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Archive Introduction


UN Performance Problems

UN Management Accountability Struggles


Where is the Rule of Law?

Inadequate UN Oversight

Recent Developments

 
  

 

 


Corruption in the UN        

                                                                                                                             

 

Introductory quotes



         "The WHO [World Health Organization] like all United Nations agencies, specializes in the production of pious verbiage, which skilfully combines highmindedness with the self-interest of its staff
… the fact is that agencies such as WHO are inherently corrupt and corrupting, regardless of who directs them.

This is not to say that the WHO does no good work at all … or that it does not have sincere and competent staff in its lower echelons.  But at its higher levels politicking and jockeying for position overwhelm any lingering concern for the health of the world's population. ….

The WHO hires not by competence but by allocation of jobs among member nations.  This not only amounts to positive discrimination in favour of the incompetent but ensures that political skills matter more than technical capacity.

I once worked in a small tropical country where the WHO representative, though personable, was the most incompetent man … I have ever encountered.   He [never visited the country's only hospital] … in his two and a half years there.  When he was finally removed from the country, it was by promotion to the regional headquarters."

Anthony Daniels, The Sunday Telegraph (UK), 25 April 1993.  

Note: The WHO and other UN system specialized agencies do indeed have such performance difficulties, but people who know the system's flaws would say the above situation and incidents are most grievous in the United Nations Secretariat itself.                                                                                   

                                                               

 

               

"Another week, another UN scandal ….

Why are scandals so frequent in [global] institutions …. ?  What ….  makes them so vulnerable to corruption, inefficiency, and  …. personal aggrandisement? ….

The first problem is leadership.  Leaders are selected by an inefficient and labyrinthine process from a pool of poor quality talent. ….

Second, the waste and inefficiency can only be reduced if they are visible to public opinion. …. [but] international institutions [lack] …. accountability ….

The third problem is the weakness of a law-governed culture. ….

 ….  The UN Charter [Article 100] focuses on the Secretary-General and staff as …. international officials accountable only to the Organization.….

Here, rooted in idealism, lie the clues in what can go wrong.  All too often the heads of UN agencies signaled their autonomy through grandeur ….

 …. The agency's task …. became subordinate to old bureaucratic instincts of self-perpetuation and resistance to outside scrutiny. ….

Sir Brian Urquhart has [suggested that] no secretary-general should serve more than one term in office.

Extended throughout the [UN system, this] …. would remove electioneering and diminish the incentive to patronage.  It may not be much, but it would be a start."

"Perri 6 and Michael Sheridan, "A world order of scandal and graft:  What is it about international agencies that invites corruption ….", The Independent (UK), May 11, 1995.                                                                 

 

 

 

"What should be done to prevent corruption in international agencies?  Here's a list of [some] key measures:

?         Impose a limit of one term on chief executives of all international agencies.

?         Give auditors power to requisition any information they believe they need.

?         Require the public registration of all the private interests of international diplomats, UN agency chief executives and senior managers. …

The most important problem is the lack of a global public opinion before which international agencies may stand accountable.  Part of the way forward may be for the national parliaments of the world's leading nations to set up scrutiny committees to review the work of all the international institutions of governance.  Just as the EU has been kept, in some measure, on its toes by the European legislation committees of the national parliaments, so global bodies could be made subject to some measure of national political discipline.

Until the international 'great and the good' feel that they are being closely watched by a lively political community, they will be tempted to take advantage of our lack of vigilance."

Perri 6, "How to win global war against corruption," The Independent (UK), May 11, 1995.                                               

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chronological quotes

 

 

"It is my belief that each member of the UN is responsible for what the Organization is, how it defines its mission, and how it carries it out. …. 

Too often, we remain silent when bosses or superiors take actions which may be contrary to the purposes and spirit of the [UN] Charter  --  or don't make sense in terms of good management.   …. [in public institutions], the managers are not less accountable to the public than are the employees ….  Because we are paid from public funds, we all share in the responsibility of ensuring an effective Organization. …. Hence, very plainly the future of the UN is in our hands, yours and mine.  We cannot put the burden on those above us, except to demand from them the kind of leadership required by the Charter and able performance of the duties for which the world public pays them."

