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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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In 1994 Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart called for drastic, substantive administrative justice reform in the UN, in sharp and refreshing contrast to all the endless talking and tinkering of the Secretariat over the past decades: "The
debilitating atmosphere and the rise of cronyism have sapped staff
confidence in justice within secretariats. Even peer appeal boards lack full
trust because no staff member seeking redress can feel confident any
longer that he or she may not be intimidated. This state of affairs has been
well known. … [There should be] a resort
system whereby staff can report malfeasance without fear, staff seeking
redress can have proper counsel, and all staff can have the requisite
measure of protection from imperious behavior by poorly-chosen
superiors. … The [50th UN]
anniversary sould be a fitting occasion for a solemn reaffirmation of
Article 100.2 by all governments in all prime organs of the system. 1995 should begin a new era of
respect by member-states for the integrity and independence of a civil
service upon which the future effectiveness of the organization in large
part depends." Erskine Childers, with Brian Urquhart, "Renewing
the United Nations System", Development Dialogue, 1994:1, Dag
Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1994, pp. 169-170. [emphasis
added.]
In that very same
year, the General Assembly called very specifically for new whistle-blower
protection and confidential staff reporting processes in the new OIOS. The
guidance was elaborated on in even more detail in a Secretary-General's Bulletin of 1994, which made it clear that
the new OIOS hotline mechanism and staff reporting processes were a very
serious matter.
"Review of the administrative and
financial functioning of the United Nations", General Assembly resolution
48/218 B of 29 July 1994, paras. 6-7.,
and "Establishment of the Office of
Internal Oversight Services", Secretary-General's Bulletin, ST/SGB/273 of
7 September 1994,
section D, "Investigation,."
para. 18.
Subsequently, however,
as discussed in detail in the preceding subsection on Disappearing
whistle-blowers , the
whistle-blower process (except for many reports of problems received by
OIOS) has largely disappeared from the UN. There were many indicators of
UN managerial distaste: -- IO Watch, which has
looked rather diligently, never was able to find mention of a UN
whistleblower, successful or not.
-- Although strong public support by
top leadership is central to implement any reform, apparently neither Mr.
Annan or Mr. Paschke or other top officials ever used the word
"whistle-blower or commended the process. --
In contrast, Mr. Paschke often emphasized his desire to work in
partnership with UN managers, and described at length in an OIOS annual
report a senior manager accused of serious and repeated improprieties: the
reporter of the allegations [actually an OIOS auditor] was fired for
mala fide behaviour, but the point of the story was the
demonstration that this manager (and others) could be totally exonerated
of any charges. -- OIOS dismissed many of the reports
made to it as mere "personnel matters" (a categorization decided on by the
Office itself) and then casually passed these sensitive matters on to the
Administration. -- IO Watch found only one mention,
in 1998, of a case of possible reprisal by a manager against
a staff member "reporting problems", an amazingly small number given some
2000 such reports made to OIOS in the midst of the prevailing UN
management climate of impunity. -- OIOS annual reports have
never provided detailed information and statistics on fraud cases, court
convictions, total resource recoveries from investigations, or
whistleblower cases and their outcomes, preferring instead to present a
few glamorous ad hoc cases investigated each
year. UN
staff are not stupid. An
early insider assessment in 1996 had observed wryly
that: "Halfway
through his term and answerable only to Member States, [Mr. Paschke] can
look forward to a comfortable couple of years … But United
Nations observers are beginning to ask what has been achieved in exchange
for … a free hand for Paschke. The answer is not encouraging.
… the original
conception of Paschke's post was a combination of Grand Inquisitor and
Super Sleuth. The final
product, insiders say, falls far short of either. … "The problem is that half the OIOS
staff do not know anything about the UN" we are told, "and the other half
know everything there is to know but are part of the establishment and
they are not going to make waves."
The results of OIOS's travails are paltry indeed …. There are whispers
that senior staff need not fear their peccadilloes will be exposed.
Paschke's Finest, it is said,
will rake no muck above a certain level of political or bureaucratic
influence."
"Diplomatic pouch", Diplomatic World
Bulletin, July29-August 6, 1996, p. 10.
Another
story on UN
"corruption-fighting" in 1997 observed that "UN employees -- who request anonymity because they fear they will
suffer more professional harm than the corrupt officials they want to
expose -- have provided numerous accounts of officials' being transferred
rather than dismissed after being caught breaking the
rules. This happens
frequently in cases of sexual harassment, nepotism, and occasionally
violence, according to these accounts. Whistle-blowers are neither
encouraged nor rewarded." Barbara Crossette, "In war on corruption and waste, UN confronts
well-entrenched foe", International Herald Tribune, 3 November
1997.
The great failing of
the UN's "lost whistle-blower decade" from 1994-2004 was that the very
specific General Assembly guidance about protecting them was unfortunately
absent from the official staff rules and "Code of Conduct" formulated and
issued in 1998 and updated in 2002. Instead of the
staff rights and the Secretary-General's responsibilities to ensure due
process safeguards and protect the rights of all involved in
investigations, the Code includes only an investigatory obligation. It
states bluntly that: "Staff members
must respond fully to requests for information from staff
members and other officials of the Organization authorized to
investigate possible misuses of fund, waste or abuse." "Status, basic rights, and duties
of United Nations staff members", ST/SGB/2002/13 of 1 November 2002, page
24, Regulation 1.2 (r). [emphasis added.] In the 2002 code
revision some specific language was added -- sort of. The excellent ICSAB guidance on
staff conduct in existence since 1954 and included as commentary to the
original 1998 code of conduct document, was erased by a new set of
"Standards of conduct" developed by the ICSC in 2001. IO Watch finds the
new version to be considerably weaker than its processor, as very notably
shown by its statement relating to whistle-blowing, buried as commentary
deep in the back of the 2002 UN code: "It must be the
duty of international civil servants to report any
breach of the organization's rules and regulations to
a higher level official, whose responsibility it is
to take appropriate action. An international civil
servant who makes such a report in good faith has the
right to be protected against reprisals or
sanctions." "Status, basic rights, and duties of United Nations staff members",
ST/SGB/2002/13 of 1 November 2002, page 36, para.
