|
|||||
UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
|
|
Growing
efforts at "lighting up" the dark world of the UN internal justice system,
linking accountability to UNAT judgements, and above all indicating that a
mechanism to sanction managers who flout the rules and waste UN money may be near, are
enormously encouraging. This is precisely part of the "mechanism" which
the General Assembly sought very clearly to create more than a decade ago,
in its management accountability resolution 48/218 A of 1993. Yet this good news conceals one enormous gap, which the UN Administration is doubtless well aware of. These dynamic sanctions essentially cannot be enforced until there is a UNAT judgement which results in losses (via damages to be paid) due to management irregularities. As the UNAT has stated, it can easily take five years for a staff member's appeal to reach it and be decided upon, and the Secretary-General is dragging his feet already, having indicated in his February 2002 report above that he would prefer to wait on such matters until the UNAT and ILOAT tribunals are "fully harmonized," whatever that means. And the proposal to add any new body for appeals of UNAT and ILOAT judgements could add many more years still (in view of all the staff, administration, and General Assembly haggling over "internal justice" of the past decades, for which please see the partial bibliography at the end of this section.) Much
more drastic action is needed, NOW, to break the
stranglehold of the UN Administration on the UN appeals process There are many nasty things
presently going on deep in the Secretariat, to the great benefit
of its bad managers but the concurrent grave detriment of staff who
struggle to act with integrity against them, as discussed in the
next five subsections of this section. It
would be useless for UN staff contesting a decision to have
to wait perhaps a decade or so for the above reforms to (perhaps) be
debated and adopted, and then several years more years for a UNAT decision
to validate their claims, pay them some recompense for damage done, and
trigger (perhaps) financial recovery of funds from the managers
responsible, to cover the UNAT damages awarded. To
put all this suddenly-emerging but at least potentially- promising tumult
over long-standing problems of administration-of-justice into proper
perspective, four more important points must be
added. FIRST,
by the Secretariat's own criteria, the past decade has been a flop. The Secretary-General set five
"performance indicators" in 1994 to show that the UN internal justice
system, "for many years … criticized for delay and inefficiency", would be
made more effective: -- early administrative resolution of
disputes; -- fewer cases under litigation;
-- reduced
costs; -- a major element of ombudsman
panels worldwide, with an ombudsman at Headquarters acting as central
coordinator; and -- improved trust between
administration and staff. A strategy for the management of the human
resources of the Organization: Revised estimates … ", A/C.5/49/5 of 21 October 1994, paras.
99-101.
In
fact, exactly a decade later the first indicator is even worse, the second
might be better (but only because more people have given up on the
"sucker's game" of appeals); costs, especially to settle managerial
errors, are very much on the rise; a lone headquarters ombudsman is now
finally "on duty", but is
very marginal relative to the worldwide needs of some 35,000 - 40,000
staff; and trust between administration and staff on justice and rights
issues may now be at an all-time low, as revealed by the results of a June
2004 worldwide survey of staff perceptions about integrity in the
Secretariat, which is highlighted in various subsections of this
archive. SECOND,
the debate on reform actions continued rather actively in 2004. The General Assembly passed
another resolution which emphasized that an independent and impartial
judiciary are essential to protect human rights and should therefore be
respected in all circumstances.
It then reaffirmed the importance of full and effective
implementation of all UN standards on human rights in the administration
of justice, and that Member States should spare no effort to ensure full
implementation of those standards, using UN technical assistance (no less)
to strengthen their capacities and infrastructure. In this context, as elsewhere, it
is time for the UN to begin to practice internally what it preaches to
others. "Human rights in the administration of
justice," General Assembly resolution 58/183 of
Secretary-General
Annan is thinking along the same lines, at least in the abstract. In his
2004 annual report, he emphasized the following "lessons
learned": "Enhancing the rule of
law On 24 September 2003, the Security
Council held its first general consideration of the topic of justice and
the rule of law. In a
statement … I shared a number of lessons that the Secretariat has learned
from its experiences over the years [in peace operations] … Foremost among those was that we
must make the rule of law and justice central objectives of our peace
operations. … In [an August 2004 report] … to
the Security Council I suggested a number of … precepts or ground rules …
[inter alia] to ensure that all courts created
or assisted by the United Nations are structured and organized in a way
that will ensure that the process of prosecution and trial is credible,
that it complies with established international standards regarding the
independence and impartiality of the judiciary, the effectiveness,
impartiality and fairness of prosecutors and the integrity of the judicial
process; … to recognize and respect the
rights of victims and ensure that relevant processes include specific
measures for their participation and protection
…" "Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization", UN document A/59/1, 20 August 2004, paras. 222-223.
