|
|||||
UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
|
|
Earlier subsections of this archive have dealt with Accountability and
Transparency, the emergence
of The International "Right to
Know" , and -- more specifically -- with UN Resource
ambiguities and the "Poor little UN"
. The UN is supported by
taxpayer and voluntary funding from countries and sources worldwide, to
the tune of $6 to $10 billion per year, most of it in often
loosely-administered "extra-budgetary" funds and "trust
funds". To earn this trust,
however, IO Watch believes that the UN should be reporting back to Member
States and the public, in clear and simple summary fashion and on a
regular basis, on how much money it got and from what sources, how it
applied it, and also how it deploys and uses its "most precious resource"
-- its staff. An
excellent paper in a 2002 OECD survey of public sector transparency and
accountability highlights an essential point: "Public scrutiny of
state affairs and access to information are key phases in the current
debate on the development of democracy
The two concepts are
interdependent, since one cannot play its part under the rule of law
without the other.
There can be no public scrutiny without access to
information.
It is even possible
to conclude
that the
level of democracy attained by a country should now be measured in terms
of the volume and quality of the information in circulation.
it should now be
clear that it is not possible to fight corruption in the absence of
a culture of transparency.
Building such a culture can begin with a legislative commitment to
the public that breaks with the many years of concealment and the
persecution of those who take an interest in public affairs.
Legislation of this
type must overcome the huge temptation to control access to information
as a means of
maintaining the conditions under which an authoritarian state can achieve
its objectives. It must also
overcome a culture of blatant isolation, behind which administrations have
long sheltered in an effort to avoid 'undesirable' interference in their
affairs." Alfredo Chirino Sαnchez, "The right of
access to information and public scrutiny: Transparency as a democratic
control instrument," in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Public sector transparency and accountability: Making it
happen, OECD, Paris, 2002, pp. 163-166 [163, 166].[emphasis
added.] The
UN has clearly restricted information on its financial and human resources
and how they are employed.
The material in the preceding subsection and elsewhere on results
reporting makes it regrettably clear that, for decades, UN Secretariat
managers and senior officials at all levels have successfully resisted
accountability for their performance, as underscored by the recent OIOS
and US GAO reports.
Yet in the financial
and human resources reporting area as well, the same old reporting
failures go on and on, but NO ONE PROTESTS AND DEMANDS
CHANGE, at least among the UN Member State diplomatic missions
that are supposed to provide "due diligence" and fulfill a fiduciary
responsibility (along with the Secretary-General) for the billions of
dollars provided to these managers every year. As a wonderful description of
prevailing UN funding processes states,
approximately: "just leave the money on a
tree stump in a clearing in the middle of the forest in the moonlight at
midnight." The
UN is engaged in a never-ending search to generate billions of dollars
worth of funds to "administer".
It is competing with
the even greater flows of billions of dollars transferred worldwide each
year through other channels
-- trade and
investment, bilateral aid programmes, billions more in people-to-people
transfers through NGOs,
foundations, and now even billions in remittances from migrants to their
families "back home". Unfortunately,
there is a severe lack of information on how the UN actually spends all
the money it gathers (and indeed how much is raised from all its various
"spigots.") Once again, one can
cite basic, still-unanswered, critical questions from the past, one from
The Economist in 1989 and the other from Anne Applebaum in 1994:
The crude truth about many of the UN agencies is that they don't
know what they are trying to achieve; and that cronyism, sloth and
incompetence would ensure they could not achieve it even if they did. The obstacles to reform are huge,
the courage to tackle them nowhere visible. Still, here are some suggestions.
Accountability must be improved. That would at least mean regular
and public reports on where and how the money goes, and on how far
pre-stated targets of achievement are being
met. "The United Nations agencies: A case for emergency treatment", The Economist, December 2, 1989, pp. 27-28, 30 [30]. [emphasis added]
"Not long ago, an editor at the New York Times told me that he was uninterested
in stories critical of the UN, because the UN is a 'necessary failure' and
always would be. But why does
it have to be so? Why do we
need to continue supporting the UN's more wasteful projects? There is nothing inherently good
or moral about an institution, merely because it is multilateral, merely
because most countries in the world belong to it, or because it claims to
be interested in Children or Health.