19. [emphasis
added.] [Note: this pious but extremely feeble statement,
and particularly the passive-voice phrasing of "who protects?", grossly
dilutes the very specific and firm whistle-blower protection called for by
the General Assembly and the Secretary-General in 1994, which is quoted in
detail later in this subsection.] Worldwide,
whistle-blowers and employees who report to confidential hotlines are
increasingly recognized to be one of the most important fraud-fighting
tools in organizations. Yet
an article on combating global corruption noted that anti-corruption
coalitions "on paper" will not be effective without enforcement in fact,
which requires: -- an independent and competent
judiciary; -- adequate prosecutorial
capabilities; and -- whistle blower protections.
Peter Richardson, "The global
assault on corruption", The Journal of Public Inquiry,
Fall/Winter 2001, p. 6.
[Note: in the UN, the second
element is apathetic, the first is totally missing, and the third is only
empty words .]
Another
knowledgeable assessment stressed that: As the international
community is increasingly recognizing, employees (especially public
employees) are an invaluable source of information about official
corruption. … Whistleblower
protection laws are intended to make it safe for employees to disclose
misconduct that they discover during the course of their
employment.
…. … the international community has
begun to devise and adopt a variety of laws and procedures for protecting
and encouraging whistle blowing. …. … statutory protection for
whistleblowers is only part of the equation, albeit an important
part. Cultural
change and top down support must accompany whistleblower protection laws
in order for them to achieve their
objectives." Elaine Kaplan, "The international emergence of legal protections for whistleblowers", The Journal of Public Inquiry, Fall/Winter 2001, pp., 37- 42 [37, 42]. [emphasis added.] Sadly,
however, and after a decade of OIOS investigative activity, IO Watch's
research has been able to find only one example of a successful
whistle-blower (even though she was fired.) She could at least sue, because
she had been employed by a UN contractor, not by the UN. "A British tribunal has ruled that
a former member of the UN police force in Bosnia was unfairly fired after
she reported to her superiors that colleagues in the police force used
women and children as sex slaves in connivance with Balkan traffickers.
… … the whistle blower, Kathryn
Bolkovac, an American citizen … charged that she was fired in 2000 for
sending e-mails to her employer, DynCorp, [charging links with] …
prostitution rings. … the UN Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina said the mission
was not commenting because it was not a party to the British legal
action. … Kofi Annan, the secretary-general
of the UN, has said that there would be zero tolerance for such
acts. Bolkovac said she was delighted
with the tribunal's findings because it would help her gain more
international exposure for the problem posed by corrupt
peacekeepers." Barry James, "Whistleblower upheld in UN Bosnia police case: Firing of former officer unfair, court rules," International Herald Tribune, August 8, 2002.
The new Secretariat
process of "manager/investigators", as discussed under the preceding
topic, only accentuated the poor UN investigations situation from the late
1990s onward. Managers, the people most likely and able to commit
large scale fraud, and certainly abuse, are not only exempted in the UN
from accountability but are now out on their own investigating subordinate
"troublemakers", while the staff, those most aware of fraud and abuse
situations, are silenced and punished (see the subsections on Behind the Scenes and Staff Self-defense .)
In mid-2004, however,
some very positive events occurred, which indicate that UN whistle-blowing
might finally come out in the open, and someday become a valuable
tool. First, three UN staff who
blew the whistle on corruption at the troubled UN war crimes tribunal in
Rwanda in 1997, and lost their jobs and had their careers interrupted if
not ruined, finally had their day in court at the UN Administrative
Tribunal in 2003. Each was
awarded from $130,000 to $240,000 (in best UN style, the actual awards
were still not paid out, and will be lowered, unless the applicants want
to appeal them all over again.)
The official who fired them was never punished before or after his
dismissal, a decision that Secretary-General Annan was forced to take in
1997. The three staff members, however, suffered greatly: "… Sirois was unemployed for four years as he
tried to clear his name. … Lacoste left Arusha shattered and
dismayed. She claimed in her
application that she had lost four years' income. [Goddard] … said his reputation as a chartered
accountant has been damaged … because of the unfair and untrue accusations
made against him. Ironically,
he says, the only place he could get a job was back at the United Nations,
in 2003. All three of these highly
qualified people who tried to right wrongs only to lose faith in the U.N.
justice system now praise the [UNAT] for its handling of their cases in
the end. But why did it have
to take so long and at such terrible human neglect all the way to the
top. And will they ever be
repaid for their losses?" Barbara Crossette, "The cost of U.N. whistle blowing", The Atlantic Online, the U.N. Wire , Copyright, National Journal Group, 1994, February 9, 2004. [Note: OIOS was doing detailed audits of the Rwanda tribunal at the time, but
apparently never intervened to protect these three whistleblowers as it is
obligated to do. In fact, there are more people -- perhaps many more
-- who have suffered similar fates since the UN whistle-blower guidelines
were first circulated in 1996.
In some cases they
received zero recompense from the UNAT.]
"A new
survey of … [UN integrity] has found that while structures
for reporting and combatting
corruption exist, most staff members are either unaware of how to
use them or afraid to do so for
fear of high-level
retaliation. The new study records
relatively high levels of worker satisfaction … but its most
negative findings have to do with ingrown leadership and the lack of
response to reports of corruption. 'Get rid of the old
boy network,' one staff member … [says.] 'That network is wide, tenacious
and powerful. … So long as you can wind your way into that
network, you are OK. … Opposing the network
is certainly the end of a UN career.'" Warren Hoge, "Report
criticizes the way UN fights corruption", International Herald
Tribune, June 16, 2004.
