

## MANAGER/INVESTIGATORS?

In its earliest days the UN Secretariat was subjected to a harsh period of investigations as the UN struck a bargain with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation to screen US staff members at the UN on their opinions, political sentiments, and private lives. Shirley Hazzard cites this as the "least mentioned official transaction in UN history," although it was later exposed in US Congressional hearings in 1952 and led to Secretary-General Trygve Lie's resignation from office. It was a harsh period for staff:

"Staff representatives who [spoke out against the] collaboration with the FBI and the United States State Department were among the earliest and least ceremonious departures. The dismissals were accompanied by intimidating and abusive statements from the administration to those remaining. ...

The squalor of these conditions, punctuated by announcements of summary dismissals, acted on the staff with a combination of attrition, confusion and violence. ... Each department had its informers, and its victims.

The total of United Nations employees affected ... undoubtedly runs into the hundreds ... [but is difficult to determine] ... since employees were permitted to resign with extra indemnities, 'in exchange for their silence' ... [or in] terminations disguised as 'economies,' or ... deportations to the field, or careers shunted [permanently] into sidings ... [or] a secret blacklisting ...

Above all, there is no accounting for the deterrent effect of Trygve Lie's policies on those who might have wished to serve a differently administered United Nations secretariat."

Shirley Hazzard on the situation in the UN Secretariat in the **early 1950s**, in Chapter Two, "The purgatory of the investigations," in her Defeat of an ideal: A study of the self-destruction of the United Nations, Macmillan, London, 1973, pp. 15, 23, 34-35. [emphasis added.]

The UN control and disciplinary climate then settled in as a lower level, lower-visibility atmosphere of restricted staff rights, Administration paranoia and controls, weak internal oversight and a weak internal justice system with quasi-judicial procedures going on behind it, including summary dismissal and a hidden group of displaced staff, all as discussed in the preceding subsections on Staff Rights? , Behind the Scenes , and Unleashed managers .

The *sub rosa* disciplinary activities did, however, maintain their nasty side, up to and including abrupt "summary

dismissals":

"In cases of summary dismissal, which U.N. sources say have been on the rise in recent years, the Secretary-General can fire an employee on the spot for "serious misconduct", although this term has never been satisfactorily defined in the last 40 years."

"Summary dismissal", letter of the New York Staff Committee president to the ASG, OPS [personnel] of 5 May 1980, UN Staff News (New York), **July 1980**, page 11, and  
Jay Axelbank, "Administrative injustice at the UN", UN Special, (Geneva), **December 1993**, pp.14-15.

Meanwhile, during the late 1980s and the 1990s, worldwide attention to battling corruption led to the establishment of inspector general units and professional investigation processes in many public organizations. Both internal controls and independent scrutiny were applied to monitor compliance with standards and deal with irregularities and systemic failures. As an excellent OECD survey stated:

"Taking action against wrongdoing

*"Taking action against violation of standards is the shared responsibility of managers and external investigative bodies. ... All [OECD] governments have developed a general framework for disciplinary procedures that both allows managers to impose timely and just sanctions and guarantees a fair process for the public servants. ...*

Although public service managers have the primary responsibility for initiating disciplinary measures in their agencies in a timely manner, they may also receive assistance from specific external institutions. These external institutions are the primary instruments for investigating and prosecuting misconduct in the public service. These bodies have the power to bring suspected cases of corruption directly to court in all OECD countries. ."

"Annex I: OECD public management policy brief on building public trust: Ethics measures in OECD countries," in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Public sector transparency and accountability: Making it happen, OECD, Paris, 2002, p. 192. [emphasis added]

In 1994 the new OIOS created a small, professional Investigations Section in the UN Secretariat, even as the Administration was also pushing strongly for much greater authority and freedom for managers. As discussed earlier under Unleashed managers, the OIOS chose to encourage cooperative work with managers on investigations, and managers gradually became more and more directly involved in them. In 1998 the Secretary-General gave prime responsibility for dealing with performance failures to managers at all levels, with OIOS advice, and he subsequently decided that managers could do preliminary investigations themselves, not only in cases of alleged misconduct, but also of gross negligence.

