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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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The many negative
events of 2004 highlighted UN Secretariat performance issues as never
before. They suggested that
past efforts at overall reform, or new management systems, or more earnest
rhetoric, would not suffice. Instead, the Secretariat requires a
fundamental reform in its overall management culture of impunity and
non-accountability. But can
the UN shake off its entrenched management culture? The tipping point is there, but
will it bring much-needed reforms, or just more of the usual UN "smoke and
mirrors"?
This subsection
examines the possibilities that, this time, UN management culture change
might just be "for real." It
begins with some more overall warnings from outside analysts about the
need for decisive UN management change (IO Watch finds the words
"management reform" so tainted in the UN that it hesitates to use them any
more.) It then briefly
surveys the most troubling and dramatic problem -- the UN oil-for-food
programme in Iraq, followed by the many other problem areas of UN effort
being sharply criticized in 2005. The subsection ends
with an extended analysis of the ways in which the UN Secretariat
responded to these challenges during early 2005. After some hasty reexaminations,
it first offered some reasonable mea culpas and acknowledgement
that major management culture changes are needed. Regrettably, however,
the Secretariat rather quickly settled into its old lines of defense and
gamesmanship. The games
included, in sequence: -- asserting that
"modernists", including Mr. Annan, were now ready to begin taking over;
-- blaming Member
States (as always) for the situation; -- looking resolutely
ahead rather than at the current mess; -- rather aggressively
belaboring major UN member states for their shortcomings;
-- and last, and worst
of all, arguing that a severely mismanaged UN Secretariat should continue
its own self-regulation, and indeed should free its senior managers even
more from accountability processes, to "allow them to
manage." In early 2005,
however, the initial emphasis was on the overall urgent need to rebuild
the UN's credibility and reputation, as damaged by the many operational
problems of 2004, and as reflected in the three following
quotes. "Isolated diplomatically over Iraq, beset with
financial and sexual scandals and manifestly failing to halt genocide in
Sudan, the UN must prove its mettle in dealing with the humanitarian
crisis in South-east Asia or face a threat to its very existence.
… … Two interrelated crises … have now brought
the UN not only to impotence (a regular occurrence), but to institutional
meltdown under Kofi Annan. The 9/11 attacks … created a new kind of threat
to world order … The UN Security Council is a forum for the big players to
settle their differences, eyeball to eyeball. You can't do that with Osama bin
Laden. … The other new crisis is the descent of the
permanent UN bureaucracy into wholesale corruption. There has always been petty
sleaze, but it was accelerated vastly by the UN's oil-for-food programme
… Annan is the first secretary general to be
recruited from the ranks of the UN permanent staff. As such, he … is more prone to
defend his bureaucrats from outside criticism. … The best solution is a new secretary general …
perhaps a former prime minister or president -- who carries respect in the
major world capitals."
George Kerevan, "Has impotent UN finally outlived its usefulness?", The Scotsman, 5 January 2005.
"Can Kofi Annan survive? The secretary-general of the
United Nations has just finished what he himself admits was an annus
horribilis for his organization.
Now an American-led campaign to unseat him is probably closer to
its goal than ever. … … Although Mr. Annan is unlikely to be directly
implicated in any personal corruption [in the UN's much-criticised
oil-for-food programme in Iraq], some of his staff could well be. As the overall boss, he could be
culpable of negligence at least. … More troubling could be his son's links to
Cotecna, a Swiss-based company that monitored imports of humanitarian aid
into Iraq. … Meanwhile, … there are grumbles from America
about the UN's alleged mishandling of relief for the tsunami
disaster. Wrangles [continue]
… about the UN's role in Darfur, [and] charges of rape and sexual abuse of
children by UN peacekeepers in Congo … This week [Mr. Annan] announced that Mark
Malloch Brown, the media-savvy head of the [UNDP] … is to take over as his
chief of staff … But he will
need to draw on all Mr. Malloch Brown's presentational skills if he is to
mount an effective defense to the Volcker report." "Kofi creamed: The secretary-general is under
increasing pressure to quit", The Economist, January 8th,
2005, pp. 44-45. " … [Secretary-General Kofi] Annan is doing the
right thing by planning further management changes … Major shakeups are
needed in critical areas like peacekeeping and refugee assistance.
…. Helping the poor and desperate … demands
strengthening the management of peacekeeping operations. Some kind of appalling nadir was
reached last month with reports that members of an international
contingent of UN peacekeepers in Congo had been raping the young girls
they had been sent to protect.
Annan and his staff must spare no effort to see that these crimes
are prosecuted and punished Sweeping changes are also needed at the UN
refugee agency … Not only has the current high commissioner, Ruud Lubbers,
performed uninspiringly, but his relations with his staff have been
embittered by a charge of sexual harassment. … The complainant withdrew
formal charges and Lubbers says he intends to finish his term, which ends
in December. He should be
asked to leave now. Given the unremitting hostility of
the Bush administration, the survival of the United Nations as an
effective organization cannot be taken for granted. Annan will have to challenge the
self-protective bureaucracy more radically than it has ever been
challenged."
"Housecleaning at the UN", International Herald
Tribune, January 12, 2005.
The most powerful
factor in the continuing heavy pressure for UN management change was, and
will probably continue to be, the steadily-emerging findings and scandals
concerning the UN-administered oil-for food programme in Iraq, especially
in two rather negative interim reports by the Volcker inquiry, as
summarized in the following five quotes. "[The Volcker preliminary report] … has sharply
criticized the United Nations for insufficiently auditing operations [of
the oil-for-food program, especially] … at its New York
headquarters. 'There were no examinations of the oil and
humanitarian contracts … during the OFFP. … Oil contracts were not examined
[closely] … despite the fact that UN officials had contract-approval
responsibilities.' It was also 'unclear' why the audits … 'focused
on areas and operations peripheral to or … away from, headquarters
operations of the OIP.' Even where audits of the programme were done,
there was often no follow-up. … The UN has explained many of the programme's
problems in terms of political games between powerful countries, but the
audits reveal that the UN secretariat itself failed to exert necessary
oversight. The report said more comprehensive monitoring
could have deterred the surcharge scheme on Iraqi oil contracts, … as well
as undercutting the Iraqi government's kickback scheme for goods
purchases. … [It found] … no examination of the processing
of letters of credit by the … bank that handled the oil-for-food account,
'even though UN officials were overseeing the work of the BNP and had
approval roles in oil sales and payments to
vendors." Mark Turner, "UN criticized by Iraq oil-for-food inquiry", Financial Times (UK), January 11, 2005.