Lowell Flanders, "The future of the UN …. In whose hands?", [President of the Staff Union], address at a preparatory meeting of the United Nations Community Forum,  Secretariat News (NY), April 16, 1979, pp. 10-11.    
                                                                                          

 

 

"The United Nations staff union has called for an independent investigation into allegations of corruption and maladministration in UN internal affairs.

Longstanding discontent among the 2,700 professional staff at the New York headquarters burst into the open when a senior UN official was allowed to resign quietly although serious allegations had been made about his financial affairs and staff appointments.

 … Staff morale is low.  Most staff members indulge in place-seeking and status preferment rather than the original spirit of dedication to UN principles.  Finding jobs for one's own group, or for those sharing ideologies, is a major pre-occupation."

Colin Legum, "UN staff call for corruption probe", The Observer (UK), November 2, 1980                                             

 

 

 

"There have recently been widespread rumours of corruption in the Secretariat, alleging misuse of official position for personal gain.  No evidence has been presented to substantiate the rumours … If they are left unverified, however, … such rumours cannot fail to [damage] the good name of the Secretariat.  The Secretary-General has decided that action should be taken … and has accordingly ordered an inquiry by a [two-member] panel ….  Any staff member [with relevant information] should approach the panel … with such information, which will be held in strictest confidence."

"Inquiry into rumours of corruption in the Secretariat", UN Information Circular ST/IC/80/33 of 13 November 1980.

Note: This circular clearly responded to the above staff union initiative.  This particular episode seems to have, eventually and quietly, disappeared, probably because of staff mustrust in "approaching the panel".]

                                                                                   

 

 

"The Administration has recently  dealt with a number of  cases of alleged fraud relating to taxes and education grants within the Secretariat.  In the process, different administrative actions have been undertaken … [including] summary dismissal, referral of cases to the Joint Disciplinary Committee, resignation and recovery of overpayment.

·                     What are the criteria according to which summary dismissal -- the hardest penalty -- has been meted out to some, but not to others?

·                     Under what circumstances it is decided that a case should be submitted to the [JDC]?

·                     What are the circumstances under which the Administration accepts the resignation of staff involved?

·                     By what criteria is it decided that only the recovery of the overpayment should be made?

We are concerned that the established judicial procedures which are intended to guarantee staff a minimum of due process should not be undermined. … There is a need to explain to the staff the circumstances governing the choice of measures being invoked.  In cases that are similar, justice will require that staff are not only equitably treated but that they are seen to be equitably treated."

From a "Group of concerned staff", "Fraud and due process," Secretariat News (NY), 16 July 1986, p. 2.                                       

 

 

 

"In a year when U.N. spending is under unusually close scrutiny, Yukio Takasu of Japan said there is a problem when administrations spend money freely … and the role of member states is limited to considering and approving budgets.

Takasu said there were significant cases of fraud or presumptive fraud and unless [the Administration] offered a full explanation of the problem and cited measures taken to deal with it, member states were bound to feel less confident in [UN management].

[The Administration's written reply stated that] …. comprehensive audits  uncovered relatively few cases of misappropriation of UN funds and in those cases disciplinary measures were taken.

From 1984 [to late 1986 it had identified] 35 possible fraud cases involving education grants … [in] amounts ranging from $187 to $31,600. 

Turning to charges that some staff cheated on their [US] tax returns, [the reply said that 19 such cases had been processed]  An audit in progress identified … 12 possible future cases ….

[The Secretariat reply] emphasized that it initiated a comprehensive audit, … promptly took action to recover misappropriated funds [and] … disciplinary measures … and improve procedures to detect past fraud and deter future fraud."

"U.N. management challenged, defended", UN Special (Geneva) [excerpted from Diplomatic World Bulletin, N.Y.], October 1986, p. 13.

                                                                                               

 

 

"Typical …. of the U.N.'s stubborn resistance to reform was the response to the [Group of 18 report's] suggestion that the Secretary-General would get more reliable data if the U.N.s [internal audit unit were made independent, rather than being a subordinate unit of the UN's management division].  To this sensible recommendation, the [head of Administration] …. said that 'it is indeed theoretically possible for the Internal Audit Service to report directly to the Secretary-General.  The advisability of this move would have to be seen in relation to other factors, such as whether the already heavy schedule of the Secretary-General should be burdened by further direct supervisory responsibilities.'"

