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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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The
preceding overview of the last decade's UN management accountability
failings, primarily under Mr. Annan's leadership, can be succinctly summarized by
comparing the very first item -- the strong management accountability
promises of Mr. Annan in January 1997 -- with the equally strong
dissatisfaction expressed in the very last item, the General Assembly
resolution of December 2004 concluding that the promised accountability
system did not exist, with negative consequences. IO Watch wishes only to add, for
further context: --
some key insights that enhance understanding of this rather dismal and thoroughly
entrenched UN management crisis; --
the situation in the parallel multinational corporate world, where the
rule of law is forcing decisive corrective action in large global
organizations, totally unlike the slow and passive "self-regulation" of
the UN Secretariat; and --
some excellent "bottom line" comments on this UN crisis and how it must
begin to be truly resolved.
The following dozen
quotes offer some excellent insights into the entrenched factors which
hinder any real UN management reform. Perhaps the most important one came
from the report of an expert group meeting of UN insiders in
1997: "Sins of member
states: Secretariat staff resent
member
state interference in
their daily work
[their micromanagement of] the hiring and promotion of
Secretariat personnel
[and of]
Secretariat budgeting,
. too often
seeking to control the minor
details of spending allocations.
. Secretariat staff members are also
frustrated by lack of clear direction from intergovernmental bodies. Too
often member states fail to agree on how best to confront global
problems
. Moreover,
mandates are frequently assigned to the Secretariat with little thought as
to the resources needed for their
implementation. Sins of the
Secretariat:
. Member states contend that
ineffective -- some would say nonexistent -- managerial practices throughout
the Secretariat have led to inefficient use of the [UN resources]
; a
staff unaccountable for its actions and prone to delegate upwards;
insufficient program coordination
; and wasteful duplication of
efforts. There has been a
lack of transparency in Secretariat decision making [on] policy issues,
personnel, and budget expenditures.
much of the information that is
provided is not timely or readable.
Overall, inefficiency and lack
of accountability within the Secretariat, whether perceived or real, have
invited member state micromanagement.
" "Making UN reform work: Improving member state-Secretariat
relations", Report of the twenty-eighth United Nations issues conference,
The Stanley Foundation, February 21-23, 1997, pp. 2, 14-16. [emphasis added.] The politicization of
the UN is indeed a dominant factor in what happens there. However, and
quite simply, it must be remembered that UN member states always have
broader interests. A journal
article and book in 2001 assessed the multiple "schools" of American
foreign policy. These
differing approaches are also certainly present, although in widely
differing mixes, in all UN Member States. The four policy
schools are, very briefly and informally stated: (1) the economic one,
seeking the growth of commerce and an enhanced position in the world
marketplace; (2) the national one, emphasizing democracy and domestic issues and
interests, and skeptical of international entanglements; (3) the
"populist" and nationalist approach, to vigorously defend national
interests and honour abroad; and only (4) the "internationalist" approach,
stressing democracy and active contact with the rest of the world. The journal article concludes
that: "
Mead's own evidence strongly
suggests that all four schools will always be with us -- regardless of
what pundits and American diplomats might desire -- for they reflect
profound aspects of the American character.
There will always be a foreign
policy of the American people -- or rather four policies, by Mead's
count. The task of American
leaders is to negotiate between these policies, not to try -- vainly -- to
select one above the rest." The
book is Walter Russell Mead, Special providence: American foreign
policy and how it changed the world, Alfred A. Knopf, The
article is H. W. Brands, "The four schoolmasters", The National
Interest, Winter 2001/02,
pp. 143-148. Two further articles
demonstrate, first just how over-inflated the perceptions of UN member
state deliberations can become, and second, just how damaging their
national interests and rivalries will probably always
be. "On the first day of what was
billed as the Millenium Summit last September in
The flattery was extravagant
.
but it was cheerfully received (strong applause, complacent nods) and for
three days and three nights the dignities gave speeches, ratified
treaties, glanced at documents, signed declarations of blameless principle
in favor of human freedom and the biosphere.
