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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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Effective global
governance is a critically important topic and priority effort, if mankind
is to master the complexities of the 21st century. Although it is a
relatively new concept, it is already a vast and complex one, as
illustrated by the many useful sources already cited at the end of this
subsection. IO Watch's
objective here is simply to try to get a better fix on what meaningful
role the UN can -- and cannot -- play within the turbulent constellation
of global governance forces. The UN's most loyal
and enthusiastic boosters see it at the top of the pyramid, as a -- or
even the -- pivotal element.
In October 2000, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded in equal
portions to the United Nations and to its Secretary-General Kofi
Annan. The Peace Prize
citation of the Norwegian Nobel Committee stated in part
that: "The UN has in its
history achieved many successes, and suffered many failures. Through this first Peace Prize to
the U.N. as such, the Norwegian Nobel Committee wishes in its centenary
year to proclaim that the only negotiable road to global peace and
cooperation goes by way of the United Nations." "Text
from Nobel Peace Prize Citation," Associated Press, Friday, October 12,
2001.
However, in September
2003 Secretary-General Annan himself confirmed the urgent need for drastic
changes in the UN's role and performance, in introducing his annual report
to the General Assembly. (In effect, he repeated the words of his various
predecessors over the past five decades, and established yet another
distinguished panel to ponder the perpetual UN performance problems and
propose solutions.) "Secretary-General
Kofi Annan said Monday that the United Nations must consider sweeping
reforms in the wake of the Iraq war and warned that the organization
had lost the confidence of
many across the globe. In unusually strong
language
. Annan suggested that the credibility of the Security Council,
the General Assembly and other UN bodies was at
stake. 'If they are to
regain their authority, they may need radical reform,' Annan said before
making public his report on the organization's future."
"UN needs big changes, Annan says", AP, AFP, International Herald Tribune, September 9, 3003. Similarly, a newspaper
editorial concluded at the same time that: "President George
W. Bush's turn to the United Nations for help in Iraq was a welcome, if
belated, recognition that global policing can acquire legitimacy only
through multinational endorsement.
But the record of the major political bodies of the UN
. has
little to show that this is the place to find that sort of legitimacy in
the 21st century. The [General]
Assembly is usually mired in speechmaking. The [Security[ Council is
increasingly perceived as a relic of the cold war. These are not just the sentiments
of neo-conservatives in Washington; they were voiced most recently by Kofi
Annan, the secretary general of the United Nations. In an unusually candid report
issued on Sept. 8, Annan challenged the UN to make radical reforms.
. The real task is to
open a serious debate on what a multilateral institution should be today,
and what rules and instruments it should have. As the world's leaders arrive for
the General Assembly this week, they would do well to present some
concrete ideas on what the United Nations should be."
"Restructuring the UN", International Herald Tribune,
September 22, 2003.
The material in this
entire archive indeed flashes a giant caution sign about hopes for UN
leadership of global governance.
The UN is afflicted with multiple performance problems, weak
accountability and oversight, self-exemption from the rule of law, and --
above all in this context -- 190-some Member States who "govern" it in an
extremely disorderly and snail-like fashion. In this condition, the UN is not
ready, and never can be, to lead the world. Within "global
governance," there are many participants, significant and dynamic
networks, a constantly changing panorama of issues, and multiple
interactions. The UN is only
one of many participants, and it is definitely not the most effective or
powerful (nor is it arguably even the most representative or democratic
one.) IO Watch offers here
several fundamental observations and cautions from this archive indicating
the importance and complexities of present-day global networks, and a
representative overview of the UN's often-limited role. The other
subsections which follow explore the UN's past and continuing limitations,
and what must be done if the Organization is to become a more competent
and reliable participant in global governance. FIRST, the basic dimensions
of global (or any) governance
reach far back in human history. The following quotes make it clear
that all leaders of such efforts must be regarded with a healthy
skepticism by vigilant media, civil society, and global
citizens. "In those days the
world teemed, the people multiplied, the world bellowed like a wild bull,
and the great god was aroused by the clamor. Enlil heard the clamour and he
said to the gods in council, 'The uproar of mankind is intolerable and
sleep is no longer possible by reason of the babel.' So the gods agreed to exterminate
mankind." --The Epic of Gilgamesh, the earliest version of the Great Flood myth,, an introductory quote Garrett Keizer, "Sound and fury: The politics of noise in a loud society", Harper's Magazine, March 2001.