"[The Volcker panel interim report] …
investigating the [UN] oil-for-food program in Iraq severely criticizes
its director and depicts the program as 'tainted' for failing to follow
the organization's own procedures. In an essay Thursday in The Wall Street
Journal, Volcker … said the report …. accused Benon Sevan, the Cypriot
who had headed what was once the world body's largest humanitarian effort,
of 'irreconcilable conflict
of interest.' … An official [said that the report] … also
criticized … Joseph Stephanides, a senior official on the Security Council
staff, for failing to ensure that the organization's own rules for buying
oil, selling goods and selecting contractors were followed.
… In his essay, Volcker said that …
'The findings do not make for pleasant reading'
… … The interim report concluded that the
auditing system was 'underfunded and undermanned' and hence, 'unable to
meet effectively the challenge posed by a really unique, massive and
complex program of humanitarian assistance.' … …. The auditing system … lacked 'clear
reporting lines and the management responsiveness critical to achieving a
fully effective auditing process.' … [Further, he wrote,] the commission … found what he called 'a clear lapse from disciplined judgement.'" Judith Miller, "Panel calls oil-for-food program 'tainted'", International Herald Tribune, February 4, 2005. "…[Investigator, Mark Pieth … rejected [Kofi]
Annan's declaration that the [Volcker] report … exonerated him on the
matter of Cotecna winning a $10 million a year UN contract, while he was
secretary-general, and while it employed his son, Kojo. 'We did not exonerate Kofi Annan', Pieth said
in an interview. 'We should not brush this off. A certain mea culpa would have been
appropriate.' … Annan, when asked if he planned to step down,
replied 'Hell, no" … 'After so many distressing and untrue allegations …
made against me, this exoneration … is a great
relief.' But the report clearly faulted [his] management
… and his oversight of the scandal-ridden oil-for-food program
… [Concerning Cotecna,] 'It's a continuous
history of us confronting them, their owning up to something and then
backtracking,' said Pieth, a professor of criminal law and criminology at
the University of Basel, in Switzerland. [He cited an April 2004 Cotecna letter, not
included in the report, which stated] … that after Kojo Annan left the
company in 1998, it paid him no more money. But the report issued Tuesday concluded that
Kojo Annan was paid as much as $484,000 after he left the
company." "Firm in UN scandal draws harsh criticism: Investigator disputes Annan comments", Associated Press, in the International Herald Tribune, March 31, 2005. "[The Volcker panel] … has delivered a mixed
verdict on Secretary General Kofi Annan. On the most explosive issue, the
panel largely exonerated Annan of personal corruption in … [awarding an oil-for-food
contract to Cotecna.] … But the panel faulted Annan for failing to
begin a serious investigation six years ago when his son's involvement
became known. This was a
grievous lapse, for which the United Nations is now paying the price as
critics accuse it of conflicts of interest and corruption in high places.
… The Volcker panel argues persuasively that the
secretary-general should have referred the matter to UN investigators for
a more thorough inquiry. Had
it done so, the panel believes, Cotecna's contract would not have been
renewed repeatedly. … This latest report cites a lot of questionable
practices at UN headquarters.
Annan's former chief of staff authorized the destruction of files.
… Even worse behaviour was shown by Kojo Annan
and Cotecna, who strove mightily to deceive [everyone] l
… … [After] a cavalier response … Kofi Annan
needs to demonstrate that he has learned from past mistakes and can still
by the strong, effective leader the United Nations needs so badly at this
time." "The verdict on Kofi Annan", International Herald Tribune, March 31, 2005. "Kofi Annan, the United Nations' embattled
secretary general, claims to have been 'exonerated' by the Volcker
committee's second report into the organisation's oil-for-food
scandal. He was not. The committee … did indeed find no
evidence of impropriety by Mr. Annan in the UN giving a hefty contact to
Cotecna, a Swiss firm that employed his son Kojo. But the report is riddled with
unanswered questions and ambiguities. Kojo, in particular, comes in for damning
criticism … accused of repeatedly lying, of seeking to conceal the true
nature of his relationship with Cotecna … and of refusing to co-operate
fully with the committee. The
committee will continue to investigate his role … and his 'financial
dealings …' [and, inter alia, it] … point[s] out
that Kojo had close contacts in the UN's procurement office
… The committee's main conclusion is carefully
worded, not to say opaque. … This is hardly the full exoneration that Mr.
Annan wanted. Some of his
many American critics are once again baying for his blood. Asked this week if he would
resign, Mr. Annan's answer was clear: 'Hell, no!' But his reputation has been
besmirched, his credibility undermined and his moral authority badly
eroded." "Kofi, Kojo and a lot or shredded documents: There are still too many unanswered questions at the United Nations", The Economist, April 2d, 2005. [Note: For much more detail on this topic, see this archive's subsection on Iraq oil-for-food programme .] However, in early 2005
many other sharp criticisms of UN performance in its major areas of
operation, some of them quite devastating, also suddenly blossomed -- or
came to light. They include (at least) the following ten
items. "The United Nations controversial peacekeeping
operation in eastern Congo has received a further blow …
[An internal report,] … obtained by the Financial Times, charged that UN
troops had not been tough enough in defending against renegade Congolese
Army commanders … It said this inaction called into question the 'very
purpose of the mission' and 'emboldened potential enemies of Monuc [the
peacekeeping mission]' … [which] threatened the shaky peace process
… Among its criticisms, the report cited poor
leadership, misleading statements by the mission and the failure of a
commander to follow orders … The failure of the mission to use force during
the crisis 'smeared the mission with the taint of impotence and
cowardice', said the internally-commissioned report, and gave the
perception 'that it had again failed the Congolese people at a critical
moment.' Monuc is the UN's most expensive peacekeeping
operation, yet it has been widely criticized for incompetence, for failing
to protect civilians, and becoming mired in sex scandals.
… A number of senior officials have since left
Monuc, but William Swing, the political head, remains in place. In February there were reports
that he would resign, but the UN later said he would complete his
term."
Andrew England, "UN report accuses peacekeepers of failing the Congolese people", Financial Times (UK), March 23, 2005. [Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsection on Peacekeeping .]
. "A U.N. report on peacekeeper sex abuse
released Thursday describes the U.N. military arm as deeply flawed and
recommends withholding salaries of the guilty and requiring nations to
pursue legal action against perpetrators. [The report] said abuses had been
reported in missions ranging from Bosnia and Kosovo to Cambodia, East
Timor, West Africa and Congo.
