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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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"The United
Nations has been hit by an unprecedented wave of fraud, waste and
corruption. Officials at its
antifraud investigation unit say they are expecting to have to run more
than 350 inquiries by the end of the year -- nearly twice the total for
1998, and a 50 per cent increase on last year. Thousands of staff, contractors,
and consultants have been interviewed in scores of countries.
The revelations
will embarrass Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, who is to welcome
national leaders
to the 'Millenium Summit' in New York next
week.
Annan is hoping to convince
skeptical heads of state that the UN has provided value for money and that
its role should be expanded.
One senior
investigator said last week that the UN investigations unit's workload was
greater than ever. "We are seeing more and more frauds and abuses of
authority.
The OIOS's
annual report, due out next month, will reveal cases of sloppy management,
lax enforcement, harassment and outright criminality.
OIOS is
working with dozens of international police forces -- including Scotland Yard -- on
inquiries into the activities of UN
personnel." Jason Burke, et. al., "UN rocked by
flood of fraud cases: Officials were 'addicted to luxury," The Observer
International (UK), September 3,
2000. [Note: Mr. Annan may or may not have been
embarrassed, but in any event the public reporting of UN anti-corruption
activities and findings has been vastly more subdued ever since, as
discussed in the following sections of this website]
"A former
[senior official of the UN Commission for Human Rights, Alan Parra], told The Observer that the UN has
'an absurd and unaccountable system of abuse, embezzlement and
ineptitude.' [He said] 'It's
very difficult to dig out and punish abuse in an organization where it is
the norm. Of each dollar
spent by the United Nations only an infinitesimal amount gets anywhere
near the project on the ground' .
Last week Parra
described a series of cases that included: assistants to a senior official
based in another country not realizing for more than a year that their
superior had died; an official report on the human rights situation in
Czechoslovakia, written by an overworked official by 'cutting and pasting'
a report from Columbia. 'It told us all
about guerillas and narco-traffickers. The words 'Czech Republic' had
just been pasted in,' Parra said. He also criticized 'an addiction
to perks and luxury.' When
one UN official in Rwanda had wanted to interview the Canadian general in
charge of peacekeeping forces there he had been told to arrange an
itinerary with stays on the way out and back in Brussels, Paris and
Geneva, Parra claimed." Jason Burke, et. al., "UN rocked by
flood of fraud cases: Officials were 'addicted to luxury," The Observer
International (UK), September 3,
2000. Note: any such interviews with OIOS staff and
dynamic results with criminal cases (see following item) seem to have come
to an abrupt end since the 2000 report, as OIOS information on its
investigation work has become very low-key and vague.]
"The [OIOS] Investigations Section investigated 38 cases which were
presented for administrative or disciplinary action: 22 of those cases
were recommended for criminal prosecution by national law enforcement
authorities." "Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the OIOS", UN document A/55/436 of 2 October 2000, para. 156.
"
As is the
obligation of all the offices in the UN which are charged with
responsibility for conducting any investigative activity, whether ongoing
or ad hoc *, the Investigations Section operates in conformity with
established United Nations regulations, rules and administrative
instructions. _______________ * For example,
investigations are conducted by, among others, programme managers, by
boards of inquiry
by joint disciplinary committees, none of
which have published their own formal procedures, although they,
too operate within
the [UN
regulations and rules.]" Introductory comments on
investigations in the UN Secretariat by OIOS, in "Rules and procedures to be
applied for the investigation functions performed by the OIOS
: Report of the
Secretary-General", UN document A/55/469 of 11October 2000, Summary
excerpt and related note, p.
1. [emphasis
added] "There are several United
Nations. There is the
international body of nations which does so many tasks -- from vaccinating
children to distributing food
-- with considerable
success.
Another United Nations, perhaps
the most intractable, was made up of the vast and largely autonomous
baronies constituted by the various agencies which carry out the UN's
development and relief work.
Undoubtedly they contained time servers, like the central
secretariat itself
because of the quotas insisted upon by
governments. Moreover, the
agencies guarded their sovereignty as fiercely as any member state and
fought any attempts to diminish their autonomy through coordination. Directors would not hesitate to
call upon their own national governments to fight any attempt by the
secretary-general to dismiss incompetent senior staff or to rationalize
their cost.
