

GENEVA GROUP "DUE DILIGENCE" FAILURE

It is generally known that UN Member State financial assessments differ, but not that the differences are so extreme. An analysis by Klaus Hufner of UN regular budget data for 2000 presented Member States' contributions grouped by percentage of total obligatory contributions paid:

<u>"Category</u>	<u>No. of Member States</u>	<u>Total per category</u>
15.001 - 25.000 %	2	45.573%
6.001 - 15.000 %	2	16.402%
3.001 - 6.000%	2	10.529%
1.001 - 3.000%	10	15.278%
0.501 - 1.000%	8	5.529%
0.201 - 0.500%	8	2.682%
0.060 - 0.200%	21	2.663%
0.001 - 0.059%	<u>136</u>	<u>1.341%</u>
TOTAL	<u>189</u>	<u>100.001%"</u>

Klaus Hufner, "Financing the United Nations: The role of the United States", in Dennis Dijkzeul, and Yves Beigbeder, eds., Rethinking international organizations: Pathology and promise, Berghahn, New York and Oxford, **2003**, pp. 29-53.

[Note: (Once again, UN financial reporting hampers the analysis: these regular budget figures are to some extent also the basis for the large assessed contributions for peacekeeping, but the much larger mass of voluntary contribution levels varies widely, with some smaller developed countries paying a much higher percentage share than some of the biggest countries.)

One of the fundamental principles of the legislative branch of any government is the "power of the purse" -- the legislature decides how much money to raise and spend and where to spend it. However, as the above shows, this principle is meaningless in the UN, because of the "ability to pay" principle which governs contributions for developed and developing Member States.

Six countries -- the USA, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom -- pay 72 percent of the total regular budget. The top 16 countries paid almost 88 percent. In contrast, the 136 countries who pay the least, up to 0.06 percent each, in total pay only about 1.3 percent of the UN regular budget. (The actual dollar range recently was from \$300 million for the USA as the biggest donor, to many at the minimal level of about \$12,500.)

IO Watch makes this assessment solely for accountability purposes. All UN Member Countries are "stakeholders", who hopefully believe in and support the UN. But in fact only a few actually pay a significant amount of funds. For those who pay the least, the assessed amount covers only perhaps 1-2 months salary for one of their citizens serving in the UN, not a significant motivator. For the top six countries, the contributions were from \$300 million down to \$54 million each (again, regular budget only, but much more when voluntary funding is added in.) The power of the purse concept for the UN overall, therefore, is relatively meaningless.

Yet the bigger countries do have some greater influence through their funding (particularly their voluntary contributions), and even more importantly a strong and direct fiduciary responsibility to their taxpayers for the wise use of those funds.

To reflect this situation, 14 developed countries belong to the so-called "Geneva Group", which, since 1964, has been an important consultation mechanism of "democratic" UN Member states contributing at least 1 percent of the UN regular budget.

This 40-year old group continues to be quite active. A UN interagency website gave the flavour of their recent preoccupations and conceptual projects, as an:

"integrated package of policy guidelines and tools encompassing:
Strategic budgeting ... a continuous process of planning, approval, implementation, evaluation, and feedback ...
Budget constraint ... not an end in itself, but a practical benchmark ...
Efficiency in programme delivery ... to ensure that maximum resources are allocated to priority program activities ...
Tools for assessment of value for money ... a strategic budgeting approach ... evaluations should be made at all levels ...
Other measures to promote better budget presentation ... full cost attribution ... greater transparency of resource allocations ... "

[Note: This document was posted online under the old ACC material on the Internet, before it became the Chief Executives Board in 2001.]

These "management mantra" activities are "nice", soothing, and commendable as concepts. IO Watch concludes, however, based on all the evidence amassed in this website, that the Geneva Group, at 40, is facing a "midlife crisis". Its efforts seem regrettably (as was once said about modern economists) like "determining the optimum arrangement of deck chairs on the Titanic." Indeed, the UN ship threatens to go down, as Secretary-General Annan emphasized to the Member States in September 2003. Yet Rosemary Righter's very detailed 1995 analysis of UN operations and the Geneva Group's role therein still seems, very regrettably, quite appropriate today.

