

GENOCIDE (UPDATED)

In the past few years some excellent books have assessed the cruelties of mankind in the 20th and the early 21st century. IO Watch notes four of them here, with a quote from one: it will add more from the other three later.

"Some ordinary villages are peaceful and well policed. The global village is of another kind. It has feuds and vendettas which often break into violence. All the inhabitants are armed. The part-time police force is amateurish and weak. It is run by a committee of villagers who rarely agree on what it should do. Powerful neighbors sometimes suppress violence by force. Peace will only come to such a village when the rule of law is imposed."

Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century, Chapter 18, "The political containment of tribalism: Policing the global village:", Yale, New Haven, CT, 1999, p. 140,

Guy B. Adams and Danny L. Balfour, Unmasking administrative evil, Sage, Thousand Oaks CA and London, 1998,

Eric D. Weitz, A century of genocide: Utopias of race and nation, Princeton University, Princeton NJ (USA) and Oxford (UK), 2003, and

Benjamin A. Valentino, Final solutions: Mass killing and genocide in the 20th century, Cornell University, Ithaca NY (USA) and London, 2004.

Even more important are two recent books which analyse directly and quite effectively the UN's recent efforts to deal with genocide, and are among IO Watch's top sources on UN management accountability issues overall in the UN Management Accountability Bibliographic Lists. The first of these books deals specifically with the United Nations handling of the Rwanda genocide, as seen from New York. The second covers Bosnia, Rwanda and related crises from the perspective of a former war correspondent in the field who is also a scholar.

Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, Cornell University, Ithaca NY (USA) and London, 2002, and

Samantha Power, The problem from hell: America and the age of genocide, Basic Books, New York, 2002.

A further recent reflection comes from the ceremonies in January 2005, including at the UN General Assembly, to commemorate the liberation of the Nazi death camps 60 years ago.

"It is a place where Adolf Hitler's Nazis murdered the Jews, I heard myself saying. Even as I answered my 11-year-old son's question about Auschwitz, I shuddered inwardly at the inadequacy of the response. ... Summarized in a sentence or two, the Holocaust sounded too much like just another of the shaming, but discrete events that sometimes deface the pages of

European history. ...

The sadism and cruelty of individuals sits alongside the complicity of politicians and others well beyond Germany's borders ...

I wonder whether there might also be another danger: that as the Holocaust slips into the unremembered past, it will seem to belong to the history of the Jewish people rather than to that of Europe. ...

... At the most conservative estimate, well over 60 million people died in Europe's wars and concentration camps during the last century. The slaughter in Stalin's terror camps ... the murderous toll of Hitler's Germany ... Bosnia and Kosovo [as] ... a chilling reminder ...

... To gaze at the images of Auschwitz and try to comprehend how so many could be complicit in such barbarism is to realize just how thin is the boundary between civilisation and inhumanity.

Philip Stevens, "The sense of shame that obliterates all borders", Financial Times (UK), **January 28, 2005.**

These genocides continue on and on, and the UN is at the center of dealing with them, or should be. But responses seem not to change, amounting to repeated late interventions rather than a commitment to take all possible preventive actions. IO Watch will maintain this topic as the last and worst UN major problem, and below presents key quotes that have appeared along the way. IO Watch will continue to add material since this section, too, is most regrettably open-ended.

" [UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar said] I was, of course, gratified by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize last year to United Nations peace-keeping operations However, careful thought needs to be given to how the purpose and scope of peace-keeping operations can be adapted to the evolving and rapidly changing world situation.

.... Peace-keeping missions will have to be adjusted to types of situations not encountered before.

The financing of peace-keeping operations has presented difficulties time and again. Such serious undertakings, in which lives are at stake, cannot be initiated or conducted with divided counsel about their details and with expectations of short-cuts. Although linked with international diplomacy, peace-keeping by the United Nations must conform to the highest standards of military efficiency

.... Lacking a concerted effort to achieve a just and lasting settlement of the dispute underlying a conflict, the mounting of peace-keeping operations or mediation can produce an illusion of calm, beneath which resentments fester, threatening new outbreaks of hostilities. This has often been forgotten in the past, but ignoring it in future can present incalculable dangers to peace."

