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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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"Problems relating to the
professional staff of the [UN] Secretariat are usually considered in
political, administrative, and budgetary terms. The time has come to discuss them
in legal terms too, or rather, in the light of the purposes and the
requirements of the Charter.
Indeed, given the political and social stresses to which the staff
is exposed, it is imperative to focus on, to reinvigorate the role of law,
and to develop proper procedures, counterbalances, safeguards, and due
process.
" Theodor Meron, The United
Nations Secretariat: The Rules and the Practice, D.C. Heath,
Lexington, Mass., 1977, pp. xiii-xiv.
The author of the
above quote was one of the first experts to assess the issues and problems
of staff rights in the UN Secretariat, as a former UN delegate and a
professor of international law in New York. His own subsequent career over the
past quarter-century underlines the vastly expanded involvement of the UN
in international judicial processes today, since he was recently
reappointed as president of the UN war crimes tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia. An interview
disclosed that: "Drama, barbarity, and
accountability are the threads that run through Meron's life
In conversation, he does not like
to dwell on the four harsh years he spent at a Nazi labor camp
But yes, he conceded, those years
unquestionably compelled him to study law in order to 'explore the means
to avoid mistreatment, to focus on ways to protect human
dignity.' His] eyes light up as he turns to
what is clearly his passion; the principles of humanitarian law
"As a judge, it would not be
appropriate for me to refer to any current case,' he said. 'But the fact
is that before this tribunal we see the same type of age-old human
tendency, of leaders and commanders washing their hands. It was already of great concern in
Shakespeare's time and it remains at the very center of war crimes today.
Shakespeare's dialogues that touch on the moral and legal duties of
leaders, their accountability, their attempt to evade blame, will resonate
in the ears of anyone who listens to the major trials going on
here.'" Marlise Simons, "Hague judge shaped by barbarity and the Bard,"
International Herald Tribune, January 3, 2004.
Unfortunately, while
justice is now being served in new ways on the international scene, the
situation that Mr. Meron analysed in 1977 within the UN has, if anything,
worsened. The issue of "UN
staff rights" may not be a pressing global priority, but it is of critical
importance to UN staff morale, and even more to UN integrity and
credibility. The UN most
certainly cannot be a proper "moral spokesman" for all mankind on human
rights and legal matters if it treats its own staff unfairly and
abusively.
Yet IO Watch has
found, and presents herein, much evidence that the UN staff rights
situation is poor. In fact, it has been firmly entrenched ever since UN
operations began. Among various experts on this topic, Shirley Hazzard is
by far the most incisive, elegant, and determined chronicler. Her satire on UN staff life
published in 1967 (she was a UN staff member for 10 years), her two books
of 1973 and 1990, and her two-part magazine article of 1989 are, tellingly
and sadly, just as valid today as when they were written. Readers who want to understand the
full magnitude of grossly inadequate UN staff rights and their larger
significance for the Organization should definitely seek out and read her
work. Shirley Hazzard, People
in glass houses, Macmillan, Australia, [reissued by Penguin, New York,
1988], 1967.
----- Defeat of an
ideal: A study of the self-destruction of the United Nations, Atlantic-Little, Brown,
Boston-Toronto, 1973.
----- "Breaking Faith,
Parts I and II", The New Yorker, September 25: 63-99, and October
2: 74-96 (both 1989), and
-----
Countenance of truth: The United Nations and the Waldheim
case, Viking Penguin, New York and London, 1990. As
noted in the preceding introductory section, UN operations are
"extra-territorial", and the UN has also asserted that (as a
non-nation-state) it is not even bound by international conventions. The
UN Secretary-General has autocratic power, with no independent judiciary
and only weak and erratic legislative oversight. He (and his representatives) have
also been granted much discretion in making exceptions to the basic staff
and financial rules and regulations approved by the General Assembly. In
a feeble attempt to "democratise" this system, the Secretary-General
appoints many staff bodies, which, however, only "advise" him on various
staff matters. In addition, the UN staff has long been denied proper
representation of its interests, compared to other organizations and
government units around the world. Joint staff-management consultation
mechanisms produce little real dialogue (and sometimes considerable
manipulation by management).
