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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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Introductory quotes
This is not to say
that the WHO does no good work at all
or that it does not
have sincere and competent staff in its lower echelons. But at its higher levels
politicking and jockeying for position overwhelm any lingering concern for
the health of the world's population.
. The WHO hires not by competence but by allocation of jobs among
member nations. This not only
amounts to positive discrimination in favour of the incompetent but
ensures that political skills matter more than technical
capacity. I once worked in a
small tropical country where the WHO representative, though personable,
was the most incompetent man
I have ever
encountered. He [never
visited the country's only hospital]
in his two and a
half years there. When he was
finally removed from the country, it was by promotion to the regional
headquarters." Anthony Daniels, The
Sunday Telegraph (UK), 25 April 1993.
Note: The WHO and other UN
system specialized agencies do indeed have such performance difficulties,
but people who know the system's flaws would say the above situation and
incidents are most grievous in the United Nations Secretariat itself.
"Another week, another UN scandal
. Why are scandals so frequent in
[global] institutions
. ?
What
. makes them so
vulnerable to corruption, inefficiency, and
. personal aggrandisement?
. The first problem is
leadership. Leaders are
selected by an inefficient and labyrinthine process from a pool of poor
quality talent.
. Second, the waste and inefficiency
can only be reduced if they are visible to public opinion.
. [but]
international institutions [lack]
. accountability
. The third problem is the weakness
of a law-governed culture.
.
. The UN Charter [Article 100]
focuses on the Secretary-General and staff as
. international officials
accountable only to the Organization.
. Here, rooted in idealism, lie the
clues in what can go wrong.
All too often the heads of UN agencies signaled their autonomy
through grandeur
.
. The agency's task
. became
subordinate to old bureaucratic instincts of self-perpetuation and
resistance to outside scrutiny.
. Sir Brian Urquhart has [suggested
that] no secretary-general should serve more than one term in
office. Extended throughout the [UN
system, this]
. would remove electioneering and diminish the incentive to
patronage. It may not be
much, but it would be a start." "Perri 6 and Michael Sheridan, "A world order of scandal and
graft: What is it about
international agencies that invites corruption
.", The Independent
(UK), May 11, 1995.
"What should be done to prevent
corruption in international agencies? Here's a list of [some] key
measures: ?
Impose
a limit of one term on chief executives of all international
agencies. ?
Give
auditors power to requisition any information they believe they
need. ?
Require
the public registration of all the private interests of international
diplomats, UN agency chief executives and senior managers.
The most important problem is the
lack of a global public opinion before which international agencies may
stand accountable. Part of
the way forward may be for the national parliaments of the world's leading
nations to set up scrutiny committees to review the work of all the
international institutions of governance. Just as the EU has been kept, in
some measure, on its toes by the European legislation committees of the
national parliaments, so global bodies could be made subject to some
measure of national political discipline. Until the international 'great and
the good' feel that they are being closely watched by a lively political
community, they will be tempted to take advantage of our lack of
vigilance." Perri 6, "How to win global war against corruption," The
Independent (UK), May 11, 1995.
Chronological
quotes "It is my belief that each member
of the UN is responsible for what the Organization is, how it defines its
mission, and how it carries it out.
. Too often, we remain silent when
bosses or superiors take actions which may be contrary to the purposes and
spirit of the [UN] Charter
-- or don't make sense
in terms of good management.
. [in public institutions], the managers are not less accountable
to the public than are the employees
. Because we are paid from public
funds, we all share in the responsibility of ensuring an effective
Organization.
. Hence, very plainly the future of the UN is in our hands,
yours and mine. We cannot put
the burden on those above us, except to demand from them the kind of
leadership required by the Charter and able performance of the duties for
which the world public pays them." Lowell
Flanders, "The future of the UN
. In whose hands?", [President of the
Staff Union], address at a preparatory meeting of the United Nations
Community Forum,
Secretariat News (NY), April 16, 1979, pp.