" William Shawcross,
Deliver us from evil: Peacekeepers, warlords, and a world of endless
conflict, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2000, p.
227.
"[Mr. Nair] noted
[OIOS] strong criticism of the management of the UN Office for Drug
Control and Crime Prevention in Vienna, which was investigated [in the
spring of 2001] after allegations of fraud and mismanagement. Last month, the United Nations
announced that Pino Arlacchi, who heads the office will leave his post in
mid-2002.
In northwest Somalia,
investigators said allegations of corruption and mismanagement were
unfounded, but the audit discovered that a senior U.N. officer had not
strictly adhered to U.N. rules.
The [OIOS] recommended that he should be held strictly accountable
for approximately $50,000 in losses as a result of his
actions." Edith M. Lederer,
"UN watchdog agency suggests savings," Associated Press, October 24,
2001. [Note: This
juxtaposition of OIOS "watchdog" actions is very interesting: a top UN
manager who was caught in flagrante and very publicly, but was punished only by eventual
non-renewal of his contract, while a lesser official was severely
sanctioned because he had "not strictly adhered to" UN
rules]
"An independent panel
investigating the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad
said today that the UN's security systems were 'dysfunctional'
What procedures were in place in
Baghdad when the 19 August attack took 22 lives were 'sloppy' in
observance, and non-compliance with regulations was 'commonplace,'
according to the report of the panel led by Martti Ahtisaari, a former
president of Finland [and also a former UN Under-Secretary-General for
management].
'The main conclusion
is that the
current security management system is dysfunctional. It provides little guarantee of
security to UN staff in Iraq or other high-risk environments and needs to
be reformed,' the panel said. The panel labelled as a major
deficiency a 'lack of accountability for the decisions and positions taken
by UN managers with regard to the security of UN
staff.' 'The United Nations', it said,
'needs a new culture of accountability in security management.'
In his briefing, Mr. Ahtisaari
said
"We need a much more professional approach, a professional staff
'" "Iraqi
bombing panel finds UN security systems dysfunctional, in need of reform,"
UN News service, 22 October 2003. "Samuel Gonzαles-Ruiz, a top
adviser on organized crime at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has
accused management of turning a blind eye to 'a pattern of
misappropriation of funds' and 'clear acts of corruption and mismanagement
by staff,' the FT has learned.
In his letter of resignation
he
wrote: 'One can observe a pattern of irregularities in the issuing of
contracts, petty corruption, and abuses of administrative discretion
commited by staff with managerial responsibilities over projects and
programs within my working domain.' Mr. Gonzαlez-Ruiz, a former head
of Mexico's anti-mafia unit who gained an international reputation for
taking on the country's drug cartels, charged that management took no
action to investigate cases of internal corruption by staff, even after
they were provided with detailed evidence. He also said in his letter that
whistleblowers within the agency were routinely punished and that corrupt
officials enjoyed 'active and/or passive protection from top
management.' Thomas
Catύn, "Adviser quits over 'corruption' at UN agency," Financial
Times, FT.com, November 2, 2003.
[Note: The Baghdad bombing and UN crime office resignation incidents, whistle-blower suppression, and oil-for-food programme scandals are discussed further in the Recent Developments section of this website under the Other Scandals subsection.] "I hope to provide an 'inside
story' which will allow the public to peer behind the facade
This is
sorely needed because the UN's culture of 'self-justification' and
'self-exoneration' has disseminated so much propaganda about 'the
accomplishments' of the system and how 'doomed' the world would be without
it, that it has become extremely difficult for many people to see the
organizations for what they are.