[emphasis added.] [Note: The actual survey
is "United Nations
organizational integrity survey", Final Report, prepared by Deloitte
Consulting LLP, June 2004. The survey can be found
at http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/index.shtml .]
" … the UN has [examined the] … Secretariat's perception of its own
integrity. … [The Integrity Survey politely explains there are concerns about
accountability] …
More directly ,,,, [the report notes (p. 11) that] 'Staff
members feel unprotected from reprisals for reporting violations of the
codes of conduct. This is not
a perception confined to a few staff in remote locales and/or dangerous
circumstances. Forty-six
percent (46%) gave unfavourable response to this item, whiles only 12%
gave favourable responses.' This is of course just one of the U.N.'s various investigations
into itself. Best-known this
season is the investigation into Oil-for-Food … Beyond that, there is an
entire division [the OIOS] … which produces in-house investigations … An
April 14 U. N. Staff Union resolution expresses concern 'over recent
events regarding an OIOS investigation into its own investigators
…' Someone needs to help this institution, and it is not a consulting
team … nor a batch of investigators operating under terms defined by the
U.N. … I'm working around to the belief that in the matter of reforming
the U.N., the only thing worse than having the U.N. ignore a problem is to
have the U.N. investigate it."
Claudia Rosett, "The problem
with the Secretariat", The Wall Street Journal, June 16,
2004.
[emphasis added]
Third,
the quite surprising findings of the integrity survey actually forced Mr.
Annan to use the "w" word in a covering letter to staff, which called
forth additional critical commentary: " … Staff [in the Integrity Survey] believe that not enough action
is taken to investigate and address instances of unethical behaviour, and
that those who expose such breaches may put themselves at risk of
reprisal. Staff also perceive
that the disciplinary process is applied unevenly, … that the outcome of
the process is generally not
known. … … [and] that breaches of integrity and ethical conduct are
insufficiently and inequitably addressed by the disciplinary system. At the same time, they voice
concern about the consequences of 'whistle-blowing' or reporting on
misconduct, and uncertainty about the mechanisms for such reporting.
… The [OIOS and Office
of Ombudsman channels] … need to be better known and made more accessible
to staff at large. We will
inform all staff about the means available to them for reporting on
suspected misconduct.
We will also develop measures to reinforce formal
protection for whistle-blowers, while ensuring that they are
not used to cloak false accusations." "Dear colleagues", letter
from Secretary-General Annan to UN staff on the findings of the Integrity
Survey, of 4 June 2004, pp. 2-3.
Having [found] … that Secretariat staff don't trust the top
management and are afraid to speak out for fear of reprisals, Mr. Annan's
response will be to convene a group of top managers and invite staff
members to speak out. … Does anyone see a problem here? The basic flaws are simple: Anytime you create a large institution,
accord it great privileges of secrecy, give it a big budget and have it
run immune from any sane standard of accountability, you are likely to get
a corrupt organization. … The problem with the Secretariat isn't 'tone' at the top. It's accountability at the top and
secrecy throughout. … [A real solution] … would probably require setting up a competing
international institution, based on openness and
accountability." Claudia Rosett, "The problem
with the Secretariat", The Wall Street Journal, June 16,
2004.
After a "lost decade"
of disappearing whistleblowers, however, other serious new tensions also
emerged in 2004, which revived concern with anti-corruption efforts and
suppressed whistleblowers. As indicated by the following quotes, there
were accusations of corruption within the OIOS itself. The UN Board of Auditors
emphasized the weak status of fraud prevention activities in Secretariat
departments and recommended strong corrective action, and UN staff
representatives criticisms and other scandals suggested an increasingly
clear absence of proper accountability processes and actions in the UN
Secretariat. "The United Nation's
anti-corruption department has been rocked by accusations that the office
itself is corrupt. The head of the [OIOS] … , Dileep
Nair, has been accused of promoting and recruiting people in ways that are
not consistent with U. N. rules and regulations. Also, a senior investigator has
been suspended … The scrutiny … comes at a delicate
time, as the UN is under intense scrutiny for alleged abuse of the Iraqi
oil-for-food program. … [Nair's office] has carried out
55 audits of the [oil-for-food] process. … … [The UN Staff Union urged
Secretary-General] Annan in April to … make an independent investigation
of OIOS. Annan recently wrote to Nair
asking him to answer the allegations … Nair, who is currently on sick
leave from his position, denied all the accusations to Fox
News. Asked if he would resign if any of
the charges are proven true, Nair said, "of course."
… Other allegations of impropriety
include charges that some inside the OIOS received financial kickbacks in
return for promoting people and that some people were promoted in exchange
for sexual favors. Nair, a
former banker and civil servant from Singapore, was picked by Annan in
2000."
Jonathan Hunt, Watching the UN's watchdog", Fox News, June 16, 2004.
"Fraud awareness, prevention
plan and policy … The United Nations has, to some
extent, an established framework on this issue. However, in terms of
implementation, it did not have a comprehensive internal anti-fraud and
anti-corruption infrastructure, and did not include anti-corruption
and anti-fraud elements in the various rules, procedures and internal
controls, which means that such internal risks may not be properly
addressed. … Owing to the lack of a
comprehensive internal fraud plan, a large number of United Nations
system offices, funds and programmes
have: (a) No sufficient
framework for prevention, detection, resolution, and
reporting; (b) No decentralized
corruption and fraud risk-assessment mechanisms and no
corruption and fraud-prevention committee; (c) No appropriate
resolution mechanisms for reported and detected incidents and allegations
of corruption and fraud (although reliance is placed on the [OIOS] in this
regard." "Financial reports and audited financial statements for the
biennium ended 31 December 2003 and Report of the Board of Auditors", Vol.