While allegations of abuse have dogged peacekeeping missions since
their inception 50 years ago, the issue was thrust into the spotlight
after the United Nations found [renewed problems in the Congo] earlier
this year. … One of the tasks of [Prince Zeid al Hussein,
Jordan's U.N. ambassador and author of the report], was finding ways to
hold peacekeepers more accountable … With the United Nations burdened by scandals …
in the [Iraq] oil-for-food program and allegations of sexual harassment by
U.N. staff, officials have sought to deal with the peacekeeper sex abuse
issue quickly. … Zeid set 2007 as a target date to complete many
of his recommendations … "Parliaments, and especially those legislatures
of the largest contributors to the U.N. peacekeeping budget, may feel ill
at ease over continuing to extend support to peacekeeping in the absence
of any significant change,' Zeid said." "U.N. report: Peacekeeping ops troubled," Associated Press, March 24, 2005. [Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsection on Refugee sexual abuses .] "The United Nations Human Rights Commission,
the UN's principal forum for promoting human rights, opens its annual
six-week session today amid unprecedented criticism of its competence and
credibility. For years human rights groups have complained
of growing politicisation and double standards that have stifled debate
and allowed countries responsible for egregious abuses to escape
condemnation. … … The authoritative high-level panel on UN
reform … last December said the reputation of the UN itself was threatened
by the commission's 'legitimacy deficit' and 'eroding credibility and
professionalism.' Kenneth Roth, head of New York-based Human
Rights Watch, reckons that about half the 53 members are there 'not to
promote human rights but to undermine them.' … If there is general agreement that the
commission is broken, there is less accord on how to fix it.
… … [Mr. Roth] and others argue that countries
with the worst human rights records should not be allowed to serve on the
commission. In addition, he says, countries seeking
membership should promise to promote human rights, for instance by
ratifying the main human rights treaties and issuing a standing invitation
for visits by UN human rights envoys. Only 50 countries have done this
so far." Frances Williams, "Double standards on human rights 'undermining UN'", Financial Times (UK), March 14, 2005. [Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsection on Human Rights .]
"Ever since [Secretary-General] Kofi Annan …
put far-reaching political reform on the [UN] agenda … there has been a
danger that … enlargement of the UN Security Council -- would dominate the
agenda. It is by far the most
divisive issue, creating rivalry between leading members. It threatens to split the UN into
factions, and cause a deadlock that would bring the whole reform debate to
a standstill. … The UN must be more effective, but it also
needs to be more legitimate in the eyes of all its members. That is the case for enlarging the
Security Council and its permanent membership to include important
developing countries, such as India and Brazil, and the biggest
contributors, such as Germany and Japan, plus two more from Africa to keep
a global balance. Africa has yet to agree on its candidates … the
other four are competing vigorously for the 128 votes they need … [and
countries excluded] such as Italy and Mexico … want a more flexible
arrangement … The stage is
set for deadlock … … Progress is urgent if the UN is not to become
a lame duck. If necessary,
Security Council reform will have to wait." "Saving the UN: Enlargement of the Security Council may have to wait", Financial Times (UK), April 18, 2005. [Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsection on the Security Council .] "Ruud Lubbers told Secretary General Kofi Annan
on Sunday that he was resigning as the high commissioner for refugees
because of a lack of confidence in him over sexual harassment
charges. 'The complaint of sexual harassment could not
be substantiated', Lubbers wrote [in his letter of resignation.]
… [Earlier], Annan said there were insufficient
grounds to dismiss him. But on Friday, Annan consulted lawyers, clearly
angered at the resurgence of sexual harassment allegations after a
newspaper report that included graphic details. … [The] article appeared in the London newspaper
The Independent citing
previously unpublished details from the UN report last summer that
confirmed the sexual harassment charges. … Diplomats at the United Nations said … Lubbers
… had fought the charges with a battery of prominent lawyers and that
Annan, consulting employment lawyers outside the United Nations, was
advised that Lubbers would win a legal test." "Embattled Lubbers resigns UN post", Associated Press, Warren Hoge, in the International Herald Tribune, February 21, 2005. [Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsection on UN Anti-harassment efforts .]
“This week the United Nations published its
annual assessment of progress toward its Millennium Development Goals -–
targets established in 2000 for advancing welfare in the developing
countries. The record, as you
might expect, is mixed. … It remains questionable, in fact, whether the
MDG exercise, with its unimpeachably good intentions and its proliferating
bureaucratic overhead, has done any good at all on balance.
… … The weakness of the whole MDG concept is that
it wills the ends without willing the means – something which the UN,
perforce, has come to specialize in.
A plan to spend a specific allocation of aid on specific
interventions … could be judged for cost-effectiveness and ranked
alongside alternative ways of expending resources … A statement of good
intentions is unfortunately just that. The UN seems especially proud of the progress
[toward the goal] … in which it has a vested interest … greater global
co-operation on development. … Conferences, working groups, declarations,
strategies, and programmes … swearing allegiance to the MDG idea, are
multiplying fantastically. In
this sense, at least, the concept is a runaway success. However, what this is actually
doing for the putative poor country beneficiaries is harder to
say.” “Ends without means: The United Nations has set benchmarks for progress in poor countries. Are these any use?”, The Economist, September 11th, 2004, p. 78. [Note: For further information on this topic, see
this archive's subsections on Lack of a strategy,
Grand lack of focus,
and A true global
strategy .]
"To hear Kofi Annan, the reforms he recommended
this week are some sort of make-or-break last chance to repair the United
Nations. On this, however,
the UN's secretary-general is surely wrong. Of two near-certainties about the
future of the organization, one is that it will continue to exist, not
least because most big powers, including habitual critics such as the
United States, will continue at times to find it useful … The other
certainty is that no reforms, however well-intentioned will turn the UN
into the perfect instrument millions of people seem to want -- one
capable, that is, of ordering international relations so that all states
obey the same rules, and especially rules that govern the use of
force. These ideas … do not -- indeed cannot -- solve
the underlying problem. … the absence of [political] will, not some legal
quibble … None of this means that Mr. Annan's ideas ought
to be rejected, or that the UN is not worth improving. … [For instance,]
it would be wonderful if Mr. Annan's proposal to buy out some of the UN's
existing staff ended up producing a secretariat that was selected on merit
rather than nationality." "Kofi Annan's reform plan: Some good ideas, but no revolution in the running of the world", The Economist, March 26th, 2005. [Note: IO Watch believes this succinct summation has much extra weight, because no media source has followed the UN so closely over the past few decades as has The Economist. [Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsection on Overall UN Reform Attempts.]