They are thus unable to deal meaningfully with major problems,
which leads to deep
frustration and lessened staff morale. Secretariat officials occasionally
have been forced to admit that the UN staff-management relationship
functions poorly, and they dutifully pledge to improve things. But staff
volunteers remain skeptical
because of repeated heavy-handed and unilateral Administration actions,
their often-futile countering advisory efforts, and doubts about the
credibility and integrity of the entire cumbersome personnel and judicial
systems. IO Watch will add
considerably more detail to this frustrating and often futile process of
UN staff-management relations in this section in the
future. "United Nations staff rules",
1999, inter
alia Regulations VIII, IX, and IX-XI, and related rules, especially
Regulations 8.1-.2, 9.1, 10.1-.2, 11.1-.2, and Rules 104.14, 108.1-.2, 109.1,
110.5-.7and 111.1. Yves Beigbeder, The internal management of
United Nations organizations: The long quest for reform, St. Martins Press, New York,
1997, Chapter 12, "The staff unions' dilemma: Confrontation or
partnership?", pp. 199-208, Aamir Ali, "The international civil
service: The idea and the reality", in Chris de Cooker, International
administration: Law and management practice in international
organisations, UNITAR, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, the Netherlands,
1989, "Claim of 'new management culture'
at UN is widely disbelieved by staff and delegations", International
Documents Review, 1996, pp 1-2, Rosemarie Waters, "Interview with
the President of the Staff Council", UN Staff Report (New
York), November 1996,
pp.2-3,
"A rubber stamp for SMCC?", UN
Staff Report (New York), November 1996, pp. 4-5,
Xavier Campos, "Down with those
walls", UN Special (Geneva), February 1999, p. 17,
and Jaques Vigne, "Labourer la
mer!", UN Special
(Geneva), January
2000, pp.14-17.
In this
inhospitable overall environment, the struggle and need for staff rights
was evident from the very beginning of UN operations in New York in
1947: "In the [UN] Secretariat
. there
is no unifying directive on the functions of management.
. The need to
keep subordinates informed of what is going on; the need to convey just
praise and blame; the need for the impartial award of privilege and
promotion; the need for discipline; the need to avoid unnecessary
impositions on the time and energy of subordinates; the need to set a
personal example do not seem to be appreciated as well as they should
be.
. These major shortcomings
. are
accompanied by the less important but nevertheless tiresome defects in
working conditions
. perennial irritants that would be tolerated if
morale were high, but which count for much when it is low. Add to this the insecurity
implicit in staff reductions and in the adjustments required to achieve
proper geographic distribution and a balanced budget and you have a most
unhappy conglomeration of forces making for discomfiture of the
staff.
The staff feels the need for a
lead from the top to combat these disrupting factors.
." A
confidential analysis in April 1947 of the UN Secretariat's morale,
as quoted in Stephen Baldwin, "Good management in the United Nations",
Secretariat News (New York), January 31, 1986, pp. 11-12.
As Shirley Hazzard
recounts, in 1949 the UN administrative chief secretly approached the United
States Federal Bureau of Investigation, with Secretary General Trygve
Lie's blessing, and an agreement was made whereby US citizens (who were
then some two-thirds of the UN headquarters staff) would be subject to FBI
screening on their opinions, political sentiments, and private lives.
Hazzard cites this as the "least mentioned official transaction in UN
history," although it was later exposed in US Congressional hearings in
1952 and led to Lie's resignation from office. That secret agreement
was: "
the ascertainable point at
which the [the UN Secretariat] conclusively delivered itself into the hands of
national interest
in direct violation of the [UN Charter insistence on]
a scrupulous independence from national pressures.
Staff representatives who [spoke
out against the] collaboration with the FBI and the United States State
Department were among the earliest and least ceremonious departures. The dismissals were accompanied by
intimidating and abusive statements from the administration to those
remaining.
The squalor of these conditions,
punctuated by announcements of summary dismissals, acted on the staff with
a combination of attrition, confusion and violence.
Each department had
its informers, and its victims. The total of United Nations
employees affected
undoubtedly runs into the hundreds
[but is
difficult to determine]
since employees were permitted to resign with
extra indemnities, 'in exchange for their silence'
[or in] terminations
disguised as 'economies,' or
deportations to the field, or careers
shunted [permanently] into sidings
[or] a secret blacklisting
Above all, there is no accounting
for the deterrent effect of Trygve Lie's policies on those who might have
wished to serve a differently administered United Nations secretariat."
