

INEPT "ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE" SYSTEM, II

Growing efforts at "lighting up" the dark world of the UN internal justice system, linking accountability to UNAT judgements, and above all indicating that a mechanism to sanction managers who flout the rules and waste UN money may be near, are enormously encouraging. This is precisely part of the "mechanism" which the General Assembly sought very clearly to create more than a decade ago, in its management accountability resolution 48/218 A of 1993.

Yet this good news conceals one enormous gap, which the UN Administration is doubtless well aware of. These dynamic sanctions essentially cannot be enforced until there is a UNAT judgement which results in losses (via damages to be paid) due to management irregularities. As the UNAT has stated, it can easily take five years for a staff member's appeal to reach it and be decided upon, and the Secretary-General is dragging his feet already, having indicated in his February 2002 report above that he would prefer to wait on such matters until the UNAT and ILOAT tribunals are "fully harmonized," whatever that means. And the proposal to add any new body for appeals of UNAT and ILOAT judgements could add many more years still (in view of all the staff, administration, and General Assembly haggling over "internal justice" of the past decades, for which please see the partial bibliography at the end of this section.)

Much more drastic action is needed, NOW, to break the stranglehold of the UN Administration on the UN appeals process There are many nasty things presently going on deep in the Secretariat, to the great benefit of its bad managers but the concurrent grave detriment of staff who struggle to act with integrity against them, as discussed in the next five subsections of this section.

It would be useless for UN staff contesting a decision to have to wait perhaps a decade or so for the above reforms to (perhaps) be debated and adopted, and then several years more years for a UNAT decision to validate their claims, pay them some recompense for damage done, and trigger (perhaps) financial recovery of funds from the managers responsible, to cover the UNAT damages awarded.

To put all this suddenly-emerging but at least potentially-promising tumult over long-standing problems of administration-of-justice into proper perspective, four more important points must be added.

FIRST, by the Secretariat's own criteria, the past decade has been a flop. The Secretary-General set five "performance indicators" in 1994 to show that the UN internal justice system, "for many years ... criticized for delay and inefficiency", would be made more effective:

- early administrative resolution of disputes;
- fewer cases under litigation;
- reduced costs;
- a major element of ombudsman panels worldwide, with an ombudsman at Headquarters acting as central coordinator; and
- improved trust between administration and staff.

A strategy for the management of the human resources of the Organization: Revised estimates ... ", A/C.5/49/5 of **21 October 1994**, paras. 99-101.

In fact, exactly a decade later the first indicator is even worse, the second might be better (but only because more people have given up on the "sucker's game" of appeals); costs, especially to settle managerial errors, are very much on the rise; a lone headquarters ombudsman is now finally "on duty", but is very marginal relative to the worldwide needs of some 35,000 - 40,000 staff; and trust between administration and staff on justice and rights issues may now be at an all-time low, as revealed by the results of a June 2004 worldwide survey of staff perceptions about integrity in the Secretariat, which is highlighted in various subsections of this archive.

SECOND, the debate on reform actions continued rather actively in 2004. The General Assembly passed another resolution which emphasized that an independent and impartial judiciary are essential to protect human rights and should therefore be respected in all circumstances. It then reaffirmed the importance of full and effective implementation of all UN standards on human rights in the administration of justice, and that Member States should spare no effort to ensure full implementation of those standards, using UN technical assistance (no less) to strengthen their capacities and infrastructure. In this context, as elsewhere, it is time for the UN to begin to practice internally what it preaches to others.

"Human rights in the administration of justice," General Assembly resolution 58/183 of 18 March 2004, preambular para. 2, and paras. 1,2, and 5.

Secretary-General Annan is thinking along the same lines, at least in the abstract. In his 2004 annual report, he emphasized the following "lessons learned":

"Enhancing the rule of law

On 24 September 2003, the Security Council held its first general consideration of the topic of justice and the rule of law. In a statement ... I shared a number of lessons that the Secretariat has learned from its experiences over the years [in peace operations] ... Foremost among those was that we must make the rule of law and justice central objectives of our peace operations. ...

