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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments |
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As noted under the subsection on Staff rights? , behind-the-scenes "justice" at the UN began to emerge in the very troubled "loyalty" investigations of the 1950s, and although it has operated in a much lower key since, it has always a hidden element in UN operations. Now, with the strong new behavioral and conduct emphases on accountability; waste, fraud and abuse; harassment and misconduct; and "freeing the managers", the hidden activities seem to be growing again. These devious
processes create a hidden subculture of ignored, abused, or forgotten UN
staff around the world. There is little public, documented
knowledge of this process. IO Watch's analysis of its workings is an
informal, open-ended and very incomplete survey based on the
experiences of many people who are familiar with this subculture,
or at some point in time have themselves had the misfortune of being been
trapped within it. The observations that IO Watch makes here, both
general and specific, are not anecdotal, but are backed up by direct
experiences and documentary evidence submitted by appellants to the UN
internal justice system. Although that system has evaded or ignored almost
all of this, these records still bear witness to what actually goes on
"behind the curtain". It is available for use whenever a
independent, expert examination of these serious problems finally ever
comes. IO Watch apologizes
for some repetition with the Staff Rights? subsection
above. The harsh UN staff experiences of the 1950s not only set the tone
for overall UN staff rights, but underscore the entrenchments of the
habits that allow the subculture to continue on as actively as it still
does to the present day. Very problematic "behind the scenes" UN personnel
practices took only a few years to emerge during the Cold War period. In 1949 the
UN Secretariat decided to allow the US Government to screen US citizens
being considered for UN employment. Shirley Hazzard, who has provided an
invaluable chronicle of these pivotal early years, cited this decision as
the "least mentioned official transaction in UN history." Although it
ultimately led to Secretary-General Trygve Lie's resignation when it was
exposed, other countries were quick to establish a pattern so that they
too would closely monitor UN staffing choices for their country's
candidates. The secret agreement was thus: "
the
ascertainable point at which the [the UN Secretariat] conclusively delivered
itself into the hands of national interest
in direct violation of the
[UN Charter insistence on] a scrupulous independence from national
pressures.
Staff
representatives who [spoke out against the] collaboration with the FBI and
the United States State Department were among the earliest and least
ceremonious departures. The dismissals were accompanied by intimidating and
abusive statements from the administration to those remaining.
The squalor of these conditions, punctuated by
announcements of summary dismissals, acted on the staff with a combination
of attrition, confusion and violence.
Each department had its informers,
and its victims. The total of United
Nations employees affected
undoubtedly runs into the
hundreds
[but is difficult to determine]
since employees
were permitted to resign with extra indemnities, 'in exchange for their
silence'
[or in] terminations disguised as 'economies,' or
deportations to the field, or careers shunted [permanently] into sidings
[or] a secret blacklisting
Above all, there is
no accounting for the deterrent effect of Trygve Lie's policies on those
who might have wished to serve a differently administered United Nations
secretariat." Shirley Hazzard on
the situation in the UN Secretariat in the early
1950s, in Chapter Two, "The purgatory of the investigations," in her
Defeat of an ideal: A study of the
self-destruction of the United Nations, Atlantic-Little, Brown,
Boston-Toronto, 1973, pp. 15, 23, 34-35.
[emphasis added.]
The seriousness of these abuses of staff rights was
not lost on some of the delegates to early General Assembly sessions: "An end must be put to
everything that seems to make the Secretary-General's post an autocratic
one, to everything that tends to make the staff subject to the whims and
caprices of their superiors and makes careers -- and even
employment
--
dependent on blind obedience to such absolute power." chief French Delegate Henri Hoppenot, protesting abuses threatening the creation
of a legitimate international service, during a debate in the U.N. General
Assembly in March 1953, as quoted in Shirley
Hazzard, "Breaking faith: I", The New Yorker, October 2, 1989, pp. 74-96, [86].