" … The United States and the European Union
should seize the opportunity presented by [Secretary-General Annan's
report on reforming and revitalizing the UN] … Some will want to start with some of the
report's bolder proposals … but … it is precisely on these issues that
agreement is likely to be most elusive. Therefore, it will be important
not to neglect or postpone other urgent aspects of the reform agenda where
near-term progress can and must be made. … … Promises of assistance to developing
countries -- Annan is calling for the world's richest nations to set aside
0.7 percent of their gross national incomes by 2015 for aid to the
developing world -- will be meaningless so long as the many UN offices and
departments continue to operate in a disjointed and uncoordinated
fashion. Both Europe and the
US should be able to agree on an agenda for improving the effectiveness of
the UN's own development efforts, as well as the mechanisms for
coordination with other international assistance agencies."
George Moose, Edward W. Gnehm, and Karl F. Inderfurth, "UN reform: A crucial task for Europe and the U.S.", International Herald Tribune, April 9-10, 2005. [Note: for further information on this topic, see
this archive's subsection on Development
Assistance.] "Two
lawyers for U.N. whistle-blowers urged the United Nations on Wednesday to
protect staffers who want to disclose corruption at the world body,
including the oil-for-food program for Iraq. One of the lawyers said 'five or six' U.N. employees including
a high-level employee had contacted him for advice on how to reveal
evidence of wrongdoing in [that] … programme without jeopardizing their
careers. … Andre Sirois -- himself a U.N. staff member and
former whistle-blower ---
said … 'In one case it
was something big, that definitely would make the front page
…' But based on his
advice, none of [them] … have gone public, he said. 'I know them. They won't. They are very quiet and under a
lot of stress.' … While U.N. rules
call for wrongdoers to be punished, they do nothing to shield staff
members from reprisals when they come forward with evidence, [Tom] Devine and Sirois
said. 'There is
irreparable harm when freedom of speech is canceled, irreparable harm to
the institution,' Devine said.
'The message is, 'Do not say anything to investigators.' '… An independent U.N. inquiry led by [Paul
Volcker is investigating] … whether any U.N. employees received bribes or
allowed kickbacks."
Irwin Arief, "Lawyers call on U.N. to shield whistle-blowers", Reuters, December 15, 2004. [Note: For further information on this topic, see
this archive's subsections on Disappearing
Whistle-blowers and
Suppressed
whistle-blowers .] "'The only thing we've gotten is small packets
of food and supplies', says … [an Indonesian tsunami victim.] 'Where the money is, we don't
know. It's just meetings,
meetings, meetings.' … Last week, Indonesia's state auditing agency
said it was having difficulty accounting for portions of more than $4
billion it has received so far … As the months have passed, government action
has been delayed. [A
draft plan] … is a daunting thing; it comes in twelve volumes.
… The government faces a huge and complex
task. It .. must rebuild …
entire economic and social environments. But none of this seems to explain the silence
of the barren city landscape … [and] many fishing villages have simply
disappeared. … As recovery inches forward … it will encounter
conflicts over inheritance and land ownership, bureaucratic inefficiency,
competition among aid groups and among government departments and, with so
much money flooding in, the possibility of corruption on a gigantic scale.
… Torn by unending war and political repression,
battered by a natural disaster that may strike again, paralyzed by a
reconstruction effort that just cannot seem to get started, Aceh today is
not a place of hope." Seth Mydans, "Months after disaster, smashed Indonesian city is still a ghost town: Paralyzed by a reconstruction effort that has yet to get off the ground", International Herald Tribune, April 6, 2005. [Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsection on the UN coordination of tsunami aid? .] The initial UN
Secretariat responses by Mr. Annan and senior UN officials in the winter
and early spring of 2004-2005 to all these emerging allegations of UN
mismanagement, weak impact, and poor performance, were initially fairly
reasonable as the damage control effort began. "Two of the world's most impressive spin
machines are locked in deadly conflict. On the one side is [the so-called]
… 'vast right-wing conspiracy', a bunch of conservative US senators and
congressmen, … [plus several major media organizations], all calling for
the head of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
Annan. On the other side is the huge amorphous mass of
the global great and good, all clucking in unison that Kofi Annan is the
best UN secretary-general since Dag Hammarskjold … although a list that
includes Kurt Waldheim and Boutros Boutros-Ghali is not much competition.
Led by [some political leaders, reinforced by some major governments,
newspaper editorial boards, and news bulletins] …, the international establishment
has rallied to Annan as the first African to run the world body, and as
the first secretary-general to bring forward thoughtful and even bold
plans for UN reform. Kofi Annan must stay, they all cry, most of
them thrilling to the symbolism of a clash between President George Bush,
who proudly sports a small American flag on his lapel, and Nobel peace
prize laureate Kofi Annan, whose equally well-tailored lapel sports a
discreet dove, tastefully wrought in white enamel." Martin Walker, "Gunning for Kofi", The Spectator, December 11, 2004.
"Secretary-General Kofi Annan said Tuesday [at
his year-end news conference] that allegations of corruption in the
oil-for-food programme had 'cast a shadow' over the United Nations and
made 2004 an especially troubled year for the international
organization. But he said he
was optimistic for the future. 'No doubt that this has been a particularly
difficult year, and I am relieved that this annus horibilus is coming to
an end', he said … 'There has been lots of criticism against the
UN, particularly with allegations surrounding the oil-for-food program,'
he said. 'These are serious
allegations, we take them seriously and this is why we are doing
everything we can to get to the bottom of this. … Asked if he would accept personal blame or
admit to mistakes, he said he preferred to await the outcome of the
Volcker investigation before commenting. 'On the question of my possible resignation,'
he said, 'let me say that I have quite a lot of work to do and, as you
have indicated, I have the confidence and the support of the member
states." Warren Hoge, "'A
particularly difficult year' for the UN, Annan says", International
Herald Tribune, December 22, 2004.
[Note" See also , in
more detail, Mark Turner, "UN puts its future up for debate in biggest
challenge yet: The international organization has been through a testing
period but even tougher battles lie ahead", Financial Times (UK),
December 21, 2004.]