"Some ordinary
villages are peaceful and well policed. The global village is of another
kind. It has feuds and
vendettas which often break into violence. All the inhabitants are
armed. The part-time police
force is amateurish and weak.
It is run by a committee of villagers who rarely agree on what it
should do. Powerful neighbors sometimes suppress violence by force. Peace will only come to such a
village when the rule of law is imposed." Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century, Chapter 18, "The political containment of tribalism: Policing the global village:", Yale, New Haven, CT, 1999, p. 140. "Considerations of
conflict resolution, decision making, economics, and space [require] large
societies to be centralized.
But centralization of power inevitably opens the door -- for those who hold the power, are
privy to information, make the decisions, and redistribute the goods -- to exploit the resulting
opportunities to reward themselves and their relatives. To anyone familiar with any modern
grouping of people, that's obvious.
As earlier societies developed, those acquiring centralized power
gradually established themselves as an elite .
Those are the
reasons why large societies cannot function with band organization and
instead are complex kleptocracies." Jared Diamond,
Guns, germs, and steel: The fates of human societies, Chapter 14,
"From egalitarianism to plutocracy: The evolution of government and
religion", Norton, New York, 1999 and 2003, p. 288. [Winner of the Pulitzer Prize,
1998]
"To try to do something which is inherently impossible is always a corrupting
enterprise." [a quote from philosopher
Michael Oakshott in] George F. Will,
"Daniel Patrick Moynihan: An exemplary public life",
International Herald Tribune, September 19, 2000.
"In
this imperfect world, corruption is bound to be happening somewhere; no
country is exempt.
What are the major current
concerns about corruption?
First
is
business bribery, which is rampant throughout the world and endemic in all
transactions, public and private. Second,
and related
, is
the large amounts of money being laundered worldwide
Third,
related to dirty money, is organized transnational crime, particularly the
operation of crime syndicates and drug cartels, which cross borders at
will
Fourth
is the growing influence of money in political life
to
secure [votes]
and
obtain favored treatment through bribes and other personal rewards;
manipulate mass media
; [by] asset-stripping
to
obtain public resources [cheaply]
; and
tax avoidance and evasion.
what is new is the sophistication
and ingenious devices employed to prevent common knowledge of political
corruption, the spin placed on illegal political contributions when
exposed, and the condescension in official circles toward the public -- as
if everybody does it
Fifth
is yet another traditional form of corruption, kleptocracy, where public
resources are viewed as private spoils, state largesse is seen as a
personal gravy train, and
[p]ublic office is a means of self-enrichment with no holds barred.
Sixth
is the embarrassing situation of the non-governmental organizations,
Some
NGOs are
beyond the reach of public
accountability mechanisms.
While some are indeed noble and heroic, others have become fronts
for organized crime or merely self-aggrandizing, rewarding themselves
handsomely for outcomes hardly worth the
bother." Gerald E. Caiden, Chapter
17, "Corruption and democracy", in Gerald E. Caiden, O. P. Dwivedi, Joseph
Jabbra, eds., Where Corruption Lives, Kumarian, Bloomfield, Conn., USA,
2001, pp. 227-243, [232-235].
"The great majority
of mankind are satisfied with appearances, as though they were realities
They are often more influenced by things that seem than by things that
are." Niccolo Machiavelli
"
. I learned as
an adult what I had learned as a child, which is that the world is a
dangerous place -- and learned also that not everyone
knows this." Daniel Patrick Moynihan with Susanne Warner, A dangerous place, Atlantic Monthly, Little, Brown, Boston, Toronto, 1978. [Note:
The quote is from the opening chapter of the book, which covers his
service as U.S. Ambassador to the UN in 1975-1976.]