These trends led to continuing and aggressive behind-the-

scenes activities, a hint of which was given in a very cryptic 2-page report which had been requested by the General Assembly. The report was intended to deal with financial malpractice cases, but instead discussed quite ambiguously the handling of possible disciplinary and misconduct cases by managers in departments or with OIOS and/or with OHRM, and some information on the various outcomes possible in such cases:

"Of the 61 cases ... submitted in 1997 to the Assistant-Secretary-General of [OHRM], 7 were referred as a result of an audit/OIOS investigation. Four of those seven resulted in a decision of summary dismissal, one is being handled by the [unit] ..., one is being prepared for submission to the [JDC], and one is ...[being considered as a possible] disciplinary matter."

"Actions taken against staff resulting from findings of malpractice discovered by the Board of Auditors: Report of the Secretary-General", A/52/864 of **2 April 1998**.

[Note: the report conspicuously ignored what happened to the other 64 reports, whether the 71 cases were for New York only or the entire global UN, and the pattern and consequences and recovery (if any). Also, if 1997 was typical, there should have been about 500 such cases in the seven years since. How did they come out? ]

In 2000 the OIOS reported, again in a report specifically requested by the General Assembly, that although investigation is a legal analytical process performed by specialized professionals, many UN managers and others were making investigations without any formal procedures. A large amount of quasi-investigative and quasi-judicial activity -- including summary dismissals -- was going on, and both the staff and the General Assembly grew increasingly concerned.

"Rules and procedures to be applied for the investigation functions performed by the OIOS ... : Report of the Secretary-General", A/55/469 of **11 October 2000**, paras. 20. [emphasis added.]

[Note: The details of these developments and their discernable impact are provided in the archive subsections on [Unleashed Managers](#) , [Disappearing Whistle-blowers](#) , and [Behind the Scenes](#) .]

In 2003 the General Assembly requested a report on these "manager/investigators", and in February 2004 the OIOS provided it. UN departments and offices had submitted a very patchwork and incomplete reporting on the pattern of the investigations they had undertaken during the year 2002 -- a total of more than 1,800, varying from quite serious to traffic accident reports, and mostly concentrated in a few high-risk field sites, such as the Congo, Sierra Leone, and East Timor.

"Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on strengthening the investigation functions in the United Nations: Note by the Secretary-General", UN document A/58/708 of **10 February 2004**.

The OIOS also found that, despite increasing concerns and

discussions, there had been little progress in addressing three major and obvious issues involved in the investigatory "free for all":

(1) Independence: professional, objective and impartial assessments are key elements [and obviously difficult for managers to credibly provide when deciding when, who, and how to investigate in their own units];

(2) Training: [much serious training is needed for proper investigation work, but UN managers have little time and actual training has been "virtually nonexistent"];

(3) Investigative procedures: [very few exist].

More specifically, the OIOS observed that:

"Throughout the Organization, managers have responsibility for responding to matters requiring investigations. This practice poses questions for both the independence of management and the integrity of the investigative process. While it is not suggested that management should be precluded from having a role in investigations, the situations in which such participation is allowed need to be clearly defined, kept within strict but reasonable limits, be subject to review and oversight and be guided by the Uniform Guidelines."

"Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on strengthening the investigation functions in the United Nations: Note by the Secretary-General", UN document A/58/708 of **10 February 2004**, para. 23  
[emphasis added.]

The OIOS concluded that professional investigation is essential, but it must be effective and impartial. OIOS classified high-risk, complex matters as "Category I" matters for investigation by professional investigators (including fraud, other serious criminal acts, abuse of authority or staff, gross mismanagement, substantial resource waste, substantial violation of UN rules) and lower-risk "Category II" cases for (trained) programme managers to handle (such as personnel matters, simple thefts, contract disputes, basic misuse of staff, basic mismanagement issues, infractions of rules, and simple entitlement fraud).

The OIOS also stated that "an appropriate policy must be developed to clarify programme managers' role in investigative activities", and promised to submit a follow-up report to the General Assembly within the next year.

"Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on strengthening the investigation functions in the United Nations: Note by the Secretary-General", UN document A/58/708 of **10 February 2004**, paras. 24-30.

This initial report is very useful, but there are many things seriously wrong with the situation. First of all, it is very late: untrained managers have been conducting "investigations" (or deciding not to) of their operations since 1998. The right to do so is a great opportunity for abusive UN managers to "settle scores", and there is no telling how many staff have been harassed or subjected to miscarriages of justice by this process in the Secretariat.

The categories I and II seem awkward, with some quite important issues to be left to managers to handle (how independently does a manager handle staff accusations of his mismanagement?) Once again, the managers set "free to manage" in the past decade have benefited quite nicely in the investigative area as well.