. Our twenty-first-century faith in
scientific miracle gives rise to the hope of 'transnational institutions'
capable of managing the world's affairs with the sangfroid of the late
.
emperor Caesar Augustus.
. the front page news
. mocked
the presumptions of omnipotence
-- civil war in
Colombia and Sierra Leone, famine in Ethiopia, a mob with machetes
murdering three U.N. officials in West Timor (on the same day that Kofi
Annan was raising his glass of congratulatory champagne), civil war in
Chechnya and Sri Lanka, floods in India and six men arrested for
cannibalism in Tanzania." Lewis H. Lapham, "Cleopatra's nose", Harpers Magazine, November 2000, pp. 9-11. "For anyone who
[thought UN
reform and Security Council restructuring]
were just a parlour game for
diplomats, [there is]
a rude awakening.
The council's permanent five --
In politics, however,
[they] are
competing for natural resources and squabbling over the sovereignty of
tiny islands.
And it is right.
To add
Should the whole exercise be
abandoned? That might be
convenient to some. Countries
such as "A
collision in Despite these enduring
political realities, the UN Secretariat cannot merely blame Member States
for its weak performance and accountability. Instead, it must finally face up
to and deal with the underlying issues, as the remaining quotes
illustrate. Accountability, that source of institutional
health, had been excluded from United Nations
experience; and, along
with it, indivisibly, the stimulus of direct public engagement and
response. 'It is not a United
Nations Organization',
Aleksander Solzhenitsyn was to say, in his Nobel address of 1972,
'but a United Governments Organization.' In offering itself as the
mere creature of its member governments, the United Nations system entered
a state of arrested moral development, marked by the habitual emblems of
immaturity: demands for approval,
and incapacity for individual or collective
self-questioning." Shirley Hazzard, "Breaking
Faith: I", The New Yorker,
"Some members of the [UN] staff have
great ability and commitment but they support a great many parasitic
'deadwood' employees and
employees serving primarily the political interests of their
government.
The principle of merit can in
the long run be protected only by fair and objective procedures and
safeguards, which are subject to law and to effective grievance
procedures.
But
should the
present trends continue
the staff would probably be suspected of lacking
neutrality and might lose the
confidence of some Member States.
The result might be paralysis of the Secretariat , which would be
unable to play an effective role in situations of
crisis." Theodor Meron, The United
Nations Secretariat: The Rules and the Practice, Chapter 4, "Selected legal questions", D.C. Heath, Lexington, Mass.,
1977, pp. 83-84.
[emphasis added.] [Note: Mr. Meron is a former
delegate to the UN, international law professor at
"
efforts must be
made to do away with the widespread tendency of staff, even in key positions, to shun
responsibility and accountability. OIOS backs measures taken by the
[DAM] to achieve this goal and will focus its own recommendations to
management accordingly.
Many UN
managers are not used to and seem to be quite reluctant to accept
criticism, particularly when it comes to applying accountability
criteria rather than settling for the
promise that some specific problems won't recur. This feature of the United
Nations culture must be changed if we are ever to develop staff
awareness and acceptance of responsibility and accountability. United Nations managers must stop
being defensive and enter into a critical dialogue with OIOS." "Report of the Secretary-General on the
activities of the [OIOS]", UN document A/50/459, [Note: The comment is from the
first OIOS head, Mr. Karl Paschke in his first annual report in
1995.]
"Another week, another UN scandal
. Why are scandals so frequent in [global]
institutions
. ? What
. makes them so vulnerable to
corruption, inefficiency, and
. personal aggrandisement?
. The first problem is
leadership. Leaders are
selected by an inefficient and labyrinthine process from a pool of poor
quality talent.
. Second, the waste and inefficiency can only be
reduced if they are visible to public opinion.
. [but] international
institutions [lack]
. accountability
. The third problem is the weakness
of a law-governed culture.
.
. The UN Charter [Article 100]
focuses on the Secretary-General and staff as
. international officials
accountable only to the Organization.
.
Here, rooted in idealism, lie the clues in what
can go wrong. All too often the heads of UN
agencies signaled their autonomy through grandeur
.