In [an August 2004 report] ... to the Security Council I suggested a number of ... precepts or ground rules ... [*inter alia*]

to ensure that all courts created or assisted by the United Nations are structured and organized in a way that will ensure that the process of prosecution and trial is credible, that it complies with established international standards regarding the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, the effectiveness, impartiality and fairness of prosecutors and the integrity of the judicial process; ...

to recognize and respect the rights of victims and ensure that relevant processes include specific measures for their participation and protection ..."

"Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization", UN document A/59/1, **20 August 2004**, paras. 222-223.

Mr. Annan's annual report, and other 2004 reports, went on to emphasize the objectives of the administration of justice in the UN and the strategy for achieving it, essentially however amounting to speeding up the process. Otherwise, most of the language only repeated commitments to improve that were made in past years.

"The Organization continued its efforts to improve client servicing and place a stronger emphasis on delivering results. ...

Practical steps have been taken to improve high-priority administrative services. ... The administration of justice has become more efficient through the assignment of additional resources and streamlining procedures, which has led to significant reductions in case backlogs."

"Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization", UN document A/59/1, **20 August 2004**, para. 233-234.

In the new UN "strategic framework" approach for 2006-2007, in which "Administration of justice" had become a featured and separate item, the Secretariat added more admirable intentions:

"Objective of the organization:

To ensure the fairness and effectiveness of the internal system of justice in the resolution and adjudication of internal grievances

Expected accomplishments of the Secretariat:

A system of internal justice that is consistent and in conformity with the human resources policies and rules of the Organization.

Strategy:

... The strategy will include ... streamlining and strengthening ... the internal system ... and improving the servicing of the internal administrative bodies responsible for advising the Secretary-General on disciplinary and/or appeal cases in a reasonable swift and transparent manner with due respect for confidentiality."

"Proposed strategic framework for the period 2006-2007: Part Two: Biennial programme

plan, Programme 24: Management and support services", UN document A/59/6/ (Prog. 24), **19 May 2004**, p. 6.

[Note: IO Watch believes the new strategy, succinctly stated, presents as its proud motto "Providing faulty decisions faster."]

However, to the interested reader seeking more specific information on the status and improvements in this key "building block" of human resources reform, the Secretary-General's 2004 reform report was a disappointment, stating simply, vaguely, and quite unhelpfully under "Next steps" only that:

"J. Administration of justice

The administration of justice is considered as a separate item in the agenda of the General Assembly."

"Human resources management reform: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/263 of **13 August 2004**, p. 35.

[Note: the subject report finally showed up in late October, see below.]

During 2004 four more reports on the administration of justice appeared, one by the JIU and three by the Secretary-General. However, they tended to be more attempts to fix the existing defective system, with the Secretariat continuing to drag its feet to avoid more meaningful change.

The JIU report dealt with harmonizing the statutes of the UNAT and the ILOAT, in general by bringing the UNAT processes more in line with those of the ILOAT, as to selection of members, authority to order specific performance, and limits on the amount of compensation. The JIU felt that this effort, which would be a gradual process -- and should not ignore the continuing need to improve the slow and cumbersome other processes of internal justice -- would be important for "removing the perception of inequality" on internal justice matters within the UN system. In its Annex III, the JIU report did provide an informative listing of payments made to staff as a result of UNAT judgements from 1999 through 2003: they ranged from as little as \$2,500 on up to \$251,000.

"Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on Administration of Justice: Harmonization of the statutes of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal and the International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal: Note by the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/280 of **19 August 2004**.

The General Assembly had specifically requested the Secretary-General to ensure the independence of the UNAT and separation of its secretariat from the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), and to study the financial independence issue. The report stated that the OLA provides only administrative support to the UNAT, not any substantive direction or oversight, and that the UNAT already has separate budgetary provisions. However, the Secretariat stated that it would move the UNAT financial resources to a different budget section, should the General

Assembly agree. But this report did not address the cozy, common and joint administrative arrangements of the UNAT and the OLA.

"Possibility of the financial independence of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal from the Office of Legal Affairs: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/78 of **4 May 2004**.

In a second report the Secretary-General, as requested by the General Assembly, addressed the long-unresolved question of what to do with the informal justice mechanism of Panels on Discrimination and other Grievances, established in 1977 but foundering in recent years, especially in light of the establishment of the new (if tiny) ombudsman function. An inquiry found that the panels can be flexible and responsive and are viewed as more fair by staff, but that managers find them unprofessional and one-sided, and do not act on their recommendations. The Secretary-General agreed, not surprisingly, with the managerial view that the panels are not effective. He noted various alternatives, but suggested that the General Assembly either simply eliminate the Panels, or transfer some functions to new joint grievance committees, which would require new administrative resources, procedures, and training.

