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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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Introductory quotes
This is not to say
that the WHO does no good work at all … or that it does not
have sincere and competent staff in its lower echelons. But at its higher levels
politicking and jockeying for position overwhelm any lingering concern for
the health of the world's population. …. The WHO hires not by competence but by allocation of jobs among
member nations. This not only
amounts to positive discrimination in favour of the incompetent but
ensures that political skills matter more than technical
capacity. I once worked in a
small tropical country where the WHO representative, though personable,
was the most incompetent man … I have ever
encountered. He [never
visited the country's only hospital] … in his two and a
half years there. When he was
finally removed from the country, it was by promotion to the regional
headquarters." Anthony Daniels, The
Sunday Telegraph (UK), 25 April 1993.
Note: The WHO and other UN
system specialized agencies do indeed have such performance difficulties,
but people who know the system's flaws would say the above situation and
incidents are most grievous in the United Nations Secretariat itself.
"Another week, another UN scandal
…. Why are scandals so frequent in
[global] institutions …. ?
What …. makes them so
vulnerable to corruption, inefficiency, and …. personal aggrandisement?
…. The first problem is
leadership. Leaders are
selected by an inefficient and labyrinthine process from a pool of poor
quality talent. …. Second, the waste and inefficiency
can only be reduced if they are visible to public opinion. …. [but]
international institutions [lack] …. accountability
…. The third problem is the weakness
of a law-governed culture. …. …. The UN Charter [Article 100]
focuses on the Secretary-General and staff as …. international officials
accountable only to the Organization.…. Here, rooted in idealism, lie the
clues in what can go wrong.
All too often the heads of UN agencies signaled their autonomy
through grandeur …. …. The agency's task …. became
subordinate to old bureaucratic instincts of self-perpetuation and
resistance to outside scrutiny. …. Sir Brian Urquhart has [suggested
that] no secretary-general should serve more than one term in
office. Extended throughout the [UN
system, this] …. would remove electioneering and diminish the incentive to
patronage. It may not be
much, but it would be a start." "Perri 6 and Michael Sheridan, "A world order of scandal and
graft: What is it about
international agencies that invites corruption ….", The Independent
(UK), May 11, 1995.
"What should be done to prevent
corruption in international agencies? Here's a list of [some] key
measures: ?
Impose
a limit of one term on chief executives of all international
agencies. ?
Give
auditors power to requisition any information they believe they
need. ?
Require
the public registration of all the private interests of international
diplomats, UN agency chief executives and senior managers.
… The most important problem is the
lack of a global public opinion before which international agencies may
stand accountable. Part of
the way forward may be for the national parliaments of the world's leading
nations to set up scrutiny committees to review the work of all the
international institutions of governance. Just as the EU has been kept, in
some measure, on its toes by the European legislation committees of the
national parliaments, so global bodies could be made subject to some
measure of national political discipline. Until the international 'great and
the good' feel that they are being closely watched by a lively political
community, they will be tempted to take advantage of our lack of
vigilance." Perri 6, "How to win global war against corruption," The
Independent (UK), May 11, 1995.
Chronological
quotes "It is my belief that each member
of the UN is responsible for what the Organization is, how it defines its
mission, and how it carries it out. …. Too often, we remain silent when
bosses or superiors take actions which may be contrary to the purposes and
spirit of the [UN] Charter
-- or don't make sense
in terms of good management.
…. [in public institutions], the managers are not less accountable
to the public than are the employees …. Because we are paid from public
funds, we all share in the responsibility of ensuring an effective
Organization. …. Hence, very plainly the future of the UN is in our hands,
yours and mine. We cannot put
the burden on those above us, except to demand from them the kind of
leadership required by the Charter and able performance of the duties for
which the world public pays them." Lowell
Flanders, "The future of the UN …. In whose hands?", [President of the
Staff Union], address at a preparatory meeting of the United Nations
Community Forum,
Secretariat News (NY), April 16, 1979, pp.
10-11. "The United Nations staff union
has called for an independent investigation into allegations of corruption
and maladministration in UN internal affairs. Longstanding discontent among the
2,700 professional staff at the New York headquarters burst into the open
when a senior UN official was allowed to resign quietly although serious
allegations had been made about his financial affairs and staff
appointments. … Staff morale is low. Most staff members indulge in
place-seeking and status preferment rather than the original spirit of
dedication to UN principles.
Finding jobs for one's own group, or for those sharing ideologies,
is a major pre-occupation." Colin Legum, "UN staff call for corruption probe", The
Observer (UK), November 2, 1980
"There have recently been
widespread rumours of corruption in the Secretariat, alleging misuse of
official position for personal gain.
No evidence has been presented to substantiate the rumours … If
they are left unverified, however, … such rumours cannot fail to [damage]
the good name of the Secretariat.
The Secretary-General has decided that action should be taken … and
has accordingly ordered an inquiry by a [two-member] panel …. Any staff member [with relevant
information] should approach the panel … with such information, which will
be held in strictest confidence." "Inquiry into rumours of corruption in the Secretariat", UN Information Circular ST/IC/80/33 of 13 November 1980. Note: This circular clearly responded to the above staff union
initiative. This particular
episode seems to have, eventually and quietly, disappeared, probably
because of staff mustrust in "approaching the panel".]
"The Administration
has recently dealt with a
number of cases of alleged
fraud relating to taxes and education grants within the Secretariat. In the process, different
administrative actions have been undertaken … [including] summary
dismissal, referral of cases to the Joint Disciplinary Committee,
resignation and recovery of overpayment. ·
What are
the criteria according to which summary dismissal -- the hardest penalty
-- has been meted out to some, but not to others?