Mr.
Annan's annual report, and other 2004 reports, went on to emphasize the
objectives of the administration of justice in the UN and the strategy for
achieving it, essentially however amounting to speeding up the process.
Otherwise, most of the language only repeated commitments to improve that
were made in past years. "The Organization continued its
efforts to improve client servicing and place a stronger emphasis on
delivering results. … Practical steps have been taken to
improve high-priority administrative services. … The administration of
justice has become more efficient through the assignment of additional
resources and streamlining procedures, which has led to significant
reductions in case backlogs." "Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization", UN document A/59/1, 20 August 2004, para. 233-234.
In the new UN
"strategic framework" approach for 2006-2007, in which "Administration of
justice" had become a featured and separate item, the Secretariat added
more admirable intentions: "Objective of the
organization: To ensure the fairness and
effectiveness of the internal system of justice in the resolution and
adjudication of internal grievances Expected accomplishments of the
Secretariat: A system of internal justice that
is consistent and in conformity with the human resources policies and
rules of the Organization. Strategy: … The strategy will include …
streamlining and strengthening … the internal system … and improving the servicing of the
internal administrative bodies responsible for advising the
Secretary-General on disciplinary and/or appeal cases in a reasonable
swift and transparent manner with due respect for condifentiality."
"Proposed strategic framework for the period 2006-2007: Part Two: Biennial programme plan, Programme 24: Management and support services", UN document A/59/6/ (Prog. 24), 19 May 2004, p. 6. [Note:
IO Watch believes the new strategy, succinctly stated, presents as its
proud motto "Providing faulty decisions faster."]
However, to the
interested reader seeking more specific information on the status and
improvements in this key "building block" of human resources reform, the
Secretary-General's 2004 reform report was a disappointment, stating
simply, vaguely, and quite unhelpfully under "Next steps" only
that: "J. Administration of
justice The administration of justice is
considered as a separate item in the agenda of the General
Assembly." "Human resources management reform: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/263 of 13 August 2004, p. 35. [Note: the subject report finally showed up in late October, see
below.]
During 2004 four more
reports on the administration
of justice appeared, one by the JIU and three by the
Secretary-General. However,
they tended to be more attempts to fix the existing defective system, with
the Secretariat continuing to drag its feet to avoid more meaningful
change.
The
JIU report dealt with harmonizing the statutes of the UNAT and the ILOAT,
in general by bringing the UNAT processes more in line with those of the
ILOAT, as to selection of members, authority to order specific
performance, and limits on the amount of compensation. The JIU felt that
this effort, which would be a gradual process -- and should not ignore the
continuing need to improve the slow and cumbersome other processes of
internal justice -- would be important for "removing the perception of
inequality" on internal justice matters within the UN system. In its Annex
III, the JIU report did provide an informative listing of payments made to
staff as a result of UNAT judgements from 1999 through 2003: they ranged
from as little as $2,500 on up to $251,000. "Report of the Joint
Inspection Unit on Administration of Justice: Harmonization of the
statutes of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal and the
International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal: Note by the
Secretary-General", UN document A/59/280 of 19 August 2004.
The
General Assembly had specifically requested the Secretary-General to
ensure the independence of the UNAT and separation of its secretariat from
the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), and to study the financial independence
issue. The report stated that the OLA provides only administrative support
to the UNAT, not any substantive direction or oversight, and that the UNAT
already has separate budgetary provisions. However, the Secretariat stated
that it would move the UNAT financial resources to a different budget
section, should the General Assembly agree. But this report did not
address the cozy, common and joint administrative arrangements of the UNAT
and the OLA. "Possibility of the
financial independence of the United Nations Administrative Tribual from
the Office of Legal Affairs: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document
A/59/78 of 4 May 2004.