"For years Western governments have complained about the lack of accountability prevailing in UN organizations, but in practice they have tolerated a degree of opacity that would be considered totally unacceptable for any civil service in a democracy. The Geneva Group's 'zero-growth' policy has been the nearest they have come to sanctions, [but it] ... has had only limited success in compelling secretariats to cooperate in discussing management practices and opening the books. Inadequate internal auditing and slipshod evaluation procedures have not only shielded inefficiency, waste, maladministration, and downright fraud; they have deprived the UN's member states of the information they need to identify the organizations' weaknesses -- and strengths. ...

... [No] amount of exhortation – as the years have proved – can compensate for the lack of routine inspection under established rules of 'open government.' Evaluation would require ... built-in procedures requiring the UN bureaucracies to respond to criticisms. So ingrained is the collusion between the permanent representatives to these organizations and the secretariats that a majority for such an initiative among the UN membership would be difficult though not impossible to muster. But many UN staff members would welcome more rigorous scrutiny ..."

Rosemary Righter, *Utopia lost: The United Nations and world order*, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1995, pp. 280-281. [emphasis added]

The excellent management accountability initiative of the General Assembly in 1993 is long gone. The holy grail of UN performance management stretches ever further outward into the distant future, and the UN managers have been given unprecedented freedom with little accountability. Yet the Geneva Group has not taken hold, and moved decisively, to ensure that the resources of its member countries are in fact being used wisely. Another decade has been lost, and the new eagerly anticipated "prince" of an OIOS seems to have turned out to be just another "frog".

IO Watch suggests that the Geneva Group too needs to finally shift gears from "best practices" concepts, to engage in UN management reform discussions in a much more business-like, professional, and results-oriented way, and to propose and insist on pragmatic and feasible corrective actions. (This could most effectively be done in conjunction with the proposed External experts oversight review and the General Assembly audit subcommittee proposed in the preceding subsections.)

The Geneva Group members might hopefully consider the following solutions as tangible, already-proposed but never tried, and "doable" elements to install independent mechanisms to counter UN managers' long-standing impunity with firm accountability requirements, the rule of law, and professional oversight in the 21st century. To recapitulate, efforts are urgently needed to :

- establish a real fraud prevention programme;
- revise the code of conduct;
- bring experts in to examine and reform or enhance internal justice, oversight, and human resource management performance;
- establish a strong and independent human rights ombudsman;
- focus efforts on a clear, pragmatic, and coherent UN (or UN system) strategy;
- establish, finally, a Fifth Committee audit subcommittee and annual reporting on UN programme results and on human and financial resource status and use;

all in active conjunction with other Member States, but as a firm assertion of real Geneva Group "due diligence" for the billions of UN and UN system funds from their taxpayers that the UN expends each and every year.

The UN staff integrity survey of June 2004; the US GAO assessments of dawdling UN performance management efforts in 2000 and again in February 2004; and the Iraq oil-for-food programme scandal, all suggest a need for urgent remedial action in day-to-day UN management and operations. UN Member States and their diplomatic missions -- not just the Secretariat top leadership and managers, the Security Council, the General Assembly and its Fifth Committee, and the OIOS -- have a clear fiduciary duty to uphold as well.

The need for a "democratic caucus" to finally intervene and firmly hold the UN to account to meet global challenges was very succinctly stated by Michael Moore, former head of the WTO, in a 2003 article.

"Challenges that must be globally managed keep popping up: genetic engineering, AIDS, and global terrorist networks. Yet ... the global landscape has

dramatically changed in the last 50 years, but the institutions serving the world have not.

The institutions cannot reform themselves. Two generations of institutional contamination and tenured self-interest ensure that this deadlock continues. But this lack of coherence damages their collective credibility, frustrates their donors and owners, and gives rise to public cynicism. There is a consensus that something must be done, but no consensus on how to go about it.

.... It's time for a small group of national leaders to take on the challenge of reforming and rebuilding global governance. They should build this effort around the issue of the democratic deficit in multilateral institutions. The leadership must come from the top. Otherwise, endless seminars and conferences will inevitably bog down the process in the name of consensus"

Similarly, **[senior officials in national legislatures] should form a democratic caucus to provide systematic oversight of international institutions, focusing particularly on increasing the transparency of these institutions. [This informal] caucus would strengthen national governments in their role in holding these agencies to account.**"

Mike Moore, "Multilateral meltdown", Foreign Policy, March/April 2003, p. 75.