"The United Nations continues to duck needed reforms", The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder, No. 593, Washington, D.C., July 9, l987, p. 6.

                                                                                               

 

 

"To continue with the charade [of official development assistance] seems to me to be absurd.  Garnered and justified in the name of the destitute and the vulnerable, aid's main function in the past half-century has been to create and then entrench a powerful new class of rich and privileged people.  In that notorious club of parasites and hangers-on made up of the United Nations, the World Bank and the bilateral agencies, it is aid -- and nothing else -- that has provided hundreds of thousands of 'jobs for the boys' and that has permitted record-breaking standards to be set in self-serving behavior, arrogance, paternalism, moral cowardice and mendacity.  At the same time, in the developing countries, aid has perpetuated the rule of incompetent and venal men whose leadership would otherwise be utterly non-viable; it has allowed governments characterized by historic ignorance, avarice and irresponsibility to thrive; and, last but not least, it has condoned -- and in some cases facilitated -- the most consistent and grievous violations of human rights that have occurred anywhere in the world since the dark ages.

 … the time has come for the lords of poverty to depart."

Graham Hancock, Lords of poverty: The freewheeling lifestyles, power, prestige, and corruption of the multi-billion dollar aid business, Macmillan, London, 1989, pp 192- 193.                           

 

 

 

"[Two years after the United Nations launched a drive .. to raise funds for clearing land mines inside Afghanistan, a UN official has charged that money, including about $10 million donated by the U.S. government, is being wasted.

Rae McGrath, a land mines specialist who spent 18 years in the British army before joining the UN … program as its field supervisor, said that the United Nations had grossly exaggerated the impact of its program, in part to raise money …

He added that large sums had been wasted on poorly planned and badly monitored educational programs for refugees.  "We're not running a mine eradication program, which is what the donors are giving the money for and what needs to be done" Mr. McGrath said. 

After a dispute with his superiors …  [he] is leaving the United Nations.  Others associated with the program … said they agreed with the thrust of Mr. McGrath's criticisms.  In its solicitations for funds, the United Nations says it has trained 20,000 Afghans in mine awareness and mine clearance.  But it has sent only one team of 27 into Afghanistan to clear mines."

Steve Coll, "Afghan funds wasted, UN official says", Washington Post Service, International Herald Tribune, 22 March 1990.

                                                                                                           

 

 

"The images are familiar: blue-bereted U.N. peace keepers … humanitarian relief workers fighting poverty and hunger …

But behind these images lies an enormous, largely uncontrolled bureaucracy, subject to abuses and deficiencies that impair its effectiveness, a nine-month study by The Washington Post has found. ….

 … U.N. food aid and other resources have been pilfered with impunity by governments and armies for years.

Peace-keeping operations, some of which drag on for decades, have become a source of soaring costs with minimal oversight. …

…  voluminous yearbooks [are] published years out of date and esoteric technical studies … go largely ignored.

… top officials operate with few checks and balances in the absence of [U.N. management] standards  The system currently has no inspector general, and a Joint Inspection Unit in Geneva is made up mostly of retired diplomats. …

The United Nations, its internal critics say, has been self-protecting and self-perpetuating, rather than self-policing.  . …

[the executive director of the human rights group Africa Watch says] "There's a hell of a lot of shocking things going on … I think there's a great deal of incompetence, there's a lot of corruption, and there's no accountability."

William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, September 20, 1992, pp. 1-2.

                                                           

 

 

" … [The UN programs which eat] up the great bulk of U.N. resources … the economic, social and humanitarian programs aimed at development, emergency relief and 'better standards of life' around the world … [get little scrutiny.] …

Clearly, the United Nations employs many hard-working and idealistic people.  [but]  … Parts of the system are overstaffed and lethargic, while others, particularly field offices in unpleasant places, are overstaffed and overworked. …

Local employees tend to bear the brunt of disciplinary action … when fraud or abuse are discovered … while erring international professional staffers often survive and even advance in the organization.  At the same time, U.N. employees who complain about irregularities [lose promotions or must transfer elsewhere.]