This can only be done by dispelling a number of myths
Taxpayers and governments should
no longer be duped into financing these institutions in their present
form. They should only pay if
these organizations become streamlined, efficient institutions, devoted to
serving the international community; not corrupt, inefficient,
disreputable bodies staffed mostly by deadwood incompetents living in
grand style. There are in fact a number of U.N.
employees who, in one whole year, do not write one sentence for the
Organization or spend one single hour working for it in any way, yet
receive unbelievable salaries at the end of each month. Such a situation does not exist
anywhere else in the world, not even in the bureaucracies of the least
developed countries." Houshang Ameri, Fraud, waste and abuse: Aspects of U.N. management and personnel policies, University Press of America, Lanham, MD (USA), June 2003, pp. viii-ix. "The [United Nations is] suffering
from two self-inflicted wounds ,,, a kickback scandal of multi-billion
dollar proportions swirling around the UN-run oil-for-food program [in
Iraq]. The other is
that
oversights in UN security management may have worsened the toll in last
August's terrorist bombing of the Baghdad headquarters. Urgent steps, including high-level
demotions and dismissals, are already underway to address the security
failures. Ferreting out the
murky details of the financial scandal, and meting out appropriate
punishments, is no less urgent.
UN officials clearly failed to
supervise effectively the roughly $10 billion a year in transactions and
may have been involved in illicit deals.
Now there is finally some political will to
investigate, and details of the corruption are emerging
The investigators must put aside
diplomatic niceties and concentrate on cleansing the UN's
reputation." "Clean
up the UN," International Herald Tribune, April 8,
2004.
For months, [US presidential
candidate John Kerry] has advocated broader international oversight [in
Iraq] that might open the door to additional peacekeeping contributions
and generate some real support for nation-building there. Now he has begun
to elaborate on how that oversight should be structured, drawing sensible
lessons from successes and failures of the recent past.
Kerry recognizes that the United
Nations cannot offer any magic bullet solutions for Iraq, and that working
with the UN Secretary general, Kofi Annan, and his special representative
Lakhdar Brahimi, cannot be a substitute for broad cooperation with all the
major powers represented in the Security Council.
Kerry also proposes
designating an international high commissioner for Iraq whose office would
be outside the barely functional, patronage-driven UN personnel
system. That would permit the
recruitment of a capable staff and create some safeguards against the kind
of wholesale corruption that is alleged to have vitiated the UN's
oil-for-food program in Iraq. Kerry's ideas
would be extremely
hard to carry out now
but they at least reflect a realistic view of what
the United Nations -- and the United States -- can and cannot
do. "Kerry's vision for Iraq," International Herald Tribune,
May 7, 2004
"A new
survey of
[UN integrity
perceptions] has found that
while structures for reporting and combating corruption exist, most staff
members are either unaware of how to use them or afraid to do so for fear of high-level
retaliation. 'The UN has a 'phone
book' of rules and regulations which are totally useless as they are never
practiced', a staff member is
quoted as saying
[Another says,] 'Senior leaders caught in serious
breaches of ethics should be punished, not promoted as usual.'
[The study] is being
made public at a time when Secretary-General Kofi Annan has been forced by
the widespread publicity [about corruption in the Iraq oil-for-food
program] to appoint a high-level panel to look into them.
The new study records relatively high levels of worker
satisfaction
but its most negative
findings have to do with ingrown leadership and the lack of response to
reports of corruption. 'Get rid of the old boy network,' one staff member
[says.]
'That network is wide, tenacious and powerful.
So long as you
can wind your way into that network, you are OK.
Opposing the network is certainly the end of a UN
career.'" Warren Hoge, "Report
criticizes the way UN fights corruption", International Herald Tribune, June 16, 2004.
[Note: The actual survey is "United Nations organizational integrity
survey", Final Report, prepared by Deloitte Consulting LLP, June 2004.]
"
the UN has
[examined the]
Secretariat's perception of its own integrity.
[The Integrity Survey
politely explains there are concerns about accountability]
More directly ,,,,
[the report notes (p. 11)
that] 'Staff members feel unprotected from reprisals for reporting
violations of the codes of conduct. This is not a perception confined to a
few staff in remote locales and/or dangerous circumstances. Forty-six
percent (46%) gave unfavourable response to this item, whiles only 12%
gave favourable responses.' This is of course
just one of the U.N.'s various investigations into itself. Best-known
this season is the investigation into Oil-for-Food
Beyond that, there is
an entire division [the OIOS]
which produces in-house investigations
An April 14 U. N. Staff Union resolution expresses concern 'over recent
events regarding an OIOS investigation into its own investigators
' Someone needs to help
this institution, and it is not a consulting team
nor a batch of
investigators operating under terms defined by the U.N.