[Note: Mr. Moore was Director General of the World Trade Organization from 1999 to 2002 and a former Prime Minister of New Zealand. He is the author of A world without walls: Freedom, development, free trade, and global governance, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK, 2003.]

Rosemary Righter's set of options, presented at the beginning of this "Answers" subsection, suggested that the governments who "pay the bills" could finally make the UN more relevant and useful by departing from mere structural reform and continued "façade management" (as with the OIOS). Instead, they should use "positive discrimination" and the West's power of the purse (there is still some), organizational abilities, and political influence to build up those UN units capable of doing good work, while letting its worst units wither on the vine. The accountability actions proposed above would be a key to help finally expose a UN culture of management immunity and impunity to firm accountability discipline, and much needed transparency in its operational and policy processes.

Rosemary Righter, "Introduction: The United Nations at a watershed," in Utopia lost: The United Nations and world order, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1995, particularly pp. 5-10.

At least in December 2004 the General Assembly firmly noted the failure of Secretary-General Annan to establish sound and effective accountability mechanisms, despite having had eight years and much prodding to do so.

"The General Assembly ...

6. Emphasizes the importance of establishing real, effective and efficient mechanisms for responsibility and accountability;

7. **Regrets that despite previous information provided by the Secretary-General on the establishment of accountability mechanisms, including the accountability panel, such mechanisms are not in place, thereby affecting the efficient and effective functioning of the Organization;**"

"Review of the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 48/218B and 54/244: Report of the Fifth Committee", UN document A/59/649 of **22 December 2004**, and

"Review of the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 48/218B and 54/244", General Assembly resolution 59/272 of **23 December 2004**, paras. 6-7. [emphasis added]

However, can the UN General Assembly, and particularly the Geneva Group members who provide (and supposedly carefully oversee) the vast majority of funds to a faltering Secretariat, finally take decisive corrective action instead of such mere complaining? Well, a recent very pessimistic assessment quite accurately summarizes the legislative impotence and inaction which was on display at the 2004 General Assembly session, as indeed it has been for decades.

"[In my view,] ... the UN is constitutionally incapable of conducting any operation efficiently or honestly. Ideally the UN, foreshadowing a future world government, ought to be run by a global meritocracy -- rule by the best. In practice, it is the opposite. Any state that can be legally defined as one can join the UN -- it is a club having no rules of probity or morals. ...

... The result is failure and graft. **UN officials are not answerable to bodies like Congress or the U.K.'s Parliament, which would be sure to track down, expose and punish gross abuses and manifest failures.** No senior UN official has ever gone to jail. It's rare for anyone to be sacked or removed. The top brass resist any kind of investigation, on principle. The oil-for-food inquiry is unique in that it has taken place at all and seems to be garnering results.

But will any punishment be meted out? Will any serious reforms be pushed through? Of course not. ..."

Paul Johnson, "The UN is for talk, not actions," *Forbes* (US), **March 14, 2005.**

[Note: Mr. Johnson is an 'eminent British historian and author.']

To overcome this pessimistic assessment, Member States and first and foremost the Geneva Group members who provide most of the \$10 billion the UN spends each year must respond to some fundamental truths, instead of regarding the UN as a "unique" institution above the rule of law and accountability for its performance.

Recent research has provided excellent guidance on proper legislative oversight responsibilities and transparency worldwide, and in 2005 Secretary-General Annan himself has underscored this duty as well, as shown by the following sequence of quotes.

"The latter half of the 20th century saw the increasing dominance of the executive branch of government over the policy process ... More recently, a wave of organizational and procedural reforms ... [have sought to modernize] public administration ... [However,] the law making assemblies which formulate the policies which public administrators are charged with implementing [have remained relatively unscathed]. ...

... The power to legislate is largely meaningless if the legislature lacks the ability to ensure that public policy is administered in accordance with legislative intent. Also, and more fundamentally ... [o]nly by monitoring the implementation process, can members of the legislature uncover any statutory defects and act to correct agency misinterpretation or maladministration. In this sense, oversight exists as an essential corollary to the lawmaking function."

Peter Falconer, Colin Smith, and C. William R. Webster, eds., Managing parliaments in the 21st century, EGPA Yearbook, Volume 16, International Institute of Administrative Sciences Monographs, IOS and Ohmsha, Amsterdam, 2001, pp. 1-2. [emphasis added.]