Why is there never any examination of how the agencies
spend their money?" Anne
Applebaum, "An anarchy of abounding acronyms", The Spectator
( More
years have passed. The UN hopefully has organized its work somewhat
better, and made a little progress in combating (lower-level) corruption,
cronyism and sloth (although many of the preceding subsections of this
archive cast doubt on even that claim.) Accountability, meaning its
implementation, has not yet happened, nor has performance management. But at least regular public
reporting could be greatly improved, beginning
immediately. The UN does indeed
already do some reporting on "the money" and "the staff", but with one
essential "bottom-line" problem
-- the
numbers NEVER TOTALLY ADD UP, they can run years behind, and they never
spell out clearly WHERE those resources go. There is for
instance an annual report on the "composition of the Secretariat", with
pages of mind-numbing detail, especially on all aspects of the status of
the posts subject to "geographic distribution". A very complex and technical
UN system-wide report on finances by year, which also does not add up, has
been published ever since 1991. "Composition of
the Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/58/666 of
"Budgetary
and financial situation of organizations of the United Nations system:
Note by the Secretary-General
", UN document A/57/265 of
These reports are
necessary, but not sufficient. The report on Secretariat composition is of
obsessive interest to competing Member State delegations who want more
posts. In fact, there used to
be (IO Watch does not know if it still exists) another grand "phone book"
listing all Secretariat posts, their incumbents, and their nationality,
which Member State missions could "shop" like a department-store
mail-order catalog every year.
On the finance side, the present system-wide report is a result of
hard-earned reporting compromises due to different legal requirements and
procedures of different UN system agencies, and has basic uses which
support its continuance. Joint Inspection Unit, "Accountability,
management improvement, and oversight in the United Nations System", Part II, UN document A/50/503,
1995 , Table I. "Total financial and staff resources of the
organizations".
[Note: the above acronyms are explained
in the introductory section of UN Accountability and Oversight
Efforts
. Updated information which confirms these general patterns and sums over a longer period is provided by the Global Policy Forum, in "Total UN system expenditures: 1986-2004", compiled by Klaus Hόfner, March 2004, at The data for "total" staffing is much more recent,
but also incomplete. Although articles about the UN often refer to about
9,000 regular staff: "As of 30 June
2004, the total number of
staff of the UN Secretariat and special status units]
holding appointments of one
year of more amounted to 37,598. Of that
total, 14,823 paid from various sources of
funding are assigned to the Secretariat and 22,375 are assigned to other entities of the
United Nations." "Composition of the
Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/299 of 26 August 2004, para. 11. [emphasis
added]
The figure of 9,000 staff usually cited is thus based
on the total regular budget posts of 8,799 [15 percent of which are stated
to be vacant, by the way], and omits the some 22,000 staff assigned to
"other entities", as well as about 6,000 more staff in the Secretariat who
are paid from non-budget funding sources. It also, as noted, does not
include additional temporary staff holding appointments of one year or
less. "
extra budgetary
posts have become an institutionalized part of [the UN's] core resource
base.
existing guiding policies for [these] posts were ill-defined and
[their] implementation was inconsistent. The audit also highlighted
frequent
contract renewals, which were
administratively costly
The report
recommended [many improvement measures for extra budgetary posts and
policies.]
OIOS also conducted
an audit of the use of consultants
During 1996, the Organization
employed some 2,675 consultants at a cost of $19.4 million. The
audit found [deficiencies and inconsistencies in this field as well.] "Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of
the OIOS", UN document A/53/428, 1998, paras.
79-81. "[The General
Assembly] requests the Secretary-General to report on the function,
relevant operational factors and incidence of temporary staff appointed at
the Professional level or above for less than one year under the 100
series of the Staff Rules of the United Nations, and the implications for
substantive appointments to the Secretariat." "Human resources management", General Assembly
resolution 57/305 of IO Watch believes that the General Assembly should now finally put an end to the decades-long opacity and confusion about UN financial and human resource levels, categories, and deployment by requiring an annual Secretariat report on the status and use of its overall financial and human resources and their application. The existing situation undermines UN accountability by allowing it to continually claim that it is strapped for funds and staff (while not accounting for how much funds it received, and what has been done with them.) This becomes another element which allows UN managers to escape scrutiny, and relentlessly push for more "money left on the tree stump in the moonlight." Member State missions, and the general public, might
recall the famous children's story of "The Emperor's new clothes", in
which a grand king was ultimately brought down by charlatans manipulating
his vanity and a child's cry that "he doesn't have anything on!" The UN
regularly transmits worldwide images of the pomp of "world leaders" at the
General Assembly sessions in New York, or the occasional dramas at the
Security Council, or the heart-rending life-and-death struggles of
humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in the field, but the actors are
without the essential information needed to properly inform and guide
their proper decisions and operations. [Note: the children's story is, of course, to be
found in Hans Christian Andersen, Andersen's Fairy Tales, New American Library,
Behind these images, as a recent incisive article
observes, is a rather naked and all-too-human attempt of people in an
organization (in the UN's case, senior staff determinedly protecting big
salaries and VIP privileges for modest work) who try aggressively to keep
that organization alive and important through money flowing in from as
many multiple sources as possible in a steady stream. "The halo that appears to
float over non-profit institutions - providing them with an aura
of altruism - distracts attention from the basic fact that non-profits
are, first and foremost, economic institutions
[An expert observes
that to improve non-profits' management one must] view them as economic
institutions with
charitable missions
Managers of
non-profit institutions understand that the organizations' survival
depends on the managers' ability to secure a generous constituency.