·
Under
what circumstances it is decided that a case should be submitted to the
[JDC]? ·
What are
the circumstances under which the Administration accepts the resignation
of staff involved? ·
By what
criteria is it decided that only the recovery of the overpayment should be
made? We are concerned that
the established judicial procedures which are intended to guarantee staff
a minimum of due process should not be undermined. … There is a need to
explain to the staff the circumstances governing the choice of measures
being invoked. In cases that
are similar, justice will require that staff are not only equitably
treated but that they are seen to be equitably
treated." From a "Group of concerned
staff", "Fraud and due process," Secretariat News (NY), 16 July
1986, p. 2.
"In a year when U.N. spending is
under unusually close scrutiny, Yukio Takasu of Japan said there is a
problem when administrations spend money freely … and the role of member
states is limited to considering and approving
budgets. Takasu said there were significant
cases of fraud or presumptive fraud and unless [the Administration]
offered a full explanation of the problem and cited measures taken to deal
with it, member states were bound to feel less confident in [UN
management]. [The Administration's written
reply stated that] …. comprehensive audits uncovered relatively few cases of
misappropriation of UN funds and in those cases disciplinary measures were
taken. From 1984 [to late 1986 it had
identified] 35 possible fraud cases involving education grants … [in]
amounts ranging from $187 to $31,600. Turning to charges that some staff
cheated on their [US] tax returns, [the reply said that 19 such cases had
been processed] An audit in
progress identified … 12 possible future cases ….
[The Secretariat reply] emphasized
that it initiated a comprehensive audit, … promptly took action to recover
misappropriated funds [and] … disciplinary measures … and improve
procedures to detect past fraud and deter future
fraud." "U.N. management challenged, defended", UN Special (Geneva) [excerpted from Diplomatic World Bulletin, N.Y.], October 1986, p. 13.
"Typical …. of the U.N.'s stubborn
resistance to reform was the response to the [Group of 18 report's]
suggestion that the Secretary-General would get more reliable data if the
U.N.s [internal audit unit were made independent, rather than being a
subordinate unit of the UN's management division]. To this sensible recommendation,
the [head of Administration] …. said that 'it is indeed theoretically
possible for the Internal Audit Service to report directly to the
Secretary-General. The
advisability of this move would have to be seen in relation to other
factors, such as whether the already heavy schedule of the
Secretary-General should be burdened by further direct supervisory
responsibilities.'" "The
United Nations continues to duck needed reforms", The Heritage Foundation,
Backgrounder, No. 593, Washington, D.C., July 9, l987, p. 6.
"To continue with the charade [of
official development assistance] seems to me to be absurd. Garnered and justified in the name
of the destitute and the vulnerable, aid's main function in the past
half-century has been to create and then entrench a powerful new class of
rich and privileged people.
In that notorious club of parasites and hangers-on made up of the
United Nations, the World Bank and the bilateral agencies, it is aid --
and nothing else -- that has provided hundreds of thousands of 'jobs for
the boys' and that has permitted record-breaking standards to be set in
self-serving behavior, arrogance, paternalism, moral cowardice and
mendacity. At the same time,
in the developing countries, aid has perpetuated the rule of incompetent
and venal men whose leadership would otherwise be utterly non-viable; it
has allowed governments characterized by historic ignorance, avarice and
irresponsibility to thrive; and, last but not least, it has condoned --
and in some cases facilitated -- the most consistent and grievous
violations of human rights that have occurred anywhere in the world since
the dark ages. … the time has come for the lords
of poverty to depart." Graham Hancock, Lords of
poverty: The freewheeling lifestyles, power, prestige, and corruption of
the multi-billion dollar aid business, Macmillan, London, 1989,
pp 192- 193.
"[Two years after the United
Nations launched a drive .. to raise funds for clearing land mines inside
Afghanistan, a UN official has charged that money, including about $10
million donated by the U.S. government, is being
wasted. Rae McGrath, a land mines
specialist who spent 18 years in the British army before joining the UN …
program as its field supervisor, said that the United Nations had grossly
exaggerated the impact of its program, in part to raise money …
He added that large sums had been
wasted on poorly planned and badly monitored educational programs for
refugees. "We're not running
a mine eradication program, which is what the donors are giving the money
for and what needs to be done" Mr. McGrath said. After a dispute with his superiors
… [he] is leaving the United
Nations. Others associated
with the program … said they agreed with the thrust of Mr. McGrath's
criticisms. In its
solicitations for funds, the United Nations says it has trained 20,000
Afghans in mine awareness and mine clearance. But it has sent only one team of
27 into Afghanistan to clear mines." Steve Coll, "Afghan funds wasted, UN official says", Washington
Post Service, International Herald Tribune, 22 March
1990.
"The images are familiar:
blue-bereted U.N. peace keepers … humanitarian relief workers fighting
poverty and hunger … But behind these images lies an
enormous, largely uncontrolled bureaucracy, subject to abuses and
deficiencies that impair its effectiveness, a nine-month study by The
Washington Post has found. …. … U.N. food aid and other resources
have been pilfered with impunity by governments and armies for
years. Peace-keeping operations, some of
which drag on for decades, have become a source of soaring costs with
minimal oversight. … … voluminous yearbooks [are]
published years out of date and esoteric technical studies … go largely
ignored. … top officials operate with few
checks and balances in the absence of [U.N. management] standards The system currently has no
inspector general, and a Joint Inspection Unit in Geneva is made up mostly
of retired diplomats. … The United Nations, its internal
critics say, has been self-protecting and self-perpetuating, rather than
self-policing. .
