us in the secretariat, with the
flexibility to carry them out, and holds us clearly accountable
for how we do it.
... If world leaders rise to
their responsibilities, the
rebirth and renewal of the UN will be just beginning
- and with it, renewed hope for a freer, fairer, and safer world." Kofi Annan, "An aspiration to a larger freedom", Financial Times ( If Member States have been reluctant to accept their
oversight responsibilities and the UN leadership quite happy with the
continuing, ineffective, "self-reform" processes every five or ten years,
at least one group -- the UN staff - has continued to urge concrete
actions by Member States to firmly establish accountability in the
Secretariat, thus far to no effect, as shown by the following five
quotes. "During [Secretary-General Kurt] Waldheim's second term [in the late 1970s ], [and] thwarted in their negotiations with the United Nations administration, [UN staff representatives] were enabled to express their disquiet to the Assembly by a special provision enacted by the Assembly itself in consequence of staff agitation. these efforts failed in their object of generating wide concern and consequent reforms The spectacle of a staff body vainly seeking the proper use of its resources in the organization's service and soliciting, in effect, the intercession of the organization's governing council to prevent continued mismanagement by its appointed leaders was not new at the United Nations." Shirley Hazzard, on the Waldheim era of staff relations
in the 1970s, "Breaking Faith: II", The New Yorker, [emphasis added.]
"UN officials who advocate a cleanup say that management by top officials has been inept and, occasionally, corrupt. 'There is no [regular] supervision of any agency' said [a senior official.] Governing councils are 'basically rubber-stamp bodies.' The U. N. Board of Auditors cites numerous [problems] and 'weak internal controls' during 1990 and 1991 [in a] 136-page report that enumerates irregularities or deficiencies in hiring, cash and property management, internal audits and purchases of everything from project equipment to airline tickets. Many anomalies [that they report] 'appear to be recurring' and point to a 'lack of determination to enforce regulations and rules and make the heads of units of the organization accountable,' the report says. A recent confidential internal paper circulating in the U. N. Development Program put the problem more bluntly. Citing 'a deplorable vacuum of basic ethics' in the system, it noted widespread criticism of 'prolific structures, pompous-Byzantine attitudes of ranking officials, operational inefficiency and gross mismanagement of financial and personnel resources.' The 10-page paper listed a dozen cases of corruption involving the development agency's staffers or programs that totaled millions of dollars in pilfered funds." William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image,
tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite
mismanagement, waste", Washington Post,
"On the very day the Sunday Times
[( The Staff Council in UNHCR agrees with the thrust of the criticisms. The staff wants to weed out corruption, mismanagement, nepotism, double-dippers, desk-warmers, and all other irregularities Staff representatives have been tirelessly pointing out unsavory management tendencies and reported to the governing body of UNHCR on how to strengthen the organization and to ensure the effective use of its human resources. The question is: what do these government representatives do with these reports when they return to their capitals UNHCR staff on the gound work with dedication and have twice won the Nobel Peace Prize, but they are demoralized when subjected to unjustified criticism. UNHCR staff needs the help of the media to further strengthen its humanitarian commitment to work for refugees." Nasr Ishak, "HCR staff replies", UN Special ( [Note: a reply letter to the Sunday Times, by the
Chairman of the Staff Council, UNHCR].
[emphasis added.] "Rosemarie Waters, [the UN Staff Union President],
said that
in the last six years, [UN]
management had been
reforming itself and increasing managerial authority, while reducing
accountability. The Staff Union [had great respect for
the Secretary-General's vision and reform programme goals.]
It could not
support, however, the erosion of staff rights and dissolution of oversight
mechanisms as a means of implementation, [or legitimize]
actions in
which staff, through their elected representatives, had no meaningful role
to play.
The [integrity survey]
revealed that staff
feared
reprisals for exposing breaches of ethics, and they perceived that the
disciplinary process was applied unevenly. Their view of integrity among senior
managers was less than positive.. The Organization had yet to establish concrete
measures for individual accountability, she continued. It was
essential that areas with expanded delegation of authority for personnel
decisions should be carefully examined and, if abuses were found, such
delegation should be revoked.
The [OHRM] had informed staff representatives of its
inability to enforce accountability because they lacked central
authority. The Fifth Committee may wish to recommend that
concrete individual accountability be developed, in consultation with
staff representatives, on a priority basis." "UN staff committee representatives tell budget
committee concerns ignored in management reform report", Fifth Committee,
Press Release GA/AB/3641 of
"James O. C. Jonah,
[who worked at the UN for three
decades]
and served as head of personnel from 1979 through 1982,
recalled that [when the Fifth Committee initiated reforms in the late
1970s],
a staff-management consultation process was established, and it
was decided that staff representatives should be allowed to appear before
the Committee. Now, it was sad to see the erosion of the international
civil service in the United Nations. That had serious implications. The
Committee should also have a serious look at the results of the integrity
study.
Never had the staff perception of integrity been so low.