10-11. "The United Nations staff union
has called for an independent investigation into allegations of corruption
and maladministration in UN internal affairs. Longstanding discontent among the
2,700 professional staff at the New York headquarters burst into the open
when a senior UN official was allowed to resign quietly although serious
allegations had been made about his financial affairs and staff
appointments.
Staff morale is low. Most staff members indulge in
place-seeking and status preferment rather than the original spirit of
dedication to UN principles.
Finding jobs for one's own group, or for those sharing ideologies,
is a major pre-occupation." Colin Legum, "UN staff call for corruption probe", The
Observer (UK), November 2, 1980
"There have recently been
widespread rumours of corruption in the Secretariat, alleging misuse of
official position for personal gain.
No evidence has been presented to substantiate the rumours
If
they are left unverified, however,
such rumours cannot fail to [damage]
the good name of the Secretariat.
The Secretary-General has decided that action should be taken
and
has accordingly ordered an inquiry by a [two-member] panel
. Any staff member [with relevant
information] should approach the panel
with such information, which will
be held in strictest confidence." "Inquiry into rumours of corruption in the Secretariat", UN Information Circular ST/IC/80/33 of 13 November 1980. Note: This circular clearly responded to the above staff union
initiative. This particular
episode seems to have, eventually and quietly, disappeared, probably
because of staff mustrust in "approaching the panel".]
"The Administration
has recently dealt with a
number of cases of alleged
fraud relating to taxes and education grants within the Secretariat. In the process, different
administrative actions have been undertaken
[including] summary
dismissal, referral of cases to the Joint Disciplinary Committee,
resignation and recovery of overpayment. ·
What are
the criteria according to which summary dismissal -- the hardest penalty
-- has been meted out to some, but not to others?
·
Under
what circumstances it is decided that a case should be submitted to the
[JDC]? ·
What are
the circumstances under which the Administration accepts the resignation
of staff involved? ·
By what
criteria is it decided that only the recovery of the overpayment should be
made? We are concerned that
the established judicial procedures which are intended to guarantee staff
a minimum of due process should not be undermined.
There is a need to
explain to the staff the circumstances governing the choice of measures
being invoked. In cases that
are similar, justice will require that staff are not only equitably
treated but that they are seen to be equitably
treated." From a "Group of concerned
staff", "Fraud and due process," Secretariat News (NY), 16 July
1986, p. 2.
"In a year when U.N. spending is
under unusually close scrutiny, Yukio Takasu of Japan said there is a
problem when administrations spend money freely
and the role of member
states is limited to considering and approving
budgets. Takasu said there were significant
cases of fraud or presumptive fraud and unless [the Administration]
offered a full explanation of the problem and cited measures taken to deal
with it, member states were bound to feel less confident in [UN
management]. [The Administration's written
reply stated that]
. comprehensive audits uncovered relatively few cases of
misappropriation of UN funds and in those cases disciplinary measures were
taken. From 1984 [to late 1986 it had
identified] 35 possible fraud cases involving education grants
[in]
amounts ranging from $187 to $31,600. Turning to charges that some staff
cheated on their [US] tax returns, [the reply said that 19 such cases had
been processed] An audit in
progress identified
12 possible future cases
.
[The Secretariat reply] emphasized
that it initiated a comprehensive audit,
promptly took action to recover
misappropriated funds [and]
disciplinary measures
and improve
procedures to detect past fraud and deter future
fraud." "U.N. management challenged, defended", UN Special (Geneva) [excerpted from Diplomatic World Bulletin, N.Y.], October 1986, p. 13.
"Typical
. of the U.N.'s stubborn
resistance to reform was the response to the [Group of 18 report's]
suggestion that the Secretary-General would get more reliable data if the
U.N.s [internal audit unit were made independent, rather than being a
subordinate unit of the UN's management division]. To this sensible recommendation,
the [head of Administration]
. said that 'it is indeed theoretically
possible for the Internal Audit Service to report directly to the
Secretary-General. The
advisability of this move would have to be seen in relation to other
factors, such as whether the already heavy schedule of the
Secretary-General should be burdened by further direct supervisory
responsibilities.'" "The
United Nations continues to duck needed reforms", The Heritage Foundation,
Backgrounder, No. 593, Washington, D.C., July 9, l987, p. 6.