. The agency's task
. became
subordinate to old bureaucratic instincts of self-perpetuation and
resistance to outside scrutiny.
. Sir Brian Urquhart has [suggested
that] no secretary-general should serve more than one term in
office. Extended throughout the [UN
system, this]
. would remove electioneering and diminish the incentive to
patronage. It may not be
much, but it would be a start." "Perri 6 and Michael Sheridan, "A world order of scandal and
graft: What is it about
international agencies that invites corruption
.", The Independent
( " "The joyless nature of the
United Nations 50th anniversary was underlined this week by a public spat
between the Staff Union and Management [on appeals of poor performance
ratings]
which could have far-reaching implications for the
international civil service.
a critical question has been
avoided: what is the
rationale for increasing the vulnerability of staff to unfair and/or
arbitrary judgements by administrators? The pat answer to that -- it will allow "managers to
manage" -- is unconvincing because the most serious problem affecting
the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN Secretariat has been bad
management.
The Secretariat reforms proposed
by the Secretary-General would
remove a range of checks and balances
built into the international civil service for the very obvious reason
that in in a multicultural, multinational context, justice must not
only be done but be seen to be done. [To weaken]
the only recourse
[performance rebutta] l for a staff member victimized by a bad
manager
would be
to reduce the integrity
of the entire structure
The United Nations will clearly
[face]
wrenching changes in the period ahead, and it would be both
unfair and counterproductive to do away now with the only means staff have
to hold managers accountable." "Staff-management spat with possible serious impact reflects a
joyless 50th anniversary," International Documents Review,
For years Western governments have
complained about the lack
of accountability prevailing in UN organizations, but in practice
they have tolerated a degree of
opacity that would be considered totally unacceptable for any civil
service in a democracy.
The Geneva Groups zero-growth policy has been the nearest they
have come to sanctions, [but it]
has had only limited success in
compelling secretariats to cooperate in discussing management practices
and opening the books. Inadequate internal auditing and
slipshod evaluation procedures have not only shielded
inefficiency, waste, maladministration, and downright fraud; they have deprived the UNs
member states of the information they need to identify the organizations
weaknesses -- and strengths.
[No] amount of exhortation as
the years have proved can compensate for the lack of routine inspection
under established rules of open government. Evaluation would require
built-in procedures requiring the UN bureaucracies to respond to
criticisms. So ingrained is the collusion
between the permanent representatives to these organizations and the
secretariats that a majority for such an initiative among the UN
membership would be difficult though not impossible to muster. But many UN staff members would
welcome more rigorous scrutiny
Rosemary
Righter, Utopia lost: The United Nations and world order, Twentieth
Century Fund, "
After all these years, the United Nations is
still struggling to adjust its human resources policies and practices to
the reality that surrounds it.
In
[a highly competitive international] environment, the UN will have to
reform its reforms, or go down reforming. Several dilemmas that have
crippled the UN for generations, however, remain unresolved, and this
organizational pathology stands in the way of the UN's efforts to remain
meaningful. When it comes to
managing human resources, the following are [some of] the obstacles that the UN must
overcome: ?
Its
addiction to the trappings of a careers-for-life staffing model, with its
emphasis on seniority
;
?
Its
fear of offending Member States that exert political pressure -- by not
insisting on merit in
staffing, even at the highest levels; ?
Its
reliance on patronage as a survival strategy, especially where outputs are
nebulous;
?
the persistent gap between its
perennial promises to improve human resources management and its capacity
to deliver; and ?
Its obsession with cosmetic
reforms, hiding the root causes of
dysfunctionality. For most pathologies, there is a cure. For the UN, faith healing will not
suffice." Dirk
Salomons, "Good intentions to naught: The pathology of human resources
management at the United Nations," in Dennis Dijkzeul, and Yves Beigbeder,
eds., Rethinking
international organizations: Pathology and promise,
"The halo that appears to
float over non-profit
institutions - providing them with an aura of altruism - distracts attention from the basic
fact that non-profits are, first and foremost, economic
institutions
[Their mythology and self-portrayal as solely
altruistic]
misinform the
public and allow them
to ensure a continued flow of salary and benefits
for their managers and the preservation of the managers' power and
status.