I'm working around to
the belief that in the matter of reforming the U.N., the only thing worse
than having the U.N. ignore a problem is to have the U.N. investigate
it." Claudia Rosett, "The
problem with the Secretariat", The Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2004.
[emphasis added]
"
Staff [in the
Integrity Survey] believe that not enough action is taken to investigate
and address instances of unethical behaviour, and that those who expose
such breaches may put themselves at risk of reprisal. Staff also
perceive that the disciplinary process is applied unevenly,
that the
outcome of the process is generally not known.
[and] that breaches
of integrity and ethical conduct are insufficiently and inequitably
addressed by the disciplinary system. At the same time, they voice concern
about the consequences of 'whistle-blowing' or reporting on misconduct,
and uncertainty about the mechanisms for such reporting.
The [OIOS and
Office of Ombudsman channels]
need to be better known and made more
accessible to staff at large. We will inform all staff about the means
available to them for reporting on suspected misconduct. We will also
develop measures to reinforce formal protection for whistle-blowers, while
ensuring that they are not used to cloak false accusations." "Dear colleagues",
letter from Secretary-General Annan to UN staff on the findings of the
Integrity Survey, of 4 June 2004, pp. 2-3.
Having [found]
that
Secretariat staff don't trust the top management and are afraid to speak
out for fear of reprisals, Mr. Annan's response will be to convene a group
of top managers and invite staff members to speak out.
Does anyone see a
problem here? The basic flaws are
simple: Anytime you create a large institution, accord it great privileges
of secrecy, give it a big budget and have it run immune from any sane
standard of accountability, you are likely to get a corrupt organization.
The problem with the
Secretariat isn't 'tone' at the top. It's accountability at the top and
secrecy throughout.
[A real solution]
would probably require setting up a competing international institution,
based on openness and accountability." Claudia Rosett, "The
problem with the Secretariat", The Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2004.
"The United Nation's
anti-corruption department has been rocked by accusations that the office
itself is corrupt. The head of the
[OIOS]
, Dileep Nair, has been accused of promoting and recruiting
people in ways that are not consistent with U. N. rules and
regulations.
Also, a senior investigator has been suspended
The scrutiny
comes
at a delicate time, as the UN is under intense scrutiny for alleged abuse
of the Iraqi oil-for-food program.
[Nair's office] has
carried out 55 audits of the [oil-for-food] process.
[The UN Staff Union
urged Secretary-General] Annan in April to
make an independent
investigation of OIOS. Annan recently wrote
to Nair asking him to answer the allegations
Nair, who is
currently on sick leave from his position, denied all the accusations to
Fox News. Asked if he would
resign if any of the charges are proven true, Nair said, "of course."
Other allegations of
impropriety include charges that some inside the OIOS received financial
kickbacks in return for promoting people and that some people were
promoted in exchange for sexual favors. Nair, a former banker and civil servant from Singapore, was picked by Annan in 2000." Jonathan Hunt, Watching the UN's watchdog", Fox News, June 16, 2004.
"Fraud awareness, prevention plan and policy
The United Nations
has, to some extent, an established framework on this issue. However, in
terms of implementation, it did not have a comprehensive internal
anti-fraud and anti-corruption infrastructure, and did not include anti-corruption
and anti-fraud elements in the various rules, procedures and internal
controls, which means that such internal risks may not be properly
addressed.