In
a second report the Secretary-General, as requested by the General
Assembly, addressed the long-unresolved question of what to do with the
informal justice mechanism of Panels on Discrimination and other
Grievances, established in 1977 but foundering in recent years, especially
in light of the establishment of the new (if tiny) ombudsman
function. An inquiry found
that the panels can be flexible and responsive and are viewed as more fair
by staff, but that managers find them unprofessional and one-sided, and do
not act on their recommendations.
The Secretary-General agreed, not surprisingly, with the managerial
view that the panels are not effective. He noted various alternatives, but
suggested that the General Assembly either simply eliminate the Panels, or
transfer some functions to new joint grievance committees, which would
require new administrative resources, procedures, and training.
"Administration of justice
in the Secretariat: role of the Panels on Discrimination and Other
Grievances: Report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/59/414 of 5
October 2004.
In
the final report, issued late in the 2004 General Assembly session, the
Secretary-General addressed concerns of the General Assembly about
inadequacies of the administration of justice. An OIOS review had made 18
recommendations to improve the cumbersome, tardy, and under-resourced
internal justice process. The
OIOS, and the Secretary-General stubbornly disputed the idea that the
Administration dominates the process, calling this "an issue of perception
rather than reality." The report then discussed alternatives to strengthen
the process, including overcoming delays in the appeals process, training
and communication needs, making JAB participation more a process of "jury
duty" for UN staff, providing legal insurance schemes, and the work of the
Panel of Counsel.
The
report's main conclusion was that "a radical overhaul" of the internal
justice system was not required, and that past inefficiencies could be
overcome by more staff and training resources, even though there had been
a significant increase in the number of cases. "Administration of justice
in the Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/449
of 21 October 2004, esp. para. 35. [Note: Concerning the
"perception" issue, IO Watch would note Mr. Annan's firm assertion in 2000
that the Secretariat had installed an accountability system that "ensures
that accountability mechanisms are effectively used, are seen to be
used, and ensure that staff at all levels are held accountable for
their actions and inaction." "Accountability and responsibility:
Report of the Secretary-General", A/55/270 of 3 August 2000,
Summary, paras. 47-48.
This
most recent internal justice report also contains two cursory subsections,
and mention of some Staff Rule adjustments on the very important issues of
UN managers' cooperation with the administration of justice system, and
the connection between that system and the accountability of UN managers
for what the Secretariat delicately labels "management irregularities" and
the real world calls waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. IO Watch will follow up on these
important issues, in light of the major failures to establish management
accountability mechanisms and "freeing the managers" instead, particularly
in the archive subsection on Unleashed Managers
. Administration of justice in
the Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/449 of
21 October 2004, paras. 25-28 and
40-41.
The
delayed submission of this key report achieved its apparent purpose. In late December 2004, as the
Fifth Committee (for the General Assembly) finished up most of its
business, it noted that the reports before it on the administration of
justice were "deferred for future consideration" at its resumed
session. "Review
of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the
United Nations: Report of the Fifth Committee", UN document A/59/652 of
22 December 2004, pp. 5-6.
IO
Watch concludes that the continuing Secretariat delays and narrow focus on
"process" issues are a very insufficient response to the urgent need to
reform the UN's defective administration of justice system. They ignore
the central questions of the legal quality, consistency, and fairness of
the decisions reached. In effect, the UN Secretariat is now merely saying
that it will strive to produce its unsatisfactory and often dubious
judgements on staff appeals (see the following extensive subsections of
this archive on Behind the Scenes
and Major Ongoing Flaws
) much more quickly.