[People need]
to realize that
the rule of caveat emptor applies even more importantly to transactions
with non-profits than with marketplace transactions.
Typically, [in the]
marketplace, one receives something in return
[but, with non-profits]
individuals conduct transactions
based
entirely on faith. Such
transactions are lamentable when one party is talking altruism but seeking
self-interest. Who will protect generous - and
gullible - donors?" Barry
D. Friedman, "How non-profit organizations fight off competition: Who will
protect non-profit donors?", PA Times
(
A second important aspect of the slow dance of
possible UN reform discussions contrasts sharply with the harsh legal
realities of
decisive corrective action and reform in the multinational
corporate world. How long can the UN -- which remains above and exempt from
national laws -- continue to hold the multi-billion
dollar "Alcatel was
supposed to be squeaky clean. In 2001, after the Organization for
Economic Cooperation & Development member countries agreed to adopt
tougher anticorruption laws, Alcatel overhauled its ethics code
[and
warned that] payment of bribes and kickbacks was prohibited. The
Paris-based telecommunications company appointed a [top management] ethics
committee [to]
monitor compliance
So why are
Dozens of other cases have
been opened in 'The climate has
definitely changed" [said an anti-corruption researcher]. 'The change
in laws is beginning to bite.' Stricter reporting
rules on international funds transfers
make it easier to trace the flow
of illicit funds.
Bold European prosecutors are even stalking prey far
from their home turf.
tThe new antibribery laws
hold companies
accountable for such indirect payments even if there is no proof that top
managers authorized them." Carol Matlack, with
Geri Smith and Gail Edmondson, "Cracking down on corporate bribery: With
tougher laws in place, prosecutors around the world are bringing high
profile cases", Business Week Europe,
"
[Experts say
that] an intensifying battle [has emerged] over efforts to revamp
corporate governance. It is one that pits influential members
of the business community
against institutional investors pushing for
greater power over the direction of troubled companies.
None of this means that corporate
The Justice
Department's corporate fraud task force, formed
in the immediate
aftermath of the WorldCom debacle, has racked up an impressive series of
victories.
By June 2004, the latest
period for which full statistics are available, the task force had
obtained more than 500 corporate fraud convictions or guilty pleas and
charged more than 900 defendants, including more than 60 top corporate
officers, with various types of fraud. During that
same time period, the [Securities and Exchange Commission] filed almost
600 separate civil enforcement actions involving financial fraud or
reporting. As the big fraud
trials unfold over the coming months, public anger may build as the
excesses of the bubble years
are again trotted out." Kurt Eichenwald,
"Pendulum is swinging back in "
After the
collapse of Enron and other companies
corporations and their boards are
adopting zero-tolerance policies and increasingly holding their employees
to lofty standards of business and personal behavior. The result is a
wave of abrupt firings as corporations move to stop perceived breaches of
ethics by their employees that could result in law enforcement action, or
public relations disasters.
The seemingly frantic reach for the moral high ground
is driven as much by self-interest as by any attempt at righteousness, now
that boards and chief executives have seen how public scandals can torpedo
stock prices, alienate customers and end careers. 'There is a new
kind of puritanism' said Marjorie Kelly, the editor of Business Ethics magazine, replacing what Kelly said was an era of 'arrogance
and ignorance, an attitude that boys will be boys.'