Owing to the lack of
a comprehensive internal fraud plan, a large number of United Nations system offices, funds
and programmes have: (a) No sufficient framework
for prevention, detection, resolution, and reporting; (b) No decentralized
corruption and fraud risk-assessment mechanisms and no corruption and
fraud-prevention committee; (c) No appropriate
resolution mechanisms for reported and detected incidents and allegations
of corruption and fraud (although reliance is placed on the [OIOS] in this
regard." "Financial reports
and audited financial statements for the biennium ended 31 December 2003
and Report of the Board of Auditors", Vol. I, UN document A/59/5 of 22 July 2004, p. 12, item (u), paras. 15(f) and
344-346. "The Board [of
Auditors] recommends that the Administration (i) implement a comprehensive
and well-communicated corruption and fraud prevention plan in the United
Nations system, (ii) establish a corruption and fraud prevention committee
that would serve as an effective framework and coordination point for a
United Nations system corruption and fraud prevention committee that would
serve as an effective framework and coordination point for a United
Nations system corruption and fraud prevention mechanism, (iii) conduct
ethics, corruption and fraud-awareness training sessions and workshops
among managers, international and local employees and other stakeholders,
(iv) develop appropriate resolution mechanisms for reported and detected
incidents and allegations of corruption and fraud, and (v) review the
investigation processes at Offices away from Headquarters." "Financial reports and audited financial statements for the biennium ended 31 December 2003 and Report of the Board of Auditors", Vol. I, UN document A/59/5 of 22 July 2004, p. 12, item (u), paras. 15(f) and 349. [Note: The
Administration airily responded that "some of the Board's comments may give the mistaken
impression to the uninitiated reader that the potential for large-scale
fraudulent and corrupted activities is widespread. The
Administration assigns high priority to the issues of fraud and corruption
"
[emphasis added] "First report on the
implementation of the recommendations of the Board of Auditors
for the
financial period ended 31 December 2003: Report of the Secretary General",
UN document A/59/318 of 1 September 2004,
paras. 124-126. Toward the end of
2000, when Saddam Husseins skimming from the oil-for-food program for
Iraq kicked into high gear, reports spread quickly to the programs
supervisors at the United Nations.
In the halls of the
UN, the programme became a battleground for the competing commercial
interests and political agendas of the 15 individual nations that made up
the Security Council [who also served on the sanctions committee],
diplomats said.
While the diplomats
were deadlocked over how to address violations of the sanctions, money and
contracts continued to flow through the Office of the Iraq Program
The
work of that office, and its former director Benon Sevan, are the focus of
a UN investigation of mismanagement and corruption in the program
Sevan
has said in a
statement that his office was not responsible for ferreting out
corruption.
Evidence of fraud passed from office to office in a round robin
ending nowhere.
While UN auditors
produced 55 reports on the program, several diplomats on the sanctions
committee said in interviews that they never even saw them. In the end, a
complicated set of political and financial pressures kept the program ripe
for corruption. Susan Sachs and Judith Miller, Saddams oil-food fraud: UN let him do it, International Herald Tribune, August 13, 2004.
A scandal over contractor
payments to Costa Rican officials has cast a shadow over [three former
presidents, including]
Josι Maria Figueres, who is now executive director of the
Swiss-based World Economic Forum. [In a statement]
Figueres acknowledged having received $906,355.31 for services to the
French telecommunications company Alcatel, but said they had been legal
and had been made after he left office. Other alleged
payments from Alcatel forced former President Miguel Angel Rodriquez to
resign this month as head of the Organization of American States. He was placed
under house detention. Former president
Rafael Angel Calderon was ordered held in prison last week during an
inquiry into alleged payments on a Finnish contract. Both Rodriquez and
Calderon have denied wrongdoing. Payments scandal taints 3d ex-president, San Jose, Costa Rica, in the International Herald Tribune, October 28, 2004. [Note: this specific
item does not concern the UN per se, but shows how easily senior
officials tainted by corruption allegations can be found in top positions
in
international organizations.]
"Rosemarie Waters,
[the UN Staff Union President], said that
in the last six years, [UN]
management had been reforming itself and increasing managerial authority,
while reducing accountability. The Staff Union [had great respect for
the Secretary-General's vision and reform programme goals.]
It could not
support, however, the erosion of staff rights and dissolution of oversight
mechanisms as a means of implementation, [or legitimize]
actions in
which staff, through their elected representatives, had no meaningful role
to play.
The [integrity
survey]
revealed that staff
feared reprisals for exposing breaches of
ethics, and they perceived that the disciplinary process was applied
unevenly.
Their view of integrity among senior managers was less than
positive..