"Above
all, he warns, never tolerate 'a concrete evil' in the name of 'an
abstract good;' expose
the pretenses of the system at every opportunity.'" Andrew Nagorski, ,a
phrasing of Vaclav Havel's beliefs, in a book review "The most potent weapon of all: How Havel prepared
for 'the gentle revolution'", Newsweek International, June 25,
1990 . [Note: The book is Vaclav
Havel, Disturbing the peace, A conversation with Karel
Hvizdala, translated by Paul
Wilson, Vintage, New York, 1991.] "A wise restraint
is central to Berlin's thinking, an acceptance of the fact that tragedy
inheres in all choice, because there is no choice that leads to the
solution of all problems. An
anti-utopian point of view, in other words, required a certain resignation
to social imperfection and the conviction that the first task of
government is similar to the first task of physicians, to do no
harm." Phrasing of the thoughts of Isaiah Berlin, from a book review by Richard Bernstein, "Books, IB, a Life," International Herald Tribune, November 25, 1998. [Note:
the book, by Michael Ignatieff, is
Isaiah Berlin, A life, Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt, New
York.]
SECOND, modern global
society has become a complex collection of networks, vastly facilitated by
the "information society" and its technologies. Not all of these networks are admirable or effective (and some
of the least admirable are the most effective, and vice
versa.) "A new group of
power-seekers are leaping on the world stage and seizing sizable chunks of
the clout once controlled by nations alone. Some are good, some, decidedly
evil.
the United Nations, which
until now has been little more than a trade association of nation-states,
may eventually be compelled to provide representation for non-states
(beyond the token consultative role now granted to certain
NGOs).
But whether or not
such speculations prove correct in the future, the new Global
Gladiators -- corporate, criminal, religious,
and other -- already share
increasing de facto power with nation
states." Alvin
Toffler, Powershift: Knowledge, wealth, and violence at the edge of the
21st century, Bantam, New York, 1991, pp. 450, 456-457. [emphasis added]
"Whether local,
national, or international, networks and network structures have had a
lasting impact on governance.
The following articles discuss networks and network structures in a
variety of instances." "Governance: Impact of networks and network structures," PA Times (USA) November 2002, pp. 3-5. {Note:
see the following three related article excerpts below.] "
Digital diasporas [which are a people dispersed through
migration, but reconnected by information technology, here "DDs"] have the
potential to influence national and international policies through broader
electronic policy networks.
DDs raise important questions for public administrators and
policymakers.
We believe that digital diasporas represent significant
opportunities to alleviate challenges posed by globalization.
DDs hold particular promise in contributing to international
development.
[They can]
enhance the capacity available to address development
challenges in their home countries. ,,, [Their policy advocacy] can
support commitments of greater resources from other sources
their
identity can [help]
inform the substance and delivery process of aid
policy within donor agencies and among international development NGOs.
Through the use of information technologies, members of diaspora
communities and their DD organizations can become an important node in a
larger socio-political-crosscultural network
thus fostering
cooperation." Lori A. Brainard
and Jennifer Brinkerhof, "Digital diasporas, networks and international
policy processes," PA Times
(USA), November 2002, p. 3.
"In a
rapidly changing society, the basic structure of many governmental
organizations is ill fitted to the tasks they are expected to perform and
the problems they are expected to solve.
the
larger pattern must be seen in the structure of governmental agencies for
action in a dynamic, uncertain environment.
The
issue is not that governmental agencies are negligent, but rather that
in
rapidly evolving conditions, network organizations demonstrate greater
flexibility in enabling key nodes to share information and maintain basic
functions under conditions of disruption or failure in other parts of the
organization.
Most
important, network organizations designed for governmental performance
need continued calibration against the context in which they will operate
to ensure effective performance.
There is no easy, one-time solution to this problem. Rather, it requires an on-going
process of monitoring
goals
against actual practice
Effective organizational
performance is a product of continuous learning and adjustment to a clear,
albeit moving, goal." Louise K.
Comfort, "Networks of action for emerging systems," PA Times (USA),
November 2002, p. 4.
"While
all
public organizations try to control the "problems" they are jointly
dealing with, there is a set of actors (both individuals and
organizations) who are bent on making the problem
worse.