The reaction
has been most severe on Wall Street, where investment banks, mutual funds
and insurers have felt the sting of legal prosecution for ethical lapses
most acutely." Landon Thomas Jr.,
"Nervous about ethics, firms are fast to fire", International Herald Tribune, [Note: IO Watch
finds nothing "frantic" in the situation at the UN, where, other than some
crowded press conferences, the senior "old boys" of the Secretariat continue
quietly and calmly on with "business as usual" -- lots of talk (though
none whatsoever from the General Assembly) and no legal action.]] "BP sacked 252 people last year as part of a drive by
the world's second biggest oil company to weed out bribery and
corruption. In its annual
report on environmental sustainability, social responsibility and
corporate governance, the company blamed the 50 percent yearly rise in
sackings for 'unethical behaviour' on theft, fraud and harassment. Lord Browne, chief
executive said 'Human ingenuity will always find something to get up
to. It
is our job to track it down.' BP has established a new team to govern legal
compliance and business ethics across the group after the spate of
high-profile scandals over the past few years. It said in the
report:
'Very clear rules on business relationships are essential when
there is any scope for bribery or fraud in dealing with suppliers or
governments.
BP is introducing a
company-wide code of conduct and measures such as forcing staff to
disclose gifts worth more than $50. Lord Browne did not
provide details on the investigation into last month's explosion at BP's
James Boxell and
Fiona Harvey, "BP sacked 252 for unethical behaviour", Financial Times ( Third, IO Watch offers some very perceptive recent insights into the UN's basic
accountability crisis of 2005 and the reform actions which must follow
(but may well not). The first is "only" a letter to the
editor, but IO Watch finds it the most succinct and clear assessment it
has found of what ails the UN and other international organizations and
what actions are required to reform them. "Your editorial 'A
head for the World Bank,' (Feb. 22) speaks to a fundamental crisis of
accountability that goes far beyond the secret selection process for a new
president. There is a culture of
secrecy that characterizes not only the World Bank, but most of the vital
international organizations -- including the United Nations. Unless these
public entities establish independent oversight, external auditing of
managerial and financial controls and safe channels for reporting
wrongdoing, scandalous harm will continue to weaken them and only compound
the grief suffered by the billions of needy people they are mandated to
serve." Melanie Beth
Oliviero, "More transparency", International
Herald Tribune,
"Imagine if U.S.
troops were accused of sexually exploiting children in impoverished
nations
a U.S. Cabinet Secretary were accused of groping a female
subordinate, [but then exonerated]
by the president
. [an agency
head]
and the president's own offspring stood accused of complicity in
[a massive embezzlement racket]
[These things
happened in the UN this year.] Where's the outrage?
Why didn't the mainstream
devote more attention to these scandals? Far from demanding high-level resignations, they are
circling the wagons. The U.N.'s friends are
doing
no favors with this knee-jerk defense. Even [Kofi]
Annan recognizes [the problems with his 1997 and 2002 management reform
attempts, and reports on [Yet] all the reformistas' efforts founder on the rocks of
apathy and inertia.
Most of the U.N.'s 191 member states
[and] 49,000
employees
have other priorities. Flawed as it is,
the UN does some useful things
Leaving the U.N.
is unrealistic. But it will
never live up to the grandiose expectations of its starry-eyed supporters,
unless they get mad enough to demand real
change.
So far there's no sign of that happening." Max Boot, "Why U.N.
stays mired in its defects: Start with too-friendly media, apathy and
members' entrenched interests", Los Angeles
Times, "Kofi Annan, UN
secretary-general
remains under pressure. Some now regard Mr. Annan as a
weak leader who failed to prevent the [oil-for-food] scandal. He is not the
only high-profile leader [in this situation.]
[A recent
management study found] that 55 percent of leaders are associated with
below-average corporate performance
Only 15 percent of
[leaders
studied] showed a consistent ability to manage innovation and
organizational change.
[Leaders include]
'opportunists' who seek to manipulate others to protect their own position
or 'diplomats' who try to avoid conflict and please everyone at the same
time.
Mr. Annan is a classic example of a diplomat in this sense.
Leaders can move
to a different level
[as] a 'strategist'
with a long-term vision
or
an 'alchemist', someone who can reinvent an organization and draw people
to share his or her vision almost effortlessly: the authors
cite Nelson Mandela as an example. [One expert argues
that many recent]
corporate scandals
came about [partly]
because
leaders began to believe in their own mythical status
like the 'masters
of the universe' satirised by Tom Wolfe in The bonfire of
the vanities
" Morgan Witzel,
"Leadership: Vision and ethics at the heart of training", Financial Times (
"[After almost a full
year]
Paul Volcker ... [has not finally reported] on the UN's
mismanagement of Neither of Mr.
