|
|||||
UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
|
|
In
1992 and 1993 the Secretariat provided some very disappointing
reports on management reform, but they were sharply contradicted by
several very new and quite critical outside reports. The contrast between Secretariat
lassitude and external analysis of a faltering UN management process
finally led the General Assembly to firmly insist in a landmark resolution
that a UN management accountability system must be established.
The first
required Secretariat report, in October 1992, briefly and blithely brushed
aside any need for new mechanisms for staff reporting of misuse of UN
funds. It stated
that "United Nations staff members
[especially managers in administration and finance] … are required to
report to senior management any inappropriate uses of [UN resources]. … ample provision exists [in the
Staff Rules and Financial Rules] for assigning personal responsibility …
for any financial loss incurred …
Such provisions … have been invoked when required … [and] serve as
a deterrent to the potential misuse of [UN
resources.] … [Whistleblower] … programmes are
thus far to be found in only a few Member
States. At the national level … those who
report abuses have frequently been the target of retaliation since … it
has been difficult to guarantee confidentiality … [also there are problems of] extensive due process
requirements … and unfounded and malicious reports … [establishing] an
administrative structure, with the associated costs … would be compounded
in a global organization [like the UN.] The difficulties [of such a
system] might therefore outweigh the potential benefits … It seems … best
… [to apply] strict adherence to the existing UN provisions and the enhancement of existing internal
controls.
The matter will, however, be kept
under active review. Should
developments warrant in the future, ,,, additional measures would be
reconsidered and the General Assembly would be so
informed. The Secretary-General
attaches great importance to his fiduciary responsibility vis-à-vis Member
States for the prudent management of resources entrusted to the
Organization. Care is
taken to ensure that these resources are utilized for the purposes for
which they were provided, that they are spent with all due regard for
economy and that there is accountability at all stages for their
use." "Measures to facilitate reporting by staff
members of inappropriate uses of the resources of the organization: …. :
Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/47/510 of October 8,
1992, paras. 9-14. [emphasis
added] This assessment
was actually at variance with actual practice and accountability emphases
in various UN Member States.
But the insistence that no real action was needed was even further
out of touch with the UN's own problems of mismanagement and waste of
resources, as already discussed in the lengthy subsection of this archive
on Corruption in the UN . (The
one item of "straight talk" in the Secretariat report was the contention
that those people who report abuses are frequently the target of
retaliation: this very real, still-current, and troubling problem within
the UN is discussed later in this section of the archive, in the oversight
section which follows, and under recent developments as
well. In fact, a very
in-depth investigation of UN mismanagement and waste was published in
September 1992, just a few weeks before the above UN document was
issued. Its four-part series
of reports began with the following overview: "The images are
familiar … blue-bereted U.N.
peacekeepers performing difficult missions …, humanitarian relief
workers fighting poverty and hunger …, idealistic U.N.
employees striving to make 'the new world order' a
reality. But behind these
images lies an enormous, largely uncontrolled bureaucracy, subject to
abuses and deficiencies that impair its effectiveness, a nine-month study
of the United Nations by the Washington Post has found. Interviews
with current and former U.N. officials on four continents, review of
thousands of pages of documents and visits to UN program sites [yield many
examples] …. These examples
characterize a U.N.system that has grown into what former undersecretary
general Brian Urquhart calls 'an enormous ramshackle structure
… a most astonishing
concoction.' In ways that
reform advocates find both absurd and infuriating, the U.N. system appears
to have careened out of control. … The United Nations,
its internal critics say, has been self-protecting and self-perpetuating,
rather than self-policing. It
has proved largely incapable of setting priorities, evaluating program
results or eliminating useless make-work. Budgets are opaque and auditing
inadequate. Many entities
have overlapping functions, but efforts to coordinate them have largely
failed." Branigan, William, "The UN empire: Polished image, tarnished reality", Washington Post, September 20, 21, 22, and 23, 1992. [The first of this set of articles was entitled "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste."] The article went on to
observe that: " … [The UN programs which eat] up
the great bulk of U.N. resources … the economic, social and humanitarian
programs aimed at development, emergency relief and 'better standards of
life' around the world … [get little scrutiny.]
… Clearly, the United Nations
employs many hard-working and idealistic people. [but] … Parts of the system are
overstaffed and lethargic, while others, particularly field offices in
unpleasant places, are overstaffed and overworked.