[these actors] constitute dark networks striving to achieve ends which
create collective action problems for governments all over the
world.
[Alongside military and economic power in international relations]
are a
variety of dark networks.
Some, like arms trafficking and drugs are illegal and pursue power
and wealth
whereas some, like Al Qaeda, wish to destroy the military, economic and
cultural power of the West.
Do
[dark networks]
adopt
a similar structure to cope with their need for secrecy?
is
there a point where dark networks come together?
what
can we learn from studying them that might help legitimate states to
combat them?
[Dark
networks] are a major policy problem, like piracy was in the 18th and 19th
centuries.
While
we are in the very early stages of network evaluation
there
is no reason to restrict our focus to only legal and covert networks when
the need to combat dark networks is so great." H. Brinton
Milward and Jφrg Raab, "Dark networks as problems," PA Times (USA),
November 2002, p. 5. "The illegal trade in drugs, arms, intellectual property, people,
and money is booming. Like
the war on terrorism, the fight to control these illicit markets pits
governments against agile, stateless, and resourceful networks empowered
by globalization. Governments
will continue to lose these wars until they adopt new strategies to deal
with a larger, unprecedented struggle that now shapes the world as much as
confrontations with nation-states once did. Why governments can't win [these wars} They are not bound by geography They defy traditional notions of
sovereignty They pit governments against market
forces They pit bureaucracies against
networks Rethinking the problem Develop more flexible notions of
sovereignty Strengthen existing multilateral institutions [particularly
INTERPOL] Devise new mechanisms and strategies Move from repression to regulation." Moisιs Naνm, "The
five wars of globalization," Foreign Policy, January/February
2003, pp. 29-37. [Note: the
article identifies other areas traded illegally for huge profits,
including human organs, endangered species, stolen art, and toxic
waste. As with most other
Foreign Policy articles, it also contains an excellent guide for
further reading on these topics.]
"As a European business leader
over the past decade, I actually
feel that business has relatively diminishing power as the game gets
infinitely more complex.
By going global, business faces new challenges on three distinct
levels. First, the
supranational level
means dealing with international institutions such
as the {EU, WTO, UN, and even NGOs] that have increasing global reach.
These bodies have not replaced the state but have become additional,
sometimes decisive, players. The second level is the traditional nation state. It includes parliaments,
congresses, unions, lobbyists, regulatory agencies, and national NGOs
in
every country.
the changing landscape includes rising nations
such as China, India, and Russia, and the emerging markets of Eastern
Europe. The third -- and sometimes most powerful -- level is local. It means having to negotiate with
governors, mayors, city councils, county officials, planning boards, party
officials, citizen groups, local NGOs, activists, or one concerned
individual.
Power today is more
a mosiac than an org chart, and it's no longer easy to figure out whether
it is indeed "shifting."
Moving
forward, it's a world of multiple stakeholders, with "multi" in the truest
sense of the word." Heinrich von
Pierer [the president and chief executive of Siemens AG], "The cornered
CEO," Newsweek International Special Issue, December, 2003,
p. 53. [Note: heads of
large public, NGO, and international organizations too must surely face
the same problems]
The insurgents,
terrorists, militias, jihadis, smugglers, rogue armies, transnational
criminal networks, and computer hackers that seem to be sprouting
everywhere [are]
testing the [US] superpowers mettle.
Of course, these
termites had long been expected.
In Sovereignty at bay, a popular
1971 book,
Robert Vernon argued that rapidly growing multinational
corporations would render the concept of national sovereignty obsolete.
Experts who
observed the rising influence of nonstate actors in the 1990s viewed
it
as a largely benign
era of civil society
. [not recognizing] the fact that
the changes in politics and technology that empowered NGOs did the same
for terrorists. Admittedly,
several expert commissions warned of the threat posed
but the roaring,
globalizing, democratizing, and economically booming 1990s
blinded
[leaders and experts]
to the dangers of a world where networks of
stateless civilians acquired unprecedented capabilities for inflicting
mayhem. The [US] 9/11
Commission recently
[cited] a failure of imagination.