The Organization had yet to
establish concrete measures for individual accountability, she
continued.
It was essential that areas with expanded delegation of authority
for personnel decisions should be carefully examined and, if abuses were
found, such delegation should be revoked.
The [OHRM] had informed staff
representatives of its inability to enforce accountability because they
lacked central authority. The Fifth Committee may wish to recommend that
concrete individual accountability be developed, in consultation with
staff representatives, on a priority basis." "UN staff committee representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in management reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of 29 October 2004, pp. 2-3. "James O. C. Jonah,
[who worked at the UN for three decades]
and served as head of personnel
from 1979 through 1982,
recalled that [when the Fifth Committee
initiated reforms in the late 1970s],
a staff-management consultation
process was established, and it was decided that staff representatives
should be allowed to appear before the Committee. Now, it was sad to see
the erosion of the international civil service in the United Nations. That had
serious implications. The Committee should also have a serious
look at the results of the integrity study. Never had the staff perception of
integrity been so low.
In some respects, the reforms had weakened the
Secretariat considerably. When he served as
head of personnel, his biggest fight had been with programme managers, who
were most resistant to reform
. He could not believe that such measures
as giving authority to programme managers would strengthen the
international civil service. What had been said about the lack of
authority of the OHRM was true. Without a strong personnel office,
however, there would be no uniformity of rules and fairness in the
system.
Governments should not take what was happening lightly." "UN staff committee representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in management reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of 29 October 2004, p. 4. "Integrity sponsor
unit 35: The staff
council: [Recalling its April
2004 request that the Secretary-General establish an independent
investigation of violations of the delegation of authority in the OIOS]
Regrets the decision
of the Secretary-General to accept the findings of an incomplete
investigation;
Further considers
that the failure to fully investigate the allegations
upholds the
findings of the [staff integrity survey] that there is a lack of integrity
particularly at the higher levels of the organization; Recalls that the
Secretary-General declined to accept the honourable action of the deputy
Secretary-General who tendered her resignation as a result of the Baghdad
bombing of a UN compound that resulted in 22 staff members perishing, to
hold accountable the head of UNHCR for alleged sexual harassment and to
hold accountable the chef de cabinet whose son was employed by the
Secretariat in contravention of staff rules; Decides that the
senior management no longer displays the level of integrity expected of
all employees of the organization; Requests: i. The president
to convey this vote of no confidence to the Secretary-General and
president of the General Assembly
iv. to the staff at
large and; v. to issue a
press release." "Raw data: U.N. staff
resolution", Fox News (US) website, November 19,
2004. [Note: Fox News
stated that the above was the text of a UN staff resolution which it
received, calling for a vote of no confidence in Kofi Annan.] "U. N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan said yesterday he was disappointed in his son
for accepting payments from a key contractor in the oil-for-food programme
for more than four years longer than
previously acknowledged.
But the appearance of
a payoff to the Secretary-General's son was just the latest
of
revelations about the Iraqi oil-for-food program
While the
organization scrambles to respond to oil-for-food inquiries, other
troubles are piling up at the organization's doorstep. ... The U.N. peacekeeping
program is wracked by accusations of rape, sexual harassment and extortion
by blue helmets and civilians in the U.N. mission in Congo.
International
pressure also is building on the United Nations and the Security Council
to do more to protect civilians in Darfur, Sudan.
Internally, a [staff]
group seeks to reopen an investigation of [the head of the OIOS]
over
charges of sexual harassment and favoritism
The U.N. staff union
also has criticized Mr. Annan's willingness to exonerate Deputy
Secretary-General Louise Frechette for failing to protect U.N. staff
members in Iraq
[Mr. Annan] also
threw out an internal report finding merit in a [recent] sexual harassment
complaint against
[UNHCR head] Ruud Lubbers." Betsy Pisic, "Another
oil-food scandal emerges", The Washington
Times, November 29, 2004.
"Imagine if U.S.
troops were accused of sexually exploiting children in impoverished
nations
a U.S. Cabinet Secretary were accused of
groping a female subordinate, [but then exonerated]
by the president
. [an
agency head]
and the president's own offspring stood accused of
complicity in [a massive embezzlement racket]
[These things
happened in the UN this year.] Where's the outrage?