"To continue with the charade [of
official development assistance] seems to me to be absurd. Garnered and justified in the name
of the destitute and the vulnerable, aid's main function in the past
half-century has been to create and then entrench a powerful new class of
rich and privileged people.
In that notorious club of parasites and hangers-on made up of the
United Nations, the World Bank and the bilateral agencies, it is aid --
and nothing else -- that has provided hundreds of thousands of 'jobs for
the boys' and that has permitted record-breaking standards to be set in
self-serving behavior, arrogance, paternalism, moral cowardice and
mendacity. At the same time,
in the developing countries, aid has perpetuated the rule of incompetent
and venal men whose leadership would otherwise be utterly non-viable; it
has allowed governments characterized by historic ignorance, avarice and
irresponsibility to thrive; and, last but not least, it has condoned --
and in some cases facilitated -- the most consistent and grievous
violations of human rights that have occurred anywhere in the world since
the dark ages.
the time has come for the lords
of poverty to depart." Graham Hancock, Lords of
poverty: The freewheeling lifestyles, power, prestige, and corruption of
the multi-billion dollar aid business, Macmillan, London, 1989,
pp 192- 193.
"[Two years after the United
Nations launched a drive .. to raise funds for clearing land mines inside
Afghanistan, a UN official has charged that money, including about $10
million donated by the U.S. government, is being
wasted. Rae McGrath, a land mines
specialist who spent 18 years in the British army before joining the UN
program as its field supervisor, said that the United Nations had grossly
exaggerated the impact of its program, in part to raise money
He added that large sums had been
wasted on poorly planned and badly monitored educational programs for
refugees. "We're not running
a mine eradication program, which is what the donors are giving the money
for and what needs to be done" Mr. McGrath said. After a dispute with his superiors
[he] is leaving the United
Nations. Others associated
with the program
said they agreed with the thrust of Mr. McGrath's
criticisms. In its
solicitations for funds, the United Nations says it has trained 20,000
Afghans in mine awareness and mine clearance. But it has sent only one team of
27 into Afghanistan to clear mines." Steve Coll, "Afghan funds wasted, UN official says", Washington
Post Service, International Herald Tribune, 22 March
1990.
"The images are familiar:
blue-bereted U.N. peace keepers
humanitarian relief workers fighting
poverty and hunger
But behind these images lies an
enormous, largely uncontrolled bureaucracy, subject to abuses and
deficiencies that impair its effectiveness, a nine-month study by The
Washington Post has found.
.
U.N. food aid and other resources
have been pilfered with impunity by governments and armies for
years. Peace-keeping operations, some of
which drag on for decades, have become a source of soaring costs with
minimal oversight.
voluminous yearbooks [are]
published years out of date and esoteric technical studies
go largely
ignored.
top officials operate with few
checks and balances in the absence of [U.N. management] standards The system currently has no
inspector general, and a Joint Inspection Unit in Geneva is made up mostly
of retired diplomats.
The United Nations, its internal
critics say, has been self-protecting and self-perpetuating, rather than
self-policing. .
[the executive director of the
human rights group Africa Watch says] "There's a hell of a lot of shocking
things going on
I think there's a great deal of incompetence, there's a
lot of corruption, and there's no
accountability." William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, September 20, 1992, pp. 1-2.
"
[The UN programs which eat] up
the great bulk of U.N. resources
the economic, social and humanitarian
programs aimed at development, emergency relief and 'better standards of
life' around the world
[get little scrutiny.]
Clearly, the United Nations
employs many hard-working and idealistic people. [but]
Parts of the system are
overstaffed and lethargic, while others, particularly field offices in
unpleasant places, are overstaffed and overworked.
Local employees tend to bear the
brunt of disciplinary action
when fraud or abuse are discovered
while
erring international professional staffers often survive and even advance
in the organization. At the
same time, U.N. employees who complain about irregularities [lose
promotions or must transfer elsewhere.] It is a system that tends to cover
up its abuses and discourage whistle-blowers.