Nevertheless, the autocratic attitudes that still
dominate UN operations were very firmly established: "During his first
year in office,
[Secretary-General Dag] Hammarskjφld sought and largely obtained
from the General Assembly administrative powers that, invested in the
Secretary-General, were at variance with the intentions of the [United
Nations] Charter toward the international civil service. (His attempt to
modify the authority of the Administrative Tribunal was acceded to only in
part, but the standing and importance of that body declined.) [These]
actions were condemned in a searching study, by Claude Julien, of erosion
of rights at the United Nations [in 1953] -- a study that
may be read with much interest today, when history has exposed the
inadequacies of successive Secretaries-General.
. The renewed
insistence on unconditional loyalty to a personality, whose requirements
are equated with those of the United Nations, again illustrates the
remoteness of the U.N. service from democratic procedures.
.
Hammarskjold's inaccessibility to rational opinion is disquieting.
. his
failure to recruit or retain persons of talent, or to expel sycophants,
were part of a striking remoteness from realities by then besetting the
U.N. service
.." Shirley
Hazzard,
on Dag Hammarskjφld's policies on assuming office in 1953, in "Breaking Faith, Part I", The New Yorker, September 25, 1989, pp. 63-99,
[82.]
The autocratic pressures were heightened by the
underlying complexities of life in the international civil service: "Like most of his
deputies, Hammarskjφld had no sustained contact with the staff body, and
his pronouncements concerning the organization's condition and morale were
misconceived.
The abstractions set forth on paper as administrative policy during
his U.N. years did nothing to mitigate the alienation of a body of persons deprived of a
merit system, uncertain of their rights, intimidated by procedures of
surveillance and by the network of secret files maintained on its
employees by the organization itself; and conscious, above all, that
adherence to the explicit principles of their appointment would result in
their victimization or dismissal. The separation of United Nations
affairs from normal legal and ethical accountability had left the
international staff quite without the 'effective protection from external
pressure and internal domineering' called for as a matter of urgency by
Henri Hoppenot of France in 1953. Many of those original fifty-one member
states against whose interference the U.N. Charter had provided were
bound, by watchful populations in their own land, to an observance of
basic rights under laws and regulations far more exigent than the policies
applied within the United Nations." Shirley Hazzard, on
the 1950s situation, in "Breaking Faith, Part
I", The New Yorker, September 25, 1989, pp.
63-99, [82-83].
[emphasis added.] Staff groups began very early to note the negative
impacts on Secretariat operations: "Staff morale is
[central] to any organization. [and particularly] to the international
career service.
The 1956 Salary Review Committee prescribed [some essential]
conditions for maintaining staff morale
. : each staff member must feel
that he can rely upon his leaders, that the personnel policy of his
organization is sound and fair, that the whole administration is activated
by a sense of equality, and that he has protection against arbitrary
action.
[It] warned that 'If these elements are missing, [morale problems]
and low productivity are probable consequences.' The
experience of the [subsequent] 13 years
. has proved the soundness of
this warning. [Applying the]
geographical distribution principle to ,,,, promotion and placement
contributes
. to slacker discipline and poorer morale. It [seems]
that hard work tends to be less appreciated than flattering words uttered
to the right person at the right time
. The fairly frequent clashes in
administrative philosophy and habits among [staff from] so many different
cultural and social backgrounds often cause tensions. As the
international organizations live to a large extent in a kind of political
vacuum, their staff often [feel] they are lost in what they are inclined
to consider a vast bureaucratic machine." Tien-Cheng Young,
reflecting on a 1956 staff assessment in "The
international civil service reexamined", Public
Administration Review (US), May/June 1970, pp. 217-224 [223].