"Address by Secretary-General on peace-keeping in 1990s", United Nations Press Release SG/SM/1039, **November 2, 1989.**

"For a decade, the Cambodian question has been addressed by the United Nations as if only one issue were of international concern: Vietnam's illegal invasion and occupation. The other grave issue, **the crimes against humanity committed by Pol Pot and his government, have been ignored in order to ensure that Vietnam left Cambodia.**

.... The Vietnamese army has finally gone, according to all available information.

[Now] Pol Pot's ...army is leading an offensive in a new civil war.

Stopping the Khmer Rouge cannot be considered [or dismissed as] an 'internal' problem for Cambodians. The international community has been actively involved in the Cambodian war since 1979. [It should be equally involved in seeking] a peaceful political settlement and a

immediate end to the civil war.

The United Nations could ... work with the Paris conference on Cambodia for the cease-fire. ...

You will hear arguments that the Cambodian question is very complicated and subtle and requires morally ambiguous solutions. Consider only one fact: Cambodia is at war. If the Khmer Rouge win, there will be nothing complicated or subtle or ambiguous about their genocidal rule. It will happen again."

Elizabeth Becker and William Shawcross, "Act now to stop another Cambodian catastrophe", International Herald Tribune, **November 14, 1989**. Note: Ms. Becker is author of When the war was over, a history of the Cambodian revolution. Mr. Shawcross is author of The quality of mercy: Cambodia, holocaust and modern conscience.]

"It wasn't only that UN officials refused to take any initiative in Somalia. Far worse, they even declined to act when asked [in July 1991].

Why was the UN so loath to act, to play the mediating, peacekeeping role for which it was established? The answer is institutional, bureaucratic caution, and personal ambition ... UN officials were reluctant to try for fear of being associated with failure. ...

If, in the future, the UN hopes to avoid failures like that in Somalia, it will need to change on a more fundamental level.

Above all, if the UN is to be effective, it must be accountable. 'The UN is probably the least accountable bureaucracy in the world -- a main reason not only for the cataclysm in Somalia but for the persistence of famine through Africa', said Alex de Waal, a British anthropologist who has studied the UN's response to famines. **'Officials who are responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths must face the prospect of prosecution, not promotion.'**....

There is also the need for a freedom of information act, so UN officials cannot hide from the public everything from their salaries to their mistakes to how much they're spending on public relations. And finally, there must be an independent watchdog organization with full power to investigate U.N. agencies.

The General Assembly has the authority to establish a commission of inquiry to examine what went wrong in Somalia, but it has never examined its own performance."

Ray Bonner, "Why we went": How the United Nations turned its back on Somalia and subverted the best chance for peace", Mother Jones, (USA), **March-April 1993**, pp. 54-60. [Note: the full article is available at MotherJones.com under the author's name.]

"It's been a bad year for peacekeeping -- and for the United Nations, which was expected to be the agency of a new world order.

There are 13 peacekeeping operations underway, a record number. [and] More than 50,000 soldiers and police officers wear the blue headgear

United Nations peacekeepers are criticized all over the world. Their rules of engagement, and their lack of heavy weapons and air support, prevent them from doing any real fighting. **The U.N. philosophy is 'to show that you're a friend. Sometimes this works' Other times, troublemakers 'see this as weakness.'**

In some hardship posts, U.N. officials live embarrassingly well. They are paid \$140 a day for expenses in Cambodia -- where the average annual wage is \$110. Salvadorans refer to the United Nations as the 'Vacaciones Unidas' (United Vacations). Yet back in New York, peacekeeping and humanitarian staffers are crushed by overwork.

With the Cold War over, the United Nations probably needs to be reinvented or at least overhauled The first requirement is a clear idea of what the United Nations can do -- and what it should not even attempt to do."

Russell Watson with Anne Underwood, "Perils of peacekeeping: With more operations than ever, the United Nations is stumbling badly", Newsweek, **February 15, 1993**, pp. 13-14.

"It is not easy to admit the truth of Srebrenica, the Bosnian town where thousands of Muslim men were executed and hundreds buried alive ... But in its report on Monday, the United Nations accepts its share of the blame.

The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, should be commended for this stark admission. The question, however, is whether his honesty will spur bolder peacekeeping in the future.

.... In the recent case of East Timor, the council supported the idea of a UN referendum on independence but refused to send troops to deter a bloodbath that was widely predicted.