A European U.N. official, who
recently left his agency in frustration, [said] 'A certain enabling
environment
allows {fraud} to happen. The question is not whether you do
it or not, but whether you're stupid enough to be
caught." "Basically, there's a lack of
determination to combat the sleaze factor' he said. 'In an environment where
mediocrity has a strong self-protective interest, these things
flourish.'" William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, September 20, 1992, pp. 3-4.
"UN officials who advocate a
cleanup
say that management by
top officials has been inept and,
occasionally, corrupt. 'There is no [regular] supervision of any agency'
said [a senior
official.] Governing councils
are 'basically rubber-stamp bodies.' The U. N. Board of Auditors
cites numerous [problems] and 'weak internal controls'
during 1990 and
1991
[in a] 136-page report that enumerates irregularities or
deficiencies in hiring, cash and property management, internal audits and
purchases of everything from project equipment to airline tickets.
Many anomalies [that they report]
'appear to be recurring' and point to a 'lack of determination to enforce
regulations and rules and make the heads of units of the organization
accountable,' the report says. A recent confidential internal
paper circulating in the U. N. Development Program
put the problem more
bluntly. Citing 'a deplorable
vacuum of basic ethics' in the system, it noted widespread criticism of
'prolific structures, pompous-Byzantine attitudes of ranking officials,
operational inefficiency and
gross mismanagement of financial and
personnel resources.' The 10-page paper listed a dozen
cases of corruption involving the development agency's staffers or
programs that totaled millions of dollars in pilfered
funds." William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, September 20, 1992, p 4.
"[Concerning allegations of
corruption at UNHCR in articles in the Washington Post in September 1992]
with respect to discipline in UNHCR, a courageous staff member in Angola
immediately brought the Boubakar wrongdoing to my attention. The case was airtight, and U.N.
headquarters found it impossible to avoid our recommendation for
dismissal. In the more complicated
Lukika case in Uganda, UNHCR's recommendation for dismissal was equally
strong. The
Secretary-General's office rejected it (on grounds that the United Nations
lacks precedents in firing for incompetence) and forced UNHCR to take
Lukika back. Threats and intimidation in no way
dampened our efforts in UNHCR to deal with corruption and incompetence.
. The
Secretary-General at the time just did not support us. Ensuing troubles with Lukika after
headquarters directed that he stay in UNHCR should surprise no
one." Arthur E. Dewey, "No laxity", UN Special (Geneva), November, 1992, p. 31. [emphasis added] [Note: Mr. Dewey was deputy high commissioner of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from 1986-1990.]
"The United Nations
presently is almost totally lacking in effective means to deal with fraud,
waste and abuse by staff members [as]
recently highlighted
in
the news
media.
The chronically
fragmented and inadequate
[UN internal
oversight structure] is currently so ineffective that, time and again, we
have been called on to create ad hoc teams to carry out
investigations of serious wrongdoing. The delay [in organizing]
these teams often
allows the trail to 'grow cold" [and]
deprives the
investigation of the vitality
professionalism and impartiality
[of]
more regularized
procedures.
I believe that few of the reports
[presently]
produced will be taken seriously by the auditees until the
'muscle' of your office is placed firmly behind a consolidated effort
carried out by a strong Inspector General's
office.' As noted in the Volcker-Ogata
report, 'support for improved financing will be dependent upon a
perception that funds are economically managed and effectively
spent.'
[so that] all Member States [can
reassure]
their taxpayers, the ultimate supporters of all United Nations
activity. This reassurance can only come
from the prompt and effective activation of a strong Inspector General's
office
" Dick Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations", 1 March 1993, pages 29-31. "With the vast increase in United
Nations activities and expenditures resulting from the organization's
newfound status as a global 911 emergency number, its capacity for
ensuring the integrity of its operations is more important than
ever. The recent report by the UN
Financing Advisory Group, led by Paul Volcker and Shijuro Ogata, noted
specifically that 'support for improved financing will be dependent upon a
perception that funds are economically managed and effectively
spent.'