In 1958, a UN Joint Disciplinary Committee of senior
officials, considering a case of staff insubordination, declared that "the
staff member must accept the findings of the higher authority or leave the
service", and went on to state: "While recognizing
that the obligations of staff members of the Secretariat are basically the
same, whatever the nature of the duties which may be entrusted to them,
the Committee considers it particularly important that the staffs assigned
to the secretariats of political bodies, operating either at Headquarters
or in the field, should not only subordinate their personal views to the
decisions of their responsible supervisors in the Secretariat, but also
understand and accept the overriding authority in all matters of substance
of the bodies themselves." UN Note to
Correspondents No. 1840", 9 July 1958, as
quoted in Shirley Hazzard, Defeat of an ideal: A
study of the self-destruction of the United Nations, Atlantic-Little,
Brown, Boston-Toronto, 1973, p. 134.
Shirley Hazzard makes the following critically
important point on this pivotal JDC judgment: "This important statement goes far beyond the obvious
requirements of impartiality and professional rectitude: it abrogates
conscience.
Although
[it emphasizes] 'secretariats of political bodies' at the UN, it concerns itself with the
conduct of all United Nations personnel, and perfectly reflects the
attitudes, as they have evolved since 1950, of administration to
staff.
It does away with at least the first five of Mr. Jenks'
requirements, and substitutes in their place the philosophy of Adolf
Eichmann. The 'personal view' of a reasonable being is not a
mere hodgepodge of latent partiality over which some arbitrarily
designated 'responsible superior' may confidently assume supremacy, but
necessarily includes the dictates of justice, of humanity, and of
self-respect.
No organization or
person is entitled to command, from any human being, a spiritual
subservience of the kind required by the 1958 [UN JDC]
"Responsible superiors,' in the UN Secretariat, are very often
geographical appointees with a greatly varying regard for international
scruples. There are any number of regulations defining the propriety of
the international civil servant without
[the JDC's]
totalitarian statement; there are ample restrictions on the career
of a United Nations employee without depriving him of his immortal
soul."
Shirley Hazzard, Defeat of an ideal: A study of the
self-destruction of the United Nations, Atlantic-Little,
Brown, Boston-Toronto, 1973, pp. 134-135.
[At this point, and "one more time", IO Watch must
insert the guiding language about UN staff from the UN Charter: 3. The paramount consideration
in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the
conditions of service
shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of
efficiency, competence, and integrity.
" ] Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Article 101, para. 3. [emphasis added]
] In 1974 a group of UN system staff representatives
met to launch the first campaign to reform the UN internal justice
system.
Their key question still reverberates today, because it is still
unanswered: "'Given the
diffidence accorded 'executive privilege,' the difficulties of staff
organizations in establishing themselves as a countervailing force to that
privilege, and the disinterest
of those whose help can make a
difference-- for instance, members of delegations and the press -- then,
what are the chances for
review and reform of the system of due process?' That question asked
18 years ago [in 1974] needs to be raised again. For, as put
by the distinguished professor of international law, M. N. Akehurst
(University of Paris): 'In the early days
of the 20th century, it may have been possible to regard legal relations
between international organizations and their staff as operating outside any known
legal system; such a view is no longer tenable.'" Peter Ozorio, [who
was a member of the 1974 staff working group]
"Legal rights revisited," UN Special (Geneva),
October 1992, pp. 24-25. [emphasis
added]
The 1974 staff analysis also disclosed, inter alia,
the basic facts that: "social justice [to
which international agencies are committed] stops short for one segment of mankind
-- the international civil servant, a member of a virtually unprotected
minority. The existing system of due process suffers from an
absence of important elements: it leaves out values. It ignores
needs
It pretends that the 'rule of law' can stand independent of the society in
which an international civil servant lives and functions. All too
often, the appeals procedure, which is conceived of as an instrument to
raise a staff member's hopes, buries it instead.
the machinery of due process is slow and ponderous,
and thus fails to provide a true safeguard against administrative
absolutism and arbitrariness
" "Appeals procedures
for international civil servants," Federation of Civil Servants
Associations (FICSA), FICSA Studies and Policies NO. 2, of 1974, as quoted and discussed in Ozorio, Peter, "Tribunal
trouble: Legal rights revisited", UN
Special
(Geneva), October 1992, pp. 25.