"The crisis meeting of veteran foreign policy
experts in a Manhattan apartment one recent Sunday was held in agreed-upon
secrecy. The high-profile guest of honor [Kofi Annan]
came unaccompanied by his usual retinue of aides … The mission, in the
worlds of one participant, was clear -- 'to save Kofi and rescue the
UN." [Annan] … listened quietly to three and a half
hours of bluntly worded counsel from a group united in their regard for
him and support for the United Nations, but deeply concerned that lapses
in his leadership over the past two years had eclipsed the accomplishments
of his first term and were jeopardizing chances of making the remaining
two years of his term meaningful. They began by arguing that Annan had to refresh
his top management team. … The larger argument … [addressed the need] to
move aggressively to repair relations with Washington … [and] to restore
his relationship with his own bureaucracy, where workers felt his office
protected high-level officials accused of
misconduct. One participant, who requested anonymity, said
that Annan … made no promises -- nor was asked to -- at its
end." Warren Hoge, "Frank words for Annan in effort to revitalize UN", International Herald Tribune, January 11, 2005. [Note: Interestingly, almost all the other attendees at the meeting were Americans.]
"Mark Malloch Brown has spent the past few days
hopping from one disaster-struck region in Asia to the next. Meanwhile, [he] … is also charged
with seeing the United Nations through one of the most trying periods in
its 59-year history. Plagued
by allegations of corruption, inefficiency and even irrelevance, the world
body will need urgent attention … … [He said] 'The United Nations needs to take a
good hard look at itself and go through a series of management reforms to
make ourselves more effective. … I think people acknowledge the UNDP is a very
successful example of U.N. reform. … … [Mr. Annan] made it clear in appointing me …
that it was that kind of management turnaround success [that we had] at
UNDP … that he wants to see brought into the United Nations proper. And the emphasis … on
communications. … We will see if we can repeat the trick at the United
Nations. … Now … the critics are a lot tougher and meaner,
and the standard of the bar set a lot higher. I know my lines, I know the part,
and we'll see what the critics have to say in the
morning." "The last word: Mark Malloch Brown", Newsweek
International, January 17, 2005. "The man appointed to oversee a management
shake-up at the United Nations has warned that it must brace itself for
wide-ranging reform … 'The crisis is still building,' [Mark] Malloch Brown said. 'It's
very hard after [last] week's revelations to believe there isn't going to
be some pretty tough stuff on management.' Paul [Volcker's group] last week criticized the
UN for its limited response to internal audits showing irregularities in
the $65 billion [Iraq oil-for-food] programme. … Mr. Malloch Brown also warned that it was no
longer only the institution's traditional, conservative critics that were
calling for a shake-up. Mr. Volcker also claimed the volume of
allegations surrounding the former [head of the Iraq] programme, Benon
Sevan, suggested there must have been some 'monkey
business.' At the end of January Mr. Volcker will issue
his preliminary findings.
'That may be a transition point', Mr. Malloch Brown said
… 'It should be a mainstream preoccupation of
every government share holder of the UN.' ,,, A reshuffle of Mr. Annan's cabinet would take
place within six weeks, maybe sooner, he said. … … The management shuffle would be followed by
'human accountability' reforms addressing other recent
scandals." Mark Turner, "UN warned to get ready for sweeping reforms", Financial Times (UK), January 17, 2005. "Reaffirming his pledge to act resolutely on
any findings of staff misconduct in connection with the United Nations
Oil-for-Food programme for Iraq, Secretary-General Kofi Annan today
announced … disciplinary
proceedings against officials involved in the operation and … broader
management measures in response to the [release of the Volcker panel
report on ] … the management
of the now-defunct relief effort. 'Should any findings of the Inquiry give rise
to criminal charges, the United Nations will cooperate with national law
enforcement authorities pursuing those charges, and … I will waive the
diplomatic immunity of the staff member concerned,' Mr. Annan said in the
statement … … The statement noted the [Volcker panel's]
intention to publish a further interim report dealing with [his son Kojo's
involvement, which Mr. Annan awaited] … 'with a clear conscience' …'
[Spokesman Mark] Malloch Brown acknowledged
that 'we're dealing with critical and vital breakdowns in the management
of the UN' … [On the inadequate UN auditing process, he
stated that] 'we'll have to look again at what we can do to strengthen the
external independence of audit, to strengthen the assurance that it will
have the resources it needs to do the task' …" "Acting on Oil-for-Food report, Annan takes disciplinary action, further management steps", UN News Service, 3 February 2005.
"No one at the United Nations doubts that big
change is necessary for the institution to regain its footing and restore
its name. … Under prodding, [Kofi] Annan is shedding most
of his inner circle … [to replace these 'traditionalists' with
'modernists.'] Shake up a bureaucracy as entrenched as the
United Nations, and people get nervous. … [Long-time observer Edward Luck said] … 'In the
early '90s the UN got too ambitious on the operational scale. … [Then and
since] … it got overly zealous in building norms, setting international
law and trying to regulate state behavior.' He also faulted the United Nations for
developing a sense of moral superiority over the pursuit of national
ambitions. 'It was as if
national interests are by definition base and narrow and mean-spirited,'
he said. 'Somehow if you're a global citizen, that's
superior to being a patriot,' said [former US ambassador to the UN]
Richard Holbrooke. He said
the United Nations had erred in placing itself above its member
states. ' … that's not
acceptable to the big powers, and not just the U.S. The Chinese and the
Russians and countries like India also won't accept the UN as senior to
them.'" Warren Hoge, "For the beleaguered UN, a dance of reinvention", International Herald Tribune, February 25, 2005. [Note: this important point about UN officials'
self-righteousness and arrogance as "global guardians" during the past
decade is an important one, not least because the quotes which follow
below suggest that a lot of Secretariat (and loyal supporter) arrogance is still left in
2005. See also this archive's
subsections on The UN and Global
Governance , UN Moral Values and Rectitude - For
Others , and many subsections
of The UN, Alone and
UNaccountable
.]
So far, not bad. However, the old patterns of UN
defensive response to outside pressure for management reform then began to
assert themselves, in a steadily more aggressive
fashion. A first, nuanced
defense of Mr. Annan, as a forward-looking "modernist" trying to drag an
entrenched UN culture into the world of modern management, was made by
John Ruggie, an academic who served for several years as an
assistant-secretary general under Mr. Annan (and who attended the "crisis"
advisory meeting with Mr. Annan in December 2004.) It was, in turn, firmly
rebutted by David Rieff. " … Throughout my own tenure at the UN [I
witnessed] … an ongoing tension between traditionalist and modernist
corporate cultures … In the traditionalist view, the accountability
of the UN begins, and ends, with member states … The modernist culture, in
contrast, appreciates that accountability is also owed to a variety of
other internal and external stakeholders: UN staff, national legislatures,
civic groups and the general public.