Unfortunately, the mechanisms in
place to promote such a perception
are creaking leftovers from more
placid times.
. What is needed is an Office of
Inspector General, staffed to audit, investigate and lay the basis for
remedial action in serious cases of conflict of interest, misappropriation
of funds or other corrupt practices. The inspector general's
office is the centerpiece of [the] agenda for
reform [that I presented to Secretary-General Butros
Butros-Ghali upon completion of my one-year assignment at the United
Nations." Dick Thornburgh, "How to clean up the United Nations", International Herald Tribune, March 26, 1993. [emphasis added] [Note:
Mr. Thornburgh was United Nations undersecretary-general for
administration and management]
"The United Nations is losing an
estimated £270 m. each year because of corruption, waste and mismanagement
.
While the organization appeals
for tens of millions of
pounds in voluntary donations, senior U.N. officials enjoy perks and
career expectations .. unthinkable to most employees in the private
sector. Among the abuses at the U.N.,
Insight has discovered:
-- Thirty-nine of the
U.N.'s top officials
are being kept on the payroll despite being
unemployed. Dubbed "desk
warmers", some sit at home doing nothing on salaries of up to £100,000 a
year.
-- Millions of
pounds are paid out to "double dippers", retired U.N. officials who are
paid lucrative consultancy fees on top of their generous
pensions.
-- A U.N.
internal report [by former UN top manager Richard Thornburgh] was
suppressed and later shredded.
He said 'there are a number of senior people who have positions and
no assignment and yet there is no capability to terminate these people's
jobs."
Insight's three-month investigation has drawn on
thousands of pages of U.N. internal reports, and interviews with more than
20 top U.N. officials in New York, Geneva, and London." Nick Rufford, Ian Burrell and David Leppard, "Scandal of U.N.
'lost' millions", The Sunday Times, 15 August 1993, as
excerpted in UN Special (Geneva), October 1993, pp. 20, 22, 27.
"
In early July, eight members of
the U.N. procurement office [in New York were suspended following
allegations of irregularities in the procurement of goods and services for
UN peacekeeping operations]
. So why did the U.N. hierarchy
suspend the eight staff members?
leaks came to the
ears of Mike Wallace of '60 minutes', who has been terrorizing senior U.N.
officials by, well, asking them questions
[Colleagues say]
the suspended
and humiliated staff have despaired of getting a fair hearing. [They made many judgment calls
about bidder [performance capabilities], but they were
responsible for [everything
needed by] the 14 U.N. peacekeeping operations and their 87,000 personnel
[and] worked 12 hours a day
and weekends [under extreme pressure], which has redoubled their
resentment at the shabby treatment they have
suffered. By contrast, the eight's boss
,
who signed many of the documents in question, received a similar job he
wanted in Geneva, while no action was taken against the senior officials
on the contracts committee who are supposed to approve all
deals. A [staff member] explained '
the
unique hierarchical structure of the U.N. which leaves all decisions to
the underlings. When
everything works, they take the credit. When it goes wrong, they wash
their hands of it.'
At the U.N., the presumption of
innocence ought to be enhanced, if only because all too often the guilty
there are promoted, not punished." Ian Williams, "Free the U.N. eight! Travelgate on First Ave.", The New York Observer, September 13, 1993, pp. 1, 10. [Note: In 1997 the UN Administrative Tribunal completely exonerated the eight staff members charged , with blunt criticism of the UN's lack of due process and apparent knuckling under to outside political pressure. The eight received $20,000 each in damages, but barely an apology, and the investigation and appeal case cost the UN millions of dollars. Apparently, no hint of a reprimand was given to the senior officials who decided to prosecute.
"Skylink case closed", UN Staff Report, March 1997, p.
14.] "UN budgeting is haphazard,
wasteful habits are scandalous and corruption is slackly checked. At the least, a vigilant inspector
general needs to be named. As
a recent '60 minutes' programme documents, offenders are rarely fired and
never prosecuted. Granted, by
the standards of many members UN malfeasance is small change. If the United Nations is to gain
the world's confidence, however, it has to set a better
example." "About peacekeeping", a New York Times editorial, in the International Herald Tribune, September, 1993.