Shirley Hazzard also observed that it was (and is)
often only the UN staff, not UN top management or the General Assembly,
that seems really concerned about UN performance issues and mismanagement
(see also the closely-related entry of October 1993 below) : "During
[Secretary-General Kurt] Waldheim's second term [in the late 1970s ],
[and] thwarted in their negotiations with the United Nations
administration, [UN staff representatives] were enabled to express their
disquiet to the Assembly by a special provision enacted by the Assembly
itself in consequence of staff agitation.
these efforts failed in their object
of generating wide concern and consequent reforms
The spectacle of a staff body
vainly seeking the proper use of its resources in the organization's
service and soliciting, in effect, the intercession of the organization's
governing council to prevent continued mismanagement by its appointed
leaders was not new at the United Nations."
Shirley
Hazzard,
on the Waldheim era of staff relations in the 1970s, "Breaking Faith: II", The New Yorker, October 2, 1989, pp. 74-96,
[85-86].
[emphasis added.]
By the late 1970s, any earlier possibilities of
openness and a healthy climate for staff and their legal protection was
already fading. As Theodor Meron noted: "
recently
there appears to have occurred a marked decline in the number of requests
for legal opinions from the Secretary-General and various departments,
including the Office of Personnel Services. This may be another indication of the
politicization of the Secretariat, of the diminishing role of law in the
Organization, and of the increasing power of the various departments that
want to be free to establish policy
" Theodor
Meron, The United Nations Secretariat: The Rules
and the Practice, Chapter 4, "Selected legal questions", D.C. Heath,
Lexington, Mass., 1977, p. 83.
Several early cases show the ease with which even the
most serious punishments can suddenly be inflicted on UN Secretariat
staff. Informal investigations within the Secretariat can unleash such
actions (especially at present with the activities of the newly-unleashed
dozens -- or hundreds of UN managers/investigators and security staff (the
"Inspector Clouseaus") -- now active in the Secretariat, as discussed in
subsequent subsections on the serious current problems of Unleashed
Managers and Manager/Investigators
. Investigative activities can even lead to "summary
dismissal," a drastic step whereby the Secretary-General fires staff
members with immediate effect, ruining their careers, disrupting their
lives, and voiding some significant separation payments, in a decision
which can be taken without any disciplinary proceeding. The Secretary-General (and his legal and
administrative staff's) summary dismissal powers can of course be
appropriate for very grave misconduct or misbehaviour which requires
immediate separation. On the other hand, these absolutist
powers can and have been used quite abruptly for even minor matters,
including a case of summary dismissal in 1980 for "making illicit
telephone calls" and another in 1993 for "personal use of a photocopying
machine."
[If these two verdicts were to be applied worldwide, about a
billion people would be thrown out on the streets.] The article on the
1993 incident also noted that: "In cases of summary dismissal, which U.N. sources
say have been on the rise in recent years, the Secretary-General can fire
an employee on the spot for "serious misconduct", although this term has
never been satisfactorily defined in the last 40 years." "Summary
dismissal", letter of the New York Staff Committee president to the ASG, OPS
[personnel] of 5 May 1980, UN Staff News (New
York), July 1980, page 11, and
Jay Axelbank,
"Administrative injustice at the UN", UN
Special, (Geneva), December 1993,
pp.14-15.
In the 1980 case the Secretariat personnel office
promptly responded to the Staff Committee president's letter, confirming
the blunt nature of summary dismissal but assuring that it would only be
invoked in extreme circumstances. It made no apology or explanation for
its application to illicit phone calls, and indeed remarked instead that
the UNAT had upheld summary dismissal in a very similar case. [Of course, IO Watch must note, spattering mud on a
wall, and then washing it away by saying that it happens only rarely and
when the authorities found it imperative, still leaves an ugly smear that
certainly heightens the "fear factor" and UN staff cautiousness about
speaking out on contentious (which usually reads "management-threatening)
issues.]