THIRD, the
UN's internal justice system can be compared to a similar process of
arbitration, for investor grievances, in the United States (which
admittedly differs mostly in the way in which the UN Administration so
totally dominates its own "arbitration"/appeals process at present.) An article in
2004 stated that in 2003 American investors filed 8,945 cases under this
US system, which has been applauded (by the securities industry, one
hastens to note) as a cheap way to adjudicate disputes. Industry lawyers note that the US system is
particularly efficient in disposing of meritless cases, but claimant
lawyers complain bitterly that the deck is still stacked against investors
in the vast bulk of cases. The problems of this system sound very
much like the deficiencies that UN staff already face in the UN internal
justice system, and would face even if the above UNAT reforms and
sanction mechanisms were implemented. They were nicely summarized as
follows: "A flawed
system? The NASD's system
of mandatory arbitration in disputes between brokers and their customers
is overloaded and replete with shortcomings, according to critics. The main
complaints: Arbitrary decisions -- Awards often fail to compensate
investors sufficiently for their losses, even in clear-cut cases of broker
liability. Inadequate explanations
-- Arbitrators fail to explain in their rulings why they decided as they
did, hampering investor appeals. Stonewalling
-- Lawyers say brokerages routinely thwart requests for documentation,
increasing the burden on litigants. Protracted proceedings
-- Some arbitrators set many hearings over weeks or months, wearing down
claimants and jacking up costs." Gary Weiss with
David Serchuk, "Walled off from justice: Arbitration is the only route for
investor grievances -- and it's full of potholes," Business Week Europe, March 22, 2004, pp. 90-92. Another appropriate
quote highlighted in the article says that "Arbitration panels [read JAB's
et al.] don't care what the law is," says one critic, and a second article
in entitled, "Give investors their day in court: Arbitration is stacked in
the brokers' favor," same issue, p. 92.
FOURTH and finally, another quite directly-applicable
opinion came from an eminent international human-rights lawyer, Geoffrey
Robertson, who was requested in 2002 to survey whether the operation
of the ILOAT (generally considered to be better than the UNAT) conforms to
the requirements of international human rights law. He found that: -- the ILOAT statute and rules had gone unchanged
since 1946; -- judges were appointed only for three-year terms,
i.e., are not independent; -- procedures fail to provide "a fair and public
hearing" by consistently denying requests for the permitted oral
proceedings, which can "transform the judicial approach"; -- there is no provision for appeal ("judgments shall
be final and without appeal"); -- and many other problems, such as
inequality between employer and complainant, inadequate power of
disclosure of key documents, denial of staff group or "class" complaints,
and the ILOAT's consistent failure to draw up rules of evidence. Mr. Robertson began, and concluded, that: "I am asked to advise the staff union of [the ILO] as
to whether the [ILOAT operation] conforms to the requirements of
international human rights law. …
It serves as the final arbiter of employment issues for some 35,000
international civil servants, deprived by their occupation of recourse to
domestic employment law … In principle, a tribunal of this potency and
importance must operate, and be seen to operate, to the highest standards
of transparency and fair play. … There are …
fundamental ways in which ILOAT fails to conform to the requirements for a
judicial body …
the deficiencies in compliance with human rights standards have produced a
perception of injustice, and have denied to unsuccessful complainants a
proper opportunity to press their case …[which consequences] require urgent
rectification. There are …
many other deficiencies both practical …and jurisprudential …
that could be addressed in any overhaul … However, in this short and necessarily
broad-brush opinion I have sought to identify the respects in which it can
be said that the Tribunal is in breach of human rights rules which have a
jus cogens quality, and should therefore be a
defining characteristic of every international judicial body." "Opinion," Geoffrey
Robertson Q.C.,
November 20, 2002, paras. 1-2,
5, 16.