Volcker's [interim] reports to date makes a clear case against Mr. Annan
himself
[who] therefore claims to have been 'exonerated'. For two
reasons, sadly, that is not the case. First,
his
critics
[argue] that the UN's boss should take ultimate responsibility
for his organization having mismanaged the program
[but] Mr. Volcker's
interim report says nothing about responsibility for this wider management
failure.
Second, even in the
Cotecna affair [involving Kojo Annan]
, [Mr. Volcker's second] report
paints a disturbing picture.
[Both reports]
suggest that Mr. Annan has been a
weak manager.
Moreover, oil-for-food is only one of
several failures to have taken place on his watch.
If the UN were a
company and Mr. Annan its boss, this paper would ask him to resign right
away. But [in] the UN
ultimate power rests with the member states [who
also, on the Security Council, oversaw the programme]
[Thus] there is an
especially strong argument for reserving final judgement until Mr. Volcker
issues his final report.
" "Torturing the
United Nations: Something rotten happened. But wait for all the facts before
demanding Kofi Annan's head", The Economist,
"
.
Under Annan, the
UN has failed and people have died.
The media and conservative politicians
[have]
discovered that the UN has been catastrophically incompetent [and]
the American neoconservative right has occupied the
moral high ground in critique of Annan
I am mystified by the reluctance
of the left
to criticize Annan's leadership
[bodies burning in [Blaming the
Security Council is not convincing.] Annan
orders
unarmed civilians to risk their lives
in the most dangerous conditions
all over the world. They do it, heroically, every day.
Some pay
with their lives, others their sanity. How can he then not
risk his job in
the cause of preventing genocide
[instead of] trying to explain why he
didn't? Annan is not
personally corrupt or incompetent. But the UN cannot have failed more
catastrophically when the stakes have been highest. If he
[is
not fired] for that, then for what? And if not now, when?" Kenneth Cain, "How
many more must die before Kofi quits?", The
Observer ( [Note: Mr. Cain is
a former UN human rights lawyer who served in U.N. peacekeeping operations
in IO Watch finds this assessment to be a very pivotal one: other excerpts from it can be found near the end of this archive's subsections on Worst of all, never-ending genocides? , Corruption in the UN , OHR (Mis-)management , Refugee sexual abuses , and Anti-harassment efforts . ]
"Anyone who was
shocked by the most recent revelations of sexual misconduct by [UN staff
has never been]
in a U.N.-sponsored refugee camp.
The [UN] and its staff lack accountability.
This lack of accountability is the central blemish on
today's United Nations, and it lies behind most of the recent
headlines.
Whether taking advantage of a malnourished refugee or of a
lucrative oil-for-food contract, the temptation is there, the act is easy
and the risk of punishment is nil. I arrived in
If the United
Nations is to enjoy [operational] immunity, it
[must] police itself
aggressively and thoroughly. Yet the recent stonewalling
[in
multiple UN scandals is]
typical of a bureaucracy dedicated to
self-preservation.
The message is: Cover your tracks and the United
Nations will obstruct your prosecution. After [a] 2002
report documented sexual abuse, Annan's steely resolve led to exactly zero
criminal prosecutions
The United Nations is a vital institution that
needs a housecleaning." Peter Dennis, "The
UN: Preying on the weak", washingtonpost.com,
[Note: Mr. Dennis
is a law student who worked for the Foundation for International Dignity
in the refugee camps surrounding "[In early 1998, Kofi
Annan]
flew to [The oil-for-food
programme]
was good business not only for Saddam, but for the U.N.
Secretariat,
[which received] huge financial incentives
The
Secretariat, in collecting 2.2 percent of Saddam's official oil sales
[generated] hundreds of millions of dollars for jobs portioned out by the
Secretariat.