Sometimes the United Nations' failure is built into its structure. Where a permanent member of the Security Council opposes intervention, no action will be authorized -- hence the current UN silence about war crimes in Chechnya, and its early impotence on Kosovo. But in cases where the Security Council does approve action, it is fair to insist that it be serious. The UN member states need to embrace force to secure peace; they need to shove neutrality aside and denounce evil in order to combat it."

"The UN apologizes", *The Washington Post*, International Herald Tribune, **November 19, 1999**.

"Just a month after the United Nations released a self-incriminating report on the massacre in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica, an equally damning report has appeared on Rwanda. During 100 days in 1994, a staggering 800,000 civilians were slaughtered in this small Central African state. The United Nations had 2,500 troops in the area in early 1994. All but a few hundred were withdrawn when the killing started.

Given its membership, the United Nations will never meet all of the world's many humanitarian challenges. But it should at least avoid empty efforts that serve to excuse the world's inaction.

If the world's leading governments are indifferent to genocide, the United Nations should not act as the vehicle for token interventions to hide their shame. It should use that shame to fight indifference; it should broadcast the horror of genocide to voters and stir the outrage that might produce serious intervention. [Secretary-General Kofi] Annan likes to say that the United Nations should not be neutral in the face of evil. Indifference to evil is not a matter for polite neutrality, either."

"Confession on Rwanda", *The Washington Post*, International Herald Tribune, **December 21, 1999**.

"A damning report issued Thursday by an international panel of experts holds both United Nations officials and leading member countries, primarily the United States, responsible for failing to prevent or stop the genocide in which hundreds of thousands of Rwandans were slaughtered in 1994.

.... the leader of the investigation, Ingvar Carlsson, a former Swedish prime minister, said **it was 'hard to understand' why the Security Council decimated the peacekeeping force in Rwanda, reducing it to a few hundred from 2,500 troops when the genocide began,** and then increased the force to 5,500 when the weeks of massacres were over.

'Information received by a United Nations mission that plans are being made to exterminate any group of people requires an immediate and determined response,' the report said.

The panel found that a cable from [General Romeo Dallaire of Canada] in January 1994 warning of Hutu plans for massacres of Tutsi was not given to Secretary-General [Butros Butros-

Ghali], whom activists in Europe have attempted to charge with genocide.

[That cable] has become the center of accusations that the United Nations could have predicted genocide and did nothing."

Barbara Crossette, "UN bungled intervention in Rwanda, inquiry says", International Herald Tribune, **December, 1999**.

"After the humiliating failures of United Nations peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Rwanda there was a consensus that new ways of undertaking them [needed urgently to be] developed. That is what makes the recent decision to deploy 5,500 U.N. peacekeepers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo so incomprehensible.

As the United Nations itself now concedes, [the efforts] in Rwanda and Bosnia ... never had either the means or the mandate to accomplish anything more than a bit of marginal humanitarian relief. [Yet in] the proposed Congo deployment the identical mistakes are being made once again. The fact that they are being made with the best of intentions alters nothing, and may, in fact, make the effects of what will almost certainly be another catastrophic failure all the more damaging. For to the public, the fact that the mission has neither the funding nor the authority to do much of anything will not be clear. Instead, it will seem as if the world tried to do something for Africa, but nothing could be done. Such a conclusion helps nobody, least of all those Africans who deserve so much better from the rest of the world."

David Rieff, "Making the same mistakes: Memo to the United Nations: A peacekeeping mission to Congo may do more harm than good", Newsweek, **March 20, 2000**.

[Note: Mr. Rieff is the author, among other books of A bed for the night: Humanitarianism in crisis, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2002.]

"[Jiri Dienstbier] the special rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, [has bluntly declared] that the peacekeeping mission [in Kosovo] has failed 'to achieve a single goal; neither security for people nor freedom of movement, not to mention creating conditions for the develop of democratic institutions in a multiethnic society.' This is a message Western leaders don't want to hear -- and strenuously seek to refute.

Just how bad is the situation on the ground? Crime, gangs, and the heroin trade are all flourishing.

Bernard Kouchner, the head of the U.N. administration in Kosovo, has few resources at his disposal so far.

Today, NATO still insists on the fiction that Kosovo is a multiethnic autonomous province within Yugoslavia.