What is
[needed] is to imagine
more effective ways to deal with the termites that are chipping away at
the foundations of the Western World. No problem has ever been solved
before it was acknowledged.
Moisιs Naνm, Devour and conquer: How the White House got a termite problem, Foreign Policy, November/December 2004, pp. 95-96.
THIRD, some excellent
recent books, articles, and reports illustrate the vast complexity,
urgency, competitiveness, and dynamism of global governance processes, in a
sea of vigorous activity and competition among actors far removed from the
leisurely diplomatic routines at UN headquarters in New York City. The following citations move from
the broadest analytical scope on down toward the specific UN role, to get
a better sense of its limited role in the global governance scheme of
things. A major and
definitive, if introductory, work by Held et al. in 1999, was based
on nearly a decade of research.
Using a rigorous analytical framework, the project set out to
investigate the extent to which regionalization and globalization are
transforming the nature of world order, and the position of national
sovereignty and autonomy within it.
It identified and then explored: "
the central
questions [at the root of controversies and debates about
globalization]: ? What is
globalization? How should it
be conceptualized? ? Does contemporary
globalization represent a novel condition? ? Is globalization
associated with the demise, the resurgence or the transformation of state
power; ? Does contemporary
globalization impose new limits to politics? How can globalization be
'civilized' and democratized?" David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global transformations: Politics, economics and culture, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 1999, pp. ix, [1-2.] This broad-scale book
devoted very little attention to the UN and the UN system per se, with
most of that being a mere list of the organizations involved and the 45 UN
peace-keeping missions (15 during the Cold War, 30 since). Near the end, however, it did
briefly state that: "It would be easy
to be pessimistic about the future of political communities
But there are other
forces at work which create the basis for a more optimistic reading
one must note the emergence,
however hesitatingly, of regional and global institutions and mechanisms
of governance in the twentieth century. The UN is, of course, weak in many
respects, but it is a relatively recent creation and it is an innovative
structure which can be built on.
The UN system, with its myriad of organizations, constitutes a
resource which provides -- for all its weaknesses -- an enduring example
of how nations might (and sometimes do) cooperate better to resolve, and
resolve fairly, common problems." David Held, Anthony McGrew,
David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global transformations:
Politics, economics and culture, Stanford University, Stanford, CA,
1999, pp. 63-67, 126-129, [451-452].
Another recent book
provided an encyclopedic (1,497 pages) review of the rapidly-expanding
international human rights field, one of the most significant recent
developments on the international scene. It examined major themes such as
changing notions of autonomy and sovereignty, the changing public-private
divide in humans rights ordering, the play of duties and rights in the
gradual expansion of the human rights movement, and the striking evolution
of ideas about the nature and purposes of the movement itself over a
half-century. It also gave major attention to the workings of
international human rights organizations -- intergovernmental and
nongovernmental -- to make the reader aware of "the essential and
pervasive relationships among norms, institutions and processes at the
international as well as national levels." Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, International human rights in context, 2d ed., Oxford University, 2000, pp. v-vii.
The fourth edition of
the most long-standing chronicle and analysis of international
organizations, by Jordan et al., was published in 2001. It argued that a shift from the
primacy of the nation state to relations through international
organizations is underway, but the process is incomplete and the outcome
indistinct, because of its halting, largely unplanned and unanticipated
manner. This book emphasized international organization management, but
believed that this process hinges on the presence or absence of
cooperation on given issues, and thus requires the management of this
cooperation. It had little
detailed analysis of UN management, but it does provide a welcome focus on
the general issues and problems of management and decision making in
international organizations. Robert S. Jordan, et al., International organizations: A comparative approach to the management of cooperation, fourth ed., Greenwood/Praeger, Westport, CN (USA), 2001, pp. 1-2 and passim. [Note:
This book reveals (Appendix C) the extraordinary growth in such
organizations, from 176 intergovernmental organizations in 1909 to 5,825
in 1999, and from 37 international NGOs in 1909 to 251 in 1999, as
compiled by the Yearbook of International Organizations in
Brussels, Union of
International Associations,
available at www.uia.org/uiastats/tb399.htm]
Another recent book
provides a very innovative and much-needed effort to systematically
analyse the management of
global issues. It examines failures and successes of cooperative efforts
in sixteen specific areas (such as corruption, environment, and health),
presented in terms of four key phases of international governance: agenda
setting, negotiation, implementation, and reactions to noncompliance. It
is not a manual for global problem solving, but it does provide an
inventory of what has been tried so far, how the tools and approaches have
worked, and other possible options. The lessons learned are considered a
solid base on which to build a rigorous field of knowledge and solid
practical experience for alleviating global problems. The editors conclude that progress
depends on the kinds of goals set, the realism of commitments, and the
attention and resources devoted to implementation. In particular, they
emphasize that: "whatever approach is taken at
the start, continuous sharp-eyed scrutiny of performance makes much
of the difference between lip service and genuine
implementation." P. J.
Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, eds., Managing global issues:
Lessons learned, Carnegie Endowment, Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC, 2001, pp. viii, 720.
Important issues are
also raised by a timely exploration of the often-contentious but
superficial recent debates over "multilateralism." Special attention needs
to be given to "dysfunctional multilateralism" (that is, to its
sub-optimal or counterproductive processes), and to the important issues,
patterns, and experiences of compliance or non-compliance. Van Oudenaren
concludes that multilateralism raises complex questions with no clear-cut
answers. He argues that international relations would be well-served by a
much more intellectually-sophisticated dialogue on what multilateralism
is, when it does and does not work, and how it can best serve nation-state
interests. John Van Oudenaren, "What is 'multilateral?'", Policy Review (USA), February & March 2003, pp. 33-47. The UNDP has made
twice examined global governance issues in its annual Human Development
Reports. In 1992 it reviewed
the existing framework of global institutions and found the international
organizations wanting, but urged significant new roles for them. In a 2002
followup, it emphasized the need to "deepen democracy" at the global level
and build more democratic
institutions.
The UNDP report called
for more accountability, and included a discussion of "judicial-style
accountability" (i.e., processes of redress to hold international
organizations accountable for acting within their powers and in keeping
with their operational rules, to publicize wrong-doing and encourage them
to reconsider decisions.) Unfortunately, the UNDP analysis concentrated on
the international financial institutions, and only discussed the UN itself
in terms of the old, never-achieved, idea of reshaping the Security
Council. Maybe, when the UNDP next revisits these issues, it can take a
long hard look at the grave problems of UN
accountability. Chapter V, "A new vision for global human development," in United Nations Development Programme, Human development report 1992, Oxford University, New York and Oxford, 1992, and Chapter V, "Deepening democracy at the global level," in United Nations Development Programme, Human development report 2002: Deepening democracy in a fragmented world, Oxford University, New York and Oxford, 2002, esp. pp. 116-117.
FOURTH, and finally, many
thoughtful analyses and criticisms have been cited throughout this archive
on the UN's role and handicaps in broader global governance. The alarm
bells are now going off for the UN and its desired global role. Five "new millennium" quotes serve
as pointed reminders of just how much remains to be done to make the
Organization a reliable and
effective part of efforts to deal with the new
realities. "Conventionally
'internationalist' administrations
are too inclined to see the IMF and the World Bank as ends in
themselves, as signs of enlightenment and virtue, however much a mess they
make of things.
It is quite right
to ask
whether these bodies need to exist at all, exactly what purpose
they are intended to serve, and just how well they are discharging their
duties, whatever they may be." "Reforming the Sisters", The
Economist, February 17th,
2001, pp. 20-21. [Note: As the most astute
chronicler of UN ups and downs over the years, The Economist would
surely extend this wise advice to the UN as well] "Challenges that
must be globally managed keep popping up: genetic engineering, AIDS, and
global terrorist networks.
Yet
the global landscape has dramatically changed in the last 50
years, but the institutions serving the world have
not. The institutions
cannot reform themselves. Two
generations of institutional contamination and tenured self-interest
ensure that this deadlock continues.
But this lack of coherence damages their collective credibility,
frustrates their donors and owners, and gives rise to public
cynicism. There is a
consensus that something must be done, but no consensus on how to go about
it.