… [the executive director of the
human rights group Africa Watch says] "There's a hell of a lot of shocking
things going on … I think there's a great deal of incompetence, there's a
lot of corruption, and there's no
accountability." William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, September 20, 1992, pp. 1-2.
" … [The UN programs which eat] up
the great bulk of U.N. resources … the economic, social and humanitarian
programs aimed at development, emergency relief and 'better standards of
life' around the world … [get little scrutiny.]
… Clearly, the United Nations
employs many hard-working and idealistic people. [but] … Parts of the system are
overstaffed and lethargic, while others, particularly field offices in
unpleasant places, are overstaffed and overworked.
… Local employees tend to bear the
brunt of disciplinary action … when fraud or abuse are discovered … while
erring international professional staffers often survive and even advance
in the organization. At the
same time, U.N. employees who complain about irregularities [lose
promotions or must transfer elsewhere.] It is a system that tends to cover
up its abuses and discourage whistle-blowers.
… A European U.N. official, who
recently left his agency in frustration, [said] 'A certain enabling
environment … allows {fraud} to happen. The question is not whether you do
it or not, but whether you're stupid enough to be
caught." "Basically, there's a lack of
determination to combat the sleaze factor' he said. 'In an environment where
mediocrity has a strong self-protective interest, these things
flourish.'" William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, September 20, 1992, pp. 3-4.
"UN officials who advocate a
cleanup … say that management by … top officials has been inept and,
occasionally, corrupt. 'There is no [regular] supervision of any agency'
… said [a senior
official.] Governing councils
… are 'basically rubber-stamp bodies.' The U. N. Board of Auditors …
cites numerous [problems] and 'weak internal controls' … during 1990 and
1991 … [in a] 136-page report that enumerates irregularities or
deficiencies in hiring, cash and property management, internal audits and
purchases of everything from project equipment to airline tickets.
… Many anomalies [that they report]
'appear to be recurring' and point to a 'lack of determination to enforce
regulations and rules and make the heads of units of the organization
accountable,' the report says. A recent confidential internal
paper circulating in the U. N. Development Program … put the problem more
bluntly. Citing 'a deplorable
vacuum of basic ethics' in the system, it noted widespread criticism of
'prolific structures, pompous-Byzantine attitudes of ranking officials,
operational inefficiency and … gross mismanagement of financial and
personnel resources.' The 10-page paper listed a dozen
cases of corruption involving the development agency's staffers or
programs that totaled millions of dollars in pilfered
funds." William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, September 20, 1992, p 4.
"[Concerning allegations of
corruption at UNHCR in articles in the Washington Post in September 1992]
with respect to discipline in UNHCR, a courageous staff member in Angola
immediately brought the Boubakar wrongdoing to my attention. The case was airtight, and U.N.
headquarters found it impossible to avoid our recommendation for
dismissal. In the more complicated
Lukika case in Uganda, UNHCR's recommendation for dismissal was equally
strong. The
Secretary-General's office rejected it (on grounds that the United Nations
lacks precedents in firing for incompetence) and forced UNHCR to take
Lukika back. Threats and intimidation in no way
dampened our efforts in UNHCR to deal with corruption and incompetence.
…. The
Secretary-General at the time just did not support us. Ensuing troubles with Lukika after
headquarters directed that he stay in UNHCR should surprise no
one." Arthur E. Dewey, "No laxity", UN Special (Geneva), November, 1992, p. 31. [emphasis added] [Note: Mr. Dewey was deputy high commissioner of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from 1986-1990.]
"The United Nations
presently is almost totally lacking in effective means to deal with fraud,
waste and abuse by staff members [as] … recently highlighted
in … the news
media. … The chronically
fragmented and inadequate …[UN internal
oversight structure] is currently so ineffective that, time and again, we
have been called on to create ad hoc teams to carry out
investigations of serious wrongdoing. The delay [in organizing]
… these teams often
allows the trail to 'grow cold" [and] … deprives the
investigation of the vitality … professionalism and impartiality
[of] … more regularized
procedures. … I believe that few of the reports
[presently] … produced will be taken seriously by the auditees until the
'muscle' of your office is placed firmly behind a consolidated effort
carried out by a strong Inspector General's
office.' As noted in the Volcker-Ogata
report, 'support for improved financing will be dependent upon a
perception that funds are economically managed and effectively
spent.' … [so that] all Member States [can
reassure] … their taxpayers, the ultimate supporters of all United Nations
activity. This reassurance can only come …
from the prompt and effective activation of a strong Inspector General's
office …" Dick Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations", 1 March 1993, pages 29-31. "With the vast increase in United
Nations activities and expenditures resulting from the organization's
newfound status as a global 911 emergency number, its capacity for
ensuring the integrity of its operations is more important than
ever. The recent report by the UN
Financing Advisory Group, led by Paul Volcker and Shijuro Ogata, noted
specifically that 'support for improved financing will be dependent upon a
perception that funds are economically managed and effectively
spent.'