I, UN document A/59/5 of 22 July 2004, p. 12, item (u), paras.
15(f) and 344-346.
[emphasis added] "The Board [of Auditors] recommends that the Administration (i) implement a comprehensive and well-communicated corruption and fraud prevention plan in the United Nations system, (ii) establish a corruption and fraud prevention committee that would serve as an effective framework and coordination point for a United Nations system corruption and fraud prevention mechanism, (iii) conduct ethics, corruption and fraud-awareness training sessions and workshops among managers, international and local employees and other stakeholders, (iv) develop appropriate resolution mechanisms for reported and detected incidents and allegations of corruption and fraud, and (v) review the investigation processes at Offices away from Headquarters." "Financial reports and audited financial statements for the biennium ended 31 December 2003 and Report of the Board of Auditors", Vol. I, UN document A/59/5 of 22 July 2004, p. 12, item (u), paras. 15(f) and 349. [Note:
The Administration airily responded that "some of the Board's
comments may give the mistaken impression to the uninitiated reader that
the potential for large-scale fraudulent and corrupted activities is
widespread. The
Administration assigns high priority to the issues of fraud and corruption
…" [emphasis added] "First
report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Board of
Auditors … for the financial period ended 31 December 2003: Report of the
Secretary General", UN document A/59/318 of 1 September 2004,
paras. 124-126. "Rosemarie Waters, [the UN Staff
Union President], said that … in the last six years, [UN] … management had
been reforming itself and increasing managerial authority, while reducing
accountability. The Staff
Union [had great respect for the Secretary-General's vision and reform
programme goals.] … It could not support, however, the erosion of staff
rights and dissolution of oversight mechanisms as a means of
implementation, [or legitimize] … actions in which staff, through their
elected representatives, had no meaningful role to play.
… The [integrity survey] … revealed
that staff … feared reprisals for exposing breaches of ethics, and they
perceived that the disciplinary process was applied unevenly. Their view of integrity among
senior managers was less than positive.. The Organization had yet to
establish concrete measures for individual accountability, she
continued. It was essential
that areas with expanded delegation of authority for personnel decisions
should be carefully examined and, if abuses were found, such delegation
should be revoked. … The [OHRM] had informed staff representatives of its
inability to enforce accountability because they lacked central authority.
The Fifth Committee may wish to recommend that concrete individual
accountability be developed, in consultation with staff representatives,
on a priority basis." "UN staff committee representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in management reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of 29 October 2004, pp. 2-3. "The United Nations, which extols
the virtues of 'good governance', is not practising what it preaches, say
[many long-time observers.] … The complaints … come amidst
several recent scandals, including accusations of bribery, nepotism,
sexual harassment, and mismanagement of peacekeeping operations
overseas. 'The underlying problem is a lack
of transparency and accountability" says Hillel Neuer, [one close
observer.] .. … in 2003 the OIOS cleared the
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna of charges of corruption and
mismanagement. … Senior U.N. officials in New
York [have reportedly routinely abused] their first class or business
class airline privileges … [Neuer said] 'if some of the
things that happen at the United Nations took place in a big corporation,
people would have been fired.' [A UN shortcoming, Neuer added, is
that the investigation results emerge very slowly] … are mostly
'white-washed' … [and occur] only after 'a lot of prodding from the media
and NGOs.' [A reporter asked spokesman Fred Eckhard if there is] 'a record
that shows that the United Nations, under Kofi Annan, has taken
allegations of mismanagement and misbehaviour seriously and fired people
as a result?' [Eckhard replied] … 'I will certainly ask for you
…" Thalif Deen, "Corruption:
U.N. failing to practice 'good governance', IPS Inter Press Service,
December 9, 2004. [emphasis
added.] [Note: No such record seems to exist, but
it definitely should, for Director-level senior officials and above, as a
clear measure to confirm that the UN indeed takes accountability
seriously.]
What
some now call the UN's "annus horribilus" also ended as it began, with
further sharp accusations about suppression of whistleblowers at the
UN. "Two lawyers for U.N.
whistle-blowers urged the United Nations on Wednesday to protect staffers
who want to disclose corruption at the world body, including the
oil-for-food program for Iraq. One of the lawyers said 'five or
six' U.N. employees including a high-level employee had contacted him for
advice on how to reveal evidence of wrongdoing in [that] … programme
without jeopardizing their careers. … Andre Sirois -- himself a U.N.
staff member and former whistle-blower --- said
… 'In one case it was something big,
that definitely would make the front page …' But based on his advice, none of
[them] … have gone public, he said.
'I know them. They won't.
They are very quiet and under a lot of stress.'
… While U.N. rules call for
wrongdoers to be punished, they do nothing to shield staff members from
reprisals when they come forward with evidence, [Tom] Devine and Sirois
said. 'There is irreparable harm when
freedom of speech is canceled, irreparable harm to the institution,'
Devine said. 'The message is,
'Do not say anything to investigators.' '… An independent U.N. inquiry led by
[Paul Volcker is investigating] … whether any U.N. employees received
bribes or allowed kickbacks."
Irwin Arief, "Lawyers call on U.N. to shield whistle-blowers", Reuters, December 15, 2004. Without
doubt the best way that the Secretary-General could now act to "reinforce
formal protection for whistle-blowers" and "lead by example" in the
bargain, would be to act decisively.
He should acknowledge his and his staff's grave mistake in ignoring the Assembly's
1994 guidance on whistle-blower protection; apologizing publicly to those
UN staff who foolishly believed that the General Assembly's and
Secretary-General's own guidance (SGB/273, see below) would be honored,
and suffered accordingly; and ensure that it is fully incorporated into
the UN staff rules and the Code of Conduct at the very first
opportunity.