Whereas traditionalists treat opaqueness as a strategic asset, for
modernists transparency is the key to institutional
success. If any good can come out of the 'horrible year'
just passed, it will be the permanent victory of the modernists.
… Mr. Annan is by instinct a modernist who won
the 2001 Nobel Peace Prize for "bringing new life" to the UN. … He [has] … acknowledged the need
to learn from the oil-for-food debacle and signaled his renewed commitment
to institutional reform. As
he goes about rebuilding his senior management team, he would be well
advised to add to each job description: only modernists need to
apply." John Ruggie, "Modernists must take over the United Nations, Financial Times (UK), January 24, 2005.
"… Despite … what modernizers in the pro-UN
reform camp have argued, the UN's problems are not those of management
systems … The secretary-general, for all his positive
innovations, has been a UN traditionalist in his tendency to take credit
for the UN's successes and blame failures on member states.
… If the UN is prepared … [to accept] real
critical analysis … [and also] deal with its present failures and
perceptions of endemic impropriety, this would represent significant
progress. … Even if the UN secretariat begins to behave
with less secrecy and more dispatch, and shows more resolve to tackle
corruption, the root causes of … the UN's annus horribilis will remain. The real challenge is defining the
UN's role in a post-cold war, post-9/11 world. … This is not to say that there is no hope of
rescuing the UN, and certainly not that it should be scrapped. It is rather to put the reforms
proposed by Mr. Annan … in their proper perspective. Ultimately, these are positive
steps to address some, but by no means all, of the symptoms of an
institutional disease that we are likelier to find ways to live with than
to cure." David Rieff, "The UN must plot a new course",
Financial Times (UK), February 21, 2005. A second approach used
the oldest weapon in the Secretariat's armory -- to blame Member States
for the ills of UN operations, with their destructive dominance of a
largely-helpless Secretariat.
Two somewhat-new variants on this approach are presented here. More basic insights into this
fundamental knee-jerk Secretariat strategy over the years of blaming
others are provided in the next subsection on the key entrenched factors
underlying the UN management accountability crises of the past six
decades. "Oil-for-Food was a conscious act of
diplomacy. And it was on
balance, a successful one: The program saved the sanctions, and the
sanctions made possible the disarmament of Iraq. But it was also, inevitably, a
mess. … [The UN] is, if anything, an explicitly
subservient body that has grown habituated to serving the interests and
the whims of its member states and understands all too well that all
decisions are, at bottom, political.
This is a pathology [which] … undermines the organization's good
efforts. Whether and to what extent it is curable is an open, and very
important, question. … Powerlessness breeds passivity. UN officials rail against their
dependent status while at the same time taking refuge in it. … [This] fosters a culture in
which no one feels personally accountable. Is it possible to foster a culture of
accountability and professionalism [in such an organization?] People who care about the
United Nations will have to demand a change in culture, but also permit a
change in culture. The
members will, in fact, have to back off on managerial issues. … If the Oil-for-Food scandal
ultimately provokes these changes, the United Nations should be grateful
for its enemies."
James Traub, "Why Oil-for-Food worked: The Security Council's role: Off target", New Republic (USA), February 21, 2005, pp. 14-17. [Note: Mr. Traub is writing a book on Kofi Annan and the United Nations.] " … The United States and the European Union
should seize the opportunity presented by [Secretary-General Annan's
report on reforming and revitalizing the UN] … to enter into a serious
dialogue on making the UN the credible and capable institution envisioned
by its founders. … Some will want to start with some of the
report's bolder proposals … which should indeed command urgent
trans-Atlantic attention, but … it is precisely on these issues that
agreement is likely to be most elusive. Therefore, it will be important
not to neglect or postpone other urgent aspects of the reform agenda where
near-term progress can and must be made. … [On UN renewal} … the institution's
accountability watchdog, the Office of Internal Oversight Services, must
be strengthened and its mandate extended to include the Security Council,
which failed in its responsibility to oversee the oil-for-food programme
in Iraq." George Moose, Edward W. Gnehm, and Karl F. Inderfurth, "UN reform: A crucial task for Europe and the U.S.", International Herald Tribune, April 9-10, 2005. [Note: the authors all served as senior U.S. diplomats at the UN. However, in their otherwise quite reasonable assessments, this last wild idea stands out. How can the UN internal audit unit, which reports to the Secretary-General, who serves the Security Council, sit in judgement on the Member States there, particularly when both the Secretary-General, his Iraq programme unit, and his OIOS bear the major responsibility for the operational, oversight and management failures in that scandal? (See this archive's subsection on the Iraq oil-for-food programme and Claudia Rosett, "The oil-for-food scam: What did Kofi Annan know, and when did he know it?", April 16, 2004, p. 1, Commentary, May 2004, available at. http://www.commentarymagazine.com/SpecialArticle.asp?article=A11705017_1 ) ]
In a third attempt at
Secretariat redemption, Jan Egeland, the head of UN humanitarian affairs
and emergency relief operations, sought to look forward optimistically
(and don't look back). He
cited the "unbridled generosity of governments" in the Asian tsunami
crisis of December 2004, and stated that it showed (the long-standing UN
assertion) that "only the UN has the legitimacy, capacity and credibility"
to lead in a truly global humanitarian emergency. But, not resting on the
UN's (self-proclaimed) "laurels", Mr. Egeland asserted that there is "no
alternative" to the UN, and that the UN is credible insofar as it now has
an "even greater awareness of the need to prevent acts of mismanagement
and abuse by our own managers or staff." The article is by Jan Egeland, "Sobering lessons for the United Nations", Financial Times (UK), March 30, 2005. [Note: the real test of the credibility of the UN
in responding to the tsunami disaster has scarcely begun -- see this
archive's ongoing subsection on UN coordination of tsunami aid? .] However, in a prompt
response to these assertions, David Rieff noted
that: " … If Jan Egeland indeed believes that the
UN-led international response to the tsunami disaster really demonstrates
the potential for an effective UN … or proves [its] … unique legitimacy,
the UN system is in even more trouble than already suggested by recent
dismal headlines about … secretary-general Kofi Annan, sex scandals and
financial mismanagement … … The tsunami, he argues, showed that 'the
world' (whatever that may be) wants the UN 'to act -- swiftly, boldly and
decisively -- in times of crisis to mobilize political will and harness
resources from around the world.'
