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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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The drive for real UN management reform, accountability and transparency
has been going on for six decades now, as discussed in considerable detail
throughout this archive. The determined push to establish and apply full
modern management accountability and transparency, however, began back in
1986 with a rebellion by Member States in the General Assembly's Fifth
(Administrative) Committee: " … Member States
[difficulty] in obtaining a complete picture of the processes of planning,
budgeting, performance monitoring, and evaluation [was compounded because
there was] … no
information on the implementation of the programmes of the preceding
budget.' ' … the new proposed
programme budget … had been
drawn up without the benefit of a critical analysis of ongoing activities
… Member States were
therefore unable to form a precise idea of the efficiency with which the
resources were used or of the quality of the results …' " … more time ought to
be spent on evaluating the application and implementation of …
programmes.' '[The General
Assembly and relevant bodies] should be given more information
… to review the
proposed programme properly and take enlightened decisions …
' ' … [A Member State representative] could not
believe that every programme element … was fully useful
… Indeed, … Member States
[broadly believed] … there was
ample room for improvement, internal redeployment and reassessment of
priorities. What the United
Nations lacked was the machinery [for this purpose] … A new impetus must
be given to the identification of activities that were obsolete, of
marginal usefulness or ineffective.'" Critical statements made in
the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, in "Summary records", General
Assembly, Fifth Committee document A/C.5/40/SR.22, paras. 3-5, 7, 15, 20
and 22, and A/C.5/40/SR.23, paras. 12-13, 38, 48, both of 6 November
1985, as quoted in UN Joint Inspection Unit, "Reporting on the
Performance and Results of United Nations Programmes: Monitoring,
evaluation and management review components"", UN document A/43/124,1988,
p. 3.
In response, the UN's
then-top manager made an excellent
and admirably succinct statement of what the UN Secretariat needed
to do, which the Secretariat has (sort of) pursued ever since without ever
attaining it: "Member States have …
stressed the need to be told, more clearly and more extensively
…. what has been the programmatic
performance of the Secretariat, which outputs have been delivered, and
with which result…. Let us strengthen the
monitoring and evaluation functions …
Let us say clearly and dispassionately what has been done and with
which result, and equally what has not been done and
why…. Let us produce more analytical performance reports
…. I find the essential
problem one of better and more transparent information, thus permitting
better decisions." "Statement", Response to the
above criticisms by UN Under-Secretary-General for Management Patricio
Ruedas, 12 November
1985, as quoted in UN Joint Inspection Unit, "Reporting on the
Performance and Results of United Nations Programmes: Monitoring,
evaluation and management review components"", UN document A/43/124,1988, p. 3.
A year later the
"Group of 18" experts made major reform recommendations, but all too soon
the Secretariat was back in the same old inadequate reporting
routines: "A clear illustration … was the
Secretary-General's 1989 'final report' on the … report of the 'Group of
18' experts. Although it
'encompassed all actions' and 'illustrated progress accomplished', it was only an information report
… [that had to be] supplemented in 1990 with an expressly analytical
report which followed a specific framework established by the General
Assembly. [Too many]
recent Secretariat reports are … still of the 'on the one hand … on the other
hand … very difficult … others have failed … one might try … will keep
under careful review' type. Reports nominally of the
"Secretary-General' … are in fact prepared by anonymous authors whose
experience and competence … is unspecified. They usually contain no
explanation of scope or methodology used, and do not crisply document and
summarize past reporting on the topic … They gloss over rather than
pinpoint problems, and still lack summaries, analysis of options, and firm
conclusions and recommendations. This vast amount of 'assessment
reporting' thus severely hampers United Nations accountability and
oversight. It ties up scarce
staff resources for trivial rather than useful reporting, clogs reporting
channels with documents of limited value, and deprives top management and
governing bodies of the substantive information they need to make
effective policy decisions." Joint Inspection Unit,
"Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN
document A/48/420,
1993, paras. 118-119.