It is a system that tends to cover up its abuses and discourage whistle-blowers. …

A European U.N. official, who recently left his agency in frustration, [said] 'A certain enabling environment … allows {fraud} to happen.  The question is not whether you do it or not, but whether you're stupid enough to be caught."

"Basically, there's a lack of determination to combat the sleaze factor' he said.  'In an environment where mediocrity has a strong self-protective interest, these things flourish.'"

William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, September 20, 1992, pp. 3-4.

                                                                       

 

 

"UN officials who advocate a cleanup … say that management by … top officials has been inept and, occasionally, corrupt. 'There is no [regular] supervision of any agency' …  said [a senior official.]  Governing councils … are 'basically rubber-stamp bodies.'

The U. N. Board of Auditors … cites numerous [problems] and 'weak internal controls' … during 1990 and 1991 … [in a] 136-page report that enumerates irregularities or deficiencies in hiring, cash and property management, internal audits and purchases of everything from project equipment to airline tickets. …

Many anomalies [that they report] 'appear to be recurring' and point to a 'lack of determination to enforce regulations and rules and make the heads of units of the organization accountable,' the report says.

A recent confidential internal paper circulating in the U. N. Development Program … put the problem more bluntly.  Citing 'a deplorable vacuum of basic ethics' in the system, it noted widespread criticism of 'prolific structures, pompous-Byzantine attitudes of ranking officials, operational inefficiency and … gross mismanagement of financial and personnel resources.'

The 10-page paper listed a dozen cases of corruption involving the development agency's staffers or programs that totaled millions of dollars in pilfered funds."

William Branigin, "The U.N. empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, September 20, 1992, p 4.

                                   

 

 

"[Concerning allegations of corruption at UNHCR in articles in the Washington Post in September 1992] with respect to discipline in UNHCR, a courageous staff member in Angola immediately brought the Boubakar wrongdoing to my attention.  The case was airtight, and U.N. headquarters found it impossible to avoid our recommendation for dismissal.

In the more complicated Lukika case in Uganda, UNHCR's recommendation for dismissal was equally strong.  The Secretary-General's office rejected it (on grounds that the United Nations lacks precedents in firing for incompetence) and forced UNHCR to take Lukika back.  Threats and intimidation in no way dampened our efforts in UNHCR to deal with corruption and incompetence. ….  The Secretary-General at the time just did not support us.  Ensuing troubles with Lukika after headquarters directed that he stay in UNHCR should surprise no one."

Arthur E. Dewey, "No laxity", UN Special (Geneva), November, 1992, p. 31.

[emphasis added] 

[Note: Mr. Dewey was deputy high commissioner of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from 1986-1990.]           

                                                           

 

 

"The United Nations presently is almost totally lacking in effective means to deal with fraud, waste and abuse by staff members [as] … recently highlighted in … the news media.

 … The chronically fragmented and inadequate …[UN internal oversight structure] is currently so ineffective that, time and again, we have been called on to create ad hoc teams to carry out investigations of serious wrongdoing.  The delay [in organizing] … these teams often allows the trail to 'grow cold" [and] … deprives the investigation of the vitality …  professionalism and impartiality [of] … more regularized procedures.

 … I believe that few of the reports [presently] … produced will be taken seriously by the auditees until the 'muscle' of your office is placed firmly behind a consolidated effort carried out by a strong Inspector General's office.'

As noted in the Volcker-Ogata report, 'support for improved financing will be dependent upon a perception that funds are economically managed and effectively spent.'  …  [so that] all Member States [can reassure] … their taxpayers, the ultimate supporters of all United Nations activity.

This reassurance can only come … from the prompt and effective activation of a strong Inspector General's office …"

Dick Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations", 1 March 1993, pages 29-31.

 

 

 

"With the vast increase in United Nations activities and expenditures resulting from the organization's newfound status as a global 911 emergency number, its capacity for ensuring the integrity of its operations is more important than ever.