As will be discussed in the "Answers" subsection which follows, IO Watch believes that it is clear and obvious that in a real "fraud-fighting UN" there should be enough professional investigators to do the job, and that a larger Investigations Division is urgently needed, rather than entrusting many of the Category II cases to involved managers to "take care of." [And, at present, even the OIOS has been occupied with investigating its own investigators, after internal allegations of mismanagement were made against its head, Dileep Nair.]

In many respects, a real risk exists that the UN Secretariat will return to the ugly and repressive days of the 1950s under this manager/investigators system. Even if all the OIOS recommendations of 2004 are implemented, it will take several years to **"train"** managers and establish a control system. And even then, there must continue to be real doubt that managers can or will report serious matters, particularly those that relate to or reflect on their own performance, to an OIOS that has no time to check in detail on every case.

Thus, overall, there has been a great increase in UN managers' impunity in the last decade, rather than the management accountability, sanctions, and independent and professional investigations that the General Assembly clearly intended and sought in 1993 and 1994.

**There is also a very interesting specific example. The biggest case ever of a "UN manager/investigator" situation is the "independent" inquiry led by Paul Volcker in 2004-2005, into the**

**many allegations of corruption and mismanagement in the UN Iraq oil-for-food programme (see the fuller specific discussion in that subsection following.)**

Secretary-General Annan reportedly first announced an investigation (by the OIOS, although OIOS had already done some 55 audits of the programme), then -- when this was rejected **as** insufficient -- named his own "independent" commission (although half-a-dozen serious other outside inquiries are already underway in Member States) with some prestigious figures (but notably, no high-level specialist on fraud, which is the key point at issue) in mid-2004.

Mr. Annan urged the inquiry toward a quick (two to three months) effort to see first if any UN staff were involved. The group reportedly had problems receiving subpoena power, and encountered budgetary and staffing start-up problems. It did produce two interim reports in early 2005 on UN staff involvement, after which Mr. Annan promptly pronounced himself "exonerated" (and some inquiry group members strongly disagreed). The overall inquiry then dragged on well into the summer of 2005.

**IO Watch wonders if the UN's own inquiry is indeed not an independent one, nor one that is receiving full UN cooperation.** As all UN managers "investigating" in their own units know, he who sets the scope, the resources, and the terms of reference (and who intimidates whistle-blowers) largely shapes the entire investigation inquiry (and then has the decision-making power to accept, reject, or modify whatever recommendations are made.)

**IO Watch believes that the UN Secretariat's present permissive process of unchecked manager investigations of their own programmes** (or worse, managers investigating their subordinates) **is extremely unfortunate and highly improper.** Now half-a-dozen years old, it only reinforces the vast management impunity which "empowered" UN managers already enjoy, particularly in the fundamental absence of Secretariat-wide accountability mechanisms and sanctions.

The 1993-1994 reforms intended to hold UN managers (the "power figures") accountable, particularly through a new system of professional internal investigations, has thus been transmuted by the Secretariat into, *inter alia*, a process for managers to hold their staff accountable (and investigate them) in a very aggressive and unfettered one-way process.

Unfortunately, the General Assembly gave its "seal of approval" to this manager/investigator process in a resolution in April 2005. It decided that OIOS may entrust "trained programme managers" to conduct investigations in its behalf. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to provide more investigation "training" for handling misconduct matters, and to develop written procedures for proper conduct of investigations (both to be done now, but only after almost a decade of manager/investigator activity. The Assembly also went so far as to identify sexual harassment as a serious ("Category I") matter, but to then note that OHRM and programme managers may be "entrusted to conduct investigations" in this area.

"Report of the [OIOS] on strengthening the investigation function in the United Nations: Note by the Secretary-General", General Assembly resolution 59/287 of **13 April 2005**, paras. 6-10.

The amazing thing to IO Watch about this General Assembly endorsement of manager/investigators is the history and context of this activity from about 1997 to 2005, as follows.

-- this archive's subsection on [Unleashed Managers](#) discusses seven areas in which the Secretariat has aggressively expanded the powers and impunity of its managers in the last decade, the most grievous of which, during Mr. Paschke's era of "partnership" with managers, was turning them into amateur investigators of their own operations and subordinates, a task which they could fulfill, including even "seeking criminal prosecutions", because they were already "familiar with" such processes;

-- the same subsection discusses the 2000 OIOS report which emphasized that investigation is a "legal, analytical process undertaken by specialized [and highly-skilled and specially-trained] professionals", and which then observed that many non-OIOS people (managers, boards of inquiry, disciplinary committees and the security services] conducted investigations in the Secretariat, although none of them "had published, formal procedures" for their activities.