Unfortunately, the mechanisms in
place to promote such a perception … are creaking leftovers from more
placid times. …. What is needed is an Office of
Inspector General, staffed to audit, investigate and lay the basis for
remedial action in serious cases of conflict of interest, misappropriation
of funds or other corrupt practices. The inspector general's
office is the centerpiece of [the] agenda for
reform [that I presented to Secretary-General Butros
Butros-Ghali upon completion of my one-year assignment at the United
Nations." Dick Thornburgh, "How to clean up the United Nations", International Herald Tribune, March 26, 1993. [emphasis added] [Note:
Mr. Thornburgh was United Nations undersecretary-general for
administration and management]
"The United Nations is losing an
estimated £270 m. each year because of corruption, waste and mismanagement
….
While the organization appeals
for tens of millions of
pounds in voluntary donations, senior U.N. officials enjoy perks and
career expectations .. unthinkable to most employees in the private
sector. Among the abuses at the U.N.,
Insight has discovered:
-- Thirty-nine of the
U.N.'s top officials … are being kept on the payroll despite being
unemployed. Dubbed "desk
warmers", some sit at home doing nothing on salaries of up to £100,000 a
year.
-- Millions of
pounds are paid out to "double dippers", retired U.N. officials who are
paid lucrative consultancy fees on top of their generous
pensions.
-- A U.N.
internal report [by former UN top manager Richard Thornburgh] was
suppressed and later shredded.
He said 'there are a number of senior people who have positions and
no assignment and yet there is no capability to terminate these people's
jobs." … Insight's three-month investigation has drawn on
thousands of pages of U.N. internal reports, and interviews with more than
20 top U.N. officials in New York, Geneva, and London." Nick Rufford, Ian Burrell and David Leppard, "Scandal of U.N.
'lost' millions", The Sunday Times, 15 August 1993, as
excerpted in UN Special (Geneva), October 1993, pp. 20, 22, 27.
"… In early July, eight members of
the U.N. procurement office [in New York were suspended following
allegations of irregularities in the procurement of goods and services for
UN peacekeeping operations]
…. So why did the U.N. hierarchy
suspend the eight staff members?
… leaks came to the
ears of Mike Wallace of '60 minutes', who has been terrorizing senior U.N.
officials by, well, asking them questions … [Colleagues say] … the suspended
and humiliated staff have despaired of getting a fair hearing. [They made many judgment calls
about bidder [performance capabilities], but they were … responsible for [everything
needed by] the 14 U.N. peacekeeping operations and their 87,000 personnel
… [and] worked 12 hours a day
and weekends [under extreme pressure], which has redoubled their
resentment at the shabby treatment they have
suffered. By contrast, the eight's boss …,
who signed many of the documents in question, received a similar job he
wanted in Geneva, while no action was taken against the senior officials
on the contracts committee who are supposed to approve all
deals. A [staff member] explained '… the
unique hierarchical structure of the U.N. which leaves all decisions to
the underlings. When
everything works, they take the credit. When it goes wrong, they wash
their hands of it.'
At the U.N., the presumption of
innocence ought to be enhanced, if only because all too often the guilty
there are promoted, not punished." Ian Williams, "Free the U.N. eight! Travelgate on First Ave.", The New York Observer, September 13, 1993, pp. 1, 10. [Note: In 1997 the UN Administrative Tribunal completely exonerated the eight staff members charged , with blunt criticism of the UN's lack of due process and apparent knuckling under to outside political pressure. The eight received $20,000 each in damages, but barely an apology, and the investigation and appeal case cost the UN millions of dollars. Apparently, no hint of a reprimand was given to the senior officials who decided to prosecute.
"Skylink case closed", UN Staff Report, March 1997, p.
14.] "UN budgeting is haphazard,
wasteful habits are scandalous and corruption is slackly checked. At the least, a vigilant inspector
general needs to be named. As
a recent '60 minutes' programme documents, offenders are rarely fired and
never prosecuted. Granted, by
the standards of many members UN malfeasance is small change. If the United Nations is to gain
the world's confidence, however, it has to set a better
example." "About peacekeeping", a New York Times editorial, in the International Herald Tribune, September, 1993.