The recent report by the UN Financing Advisory Group, led by Paul Volcker and Shijuro Ogata, noted specifically that 'support for improved financing will be dependent upon a perception that funds are economically managed and effectively spent.' 

Unfortunately, the mechanisms in place to promote such a perception … are creaking leftovers from more placid times. ….

What is needed is an Office of Inspector General, staffed to audit, investigate and lay the basis for remedial action in serious cases of conflict of interest, misappropriation of funds or other corrupt practices.

The inspector general's office is the centerpiece of [the] agenda for reform [that I presented to Secretary-General Butros Butros-Ghali upon completion of my one-year assignment at the United Nations."

Dick Thornburgh, "How to clean up the United Nations", International Herald Tribune, March 26, 1993.                       [emphasis added]

[Note: Mr. Thornburgh was United Nations undersecretary-general for administration and management]       

 

 

 

"The United Nations is losing an estimated £270 m. each year because of corruption, waste and mismanagement …. 

While the organization appeals for  tens of millions of pounds in voluntary donations, senior U.N. officials enjoy perks and career expectations .. unthinkable to most employees in the private sector.

Among the abuses at the U.N., Insight has discovered:

            --  Thirty-nine of the U.N.'s top officials … are being kept on the payroll despite being unemployed.  Dubbed "desk warmers", some sit at home doing nothing on salaries of up to £100,000 a year.

            --   Millions of pounds are paid out to "double dippers", retired U.N. officials who are paid lucrative consultancy fees on top of their generous pensions.

            --   A U.N. internal report [by former UN top manager Richard Thornburgh] was suppressed and later shredded.  He said 'there are a number of senior people who have positions and no assignment and yet there is no capability to terminate these people's jobs." …

Insight's three-month investigation has drawn on thousands of pages of U.N. internal reports, and interviews with more than 20 top U.N. officials in New York, Geneva, and London." 

Nick Rufford, Ian Burrell and David Leppard, "Scandal of U.N. 'lost' millions", The Sunday Times, 15 August 1993, as excerpted in UN Special (Geneva),  October 1993, pp. 20, 22, 27.

                                                                                                           

 

 

"… In early July, eight members of the U.N. procurement office [in New York were suspended following allegations of irregularities in the procurement of goods and services for UN peacekeeping operations]  ….

So why did the U.N. hierarchy suspend the eight staff members?  …  leaks came to the ears of Mike Wallace of '60 minutes', who has been terrorizing senior U.N. officials by, well, asking them questions …

[Colleagues say] … the suspended and humiliated staff have despaired of getting a fair hearing.  [They made many judgment calls about bidder [performance capabilities], but they were  … responsible for [everything needed by] the 14 U.N. peacekeeping operations and their 87,000 personnel … [and]  worked 12 hours a day and weekends [under extreme pressure], which has redoubled their resentment at the shabby treatment they have suffered.

By contrast, the eight's boss …, who signed many of the documents in question, received a similar job he wanted in Geneva, while no action was taken against the senior officials on the contracts committee who are supposed to approve all deals.

A [staff member] explained '… the unique hierarchical structure of the U.N. which leaves all decisions to the underlings.  When everything works, they take the credit.  When it goes wrong, they wash their hands of it.'   

At the U.N., the presumption of innocence ought to be enhanced, if only because all too often the guilty there are promoted, not punished."

Ian Williams, "Free the U.N. eight!  Travelgate on First Ave.", The New York Observer,  September 13, 1993, pp. 1, 10.

[Note: In 1997 the UN Administrative Tribunal completely exonerated the  eight staff members charged , with blunt criticism of the UN's lack of due process and apparent knuckling under to outside political pressure.  The eight received $20,000 each in damages, but barely an apology, and the investigation and appeal case cost the UN millions of dollars.  Apparently, no hint of a reprimand was given to the senior officials who decided to prosecute.

                "Skylink case closed", UN Staff Report, March 1997, p. 14.]    
                                                   

 

 

"UN budgeting is haphazard, wasteful habits are scandalous and corruption is slackly checked.  At the least, a vigilant inspector general needs to be named.  As a recent '60 minutes' programme documents, offenders are rarely fired and never prosecuted.  Granted, by the standards of many members UN malfeasance is small change.  If the United Nations is to gain the world's confidence, however, it has to set a better example."