"Administration of justice in the Secretariat: role of the Panels on Discrimination and Other Grievances: Report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/59/414 of **5 October 2004**.

In the final report, issued late in the 2004 General Assembly session, the Secretary-General addressed concerns of the General Assembly about inadequacies of the administration of justice. An OIOS review had made 18 recommendations to improve the cumbersome, tardy, and under-resourced internal justice process. The OIOS, and the Secretary-General stubbornly disputed the idea that the Administration dominates the process, calling this "an issue of perception rather than reality." The report then discussed alternatives to strengthen the process, including overcoming delays in the appeals process, training and communication needs, making JAB participation more a process of "jury duty" for UN staff, providing legal insurance schemes, and the work of the Panel of Counsel.

The report's main conclusion was that "a radical overhaul" of the internal justice system was not required, and that past inefficiencies could be overcome by more staff and training resources, even though there had been a significant increase in the number of cases.

"Administration of justice in the Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/449 of **21 October 2004**, esp. para. 35.

[Note: Concerning the "perception" issue, IO Watch would note Mr. Annan's firm assertion in 2000 that the Secretariat had installed an accountability system that "ensures that accountability mechanisms are effectively used, are seen to be used, and ensure that staff at all levels are held accountable for their actions and inaction."

"Accountability and responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General", A/55/270 of **3 August 2000**, Summary, paras. 47-48.

This most recent internal justice report also contains two cursory subsections, and mention of some Staff Rule adjustments on the very important issues of UN managers' cooperation with the administration of justice system, and the connection between that system and the accountability of UN managers for what the Secretariat delicately labels "management irregularities" and the real world calls waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. IO Watch will follow up on these important issues, in light of the major failures to establish management accountability mechanisms and "freeing the managers" instead, particularly in the archive subsection on Unleashed Managers .

Administration of justice in the Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/449 of **21 October 2004**, paras. 25-28 and 40-41.

The delayed submission of this key report achieved its apparent purpose. In late December 2004, as the Fifth Committee (for the General Assembly) finished up most of its business, it noted that the reports before it on the administration of justice were "deferred for future consideration" at its resumed session.

"Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations: Report of the Fifth Committee", UN document A/59/652 of **22 December 2004**, pp. 5-6.

IO Watch concludes that the continuing Secretariat delays and narrow focus on "process" issues are a very insufficient response to the urgent need to reform the UN's defective administration of justice system. They ignore the central questions of the legal quality, consistency, and fairness of the decisions reached. In effect, the UN Secretariat is now merely saying that it will strive to produce its unsatisfactory and often dubious judgements on staff appeals (see the following extensive subsections of this archive on Behind the Scenes and Major Ongoing Flaws) much more quickly.

THIRD, the UN's internal justice system can be compared to a similar process of arbitration, for investor grievances, in the United States (which admittedly differs mostly in the way in which the UN Administration so totally dominates its own "arbitration"/appeals process at present.) An article in 2004 stated that in 2003 American investors filed 8,945 cases under this US system, which has been applauded (by the securities industry, one hastens to note) as a cheap way to adjudicate disputes.

Industry lawyers note that the US system is particularly efficient in disposing of meritless cases, but claimant lawyers complain bitterly that the deck is still stacked against investors in the vast bulk of cases. The problems of this system sound very much like the deficiencies that UN staff already face in the UN internal justice system, and would face even if the above UNAT reforms and sanction

mechanisms were implemented. They were nicely summarized as follows:

"A flawed system?

The NASD's system of mandatory arbitration in disputes between brokers and their customers is overloaded and replete with shortcomings, according to critics. The main complaints:

Arbitrary decisions -- Awards often fail to compensate investors sufficiently for their losses, even in clear-cut cases of broker liability.

Inadequate explanations -- Arbitrators fail to explain in their rulings why they decided as they did, hampering investor appeals.

Stonewalling -- Lawyers say brokerages routinely thwart requests for documentation, increasing the burden on litigants.