"The United Nations is not exempt
from [worldwide] … waste, fraud, abuse and corruption problems … UN [audit
officials] acknowledged that investigations of complaints of violations
are neither centralized or organized. … The only firm data … come from
personal grievances and managerial disciplinary actions appealed to [OHRM]
… [they] show a very disturbing recent increase in … mismanagement and
fraud cases as field operations have rapidly expanded
worldwide: First
half of
1990
1991
1992 1993
Total new cases referred 28
30
40
70 subtotal: mismanagement/fraud
15
17
13
45 leading to: dismissal of staff
2
4
4
1
appropriate action 8
10
4
3
lack of evidence
4
2
5 29 other 1 1 1 13 The biennial reports
by the Board of Auditors include some information … [but] cover only the
1986-1991 period, [and thus] … do not reflect fraud problems [from the
vast] … expansion of [UN] operational activities. Meanwhile,
partial [internal audit] statistics on recovery against fraud, which is the
responsibility of the managers concerned, show serious problems. Between 1988
and mid-1993, the internal auditors recommended $3,500,000 for recovery,
but only $85,000, a mere 2 percent of the total, had actually been
recovered." Joint Inspection
Unit, "Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN
document
A/48/420,
1993, p. 14. [emphasis added]
"The General Assembly, III. …
Determined to address alleged cases of fraud in the
United Nations in an impartial manner, in accordance with due process of
law and full respect for the rights of each individual concerned,
especially the rights of defense … 2. Also decides to this end to establish an
ad hoc …
working group of experts …
to report to the General Assembly [in 1994] … on the possibilities of new
[or] improved jurisdictional and procedural mechanisms." "Review of the
administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations", General
Assembly resolution 48/218 A, 23 December 1993,
sections
II. And III. [emphasis
added]
"RECENT CASES OF
MAJOR FRAUD UNHCR [In August 1993] The
former UNHCR Special Representative to Uganda and Djibouti … was forced to
resign after … the auditors found more than £2 million in losses from his
relief operations: 'food aid worth £250 000 disappeared from a warehouse
on orders bearing his signature. … more than £ 300 000 of UN vehicles were
sold or given away. … After his transfer to Djibouti, a further £450 000
in UN funds went missing, apparently paid to companies that did not
exist. On
his forced resignation, Mr. L. was denied his severance pay but allowed to
keep his pension. The [Sunday
Times] alleges tht Mr. L. had 'powerful friends in the UN's Africa
hierarchy' and that the UN tried to cover up this scandal. If the Sunday Times
allegations are correct, why was Mr. L. not summarily dismissed following
the UNHCR financial losses caused by his mismanagement? Why was he
allowed to be transferred to another assignment, and then, why was he
allowed to resign instead of being summarily dismissed? If the
newspaper's allegations are false, why did the UN not reply to them
publicly?" Corruption problems
in 1993, as discussed in Yves Beigbeder, The internal management of United Nations
Organizations: The Long Quest for Reform, Macmillan,
London and St. Martins, New York, 1997, Chapter 7, "The extent of fraud
and losses,"
pp. 106-107. "Betrug und
Mismanagement, Schützlingswirtshaft and bürokratischer Wildwuchs
verschlingen jährlich Millionen und bringen die Uno in Finanznot. Kommt nicht
bald neues Geld in die Kassen, steht die Welt-organization vor der
Pleite.
Dabei könnte Generalsekretar Butros Butros Ghali im eigenen Haus
mächtig sparen." [ informal
translation: "Fraud and mismanagement, nepotism and bureaucratic
wilderness swallow up millions a year and lead the UN into financial
emergency.
If new funds don’t arrive in the cashbox, the world organization is
approaching bankruptcy. The Secretary-General, however, could
save a lot in his own house."] "Vereinte Nationen:
Die korrupte Weltmacht", [UN: The corrupt world power"], Der Speigel, Germany, 4/1994, January 24, 1994, pp. 124-136 .
"The effectiveness of an oversight office depends to a
large extent on how senior officers perceive their roles. The concept of
management accountability in the United Nations has not been consistently
applied. …
no system of accountability will be effective without the assurance that
sanctions will be promptly applied when violations occur. I strongly
recommend that any new system of accountability and responsibility include
specific penalties or sanctions for United Nations managers and other
staff who disregard United Nations regulations and rules or who are
negligent in the conduct of their duties and responsibilities.
… During this first
year, [the new office] has addressed symptoms but has not yet been able to
address the root causes of many [UN] problems. I refer to such issues as
recruitment and promotion policies, the administration of justice,
management reporting systems, staffing and financing of peacekeeping
operations and contract management. A
vast amount of work remains to be done before the United Nations has
management structures and a management culture adequate to the great tasks
entrusted to it….
"
Mohamed Aly Niazi,
transitional head of the new UN oversight office, in the introduction to
"Report of the Office of Inspections and Investigations", UN document
A/49/449, 28 September 1994, pages 5-6. "
… permit me to tell you briefly my basic philosophy for
the fulfillment of my duties …
in general and for the OIOS [Office of Internal Oversight Services] in
particular. First of all, I do not consider myself an antagonistic
type of person.
…
I believe in consensus-seeking. …
Results are better achieved thorough dialogue and quiet reasoning, in an
atmosphere of mutual trust. …
above all, I see myself as an adviser to the Secretary-General and to
senior officials, and as a counsel to line managers and to the
Organization as a whole, for better management. …
My approach will not be primarily that of a
critic.
OIOS …
should offer assistance to managers
in implementing our recommendations …
[and] to give …
advice on putting into practice the measures we propose. …
I understand that the primary responsibility for programme implementation
rests with programme managers. The role of OIOS is to ensure that
adequate systems for monitoring are in place in each department and
office. …
I hope to encourage greater concern by managers throughout the United
Nations with the results of their activities …" "Statement by Karl
Th. Paschke [first head of the new OIOS] … to the Fifth
Committee," 5 December 1994, pp. 4-5, 7-8.
[emphasis added]
"As part of the investigation function, we now have
procedures for receiving confidential information …
I will guarantee complete confidentiality to all those who wish to provide
us with information on problems. …
Having said this I must add immediately that I am not comfortable with
receiving anonymous messages, and will certainly do nothing to encourage
this practice. In any case, this should be seen as a system of last
resort.
The first, and by far the most important way, for staff to voice
complaints and make suggestions must be to and through their immediate
supervisors. When I was told I would have to take anonymous tips
into account in my new job I was reminded of …
Hamlet,…
who was given a suggestion by a ghost …
[and] then proceeded to procrastinate. He was a rational man and had his doubts
about acting on the advice of ghosts. I hope I am not put in a similar
situation myself too often." "Statement by Karl
Th. Paschke … to the Fifth Committee," 5
December 1994, pp. 11-12 .
"Karl T. Paschke's
introductory remarks to the Fifth Committee reveal a man curiously
laid-back for a job that requires cracking down on waste, abuse, and
corruption.