"About peacekeeping", a New York Times editorial, in the International Herald Tribune, September, 1993.                                    

                                                                                                               

 

 

"The United Nations is not exempt from [worldwide] … waste, fraud, abuse and corruption problems … UN [audit officials] acknowledged that investigations of complaints of violations are neither centralized or organized.  …

The only firm data … come from personal grievances and managerial disciplinary actions appealed to [OHRM] … [they] show a very disturbing recent increase in … mismanagement and fraud cases as field operations have rapidly expanded worldwide:

 

                                                                                First half of        

                                              1990      1991    1992      1993

 

Total new cases referred                         28         30         40         70

subtotal: mismanagement/fraud               15         17         13         45

leading to: dismissal of staff                      2         4            4           1

                appropriate action                    8         10           4           3

                lack of evidence                       4          2            5         29

                other                           1          1            1         13        
                

The biennial reports by the Board of Auditors include some information … [but] cover only the 1986-1991 period, [and thus] … do not reflect fraud problems [from the vast] … expansion of [UN] operational activities.  Meanwhile, partial [internal audit] statistics on recovery against fraud, which is the responsibility of the managers concerned, show serious problems.  Between 1988 and mid-1993, the internal auditors recommended $3,500,000 for recovery, but only $85,000, a mere 2 percent of the total, had actually been recovered."

Joint Inspection Unit, "Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN document  A/48/420,  1993, p. 14.    [emphasis added]   

                                                               

 

 

 "The General Assembly,

III. … Determined to address alleged cases of fraud in the United Nations in an impartial manner, in accordance with due process of law and full respect for the rights of each individual concerned, especially the rights of defense …

2.  Also decides to this end to establish an ad hoc … working group of experts … to report to the General Assembly [in 1994] … on the possibilities of new [or] improved jurisdictional and procedural mechanisms."

"Review of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations", General Assembly resolution 48/218 A, 23 December 1993, sections  II. And III.      [emphasis added]                

                               

 

 

"RECENT CASES OF MAJOR FRAUD

UNHCR

[In August 1993] The former UNHCR Special Representative to Uganda and Djibouti … was forced to resign after … the auditors found more than £2 million in losses from his relief operations: 'food aid worth £250 000 disappeared from a warehouse on orders bearing his signature. … more than £ 300 000 of UN vehicles were sold or given away. … After his transfer to Djibouti, a further £450 000 in UN funds went missing, apparently paid to companies that did not exist.  On his forced resignation, Mr. L. was denied his severance pay but allowed to keep his pension.  The [Sunday Times] alleges tht Mr. L. had 'powerful friends in the UN's Africa hierarchy' and that the UN tried to cover up this scandal.

If the Sunday Times allegations are correct, why was Mr. L. not summarily dismissed following the UNHCR financial losses caused by his mismanagement?  Why was he allowed to be transferred to another assignment, and then, why was he allowed to resign instead of being summarily dismissed?  If the newspaper's allegations are false, why did the UN not reply to them publicly?"

Corruption problems in 1993, as discussed in Yves Beigbeder, The internal management of United Nations Organizations: The Long Quest for Reform,  Macmillan, London and St. Martins, New York, 1997, Chapter 7, "The extent of fraud and losses,"  pp. 106-107.

 

 

 

"Betrug und Mismanagement, Schόtzlingswirtshaft and bόrokratischer Wildwuchs verschlingen jδhrlich Millionen und bringen die Uno in Finanznot.  Kommt nicht bald neues Geld in die Kassen, steht die Welt-organization vor der Pleite.  Dabei kφnnte Generalsekretar Butros Butros Ghali im eigenen Haus mδchtig sparen."

[ informal translation: "Fraud and mismanagement, nepotism and bureaucratic wilderness swallow up millions a year and lead the UN into financial emergency.  If new funds don’t arrive in the cashbox, the world organization is approaching bankruptcy.  The Secretary-General, however, could save a lot in his own house."]

"Vereinte Nationen: Die korrupte Weltmacht", [UN: The corrupt world power"],  Der Speigel, Germany,  4/1994, January 24, 1994, pp. 124-136 .