Protracted proceedings -- Some arbitrators set many hearings over weeks or months, wearing down claimants and jacking up costs."

Gary Weiss with David Serchuk, "Walled off from justice: Arbitration is the only route for investor grievances -- and it's full of potholes," Business Week Europe, March 22, 2004, pp. 90-92.

Another appropriate quote highlighted in the article says that "Arbitration panels [read JAB's et al.] don't care what the law is," says one critic,

and a second article in entitled, "Give investors their day in court: Arbitration is stacked in the brokers' favor," same issue, p. 92.

FOURTH and finally, another quite directly-applicable opinion came from an eminent international human-rights lawyer, Geoffrey Robertson, who was requested in 2002 to survey whether the operation of the ILOAT (generally considered to be better than the UNAT) conforms to the requirements of international human rights law. He found that:

-- the ILOAT statute and rules had gone unchanged since 1946;

-- judges were appointed only for three-year terms, i.e., are not independent;

-- procedures fail to provide "a fair and public hearing" by consistently denying requests for the permitted oral proceedings, which can "transform the judicial approach";

-- there is no provision for appeal ("judgments shall be final and without appeal");

-- and many other problems, such as inequality between employer and complainant, inadequate power of disclosure of key documents, denial of staff group or "class" complaints, and the ILOAT's consistent failure to draw up rules of evidence.

Mr. Robertson began, and concluded, that:

"I am asked to advise the staff union of [the ILO] as to whether the [ILOAT operation] conforms to the requirements of international human rights law. ... It serves as the final arbiter of employment issues for some 35,000 international civil servants, deprived by their occupation of recourse to domestic employment law ...

In principle, a tribunal of this potency and importance must operate, and be seen to operate, to the highest standards of transparency and fair play. ...

There are ... fundamental ways in which ILOAT fails to conform to the requirements for a judicial body ... the deficiencies in compliance with human rights standards have produced a perception of injustice, and have denied to unsuccessful complainants a proper opportunity to press their case ...[which consequences] require urgent rectification.

There are ... many other deficiencies both practical ...and jurisprudential ... that could be addressed in any overhaul ... However, in this short and necessarily broad-brush opinion I have sought to identify the respects in which it can be said that the Tribunal is in breach of human rights rules which have a jus cogens quality, and should therefore be a defining characteristic of every international judicial body."

"Opinion," Geoffrey Robertson Q.C., **November 20, 2002**, paras. 1-2, 5, 16.

[Note: Mr. Robertson is the author of Crimes Against humanity: The struggle for global justice, (2d ed., Penguin Books, London, 2002), which is placed near the very top of IO Watch's list of most relevant books on UN management accountability in the Recent Developments section. Several of his expert insights will be quoted at various places in this archive.]

At its resumed session in early 2005, the General Assembly once again took up the administration of justice issues that had been postponed by late submission of the requested Secretariat report in the autumn of 2004. It finally called for major reform efforts that must be taken. Unfortunately, everything proceeds on at the usual leisurely UN pace -- any decisions and action will not be decided upon until at least the spring of 2007.

The debate in 2005 focused initially on a review of procedural and institutional matters of the Secretariat appeals process (i.e., not on the actual quality and effectiveness of the process.) The OIOS found that the appeals process should be shortened by providing more funding, (and that the role of the Department of Management as both "prosecutor" and "judge and jury" should be clarified to mitigate conflict of interest.)

"Management review of the appeals process at the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/408 of **1 October 2004**, Summary.

The Secretary-General's report of 21 October 2004, as already discussed, asserted that "a radical overhaul" of the internal justice system was not required, and that the idea that the Administration dominates the appeals process "was an issue of perception rather than reality." However, it did agree that additional resources were needed to speed up the system, as the OIOS recommended. Thus, in a report of February 2005, the Secretariat proposed additional spending of about \$460,000 in the 2004-2005 biennium, and \$960,000 in 2006-2007, to keep appeals cases current and within time limits.

"Administration of justice in the Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/449 of **21 October 2004**, paras. 33-35, 13, and

"Administration of Justice in the Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/706 of **18 February 2005**, paras. 1-5.