But **it's time to get real Peacekeeping missions are proliferating in remote areas -- East Timor, Sierra Leone, Georgia.** 'If we can't turn the situation around in a tiny area with 1.7 million people who are mostly on our side, it's the end of humanitarian interventionism everywhere' argues NATO spokesman Jamie Shea. An overblown prediction, perhaps -- but only a tad, I'd say."

Andrew Nagorski, "The perils of peacekeeping" A year after the NATO air war, the result of NATO's efforts is a highly volatile mess", Newsweek, **April 17, 2000**, p. 2.

" The Security Council pledged 11,100 troops for the Sierra Leone operation, which would make it the biggest current peacekeeping force and a test case for UN resolve in Africa. It is not going well

The UN force is supposed to monitor a peace deal, signed last July [but a] recent UN report accused the RUF rebels of continuing to terrorise civilians. 'There have been almost daily reports of looting of villages, house burnings, harassment and abductions of

civilians, rape and sexual abuse,' [and] cannibalism and chopping off limbs have been RUF specialties.

[This may be occurring with rebel leader Foday Sankoh's] blessing, or even encouragement. His attitude to peace and the UN is troubling. He recently told UN officers: 'The UN has no reason to be in Sierra Leone. We have no business with you. You are not helping us, [you are] a threat to the security of our people.' For good measure, he described President [Ahmed Tejan] Kabbah as an agent of colonialism and called [Secretary-General Kofi] Annan 'a nuisance.'

"Sierra Leone: Out of control", The Economist, **May 6, 2000**, p. 43.

"Nine days ago, a Security Council delegation went to **Africa** to assess] small hopes for lasting peace

A lot was at stake, they thought: the political and economic stability of at least six countries; the fabulous wealth of Democratic Republic of the Congo itself and the future of United Nations peacekeeping.

[When they returned to New York] Congo had all but receded to the background. But broader concerns about Africa and its evolving political leadership had mushroomed.

[A US official assessed] the costs of African wars: **'Of the 4 to 5 million people who have died in communal and regional conflicts worldwide over the past decade, more than 3 million have died on this continent.** The most obvious threat to peace comes from the barrel of a gun or the blade of a machete But insecurity can also come from corrupt politicians; it can come from crime lords and narcotics syndicates. It can come from diamond mines as well as land mines.'

.... buffeted by events, several of the diplomats spoke at they headed home about the profound unease they felt about Africa's future, given the demonstrated willfulness of key leaders."

Barbara Crossette, "A continent is seething: No remedy for Africa", International Herald Tribune, **May 11, 2000**.

"The UN seems to survive only by forgetting. By forgetting, it it manages to repress a legacy of shame. In 1994, Rwanda, in 1995, Srebrenica Only last autumn, Secretary-General Kofi Annan vowed to learn from these catastrophes. Now a new catastrophe unfolds.

The UN's department of peacekeeping operations knew that the contingents in Sierra Leone were under-strength and poorly equipped, yet it failed to protest publicly when the Security Council sent them anyway.

Institutional amnesia locks the United Nations system into a fatal compulsion to repeat. An incorrigible moral narcissism about its own good intentions makes it unable to recognize that its central ideal and instrument -- peacekeeping -- is so flawed that it must be abandoned altogether.

Where peace has to be enforced rather than maintained, what's required are combat-capable warriors under robust rules of engagement [with strong support] and a single line of command to a national government or regional alliance.

But the largest lesson of all is that peacekeeping is destroying the United Nations itself. If it still values its own survival, it must abandon an ideal that it has so comprehensively betrayed."

Michael Ignatieff, "A bungling UN is undermining itself", International Herald Tribune, **May 16, 2000**. [Note: Mr. Ignatieff is the author *inter alia* of Virtual war: Kosovo and beyond.]

" ... both the Security Council and the UN Secretariat had compiled an entirely inglorious

record in the months preceding the [Rwanda] genocide ...

... the UN Secretariat went far beyond being merely neutral bureaucrats carrying out the wishes of their political masters in the Security Council. Time and again, they imposed on UNAMIR the tightest constraints imaginable ...

The Secretariat did not exercise its right to function as an advocate with the Security Council by [fudging members] ... to take more positive action. ... Their record is a dark stain on the UN and themselves.

