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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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Two
decades ago (all analyses of remedies for dealing with accountability and
rule-of-law problems in the UN seem to begin with that "xx decades ago"
phrase) the UN's then-top manager made an excellent and admirably succinct
statement of what the UN Secretariat needed to do to meet the
decision-making needs of a very unhappy set of Member States in the Fifth
Committee: "Member States have …
stressed the need to be told, more clearly and more extensively
…. what has been the programmatic
performance of the Secretariat, which outputs have been delivered, and
with which result…. Let us strengthen the
monitoring and evaluation functions …
Let us say clearly and dispassionately what has been done and with
which result, and equally what has not been done and
why…. Let us produce more analytical performance reports
…. I find the essential
problem one of better and more transparent information, thus permitting
better decisions."
"Statement", Response to
criticisms by UN Under-Secretary-General for Management Patricio
Ruedas, 12 November
1985, as quoted in UN Joint Inspection Unit, "Reporting on the
Performance and Results of United Nations Programmes: Monitoring,
evaluation and management review components"", UN document A/43/124,1988, p. 3.
Yet a 1989 summary
assessment made by The Economist found precious little change, and
is still directly relevant: "The crude truth about many of the UN agencies is that they don't
know what they are trying to achieve; and that cronyism, sloth and
incompetence would ensure they could not achieve it even if they did. The obstacles to reform are huge,
the courage to tackle them nowhere visible. Still, here are some
suggestions. The system reflects
the whims and false starts of 44 years … some parts should be
radically slimmed or closed entirely. Other parts are
paralysed by having too many separate aims, too many programmes
…. Each should be
given a manageable set of objectives and focused on
these. Accountability must be improved. That would at least mean regular
and public reports on where and how the money goes, and on how far
pre-stated targets of achievement are being met
" "The United Nations agencies: A case for emergency treatment", The Economist, December 2, 1989, pp. 27-28, 30 [30]. [emphasis added] [Note: the article offered a set of sensible suggestions for improvement as of 1989. At present, most if not almost all still seem to have been ignored.]
In the year 2000, a
pivotal series of reports appeared, which illustrate that the UN
Secretariat is still "accountability-challenged" when it comes to
transparent performance reporting. First, a very detailed and expert assessment of the
Secretary-General's reform plan was issued by the United States General
Accounting Office in May 2000.
The GAO observed that: "In recent
years, the United Nations has had fundamental problems. In 1994 … there was an
overall failure of its human resources system to staff critical posts with
the right people. … "[In 1997] The
Secretary General proposed a reform program consisting of three
[integrated] core elements: (1) restructuring U.N. leadership and
operations; (2) developing a performance-based human capital system; and
(3) introducing programming
and budgeting processes based on results. … [He] set the
end of 1999 as the target to put the reforms in place. … The United
Nations has substantially restructured its leadership and operations and
partly implemented a merit-based and performance-oriented
human capital system … However, … the overall objectives of the reform have not
yet been achieved.
Specifically, the United Nations has not yet implemented reforms to focus
its programming and budgeting on managing the Secretariat's performance.
These initiatives would enable Member States to hold the Secretariat
accountable for results and are key to the success of the overall
reform because they institutionalize a shift in the organization's focus
from carrying out activities to accomplishing missions. … the U.N. reform is an interrelated
process and requires that all core elements be in place to
succeed." "US General Accounting Office,
"United Nations: Reforms are progressing, but overall objectives have not
been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-169, 15 pages, of May 10, 2000, especially summary and pp. 2-3 and
9-15, and "United Nations: Reform initiatives
have strengthened operations, but overall objectives have not been
achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-150, May 10, 2000, 84 pages.
[emphasis added]
Notwithstanding
this negative assessment, in August 2000, Secretary-General Annan
summarized the status of accountability and responsibility reform actions
since 1994, and -- quite abruptly
-- declared
"victory":
"In conclusion,
the Secretary-General is confident that the
comprehensive system of
accountability now in place ensures that accountability mechanisms
are effectively used, are seen to be used, and ensure that staff at all
levels are held accountable for their actions and
inaction."
"Accountability and responsibility:
Report of the Secretary-General", A/55/270 of 3 August 2000,
Summary, paras. 1-2, 47-48.
[emphasis added.]