At its resumed session in early 2005, the General
Assembly once again took up the administration of justice issues that had
been postponed by late submission of the requested Secretariat report in
the autumn of 2004. It finally called for major reform efforts that must
be taken. Unfortunately, everything proceeds on at the usual leisurely UN
pace -- any decisions and action will not be decided upon until at least
the spring of 2007. The debate in 2005 focused initially on a review of
procedural and institutional matters of the Secretariat appeals process
(i.e., not on the actual quality and effectiveness of the process.) The
OIOS found that the appeals process should be shortened by providing more
funding, (and that the role of the Department of Management as both
"prosecutor" and "judge and jury" should be clarified to mitigate conflict
of interest.) "Management review of the appeals process at the
United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/408 of
The Secretary-General's report of "Administration of justice in the Secretariat: Report
of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/449 of "Administration of Justice in the Secretariat: Report
of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/706 of
In a very critical interim report on this situation
of " … the issues raised in the … [Secretary-General's
October] report had been raised by the Committee as far back as 1985. …
The problems alluded to had persisted over many years … The Committee
takes this matter very seriously as it has a significant impact on staff
morale and productivity as well as … [Organizational efficiency] and could
also have a significant financial impact. … The Committee regrets that the requested report …
very brief, was not received until ... [February and] does not fully
respond to the Committee's request] for a clear justification of needs and
… full expose of what [additional resources would achieve.] … The Committee has consistently maintained over the
years that the problems besetting the administration of justice … involve
much more than a perceived lack of resources; indeed, at the core of
the matter lie difficulties with administrative processes and procedures
and the culture of staff-management relations. The Committee
is once again prepared to look into this matter comprehensively. … [It trusts that} … information will also be made
available on how … [the General Assembly's 2003 request to link] the
administration of justice and personal responsibility and accountability
[is] being met." "Administration of justice in the Secretariat:
Interim report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions", UN document A/59/715 of In April 2005 the Fifth Committee reported on its
consideration of no less than 13 documents concerning the administration
of justice.
The resulting resolution adopted by the General Assembly stated
very firmly, inter alia, that: "Stressing that the system of justice in the United
Nations as a whole should be independent, transparent, effective,
efficient and fair, Stressing the importance of increased transparency in
decision-making and increased accountability of managers for the
system, Noting that the existing system should respect the
principle of due process and provide for appropriate peer review, … Regretting that the present system of administration
of justice in the Secretariat continues to be slow, cumbersome, and
costly, Regrets the continued serious delays in the appeals
process … Cross-cutting issues: General guidelines … 11. Stresses the importance of the proper implementation
of a sound performance appraisal system as a potential means of
avoiding conflict; 12. Also stresses the need to provide
training in managerial skills to improve the conflict resolution skills of
managers; … 14. Notes that staff rule 112.3, which relates to the
financial liability of managers, has yet to be implemented …" "Administration of justice at the United Nations:
Report of the Fifth Committee", UN document A/59/773 of "Administration of justice at the United Nations",
General Assembly resolution 59/283 of Most importantly, the General Assembly resolution
stated that it: "47. Decides that the
Secretary-General shall form a panel of external and independent experts
to consider redesigning the system of administration of
justice; 48. Also decides that the panel shall be
composed of a pre-eminent judge or former judge with administrative law
experience, an expert in alternative dispute resolution methods, a leading
legal academic in international law, a person with senior management and
administrative experience in an international organization and a person
with United Nations field experience; … [49.(a)] The redesign
panel shall propose a new model for resolving staff grievances in the
United Nations that is independent, transparent, effective, efficient and
adequately resourced and that ensures managerial accountability; …
[49.(c)] The redesign panel shall, in
particular: (i) Consider alternative systems for resolving staff
grievances by considering other models of organizational dispute
resolution while
acknowledging the uniqueness of the United Nations system, in particular
the immunity of United Nations staff from national laws and thus the lack
of recourse to national courts; …" "Administration of justice at the United Nations",
General Assembly resolution 59/283 of This new General Assembly resolution is a major step
forward in reforming the inept UN "administration of justice" system which
could reverse decades of Secretariat inertia. It also calls
for an outside expert review (as this archive notes was done in the World
Bank a decade ago while the UN dithered along on this key issue.) However, IO Watch believes that there are two major
problems with the above guidance. The first is serious substantive gaps.
The "independent" panel, as always under Mr. Annan, will be "FOK's"
("friends of Kofi", that is, people of his own choosing). He will in turn
comment and advise the General Assembly on their recommendations and what
should be done.
Also, the resolution calls firmly for an "independent" system,
which, quite simply, can never exist within the UN Secretariat and under
the firm thumb and control of the Secretary-General snd the many officials
who act in his name. The General Assembly resolution also emphasizes a
"fair" internal justice system in its preamble, and that the existing system "should respect the principle of
due process".