... [In mid-1998], Secretary-General Annan [a direct participant] ... traveled to Kigali and apologized ... 'Looking back now ... we see the signs ... what we did was not nearly enough ...' Rwandan officials, who had no doubt whatsoever about the signs ... available, were furious with the Secretary-General's performance.

The price of the [international] betrayal was paid by countless Rwandans ... In contrast, ... [of the key Security Council or Secretariat actors] ... No one resigned ... Many of their careers have flourished greatly ... Instead of international accountability, it appears that international impunity is the rule of the day."

Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, Report of The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, Organization of African Unity, **7 July 2000**,

Chapter 15, The world during the genocide: The United Nations, Belgium, France, and the OAU", paras. 15.1, 15.34-.36, and 15.41. [Note: The entire report is available

at the Aegis Trust website at www.aegistrust.org/]

"Secretary-General Kofi Annan has called publicly for a rethinking of the international institutions "that were largely sidelined during the Iraq war.

.... The war [in Iraq] and more recent crises in Africa 'force us to ask ourselves whether the institutions and methods we are accustomed to are really adequate to deal with all the stresses of the last couple of years.'

Suggesting that some world leaders at the upcoming General Assembly should set aside time for basic discussions on these issues, he said: If we are going to make preventive action, or war, part of our response to these new threats, what are the rules? Who decides? Under what circumstances? Did what happened in Iraq constitute an exception? A procedure others can exploit? **What are the rules?**

At one point, recalling the bitter dismissals of the United Nations last winter, he said, with a bare hint of satisfaction, 'I did warn those who were bashing the UN that they had to be careful because they may need the UN soon.'"

Felicity Barringer, "Annan urges rethink of UN role in crises", International Herald Tribune, **August 1, 2003**. [Note: in comparing this quote with former Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar's wise comments of 1989 above, it is sad to note the almost total lack of UN progress in thinking about developing lasting preventive solutions rather than just putting out fires.]

"While much U. S. political debate is focused on reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan [Sudan seems destined to get nothing although] it is on the brink of a historic peace agreement that could end the world's longest and most destructive civil conflict.

.... **More than 2 million have perished [in Sudan's 20-year civil war]**..... 5 million have been internally displaced and in southern Sudan there is a total lack of economic transport or communications infrastructure. If peace finally arrives, the need for transitional aid will become extremely urgent.

These people will have no chance of resuming productive lives without very significant assistance

.... A peacekeeping force, which should be deployed under UN auspices, may be the most important element in any sustainable peace for Sudan.[and] Given the high levels of

humanitarian assistance that the United States has provided for well over a decade, this seems the most ill-considered of times to withhold promised funding.

Sudan has suffered decades of invisibility on the global stage, and Sudanese lives have suffered a deeply disgraceful moral discounting. At its moment of greatest hope this broken nation must not be betrayed once again."

Eric Reeves, "A promise the U. S. must keep", International Herald Tribune, **October 28, 2003**. [Note: Once again (and in addition to the United States), where was and is the UN, and where is the "international community," in this urgent situation?]

"A number of [Secretary-General] Annan's closest associates ... believed their boss was treated unfairly in the **Rwanda** report, because nothing he could have done in the months before the genocide would have made the member states ... more willing to act ... This amounts to saying that the genocide was inevitable, and the peacekeeping mission useless from the outset. Annan himself said much the same thing when we talked ... before he left Sarajevo. ... 'I say, when [the member states] knew, what did they do?' he told me. 'They went to Rwanda, picked up their nationals, and left.' By then, all hell had broken loose. ... Even if Annan's decision to keep his force commander's warnings to himself did no measurable harm -- and that is a big, and unprovable, if -- the fact remains that not doing wrong is a far cry from not doing right. **The Security Council's pusillanimity in the face of the slaughter is not in dispute, but what are we to make of Annan's certainty that it would have been pointless to raise the alarm months earlier? How can he know when he didn't even try?**

'Maybe we were overly cautious', he said.'

Philip Gourevich, "The optimist: Kofi Annan's U.N. has never been more important and more imperiled", The New Yorker, **March 3, 2003**, pp. 51-73 [69]. [Note: Mr. Gourevich is the author of *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda*, Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, New York, 1998, and *Picador*, London, 1999, [Winner of the Guardian (UK) First Book Award.]