"Summary
dismissal", response from OPS official, 3 July 1980, UN Staff News
(New York), July 1980, page
11.
A
critical report by a former UN senior legal officer in 1981 also cited the
fundamental attitudes of the Administration toward staff rights, and the
failings of the administration of justice system to correct them: "
the UN
Administrative Management Service [hired a consultant to review continuing
crises in Secretariat administration of justice and remedies therefore],
who stated in a detailed report in November 1981 that]: 'The delays in the Joint
Appeals Board at Headquarters are now so serious that they cast doubt on
the willingness and ability of the United Nations to provide effective
means for settling disputes with the staff. The situation has already
had a bad effect on staff morale
The United Nations enjoys immunity from
the jurisdiction of States
[but has undertaken] to provide effective
means of settling disputes to which it is a party
a failure to do so
could have grave effects. It is therefore vitally important and
urgent to remedy the present situation.'" Mark A. Roy, on a 1981 study by an outside consultant, in "Administration of justice in the United Nations Secretariat", Secretariat News (New York), 19 June 1984, pp. 4-7, [5-6]. [emphasis added] [Note: Mr. Roy was
the Chairman of the Legal Committee of the Staff Council, and the
consultant referred to was Mr. Gordon Wattles, former Principal Officer in
the UN Office of Legal Affairs.]
In 1984 Donald Dunham provided a vivid example of the
way that some UN staffing decisions simply throw people adrift (a
persistent problem which still continues today in the UN "gulag"): "If one independent
[UN] fiefdom should lock horns with another independent fiefdom and staff members are caught in
the middle, their demise is assured. No machinery
exists to force either one to take responsibility to resolve the issue;
and no top official will pull the horns apart, free the staff members and
then knock their heads together. [Curiously,] when the first unit has
issued termination notice on the staff member and the second unit
countermands it and arranges for work continuation without a contract
against retroactive reimbursement.
. According to UN regulations, the
countermanded assumes no responsibility for staff members by its action,
while the terminator does not lose its responsibility because it was on
its payroll that they were last listed. The butting back and forth is pretty exhausting [and
can go on for years.]
. since there is no liberator in
sight, the literal demise may beat the administrative one to the
punch." Donald Dunham, "Management by personnel action", Secretariat News (New York), November 30, 1984, p. 11. [emphasis added.] [Note: this kind of muddled and irresponsible management still goes on, leading to the continuing phenomenon of a group of UN 'floaters,'' who may be suspended between units, or sitting somewhere with no work at all, for years at a time -- an enormous waste of funds and work skills, and a matter which is discussed further below.] Dunham also
emphasized the hazards of formally challenging a stubborn or arrogant
manager who will not reasonably discuss and resolve problems: "A complaining
staff member is immediately classified as a 'personnel case', presumably
because he or she has had the temerity to intervene. If the complaint has to do
with management direction, all hands in OPS [Personnel] and its
affiliates close ranks to gather material to fashion as strong a personnel case as possible, and
no recognition whatsoever is made of the key management issue.
.OPS has scant choice but to bypass the administrative implications of
the case and propel it rapidly to the quasi-legal restraints of the Joint
Appeals Board where it can be confined. The upshot is that a staff member must sue to force a
management director to do his administrative duty. The guilty persons
can get away with this kind of irresponsible performance more readily in
the bureaucratic system of the UN than in any foreign office, however
small.
There is no really effective vertical responsibility upwards within
the UN table of organization, nor effective direction downward
" Donald Dunham,
"Management by personnel action", Secretariat
News (New York), November 30, 1984, p.
11.
[emphasis added]
In the mid-1980s the UN staff also began to pressure
the Administration to be more forthcoming about its handling of
disciplinary and fraud matters, again with little or no success. One such
effort observed that: "The Administration has recently dealt with a number
of cases of alleged fraud relating to taxes and education grants within
the Secretariat. In the process, different
administrative actions have been undertaken
[including] summary dismissal, referral of cases to the Joint Disciplinary
Committee, resignation and recovery of overpayment. ?