Unfortunately, this report ignored its own Annexes, the first of
which identified four clear "steps to ensuring accountability," of which
the UN -- at that time and
arguably ever since -- has only done perhaps one or one-and-a-half. The Secretariat has never given
the General Assembly any systematic report on the most critical
steps, 3 and 4
below: "1. Specifying responsibility,
authority and results to be achieved 2. Providing guidance and
support 3. Monitoring and
assessing the exercise of responsibility and
authority 4. Taking
appropriate action Follow-up
must be capable of distinguishing between and dealing
appropriately with the following: (a) Excellent or satisfactory
execution of responsibility and authority; (b) Unsatisfactory execution of
responsibility and authority as a result of carelessness or
ignorance; c) Unacceptable exercise of
responsibility and authority due to deliberate flouting of policies, rules and regulations,
or exceeding the limits of authority. (d) Misconduct or fraud."
"Accountability and responsibility:
Report of the Secretary-General", A/55/270 of 3 August 2000, Annex I, "Four steps to ensuring
accountability.'
[emphasis added.] [Note: Annex II, "The chain of
accountability," is equally informative in detailing all the mechanisms
which must be in place (and fully functioning), as they are not in the UN
Secretariat]
An emphatic and substantive further rebuttal to
Secretary-General Annan's declaration that accountability mechanisms were
then in place and being effectively used came only a month later. An article on the work of his own
OIOS stated that: "The United
Nations has been hit by an unprecedented wave of fraud, waste and
corruption. Officials at its
antifraud investigation unit say they are expecting to have to run more
than 350 inquiries by the end of the year -- nearly twice the total for
1998, and a 50 per cent increase on last year. Thousands of staff, contractors,
and consultants have been interviewed in scores of countries. … The revelations
will embarrass Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, who is to welcome
national leaders … to the 'Millenium Summit' in New York next
week. … Annan is hoping to convince
skeptical heads of state that the UN has provided value for money and that
its role should be expanded. … One senior
investigator said last week that the UN investigations unit's workload was
greater than ever. "We are seeing more and more frauds and abuses of
authority. … The OIOS's
annual report, due out next month, will reveal cases of sloppy management,
lax enforcement, harassment and outright criminality. … OIOS is
working with dozens of interntional police forces -- including Scotland Yard -- on
inquiries into the activities of UN
personnel." Jason Burke, et. al., "UN rocked by
flood of fraud cases: Officials were 'addicted to luxury," The Observer
International (UK), September 3,
2000. [Note: any such interviews with
OIOS staff seem to have come to an abrupt end thereafter, and subsequent
OIOS reports on fraud, mismanagement, and its own investigation activities
have become so subdued as to almost
disappear.]
Again, however, Mr.
Annan forged ahead in 2002 with more dynamic reforms as part of his
"agenda for further change", to take place in a "phased approach" which
continues on. However, the General Assembly, which had appeared to tire of
protesting a decade of "will soon" and 'could be" reports after its call
for UN management accountability of 1993, is now making a renewed effort
to emphasize results and accountability. It stated in its 2003 resolution
on Mr. Annan's new initiatives that he should: "4. … report to the General Assembly
[in 2004] in a comprehensive manner on the achievements of the human
resources management reform, when sufficient information will be available
on the experiences of the Secretariat with … implementation
…; 5. … conduct a study [by the OIOS]
on the impact of … [the reforms], in particular on the improvement of
recruitment, placement, promotion and training, including an assessment of
the role of the central review bodies and mobility
…; 6. … ensure that all future
reports on the implementation of [these] … reforms focus on the results of
such measures; 10. … ensure the
accountability of programme managers in the staff selection
process, in close collaboration with the [OHRM], and to report
thereon [in 2004 ];"
"Human
resources management," General Assembly resolution 57/305 of 1 May
2003, Section II. [emphasis added.]
The Secretariat
biennial reports on reforms for 2004 remain to be seen and assessed. However, the US GAO issued another
timely report on these matters in February 2004. Its summary suggests that chances
for UN performance management and reporting implementation remain elusive,
always dangling elusively somewhere out there in the foggy
future: Why GAO did this
study The U.N. Secretary General
launched two reform agendas, in 1997 and 2002, to address the U.N.'s
core management challenges -- poor leadership of the Secretariat,
duplication among its many offices and programs, and the lack of
accountability for staff performance. … In 2000, GAO reported that the
reforms were not yet complete. What GAO
found … First, the Secretariat has taken
positive steps to strengthen its human capital management, but reforms in
this area are ongoing and additional challenges remain. Second, the U.N. has begun to
adopt results-oriented budgeting, but its monitoring and evaluation system
does not measure program impact. … UN reform faces several
challenges. For example,
the Secretariat does not conduct comprehensive assessments of the
status and impact of U.N. reforms.