The sad reality is that nothing could be further from the truth, as
UN dithering on Darfur over the past year has amply
demonstrated. Of course, … there is widespread international
support for UN-led responses to a natural disaster … [but] precisely
because such events are non-controversial in political
terms. In short, [the tsunami response is not a lesson
in how to think about] … the man-made catastrophes that afflict our world
… That a senior UN official could suggest otherwise … testifies to the
culture of complacency and self-delusion that still reigns within that
organization." David Rieff, "Culture of self-delusion still reigns
at the UN", Financial Times (UK), April 1, 2005. A fourth attempt at
Secretariat "spin" followed the dictum that "the best defense is a good
offence". For instance,
Secretariat officials aggressively
criticised the "stinginess" of major UN member states (and expanded
Security Council candidates)such as Japan, Germany, and India, and
lectured them on accountability (to their regions.) This certainly belies the
Secretariat's oft-stated image of itself as humble servants of those
member states. Such remarks,
in particular by Mark Maloch Brown in various recent articles, but
beginning with his days as head of the UNDP, are now delivered with much
more force in his role as the new chief of staff and apparent chief public
spokesman for Secretary-General Annan. "Japan, the second largest financial contributor
to the United Nations, plans to cut its support by one-quarter in coming
years … Japanese diplomats calculate that Japan's gross
domestic product is only 14.4 percent of the global economy. But Japan pays 19.5 percent of the
United Nations budget … By
contrast, the United States figures [are 30 percent of global GDP, but it
pays only 22 percent … ] 'Japan cannot just give sweet faces to
everybody," [said a spokesman.] Moving on programs with weak constituencies,
politicians have cut Japan's overall foreign aid budget … by 15.5 percent
… "We should get a seat on the Security Council
…" said a spokesman. 'No
taxation without representation is the basic idea.' Japan's $1 billion slice of the United Nation's
[biennial] budget is more than the combined payments of four out of five …
permanent members of the Security Council: Britain, China, France and
Russia." One United Nations official here who asked not
to be identified said that
cutting support would not help …, arguing 'If their quest is for the
Security Council seat, it is not smart politics. They are not creating an
image that Japan is a team player.'" James Brooke, "Japan to cut its financial support
to U.N.", New York Times, January 20, 2003. [emphasis added.] "Japan risks damaging its campaign to win a
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council if it continues to
cut its budget for overseas development aid, a senior UN official said
yesterday. 'Japan needs to polish up its ODA credentials',
said Mark Maloch Brown, head of the [UNDP], in an interview … 'We are not
saying, 'Give more ODA or there will be no club membership.' But Japan's case is going to be
hugely enhanced if it is playing with a quiver full of arrows rather than
empty.' There has been a public backlash in Japan
against ODC because of economic stagnation … Some politicians have advocated
cutting Japan's UN contributions, which are proportionately higher than
many other countries, in protest at Tokyo's perceived lack of
influence. [Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi cites Japan's
increased role in peacekeeping operations,] … but Mr. Maloch Brown … said
sending troops 'was not a plausible substitute.' Japan needed to woo poorer countries,
especially in Africa, by convincing them it 'was an ODA champion', he
said. ' … Japan's case has to be sufficiently compelling to huge numbers
of countries.' He said Japan should not let 'bean counters'
drive its foreign policy." David Pilling, "Tokyo warned over cuts to aid
budget", Financial Times (UK), October 15, 2004. "The UN expects an improvement in relations
with the US this year and believes hostility to the world body in
Washington has 'peaked', according to … Mark Moluch Brown. ' … I do think there's been a
peaking of the really visceral rightwing 'destroy the UN' mode and it has
pulled back, even among that constituency, to a more moderated 'reform the
UN.' … While acknowledging that there were 'huge
problems ahead' …, Mr. Maloch Brown argued that even Washington's most
conservative politicians -- including those who recently called for Mr.
Annan's resignation -- now recognized the ''basic utility of the UN' for
peacekeeping, development efforts and disaster
relief. Commenting on another controversial US
appointment, Mr. Malloch Brown said he expected Paul Wolfowitz, the new
president of the World Bank, to have to 'reach out' to the UN in order to
'quickly distance himself from [policy] prescriptions that were too unilaterally American.' [Brown] added, 'We'll be
waiting.' Referring to Germany's bid for a permanent
Security Council seat, he said Berlin would have to pledge to increase its
aid to 0.7 percent of gross national product if it wants to succeed. Germany spends 0.28 percent
now." Hugh Williamson, "Washington's hostility to the UN has peaked, says Annan aide", Financial Times (UK), April 13, 2005.
"Mark Maloch Brown, chief of staff to
[Secretary-General] Kofi Annan, … warned yesterday that tensions between
China and Japan could derail plans for far-reaching UN reforms to be
agreed by September.
… The tensions 'are indicative of a core
uneasiness about … an enlargement [of the Security Council] that creates
an even more entrenched group of big states with no accountability to
their regions,' he said. … "[Chinese demonstrations] against the Japanese
embassy and consulates reminds one that far away from Europe there is a
China-Japan dimension to which Germany's [potential Security Council]
membership is hostage.' 'Germany and Japan and India really need to
listen to their regions and give … assurance that they are not going to
use their membership to settle scores within the region, but to genuinely
accept a sense of accountability to their region.' Hugh Williamson and Ray Marcelo, "China-Japan row threatens Security Council Reform, warns Annan aide", Financial Times (UK), April 13, 2005. "As the date rapidly approaches for a big
meeting where leaders of the rich world are supposed to come up with a
plan to help lift Africa's poor, tired and huddled masses out of poverty,
things are starting to get interesting. Last week, Japan announced that it would double
its aid to Africa. Granted,
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is doing so to better Japan's chances of
getting a seat on the UN Security Council … [says a Japanese newspaper.]
… And after weeks of hinting, Germany publicly
announced that it would meet the UN target of increasing foreign
assistance to poor countries to 0.7 percent of the gross national product
by 2014. … British prime minister Tony Blair … [seeks] to
pry money out of rich countries for Africa … [He] has staked his
chairmanship of the G-7 this year on a Marshall Plan for Africa, and we
are hard-pressed to think of a more worthy goal. " "Meeting aid promises", International Herald Tribune, April 15, 2005.