Very regrettably, however, these central elements are omitted
entirely from the central guidance for the redesign panel provided in
paragraph 49a quoted above. Most importantly, the resolution
underscores the "uniqueness" of the UN system, particularly the immunity
of UN staff from national laws [unlike the rest of humanity] and thus the
lack of recourse to national courts [although at present the
Secretary-General can choose to waive this immunity and send them there --
or not]. Secondly, the reform will at best proceed slowly, and
will perpetuate the decades-long period during which UN "justice delayed
is justice denied". The General Assembly specified that the
panel should begin its work by February 2006 and report by the end of
July, with the Secretary-General to then transmit its report and
recommendations to the Assembly "as a matter of priority," and to submit
his own comments, and estimate of time and resources needed for
implementation of the recommendations, in the spring of 2007. And the
battle lines are already drawn: while the General Assembly wants a "new
model", the Secretariat has already stated its belief that "a radical
overhaul" is not required, and that the UN administration's domination of
the internal justice processes is merely "a perception." This
certainly sets the scene for a protracted stalemate in 2007 and
beyond. Meanwhile, the inept UN Secretariat "administration
of justice" system, as the General Assembly repeatedly states, continues to
fail to meet the essential legal requirement stated by the
Secretary-General himself (at the beginning of this subsection), and to
maintain staff morale and enforce accountability in the UN: "The jurisdictional immunity of the Organization
legally obligates it to have just and effective internal
processes to deal with grievances and appeals by staff, and
with disciplinary cases … [as] an indispensable
aid to maintaining staff morale, as well as enforcing
accountability. ..." "Accountability and responsibility: Report of the
Secretary-General", A/55/270 of 3 August 2000,
Summary, para. 39. [emphasis
added] It should be recalled that three decades ago, in
1974, a group of UN system staff representatives met to launch the first
campaign to reform the UN internal justice system. Their key
question still reverberates today because it remains
unanswered: "'Given the diffidence accorded 'executive
privilege,' the difficulties of staff organizations in establishing
themselves as a countervailing force to that privilege, and the
disinterest … of those whose help can make a difference-- for instance,
members of delegations and the press -- then, what are the chances for review and reform of the
system of due process?' That question asked 18 years ago [in 1974] needs to
be raised again. For, as put by the distinguished
professor of international law, M. N. Akehurst ( 'In the early days of the 20th century, it may have
been possible to regard legal relations between international
organizations and their staff as operating outside any known legal system;
such a view is no longer
tenable.'" Peter Ozorio, [who was a member of the 1974 staff
working group] "Legal rights revisited," UN
Special ( The General Assembly has taken a major step toward
basic reform of this sorry situation, but similar serious efforts in the
late-1970s, late-1980's, and mid-1990s all eventually broke down in
protracted debates among the administration, staff, and General Assembly.
Whether this new system will ever actually be implemented, and how well,
is something that IO Watch will continue to track. For the
present, as for several decades past, the answer to this section's guiding
question, Where is the rule of law?, continues to be -- not in the UN
Secretariat. UN management accountability
is fundamentally handicapped by the gross lack of a just and effective
legal foundation. The subsections which follow discuss in more depth
the grievous justice and rule-of-law abuses which continue on behind the
scenes in the UN; the major flaws of the current system of "internal
justice", especially a staff code of conduct which is quite heavy on staff
responsibilities but disturbingly weak on staff rights and due process; UN
hypocrisy in promoting the rule of law and judicial reform worldwide but
not in its own operations; and the very real issues of UN senior
officials' (and peacekeepers') impunity. This section concludes with important reform
initiatives that could certainly help overcome all these serious
rule-of-law problems: -- providing a much-needed Revision of the Code of
Conduct -- commissioning an External experts justice reform
review, including establishment of
the essential element of independent expert
oversight and monitoring of the UN internal justice system (as the UN
hypocritically recommends for others but not itself); and -- establishing a real (that is, properly-staffed and
empowered) Human rights
ombudsman, as recommended by
prestigious UN expert observers a decade ago. In addition, an analysis of the basic legal
weaknesses of the current system, as well as related documentation and IO
Watch future plans for follow-up activities, are presented , under Legal
overview, in the Legal section
of this website.