"Rules and procedures to be applied for the investigation functions performed by the OIOS: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/55/469 of **11 October 2000**, "Summary", paras. 1-3, 20.

-- After some observers expressed concern about this amateur process in a very serious area, the OIOS reported again, in February 2004 as discussed above, that a great deal of quasi-investigative and quasi-judicial activity was indeed going on, and that:

"Throughout the Organization, managers have responsibility for responding to matters requiring investigations. **This practice poses questions**

**for both the independence of management and the integrity of the investigative process.** While it is not suggested that management should be precluded, ... the situations need to be clearly defined, kept within strict but reasonable limits, be subject to review and oversight and be guided by the Uniform Guidelines."

"Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on strengthening the investigation functions in the United Nations: Note by the Secretary-General", UN document A/58/708 of **10 February 2004**, para. 23 [emphasis added.]

-- In 2004 and 2005, as discussed under [The UN Old Boys' Last Hurrah?](#) and in [Other Major Problems](#), there have since been many disturbing revelations of mismanagement and abuse in the Iraq oil-for-food programme, security mismanagement, refugee abuse, and other grave problems.

-- In June 2004 the UN Board of Auditors severely criticized the lack of fraud awareness, prevention plans, policies, and mechanisms throughout the UN Secretariat, and recommended comprehensive and decisive corrective action, which the Secretariat airily brushed aside as a serious problem (see the subsection on [A real UN fraud prevention programme](#)).

-- In May 2005 the Secretariat finally issued a dramatic *mea culpa* in its 2005 Reform Programme, which made no mention of the Secretariat manager/investigators, but stated that:

"Perhaps the most obvious shortcomings identified by the Volcker Inquiry and other **crises are in the area of oversight and accountability. The current 'control' systems for monitoring management performance and preventing fraud and corruption are insufficient and must be significantly enhanced.**"

"Fréchette unveils UN reforms responding to Volcker panel's criticisms", [UN News Service](#), **17 May 2005**.

The General Assembly resolution of April 2005 on OIOS itself stated that

"... independent investigation is in the best interests of the Organization; ... Re-emphasizes the principle of separation, impartiality and fairness on the part of those with responsibility for investigation functions; ...

"Report of the [OIOS] on strengthening the investigation function in the United Nations: Note by the Secretary-General", General Assembly resolution 59/287 of **13 April 2005**, preambular paras. 4-5.

Yet the Assembly allows the Secretariat, in the midst of mismanagement crises and criticisms, to determine that "trained" managers are free to make investigations, like Peter Sellers' Inspector Clouseau. First, any "training" can never be more than minimal relative to such a serious task as investigation, and

clear policies and guidelines are still not established despite years of talk about their importance.

Second, while good managers are busy with their own work and will turn the work over to OIOS professionals (if OIOS is sufficiently staffed, which does not now seem true), meddling and abusive managers will be only too glad to bully and intimidate their subordinates with this powerful punitive tool. (If this statement seems excessive in its concern with the impact of bad managers, please see a full discussion of these problems over the past 60 years in the archive subsections on [Unleashed managers](#), [Staff Self-defense](#), and [Behind the Scenes](#).)

Third, the dangers that such manager/investigators will contaminate the investigations process with shabby work, insert their own biases and objectives (no "fairness"), head off serious investigations in their units by making preemptive "investigations" of their own, undermine staff morale, and most certainly raise doubts about their objectivity, are very large, and immensely counter-productive.

And fourth, Secretariat managers have often been cited for their foot-dragging on management accountability and programme evaluation matters over the past few decades, arguing that they are too busy managing to assess their performance and learn how to manage better. (Their ongoing resistance to accountability and evaluation reform requirements is discussed in this archive's subsection on [Non-implementation of the resolution](#) for management accountability of 1993.) Yet they do seem quite enthusiastic about interrupting their busy managerial schedules for extra investigation work to hold their subordinates accountable, up to and including possible criminal charges (see below).