Shirley Hazzard on the
situation in the UN Secretariat in the early 1950s, in Chapter Two,
"The purgatory of the investigations," in her Defeat of an ideal: A
study of the self-destruction of the United Nations, Atlantic-Little,
Brown, Boston-Toronto, 1973, pp. 15, 23, 34-35. The corruption of UN
staffing practices had thus been initiated in the 1950s by the United
States, but then everyone else jumped on board: The uncontested establishment of
[US government screening and approving personnel for UN service in the
1950s] nullified the Charter concept of an independent and effective civil
service, inflicting untold damage on the potential of the United
Nations. Other governments
would thenceforth [and aggressively] also install their nominees in
virtually all significant, and in many insignificant, U. N. posts. Hundreds of meaningless and costly
positions would be created throughout the leadership of the U. N. system
for the sole purpose of accommodating national candidates -- some of whom [were] devoid of
qualifications
. Unwanted in their homelands
. [or] trailing rumors of
incompetence or scandal. The useful work of field missions
would, on occasion, be similarly encumbered by such superfluous
emissaries, dispatched to lucrative senior field assignments
. In 1978 [Secretary-General]
Waldheim would inform his unhappy staff that 'the General Assembly has
made it clear the
. geographical distribution of the staff is the
over-riding factor' --
without reference to the contrary mandate of the
Charter. By the nineteen-eighties, the
Times would report the view of 'one Western ambassador' that 'You
try to get as many posts as possible for your own nationals. This is wrong, but everybody does
it.'"
Shirley Hazzard on the UN in
the 1950s, in "Breaking Faith, Part I", The New Yorker,
September 25, 1989, pp. 63-99, p. 74.
The seriousness of
these abuses of staff rights was also not lost on some of the delegates to
early General Assembly sessions: "An end must be put to everything
that seems to make the Secretary-General's post an autocratic one, to
everything that tends to make the staff subject to the whims and caprices
of their superiors and makes careers
-- and even
employment -- dependent on blind obedience to
such absolute power." chief
French Delegate Henri Hoppenot, protesting abuses threatening the creation
of a legitimate international service, during a debate in the U.N. General
Assembly in March 1953, as quoted in Shirley Hazzard, "Breaking faith: I", The New
Yorker, October 2, 1989, pp. 74-96, [86].
Ms. Hazzard also
observed that [arguably the most respected] UN Secretary-General, Dag
Hammarskjφld, played a large part during the 1950s in establishing the
autocratic attitudes that still dominate UN
operations: "During his first year in
office, Hammarskjφld sought
and largely obtained from the General Assembly administrative powers that,
invested in the Secretary-General, were at variance with the intentions of
the [United Nations] Charter toward the international civil service. (His
attempt to modify the authority of the Administrative Tribunal was acceded
to only in part, but the standing and importance of that body
declined.) [These] actions
were condemned in a searching study, by Claude Julien, of erosion of
rights at the United Nations [in 1953] -- a study that may be read with much
interest today, when history has exposed the inadequacies of successive
Secretaries-General.
. The renewed insistence on
unconditional loyalty to a personality, whose requirements are equated
with those of the United Nations, again illustrates the remoteness of the
U.N. service from democratic procedures.
. Hammarskjold's inaccessibility
to rational opinion is disquieting.
. his failure to recruit or retain
persons of talent, or to expel sycophants, were part of a striking
remoteness from realities by then besetting the U.N. service
.." Shirley Hazzard, on Dag Hammarskjφld's policies on
assuming office in 1953, in "Breaking Faith, Part I", The New
Yorker, September 25, 1989, pp. 63-99, [82.] The pressures created
by autocratic leaders were heightened by the underlying pressures of life
in the international civil service: "Like most of his deputies,
Hammarskjφld had no sustained contact with the staff body, and his
pronouncements concerning the organization's condition and morale were
misconceived. The
abstractions set forth on paper as administrative policy during his U.N.
years did nothing to mitigate the alienation of a body of persons deprived
of a merit system, uncertain of their rights, intimidated by procedures of
surveillance and by the network of secret files maintained on its
employees by the organization itself; and conscious, above all, that
adherence to the explicit principles of their appointment would result in
their victimization or dismissal.
The separation of United Nations affairs from normal legal and
ethical accountability had left the international staff quite without the
'effective protection from external pressure and internal domineering'
called for as a matter of urgency by Henri Hoppenot of France in
1953. Many of those original
fifty-one member states against whose interference the U.N. Charter had
provided were bound, by watchful populations in their own land, to an
observance of basic rights under laws and regulations far more exigent
than the policies applied within the United
Nations." Shirley Hazzard, on the
1950s situation, in "Breaking Faith, Part I", The New
Yorker, September 25, 1989, pp. 63-99, [82-83].