The perception that
non-profit organizations are small, fragile and non-threatening
enterprises
conceals their actual size, power, and competitive
determination.
[Their mythology and self-portrayal as solely altruistic]
misinform the public and
allow them
to ensure a continued flow of salary and benefits for their
managers and the preservation of the managers' power and status.
[People need]
to realize that
the rule of caveat emptor applies even more
importantly to transactions with non-profits than with marketplace
transactions. Typically, [in the]
marketplace, one
receives something in return [but, with non-profits]
individuals conduct transactions
based entirely on faith. Such transactions are lamentable when
one party is talking altruism but seeking self-interest. Who will
protect generous - and gullible - donors?"
Barry D. Friedman, "How non-profit organizations fight off competition: Who will protect non-profit donors?", PA Times (USA), May 2004, pp. 5-6.
The UN's financial, human resource, and computerized
information systems have, in the past, been too decrepit to permit regular
and comprehensive status reporting on its finances and staffing.
Unfortunately, as discussed throughout this archive, the performance
management systems are still shamefully inadequate, as the managers
continue to obstruct accountability measures. But at least, in a world of
increasingly instantaneous computerized information, the UN's financial
systems and accounting standards appear to have made some progress, the
IMIS information systems have finally been put in place after a decade of
expensive detours, and even the OHRM now has a computerized human
resources system which it is quite proud of. In 1991 the General Assembly had called on the
Secretary-General to 'propose a set of accounting standards' for common
application to the UN system. The organizations finally developed a
framework for UN system accounting and financial reporting, reflecting
generally accepted accounting principles (while allowing for variations),
and intended to promote consistency between the organizations. A related
paper of the Administrative Committee on Coordination of 1995 stated
nicely that underlying the objective of these standards are the needs: "
for
governments and other contributors to the organizations to have the means
to judge the manner in which resources made available by them are
used, and for the management of each organization to
demonstrate that they have fulfilled their responsibility for stewardship
and accountability in respect of such resources. Accounting and
financial reporting in accordance with the standards should among other
things assist those concerned: (i) To ensure consistent and transparent
treatment and disclosure of financial transactions; (ii) To assess the financial position and
its evolution over time; (iii) To ascertain
the sources from which
income has been derived and the ways in which it has been used; and (iv) to judge financial
performance under approved budgets." "United Nations system accounting standards: Revision I," Annex III of UN document ACC/1995/20, 1995, pp. 31-33.