FOR
EASY REFERENCE, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S EXPRESS GUIDANCE OF 1994 IN
ESTABLISHING THE OIOS WAS THE FOLLOWING: "6. Requests the
Secretary-General to ensure that the [OIOS] has procedures
in place that provide for direct confidential access of staff
members to the Office and for protection against repercussions, for
the purposes of suggesting improvements for programme delivery and
reporting perceived cases of
misconduct; 7. Also requests the Secretary
General to ensure that procedures are in place that protect individual rights, the anonymity
of staff members, due process for all parties
concerned and fairness during any
investigations, that falsely accused staff members are
fully cleared and that disciplinary and/or jurisdictional proceedings are
initiated without undue delay in cases where the Secretary-General
considers
it justified: such
procedures shall include any necessary
amendments
to the Staff Regulations and Rules of the United
Nations
…;" "Review of the administrative and financial
functioning of the United Nations", General Assembly resolution 48/218 B
of 29 July 1994, paras.
6-7. The Secretary-General's own Bulletin of 1994
detailed the new OIOS hotline processes even further, and identified
protections nd procedures as a very serious matter. "18. The Office may receive and investigate
reports from staff and other persons … suggesting improvements … and reporting perceived
cases of possible violations of rules or regulations, mismanagement,
misconduct, waste of resources or abuse of authority. … staff members and others
can make directly to the Office suggestions and reports which shall be received and handled in
complete confidence. Further procedures … and related arrangements
are designed to protect individual rights, the anonymity of staff and
others, due process for all parties concerned and fairness during any
investigation, as well as to protect against
reprisals. (a)
Investigations shall respect the individual rights of staff members and be
conducted with strict
regard for fairness and due process for all concerned …" (b) The
[USG of OIOS] shall designate the officials authorized to receive such
suggestions and reports … [who] shall be responsible for safeguarding
… [them]. Unauthorized
disclosure …
shall constitute misconduct … … (e) The transmittal
of suggestions or reports to the Office with knowledge of their falsity or
with willful disregard of their truth or falsity shall constitute
misconduct, for which disciplinary measures may be imposed. (f) No action shall be taken
against staff or others as a reprisal or making a report or disclosing
information to, or otherwise cooperating with, the Office. Disciplinary
proceedings shall be initiated and disciplinary action shall be taken in respect of any
staff member who is proven to have retaliated against a staff member
or other person who has submitted suggestions or reports to the
Office or otherwise cooperated with the Office." "Establishment of
the Office of Internal Oversight Services", Secretary-General's Bulletin,
ST/SGB/273 of 7 September 1994, section D,
"Investigation,." para. 18.
[emphasis added] Finally, the UN Staff Regulations since January 1999
are quite clear on this point as well. The relevant regulation and its
commentary, which Mr. Annan and his legal office have simply ignored,
state that: "Regulation 1.1
(c)
The
Secretary-General shall ensure that the rights and duties of staff members
as set out in the Charter and the Staff Regulations and Rules and
in the relevant
resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly are
respected. Commentary 1. Staff
regulation 1.1 (c) is new. 2. The regulation codifies an implicit duty that falls on
the Secretary-General, that is, to ensure that the rights and duties of
staff members are respected." "Status, basic rights and
duties of United Nations staff members", ST/SGB/2002/13 of 1 November
2002. [emphasis added.] Further, UN Staff regulation 101.2 and (a) state
that "Staff Rule
101.2 Basic rights and
obligations of staff. General Rule 101.2 (a) Disciplinary
procedures … may be instituted against a staff member
who fails to comply with his or her obligations and the standards of
conduct set out in the Charter … the Staff [and Financial] Regulations and
Rules, and all administrative issuances." "Status, basic rights and
duties of United Nations staff members", ST/SGB/2002/13 of 1 November
2002, p. 23.
[emphasis added] This provision of course only says "may", but its
commentary asserts confidently that: "Staff Rule 101.2
is new. It will ensure that that staff are held
accountable through disciplinary procedures for failure to comply with
their obligations and the standards of conduct …" "Status, basic rights and
duties of United Nations staff members", ST/SGB/2002/13 of 1 November
2002, p. 24.
[emphasis added] To underscore all the above responsibilities, the
General Assembly, while "regretting the limited time it had at its
disposal to consider this matter", endorsed the revised regulations and
rules, and code, but added a very important emphasis on management
responsibility in the code and its standards, when it : " … emphasizes that managers, as staff members, are bound
by the duties and obligations set out in … [the newly-stated
staff regulations and rules] … and that their higher-level
functions and responsibilities entail increased accountability for the
proper performance of all their duties in managing the human
and financial resources entrusted to them. Requests the
Secretary-General to emphasize in the commentary …that the higher level of
responsibilities associated with managerial functions entails a
commensurate increase in the accountability of managers." "Revisions to
article I of the Staff Regulations and chapter 1 of the 100 series of the
Staff Rules of the United Nations", General Assembly resolution 52/252 of
8 September 1998, prologue and paras. 6-7, included in the "Status, basic rights and
duties of United Nations staff members", ST/SGB/2002/13 of 1 November
2002, pp. 5-8.