In
the late 1950s a pivotal action occurred that defines the low status, and
abuses of, UN staff rights and their consequences. The hopes for the new United
Nations of the 1940s (see first quote below) were firmly buried forever by
a severe and autocratic disciplinary action case (see second, third, and
fourth quotes following): "In 1943
Mr. C. W. Jenks
emphasized that quality of leadership would dominate the effectuality of a
future United Nations Organization; and listed as the desirable attributes
of an international civil servant
'integrity, conviction, courage, imagination, drive, and technical
grasp -- in that order.'" Shirley Hazzard, on events in 1943, in Defeat of an ideal: A study of the self-destruction of the United Nations, Atlantic-Little, Brown, Boston-Toronto, 1973, p. 132. [Note: In 1970 Mr. Jenks became Director-General of the International Labour Organization (ILO)] One key incident,
related by Hazzard, vividly illustrates the very personal nature of staff
rights and relations established in the Hammarskjφld era on a severe
disciplinary issue [in contrast to the present-day UN staff of more than
33,000, and the many assistants that
more recent Secretary-Generals now have available to carry out such
disciplinary tasks for them]: "In a bizarre episode, which [led
to] the apparent suicide of a senior official who had opposed his orders
on a claim of principle, Hammarskjφld [issued] a long personal letter of
dismissal
. as a United
Nations press release: 'It is further my view that any
moral reservations which might have prevented you from obeying my
instructions do not ameliorate the impropriety of your conduct as a member
of the Secretariat in refusing an order by the Secretary-General relative
to official papers. It is my
view that if you considered your clear official duty to acknowledge my
authority in Secretariat matters to be in conflict with your private moral
convictions arising from an unauthorized assumption of authority, it was
your duty to resign from the service.' The official
. had
. refused to
relinquish papers identifying activists in the Hungarian uprising of 1956,
for fear [that the Secretariat could not protect such documents].
. the case served as a forum for
Hammarskjφld's views, expressed with despotic ferocity, with regard to the
unreflecting submission he required from his staff.
A disciplinary body composed of
senior officers of the United Nations circle reproduced Hammarskjφld's
attitude in its censure of this 'defendant'
."
Shirley Hazzard, on Hammarskjold's actions in
1958, in "Breaking Faith, Part I", The New Yorker, September
25, 1989, pp. 63-99, [83,86]. In 1958, a UN Joint
Disciplinary Committee of senior officials, considering [the above] case,
declared that "the staff member must accept the findings of the higher
authority or leave the service. Finding heavily against the "defendant,"
the disciplinary body went on to state: "While recognizing that the
obligations of staff members of the Secretariat are basically the same,
whatever the nature of the duties which may be entrusted to them, the
Committee considers it particularly important that the staffs assigned to
the secretariats of political bodies, operating either at Headquarters or
in the field, should not only subordinate their personal views to the
decisions of their responsible supervisors in the Secretariat, but also
understand and accept the overriding authority in all matters of substance
of the bodies themselves." Shirley Hazzard, on events
in 1958, in Defeat
of an ideal: A study of the self-destruction of the United Nations,
Atlantic-Little, Brown, Boston-Toronto, 1973, p.
134. Ms.
Hazzard makes the following important point on this pivotal JDC
judgment: "This important
statement goes far beyond the obvious requirements of impartiality and
professional rectitude: it abrogates conscience. Although
[it emphasizes]
'secretariats of political bodies' at the UN, it concerns itself
with the conduct of all United Nations personnel, and perfectly reflects
the attitudes, as they have evolved since 1950, of administration to
staff. It does away
with at least the first five of Mr. Jenks' requirements, and substitutes
in their place the philosophy of Adolf
Eichmann. The 'personal view'
of a reasonable being is not a mere hodgepodge of latent partiality over
which some arbitrarily designated 'responsible superior' may confidently
assume supremacy, but necessarily includes the dictates of justice, of
humanity, and of self-respect.
No organization or person is entitled to command, from any
human being, a spiritual subservience of the kind required by the 1958 [UN
JDC]
"Responsible
superiors,' in the UN Secretariat, are very often geographical appointees
with a greatly varying regard for international scruples. There are any
number of regulations defining the propriety of the international civil
servant without
[the
JDC's] totalitarian
statement; there are ample restrictions on the career of a United Nations
employee without depriving him of his immortal soul." Shirley
Hazzard, Defeat of an ideal: A study of the self-destruction of the United
Nations,
Atlantic-Little, Brown, Boston-Toronto, 1973, pp.