"In the Darfur province of western Sudan, a slow-motion genocide has been taking place while the rest of the world either pretends not to notice or finds excuses for refusing to intervene.

... **The Darfur atrocities have been going on for 16 months.** If they are not stopped immediately, the world will witness a human calamity on the scale of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The UN special rapporteur ... [said] recently that the number of black Africans killed by Arab militias in the Darfur region is 'bound to be staggering.' ...

Human rights groups and others gripped by the horror of Darfur know what needs to be done to save these refugees from death by starvation or from the cholera and malaria that will inevitably rage through their crowded camps.

But Khartoum's pattern is to impede, obstruct and delay. ...

There is no other way to stop the Darfur genocide other than a humanitarian intervention. In accord with **the 1948 Convention on Genocide**, the UN Security Council should pass such a resolution and invite a coalition of willing life savers to enter Darfur and rescue a million fellow human beings."

"Stop the killing in Darfur", The Boston Globe, International Herald Tribune, **July 16, 2004**.

"... I am afraid that moral condemnation, trade penalties and military efforts by African countries are simply not going to be enough to stop the killing [in Darfur] -- not nearly enough.

I know because I've seen it all happen before ... [as the Canadian commander of] UN forces in Rwanda when civil war began there and quickly turned into genocide. The conflict was often

portrayed as nothing more than an age-old feud between African tribes ...

The United Nations, emasculated by the self-interested maneuverings of the five permanent members of **the Security Council, fails to intervene. Its only concrete step, the Security Council resolution passed in July, all but plagiarizes the resolutions on Rwanda 10 years earlier.** ...

So in the end we get [a] ... few hundred observers from the African Union. ...

I believe that ... mobile African Union troops supported by [well-equipped] NATO soldiers ... could protect Darfur's displaced people, and eliminate or incarcerate the Janjaweed.

[Rwanda has provided troops for Darfur as it vowed to do] ... Having called what happened in Darfur genocide and having vowed to stop it, it is time for the West to keep its word as well."

Romeo Dallaire, "The world's failure to act: Looking at Darfur, seeing Rwanda", International Herald Tribune, **October 5, 2004**. Note: Mr. Dallaire is a fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard University and author of Shake hands with the devil: The failure of humanity in Rwanda, Caroll & Graf, New York, **2004**.

"A debate currently rages about whether Kofi Annan enjoys the moral authority to lead the United Nations because the Oil for Food scandal happened under his command. ... [But] the salient indictment of Mr. Annan's leadership is lethal cowardice, not corruption; the evidence is genocide, not oil.

... **10 years ago, [in Rwanda] ... some 800,000 bodies rotted in the African sun.**

... Most of the U.N.'s armed troops [had] evacuated ... abandoning vulnerable civilians to their fate, which included, literally the worst things ... a human being can do to another human being.

[In] Srebrenica ten years ago, thousands of Muslim civilians [sought] ... shelter at a U.N. base. But Serb militias separated the men and boys ... and put them on buses. Armed Blue Helmeted U.N. Peacekeepers -- tasked under Mr. Annan's leadership to protect them in this U.N.-declared 'Safe Area' watched passively. ... Across the street [now] lies a new cemetery and memorial for the 8,000 fallen men of Srebrenica. ...

If anyone's values have been betrayed at the U.N. over the years it is those of us who believe most deeply in the organization's ideals. Just ask the men and women of Rwanda and Srebrenica."

Kenneth L. Cain, "The real reason Kofi Annan must go", Wall Street Journal, WSJ.com, Opinion Journal, **December 21, 2004**. [Note: Mr. Cain is a former UN human rights lawyer who served in U.N. peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Liberia.]

"Good intentions pervaded ceremonies this week in the UN General Assembly to commemorate the liberation of the Nazi death camps 60 years ago. ...

... The event -- at least on a symbolic level -- was a long overdue recognition of the moral imperative of the United Nations' origins. ...

In [Kofi] Annan's speech ..., he lamented that 'the world has, to its shame, failed more than once to pressure or halt genocide.' He invoked Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. He then said, 'Terrible things are happening today in Darfur, Sudan.'