Had Annan
[funded program administration from member
state donations]
would he still have pushed to expand [it]
until it
entailed more than $1 billion in UN overhead?
Oil-for-Food, in the postmortem, offers an
unprecedented view into the inner workings of the United
Nations.
The work ahead should be not to
preserve a Potemkin image of integrity, but to
[determine] what's wrong
with the foundations and to rebuild the place from the ground up. Far greater transparency would be an immense help in
keeping the place honest. But reform has to start with the
Secretariat and proceed along lines that will produce
secretaries-general willing to work vigorously not to save themselves, or
please their pals, but to protect the integrity of the institution." Claudia Rosett,
"How Kofi Annan failed: Kofi Annan's silence: Blame game", Claudia Rosett,
"The oil-for-food scam: What did Kofi Annan know, and when did he know
it?", http://www.commentarymagazine.com/SpecialArticle.asp?article=A11705017_1 ) ]
"[In my view,]
the UN is constitutionally incapable of conducting any operation
efficiently or honestly. Ideally the UN, foreshadowing a future
world government, ought to be run by a global meritocracy -- rule by the
best. In
practice, it is the opposite. Any state that can be legally defined as one
can join the UN -- it is a club having no rules of probity
or morals.
The result is
failure and graft. UN officials are not
answerable to bodies like Congress or the U.K.'s Parliament, which would
be sure to track down, expose and punish gross abuses and manifest
failures. No senior UN official has ever gone to
jail.
It's rare for anyone to be sacked or removed. The top brass
resist any kind of investigation, on principle. The
oil-for-food inquiry is unique in that it has taken place at all and seems
to be garnering results. But will any punishment be meted out? Will any
serious reforms be pushed through? Of course not.
" Paul Johnson, "The
UN is for talk, not actions," Forbes (US),
[Note: Mr. Johnson
is an 'eminent British historian and author."]
Finally, two recent descriptions of accountable
organizations and leaders show what the UN could aspire to, the first from
a new in-depth study from a leading "management guru" and the second from
a veteran manager who headed a huge [Management guru
Rosabeth Moss Kanters latest book, Confidence, concludes, inter alia]: Leaders who guide their teams toward success espouse
the values of accountability, collaboration and initiative in their messages to
others, model those qualities in their own behaviour and create formal
programmes and structural mechanisms to embed them in
institutions.
We know that high performance organizations need
leaders who not only talk the talk but also walk the walk. We also know that good
leaders hold people accountable to explicit targets
They use concrete policies
to encourage (or, in
extreme circumstances, mandate) desired behaviour. These
are the disciplines of execution, currently one of the
hottest topics among mass-market management writers. If Professor Kanter
does break new ground, it is by bringing together authentic leadership and
execution in one volume.
In world-beating organizations whether
corporations or basketball teams she finds leadership that is open,
transparent, collaborative and optimistic. But she also finds organizations that
are well-resourced, hold people accountable and go out of their way to retain top
talent. In other words, Confidence presents a mature, holistic view of
what it takes to build high-performing organisations. Simon London,
Management gurus: No crack in Kanters confidence, Financial Times ( The book is
Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Confidence: How
winning streaks and losing streaks begin and end, Crown Business,
[Note: The study was based on 300 structured interviews with chief executives and team leaders in diverse organizations worldwide, from which emerged theories that were then tested against the results of two surveys which obtained a combined 2,754 responses.]
"[Twelve lessons that top managers can use to manage a
large public organization with honesty and integrity:] First.
Standards must
be set at the top
Managers at every level must lead by example. Second. Choose people based on both the content of
their resume -- and their character
The two most important appointments we made were our
General Counsel
and our Inspector General
. Quality appointments are essential to
an ethical institution
Third. You need to foster interdisciplinary
discussion
[and dialog]. Fourth.
The experience and institutional memories of civil servants are vital.
Fifth.
You must be willing to not just hear
the bad news -- but to listen to it.
Just as important, people can't be afraid to raise the bad news.
Sixth.
If we made a mistake,
we admitted it
Of course, no one will be able to
unless the leader cultivates an atmosphere of transparency.