134-135. IO
Watch believes that powerful elements of the same shamelessly autocratic
attitude of UN management in the 1950s remain embedded in the Secretariat
today, as evidenced by the arrangements introduced in the past five years
for managers to "investigate" and control UN fraud, waste, and abuse
cases, the punishment of UN whistleblowers, and the often farcical
"internal justice" system, which helps maintain senior UN managers'
impunity even in the face of mounting scandals and major field program
decision-making failures.
The
first of the desirable attributes
of an international civil servant
listed by Mr. Jenks in 1943
--
integrity -- is in
fact one of the three paramount considerations in the employment of
staff listed in article 101
of the UN Charter. To make
clear the meaning of this critical integrity term, highlighted in the
Charter but so frequently used and abused by UN senior officials, IO Watch
wishes to note the illuminating thinking on what integrity means in
everyday language, provided by Stephen Carter in his excellent book on the
topic in 1996: "Integrity is like the weather:
everybody talks about it but nobody knows what to do about it. Integrity is that stuff we always
say we want more of.
. When I refer to integrity, I have
something very simple and very specific in mind. Integrity
requires three
steps: (1) discerning what is
right and what is wrong; (2) acting on what you
have discerned, even at personal cost; and (3) saying openly
that you are acting on your
understanding of right from wrong.
A person of integrity lurks somewhere inside each of us: a person
we feel we can trust to do right, to play by the rules, to keep
commitments.
.
Indeed, one reason to focus on
integrity as perhaps the first among the virtues that make for good
character is that it is in some sense prior to everything else: the rest
of what we think matters very little if we lack essential integrity, the
courage of our convictions, the willingness to act and speak in behalf of
what we know to be right."
Stephen L.
Carter, Integrity, 1996, Basic Books, New York, pp.
6-7.
[Note: Mr. Carter is the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law
at Yale University, and the author of several critically-acclaimed books
on related topics.] UN staff groups began
very early to analyze their vulnerability on basic rights issues (such as speaking out to maintain
their integrity), noting the negative impacts on operations:
"Staff morale is [central] to any
organization. [and particularly] to the international career service. The
1956 Salary Review Committee prescribed [some essential] conditions for
maintaining staff morale
. : each staff member must feel that he can rely
upon his leaders, that the personnel policy of his organization is sound
and fair, that the whole administration is activated by a sense of
equality, and that he has protection against arbitrary action. [It] warned that 'If these
elements are missing, [morale problems] and low productivity are probable
consequences.' The experience
of the [subsequent] 13 years
. has proved the soundness of this
warning. [Applying the] geographical
distribution principle to ,,,, promotion and placement contributes
. to
slacker discipline and poorer morale. It [seems] that hard work tends to
be less appreciated than flattering words uttered to the right person at
the right time
. The fairly
frequent clashes in administrative philosophy and habits among [staff
from] so many different cultural and social backgrounds often cause
tensions. As the
international organizations live to a large extent in a kind of political
vacuum, their staff often [feel] they are lost in what they are inclined
to consider a vast bureaucratic machine." Tien-Cheng Young, reflecting on a 1956 staff assessment in "The international civil service reexamined", Public Administration Review (US), May/June 1970, pp. 217-224 [223].
In 1974 a group of UN
system staff representatives met to launch their first campaign to reform
the UN internal justice system. Their key question still reverberates
today: "'Given the diffidence accorded
'executive privilege,' the difficulties of staff organizations in
establishing themselves as a countervailing force to that privilege, and
the disinterest
of those whose help can make a difference-- for
instance, members of delegations and the press -- then, what are the
chances for review and reform of the system of due
process?' That question asked 18 years ago
[in 1974] needs to be raised again.
For, as put by the distinguished professor of international law, M.