In addition, the reform agendas lack clearly stated priorities,
interim goals, and target dates for overall completion. Other challenges include
resistance to change from program managers and possible resource
constraints. What GAO
recommends … the [US] Secretary of State and
[US Mission to the UN] should work with other member states to encourage
the Secretary-General to (1) report regularly on the status and
impact of reforms; (2) identify short- and long-term goals and
establish target end dates for remaining reforms; and (3) conduct
assessments of the resulting resource
implications." U.S. General Accounting
Office, United Nations: Reforms progressing, but comprehensive
assessments needed to measure impact, GAO 04-339, February
2004, "Highlights" page.
[emphasis added] [Note: the complete report
is available at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-339
, and see again the GAO's report of May 10, 2000 cited above.]
In a section on
"Various factors may impede full implementation of U.N. reforms," the GAO
first cited the lack of systematic Secretariat follow-up on the reforms to
assess how they are working, and the lack of time frames or milestones for
completion of reform actions.
The report then elaborated on managerial non-cooperation and a lack
of resources committed to realizing the reforms, and the elusive
"solution" proposed by the Secretariat: "Third, according to [UN] …
officials, some program managers and staff have resisted implementing
certain reform initiatives. … OIOS reported that about half of
program managers across the Secretariat have not complied with U.N.
regulations to monitor and evaluate the performance of program
activities … [and that] The
Secretariat lacks clear rules and procedures for conducting [such] …
exercises. … Some managers also stated that they lacked resources to
support this work and were concerned that these evaluation requirements
would detract time and money from their regular work responsibilities.
… Fourth, U.N. officials stated that
they have encountered delays in implementing reforms due to a lack of
available regular budget resources.
… The Secretary General stated that departments would need to
implement reforms with existing resources because additional funding would
not be available …" U.S. General Accounting
Office, United Nations: Reforms progressing, but comprehensive
assessments needed to measure impact, GAO 04-339, February,
2004, page 35.
[emphasis added.]
The GAO learned that
the UN was working on the problem, and a performance reporting system
could be expected soon --
well, actually only in 2006: "In 2002, the … [OIOS] found that
program managers and department and office heads were not complying with
U.N. regulations. … nearly
half of program managers were not regularly monitoring and evaluating
program performance. In
addition, program managers were not held accountable for meeting program
objectives because U.N. regulations prevent linking program effectiveness
and impact with program managers' performance. U.N. officials told us that a more
mature program monitoring and evaluation system is needed before program
managers can be held responsible for program
performance. We found that there were a variety
of problems … Most programs do not have comprehensive monitoring and
evaluation plans … managers … did not directly review … [evaluation
results] in [more than half of the] programmes surveyed in 2001 … overall,
evaluation findings were not used … The Secretary-General tasked the …
OIOS to develop a strategy to systematically evaluate and monitor
programme results and to introduce information systems needed … and
expects to have a complete system by 2006." U. S. General Accounting Office, United Nations: Reforms progressing, but comprehensive assessments needed to measure impact, GAO 04-339, February 2004, pp. 19-23 [22-23]. The GAO then
recommended, as had the General Assembly in May 2003, that Member States
should encourage reporting on reform status and impact, and observed that
overcoming managers' resistance was critical to this
process: "To promote full implementation
and accountability of the Secretary General's overall reform actions, we
recommend that the Secretary of State [and the US Mission to the UN] work
with other member states to encourage the Secretary General to
?
Report
regularly through an existing U.N. reporting mechanism on the status and impact
of the 1997 and 2002 reforms and other reforms that may follow …"
"[Because of managers' resistance,
and the lack of guidance and resources for implementing the reforms] … the
Secretariat is providing training to all departments to assist managers
and staff in conducting self-monitoring and evaluation exercises to comply
with performance-oriented budgeting and overcome resistance.