What are the
criteria according to which summary dismissal -- the hardest penalty --
has been meted out to some, but not to others? ?
Under what
circumstances it is decided that a case should be submitted to the
[JDC]? ?
What are the
circumstances under which the Administration accepts the resignation of
staff involved? ?
By what criteria is
it decided that only the recovery of the overpayment should be made? We are concerned that the established judicial
procedures which are intended to guarantee staff a minimum of due process
should not be undermined.
There is a need to explain to the staff the circumstances governing the
choice of measures being invoked. In cases that are similar, justice will
require that staff are not only equitably treated but that they are seen
to be equitably treated." From a "Group of
concerned staff", "Fraud and due process," Secretariat News (NY), 16
July 1986, p. 2.
[emphasis added.] In 1987 the UN's top manager warned of the grave
consequences which continuing acceptance of the poor internal justice
system could have for the UN as an organization: "
Lamenting that 'Something has
gone very wrong with our processes', [UN Under-Secretary-General
for Administration and Management Martti Ahtisaari] stressed that justice
was not only important in itself, but was also a basic aspect of good
staff-management relations. Justice was a 'primary defense against
the buildup of feelings of arbitrariness and discrimination' which, he warned, could
undermine staff morale and 'finally destroy an international organization
however high its ideals and purposes.'" "Staff-management meeting to discuss justice administration reform and performance reports", Secretariat News [New York], 31 August 1987, p. 5. [emphasis added]
However, over the next few years the UN's expanding
field operations, in particular, provided many more instances of abusive
senior officials, who were protected and retained by the UN leadership,
while the situations were condemned by staff to no effect, as shown by the
following four quotes. "
[The UN
programs which eat] up the great bulk of U.N. resources
the economic,
social and humanitarian programs aimed at development, emergency relief
and 'better standards of life' around the world
[get little scrutiny.]
Clearly, the United
Nations employs many hard-working and idealistic people. [but]
Parts of
the system are overstaffed and lethargic, while others, particularly field
offices in unpleasant places, are overstaffed and overworked.
Local employees tend to bear the brunt of
disciplinary action
when fraud or abuse are discovered
while erring
international professional staffers often survive and even advance in the
organization.
At the same time, U.N. employees who complain about irregularities
[lose promotions or must transfer elsewhere.] It is a system that
tends to cover up its abuses and discourage whistle-blowers.
A European U.N.
official, who recently left his agency in frustration, [said] 'A certain
enabling environment
allows [fraud} to happen. The question
is not whether you do it or not, but whether you're stupid enough to be
caught." "Basically, there's a lack
of determination to combat the sleaze factor' he said. 'In an
environment where mediocrity has a strong self-protective interest, these
things flourish.'" William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, September 20, 1992, pp. 3-4. [emphasis added.]
"UN officials who
advocate a cleanup
say that management by
top officials has been inept
and, occasionally, corrupt. 'There is no [regular] supervision of any
agency'
said [a senior official.] Governing councils
are 'basically
rubber-stamp bodies.' The U. N. Board of
Auditors
cites numerous [problems] and 'weak internal controls'
during
1990 and 1991
[in a] 136-page report that enumerates irregularities or
deficiencies in hiring, cash and property management, internal audits and
purchases of everything from project equipment to airline tickets.
Many anomalies
[that they report] 'appear to be recurring' and point to a 'lack of determination to
enforce regulations and rules and make the heads of units of the
organization accountable,' the report says. A recent
confidential internal paper circulating in the U. N. Development Program
put the problem more bluntly. Citing 'a deplorable vacuum of basic ethics' in the system,
it noted widespread criticism of 'prolific structures, pompous-Byzantine
attitudes of ranking officials, operational inefficiency and
gross
mismanagement of financial and personnel resources.' The 10-page paper
listed a dozen cases of corruption involving the development agency's
staffers or programs that totaled millions of dollars in pilfered
funds." William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, September 20, 1992, p 4.