IO Watch believes that the time has definitely come
for Member States and the General Assembly to insist that the old UN
resources "shell game" be replaced with clear and transparent annual
reporting. This reporting should be succinct but comprehensive. It should
allow readers worldwide to clearly see an overview of UN operations. And above all, the report should
emphasize the little details that UN report writers fear as a vampire
(appropriately) fears the sunlight -- clear, understandable summary
pie charts, graphs, and other visual aids that allow an understanding of
UN operational status and resource use in key areas at a
glance. As discussed under The International "Right to
Know" subsection of this archive,
some organizations now do a marvelous job of explaining complex issues
with succinct graphics and text, as in The Atlas
of War and Peace or the New
Internationalist's monthly topical reviews or Foreign Policy articles. While these sources seek
to clarify, illuminate, summarize, explain, educate, and edify, the UN and
its words, words, words (plus a few, very rare and painfully trivial
graphs) seem too often concerned with obscuring, evading, moderating,
defusing, and even manipulating the topic at hand. Dan
Smith, with Ane Brζin, The atlas of war and
peace, Earthscan, "In
the name of God: The use and abuses of religion", New Internationalist, No. 370, August 2004, pp. 18-19, available at NI
online, www.newint.org
, and Foreign Policy at www.foreignpolicy.com [and this archive's subsection on Top Related Sources and Websites .] The first component of a new UN annual resource
status report, an overview of FINANCIAL STATUS of the $6 to $10 billion
that the UN annually receives, would hopefully be facilitated by the above
ACC reporting standards, and in any event should not be evaded, but
proceed on "best available" information and estimates year-by year (and
not two years or more later) if there is no other alternative. However, a second topic should be clearly reported on
as well: the status and results of FUND RAISING for
the dominant UN voluntary-funded and extra-budgetary programmes. How much
is spent on fund-raising? [Note: good NGOs regularly disclose this.] What
happened to the proposed set of fund appeal targets each year of $3 or
perhaps $4 billion to aid areas ravaged by war and other crises? What happened
to other such appeals? How much money was actually raised,
where did the donors put it, and how much was spent? (Some UN
Secretariat report-writers could easily spin out 2,000 befuddling words on
these matters, but a competent designer could capture most of it in a few
summary charts.) Irwin Arieff, "UN seeks $3 billion to aid 50 million in crisis", Reuters, November 19, 2002, and "Annan launches UN's 2004 humanitarian appeal for $3 billion", UN News Center, 19 November 2003. In fact, there are some very important funding issues
that need to see the light of day. Addressing
them might help the UN, and all global anti-poverty and humanitarian
efforts, greatly. For example, a small but very
significant recent article focuses on donor "deadbeats" and disruption of
funding flows for important causes: "Five years ago
the
Roll Back Malaria initiative (RBM) [was founded to] combat resurgent
malaria in many [countries]
Almost every major aid agency promised
new funds. [Financing rose]
from $64 million in 1998 to a promised $750
million by the end of 2000. However, in 2002
international funding had reached only $130 million.
[A recent journal
article grapples]
with the disconnect between cost estimates, ambitious
donation pronouncements, and the actual sums spent on malaria-related
programs. [Its] conclusions are simple and depressing: Pledged
donations are far lower than what most experts believe is needed; many
pledges are not dispersed in full; and current program-management and
accounting systems are so poor that no one can learn precisely what is
being spent by whom, where, and on what.
[The authors
conclude that] many donors remain unrepentant about their lax financial
reporting habits.
Sadly, these
findings are not surprising. In many domains
collaboration
often
peaks at the pledging stage.
Malaria is more closely
linked to global poverty than any other disease.
The failure to track
well-publicized RBM pledges is particularly reprehensible. Malaria and
poverty will persist as donor commitments recede." Phyllis Freeman and Anthony Robbins, "Disease deadbeats", Foreign Policy, September/October 2003, pp. 79-80. The article itself is Vasant Narasimhan and Amir Attaran, "Roll back malaria? The scarcity of international aid for malaria", Malaria Journal 2003, 2:8, published 15 April 2003, available at www.malariajournal.com.] [Note: The "Copenhagen Consensus" of 2004 on prioritizing global problems, discussed in the subsection on A true global strategy , in fact ranked control of malaria in the top four of a list of major global projects, based on social benefits which greatly exceed their costs.] There are definitely complexities to such financial reporting, and the UN will undoubtedly plead them. But the rest of the world is wisely becoming much more responsive to demands by donors to know what happened with their money (at least that portion that they actually provided), and the UN should receive no free pass. For instance: "In the world of
international relief agencies, it's known as 'the fog of disaster.' Brought
on by
calamities,
getting the necessary donations to buy the right
supplies and get them to rescuers on the scene can be a bureaucratic
nightmare.
But [the Red Cross (IFRC)] has instituted a new web-based
technology designed to cut through the confusion and paperwork of
a crisis. [It]
. Can track
donations of money and supplies in real time
[and] allows aid groups to make an
instant and accurate accounting for every dollar a donor
gives. The software couldn't come
at a better time. According to the World Disaster Report,
226 million people were hit by disasters in 2002. A study by
the IFRC shows that the software [can]
speed up the relief process by 20
to 30 percent." "Technology: Online relief," Newsweek International, September 15, 2003. [emphasis added.] STAFFING
is the third, and perhaps even more mysterious and secretive area which
requires regular status reporting, particularly with all the management
reforms and shuffles in contractual arrangements that Secretary-General
Annan has been introducing in the past few years. There are many relevant
human resource topics for status reporting, to be sorted out for attention
by priorities, and to be continually observed to ensure that entire
important areas or aspects (such as temporary staffing) are not being
disguised or buried. A partial laundry list, developed for
such UN status reporting by the JIU in a 1994 report, gives an idea: a.