Useful sources
"Management review of the appeals process at the
United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/408 of
"Administration of justice in the Secretariat: Report
of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/449 of
"Administration of Justice in the Secretariat: Report
of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/706 of "Administration of justice in the Secretariat:
Interim report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions", UN document A/59/715 of "Administration of justice at the United Nations:
Report of the Fifth Committee", UN document A/59/773 of "Administration of justice at the United Nations",
General Assembly resolution 59/283 of Beigbeder, Yves, The internal management of UN organizations: The long
quest for reform, Chapter 11, "The uneven legal protection of UN
staff",
Ch. 12 "The staff unions' dilemma: Confrontation or partnership',
St. Martins Press, New York, 1997. Beigbeder, Yves, Management problems in United Nations organizations: Reform or decline?, Frances Pinter, London, 1987, Chapter 8, "Staff grievances: Ombudsmen, boards, and judges". De Cooker, Chris,
Ed., International Administration: Law and
management practice in international organizations, especially section
V. "Judicial protection", I.1 "The international civil service: The idea
and the reality", and II.6 "Changing roles and functions of staff
representatives in the United Nations system", UNITAR,
Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1989. Childers, Erskine
with Urquhart, Brian, "Renewing the United Nations system", Development Dialogue 1994:1, Dag Hammarskjold
Foundation and Ford Foundation, Upsala, Sweden, 1994, pp. 168-169,
210-211. "Administration of
justice at the United Nations", Joint Inspection Unit report
JIU/REP/2000/1 of August 2000. FICSA Studies and
Policies No. 2, "Appeals procedures for international civil
servants",
Washington DC 1974. Reinisch,
August,
International organizations before national
courts, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law,
Cambridge University Press, 2000. "The legal corner: That losing feeling", UN Special (Geneva), January 2002, pp. 15-17.
"Abuse of
authority", UN Staff Report (NY), September
1997, page 6-7.
[excerpt only] Amerasinghe, Prof.
C. F., "The 'Code of conduct' ", UN Staff
Report, December 1997, pp. 12-13. Robertson, Geoffrey, Crimes Against humanity: The struggle for global justice, 2d ed., Penguin Books, London, 2002. Hazzard, Shirley, "Breaking Faith, Parts I and II", The New Yorker, September 25, 1989, pp. 63-99, and October 2, 1989, pp. 74-96. "Administration of
justice in the United Nations", Joint Inspection Unit report JIU/REP/86/8
of September 1986. "Administration of
justice in the organizations of the [UN] common system: Grievance,
disciplinary and appeals procedures: Note by the Secretariat of the
ICSC" (2
parts), ICSC/29/R.8/Add. 2 of 7 February 1989. Heitz, Andre and
Lombardi, Antonio, "UN misbehaves on the 'Code of Conduct' ", UN Special, November 1997, pp. 12-13. Ozorio, Peter,
"Tribunal trouble: Legal rights revisited", UN Special,
September 1992 and October 1992, pp. 24-25. Samson, Klaus, "The
protection of the interests of … staff … in
… reorganization or reduction", UN Special, January 2000, pp.18-21. Secret,
Louis-Bernard, "Heads I win: Tails you lose: Justice according to the UN",
UN Special, January 1998, pp. 32-35.
Roy, Mark, "For a
separate office for administration of justice in the United Nations," Mark
Roy, [New York staff publication source??], July 1993. "The internal
system of justice: Reform -- To be or not to be", UN Staff Report (New York),
March 1997, pp. 10-11.
Axelbank, Jay, four
articles:
"Administrative injustice at the
UN", UN Special (Geneva), December 1993, pp.14-15,
"Win case but lose job", January 1994, pp. 30-31,
"Win case; win $1 in damages", February 1994, 30-31, and
"Administrative injustice", May 1994, pp. 29-30
[all excerpted from articles in UN
Staff Report (New Heitz, Andre, "Lets
do justice to justice", UN
Special (Geneva), September 1994, pp. 32-33, 35, Secret,
Louis-Bernard, "Heads I win: Tails you lose: Justice according to the UN",
UN Special (Geneva), January 1998, pp.