IO Watch must also note that the lead "manager/investigator", Secretary-General Annan, who has arranged many "independent" investigations over the past decade, has now set as his ultimate investigation target the OIOS itself. The May 2005 management reform document states that:

"In November 2004, the Secretary-General recommended to the General Assembly that the [OIOS] undergo a comprehensive external review to strengthen its independence and authority while ensuring it is fully equipped ... to carry out all aspects of its work. ... In addition, the General Assembly has asked the Secretary-General to report on how to guarantee the full operational independence of OIOS at the upcoming session this fall [of 2005].

Status: The Secretary-General's recommendation is currently before the General Assembly ...[and preparation of his report is underway.]"

"UN management reforms 2005: Management reform measures to strengthen accountability, ethical conduct and management performance", May 17, 2005,

Four authoritative sources argue against this dangerous "manager/investigator" process in the UN. They come from the UN Board of Auditors (the only effective and professional oversight body in the UN); the OECD's examination of public sector accountability; the UN's own advice for multinational corporations associated with Mr. Annan's "Global Compact" of good organizational behaviour; and the United Nations Charter.

"Integrity, objectivity, and independence

The External Auditor should be straightforward and honest in performing professional work. ... **The External Auditor should be independent in fact and appearance.** ...

**Professional Competence and Due Care**

*The External Auditor in agreeing to provide professional services implies that **there is a level of competence necessary to perform professional services** and that the knowledge, skill, and experience of the External Auditor will be applied with reasonable care and diligence. **Auditors should therefore refrain from performing any services, which they are not competent to carry out** unless advice and assistance is obtained to ensure that the services are performed satisfactorily.*

***The External Auditor** should perform professional services with due care, competence, and diligence and **has a continuing duty to maintain professional knowledge and skill** at a required level **to ensure** that the audited entity receives the advantage of **competent professional service based on up-to-date developments in practice, legislation, and techniques.**"*

[Note: see [www.unsystem.org/auditors/external.htm](http://www.unsystem.org/auditors/external.htm) under "Additional Guidance on Standards".]

"Taking action against wrongdoing

*"Taking action against violation of standards is the shared responsibility of managers and external investigative bodies. OECD countries recognize that disciplinary actions against a breach of public service standards should be taken within the organization where the breach occurred. All governments have developed a general framework for disciplinary procedures that both allows managers to impose timely and just sanctions and guarantees a fair process for the public servants. ...*

*Although public service managers have the primary responsibility for initiating disciplinary measures in their agencies in a timely manner, they may also receive assistance from specific external institutions. These **external institutions are the primary instruments for investigating and prosecuting misconduct in the public service. These bodies have the power to bring suspected cases of corruption directly to court in all OECD countries.** Moreover, two-thirds of countries have procedures and mechanisms to enable the public to signal wrongdoing to bodies exercising independent scrutiny on public service activities."*

*"Annex I: OECD public management policy brief on building public trust: Ethics measures in OECD countries," in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Public sector transparency and accountability: Making it happen, OECD, Paris, 2002, p. 192. [emphasis added]*

"[A UN senior spokesman] ... said **companies participate in the Global Compact by making a commitment** to observe a series of general principles on human rights, labor relations and environmental protection, and to engage in open dialogue on how they were doing so.

Once their chosen methods of carrying out those guidelines are posted on the Internet, **they are subjected to critiques -- by their own employees as well as outsiders including human rights and environmental groups and labor unions.**"

Irwin Arieff, "Some 300 firms sign up for global compact", Reuters, July 28, 2001. [emphasis added]

"Article 100. ...

2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101.

1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly. ...

3. **The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff** and in the determination of the conditions of service **shall be** the necessity of **securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity.** Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible."

Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Articles 100 and 101.

[emphasis added]

The fundamental question raised by all of the above, very troubling, issues, is

**How could the United Nations Secretariat (with General Assembly approval) get so far off track in an area where the fundamental UN Charter principles of competence and integrity are of such central concern?**

In summary, IO Watch believes that five final quotes highlight the pivotal events or circumstances in the entrenched, and defective, UN Secretariat management culture which permitted this situation to emerge:

1. The enthusiasm of the first diplomat/inspector, Mr. Paschke, for partnership with Secretariat managers rather than an arms-length oversight relationship, led quickly to their participation in the new investigations function, even for the most serious matters.

"It is ... my observation that the [Investigations Section] is increasingly seized with **more and more complex investigation matters, many of which are raised with us by programme managers** ...