In a very critical interim report on this situation of 28 February 2005, the ACABQ stated that:

" ... the issues raised in the ... [Secretary-General's October] report had been raised by the Committee as far back as 1985. ... The problems alluded to had persisted over many

years ... The Committee takes this matter very seriously as it has a significant impact on staff morale and productivity as well as ... [Organizational efficiency] and could also have a significant financial impact. ...

The Committee regrets that the requested report ... very brief, was not received until ... [February and] does not fully respond to the Committee's request] for a clear justification of needs and ... full expose of what [additional resources would achieve.] ...

The Committee has consistently maintained over the years that the problems besetting the administration of justice ... involve much more than a perceived lack of resources; indeed, **at the core of the matter lie difficulties with administrative processes and procedures and the culture of staff-management relations.** The Committee is once again prepared to look into this matter comprehensively. ...

[It trusts that] ... information will also be made available on how ... [the General Assembly's 2003 request to link] the administration of justice and personal responsibility and accountability [is] being met."

"Administration of justice in the Secretariat: Interim report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions", UN document A/59/715 of **28 February 2005**, paras. 3-4, 8, 10. [emphasis added]

In April 2005 the Fifth Committee reported on its consideration of no less than 13 documents concerning the administration of justice. The resulting resolution adopted by the General Assembly stated very firmly, *inter alia*, that:

"Stressing that the system of justice in the United Nations as a whole should be independent, transparent, effective, efficient and fair,

Stressing the importance of increased transparency in decision-making and increased accountability of managers for the system,

Noting that the existing system should respect the principle of due process and provide for appropriate peer review, ...

Regretting that the present system of administration of justice in the Secretariat continues to be slow, cumbersome, and costly,

Regrets the continued serious delays in the appeals process ...

Cross-cutting issues: General guidelines ...

11. **Stresses the importance of the proper implementation of a sound performance appraisal system** as a potential means of avoiding conflict;

12. Also stresses the need to provide training in managerial skills to improve the conflict resolution skills of managers; ...

14. **Notes that staff rule 112.3, which relates to the financial liability of managers, has yet to be implemented ..."**

"Administration of justice at the United Nations: Report of the Fifth Committee", UN document A/59/773 of **7 April 2005**, para. 3, and

"Administration of justice at the United Nations", General Assembly resolution 59/283 of **13 April 2005**, preambular and Part I, paras. 11-12, 14. [emphasis added]

Most importantly, the General Assembly resolution stated that it:

"47. Decides that **the Secretary-General shall form a panel of external and independent experts to consider redesigning the system of administration of justice;**

48. Also decides that the panel shall be composed of a pre-eminent judge or former judge with administrative law experience, an expert in alternative dispute resolution methods, a leading legal academic in international law, a person with senior management and administrative experience in an international organization and a person with United Nations field experience; ...

[49.(a)] The redesign panel shall propose a new model for resolving staff grievances in the

United Nations that is independent, transparent, effective, efficient and adequately resourced and that ensures managerial accountability; ...

[49.(c)] The redesign panel shall, in particular:

(i) Consider alternative systems for resolving staff grievances by considering other models of organizational dispute resolution **while acknowledging the uniqueness of the United Nations system, in particular the immunity of United Nations staff from national laws and thus the lack of recourse to national courts; ...**"

"Administration of justice at the United Nations", General Assembly resolution 59/283 of 13 April 2005, Part IV. [emphasis added]

This new General Assembly resolution is a major step forward in reforming the inept UN "administration of justice" system which could reverse decades of Secretariat inertia. It also calls for an outside expert review (as this archive notes was done in the World Bank a decade ago while the UN dithered along on this key issue.)

However, IO Watch believes that there are two major problems with the above guidance. The first is serious substantive gaps. The "independent" panel, as always under Mr. Annan, will be "FOK's" ("friends of Kofi", that is, people of his own choosing). He will in turn comment and advise the General Assembly on their recommendations and what should be done. Also, the resolution calls firmly for an "independent" system, which, quite simply, can never exist within the UN Secretariat and under the firm thumb and control of the Secretary-General and the many officials who act in his name.

The General Assembly resolution also emphasizes a "fair" internal justice system in its preamble, and that the existing system "should respect the principle of due process". Very regrettably, however, these central elements are omitted entirely from the central guidance for the redesign panel provided in paragraph 49a quoted above. Most importantly, the resolution underscores the "uniqueness" of the UN system, particularly the immunity of UN staff from national laws [unlike the rest of humanity] and thus the lack of recourse to national courts [although at present the Secretary-General can choose to waive this immunity and send them there -- or not].