The JIU observed
in 1995 that the Fifth Committee was sinking under a flood of
documentation, and that certain basic reporting reforms could help stem
this flood. It recommended
that the Committee require the following changes for reports made to it
(which could apply to other reporting to intergovernmental bodies as
well):
"Summary :
Secretariat reports should emulate [most other UN system
organizations and] … require that every document have a brief summary at
the front … [to assist] busy readers. Contents:
The many Secretariat reports which omit a table of contents are a
great disservice, and almost an insult, to readers … all reports should contain
[one]. On time:
[many reports are very tardy] … the 'six-weeks rule' for
circulating documents to Member States before discussion should be much more firmly enforced, with
sanctions …. Action-oriented: … Cautious and bland overviews of past
efforts and current conditions should be replaced with specific (and
time-limited) proposals for corrective
action. Accountability: … [Under the new
accountability system reports should clearly identify] … the specific unit
… responsible for preparing each report … References: Present
Secretariat reports contain almost no endnotes, and only vague text
mention of a 'prior report' [or a cursory and obscure bibliographic
notation] … appropriate citations, with document titles, dates, and
paragraph references should be added [to show a professional, complete,
credible, and objective report] … Graphics: Most Secretariat
management reports provide very few, if any, charts and graphs … and
tables are often [endless pages of details] … instead of succinct
quantitative summaries. One
good picture continues to be worth a thousand words. In an era of 'desktop
publishing,' the Secretariat should join other System organizations in
providing … many more report tables and graphs that clearly and concisely
show major trends, patterns and status. … Question period: … much more impact can sometimes
be achieved by periodic appearances of key officials before the Fifth
Committee for a dialogue … this practice occurs widely in national
governments … Necessary and substantive: …
intergovernmental bodies must do their parts … not request 'a report' as a
way to postpone or avoid their responsibilities for negotiations and
discussions … but require instead only those reports [essential to help]
fulfill their oversight and policy-making
functions. Focused: [In addition] … the
intergovernmental bodies should state as clearly and specifically as
possible the substantive issues which the requested Secretariat report
should address."
Joint Inspection Unit,
"Management in the United Nations: Work in progress", JIU/REP/95/8, UN
document A/50/507,1995, paras. 164-165.
As already discussed
in detail under 1993 Management Accountability
Attempt , the General Assembly
passed its most specific and detailed reform prescription ever, for the
system of management accountability in 1993, and the Secretariat agreed
profusely that drastic change was indeed needed. But then, in 1996, 1998, and 2000,
it strung the Assembly along with more lengthy but vague "progress and
intention" reports. When Secretary-General Annan declared
victory in 2000, arguing that the new system was "installed," the Assembly
backed off, apparently tired of the chase. The ACABQ summarized
the evasive Secretariat management reporting during this period in a
"rather scathing report" in early 1998. It dismissed a Secretariat
"concept paper" on reducing administrative costs in order to free up $195
million for a proposed new UN "Development Account." The Committee criticized the 'lack
of a clear concept," and "was disbelieving of the claims made about
efficiency gains and their impact."
It suggested that it might be better if the Secretariat
would " … set aside a preoccupation with
concept and theory … to concentrate on … specific new measures to increase
the efficiency and confirm the results arising out of the implementation
of new measures as well as those initiated prior to the current
exercise." "Advisory Committee rejects 'non-programme
costs' report", International Documents Review, 16 March
1998, page 5.
Of course, the reforms
continued not to be applied, or even completed. This was confirmed by a
detailed US General Accounting Office report released in 2000, several
months before Mr. Annan's accountability "victory declaration". The GAO concluded
that: "In recent
years, the United Nations has had fundamental problems. In 1994 … there was
an overall failure of its human resources system to staff critical
posts with the right people. … "[In 1997] The
Secretary General proposed a reform program consisting of three
[integrated] core elements: (1) restructuring U.N. leadership and
operations; (2) developing a performance-based human capital system; and
(3) introducing programming
and budgeting processes based on results. … [He]
set the end of 1999 as the target to put the reforms in place.
… The United
Nations has substantially restructured its leadership and operations and
partly implemented a merit-based and performance-oriented human capital
system … However, … the overall objectives of the reform have not
yet been achieved.
Specifically, the United Nations has not yet implemented reforms to focus
its programming and budgeting on managing the Secretariat's performance.