"[Concerning
allegations of corruption at UNHCR in articles in the Washington Post in
September 1992] with respect to discipline in UNHCR, a courageous staff
member in Angola immediately brought the Boubakar wrongdoing to my
attention.
The case was airtight, and U.N. headquarters found it impossible to
avoid our recommendation for dismissal. In the more complicated
Lukika case in Uganda, UNHCR's recommendation for dismissal was equally
strong.
The Secretary-General's office rejected it (on grounds that the
United Nations lacks precedents in firing for incompetence) and forced
UNHCR to take Lukika back. Threats and intimidation in no way
dampened our efforts in UNHCR to deal with corruption and
incompetence.
. The Secretary-General at the time just
did not support us. Ensuing troubles with Lukika after
headquarters directed that he stay in UNHCR should surprise no one." Arthur E. Dewey, "No laxity", UN Special (Geneva), November, 1992, p. 31. [Note: Mr. Dewey was deputy high commissioner of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from 1986-1990.] [emphasis added.]
"On the very day
the Sunday Times [(UK published a very critical report on UN
mismanagement]
I received the news of the killing of one more UNHCR
colleague, Boris Zeravcic, in Bosnia.
. The report failed to mention the
sacrifices that the vast majority of the United Nations staff make,
particularly the loss of life, while working in conflict situations.
. The Staff Council
in UNHCR agrees with the thrust of the criticisms. The
staff wants to weed out corruption, mismanagement, nepotism,
double-dippers, desk-warmers, and all other irregularities
Staff
representatives have been tirelessly pointing out unsavory management
tendencies and reported to the governing body of UNHCR
on how to
strengthen the organization and to ensure the effective use of its human
resources.
The question is: what do these government
representatives do with these reports when they return to their capitals
UNHCR
staff on
the gound work with dedication and have twice won the Nobel Peace Prize,
but they are demoralized when subjected to unjustified criticism. UNHCR staff
needs the help of the media to further strengthen its humanitarian
commitment to work for refugees." Nasr Ishak, "HCR staff replies", UN Special (Geneva), October 1993, p. 20. [Note: a reply
letter to the Sunday Times, by the Chairman of the Staff Council,
UNHCR].
[emphasis added.] Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart added one more
very authoritative expert view, and excellent summary, of the debilities of
UN staff rights and the underlying causes of the gulag, [leading to
another excessive "emphasis added" for which IO Watch apologizes]: "The
debilitating atmosphere and the rise of cronyism have sapped staff
confidence in justice within secretariats. Even peer appeal boards lack full trust
because no staff member seeking redress can feel confident
any longer that he or she may not be intimidated. This state of
affairs has been well known.
[There should be] a resort
system whereby staff can report malfeasance without fear, staff seeking
redress can have proper counsel, and all staff can have the requisite
measure of protection from imperious behavior by poorly-chosen superiors.
The
[50th UN] anniversary should be a fitting occasion for a solemn
reaffirmation of Article 100.2 by all governments in all prime organs of
the system.
1995 should begin a
new era of respect by member-states for the integrity and independence of
a civil service upon which the future effectiveness of the organization in
large part depends." Erskine Childers,
with Brian Urquhart, "Renewing the United Nations System", Development Dialogue, 1994:1, Dag Hammarskjold
Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1994, pp.
169-170. [emphasis
added.]
Unfortunately, however, abuses of staff seem only to
have increased in the new "accountability era" of reforms under
Secretary-General Annan, with "respect for integrity" left behind. For
years, UN staff have formally complained about disruptive and unexplained
administrative intrusions by the Administration in various units. In 1997
New York staff discussed concerns about the conduct of investigations of
wrongdoing: "In 1993 a study revealed that not only were
investigations taking months to complete, but that all
[staff] of the department concerned, including the staff member, also knew
about the investigation.