… Local employees tend to bear the
brunt of disciplinary action … when fraud or abuse are discovered … while
erring international professional staffers often survive and even advance
in the organization. At the
same time, U.N. employees who complain about irregularities [lose
promotions or must transfer elsewhere.] It is a system that tends to cover
up its abuses and discourage whistle-blowers.
… A European U.N. official, who
recently left his agency in frustration, [said] 'A certain enabling
environment … allows {fraud} to happen. The question is not whether you do
it or not, but whether you're stupid enough to be
caught." "Basically, there's a lack of
determination to combat the sleaze factor' he said. 'In an environment where
mediocrity has a strong self-protective interest, these things
flourish.'" William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, September 20, 1992, pp. 3-4.
And the article
further stated that: "UN officials who advocate a
cleanup … say that management by … top officials has been inept and,
occasionally, corrupt. 'There is no [regular] supervision of any agency'
… said [a senior
official.] Governing councils
… are 'basically rubber-stamp bodies.' The U. N. Board of Auditors …
cites numerous [problems] and 'weak internal controls' … during 1990 and
1991 … [in a] 136-page report that enumerates irregularities or
deficiencies in hiring, cash and property management, internal audits and
purchases of everything from project equipment to airline tickets.
… Many anomalies [that they report]
'appear to be recurring' and point to a 'lack of determination to enforce
regulations and rules and make the heads of units of the organization
accountable,' the report says. A recent confidential internal
paper circulating in the U. N. Development Program … put the problem more
bluntly. Citing 'a deplorable
vacuum of basic ethics' in the system, it noted widespread criticism of
'prolific structures, pompous-Byzantine attitudes of ranking officials,
operational inefficiency and … gross mismanagement of financial and
personnel resources.' The 10-page paper listed a dozen
cases of corruption involving the development agency's staffers or
programs that totaled millions of dollars in pilfered
funds." William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, September 20, 1992, p 4.
Another article
in October 1992 reported further on the findings of severe management
problems by the UN Board of Auditors:
"Mismanagement, waste, abuse and
in some cases fraud. These
are among the findings by the U.N. Board of Auditors in its examination of
Secretariat operations cited by the United States in a presentation to the
General Assembly's budget-writing Fifth
Committee. The [U.S. representative] stated
that the Secretariat 'has not made significant progress' in addressing
these problems. Referring to the current audit
report [and affirming his status as a U.N. supporter, he] said it led to
the conclusion that "existing mechanisms alone are unable to administer
and safeguard funds entrusted to the
organization.' The Board's report identified
serious deficiencies and abuses in program management, use of staff,
payment of staff allowances and benefits and in procurement and property
management, he said." "Auditors' report blasts U.N. for waste, fraud", Diplomatic
World Bulletin (New York), October 19-26, 1992, p. 1.
A third decisive
rebuttal to the UN's October 1992 "status quo" report followed four months
later, from no less than the UN's top manager, in a departing report to
Secretary-General Butros Butros-Ghali. His report, the "Thornburgh
report," was quickly suppressed by the UN Secretariat, but hundreds of copies nevertheless
circulated, and IO Watch has a copy too. The author noted that he had
joined the UN for a one-year tour, at the request of US president (and
former US Ambassador to the UN) George Bush, to evaluate UN integrity,
efficiency and cost-effectiveness from an outside viewpoint. His report said in
part: "Fraud, waste and
abuse" The United Nations presently is
almost totally lacking in effective means to deal with fraud, waste and
abuse by staff members of the type which has so recently been highlighted
in the reports of audit agencies and in the news media.
… … The chronically fragmented and
inadequate structure for audit, inspection, investigation and programme
evaluation is currently so ineffective that, time and again, we have been
called upon to create ad hoc teams to carry out investigations into
allegations of serious wrongdoing.
The delay inherent in the process of recruiting and staffing these
teams often allows the trail to 'grow cold.' It also deprives the investigation
of its vitality and the professionalism and impartiality which would come
from more regularized procedures. … [Reform is] especially crucial
given the mounting concern of major contributing Member States over the
rising level of [UN] expenditures … in nearly every area. As noted in the Volcker-Ogata
report, 'support for improved financing will be dependent upon a
perception that funds are economically managed and effectively
spent.' Major donors, and
indeed all Member States, deserve the reassurance that … their
contributions are being wisely and prudently utilized [which they can then
convey] to their taxpayers, the ultimate supporters of all United Nations
activity. This reassurance can only come …
from the prompt and effective activation of a strong [UN] Inspector
General's office along the lines I have previously suggested."