These initiatives would enable Member States to hold the Secretariat
accountable for results and are key to the success of the overall
reform because they institutionalize a shift in the organization's focus
from carrying out activities to accomplishing missions. … the U.N. reform is an interrelated
process and requires that all core elements be in place to
succeed." "US General Accounting Office,
"United Nations: Reforms are progressing, but overall objectives have not
been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-169, 15 pages, of May 10, 2000, especially summary and pp. 2-3 and
9-15, and "United Nations: Reform initiatives
have strengthened operations, but overall objectives have not been
achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-150, May 10, 2000, 84 pages.
[emphasis added]
In 2002 Mr. Annan
forged ahead with more dynamic reforms as part of his "agenda for further
change", to take place in a "phased approach" which still continues on.
Once more, however, the General Assembly is trying to stem the tide
of "will soon" and 'could
be's" by attempting yet again (see its efforts above of 1985) to obtain an
emphasis on highlighting results and accountability. In its
resolution on Mr. Annan's new initiatives, in May 2003, it began by
requesting the Secretary-General to : "4. … report to the General Assembly
[in 2004] in a comprehensive manner on the achievements of the human
resources management reform, when sufficient information will be available
on the experiences of the Secretariat with … implementation
…; 5. … conduct a study [by the OIOS]
on the impact of … [the reforms], in particular on the improvement of
recruitment, placement, promotion and training, including an assessment of
the role of the central review bodies and mobility
…; 6. … ensure that all future
reports on the implementation of [these] … reforms focus on the results of
such measures; 10. … ensure the accountability of
programme managers in the staff selection process, in close collaboration
with the [OHRM], and to report thereon [in 2004 ];"
"Human
resources management," General Assembly resolution 57/305 of 1 May
2003, Section II.
It remains to be seen
if the Secretariat, in late 2004, will finally come through with a solid
report of the type that the
General Assembly seeks. It
seems more likely, however, that underneath the Secretariat rhetoric will
be the old reality -- as Dirk
Salomons stated it, also in 2003, that: " … after all these years, the United Nations is
still struggling to adjust its human resources policies and practices to
the reality that surrounds it. … In [a highly competitive
international] environment, the UN will have to reform its reforms, or go
down reforming. Several dilemmas that have
crippled the UN for generations, however, remain unresolved, and this
organizational pathology stands in the way of the UN's efforts to remain
meaningful. When it comes to
managing human resources, the following are [some of] the obstacles that
the UN must overcome: ?
Its
addiction to the trappings of a careers-for-life staffing model, with its
emphasis on seniority …; … ?
Its
fear of offending Member States that exert political pressure -- by not
insisting on merit in
staffing, even at the highest levels; ?
Its
reliance on patronage as a survival strategy, especially where outputs are
nebulous; … ?
the persistent gap between its perennial promises to improve human
resources management and its capacity to deliver; and
?
Its obsession with cosmetic reforms, hiding the root causes of
dysfunctionality. For most pathologies, there is a
cure. For the UN, faith
healing will not suffice." Dirk Salomons, "Good intentions to naught: The pathology of human resources management at the United Nations," in Dennis Dijkzeul, and Yves Beigbeder, eds., Rethinking international organizations: Pathology and promise, Berghahn, New York and Oxford, 2003, pp. 111-139 [136-137]. [emphasis added.]
The OIOS, tasked with
performing the results-oriented management reporting that the Secretariat
could not somehow gather itself to provide, found "significant progress"
in early 2003 in a number of initiatives, as the OHRM struggles to change
itself from "an administrative, oversight function" to a "more strategic,
partnering role." But it did
conclude that: " … in order for the reform to
reach the next level, its elements should be linked systematically, not
just with each other, but also with other [UN] reform initiatives …
Successful implementation … will depend upon the mutual cooperation
between different partners and bodies throughout the Organization in
support of a culture of change. Furthermore, … OHRM could assume a
more strategic role … [and] should strengthen its ability to measure the
impact of its activities on the Organization's performance and, if
necessary, to refocus initiatives …" "Implementation of all provisions of General Assembly resolution 55/258 on human resources management: Note by the Secretary-General", UN document A/57/726 of 10 February 2003, "Summary, and paras. 17-26, and 53-55.