N. Akehurst (University of Paris): 'In the early days of the 20th
century, it may have been possible to regard legal relations between
international organizations and their staff as operating outside
any known legal system; such a view is no longer
tenable.'" Peter Ozorio, [who was a member of the 1974 staff working group] "Legal rights revisited," UN Special (Geneva), October 1992, pp. 24-25. [emphasis added]
By the late 1970s, any
earlier possibilities of openness and a healthy climate for staff and
their legal protection was already fading. As Theodor Meron noted:
"
recently there appears to have
occurred a marked decline in the number of requests for legal opinions
from the Secretary-General and various departments, including the Office
of Personnel Services. This
may be another indication of the politicization of the Secretariat, of the
diminishing role of law in the Organization, and of the increasing power
of the various departments that want to be free to establish policy
"
Theodor Meron, The United Nations
Secretariat: The Rules and the Practice, Chapter 4, "Selected legal
questions", D.C. Heath, Lexington, Mass., 1977, p. 83.
Shirley Hazzard
observed that, surprisingly and tellingly, it was only UN staff, not UN
top management or the General Assembly, that seemed really concerned about UN
performance issues and mismanagement: During [Secretary-General Kurt]
Waldheim's second term [in the late 1970s ],
[and] thwarted in their
negotiations with the United Nations administration, [UN staff
representatives] were enabled to express their disquiet to the Assembly by
a special provision enacted by the Assembly itself in consequence of staff
agitation.
these efforts
failed in their object of generating wide concern and consequent
reforms
The spectacle of a staff
body vainly seeking the proper use of its resources in the organization's
service and soliciting, in effect, the intercession of the organization's
governing council to prevent continued mismanagement by its appointed
leaders was not new at the United Nations."
Hazzard Shirley, on the Waldheim era of staff
relations in the 1970s, "Breaking Faith: II", The New
Yorker, October 2, 1989, pp. 74-96, [85-86].
[emphasis added.]
Outside experts
were equally disturbed by the lordly attitudes of UN top leadership, and
the lack of rights of UN staff: "In the late 1970s, the U.N. staff
union in New York engaged the American labor negotiator Theodore Kheel to
represent it in its dealings with the U.N. administration. His
experience with the U.N.
hierarchy -- which he likens
to 'the court of Henry VIII' --- [focused in particular on] its propensity
for abrogating formal agreements on basic matters of staff rights
. 'The thing that utterly
amazed me' Kheel said recently, 'was the position taken by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations [then Kurt Waldheim] to disregard
the elementary established rights of employees; that the agency
created to maintain standards of human decency and to bring about peace by
negotiated settlement would violate its own agreements and see no
necessity for compliance with its own
word.'" Hazzard, Shirley, on impressions of leadership
attitudes in the late 1970s, in "Breaking faith: II", The New
Yorker, October 2, 1989, pp. 74-96 [86]. [emphasis added]
Indeed, open
dialogue and especially any internal criticism or dissent seemed to have
become patterns to be feared and firmly suppressed in the UN
Secretariat: "[Recently, as President of the
Staff Union] I met with senior UN officials, who warned me]
that the
staff must be extremely careful about its actions because the UN was on
the verge of collapse and the tiniest upset might bring the whole
structure crumbling down. I asked 'Gentlemen, do you really believe that
the UN is such a fragile flower?' A solemn yes was the reply I received.
(This, I might say, is [a line] used rather consistently over the years to
silence criticism and unrest. I recently saw an article from the 12 March
1947 edition of The New York Times where the first
Secretary-General, Mr. Trygve Lie, was quoted as saying to a meeting of the staff,
'Everything you say will be used against this Organization by the enemies
of the United Nations.)
more often than not, we find our
[UN existence) defined by limitations anti negatives rather than
positives The
whole tone of present personnel policies and practices is founded on
rather outdated concepts of limiting, checking, and blocking staff rather
than [seeking) the optimum development of each employee so that the
Organization can function bettor. Lowell Flanders, The future of the UN In whose hands?, address at a preparatory meeting
of the United Nations Community Forum, Secretariat
News (NY), April 16, 1979, pp 10-11.
In 1984 Donald Dunham
cited the growing mismanagement problems, and the extreme carelessness
with which UN staffing decisions simply left some staff members adrift (a
persistent problem which still continues today: "If one independent [UN] fiefdom
should lock horns with another independent fiefdom and staff members are
caught in the middle, their demise is assured. No machinery exists to force
either one to take responsibility to resolve the issue; and no top
official will pull the horns apart, free the staff members and then knock
their heads together.
[Curiously,] when the first unit has issued termination notice on
the staff member and the second unit countermands it and arranges for work
continuation without a contract against retroactive reimbursement.
.
According to UN regulations, the countermanded assumes no responsibility
for staff members by its action, while the terminator does not lose its
responsibility because it was on its payroll that they were last
listed. The butting back and
forth is pretty exhausting [and can go on for years.]