                                                                       

 

 

"The effectiveness of an oversight office depends to a large extent on how senior officers perceive their roles.  The concept of management accountability in the United Nations has not been consistently applied. … no system of accountability will be effective without the assurance that sanctions will be promptly applied when violations occur.  I strongly recommend that any new system of accountability and responsibility include specific penalties or sanctions for United Nations managers and other staff who disregard United Nations regulations and rules or who are negligent in the conduct of their duties and responsibilities. …

During this first year, [the new office] has addressed symptoms but has not yet been able to address the root causes of many [UN] problems. I refer to such  issues as recruitment and promotion policies, the administration of justice, management reporting systems, staffing and financing of peacekeeping operations and contract management.

A vast amount of work remains to be done before the United Nations has management structures and a management culture adequate to the great tasks entrusted to it…. "   

Mohamed Aly Niazi, transitional head of the new UN oversight office, in the introduction to "Report of the Office of Inspections and Investigations", UN document A/49/449, 28 September 1994, pages 5-6.

 

 

 

" … permit me to tell you briefly my basic philosophy for the fulfillment of my duties … in general and for the OIOS [Office of Internal Oversight Services] in particular.

First of all, I do not consider myself an antagonistic type of person.  … I believe in consensus-seeking. … Results are better achieved thorough dialogue and quiet reasoning, in an atmosphere of mutual trust.

 … above all, I see myself as an adviser to the Secretary-General and to senior officials, and as a counsel to line managers and to the Organization as a whole, for better management.

 … My approach will not be primarily that of a critic.  OIOS … should offer assistance to managers in implementing our recommendations … [and] to give … advice on putting into practice the measures we propose.

 … I understand that the primary responsibility for programme implementation rests with programme managers.  The role of OIOS is to ensure that adequate systems for monitoring are in place in each department and office. … I hope to encourage greater concern by managers throughout the United Nations with the results of their activities …"

"Statement by Karl Th. Paschke [first head of the new OIOS] … to the Fifth Committee," 5 December 1994, pp. 4-5,  7-8.     [emphasis added]

                                                               

 

 

"As part of the investigation function, we now have procedures for receiving confidential information … I will guarantee complete confidentiality to all those who wish to provide us with information on problems. … Having said this I must add immediately that I am not comfortable with receiving anonymous messages, and will certainly do nothing to encourage this practice. In any case, this should be seen as a system of last resort.  The first, and by far the most important way, for staff to voice complaints and make suggestions must be to and through their immediate supervisors.

When I was told I would have to take anonymous tips into account in my new job I was reminded of … Hamlet,… who was given a suggestion by a ghost … [and] then proceeded to procrastinate.  He was a rational man and had his doubts about acting on the advice of ghosts.  I hope I am not put in a similar situation myself too often."

"Statement by Karl Th. Paschke … to the Fifth Committee," 5 December 1994, pp. 11-12 .

                               

 

 

"Karl T. Paschke's introductory remarks to the Fifth Committee reveal a man curiously laid-back for a job that requires cracking down on waste, abuse, and corruption.  Could it be that Paschke is finessing?

True, coming on like gangbusters would have been a mistake, given the well-known misgivings in the higher echelons of the Secretariat about the whole enterprise.  So Paschke went out of his way to acknowledge that Butros Boutros-Ghali still is boss in the house, although his emphasis on his own role as 'adviser' may have been a bit exaggerated. …

Paschke does not invite anonymous tips and would prefer that staffers go through their immediate supervisors with complaints.  If meant seriously, that's perhaps a little naοve.  Supervisors like to have a tidy shop and who among them would look kindly on a subordinate whistleblower.  As long as guarantees of confidentiality can be maintained, far better … [that staff] pass it along through the dedicated telephone line …"

"Diplomatic pouch" by Petronius, Diplomatic World Bulletin  (NY),   December 12, 1994. 

 

 

 

" … the bulk [of financial abuses] usually occurs … in emergency operations where cash or supplies are being moved … [urgently], or where contracts must be issued under great pressure.  Given the appalling under-staffing of peacekeeping operatio