It is particularly
discouraging that the OHRM, like the OIOS itself, is now much taken with
"partnering" and "cooperative" activities, in the "feel good" context of
the new UN Integrity Initiative. IO Watch believes that it should
instead be acting as a firm
oversight figure to ensure that UN Secretariat accountability is
maintained, the rules are followed, and sanctions are applied where
necessary (at which point, a long overdue programme of
recognition of merit and outstanding performance for UN managers and staff
could finally begin). Whatever reporting the
Secretariat may offer in late 2004, the US GAO has, thankfully, once again
preempted it. The GAO did a
follow-up on its 2000 report which was issued in February 2004. The GAO
noted, interestingly enough, that one major implementation problem was
that managers were not complying with monitoring and evaluation
regulations and processes, and complained of a lack of additional
resources to implement the management reforms. As the GAO summarized
it: "Why GAO did this
study The U.N. Secretary General
launched two reform agendas, in 1997 and 2002, to address the U.N.'s
core management challenges -- poor leadership of the Secretariat,
duplication among its many offices and programs, and the lack of
accountability for staff performance. … In 2000, GAO reported that the
reforms were not yet complete. What GAO
found … First, the Secretariat has taken
positive steps to strengthen its human capital management, but reforms in
this area are ongoing and additional challenges remain. Second, the U.N. has begun to
adopt results-oriented budgeting, but its monitoring and evaluation system
does not measure program impact. … UN reform faces several
challenges. For example,
the Secretariat does not conduct comprehensive assessments of the
status and impact of U.N. reforms.
In addition, the reform agendas lack clearly stated priorities,
interim goals, and target dates for overall completion. Other challenges include
resistance to change from program managers and possible resource
constraints. What GAO
recommends … the [US] Secretary of State and
[US Mission to the UN] should work with other member states to encourage
the Secretary-General to (1) report regularly on the status and impact of
reforms; (2) identify short- and long-term goals and establish target end
dates for remaining reforms; and conduct assessments of the resulting
resource implications." U.S. General Accounting Office, United Nations: Reforms progressing, but comprehensive assessments needed to measure impact, GAO 04-339, February 2004, "Highlights" page. [emphasis added] [Note: the complete report
is available at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-339
]
The GAO concluded that
there was a strong need for Member States to insist on regular reporting
by the Secretary-General on all recent and current reform status and
impact, and to work to overcome the resistance of managers to the reforms,
as a critical factor: "To promote full implementation
and accountability of the Secretary General's overall reform actions, we
recommend that the Secretary of State [and the US Mission to the UN] work
with other member states to encourage the Secretary General to
?
Report
regularly through an existing U.N. reporting mechanism on the status and impact
of the 1997 and 2002 reforms and other reforms that may follow …"
"[Because of the resistance, and lack of guidance and resources
for implementing the reforms] … the Secretariat is providing
training to all departments to assist managers and staff in
conducting self-monitoring and evaluation exercises to comply with
performance-oriented budgeting and overcome resistance. Managers'
support is critical for the institutionalization of reforms in the long
term." U.S. General Accounting
Office, United Nations: Reforms progressing, but comprehensive
assessments needed to measure impact, GAO 04-339, February,
2004, pp. 36, 35.
The excellent GAO 2004
report thus brings the story back full circle to the struggles of 1985 in
the General Assembly to obtain proper management reporting from the
Secretariat. Will the next
cycle play out by the year 2025, when the third or fourth
Secretary-General who follows Mr. Annan will promise that reform is just
around the corner -- that is, if there is a functioning UN at that distant
time?
However, the 2004 GAO report goes one critically important step further.
It lays much of the blame for failure to establish and apply management
accountability reform right where it belongs -- with the stubborn and
recalcitrant UN senior managers who, like petulant children in primary
school, refuse to act responsibly.
This situation -- the deterioration of the UN management culture in
recent years, and the continuing submission to them by the UN top
leadership -- is in fact the next negative facet of this subsection.
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