. since there is no liberator in
sight, the literal demise may beat the administrative one to the punch."
Donald Dunham, "Management by personnel action", Secretariat News (New York), November 30, 1984, p. 11. Note:
this kind of muddled and irresponsible management still goes on, leading
to the continuing phenomenon of a group of UN 'floaters,'' who may be
suspended between units, or sitting somewhere with no work at all, for
years at a time -- an enormous waste which continues
on, as discussed in the UN
"gulag" subsection later in this archive):
Houshang Ameri noted
further in 1985 that this overall carelessness was increasingly
destructive and needed [but subsequently never received] urgent
attention: "On the occasion of the 40th
anniversary, the Secretary-General suggested a critique 'of the weaknesses
of the Organization and their cause or
causes.' The shortcomings [are broadly two:
those] of a predominantly political or structural nature [which are beyond
the Secretary-General's control]
. [and those which are] the result of a
chronic mismanagement of the Secretariat
. [which] the Secretary-General
can put right.
This [latter] malaise is due to a
wide range of causes, which include
.: the Secretariat's submissiveness
towards influential governments; the failure to [properly]
. balance the
principles of merit and geographic distribution; extremely poor personnel
management; passive and defective recruitment policies
.; politicization
of
. selection, appointment and promotion of staff; lack of a career
development plan;
. etc. Acknowledging the Secretariat's
shortcomings -- and the
breathtaking deterioration of both performance and the public image of the
UN -- would be the first step toward finding answers
[But] the attitude
of many top [UN] officials is still characterized by indifference
."
Houshang Ameri, "Shortcomings of the United Nations",
Secretariat News (New York), October 16, 1985,
pp.22-23.
Meanwhile, UN staff
were becoming very much aware of hidden agendas and discriminatory
treatment in UN disciplinary cases: "The Administration
has recently dealt with a
number of cases of alleged
fraud relating to taxes and education grants within the Secretariat. In the process, different
administrative actions have been undertaken
[including] summary
dismissal, referral of cases to the Joint Disciplinary Committee,
resignation and recovery of overpayment. ?
What are
the criteria according to which summary dismissal -- the hardest penalty
-- has been meted out to some, but not to others?
?
Under
what circumstances it is decided that a case should be submitted to the
[JDC]? ?
What are
the circumstances under which the Administration accepts the resignation
of staff involved? ?
By what
criteria is it decided that only the recovery of the overpayment should be
made? We are concerned that
the established judicial procedures which are intended to guarantee staff
a minimum of due process should not be undermined.
There is a need to
explain to the staff the circumstances governing the choice of measures
being invoked. In cases that
are similar, justice will require that staff are not only equitably
treated but that they are seen to be equitably
treated." From a "Group of concerned
staff", "Fraud and due process," Secretariat News (NY), 16 July
1986, p. 2.
The UN's increasing
field operations also provided many instances of abusive senior officials,
who were protected and retained by the UN leadership, while the situation
was condemned by staff, as shown by the following three
quotes. "
[The UN programs which eat] up the great
bulk of U.N. resources
the economic, social and humanitarian programs
aimed at development, emergency relief and 'better standards of life'
around the world
[get little scrutiny.]
Clearly, the United Nations employs many
hard-working and idealistic people.
[but]
Parts of the
system are overstaffed and lethargic, while others, particularly field
offices in unpleasant places, are overstaffed and overworked.
Local employees tend to bear the brunt of
disciplinary action
when fraud or abuse are discovered
while erring
international professional staffers often survive and even advance in the
organization. At the same
time, U.N. employees who complain about irregularities [lose promotions or
must transfer elsewhere.] It is a system that tends to cover up its
abuses and discourage whistle-blowers.
A European U.N. official, who recently left his
agency in frustration, [said] 'A certain enabling environment
allows
[raud} to happen. The
question is not whether you do it or not, but whether you're stupid enough
to be caught." "Basically, there's a lack of determination to
combat the sleaze factor' he said.
'In an environment where mediocrity has a strong self-protective
interest, these things flourish.'" William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image,
tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite
mismanagement, waste", Washington Post,
"[Concerning allegations of corruption at UNHCR
in articles in the Washington Post in September 1992] with respect to
discipline in UNHCR, a courageous staff member in
In the more complicated Lukika case in
Arthur E. Dewey, "No laxity", UN Special
( [Note: Mr. Dewey was deputy high commissioner of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from 1986-1990.]