"Public scrutiny of state affairs and access to information are key phases in the current debate on the development of democracy ... The two concepts are interdependent, since one cannot play its part under the rule of law without the other. There can be no public scrutiny without access to information. ...

... It is even possible to conclude ... that the level of democracy attained by a country should now be measured in terms of the volume and quality of the information in circulation. ...

... it should now be clear that ***it is not possible to fight corruption in the absence of a culture of transparency. Building such a culture can begin with a legislative commitment to the public that breaks with the many years of concealment and the persecution of those who take an interest in public affairs. ...***

Legislation of this type must overcome the huge temptation to control access to information as a means of maintaining the conditions under which an authoritarian state can achieve its objectives. It must also overcome ***a culture of blatant isolation, behind which administrations have long sheltered in an effort to avoid 'undesirable' interference in their affairs."***

Alfredo Chirino Sánchez, "The right of access to information and public scrutiny: Transparency as a democratic control instrument," in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Public sector transparency and accountability: Making it happen, OECD, Paris, 2002, pp. 163-166 [163, 166]. [emphasis added]

"Today I shall be presenting my report, "In Larger Freedom" to the United Nations General Assembly. ...

I wanted to remind the governments of the world, who put me in my job and to whom I am accountable, that they are in the UN to represent not themselves but their peoples, who expect them to work for the [UN Charter's] ... aims ...

The UN ... can be a much more effective instrument ***if its governing body, the General Assembly***, is better organized and gives clearer directives to us in the secretariat, with the flexibility to carry them out, and ***holds us clearly accountable for how we do it. ...***

... If world leaders rise to their responsibilities, the rebirth and renewal of the UN will be just beginning - and with it, renewed hope for a freer, fairer, and safer world."

Kofi Annan, "An aspiration to a larger freedom", Financial Times (UK), March 21, 2005. [emphasis added.]

If Member States have been reluctant to accept their oversight responsibilities and the UN leadership quite happy with the continuing, ineffective, "self-reform" processes every five

or ten years, at least one group -- the UN staff - has continued to urge concrete actions by Member States to firmly establish accountability in the Secretariat, thus far to no effect, as shown by the following five quotes.

"During [Secretary-General Kurt] Waldheim's second term [in the late 1970s], ... [and] thwarted in their negotiations with the United Nations administration, [UN staff representatives] were enabled to express their disquiet to the Assembly by a special provision enacted by the Assembly itself in consequence of staff agitation. ... these efforts failed in their object of generating wide concern and consequent reforms ... **The spectacle of a staff body vainly seeking the proper use of its resources in the organization's service and soliciting, in effect, the intercession of the organization's governing council to prevent continued mismanagement by its appointed leaders was not new at the United Nations.**"

Shirley Hazzard, on the Waldheim era of staff relations in the 1970s, "Breaking Faith: II", The New Yorker, **October 2, 1989**, pp. 74-96, [85-86].
[emphasis added.]

"UN officials who advocate a cleanup ... say that management by ... top officials has been inept and, occasionally, corrupt. 'There is no [regular] supervision of any agency' ... said [a senior official.] **Governing councils ... are 'basically rubber-stamp bodies.'**"

The U. N. Board of Auditors ... cites numerous [problems] and 'weak internal controls' ... during 1990 and 1991 ... [in a] 136-page report that enumerates irregularities or deficiencies in hiring, cash and property management, internal audits and purchases of everything from project equipment to airline tickets. ...

Many anomalies [that they report] 'appear to be recurring' and point to **a 'lack of determination to enforce regulations and rules and make the heads of units of the organization accountable,' the report says.**

A recent confidential internal paper circulating in the U. N. Development Program ... put the problem more bluntly. Citing **'a deplorable vacuum of basic ethics' in the system, it noted widespread criticism of 'prolific structures, pompous-Byzantine attitudes of ranking officials, operational inefficiency and ... gross mismanagement** of financial and personnel resources.'

The 10-page paper listed a dozen cases of corruption involving the development agency's staffers or programs that totaled millions of dollars in pilfered funds."

William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, **September 20, 1992**, p 4.