Managers' support is critical for the institutionalization of
reforms in the long term." U.S. General Accounting
Office, United Nations: Reforms progressing, but comprehensive
assessments needed to measure impact, GAO 04-339, February
2004, pp. 36, 35.
IO Watch believes that
this process is like a "greased-pig contest", in which the General
Assembly can never quite grab hold of a real UN performance management
system. In fact, UN managers have consistently obstructed establishment of
the system. Even today, UN senior officials still say, with a straight
face -- and after 40 years of 'effort",
that a "more mature" monitoring system is needed, and that managers who do
not use evaluation tools indeed cannot be held accountable because UN
regulations prevent it. Thus the process of UN performance management is
postponed once again, until 2006.
Where's the
accountability? [Note: this whole lengthy and abortive history is discussed in the subsection of this archive on Programme planning system (PPBE) . ] By fait accompli
and dereliction of duty, IO Watch believes that any hope for proper UN
performance management reporting and accountability, and reporting
thereon, seems a lost cause for at least several more years. However, at
least the General Assembly now seems ready to insist on the important
first step of establishing serious annual progress reporting on overall
management reforms, as first indicated by an annoyed 1998 ACABQ report (and now
reaffirmed by the General Assembly resolution of 2003), namely that the
Secretariat should: " … set aside a preoccupation with
concept and theory … to concentrate on … specific new measures to increase
the efficiency and confirm the results arising out of the implementation
of new measures as well as those initiated prior to the current
exercise." "Advisory Committee rejects 'non-programme
costs' report", International Documents Review, 16 March
1998, page 5.
To deal firmly with
the perpetual Secretariat evasiveness, a sound proposal already exists,
and is now needed more than ever.
In their excellent and still highly-relevant report on Renewing
the United Nations system in 1994, Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart
proposed very specifically that:
"Recommendations for the process
of reform 1. Governments must be far more
conscious that many weaknesses in the UN system can only be corrected by
improving the quality of the people they appoint to lead it.
… 8. The General Assembly should adopt
a standard discipline that before voting on any
reform package it will obtain an independent "Reform
Impact Report."
This report should recall the weaknesses that were to be addressed,
and advise the Assembly to what extent the negotiated reform will meet
them; where it will not do so; and any serious lacunae in it … 9. The ACABQ should be requested to
maintain a fully comprehensive data bank of all significant
reform and restructuring decisions by the Secretary-General and/or the
General Assembly since 1960 … in computer memory, accessible to
Delegations and the public.
The data bank should also store mandatory follow-up
reports. 10 [Annually for
three] … years following any [reform decision] the ACABQ should
[report] on implementation to the General Assembly,
clearly identifying … [delays, causes, responsibilities, and adjustments]
… 11. … not more than five years
after a significant reform … the ACABQ should commission
an independent evaluation of its impact, with
recommendations." Erskine Childers, with Brian
Urquhart, in Chapter X, "The international civil service", in "Renewing
the United Nations System", Development Dialogue, 1994:1, Dag
Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1994, pp.
188-189. [emphasis added.]
After a decade of
failed attempts to install UN management accountability reforms, and
numerous other reforms relentlessly underway, action on this
recommendation is essential
and long, long overdue.
Unexamined UN reforms can do much damage: As the strong
and specific emphases of the above Childers and Urquhart recommendations
make clear, to permit UN reforms to proceed relentlessly without
independent expert analysis and assessment, and adjustment, is a grave
governance failure. IO Watch would suggest
that oversight and use of this critical process be entrusted to
the General Assembly audit subcommittee proposed
above in this "Answers" subsection. It would finally create an
expert body directly concerned with the central issues of outputs,
results, and Secretariat performance, to at last balance the
input-oriented ACABQ.
Particularly if this new subcommittee is composed of members (and
staff) who are professional management auditors, and works closely with
the Board of Auditors and the OIOS, it could be the center of a
critically-needed process of knowledgeable UN oversight and regular
independent reform assessment, performance reporting, and
follow-up.
In the battle for UN
management accountability, game and set have gone to the Secretariat, but
it is definitely time for the General Assembly to rally and exercise full
"due diligence" to win the match.
The Assembly could thereby accept, as it does not at present,
"accountability for accountability", and fulfill its oversight
responsibilities to Member States, taxpayers, and the people of the world
who rely on (or at least still hope for) effective UN services and
programmes. |
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