But **there is a strange disconnect between Annan's words and deeds.** In 1994, as chief of UN peacekeeping, he disregarded pleas from the UN force commander in Rwanda to intervene and stop a genocide in its planning stage or its first few days. And today Annan is presiding over a club of governments that refuses to save victims of genocide in Darfur from a Sudanese government that is seated in the General Assembly. His profession of good intentions is not enough to save lives. **Under his leadership, the United Nations is failing to live up to its original motivation: the prevention of more genocides."**

"Hollow words at the UN", The Boston Globe, in the International Herald Tribune, **January 28, 2005.**

"The UN commission of inquiry that has compiled devastating documentation of crimes against humanity in the Darfur region of Sudan nevertheless brought shame on the United Nations by submitting a report last week that absolves the National Islamic Front in Sudan of the crime of genocide.

The commission did find that the murdered civilians of Darfur -- probably more than 200,000 already -- and the 2.4 million refugees facing death from disease and malnutrition have suffered from violations of international humanitarian law. The commission even identified the government in Khartoum and its Arab militia allies known as Janjaweed as the parties responsible.

... Moreover, the commission said these crimes were perpetrated 'on a widespread and systematic basis.' Yet in what seems a politically-motivated contortion of language and logic ... the commission decided that Khartoum's crimes satisfied only two of three elements needed for ... [a finding of a policy of genocide.]

... **In denying the existence of the Darfur genocide** in a way that suits the amoral interests of governments represented in the United Nations, **[the UN commission of inquiry] has failed to end a much greater wrong -- the genocidal annihilation of Darfur's African tribal groups.**"

"UN denial on Darfur", International Herald Tribune, **February 8, 2005.**

"...Rwanda's stunning new genocide museum, perched on a quiet hillside overlooking Kigali, is at its most arresting when it honours the lost children. One installation invites us to consider David, a cute, shy boy, with big round black eyes: ... he was tortured to death; his last words were 'The UN will come to get us.'

... Next to these tributes is another installation - **a reproduction of the infamous fax by the UN force commander, General Romeo Dallaire, imploring the then head of UN peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, for authority to defend Rwandan civilians** - many of whom had taken refuge in UN compounds under implicit and sometimes explicit promises of protection.

Here, too, is **Annan's faxed response - ordering Dallaire to defend only the UN's image of impartiality, forbidding him to protect desperate civilians waiting to die.** Next it details the withdrawal of UN troops, even while ... the assassins reigned ...

The museum's silent juxtaposition of personal courage versus Annan's passive capitulation to evil is an effective reminder of what is at stake in the debate over Annan's future: **when the UN fails, innocent people die.** Under Annan, the UN has failed, and people have died."

Kenneth Cain, "How many more must die before Kofi quits?", The Observer (UK), **April 2, 2005.**

"It has been **ten years since a five-day killing spree** under the eyes of the United Nations went on in the eastern Bosnian enclave of **Srebrenica**. Ten years since the men were lined up in the fields, holding each other and whispering, 'Are they going to kill us? They can't kill us,' before they were mowed down ...

Eight thousand men disappeared ... Most of the bones have not been found. ...

Most of the killers, the men who pulled the trigger and tossed bodies in mass graves, still sit in cafés in Srebrenica; sipping coffee and gloating over their victory. ...

The fact is, Srebrenica was more than a genocide ... It was a victory for ethnic cleansing. Srebrenica ... [now lies inside] the Republika Srpska. The few Muslims who have gone back are brave, because this is a haunted, spooky place.

I sit in the café near the mosque and talk to returned refugees huddled over their coffee cups. ...

How can you forget what happened? If women as gentle as Senada or Nurija want to rip the throats off of the men who killed their beloved men, how can these people ever live together again?"

Janine de Giovanni, "Srebrenica: Anniversary of a genocide", International Herald Tribune, **July 9-10, 2005**. [Note: Ms. Di Giovanni is the author of Madness visible: A memoir of war, Knopf, 2003.]

Much more information and insights on the UN and genocide can be found in the IO Watch Dark Side features UN, genocide, 1993-1994, UN, genocide, 1992-2006, and UN, illegitimacy?, 2004, as well as the UN Hall of Shame entry for Kofi A. Annan, "the first problem ..." and the Dark Side feature on UN, humanitarianism, 2004.

This topic continues in Genocide, II