Could it be that Paschke is finessing? True, coming on like gangbusters would have been a
mistake, given the well-known misgivings in the higher echelons of the
Secretariat about the whole enterprise. So Paschke went out of his way to
acknowledge that Butros Boutros-Ghali still is boss in the house, although
his emphasis on his own role as 'adviser' may have been a bit exaggerated.
… Paschke does not invite anonymous tips and would
prefer that staffers go through their immediate supervisors with
complaints.
If meant seriously, that's perhaps a little naïve. Supervisors
like to have a tidy shop and who among them would look kindly on a
subordinate whistleblower. As long as guarantees of confidentiality
can be maintained, far better …
[that staff] pass it along through the dedicated telephone line
…" "Diplomatic pouch" by
Petronius, Diplomatic World Bulletin (NY), December 12, 1994. " … the bulk [of
financial abuses] usually occurs … in emergency operations where cash or
supplies are being moved … [urgently], or where contracts must be issued
under great pressure. Given the appalling under-staffing of
peacekeeping operations and the disorganized state of humanitarian
emergency assistance the surprise if any is that there is not more fraud
and waste in these operations. … A further ironic
consequence of zero-growth demands has been the severe under-staffing of
the Internal Audit Division [IAD.] … neither Secretaries-General nor member
states have paid enough attention … [thus there have been only some 30
fully qualified auditors and 6 [professional evaluation staff] to cover
the entire [UN} work programme in thousands of expenditure lines, carried
out at New York, Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi, five Regional Commissions,
over a hundred country offices, huge world conferences and in addition
over a dozen complex peacekeeping operations. …" Erskine Childers,
with Brian Urquhart, "Renewing the United Nations system", Development Dialogue, 1994:1, Dag Hammarskjold
Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1994, p. 146.
"Internal procedures
to enable staff to report palpable misconduct without fear [and on the
other hand without creating an atmosphere of witch-hunting] should be
improved.
The UN's ability to pursue miscreants through national
jurisdictions needs to be strengthened. After decades of periodic suggestions
for an Inspector General to be attached directly to the Office of the
Secretary-General, this issue is now being actively pressed. This may, on
balance, be helpful but not really effective if the IAD remains so grossly
understaffed.
To carry maximum credulity and universal confidence the appointee
must be of impeccable repute and with top-calibre qualifications for such
work." Erskine Childers,
with Brian Urquhart, "Renewing the United Nations system", Development Dialogue, 1994:1, Dag Hammarskjold
Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1994, pp.
146-147.
"Somalia The theft of $3.9
million was discovered …[in April 1994] at the headquarters of the UN
Operation in Somalia … This sum had been kept in the bottom drawer of a
reinforced filing cabinet. A [subsequent] investigation was carried
out by a UN headquarters team … A detailed report
… was
only submitted by the Secretary-General … on 2 February 1995 … in response
to the 'deep concern' expressed by the General Assembly … The stolen funds were
not recovered, nor the thieves identified. [The 'assumed'] insiders were
not identified.
The officials in charge … were found to have been 'grossly
negligent' … An internal audit
[report of December 1993 had questioned cashier's office security] … but
none of the recommended security measures had been installed by the time
of the theft.
Appropriate measures were taken only after the theft … The Director …
resigned on 12 May 1994, the former Chief Finance Officer [had] his
repatriation grant and annual leave balance withheld … The Chief Cashier
received a written reprimand. … why was the
internal audit report not implemented immediately? Who was
responsible for recruiting, assigning and retaining incompetent or
negligent officials in such positions of responsibility?" Corruption problems
in 1994-1995, as discussed in Yves Beigbeder,
The internal management of United Nations
Organizations: The Long Quest for Reform, Macmillan,
London and St. Martins, New York, 1997, Chapter 7, "The extent of fraud
and losses," pp. 107-108.
"UNICEF - Kenya UNICEF lost
approximately $10 million, out of its $37 million budget for 1993 and
1994, to serious fraud and mismanagement in its Kenya office. [The problems
were first found by an unannounced auditor visit to Nairobi in November
1994.]
The fraud included payments for non-existent services, double
billing, bogus contractors, and insurance claims for non-existent medical
treatment.
An additional $8 to $9 million was due to mismanagement, including
spending beyond the authorized budget [and] failing to oversee contract
services …
By June 1995, 24 staff members had been suspended or dismissed, and
23 more were being investigated. … the two successive Directors of the
Kenya Office … were suspended without pay … The fraud was probably
facilitated by the doubling of the Office's budget in that period, caused
by the drought and an influx of refugees from the war in Somalia. … Here again, there was
a serious lack of supervision and control on the part of the Directors,
showing at best their incompetence and at worst their collusion in the
financial irregularities. Were these Directors qualified for their
assignments, and why were their operations not more closely supervised and
controlled by their UNICEF supervisors?" Corruption problems
in 1994-1995, as discussed in Yves Beigbeder,
The internal management of United Nations
Organizations: The Long Quest for Reform, Macmillan,
London and St. Martins, New York, 1997, Chapter 7, "The extent of fraud
and losses," pp. 108-109.