32-35,
Blair, Eric, "Build
your case before it's too late", UN Special,
January 1998, pp. 19-21, Fayache, M. L.,
"Defense des droits du personnel", UN Special,
February 1999, pp. 23-25 ----,
"Frivolous defence", February 2000, pp.25-26,
----, "List of UNAT cases dealing with
PER", February 1999, pp-19-20, ----, "More good news on PERs from the UNAT (at least for the staff!), February 2000, p. 27, -----, "Le systeme
des castes se porte bien a l'ONU", January 2000, pp. 12-13,
-----,
"The staff needs the statutory 'administrative review', February
2000, pp. 28-29.
[all in the UN Special] Comeau, Pauline,
"Guilty verdict handed down in "secret" UN sexual harassment hearing:
Special report", Human Rights Tribune,
March/April 1994, pp. 20-25. "Human resources
management reform: Report of the Secretary-General", section II.F.
"Administration of justice" and Annex V., A/55/253 of 1 August 2000. Rodrik, Phillipe,
"L'ONU sanctionne le chef du protocole pour harcelement
et brimades", Tribune de Geneve, 17 May
1994. Sheridan, Michael,
"Women speak out against harassment within UN", the Independent (UK), and "UN covers for official who
harassed women", 6 June 1995. Simpson, Glenn R.,
"World Bank, under attack, concedes staff problems", Wall Street Journal, March
1999, p.
A20. Sopher, Jamil,
"Here at the World Bank: Our story", Letter to the Editor, Wall Street Journal, 20 April 1999. Souria, Robert,
"The truth about the Geneva Joint Appeals Board", UN Special, March 2000, pp.15-16. "The internal
system of justice: Reform -- to be or not to be", UN Staff Report (NY), March 1997, pp. 10-11 "Feasibility of
establishing an office of Ombudsman at the UN: Report of the
Secretary-General", A/C.5/40/38 of 5 November 1985. "Administration of
justice in the Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General", A/C.5/46/7
of 19 September 1991. "Human resources
management", General Assembly resolution 53/221 of 23 April 1999, Part IV.
paras. 8, 10-11. "Recovery of
misappropriated funds from staff members and former staff members: Report
of the Secretary-General", UN document A/48/572 of 9 November 1993.
"Alleged cases of fraud in the UN: Study of the
possibility of the establishment of a new jurisdictional and procedural
mechanism or of the extension of mandates and improvement of existing
jurisdictional and procedural mechamisms; Overview by the Secretariat", UN
document A/AC.243/1994/L.3 of 4 April 1994.
"Jurisdictional and procedural mechanism for the
proper management of resources and funds of the United Nations: Report of
the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts established pursuant
to General Assembly resolution 48/218 A", UN document A/49/418 of 22
September 1994.
"Reform of the
internal system of justice at the United Nations Secretariat: Report of
the Secretary-General", A/C.5/49/13 of 8 November 1994. "Establishment of
panels on discrimination and other grievances," UN document ST/AI/308/
Rev. 1 of 25 November 1983. "Reform of the internal
system of justice in the UN Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General",
A/C.5/50/2 of 27 September 1995. "Reform of the
internal system of justice in the United Nations Secretariat: Report of
the Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/49/13 of 8 November 1994. "Reform of the
internal system of justice at the United Nations Secretariat: Note by the
Secretary-General", Fifth Committee, A.C.5/49/CRP.2 and Annex of 14
November 1994. "Personnel questions",
General Assembly resolution 47/226 of 30 April
1993, Part II,
"Administration of justice in the Secretariat."
"Administration of
justice in the United Nations: Report of the [ACABQ]," UN document
A/55/514 of 23 October 2000 .
"Administration of
justice in the Secretariat," General Assembly resolution 57/307 of 22 May 2003. "Human rights in
the administration of justice," General Assembly resolution 58/183 of 18
March 2004, preambular para. 2, and paras. 1,2, and 5. "Comprehensive
report on the activities of the [UNAT]: Report of the [UNAT]", UN document
58/680 of 14 January 2004.
Joint Inspection
Unit, "Report of the [JIU] on reform of the administration of justice in
the United Nations System: Options for higher recourse instances", UN
document A/57/441 of 27 September 2002. "Administration of
justice in the Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document
A/56/800 of 13 February 2002. |
|||