"The United Nations is not exempt
from [worldwide]
waste, fraud, abuse and corruption problems
UN [audit
officials] acknowledged that investigations of complaints of violations
are neither centralized or organized.
The only firm data
come from
personal grievances and managerial disciplinary actions appealed to [OHRM]
[they] show a very disturbing recent increase in
mismanagement and
fraud cases as field operations have rapidly expanded
worldwide: First
half of
1990
1991
1992 1993
Total new cases referred 28
30
40
70 subtotal: mismanagement/fraud
15
17
13
45 leading to: dismissal of staff
2
4
4
1
appropriate action 8
10
4
3
lack of evidence
4
2
5 29 other 1 1 1 13 The biennial reports
by the Board of Auditors include some information
[but] cover only the
1986-1991 period, [and thus]
do not reflect fraud problems [from the
vast]
expansion of [UN] operational activities. Meanwhile,
partial [internal audit] statistics on recovery against fraud, which is the
responsibility of the managers concerned, show serious problems. Between 1988
and mid-1993, the internal auditors recommended $3,500,000 for recovery,
but only $85,000, a mere 2 percent of the total, had actually been
recovered." Joint Inspection
Unit, "Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN
document
A/48/420,
1993, p. 14. [emphasis added]
"The General Assembly, III.
Determined to address alleged cases of fraud in the
United Nations in an impartial manner, in accordance with due process of
law and full respect for the rights of each individual concerned,
especially the rights of defense
2. Also decides to this end to establish an
ad hoc
working group of experts
to report to the General Assembly [in 1994]
on the possibilities of new
[or] improved jurisdictional and procedural mechanisms." "Review of the
administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations", General
Assembly resolution 48/218 A, 23 December 1993,
sections
II. And III. [emphasis
added]
"RECENT CASES OF
MAJOR FRAUD UNHCR [In August 1993] The
former UNHCR Special Representative to Uganda and Djibouti
was forced to
resign after
the auditors found more than £2 million in losses from his
relief operations: 'food aid worth £250 000 disappeared from a warehouse
on orders bearing his signature.
more than £ 300 000 of UN vehicles were
sold or given away.
After his transfer to Djibouti, a further £450 000
in UN funds went missing, apparently paid to companies that did not
exist. On
his forced resignation, Mr. L. was denied his severance pay but allowed to
keep his pension. The [Sunday
Times] alleges tht Mr. L. had 'powerful friends in the UN's Africa
hierarchy' and that the UN tried to cover up this scandal. If the Sunday Times
allegations are correct, why was Mr. L. not summarily dismissed following
the UNHCR financial losses caused by his mismanagement? Why was he
allowed to be transferred to another assignment, and then, why was he
allowed to resign instead of being summarily dismissed? If the
newspaper's allegations are false, why did the UN not reply to them
publicly?" Corruption problems
in 1993, as discussed in Yves Beigbeder, The internal management of United Nations
Organizations: The Long Quest for Reform, Macmillan,
London and St. Martins, New York, 1997, Chapter 7, "The extent of fraud
and losses,"
pp. 106-107. "Betrug und
Mismanagement, Schόtzlingswirtshaft and bόrokratischer Wildwuchs
verschlingen jδhrlich Millionen und bringen die Uno in Finanznot. Kommt nicht
bald neues Geld in die Kassen, steht die Welt-organization vor der
Pleite.
Dabei kφnnte Generalsekretar Butros Butros Ghali im eigenen Haus
mδchtig sparen." [ informal
translation: "Fraud and mismanagement, nepotism and bureaucratic
wilderness swallow up millions a year and lead the UN into financial
emergency.
If new funds dont arrive in the cashbox, the world organization is
approaching bankruptcy. The Secretary-General, however, could
save a lot in his own house."] "Vereinte Nationen:
Die korrupte Weltmacht", [UN: The corrupt world power"], Der Speigel, Germany, 4/1994, January 24, 1994, pp. 124-136 .