Why didn't the mainstream
devote more attention to these scandals? Far
from demanding high-level resignations, they are circling the wagons. The U.N.'s friends
are doing
no favors with this knee-jerk defense. Even [Kofi]
Annan recognizes [the problems with his 1997 and 2002 management reform
attempts, and reports on Rwanda, Bosnia, and general peacekeeping
failures.]
[Yet] all the reformistas' efforts founder on the rocks of
apathy and inertia.
Most of the U.N.'s 191 member states
[and] 49,000
employees
have other priorities. Flawed as it is, the
UN does some useful things
Leaving the U.N.
is unrealistic. But it will
never live up to the grandiose expectations of its starry-eyed supporters,
unless they get mad enough to demand real change. So far there's
no sign of that happening." Max Boot, "Why U.N.
stays mired in its defects: Start with too-friendly media, apathy and
members' entrenched interests", Los Angeles
Times, December 9, 2004. "The United Nations,
which extols the virtues of 'good governance', is not practising what it
preaches, say [many long-time observers.]
The complaints
come
amidst several recent scandals, including accusations of bribery,
nepotism, sexual harassment, and mismanagement of peacekeeping operations
overseas. 'The underlying
problem is a lack of transparency and accountability" says Hillel Neuer,
[one close observer.] ..
in 2003 the OIOS
cleared the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna of charges of
corruption and mismanagement.
Senior U.N.
officials in New York [have reportedly routinely abused] their first class
or business class airline privileges
[Neuer said] 'if some
of the things that happen at the United Nations took place in a big
corporation, people would have been fired.' [A UN
shortcoming, Neuer added, is that the investigation results emerge very
slowly]
are mostly 'white-washed'
[and occur] only after 'a lot of
prodding from the media and NGOs.' [A reporter asked
spokesman Fred Eckhard if there is] 'a record that shows that the United
Nations, under Kofi Annan, has taken allegations of mismanagement and
misbehaviour seriously and fired people as a result?' [Eckhard replied]
'I will certainly ask for you
" Thalif Deen,
"Corruption: U.N. failing to practice 'good governance', IPS Inter Press
Service, December 9, 2004. [Note: No such record
seems to exist, but it definitely should, as a clear measure to confirm
that the UN indeed takes accountability seriously.]
"Two lawyers for U.N.
whistle-blowers urged the United Nations on Wednesday to protect staffers
who want to disclose corruption at the world body, including the
oil-for-food program for Iraq. One of the lawyers
said 'five or six' U.N. employees including a high-level employee had
contacted him for advice on how to reveal evidence of wrongdoing in [that]
programme without jeopardizing their careers.
Andre Sirois --
himself a U.N. staff member and former whistle-blower --- said
'In one case it was
something big, that definitely would make the front page
' But based on his
advice, none of [them]
have gone public, he said. 'I know them.
They won't.
They are very quiet and under a lot of stress.'
While U.N. rules call
for wrongdoers to be punished, they do nothing to shield staff members
from reprisals when they come forward with evidence, [Tom] Devine and
Sirois said. 'There is irreparable
harm when freedom of speech is canceled, irreparable harm to the
institution,' Devine said. 'The message is, 'Do not say anything to
investigators.' '
An independent U.N. inquiry
led by [Paul Volcker is investigating]
whether any U.N. employees
received bribes or allowed kickbacks."
Irwin Arief, "Lawyers call on U.N. to shield whistle-blowers", Reuters, December 15, 2004.
"The tempest inside
the World Meteorological Organization began with a single check
endorsed
to
an unknown third party.
That discovery led to
a formal audit and a continuing criminal investigation by the Swiss
authorities, focusing on allegations of embezzlement of training funds by
Muhammad Hassan, a Sudanese who
[investigators allege,] stole as much as
$3 million over three or four years. The agency is small
by UN standards
[but investigators' documents show it to be] rife with
intrigue and politics.