"On the very day the Sunday Times
[( The Staff Council in UNHCR agrees with the
thrust of the criticisms. The
staff wants to weed out corruption, mismanagement, nepotism,
double-dippers, desk-warmers, and all other
irregularities
Staff representatives have been
tirelessly pointing out unsavory management tendencies and reported to the
governing body of UNHCR
on how to strengthen the organization and to
ensure the effective use of its human resources. The question is: what do these
government representatives do with these reports when they return to their
capitals
UNHCR
staff on the gound work with dedication
and have twice won the Nobel Peace Prize, but they are demoralized when
subjected to unjustified criticism.
UNHCR staff needs the help of the media to further strengthen its
humanitarian commitment to work for
refugees." Nasr Ishak, "HCR staff replies", UN Special
( [Note:
a reply letter to the Sunday Times, by the Chairman of the Staff Council,
UNHCR].
[emphasis
added.] During the 1990s new
staff concerns, such as sexual harassment and abusive managers, became
more evident and showed that in these new areas too the UN leadership was
almost totally unable to observe staff rights and to sanction managers for
flagrant misconduct: Geneva. "The United Nations Wednesday
denied reports that it briefly suspended a senior official earlier this
year for sexually harassing up to 10 women
. after a disciplinary
committee inquiry into sexual harassment allegations by 10 secretaries
. The United Nations refuses to
disclose [such records, which] underscores the difficulty individual
workers have in pursuing formal complaints when they believe they have
been treated wrongly. Secrecy laws at the United Nations
cover a broad spectrum of regulations but there are no specific guidelines
for what will be made public and what will be kept under lock and
key. U.N. staff are not allowed to
speak to the press on [work-related matters] for example, nor are they
allowed to start any legal proceedings in court without the permission of
the Secretary-General.
. Even if a senior official is
brought to trial, he or she cannot be forced to testify because of
diplomatic immunity. Most
senior U.N. officials enjoy the protective blanket of immunity which can
only be revoked by the U. N.
Secretary-General. 'It's an old boy's club and when
you have reached the diplomatic level, they all protect each other', said
one secretary who requested anonymity.'" "U.N. denies sexual harassment", UPN, May 19, 1994.
As the UN moved
toward much more aggressive internal investigations of UN operations in
the 1990s, that same favoritism of managers against lesser staff was very
much in evidence: "
In early July, eight members of
the U.N. procurement office [were suspended following alleged procurement
irregularities in UN peacekeeping operations]
. So why did the U.N. hierarchy
suspend the eight staff members?
. [Colleagues say]
the suspended
and humiliated staff made many judgment calls about bidder [performance
capabilities], but they were [serving] ,,, 14 U.N. peacekeeping operations
and their 87,000 personnel
[and]
worked 12 hours a day and weekends [under extreme pressure], which
has redoubled their resentment at the shabby treatment they have
suffered. By contrast, the eight's boss
,
who signed many of the documents in question, received a similar job he
wanted in Geneva, while no action was taken against the senior officials
on the contracts committee who are supposed to approve all
deals. A [staff member] explained '
the
unique hierarchical structure of the U.N. which leaves all decisions to
the underlings. When
everything works, they take the credit. When it goes wrong, they wash
their hands of it.'
At the U.N., the presumption of
innocence ought to be enhanced, if only because all too often the guilty
there are promoted, not punished." Ian Williams, "Free the U.N. eight! Travelgate on First Ave.", The New York Observer, September 13, 1993, pp. 1, 10. [Note: In 1997 the UN Administrative Tribunal completely exonerated the eight staff members charged , with blunt criticism of the UN's lack of due process and an apparent knuckling under to outside political pressure. The eight received $20,000 each, but barely an apology, and the investigation and case cost the UN millions of dollars. Apparently as well, no hint of a reprimand was given to the senior officials who decided to prosecute.
"Skylink case closed", UN Staff Report, March 1997,
p. 14.]
The autocratic style
and the lack of a law-based culture continued to be cited as key UN
failings in the 1990s: "Another week, another UN scandal
. Why are scandals so frequent in
[global] institutions
. ?
What
. makes them so
vulnerable to corruption, inefficiency, and
. personal aggrandisement?
. The first problem is
leadership. Leaders are
selected by an inefficient and labyrinthine process from a pool of poor
quality talent.
. Second, the waste and inefficiency can only be r | |||