As this last quote
shows, the Secretariat can have some great success in manipulating Member
States who want a greater role on the UN stage. However, IO Watch would
note that most of this Secretariat lobbying, coaxing, and playing Member
States and regional groupings off against each other goes on continually
in the back corridors and "informal consultations" surrounding the General
Assembly and day-to-day diplomatic life in New York. Secretariat
officials, particularly after decades of practice, are not at all helpless
in advancing their own interests in any discussions of Secretariat
"reform" processes.]
In fact, this
continuous process of Secretariat "interaction" with Member State
delegations to the UN is most noticeable in the last and most disturbing
of the five approaches which IO Watch notes in this section. Far from installing an effective
UN management accountability system over the past decade, IO Watch
concludes that Mr. Annan and other UN senior officials have had quite
considerable success in doing the opposite. They have argued that controls
restrain managers from doing their job, and have worked steadily to remove
such restraints. These critical
developments are discussed at length in the following sub-sections of this
archive on The Winner: "Free the Managers", Unleashed
Managers, and Disappearing
Whistle-blowers, as well as in many parts of the
Recent Developments section on The UN, Alone and Unaccountable .
The amazing thing
which IO Watch wishes to note here, as shown by the following sequence of
quotes, is that even in the face of all the current UN mismanagement
embarrassments and scandals of 2004 and 2005, the Secretariat leadership
clings stubbornly to the idea (along with other sweeping internal changes,
see last quote following) that the only real solution to the UN's
management accountability crisis is to give UN managers more freedom to
manage -- that is, to continue and actually expand the failed routine of
old-boy self-regulation. "Previous management
measures Programme Managers have been
empowered to take
action in their areas of responsibility, thus reducing layers of
centralized administration." "Executive summary of the measures outlined in the
letter of 17 March 1997 from the Secretary-General to the President of the
General Assembly," UN document A/INF/51/6 of 17 March 1997, p.
3.
[emphasis added]
"Kofi Annan's election to a second and last
term should normally allow him to help establish the United Nations as
the centerpiece of an emerging system of global management
that is efficient, just and accepted as legitimate by all peoples and
nations. … Decisive action should not continue to be
postponed in regaining the motivation and professional quality of the
United Nations in its earlier years … Also, much would be achieved if UN programme managers were allowed
to manage -- yes, manage -- their own budgets and
personnel. Not only would
their motivation increase immediately, but they could be held
accountable for failure to achieve agreed
objectives." Enrique ter Horst, "A re-elected Secretary-General can give the world the facts," International Herald Tribune, 6 July 2001. [emphasis added] [Note: Mr. ter Horst was a former UN
Assistant-Secretary-General, who served under several UN
Secretary-Generals, including Mr. Annan]
"One of my priorities in my first term
was to improve the Organization's professional capacity and
to promote a new culture of performance, accountability and
trust. We have made
significant strides … I am confident that the new system of
recruitment, by giving managers primary responsibility for staff
selection, will lead to a new level of accountability and empowerment.
… I intend to adopt additional
measures to cut
unnecessary layers of bureaucracy.
At present, the Organization recruits highly qualified
individuals, for management functions -- yet its procedures do not allow
them to manage a budget, procure what they need for everyday
activities or authorize travel for their staff." "Strengthening of the United Nations: An agenda for
further change: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/57/387 of
9 September 2002, paras. 174, 188-190. [emphasis added] "[After the release of the first interim
Volcker report on oil-for-food program mismanagement, Mr. Annan's chief of
staff, Mark Malloch Brown] … was asked if the report should be read as 'an
indictment of United Nations culture.' Malloch Brown was candid enough to
concede that 'the culture of political complicity' was a serious
problem. Members, he said, should 'back off
and allow us to manage this organization.' Powerlessness breeds complicity: UN officials
rail against their dependent status while at the same time taking refuge
in it. … The members
micromanage the budget … but it fosters a culture in which no one feels
personally accountable. Is it possible to foster a culture of
accountability and professionalism in an organization that must be so
acutely responsive to the wishes of its masters? Is it possible, for
example, to fill jobs with the best candidates so long as the principle of
'equitable national distribution' must be honored? If the answer is no, then we need
to envision other kinds of organization. People who care about the United
Nations will have to demand [but also permit] …a change in culture. The members will, in fact, have to
back off on managerial issues." James Traub, "Why Oil-for-Food worked: The Security Council's role: Off target", New Republic (USA), February 21, 2005, pp. 14-17. [emphasis added] [Note: Mr. Traub is writing a book on Kofi Annan and the United Nations. Note: IO Watch finds this to be an amazingly blunt statement of Secretariat leadership arrogance in defiance of fundamental management accountability, and a non sequitur -- we have gravely mismanaged, but now just [give us the money,] back off and let us manage.] "C.
The Secretariat 184. A capable and effective Secretariat is
indispensable to the work of the United Nations. … In 1997 I launched a package of
structural reforms … and followed up with a further set of managerial and
technical improvements in 2002 … 185.
… But these reforms do not go far
enough. If the
United Nations is to be truly effective the Secretariat will have to be
completely transformed. 186. … The Secretary-General and his or
her managers must be given the discretion, the means, the authority and
the expert assistance that they need to manage [the] organization
… 190. … I
therefore request the General Assembly to provide me with the authority
and resources to pursue a one-time staff buyout so as to
refresh and realign the staff to meet current
needs. 191.
… I ask Member States to work with me to undertake a comprehensive review of the
budget and human resources rules under which we
operate. 192.
… We must continue to improve the transparency and accountability
of the Secretariat. …" "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/2005 of 21 March 2005. [emphasis added] The next archive
subsection seeks to place all these UN management reform issues of
mid-2005 in a broader and longer-term perspective and context,
with: -- in its Part I, a
specific, summary chronology of Secretary-General Annan's concerted
efforts since 1997 to free UN managers to manage, in the midst of a
purported period of ensuring management accountability;
-- in its Part II, key
insights as to how the unaccountable UN management culture became so
deeply entrenched in the UN over six decades; -- comparison of the
perpetual immunity and impunity of the UN's senior managers with the
dramatic recent developments in the corporate world, where major
corruption cases are being quite firmly addressed through civil and
criminal legal processes and sanctions; -- and several very
lucid reflections on how, this
time, Member States must finally insist on proper UN management
accountability and performance, if the Organization is ever to reestablish
its tainted integrity and status as an effective element of global
governance.
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