'Hassan was very
close to the
Secretary-General' [said a staff member,]
Godwin Olu
Patrick Obasi, a Nigerian, who had run the meteorological agency for more
than 20 years before retiring. The criminal
investigation is continuing
But the subject
is nowhere to be
found.
Hassan was dismissed in late 2003.
Seeking to claim his pension, a woman
saying she was his widow then presented the agency with a Sudanese death
certificate
Not only have
officials been informed that the death certificate is not authentic, but
Swiss investigators have determined that the supposed widow may not even
have been Hassan's wife." Judith Miller, "Another UN arm, its weather agency,
rocked by fraud", International Herald Tribune,
[Note: this and the following
item are from UN specialized agencies in "The
The allegations centre on
Michael Wilson, a Ghanaian businessman [who recruited Kojo Annan, a
childhood friend, to Cotecna, a company involved in
The Swiss
investigation
[established that Mr. Wilson was paid a $3 to $4 million
fee by the winners of the WIPO contract.]
The investigation
later found that Mr. Wilson had transferred
[some $240,000] to the
account of Khamis Suedi, a Tanzanian national who is assistant
director-general at Wipo and special adviser to [Kamil Idris, Wipo
director general]. Mr. Wilson was not available for
comment. Edward Kwakwe, Wipo's
legal counsel, said [Mr. Suedi said the payment was for a joint private
business
venture.]
Mr. Kwakwe said
[the contract award]
had been handled
'correctly.' Wipo rules on
external activities by its staff, which are now under review, are looser
than those of other UN agencies. US officials said
they were not
satisfied with Wipo's response to the allegations. This includes
the 'mutually arranged departure' of Mr. Suedi from Wipo at the end of
this month." Frances Williams, "US seeks probe of bribery
claim at UN agency", Financial Times
( "[In my view,]
the
UN is constitutionally incapable of conducting any operation efficiently
or honestly.
Ideally the UN, foreshadowing a future world government, ought to
be run by a global meritocracy -- rule by the best. In practice,
it is the opposite. Any state that can be legally defined as one can join
the UN --
it is a club having no rules of probity or morals.
The result is failure and
graft. UN
officials are not answerable to bodies like Congress or the U.K.'s
Parliament, which would be sure to track down, expose and punish gross
abuses and manifest failures. No senior UN official has ever gone to
jail. It's rare for anyone to be sacked or
removed.
The top brass resist any kind of investigation, on principle. The
oil-for-food inquiry is unique in that it has taken place at all and seems
to be garnering results. But will any
punishment be meted out? Will any serious reforms be
pushed through?
Of course not.
the UN is beyond reform until
membership is restricted to civilized powers that practice democracy and
the rule of law and hold their rulers responsible for their actions." Paul Johnson, "The UN is for
talk, not actions," Forbes (US), March 14, 2005. [Note: Mr. Johnson is an
'eminent British historian and author. This recent quote quite bluntly summarizes the failure of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly over the years to provide any serious oversight, or insistence on firm and systematic corrective action, of the Secretariat programme operations which are now falling apart at an alarming rate.] "
When I worked in
Liberia in the mid-Nineties a new [UN] chief administrative officer
[replaced the previous CAO, who was taking kickbacks on UN procurement
contracts.]
The new CAO [moved aggressively for]
a 15 percent kickback on
everything we purchased. [He also tried to
force many]
young 'local staff' to sleep with him
I was the human
rights lawyer and these girls would come to my office in tears
[I wrote
many memos. but]
. when I visited the UN [personnel] office in New York,
they laughed at my naοve outrage: 'It happens all the time in the field',
they said.
'There is nothing we can do.'
That CAO had been
knocking around West Africa for years, always mired in corruption, never
disciplined, always promoted and reassigned
- during which time the head
of personnel was Kofi Annan. [The CAO]
was eventually indicted by
US federal prosecutors in New York for $1.5 million of fraudulent
kickbacks
He has since died.] What kind of
leadership would tolerate this conduct 10 years ago?
Precisely
the same leadership that [has now]
permitted the oil-for-food scandal
and the sex-for-food scandal." Kenneth Cain, "How many more must die before Kofi quits?", The Observer (UK), April 2, 2005. [Note: Mr. Cain | |||