In some respects, the
reforms had weakened the Secretariat considerably. When he served as head of
personnel, his biggest fight had been with programme managers, who were
most resistant to reform
. He could not believe that such measures as
giving authority to programme managers would strengthen the international
civil service.
What had been said about the lack of authority of the OHRM was
true.
Without a strong personnel office, however, there would be no
uniformity of rules and fairness in the system. Governments should not take what was happening
lightly." "UN staff committee representatives tell budget
committee concerns ignored in management reform report", Fifth Committee,
Press Release GA/AB/3641 of
IO Watch believes that UN Member States must finally
rise to
meet their "accountability for accountability", as repeatedly urged by UN
staff over the decades, and as discussed in this archive's subsection
on The General Assembly, plus
and also under General Assembly audit
subcommittee above. This should
not be merely a part of the 60th anniversary session of the General
Assembly in the autumn of 2005, but a continuing substantive, focused, and
very serious commitment for action in the future. Furthermore, the fundamental need for this Fifth
Committee accountability role was clearly laid out a decade ago, and the
ensuing experiences of mismanagement and crisis have certainly underscored
the need to implement it urgently. "
The ultimate
leadership, responsibility, authority and accountability for the
[UN's]
management, good or poor, rest with [both] top management
[and] the
General Assembly.
governing bodies set the tone for their entire
organization.
They must show through their actions and determined follow-up that
they give high priority to firm accountability,
effective oversight, a
performance culture, wise resource use,
and maximum implementation
of
organizational missions
The Fifth
Committee,
as a "board of directors" with 185 Member States considering
all types of management issues, can hardly operate effectively.
Many governing bodies in
the United Nations system now have or are
establishing specialized subcommittees
to devote more continuous
attention to administrative, management and oversight matters.
if
professionalism and competence [and full transparency and reporting] can
be assured, three new subcommittees could be [established]: Peace-keeping
management subcommittee [for the greatest single burden of Fifth Strategic planning
and management subcommittee;
Oversight
subcommittee.
Finally, many national governments have legislative staffs and
analysts to help them [with oversight.] JIU proposed this idea of modest staff
resources to assist the CPC in 1984, but the Secretary-General was opposed
establishing a few posts for [each of the above committees]
could have a great positive impact on the future oversight and
decision-making effectiveness of the Fifth Committee. "The United Nations
has often been criticized for establishing many grand objectives and goals
in all areas over the years, without paying much attention to whether the
Organization's subsequent programmes actually contribute to progress
toward those goals. The Fifth Committee, with reforms such as those
suggested above, must be a critical leader and 'linch pin' in the new
system of accountability and responsibility, driving the United Nations
continuously toward the management reforms and 'transparency and
effectiveness' which the General Assembly has repeatedly called for." Joint Inspection Unit, "Management in the United
Nations: Work in progress", Chapter VI.A., "Accountability for
accountability," UN document A/50/507, 1995, paras. 150-154, 166-175 [150-152,
170-175.].
[emphasis added.] Amid all the discussions about the proposed grand
reforms of the UN during 2005, Member States seem to have contributed very
little on the critical operational issue of management reform. A
bipartisan group of the US Congress provided a lengthy analysis and report
on needed management reforms in June 2005, and a recent article noted the
role of Switzerland in taking the lead in urging strong reform of the very
troubled Human Rights Commission, now finally receiving serious reform
attention after years of embarrassing activity (see Human
Rights). Yet IO Watch
has been unable to find any other such initiatives from Member States, a
very disappointing performance. American interests and UN reform: Report of the Task Force on the United Nations, United States Institute of Peace, June 2005, especially Chapter 3, "In need of repair: Reforming the United Nations", available on the Institute's website at www.usip.org/ under "Task Force on UN", and Tom Wright, "Swiss take lead role in seeking UN rights reform", International Herald Tribune, June 30, 2005.
UN Member States also reacted with inertia and
seeming apathy at the General Assembly in late 2004 and early 2005
concerning the "'I do not expect
[the Oil-for-Food programme problems] to derail the reform process', he
[said]
'We are determined to go ahead'
"We are taking
measures to strengthen our own administration and transparency', he said,
adding, 'The Member States, who themselves are very much aware of how the
Oil-for-Food [programme] was set up, how it was managed, how it was
organized, I think are much more sanguine about the facts than most other
people
'" "Oil-for-food
allegations will not derail UN reform initiative, Annan says", UN News Service, It also was most disappointing that the
Assembly resolution of December 2004, cited above, emphasised once again
the importance of real accountability mechanisms in the UN Secretariat,
but merely "regretted" that they are not in place.
IO Watch believes that the only solution to the
mismanagement morass of the UN Secretariat now and in the future is for
These Decisive Geneva Group action would meet three key
needs.
It would finally exercise due diligence at the UN on behalf of
their taxpayers who pay the (some $10 billion a year) bills. It would
support conscientious UN staff who work hard but are often badly led. And above
all, it would greatly aid the millions of people who rely on effective UN
field programmes for their very survival. |
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