"Corruption is the
main cause for the UN deficit of 375 billion pesetas. A mafia-style
law of silence protects the corrupt staff members and covers up the
scandals of money or sex which keep recurring. The Geneva
Police has also established the relationship between the UN diplomats and
the underworld, who steal [everything] from computers of the international
headquarters to luggage of VIP visitors. The UN corruption
goes beyond the embezzled millions. … with the inside mafia who
'fabricate' work positions with very high salaries and cover each other,
the abuse of auxiliary staff which, at times, reaches the slavery levels,
the sexual and drugs scandals, or the connections of high ranking
personnel with the crime world. …. Within the UN Geneva
office circulates a clandestine magazine denouncing rackets, abuses and
mafia of the organization. The law office dedicates now all its
efforts in trying to find the editors of the accusing pamphlet." English translation
of "Mafia, corruption and orgies at the UN", Tiempo magazine (Spain), 19
June 1995.
"I believe that some of the deficiencies and
weaknesses which an increasingly critical public nowadays seems to detect
in the United Nations have something to do with the traditionally weak
oversight functions: the bureaucracy has grown without pruning for too
many years …
…
efforts must be made to do away with the widespread tendency of staff, even in key positions,
to shun responsibility and accountability. OIOS backs measures taken by the DAM
[Department of Administration and Management] to achieve this goal and will focus its own
recommendations to management accordingly. … …
Many UN managers are not used to and seem to be quite reluctant to accept
criticism, particularly when
it comes to applying accountability criteria rather than settling
for the promise that some specific problems won't recur. This feature
of the United Nations culture must be changed if we are ever to develop
staff awareness and acceptance of responsibility and accountability. United Nations
managers must stop
being defensive and enter
into a critical dialogue with OIOS. In order to make oversight effective, we offer ourselves as
partners, not adversaries." Comments of Mr.
Paschke in his 1995 annual report, "Report of the Secretary-General on the
activities of the [OIOS]", UN document A/50/459, 2
October 1995, "Preface." [emphasis added]
"Introduction: A good
idea fallen among thieves The UN has the media
relations of a 1950s state bureaucracy. It doesn't like reporters
looking into its inner workings, and it threatens dire penalties to staff
found leaking information to the media. Time and time again, when journalists have exposed
scandals in the UN, senior officials set up an enquiry -- into who
leaked!" Williams, Ian, The UN for beginners, Writers and Readers
Publishing, New York, 1995, p. 1.
"The Investigations Unit of the
Office was to some extent still under construction in terms of staffing
and establishing appropriate procedures … The Unit addressed cases
submitted to it mostly through the so-called "hot-line." The Unit's
work was mostly involved with staff who had personnel grievances and
believed that the Unit was another appeals board. That was not
true, but the grievances were analyzed and referred to the appropriate
part of the Administration. [In response to a
question] Mr. Paschke said that the Unit had five staff and needed about 12 to 15
professional investigators." "Press briefing by [OIOS}, " 8 February
1996. [emphasis
added] "Lifting the rock
barely - The Inspector General's first report Short on time, funds, and staff, the first [OIOS]
report produced little surprise …
but is reported to have 'demoralized' much of the organization's staff.
… But even that first limited swipe uncovered $16.8
million in outright fraud and waste. [He found} ?
In Somalia, $369,000
was paid for fuel distribution services that a contractor did not
provide. ?
A
project director …
for
Palestine refugee [aid] kept $100,000 of agency money in his private bank
account … ?
In Nairobi …
a staff member arranged loans worth $98,000 for a company …
with whose director she was 'closely associated." ?
A
travel assistant …
for a special commission …
on dismantling Iraq's nuclear weapons program misappropriated $28,000 in
travel checks. [Yet Mr. Paschke] stated, "I have not found the UN to
be a more corrupt organization …
than any other comparable public organization." …
U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright -- no UN buster
-- suggested that Paschke had [so far been] a 'junkyard puppy" [rather
than a trusty watchdog.] The [OIOS}, in short, may well become another typical
UN effort to deflect criticism without addressing the central problem.
…" Stefan Halper, A miasma of corruption: The United Nations at 50,
Cato Policy Analysis No. 253, Cato Institute, April 30, 1996, pp. 6-7.
"Halfway
through his term and answerable only to Member States, [Mr. Paschke] can
look forward to a comfortable couple of years … But United Nations
observers are beginning to ask what has been achieved in exchange for
… a free hand
for Paschke.
The answer is not encouraging. … the original conception of
Paschke's post was a combination of Grand Inquisitor and Super
Sleuth.
The final product, insiders say, falls far short of either.
… "The problem is that half the OIOS staff
do not know anything about the UN" we are told, "and the other half know
everything there is to know but are part of the establishment and they are
not going to make waves." The results of OIOS's travails are
paltry indeed …. There are whispers that senior staff need not fear
their peccadilloes will be exposed. Paschke's Finest, it is said, will
rake no muck above a certain level of political or bureaucratic
influence."
"Diplomatic pouch", Diplomatic World Bulletin, July29-August 6, 1996, p. 10.
"He …
reiterated the fact that any staff who come forward with complaints,
criticisms and information on mismanagement, waste and abuse, will be
protected by his office. He has no difficulty in approaching
supervisors directly to ensure that staff do not suffer reprisals for
providing OIOS with information." Assurances to staff
on hotline use by Mr. Paschke, in "Interview with USG/OIOS," What's New, Staff Union journal (NY), August 21, 1996, p. 4.
"He had been asked that question before, and would
repeat his answer now. He believed that the United Nations was
certainly no worse than other comparable institutions. … In the first two years of his work he had come to the
conclusion that fraud was not the main concern of the OIOS, but rather
administrative weakness and a very limited administrative expertise, with
many people handling sizeable amounts of money. It was,
therefore, also a problem of enhancing management expertise and management
savvy …" Response by Mr.