"On the very day the Sunday Times [(UK) published a very critical report on UN mismanagement] ... I received the news of the killing of one more UNHCR colleague, Boris Zeravic, in Bosnia. The report failed to mention the sacrifices that the vast majority of the United Nations staff make, particularly the loss of life, while working in conflict situations.

The Staff Council in UNHCR agrees with the thrust of the criticisms. **The staff wants to weed out corruption, mismanagement, nepotism, double-dippers, desk-warmers, and all other irregularities ... Staff representatives have been tirelessly pointing out unsavory management tendencies and reported to the governing body of UNHCR ... on how to strengthen the organization and to ensure the**

effective use of its human resources. The question is: what do these government representatives do with these reports when they return to their capitals ...

UNHCR ... staff on the ground work with dedication and have twice won the Nobel Peace Prize, but they are demoralized when subjected to unjustified criticism. UNHCR staff needs the help of the media to further strengthen its humanitarian commitment to work for refugees."

Nasr Ishak, "HCR staff replies", UN Special (Geneva), **October 1993**, p. 20.

[Note: a reply letter to the Sunday Times, by the Chairman of the Staff Council, UNHCR]. [emphasis added.]

"Rosemarie Waters, [the UN Staff Union President], said that ... **in the last six years, [UN] ... management had been reforming itself and increasing managerial authority, while reducing accountability.** The Staff Union [had great respect for the Secretary-General's vision and reform programme goals.] ... It could not support, however, the erosion of staff rights and dissolution of oversight mechanisms as a means of implementation, [or legitimize] ... actions in which staff, through their elected representatives, had no meaningful role to play. ...

The [integrity survey] ... revealed that staff ... feared reprisals for exposing breaches of ethics, and they perceived that the disciplinary process was applied unevenly. Their view of integrity among senior managers was less than positive..

The Organization had yet to establish concrete measures for individual accountability, she continued. It was essential that areas with expanded delegation of authority for personnel decisions should be carefully examined and, if abuses were found, such delegation should be revoked. ... **The [OHRM] had informed staff representatives of its inability to enforce accountability because they lacked central authority. The Fifth Committee may wish to recommend that concrete individual accountability be developed, in consultation with staff representatives, on a priority basis.**"

"UN staff committee representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in management reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of **29 October 2004**, pp. 2-3. [emphasis added]

"James O. C. Jonah, ... [who worked at the UN for three decades] ... and served as head of personnel from 1979 through 1982, ... recalled that [when the Fifth Committee initiated reforms in the late 1970s], ... a staff-management consultation process was established, and it was decided that staff representatives should be allowed to appear before the Committee. Now, it was sad to see the erosion of the international civil service in the United Nations. That had serious implications. **The Committee should also have a serious look at the results of the integrity study. Never had the staff perception of integrity been so low. ... In some respects, the reforms had weakened the Secretariat considerably.**

When he served as head of personnel, his biggest fight had been with programme managers, who were most resistant to reform He could not believe that such measures as giving authority to programme managers would strengthen the international civil service. What had been said about the lack of authority of the OHRM was true. Without a strong personnel office, however, there would be no uniformity of rules and fairness in the system. Governments should not take what was happening lightly."

"UN staff committee representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in management reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of **29 October 2004**, p. 4. [emphasis added]

IO Watch believes that UN Member States must finally rise to meet their "accountability for accountability", as repeatedly urged by UN staff over the decades, and as discussed in this archive's subsection on [The General Assembly, plus ...](#) and also under [General Assembly audit subcommittee](#) above. This should not be merely a part of the 60th anniversary session of the General Assembly in the autumn of 2005, but a continuing substantive, focused, and very serious commitment for action in the future.

Furthermore, the fundamental need for this Fifth Committee accountability role was clearly laid out a decade ago, and the ensuing experiences of mismanagement and crisis have certainly underscored the need to implement it urgently.

"...The ultimate leadership, responsibility, authority and accountability for the ... [UN's] management, good or poor, rest with [both] top management ... [and] the General Assembly. ... governing bodies set the tone for their entire organization. They must show through their actions and determined follow-up that they give high priority to firm accountability, ... effective oversight, a performance culture, wise resource use, ... and maximum implementation ... of organizational missions ..."

The Fifth Committee, ...as a "board of directors" with 185 Member States considering all types of management issues, can hardly operate effectively. ...