Staff were being denied access to their desks or offices without any
semblance of due process. Summary dismissal was also used in
cases where patent misconduct had not been established. OHRM agreed that a
[department's preliminary review] should not exceed two weeks, provided it
was done in a discreet manner. If it became clear that an
investigation was being conducted, the staff member would be informed
immediately of the allegations. It was further agreed that summary
dismissal would only be used in cases where misconduct was
[very serious.] "Abuse of
authority", UN Staff Report (New York), September 1997, p. 6.
The article also discussed improper practices in the
Security Service: "
including external investigations of private citizens, illegal use of
authority to obtain confidential documents, interviews without proper
authorization and identification and the ability to file adverse material
and maintain confidential files on staff without regard for the
established rules and procedures.
police officers are trained in he law, whilst UN Security is not.
they do not know the limits of their authority, and in consequence those
limits must be clearly defined for the protection of all parties.
Clear guidelines
should be established as to the scope of its [Special Services]
Unit."
"Abuse of
authority", UN Staff Report (New York), September 1997, p. 6. [Note: since 2001,
OIOS has been enlisting the (now supposedly trained) Security Services in
the expanded investigatory work of the many newly- unleashed UN
managers/investigators, and many of the same complaints about overzealous
and improper investigation procedures seem again to be emerging.]
In another 1997 article, the President of the New
York Staff Committee commented that: "
staff dream of an Organization where decisions are taken according to
clear rules and guidelines. The real situation is far
different.
Staff representatives are mandated by
the Staff Regulations and Rules to defend staff interests and welfare
[but are often] denied access to the information and
documentation needed to perform this essential function. Staff are switched from core
posts to short-term funded posts without their knowledge, placing their
continued employment in jeopardy. Decisions are unilaterally taken in
isolation and under a cloak of secrecy. We continue to hear about the need for accountability
along with stories of physical and verbal abuse against staff against
staff members by senior officials which remain unadressed. A steady flow
of appellants in the internal justice system attests to the faulty
managerial decision-making which continues
unabated." "Standing
up for our rights," UN Staff Report (New
York), December 1997, p. 2. [emphasis
added.]
In 1998 the Secretary-General provided a required but
very brief summary of the handling of financial malpractice cases. He reported
that such cases not involving misconduct and not reported to OHRM can be
handled at the departmental level. When received at OHRM, such cases are
handled as are all other disciplinary cases: OHRM examines whether the
case is a disciplinary one, and whether suspension from duty is
warranted.
If disciplinary, written allegations are prepared and a reply
obtained from the staff member, and then OHRM decides whether it warrants
summary dismissal, or submission to the JDC, or can be closed. If closed, it
may be pursued by the department as a performance issue, with in some
cases a letter of caution or reprimand (which are non-disciplinary
matters.) The report concluded with the very opaque statement that: "Of the 61 cases
submitted in 1997 to the Assistant-Secretary-General of [OHRM], 7 were
referred as a result of an audit/OIOS investigation. Four of those
seven resulted in a decision of summary dismissal, one is being handled by
the [unit]
, one is being prepared for submission to the [JDC],
and one is
[being considered as a possible] disciplinary
matter." "Actions taken
against staff resulting from findings of malpractice discovered by the
Board of Auditors: Report of the Secretary-General", A/52/864 of 2 April 1998. [Note: the report conspicuously
ignored what happened to the other 64 reports, and whether the 71
cases were for New York only or the entire global UN, and the pattern and
consequences and recovery (if any) from the "malpracticees." Also, if 1997 was typical,
there should have been about 500 such cases in the seven years since. How did they
come out? ] In an August 2000 report, on progress made in the
administration of justice system as part of reforming UN human resources
management, Secretary-General Annan expressed confidence that the UN has
"a comprehensive system in place" but then surprisingly pointed out its
major failings: | |||