Paschke to a question about his assertion that the UN had no more
corruption problems than other comparable organizations, in "Press
briefing by Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services," UN,
New York, 31 October 1996.
"
… I categorically reject the suggestion that I would in
any way discriminate against a staff member who reports problems or
uncovers fraud." "Statement to the
Fifth Committee by Karl Th. Paschke, [USG for OIOS]," December 2, 1996. [UN Staff who had
been or were being "sold out" by Mr. Paschke even as he made this
statement were not impressed.] "The image of the UN
is disastrously bad not only for the public at large, but even among
diplomats or delegates to the U.N. who are in constant touch with the
Secretariat members. It is extremely bad among the few
reasonable and honest 'senior U.N. officers' who remain in the service of
the Organization. One of them told Maggie O'Kane, the
well-known investigative reporter (who has also won the 'Journalist of the
Year' award) that, 'This is the most corrupt organization I have ever
worked for; everybody is on the take.'" Houshang Ameri, Politics of staffing the United Nations Secretariat, Major Concepts in Politics and Political Theory, Vol. 8, Peter Lang, New York, 1996, p. 399. [Note: the concluding quote is from The Guardian (UK), August 26 1993.] "The General
Assembly, … Expressing deep
concern about the persistence of problems and defects observed by the
Board of Auditors in the financial administration and administration of
the United Nations, … 11. Notes with
deep concern the incidents of fraud and presumed fraud reported by the
Board of Auditors,; 12. Requests the
Secretary-General and the heads of the organizations concerned to take the
disciplinary measures necessary in cases of proven fraud and to enhance
the individual accountability of United Nations personnel, including
through stronger managerial control; 13. Requests the
Secretary-General to report [thereon] to the General Assembly …" "Financial reports and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors", General Assembly resolution 51/225 of 16 May 1997, paras. A.11 and 12. "UN employees -- who
request anonymity because they fear they will suffer more professional
harm than the corrupt officials they want to expose -- have provided
numerous accounts of officials' being transferred rather than dismissed
after being caught breaking the rules. This happens frequently in cases of sexual harassment,
nepotism, and occasionally violence, according to these accounts.
Whistle-blowers are neither encouraged nor rewarded." Barbara Crossette, "In war on corruption and waste, UN confronts well-entrenched foe", International Herald Tribune, 3 November 1997. "It is
… my observation that the
[Investigations Section] is increasingly seized with more and more complex
investigation matters, many of which are raised with us by programme
managers … This
year … major commitments to
investigate [such cases] were made by the Governments of Kenya and
Switzerland. There is also substantive and consistent commitment to [such
cases] by the concerned programme managers in … Geneva and Nairobi.
… These decisions by programme
managers to seek criminal prosecutions, in order to send a message
that criminal conduct can result in criminal prosecution … represent hard evidence of
the realization of the Secretary-General's determination to increase accountability as part
of his reform programme. " Comments by OIOS head
Karl Paschke, in "Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the
OIOS", UN document A/53/428, 23 September
1998,
Preface, para. 8, and para. 121.
"The Second UN Conference on Human Settlements
… is perhaps the crown jewel among the scandals
recorded by OIOS …
because of the all-round incompetence involved. The
'secretariat [hired] consultants at a total cost of $2.5 million without
… competitive bidding.' The [conference] Secretary-General
… incurred travel costs of $370,000 …' The Conference 'never submitted a cost
plan for the use of the $8.2 million in voluntary contributions
… [and] accounting for donor contributions was
incomplete …' OIOS does not
address …
how this situation developed and was allowed to continue. How was Mr.
N'dow picked to organize a major UN conference? What were his
credentials?
Why was nothing done when the first alarm bells went
off?" OIOS has investigated
several cases of fraud. One of which we have written before
involves an UNCTAD staff member (a United States citizen of Cuban origin)
who bilked the agency of over $600,000 by claiming travel and per diem
expenses for non-existent experts attending imaginary meetings. OIOS does not record the fact that this imaginative
individual was caught only because he was hospitalized for a time and
could not keep up the charade. This is surely material for a Hollywood
comedy." "Reviewing 3+ years
of work, [OIOS] sees continuing problems - but reforms are afoot," International Documents Review, 2 November 1988, pp. 1-4.
"One [OIOS
investigation of field operations] concerned a report alleging that … from
1992 to 1998,
two UNHCR staff members accepted kickbacks from vendors in exchange
for the disbursement of inflated payments and the procurement of excessive
quantities of rice seeds … and [that] … a false United Nations audit
report [thereon] … had been circulated to a local newspaper. [OIOS
determined]
that the investigation … did not substantiate the allegation of the
acceptance of kickbacks, … [and] the staff members accused [were
cleared.]
On the other hand, [OIOS established that] a purported United
Nations document was false and that it had been circulated to a newspaper
by a former UNHCR staff member mala fide. The Investigations
Section considers that [such a case] highlights a function of the Section
that is valuable, but often overlooked. Through its recommendation to clear
staff members, the Investigations Section affords protection to those
individuals who have been either wrongly accused or against whom
sufficient evidence does not exist." "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services" A/54/393 of 23 September 1999, paras.
56-57.
[Note: the concern
for managers' rights expressed here is impressive, but in this case the
other party was a UN auditor, who was fired. There appears
never to have been a
corresponding OIOS reporting an instance in which it upheld a
whistleblower, and sanctioned the manager involved.
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