"The effectiveness of an oversight office depends to a
large extent on how senior officers perceive their roles. The concept of
management accountability in the United Nations has not been consistently
applied.
no system of accountability will be effective without the assurance that
sanctions will be promptly applied when violations occur. I strongly
recommend that any new system of accountability and responsibility include
specific penalties or sanctions for United Nations managers and other
staff who disregard United Nations regulations and rules or who are
negligent in the conduct of their duties and responsibilities.
During this first
year, [the new office] has addressed symptoms but has not yet been able to
address the root causes of many [UN] problems. I refer to such issues as
recruitment and promotion policies, the administration of justice,
management reporting systems, staffing and financing of peacekeeping
operations and contract management. A
vast amount of work remains to be done before the United Nations has
management structures and a management culture adequate to the great tasks
entrusted to it
.
"
Mohamed Aly Niazi,
transitional head of the new UN oversight office, in the introduction to
"Report of the Office of Inspections and Investigations", UN document
A/49/449, 28 September 1994, pages 5-6. "
permit me to tell you briefly my basic philosophy for
the fulfillment of my duties
in general and for the OIOS [Office of Internal Oversight Services] in
particular. First of all, I do not consider myself an antagonistic
type of person.
I believe in consensus-seeking.
Results are better achieved thorough dialogue and quiet reasoning, in an
atmosphere of mutual trust.
above all, I see myself as an adviser to the Secretary-General and to
senior officials, and as a counsel to line managers and to the
Organization as a whole, for better management.
My approach will not be primarily that of a
critic.
OIOS
should offer assistance to managers
in implementing our recommendations
[and] to give
advice on putting into practice the measures we propose.
I understand that the primary responsibility for programme implementation
rests with programme managers. The role of OIOS is to ensure that
adequate systems for monitoring are in place in each department and
office.
I hope to encourage greater concern by managers throughout the United
Nations with the results of their activities
" "Statement by Karl
Th. Paschke [first head of the new OIOS]
to the Fifth
Committee," 5 December 1994, pp. 4-5, 7-8.
[emphasis added]
"As part of the investigation function, we now have
procedures for receiving confidential information
I will guarantee complete confidentiality to all those who wish to provide
us with information on problems.
Having said this I must add immediately that I am not comfortable with
receiving anonymous messages, and will certainly do nothing to encourage
this practice. In any case, this should be seen as a system of last
resort.
The first, and by far the most important way, for staff to voice
complaints and make suggestions must be to and through their immediate
supervisors. When I was told I would have to take anonymous tips
into account in my new job I was reminded of
Hamlet,
who was given a suggestion by a ghost
[and] then proceeded to procrastinate. He was a rational man and had his doubts
about acting on the advice of ghosts. I hope I am not put in a similar
situation myself too often." "Statement by Karl
Th. Paschke
to the Fifth Committee," 5
December 1994, pp. 11-12 .
"Karl T. Paschke's
introductory remarks to the Fifth Committee reveal a man curiously
laid-back for a job that requires cracking down on waste, abuse, and
corruption.
Could it be that Paschke is finessing? True, coming on like gangbusters would have been a
mistake, given the well-known misgivings in the higher echelons of the
Secretariat about the whole enterprise. So Paschke went out of his way to
acknowledge that Butros Boutros-Ghali still is boss in the house, although
his emphasis on his own role as 'adviser' may have been a bit exaggerated.
Paschke does not invite anonymous tips and would
prefer that staffers go through their immediate supervisors with
complaints.
If meant seriously, that's perhaps a little naοve. Supervisors
like to have a tidy shop and who among them would look kindly on a
subordinate whistleblower. As long as guarantees of confidentiality
can be maintained, far better
[that staff] pass it along through the dedicated telephone line
" "Diplomatic pouch" by
Petronius, Diplomatic World Bulletin (NY), December 12, 1994. " the bulk [of financial abuses] usually occurs in emergency operations where cash or supplies are being moved [urgently], or where contracts must be issued under great pressure. Given the appalling under-staffing of peacekeeping operatio | |||