Many governing bodies in the United Nations system now have or are establishing specialized subcommittees ... to **devote more continuous attention to administrative, management and oversight matters.**

... if professionalism and competence [and full transparency and reporting] can be assured, three new subcommittees could be [established]:

Peace-keeping management subcommittee [for the greatest single burden of Fifth Committee work]; ...

Strategic planning and management subcommittee; ...

Oversight subcommittee. ...

... **Finally, many national governments have legislative staffs and analysts to help them [with oversight.]** JIU proposed this idea of modest staff resources to assist the CPC in 1984, but the Secretary-General was opposed ... establishing a few posts for [each of the above committees] could have a great positive impact on the future oversight and decision-making effectiveness of the Fifth Committee.

"The United Nations has often been criticized for establishing many grand objectives and goals in all areas over the years, without paying much attention to whether the Organization's subsequent programmes actually contribute to progress toward those goals. **The Fifth Committee, with reforms such as those suggested above, must be a critical leader and 'linch pin' in the new system of accountability and responsibility, driving the United Nations continuously toward the management reforms and 'transparency and effectiveness' which the General Assembly has repeatedly called for.**"

Joint Inspection Unit, "Management in the United Nations: Work in progress", Chapter VI.A., "Accountability for accountability," UN document A/50/507, 1995, paras. 150-154, 166-175 [150-152, 170-175]. [emphasis added.]

Amid all the discussions about the proposed grand reforms of the UN during 2005, Member States seem to have contributed

very little on the critical operational issue of management reform. A bipartisan group of the US Congress provided a lengthy analysis and report on needed management reforms in June 2005, and a recent article noted the role of Switzerland in taking the lead in urging strong reform of the very troubled Human Rights Commission, now finally receiving serious reform attention after years of embarrassing activity (see [Human Rights](#)). Yet IO Watch has been unable to find any other such initiatives from Member States, a very disappointing performance.

American interests and UN reform: Report of the Task Force on the United Nations, United States Institute of Peace, **June 2005**, especially Chapter 3, "In need of repair: Reforming the United Nations", available on the Institute's website at www.usip.org/ under "Task Force on UN", and Tom Wright, "Swiss take lead role in seeking UN rights reform", International Herald Tribune, **June 30, 2005**.

UN Member States also reacted with inertia and seeming apathy at the General Assembly in late 2004 and early 2005 concerning the Iraq oil-for-food programme mess and other current UN management reform crises, apparently quite willing to leave any correction of Secretariat mismanagement in the hands of the Secretariat mismanagers, as usual.

Mr. Annan himself seemed quite confident in mid-2005 that this very passive Member State reaction would continue:

"I do not expect [the Oil-for-Food programme problems] to derail the reform process", he [said] ... 'We are determined to go ahead' ...

"We are taking measures to strengthen our own administration and transparency", he said, adding, 'The Member States, who themselves are very much aware of how the Oil-for-Food [programme] was set up, how it was managed, how it was organized, I think are much more sanguine about the facts than most other people ...'"

"Oil-for-food allegations will not derail UN reform initiative, Annan says", UN News Service, **13 May 2005**.

It also was most disappointing that the Assembly resolution of December 2004, cited above, emphasised once again the importance of real accountability mechanisms in the UN Secretariat, but merely "regretted" that they are not in place.

IO Watch believes that the only solution to the mismanagement morass of the UN Secretariat now and in the future is for Member States, and particularly the Geneva Group countries which pay almost all the bills, to finally and firmly accept their "accountability for accountability" by refusing to settle for yet another UN Secretariat "self-reform" effort.

These Member States, and especially their diplomatic

missions to the UN, must act now to help ensure the long-term survival and viability of the UN through small but specific external oversight mechanisms and processes which hold the UN Secretariat firmly accountable, along the lines of the "Answers" outlined in the subsections above.

Decisive Geneva Group action would meet three key needs. It would finally exercise due diligence at the UN on behalf of their taxpayers who pay the (some \$10 billion a year) bills. It would support conscientious UN staff who work hard but are often badly led. And above all, it would greatly aid the millions of people who rely on effective UN field programmes for their very survival.

If the apathy continues, however, IO Watch believes that Paul Johnson's pessimistic conclusion of March 2005 (as cited above) about the inability of the UN to establish management accountability will certainly be borne out, with very negative consequences for all three of these groups and for the UN's future integrity and global role.