This year ... major commitments to investigate [criminal cases] were made by the Governments of Kenya and Switzerland. There is also substantive

and consistent commitment to such cases by the concerned programme managers in ... Geneva and Nairobi. ... **These decisions by programme managers to seek criminal prosecutions**, in order to send a message that criminal conduct can result in criminal prosecution ... **represent hard evidence of the realization of the Secretary-General's determination to increase accountability as part of his reform programme.** "

"Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", A/53/428, 23 September 1998, Preface, p. 5, last para., and para. 121.

2. The basis of the manager/investigator concept in the UN fascination has been the long-standing view that Ambassadors are wise men who can do anything, leading to a fundamental (and destructive) Secretariat emphasis on selecting generalists, not professionals, for leadership and managerial posts:

"A distinguished professor of international law once deplored the fact that 'the League of Nations has been abandoned to the diplomats', but the UN Secretariat is much more dependent on the national diplomatic bureaucracies. They derive invaluable flexibility and power from having additional posts at their disposal ... to confer favors but also to displace unwanted staff. ... the incentives are all the greater because many UN posts, especially the senior ones, are much sought after because of the [high] scales of pay ... and the prestige they carry.

**A diplomatic ideology has even developed at the UN, [that] there is no higher dignity than that of Ambassador, holders of this title being by definition capable of taking up any high-ranking post, even in a technical field. This naturally generates a bias in favor of 'generalists' at the expense of other professionals."**

Maurice Bertrand, "The recruitment policy of United Nations staff", in de Cooker, Chris, ed., International Administration: Law and Management Practice in International Organisations, UNITAR, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, the Netherlands, 1989, II.2/1-9, pp. II/2 and /3.

[Note: Mr. Bertrand served as an Inspector in the UN Joint Inspection Unit from 1968-1985.]

3. The very casual approach by the Secretariat (and the General Assembly) to some "training", when even a casual examination of the work of the global organization that certifies, supports, and promotes fraud investigation shows the tremendous amount of basic education, training, and steadily updated retraining, that such work requires. The website of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) is found at [www.cfenet.com/home.asp](http://www.cfenet.com/home.asp), and the demanding regime required to "become a CFE" is laid out there in detail.

[Note: In this area, it would be interesting to know how many of the OIOS professional investigators are among the some 34,000 ACFE members or the 16,000 of them who are professionally certified, and whether the consultant Mr. Annan chose to advise on for Secretariat whistle-blower enhancement was an ACFE member, particularly since ACFE has an excellent Ethics Hotline, which the UN could use instead of its present OIOS "fig-leaf" mechanism or the "many reporting sources" approaches now being advocated -- see the following

subsection on [Suppressed Whistleblowers](#) .]

4. Mr. Annan made a pivotal pronouncement in 1995, as a past head of personnel and the then-head of UN peacekeeping, that the days of "gifted amateurism" in the Secretariat were past, leading to his major reform drive as Secretary-General (see the archive subsection on [The Winner: "Free the managers"](#). In fact, the mismanagement crises and resulting reform announcements of May 2005 make it abundantly clear that the old amateurs were not gifted, and that "modernists" are only expected to appear in merit-based Secretariat leadership selection processes of the future.

"Inspectors score U.N. staff recruitment procedures", [Diplomatic World Bulletin](#), March 20-27, 1995, p. 1.

5. The General Assembly's trusting, timid, tired, and not even well-formulated reminder to Mr. Annan in April 2005 to -- oh, by the way -- protect whistle-blowers, shows a basic unawareness of the "behind the scenes" Secretariat reality that such protection has been almost non-existent in the UN Secretariat over the past decade, as the staff clearly recognized in the Integrity Survey (and see the next section on [Suppressed Whistleblowers](#).)

"The General Assembly, ...

15. Requests the Secretary to ensure that an appropriate mechanism is in place to protect staff members who report misconduct within the Secretariat against retaliation."

"Report of the [OIOS] on strengthening the investigation function in the United Nations, General Assembly resolution 59/287 of **13 April 2005**.

In view of all these essential factors, IO Watch believes that the severe pollution of internal investigation work in the UN Secretariat must be stopped. The solution is not another "independent investigation" arranged by Secretary-General Annan (which could preclude any other action as the Volcker Inquiry did for more than a year, and which he makes as a 'lame-duck" Secretary-General). Instead, the UN should act decisively and directly to correct the newly-admitted "obvious shortcomings in oversight and accountability" through the combination of [A real UN fraud prevention programme](#), an [External experts oversight review](#), and a [General Assembly audit subcommittee](#). These important steps are discussed under the [Answers: A Starting Point](#) subsection of this archive.