Seventh
You can't
cultivate honesty and integrity in the dark.
It is transparency that strengthens the hand of people
who want to do things right. Eighth.
You can't subordinate policy to politics.
To lead with integrity, you need to have the courage of your
convictions. Ninth.
You have to look at issues through a prism
as the data or the circumstances or the political environment changes.
[Use] everyone's input
[as an] honest broker. Tenth.
It's your friends, not your enemies, who will get often get you into
trouble.
[Don't] act out of favoritism, or be perceived as doing so. Eleventh.
Ethical employers care about their employees.
People
are motivated by consideration and compassion.
Showing
you have confidence in them
can pay big dividends. Twelfth.
you must have a vision, and you must share that vision. My vision was
simple
every person at HHS had a single obligation: To always serve the public
interest ethically. That same idea
[is] the crux of my twelve lessons
[and] of good government. It is our
ultimate commitment." Donna E. Shalala,
"The buck stops here: Managing large organizations with honesty and
integrity",
PA Times
( [Emphasis
added.]
"There is no shortage of suggestions for reforms at
the United Nations,
[but] if, in the future, the UN hopes to avoid failures like that in
Above all, if the UN is going to be effective, it
must be accountable. 'The UN is probably the least
accountable government-based bureaucracy in the world' said
Alex de There is
[a] need for a freedom of information
act, so UN officials cannot hide from the public
everything from their salaries to their mistakes to how much they're
spending on public relations. And, finally, or perhaps
first, there must be an independent watchdog organization with full power
to investigate UN agencies. The General Assembly has the authority
to establish a commission of inquiry to examine what went wrong in
Ray Bonner,
"Why we went": How the United Nations turned its back on
[Note: the full
article is available at MotherJones.com under the
author's name.]
"Taking action
against wrongdoing Taking action against
violation of standards is the shared responsibility of managers and
external investigative bodies. OECD countries recognize that
disciplinary actions against a breach of public service standards should
be taken within the organization where the breach occurred. All
governments have developed a general framework for disciplinary procedures
that both allows managers to impose timely and just sanctions and
guarantees a fair process for the public servants.
Although public service
managers have the primary responsibility for initiating disciplinary
measures in their agencies in a timely manner, they may also receive
assistance from specific external institutions. These external institutions are the
primary instruments for investigating and prosecuting misconduct in the
public service. These bodies have the power to bring suspected cases
of corruption directly to court in all OECD countries. Moreover, two-thirds
of countries have procedures and mechanisms to enable the public to signal wrongdoing to bodies
exercising independent scrutiny on public service
activities." "Annex I: OECD
public management policy brief on building public trust: Ethics measures
in OECD countries," in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Public sector transparency and
accountability: Making it happen, OECD,
[In corporate
The Directors
are taking their
once-ceremonial duties
far more seriously.
[The bigggest change]
is the all-important audit
committee.
[The members]
now have the power to spend company money on their
own lawyers, accountants, and forensic investigators
[and to supervise
the external] auditors.
The Auditors
[are more
powerful] than ever.
[Their] newfound assertiveness can lead
to some bloody showdowns with CEOs -- with the boss sometimes losing.
The Lawyers
[are] more
likely to be hired [as advisors] by directors, and
to behave as if their
true clients are shareholders
especially
[in] 'independent internal
investigations'
The U.S. Justice Dept. [can bring] criminal charges
against companies
[and] merely being charged with a crime [can amount]
to a death sentence
[especially for] those businesses
that are built on public trust
Of course,
CEO's are still in charge, but their power is much more limited. The age of the absolute corporate monarch
is
over." David Henry, Mike
France, and Louis Lavelle, "Special report: The boss on the sidelines", Business Week Europe,
IO Watch will continue to follow the story of the
UN's newest attempts in 2005 and beyond to overcome its perpetual
management crisis in this subsection. However, the overall Management
Accountability Struggles section of the archive continues with a brief
look at UN management systems reform problems, and then a detailed
examination of the damage done by the Secretariat's recent "free the
managers" campaign. |
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