[emphasis added] Will Secretary-General Annan and his top legal aides
who omitted the important and specific staff rights and protections for
confidential reporting of 1994 from the staff Code of Conduct and Staff
Regulations and Rules accept "increased accountability" for proper
performance of their managerial duties, and be disciplined and held
accountable as the commentary "ensures"? IO Watch concludes: of course not. The
all-important "may" weasel word of rule 101.2 (a) would immediately be
brought into play. Then, however, the validity and impact of these new
rules and codes and "highest standards" of the international civil service
are brought into question at their very core. IO Watch has devoted considerable space in this
archive to whistle-blowers, in its subsections on Investigations: Is the OIOS a fig
leaf? , Disappearing
whistle-blowers, and in this subsection
on Suppressed
whistle-blowers . This is because what might seem a minor
process is really a fundamental litmus test of the UN Secretariat's
commitment to accountability, transparency, and the exercise of integrity,
which it resoundingly fails. The entire story, reduced to a brief
chronology, goes as follows. -- Beginning in the late 1980s, the General Assembly
urged new Secretariat actions to fight fraud, including mechanisms for
staff whistle-blower reporting and their protection. -- The Secretariat responded, in 1992, that the
existing rules were quite adequate for fraud fighting and warned [with
awesome prescience!] that protecting staff whistle-blowers had proven
difficult in practice. -- As part of the 1993 management accountability and
1994 OIOS resolutions, the General Assembly nonetheless called, in very
explicit terms, for the Secretary-General to establish such mechanisms and
protections. -- Mr. Paschke, after initial contempt for
whistle-blowers, was eventually impelled to acknowledge the required
process.
But IO Watch can find in OIOS reports of its first decade only one
prominent example of a UN manager accused but vindicated by OIOS [the
whistleblower was dismissed], one mention of a manager who was accused of
possible retaliation, and zero mentions (or encouragements) to UN staff
whistle-blowers. -- During the 1994-2003 period, IO Watch could also
find no instances of Mr. Annan or any other senior official ever
mentioning the whistle-blower process, even while making pronouncements
about the UN Convention against Corruption. Only the General Assembly pressed Mr.
Paschke on questions of retaliation against whistle-blowers. -- In 1998, in the UN Code of Conduct on staff rights
and obligations, the Secretariat included staff obligations to cooperate
with investigations by OIOS and managers, but omitted any mention of the
specific rights to protect whistle-blowers. -- The Code also made it an explicit duty of the
Secretary-General to ensure that staff rights are protected, including
those set out in relevant General Assembly resolutions, as were the
whistle-blower provisions. -- In 2000, as detailed in this archive's subsection
on OIOS, Mr. Nair and OIOS reported a "flood of fraud cases" in the UN
just before Mr. Annan's Millennium Assembly celebrations in New York --
not coincidentally, in all subsequent OIOS annual reports any discussion
of overall OIOS investigations progress and results was suppressed, with
only a few ad hoc "gotcha" stories of
individual investigations. -- In a revision of the code of conduct in 2002 the
Secretariat finally added, but only as commentary buried at the back of
the document, new cryptic "weasel word" guidance on the duty of staff to
report code violations to "a" higher official for "appropriate action",
with a "right" to be protected against reprisals or sanctions. -- Only in late 2003 did UN whistleblowers emerge in
public, after three of them won large damage awards in the UN internal
justice process. -- Following the integrity survey revelations in June
2004 that staff had serious concerns about reporting violations of the
code of conduct and reprisals therefore, Secretary-General Annan finally
uttered the "whistle-blower" word and promised to "develop measures to
reinforce formal protection for whistle-blowers." -- However, in December 2004 the continued UN suppression of whistle-blowers was highlighted once again, in conjunction with the oil-for-food scandal inquiries underway. The whistle-blower process has thus gone full circle,
with Mr. Annan now promising do something that he, as
Secretary-General, had been obligated to do, and has
failed to do, ever since 1997. "In direct response
to the concerns about fairness and integrity raised in last year's
Integrity Survey among UN staff and to prevent the reoccurrence of such
damaging incidents as the exploitation reported in certain peacekeeping
missions, misconduct of senior officials and harassment in the workplace,
the UN is implementing concrete steps. Whistleblower protection The results of the
Integrity Survey indicated that staff had little confidence in the
Organization's ability to provide sufficient protection for
whistleblowers.
A review of best practice was conducted, using the expertise of a
consultant recommended by Transparency International. The
Secretary-General has now issued a robust new whistleblower policy and is
seeking the views of staff before formally promulgating it. The policy is
designed to provide staff a viable mechanism so that they feel free to
come forward with their concerns with the confidence that they will be
protected against retribution. The release of the draft policy was
accomplished by a circular outlining to staff all existing avenues for the
reporting of alleged misconduct. Status: Staff consultations are already underway and the new policy will be promulgated as soon as this process is completed." "UN management reforms 2005:
Management reform measures to strengthen accountability, ethical conduct
and management performance", May 17,
2005,
p. 4, available at www.un.org/reform/reform_update.html. As of July, the only whistle-blower details made
public, as best IO Watch can determine, are the following: "The United Nations
is considering creating a high-level ethics office to encourage workers to
come forward with allegations of misconduct or mismanagement against their
superiors, UN officials said … The idea is part of
a plan to strengthen protections for employees who report misconduct,
after a survey found that UN staffers believed that little was being done
to root out unethical behaviour and that workers who exposed wrongdoing
risked reprisals."
"Officials weigh creating high-level ethics office", Reuters, in the IO Watch considers the above Secretariat
consultations and proposals to be extremely cynical. The new "robust"
framework for whistle-blowing was created by senior Secretariat officials
(helped by a consultant) who have been suppressing whistle-blowers for the
past decade.
Learning that staff mistrust the leadership's commitment to
corruption-fighting and believe that any reporting risks reprisals, the
Secretariat further blithely proposes even more senior officials for them
to report to and a senior official review body to ensure that all is
well.
These multiple high-level officers and groups not only create some
plush new jobs, but also blur responsibility for firm action, which
clearly should rest with the very specific OIOS mechanism which the
General Assembly established in 1994. And the possible whistle-blower
award should go to the next successful whistle-blower, because he or she,
it seems clear, would be the first. And, once again, the Secretariat indicates that -- as
already discussed in the area of Anti-harassment efforts -- it will
settle for a strong policy that is not implemented. Equally,
Secretariat reporting might also disclose that there are few "cases".