"An overview of plans, strategy, and
progress; b.
Medium-term human resources planning, trends,
and changes; c.
The overall career development system; d.
Recruitment/appointment, placement and
promotion; e.
Performance evaluation; f.
The system of accountability and
responsibility; g.
Staff training and retraining; h.
Improvement of the status of women; i.
Geographic distribution; j.
High-level posts; k.
The General Service and related staff; l.
The management and utilization of posts; m.
Staff-management relations; n.
Conditions of service; o.
Work-family related issues; p.
The administration of justice system; q.
Interagency activities, including ICSC
efforts; r.
The strengthening of OHRM capacities; s.
Followup of human resources
audits/inspections." Joint Inspection Unit,
"Advancement of the status of women in the United Nations Secretariat in
an era of 'human resources management' and 'accountability': A new
beginning?",
UN document A/49/176, 1994,
Chapter V, "A proper human resources approach", paras. 84-153,
[119]. As noted in this archive's subsection on Is the UN another Enron? , a large
amount of "off the books-type" expenditures and activities, and weak and
incomplete financial reporting, are key factors which seem to
uncomfortably connect the UN with the scandal-ridden Enron
corporation.
Bethany McClean, "Why Enron went bust: Start with
arrogance. Add greed, deceit
", Fortune European
edition, "Post-Enron lessons", editorial, The Washington Post, Floyd Norris, "Bringing down the symbol of Enron:
Goal seen as not letting Lay escape", International
Herald Tribune, Kurt Eichenwald and Christine Hauser, "Former Enron
chief is charged: Lay turns himself in and is released on $500,000 bail",
International Herald Tribune, Simon Romero, "Once a hunter, company has become a
'carcass'",
International Herald Tribune,
In order to avoid Enron's fate, and to strengthen its
transparency and annual status reporting to all concerned, IO Watch
suggests that the proposed new General Assembly audit
subcommittee of the Fifth
Committee should devote particular attention to the contents and issues
raised by this new resource status report. Over time, it should refine and
sharpen the report's contents on finance, fund raising, and staffing, and
discuss them on a continuing basis with UN financial and human resources
officials to ensure that the UN is finally "on track" to clearly and
transparently respond to the new international "right to know." Thomas Blanton, "The world's right to know," Foreign Policy, July-August 2002, pp. 50-58 [lead-in, pp.
56-58]. [Note: the article contains an excellent resource
guide on sources and studies dealing with this issue] In May 2005 the Secretariat released a new management
reform document for "real action now" and immediate reform, "particularly
in the critical areas of management, oversight and accountability." In a section
on "Increasing Transparency", it stated that: "Access to
Information Currently, there is no established policy for
determining which UN documents should be accessible outside the
Secretariat.
While a large number of documents are currently accessible, the UN
needs a clear and consistent policy that increases transparency while
ensuring confidentiality where needed. The Office of Legal Affairs has carried
out an assessment of best practices in public administration around the
world.
The new Management Committee will review this work and provide
guidance on the best way forward. Status: A new policy will be formulated during the course
of the fall for discussion and action by Member States."
Policy guidance on
pro-bono contracts A working group led by the Office of Legal Affairs is
drafting a new policy on the provision of pro-bono goods and services
offered to the UN, building on a body of disparate existing practice and
precedent. Status: The policy guidance is due for completion by the
end of June. "UN management reforms 2005: Management reform
measures to strengthen accountability, ethical conduct and management
performance", Now that the "Bertini: U.N. finances improved but still
"delicate", UNforum, However, Secretariat transparency problems are not
merely those of "public dissemination" of information, or drafting a new
policy for "disparate existing practice" on "pro bono" goods and
services", as cited in the May 2005 reform proposals on "Increasing
Transparency" quoted above. In April 2005 the ACABQ issued a very lengthy
analytical report on the financing of peacekeeping operations. It noted
continuing concerns about a deteriorating financial situation and assessed
contributions still outstanding, and problems of lax financial controls,
although a new Funds Monitoring Tool to track key areas was useful and
should be expanded. It observed that ad hoc
management reviews are conducted, but that there was no overall plan for
such assessments, and no central point for collecting them (thus the ACABQ
could not assess their extent). Concerning the Secretary-General's reports on the
financing of peacekeeping, the report cited the difficulty that it had in
handling some 20 proposed budgets, revised estimates, and large commitment
authority in a short time and with no overview report provided. It also
stated inter alia that: "The level of peacekeeping requirements and the
complexity of the operations are greater than ever before, yet the
Committee has less time for the consideration of the proposals of the
Secretary-General
Further, the Advisory Committee is concerned about
the unevenness in the quality of presentation in the documentation
submitted
While the Committee recognizes the difficulties inherent in
assembling information
often under trying circumstances,
[it believes
that] the ultimate responsibility rests with Headquarters for maintaining
standards with regard to presentation, timeliness of submission, and
accuracy of figures and consistency in the definition and application of
policies. The Advisory Committee notes with concern a tendency
to use the budgets of the peacekeeping operations to introduce
initiatives with policy implications, rather than first seeking the
necessary policy guidance from the General Assembly.