Secondly, the reform will at best proceed slowly, and will perpetuate the decades-long period during which UN "justice delayed is justice denied". The General Assembly specified that the panel should begin its work by February 2006 and report by the end of July, with the Secretary-General to then transmit its report and recommendations to the Assembly "as a matter of priority," and to submit his own comments, and estimate of time and resources needed for implementation of the recommendations, in the spring of 2007. And the battle lines are already drawn: while the General Assembly wants a "new model", the Secretariat has already stated its belief that "a radical overhaul" is not required, and that the UN administration's domination of the internal justice

processes is merely "a perception." This certainly sets the scene for a protracted stalemate in 2007 and beyond.

Meanwhile, the inept UN Secretariat "administration of justice" system, as the General Assembly repeatedly states, continues to fail to meet the essential legal requirement stated by the Secretary-General himself (at the beginning of this subsection), and to maintain staff morale and enforce accountability in the UN:

"The jurisdictional immunity of the Organization legally obligates it to have just and effective internal processes to deal with grievances and appeals by staff, and with disciplinary cases ... [as] an indispensable aid to maintaining staff morale, as well as enforcing accountability. ..."

"Accountability and responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General", A/55/270 of 3 August 2000, Summary, para. 39. [emphasis added]

It should be recalled that three decades ago, in 1974, a group of UN system staff representatives met to launch the first campaign to reform the UN internal justice system. Their key question still reverberates today because it remains unanswered:

"Given the diffidence accorded 'executive privilege,' the difficulties of staff organizations in establishing themselves as a countervailing force to that privilege, and the disinterest ... of those whose help can make a difference-- for instance, members of delegations and the press -- then, what are the chances for review and reform of the system of due process?"

That question asked 18 years ago [in 1974] needs to be raised again. For, as put by the distinguished professor of international law, M. N. Akehurst (University of Paris):

"In the early days of the 20th century, it may have been possible to regard legal relations between international organizations and their staff as operating outside any known legal system; such a view is no longer tenable."

Peter Ozorio, [who was a member of the 1974 staff working group] "Legal rights revisited," UN Special (Geneva), October 1992, pp. 24-25. [emphasis added]

The General Assembly has taken a major step toward basic reform of this sorry situation, but similar serious efforts in the late-1970s, late-1980's, and mid-1990s all eventually broke down in protracted debates among the administration, staff, and General Assembly. Whether this new system will ever actually be implemented, and how well, is something that IO Watch will continue to track. For the present, as for several decades past, the answer to this section's guiding question, Where is the rule of law?, continues to be -- not in the UN Secretariat. **UN management accountability is fundamentally handicapped by the gross lack of a just and effective legal foundation.**

The subsections which follow discuss in more depth the grievous justice and rule-of-law abuses which continue on behind the scenes in the UN; the major flaws of the current system of "internal justice",

especially a staff code of conduct which is quite heavy on staff responsibilities but disturbingly weak on staff rights and due process; UN hypocrisy in promoting the rule of law and judicial reform worldwide but not in its own operations; and the very real issues of UN senior officials' (and peacekeepers') impunity.

This section concludes with important reform initiatives that could certainly help overcome all these serious rule-of-law problems:

- providing a much-needed [Revision of the Code of Conduct](#) and underlying staff rules and regulations, particularly with regard to due process protections for staff;

- commissioning an [External experts justice reform review](#), including establishment of the essential element of independent expert oversight and monitoring of the UN internal justice system (as the UN hypocritically recommends for others but not itself); and

- establishing a real (that is, properly-staffed and empowered) [Human rights ombudsman](#), as recommended by prestigious UN expert observers a decade ago.

In addition, an analysis of the basic legal weaknesses of the current system, as well as related documentation and IO Watch future plans for follow-up activities, are presented , under [Legal overview](#), in the [Legal](#) section of this website.

Useful sources

(Note: informally assembled by IO Watch, roughly ranked from "most useful" on down and in this list somewhat chronological, and subject to change as new sources are added)

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"Win case but lose job", January 1994, pp. 30-31,

"Win case; win \$1 in damages", February 1994, 30-31, and

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