However, this outcome would quite probably not confirm that "all is well",
but that UN staff will not jeopardize their careers by trusting this
defective "old-boy" protection system. As an IO Watch participant was once
told by a senior UN oversight veteran, "It's great if you can report
misconduct and corruption, but who is going to be listening on the other
end of the phone line?" As a much-needed "reality check," IO Watch wishes
therefore to conclude with: (1) the following brief quote excerpts as reminders
of the importance of the whistle-blower topic and the UN Secretariat's
long-standing evasion of it; (2) some good and directly-relevant practices which
exist elsewhere; (3) the heightened irony of weak whistle-blower
activity in the midst of the (4) a final expert quote written a decade
ago for the UN's 50th anniversary celebrations but, regrettably, still
fully applicable as the 60th anniversary celebrations begin in the autumn
of 2005. First, the brief excerpts: "An open-ended
question … in the [UN Organizational Integrity Survey] questionnaire …
[required an answer] … in the respondents' own words. The item
asked: 'What suggestions would you like to offer to improve integrity
within the UN?' … Four themes are
apparent from reviewing the comments. (1) Improve the
management system to enhance integrity … (2) Supervisors and
managers should be more closely supervised by senior management … (3) Management
accountability should be better developed …[with rewards and punishments
for managers] … (4) Senior leaders'
personal commitment to integrity and ethical conduct should be more
clearly stated and monitored for compliance … Negative comments
to the open-end question reveal a clear majority. As one
analyst has observed "Even though the open-end question is positive and
proactive, the majority of the answers are rather
negative. Some respondents go beyond light
criticisms and take an aggressive, bitter [tone].'" "Staff
members feel unprotected from reprisals for reporting violations of
the codes of conduct. This is not a perception confined to a
few staff in remote locales and/or dangerous circumstances. Forty-six percent (46%) gave unfavourable response to
this item, while only 12% gave favourable responses. The causes of
ths perception have at least two sources: experience and/or mistrust. The basis for
these perceptions has got to be determined and remediation must be
made. … Overcoming mistrust is more difficult than
remediating incidences, but a combination of policy
review and training and development efforts will help. Training …
would include examples of how such matters are handled … and examples of
actions taken against those who would violate the whistleblower
policy. Both quotes above are from the
"United Nations organizational integrity survey", Final Report, prepared
by Deloitte Consulting LLP, June 2004, the
first on page 10, the second on page 11. [Note: Based on IO Watch's
extensive review of available documentation, overcoming UN staff mistrust
will indeed be very difficult in training, because the "handling of such
matters" is (a) to ignore them or (b) send a brief letter after a year or
two saying a management investigation "revealed no problem", and because
"examples of actions taken" against retaliating managers seem to be
zero.] "Having [found] …
that Secretariat staff don't trust the top management and are afraid to
speak out for fear of reprisals, Mr. Annan's response will be to convene a
group of top managers and invite staff members to speak out. … Does anyone see a
problem here? The basic flaws are
simple: Anytime you create a large institution, accord it great privileges
of secrecy, give it a big budget and have it run immune from any sane
standard of accountability, you are likely to get a corrupt organization.
… The problem with the Secretariat isn't 'tone' at the
top.
It's accountability at the top and secrecy
throughout.
…" Both quotes are from
Claudia Rosett, "The problem with the Secretariat", The Wall Street Journal, As the international community is increasingly
recognizing, employees (especially public employees) are an invaluable
source of information about official corruption. …
Whistleblower protection laws are intended to make it safe for employees
to disclose misconduct that they discover during the course of their
employment. …. … statutory protection for whistleblowers is only
part of the equation, albeit an important part. Cultural change and top down support must accompany
whistleblower protection laws in order for them to achieve their
objectives." Elaine Kaplan, "The international emergence of legal
protections for whistleblowers", The Journal of
Public Inquiry, Fall/Winter 2001, pp., 37-
42 [37,
42].
[emphasis added.]
"Even when … systemic requirements [for fighting
corruption] are well satisfied on paper, they will not be effective unless
enforced.
Fully effective enforcement requires: ?
an independent and competent
judiciary ?
adequate prosecutorial capabilities ?
whistle blower protections ?
Periodic asset declarations by senior public
officials and [oversight] organizations] ?
Empowerment of private enforcers by giving them the
right to recover damages and have government actions invalidated ?
Protections for the media to enable them to keep up
the pressure for reform." Richardson, Peter, "The global assault on
corruption", The Journal of Public Inquiry, Fall/Winter 2001, p. 6.