Dick Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations" ["The Thornburgh report"], 1 March 1993, pp. 29-31.
This
report were widely discussed in the news media, and an article by Mr.
Thornburgh himself provided a succinct summary of its major
point: "Unfortunately, the
mechanisms in place to … deal with
allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse within the United Nations are
creaking leftovers from more placid times. Internal audit units are woefully
understaffed [and] external audit functions are ill defined …
What is needed is an Office of Inspector General, staffed to audit,
investigate and lay the basis for remedial action in serious cases of
conflict of interest, misappropriation of funds or other corrupt
practices.. Creation of this
office should be coupled with adoption of a comprehensive code of conduct
with strict financial disclosure requirements for key UN staff members; a
moratorium on further expensive worldwide conferences; reduced travel
expenditures; elimination of 'featherbedding' practices, and more
strenuous control over the unnecessarily wide array of UN publications
… The Inspector General's office is
the centerpiece of this agenda for reform." Dick Thornburgh, "How to
clean up the United Nations", International Herald Tribune,
March 26, 1993.
[Note: Mr. Thornburgh is
still engaged in the restructuring of severely troubled organizations, as
one of several experts with "prestige and integrity" helping clean up the
scandal-ridden Worldcom firm, see Jonathan D. Glater, "A cleaned up image
doesn't come cheap.", International Herald Tribune, December 14-15.
2002.] However, the
heaviest pressure for change certainly came from the U.S.
Congress: "The [U.S. House of Representatives] voted Wednesday to withhold
back payments owed by the United States to the United Nations until the UN
sets up an inspector-general's office to oversee management
practices. "I do not believe the
UN has treated the American taxpayer with respect," said [the Congressman]
who introduced the motion … The [U.S.] Senate, in
its version of an appropriations bill passed in July, approved $44 million
to repay a portion of U.S. debts to the United Nations, but conditioned
funding on creation of an independent UN office to root out
waste." "House pushes for UN
watchdog unit," International Herald Tribune, September 30,
1993.
These
knowledgeable criticisms and pressures seem devastating. But the Secretariat's subsequent
1993 report on establishing a new system of management accountability
(required by no less than four General Assembly resolutions) remained
remarkably casual and dismissive. It pontificated on general
considerations and multiple factors to be reflected upon. It outlined
policy-level issues for the various participants, and in expanding field
operations. It pondered managerial responsibilities at various levels, but
then discussed centralized UN procedures and UN managers' unhappiness with
their restrictive nature. Finally, it concluded that: "The more complicated
and increased demands by Member States, coupled with greater managerial
discretion, may require adjustments in [Secretariat regulations and rules}
… in the context of
the new realities. The balance between centralized controls and the
legitimate concerns for a more decentralized style of management will have
to be rethought. Action to be taken: " … In the course of the
preparation of this report, many suggestions for improvements were made
… But ad hoc
adjustments will not address the central problem of [balancing] … the need for a
greater degree of managerial discretion by senior staff … and the ultimate
responsibilities to Member States.
A thorough review of the [relevant] regulations, rules and
procedures [for staff] will be undertaken in the coming year to
… provide sufficient
discretion in the conduct of their work … and make the
necessary adjustments to the [existing UN] systems of accountability and
responsibility. [The
Secretary-General would intend] to report to the General Assembly on the
outcome of that comprehensive review …" "Accountability and responsibility
of programme managers in the United Nations: Report of the
Secretary-General", UN document A/48/452 of October 5, 1993, paras.
57-60. [Note: the recommended Secretariat action,
calling for preparation of another report, did not even give a "due
date."]