The Committee strongly cautions against what appears
to be a less than transparent means for changing policy through the
budgets of the peacekeeping operations.
The Advisory Committee has [also] consistently
stressed the need to improve the measurability of indicators of
achievement and outputs as well as identify time frames for implementation
to facilitate monitoring and reporting." "Administrative and budgetary aspects of the
financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations: Report of the
Board of Auditors: Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions", document A/59/736 of In June 2005 the General Assembly adopted a
"record-setting" $3.2 billion peacekeeping budget in a 22-part resolution
seeking a "coherent and focused" approach to peacekeeping management. Among the
actions envisioned is: "an annual overview of peacekeeping financing, which
should include information on trends in the size, composition and funding
of missions, relevant developments, efforts to improve the missions'
functioning, and management priorities for the coming year." "General Assembly approves record UN peacekeeping
budget", UN News Service, "General Assembly adopts $3.2 billion 2005-2006
peacekeeping budget; Stresses need for stronger management during surge in
operations", UN Press Release, GA/10356 of A
concurrent report of the Secretary-General, however, indicated that the
General Assembly may have to wait several years for the Secretariat to
actually do anything on this very important and worthwhile proposal. In April
2005, he submitted a note on a request made by the General Assembly in
July 2003, which called on him to report on the feasibility of
consolidating the various peacekeeping operations accounts, with a
simulation of proposed options. But the Secretary-General and
peacekeeping staff stated that they are too busy "doing" things to
consider how to do them better, and he sent his regrets. The note
stated brusquely that: "2. The Secretary-General regrets that, owing to the
unprecedented surge in peacekeeping operations, the Secretariat has not
been in a position to dedicate the necessary resources to the preparation
of the report.
In addition, further analysis is required to consider the
efficiency aspects of streamlining the processes for the financing of
peacekeeping operations and at the same time permitting more consistent
and timely reimbursement to troop-contributing governments, in the context
of the Secretary-General's proposals on reform. 3. The Secretary-General intends to submit the report to the General
Assembly at its sixtieth session." "Feasibility of consolidating the accounts of the
various peacekeeping operations: Note by the Secretary-General", UN
document A/59/795 of [Note: The key word here is "intends". In the past,
this has often meant "much later still". And the 60th session of the General
Assembly, it should be noted, itself goes well beyond the normal fall
session and on to a resumed session into perhaps June of 2006, as shown by
several of the above documents.] The introductory quote of this
archive's subsection on Peacekeeping
contains an excellent policy statement of 1989 from
then-Secretary-General Javier Pιrιz
de Cuellar. In response to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to UN
peacekeepers, he noted that "careful thought" needed to be given to
adapting peacekeeping operations to the rapidly changing world situation,
and that UN peacekeeping operations and financing, where lives are at
stake, "must conform to the highest standards of military efficiency."
Sixteen years later, in 2005, the UN Secretariat is still struggling to
"get its act together" and meet these lofty but essential management
standards. There is thus a lot to be done on the Secretariat's
self-selected "Increasing Transparency" tasks, not merely for the public
but even more importantly for the General Assembly itself. The other
Secretariat priority -- drafting a new policy on the provision of pro-bono
goods and services offered to the UN, to build on "a body of disparate
existing practice and precedent", also raises some major transparency
questions. To cite only one example -- but a very big one --
such goods and services are definitely not trivial. In 2001 the
US GAO reported that from 1996-2001, the US Government contributed about
$3.45 billion directly to support UN peacekeeping. However, it
also made total indirect contributions of some $24.2 billion during that period that benefited
UN peacekeeping. Some $21.8 billion of military
operations helped provide a secure environment for the UN operations
overall. Further, the big, complex peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and
East Timor alone involved over $5 billion of estimated U.S. government
contributions, to help provide a secure environment and refugee food and
shelter, and to train police and court officials. "U.N. peacekeeping: Estimated | |||