"The United Nations, which extols the virtues of
'good governance', is not practising what it preaches, say [many long-time
observers.] … The complaints … come amidst several recent scandals,
including accusations of bribery, nepotism, sexual harassment, and
mismanagement of peacekeeping operations overseas. 'The underlying problem is a lack of transparency and
accountability" says Hillel Neuer, [one close observer.] . .. … the investigation results emerge very slowly] … are
mostly 'white-washed' … [and occur] only after 'a lot of prodding from the
media and NGOs.' [A reporter asked spokesman Fred Eckhard if there is]
'a record that shows that the United Nations, under Kofi Annan, has taken
allegations of mismanagement and misbehaviour seriously and fired people
as a result?' [Eckhard replied] … 'I will certainly ask for you
…" Thalif Deen, "Corruption: U.N. failing to practice
'good governance', IPS Inter Press Service,
"James O. C. Jonah, … [who worked at the UN for three
decades] … and served as head of personnel from 1979 through 1982, …
[observed that] The [Fifth] Committee should … have a serious look at
the results of the integrity study. Never had the staff perception of
integrity been so low. … In some respects, the reforms had
weakened the Secretariat considerably. When he served as head of
personnel, his biggest fight had been with programme managers, who were
most resistant to reform …. Without a strong personnel office, however,
there would be no uniformity of rules and fairness in the system. Governments should not take what was happening
lightly." "UN staff committee representatives tell budget
committee concerns ignored in management reform report", Fifth Committee,
Press Release GA/AB/3641 of Second, the UN could learn much about a serious
whistle-blower process and its effective use by adopting good practices
used elsewhere, including clear and simple reporting on these topics which
the World Bank was already providing in 1997,
and the ready availability of a professional, very-experienced, and
independent hotline which the UN could itself contract for, instead of
using the multiple "old-boy" and weak OIOS mechanisms as at present:
"World Bank
Complaints Misconduct cases investigated by the World Bank's Office of Professional ethics in 1997 TYPE OF CASE
NUMBER Tax related 57
Misuse of facilities or property
54 Harassment - nonsexual
36 Benefits related
30 Abuse or negligence of authority or position
22 Fraud
21 Harassment - sexual
8 Criminal charges
3 Other misconduct *
77 TOTAL
308
* Other misconduct includes defaults on loans, favoritism in hiring, conflict of interest,
abusive behaviour toward security, plagiarism, bribe solicitation, and overtime discrepancies"
Glenn R. Simpson, "World Bank, under attack, concedes staff problems," The official hotline of the Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners (ACFE) provides a highly-professional hotline
service.
It has many client organizations from both business and
government, works in 150 languages (144 more than the UN, which could
certainly facilitate reporting from troubled UN field operations), and has
more than 20 years of experience. Although the UN is "above the laws" that
govern the rest of the world, if it is really serious about
whistle-blowing tools to help stop its recent accountability and
mismanagement crises, it could adopt this turn-key service. Full details
on the ACFE services and resources are available at www.ethicsline.com.
Third, it is scandalous that the UN takes such weak
action to strengthen whistle-blowing now, in the midst of all the
revelations about corruption and mismanagement in the
"Two lawyers for U.N.
whistle-blowers urged the United Nations on Wednesday to protect staffers who want to disclose corruption
at the world body, including the oil-for-food program for
One of the lawyers
said 'five or six' U.N.
employees including a high-level employee had contacted him for advice on
how to reveal evidence of wrongdoing in [that] … programme without
jeopardizing their careers. … Andre Sirois --
himself a U.N. staff member and former whistle-blower --- said … 'In one case it was
something big, that definitely would make the front page …' But based on his advice,
none of [them] … have gone public, he said. 'I know them.
They won't. They are very quiet and under a lot of
stress.' … While U.N. rules
call for wrongdoers to be punished, they do nothing to shield staff
members from reprisals when they come forward with evidence, [Tom] Devine
and Sirois said. Irwin Arief, "Lawyers call on
U.N. to shield whistle-blowers", Reuters,
IO Watch believes that something must be done
quickly, finally, and forcefully to fully establish and use the
whistle-blowing mechanisms that the General Assembly called for in
1994. Furthermore, Mr. Annan should be held directly
accountable (and sanctioned) for his failure as the UN chief
administrative officer: to ensure the proper use of Member State funds by
protecting whistle-blowers from retaliation; add the 1994 whistle-blower
provisions to the UN staff rules; and establish a proper fraud strategy
during the past decade. Timely action could doubtless have
prevented much of the waste of large amounts of funds in the UN
administered Iraq oil-for-food programme, and in many other areas of UN
management crisis, past, present, and future. As Mr. Annan's predecessor stated firmly in 1992 (in
a report trying to assure the General Assembly that Secretariat
fraud-fighting efforts were firmly under control): "The
Secretary-General attaches great importance to his fiduciary
responsibility vis-à-vis Member States for the prudent management of
resources entrusted to the Organization. Care is taken to
ensure that these resources are utilized for the purposes for which they
were provided, that they are spent with all due regard for economy and
that there is accountability at all stages for their
use." "Measures to facilitate
reporting by staff members of inappropriate uses of the resources of the
organization: …. : Report of the Secretary-General", UN document
A/47/510 of
The final observation on failed UN whistle-blowing is
to repeat the eloquent initial quote of this subsection, from prestigious
UN ex-senior officials (and subsequently expert observers) Erskine
Childers and Brian Urquhart, which they made in 1994 before the UN 50th
anniversary celebrations. "The
debilitating atmosphere and the rise of cronyism have sapped staff
confidence in justice within secretariats. Even peer
appeal boards lack full trust because no staff member seeking redress can
feel confident any longer that he or she may not be intimidated. This state of
affairs has been well known. … [There should
be] a proper resort system whereby staff can report malfeasance without
fear, staff seeking redress can have proper counsel, and all staff can
have the requisite measure of protection from imperious behavior by
poorly-chosen superiors.
… The [50th UN]
anniversary should be a fitting occasion for a solemn reaffirmation of
Article 100.2 by all governments in all prime organs of the system. 1995 should
begin a new era of respect by member-states for the integrity and
independence of a civil service upon which the future effectiveness of the
organization in large part depends." Erskine Childers,
with Brian Urquhart, "Renewing the United Nations System", Development Dialogue, 1994:1, Dag Hammarskjold
Foundation, Unfortunately, Childers and Urquhart's very important
prescription remains fully-applicable but still ignored as the UN 60th
anniversary arrives. IO Watch offers some feasible ways to decisively
correct this sad situation through an External experts oversight
review based on, but updating, the
above proposal, in the section on the rule of law. Important
related reform actions are also found in the subsection on Answers: A Starting Point which
discuss A real UN fraud prevention
programme and General Assembly audit
subcommittee. |
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