In
the very same month, the JIU issued still another detailed report on UN
accountability and oversight problems. It found the existing mechanisms
to be "seriously deficient", and concluded that "rising criticisms and
concerns" clearly indicated a "crisis of confidence" among Member States
about the UN's deteriorating management performance, which required urgent
and far-reaching corrective action. It summarized the situation as
follows: "
… the four main
oversight units … are
foundering: -- internal audit needs "urgent
strengthening", again -- internal evaluation is an
acknowledged "somewhat sickly child"; -- monitoring spews out only a flood
of tepid numbers; -- management advisory efforts fall
far short of stated objectives. The
various other accountability, control, and oversight processes in the
Secretariat fare
little better: -- on-site inspection work scarcely
touches operating units; -- fraud and abuse investigations are
too little, too late; -- "hotlines" are considered to be
too much trouble; -- information systems work is tied
up in one big project; -- financial control discipline is
questioned in many areas; -- management training will begin,
but very late in the day; -- management improvement potential
is scarcely being tapped; -- many other "assessment reports"
often have little to say; -- management consultants are
reserved for internal use; -- reorganizations have brought
confusion as well as streamlining; -- needed programming tools have not
developed as expected; and -- effective personal accountability
does not exist." Joint Inspection Unit,
"Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN document A/48/420 of 12 October
1993 and Add. 1 of 22 November 1993, pp. 2, 25.
In December 1993
the General Assembly "regretted" the inadequacy of the Secretariat's
dismissive report in response to the four prior Assembly resolutions
calling for change. Instead,
it followed the advice of the Board of Auditors, its top manager, and the
JIU (and the pressure from the U.S. Congress.) In the firmest and most
specific management reform guidance in the UN's five-decade history, it
called upon the Secretariat to establish a system of management
accountability, as follows: "The
General Assembly … 4.
Endorses the recommendations of the Committee for Programme and
Coordination on the establishment of a transparent and effective
system of accountability and responsibility no later than 1 January 1995
…; 5.
Requests the Secretary-General to include in the system of accountability
and responsibility the following elements, taking into account relevant
experience within and outside the United Nations
system;
(a) The establishment of clear responsibility for programme
delivery, including performance indicators as a measure of quality
control;
(b) A mechanism ensuring that programme managers are
accountable for the effective management of the personnel and financial
resources allocated to them;
(c)
Performance evaluation for all officials, including senior
officials, with objectives and performance
indicators;
(d) Effective training of staff in financial and management
responsibilities." "Review of the
administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations", General
Assembly resolution 48/218 A, 23 December 1993, paras. I.E.
2-5. [emphasis added]
Yves Beigbeder,
one of the very few long-term analysts of the UN's decades of management reform struggles (whose
incisive thoughts are cited often in this IO Watch website) observed about
these General Assembly "marching orders": "The fact that these very sound and well-recognized management
principles seem to have been 'discovered' by the UN … [almost fifty] years after its
creation, and then only implemented in part in 1994, is a candid admission
that, in the past, senior UN managers have either not been aware of, or
have not been seriously concerned with, the basic need for a strong
management base for the Organization's programmes and
operations." Yves Beigbeder, The
internal management of United Nations Organizations: The Long Quest for
Reform, Macmillan, London
and St. Martins, New York, 1997, p. 127.
Even before the
General Assembly acted, however, the Secretary-General had
surrendered, and established a new internal oversight unit (by simply
combining the four existing units) in September 1993. [Subsequent developments in this
very important area are discussed in detail in the next major subsection,
on Internal Oversight: The OIOS .] The first head of
the new temporary unit, Mohamed Aly Niazi, had extensive "hands-on" UN audit
experience, especially as head of the struggling (because resource-starved
and powerless) UN internal audit unit. In his report of September 1994 on
the new unit's first year, he warned that despite "high expectations", the 60
professional staff of the new unit could not properly oversee the billions
of dollars of annual UN expenditures scattered worldwide. He observed in particular that:
"The effectiveness of
an oversight office depends to a large extent on how senior officers
perceive their roles. The
concept of management accountability in the United Nations has not been
consistently applied. … no system of accountability will be effective without the
assurance that sanctions will be promptly applied when violations
occur. I strongly recommend
that any new system of accountability and responsibility include specific
penalties or sanctions for United Nations managers and other staff who
disregard United Nations regulations and rules or who are negligent in the
conduct of their duties and responsibilities.
… [This Office] has
initiated a comprehensive overhaul of the oversight functions of the
United Nations … with high
expectations but with [an acknowledged] inadequate level of resources.
During this first year, [it] has addressed symptoms but has not yet been
able to address the root causes of many [UN] problems. I refer to
such issues as recruitment
and promotion policies, the administration of justice, management
reporting systems, staffing and financing of peacekeeping operations and
contract management. A vast amount of work
remains to be done before the United Nations has management structures and
a management culture adequate to the great tasks
entrusted to it…. " "Report
of the Office of Inspections and Investigations", UN document
|
|||