. It's time for a small group of
national leaders to take on the challenge of reforming and rebuilding
global governance. They
should build this effort around the issue of the democratic deficit in
multilateral institutions.
The leadership must come from the top.
. Otherwise, endless
seminars and conferences will inevitably bog down the process in the name
of consensus
." Similarly, [senior
officials in national legislatures] should form a democratic caucus to
provide systematic oversight of international institutions, focusing
particularly on increasing the transparency of these institutions.
. [This informal] caucus would
strengthen national governments in their role in holding these agencies to
account." Mike Moore, "Multilateral meltdown", Foreign Policy, March/April 2003, p. 75. [Note: Mr. Moore was Director General of the World Trade Organization from 1999 to 2002 and a former Prime Minister of New Zealand. He is the author of A world without walls: Freedom, development, free trade, and global governance, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK, 2003.] "
after all these years, the
United Nations is still struggling to adjust its human resources policies
and practices to the reality that surrounds it.
This is no time to
stand idly by. In the area of
development, the Bretton Woods institutions threaten to marginalize the UN
system. In the area of global
trade, the WTO overshadows UNCTAD.
In peacekeeping and peace building, large regional organizations
such as NATO move in when their interests are at stake (as in the Balkans)
and play dead when there is nothing to be gained (as in Rwanda). In the delivery of humanitarian
assistance, NGOs and bilateral agencies are becoming the agents of choice
(as became manifest in Kosovo).
In this highly competitive environment, the UN will have to reform
its reforms, or go down reforming. Several dilemmas
that have crippled the UN for generations, however, remain unresolved, and
this organizational pathology stands in the way of the UN's efforts to
remain meaningful.
For most
pathologies, there is a cure.
For the UN, faith healing will not
suffice." Dirk Salomons, "Good intentions to naught: The pathology of human resources management at the United Nations," in Dennis Dijkzeul, and Yves Beigbeder, eds., Rethinking international organizations: Pathology and promise, Berghahn, New York and Oxford, 2003, pp. 111-139 [136-137].
"Isolated
diplomatically over Iraq, beset with financial and sexual scandals and
manifestly failing to halt genocide in Sudan, the UN must prove its mettle
in dealing with the humanitarian crisis in South-east Asia or face a
threat to its very existence.
Two interrelated
crises
have now brought the UN not only to impotence (a regular
occurrence), but to institutional meltdown under Kofi
Annan. The 9/11 attacks
created a new kind of threat to world order
The UN Security Council is a
forum for the big players to settle their differences, eyeball to
eyeball. You can't do that
with Osama bin Laden.
The other new
crisis is the descent of the permanent UN bureaucracy into wholesale
corruption. There has always
been petty sleaze, but it was accelerated vastly by the UN's oil-for-food
programme
Annan is the first
secretary general to be recruited from the ranks of the UN permanent
staff. As such, he
is more
prone to defend his bureaucrats from outside criticism.
The best solution
is a new secretary general
perhaps a former prime minister or president
-- who carries respect in the major world capitals." George
Kerevan, "Has impotent UN finally outlived its usefulness?", The
Scotsman, 5 January 2005.
"The United
Nations, which extols the virtues of 'good governance', is not practising
what it preaches, say [many long-time observers.]
The complaints
come amidst several recent scandals, including accusations of bribery,
nepotism, sexual harassment, and mismanagement of peacekeeping operations
overseas. 'The underlying
problem is a lack of transparency and accountability" says Hillel Neuer,
[one close observer.] ..
in 2003 the OIOS
cleared the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna of charges of
corruption and mismanagement.
Senior U.N.
officials in New York [have reportedly routinely abused] their first class
or business class airline privileges
[Neuer said] 'if
some of the things that happen at the United Nations took place in a big
corporation, people would have been fired.' [A UN shortcoming, Neuer added, is
that the investigation results emerge very slowly]
are mostly
'white-washed'
[and occur] only after 'a lot of prodding from the media
and NGOs.' Thalif Deen, "Corruption: U.N. failing to practice 'good governance', IPS Inter Press Service, December 9, 2004. Useful Sources
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