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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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The General Assembly was very
forward-looking in the early 1990s when it specifically and repeatedly
urged a confidential hotline and whistle-blower reporting for use by an
extremely reluctant UN Secretariat.
This initiative was part
of the growing recognition worldwide that fraud and abuse are pervasive problems which cost organizations billions of dollars
every year. It is very important that all types of organizations, both
public and private, have strong programmes to detect, deter, and prevent
fraud, particularly asset misappropriation, corruption, and fraudulent
statements. According
to an extensive survey in the United States in 1996, the average company
loses 6 percent of its total annual revenue to fraud and abuse committed
by its own employees, and the most serious abuses are committed by
managers, because of their greater organizational power. The
billions of dollars lost make it clear that preventing fraud is
essential.
Wells, Joseph T, Occupational
fraud and abuse, Obsidian, Austin TX (USA), 1997, esp. pp. 33-51.
An
employee hotline for anonymous reporting, staffed with professional
investigators and protecting the "whistle blowers", is very important to
help audit and investigation units identify problems and curb waste and
losses. An effective hotline can also reduce
occupational abuse and harassment, improve employee productivity, enhance
employee morale, and demonstrate that an organization is trust-worthy and
acts to correct its mistakes and problems. Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, and its EthicsLine at www.FraudInfo.com .
Other
knowledgeable assessments have confirmed the importance of this
process. For
instance: As the international
community is increasingly recognizing, employees (especially public
employees) are an invaluable source of information about official
corruption.
Whistleblower
protection laws are intended to make it safe for employees to disclose
misconduct that they discover during the course of their
employment.
.
the international community has
begun to devise and adopt a variety of laws and procedures for protecting
and encouraging whistle blowing.
.
statutory protection for
whistleblowers is only part of the equation, albeit an important
part. Cultural
change and top down support must accompany whistleblower protection laws
in order for them to achieve their
objectives." Elaine Kaplan, "The international emergence of legal protections for whistleblowers", The Journal of Public Inquiry, Fall/Winter 2001, pp., 37- 42 [37, 42]. [emphasis added.] "Even when
systemic requirements
[for fighting corruption] are well satisfied on paper, they
?
an
independent and competent judiciary ?
adequate prosecutorial capabilities ?
whistle blower protections ?
Periodic asset declarations by senior public officials and
[oversight] organizations] ?
Empowerment of private
enforcers by giving them
the right to recover damages and have government actions
invalidated ?
Protections for the media to enable them to
keep up the pressure for reform." Richardson, Peter, "The global
assault on corruption", The Journal of Public Inquiry, Fall/Winter
2001, p. 6.
[Note: in the UN, the first element is totally
missing, the second element is apathetic, and the third seems to be all a
facade, as discussed in this subsection. The fifth, which can empower
whistle-blowers by giving them a financial share in waste and fraud
identified, can be an extremely powerful incentive: if it were ever applied as a tool
in the UN, it would certainly increase savings and fund recoveries many
times over.]
"Monitoring
compliance Sound ethics management not only
sets standards of behaviour but also monitors compliance with these
standards. Internal
control is widely used to detect individual irregularities and systemic
failures in OECD countries.
Internal control is accompanied
by independent scrutiny.
This scrutiny keeps
public servants accountable for their actions
In virtually all
countries, the legislative branch undertakes reviews of public service
activities. Other common
types of scrutiny range from external investigation by the Ombudsman or
the Inspector General to specific judicial or ethics reviews.
Reporting misconduct by
public servants is either required by law and/or facilitated by
organizational rules in two-thirds of OECD countries. A growing need to protect
whistleblowers in the public service is also visible across OECD
countries.
the most
commonly provided safeguards are legal protection and anonymity. In two-thirds of OECD countries
citizens have access to services, such as complaint procedures, an
Ombudsman or Inspector General, and help desks or telephone lines,
enabling them to expose wrongdoing by public
servants." "Annex I: OECD public management policy brief on building public trust: Ethics measures in OECD countries," in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Public sector transparency and accountability: Making it happen, OECD, Paris, 2002, p. 192. [emphasis added.]
But precisely because
whistle-blower mechanisms can be so effective in exposing wrongdoing,
organizational leaders can and quite often do make it extremely unpleasant
for people who contemplate speaking out (unless they are very firmly
protected): "This article discusses the
experience of certified accountants and human resource professionals faced
with situations that caused them personal angst. Because of their organizational
impotence and fear for
[their careers], none felt able to significantly
challenge the practices in question.
The analysis contends that individual attempts to exercise moral
agency will be stillborn as long as significant power asymmetries exist,
accountability mechanisms are inadequate, the act of whistleblowing is
judged to be a more serious offence than the crime it reports, and
managerial imperatives allow organizational loyalty to supercede personal
integrity and societal interests." Alan
Lovell, "The enduring phenomenon of moral muteness: Suppressed whistle
blowing", Abstract, Public Integrity [US], , vol. 5, no. 3,
Summer 2003, pp. 187-204. [Note: the groups
cited are of particular importance. Certainly in the UN it is the mid- and
lower-level staff in finance and personnel who most regularly are exposed
to the games, evasions, abuses, and other "special treatment" that many
managers regularly expect, and must process them. What
discouraging and amazing stories these long-suffering people would have to
tell.] In light of the recent and evolving Enron scandal in
the multinational corporate world, the Economist has reported that legislation to give
greater protection to people who expose government corruption is being
introduced in a number of countries. To underscore the importance to society
of protecting those who report corruption, the article observed that
"whistleblowing is good for society, but bad for careers: it should
be good for both."
"Corporate
malpractice: In praise of whistleblowers", and "Whistleblowing:
Peep and weep", both in the Economist, January 12th, 2002, pp. 13-14 and 61-62, and Philip H. Jos et al., "In praise of difficult people: A
portrait of the committed whistleblower", Public
Administration Review (USA), November/December
1989, pp. 552-560.
[Note: among the many other articles on the travails of whistle-blowers, see those cited in the bibliography in the introductory subsection to Internal Oversight: The OIOS .
In the UN, the General Assembly's calls for a
confidential hotline and staff reporting of abuses from 1990 onward were
met by this very kind of opposition and obstruction (as the Secretariat
had presciently predicted in 1992, as noted below.) Despite the eventual
establishment of the OIOS and its investigation section, the Secretariat
efforts to downplay the process and find ways to undermine it have
continued on to the present day. The General Assembly requested specific action on
these matters in 1990, stating that it: "Requests the Secretary-General
(b) To consider
effective measures to facilitate reporting by staff members on a
confidential basis of any inappropriate use of [UN] resources, and to
report to the General Assembly
[in 1991], (c) To implement stringent
inventory controls on non-expendable property and to report thereon
[in 1991], (d) To institute without delay more
effective control on the payment of all allowances and benefits to staff
members and to report on measures taken in this regard
[in 1991]; 14. Reaffirms the importance of
strict compliance with financial regulations and rules on the subject of
unliquidated obligations, and requests
a thorough report
[in 1991];" "Financial reports
and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of
Auditors,"
General Assembly resolution 45/235 of 21
December 1990. [emphasis
added.]
In 1991, the Assembly strengthened its request to
focus on "the implementation of effective measures" to facilitate
confidential reporting. In 1992, concerned about deficiencies
and inappropriate or fraudulent use of resources reported by the Board of
Auditors, it further requested the Secretary-General to make proposals for
legal and effective mechanisms to obtain recovery of misappropriated
funds, and to seek criminal prosecution of those who have committed fraud
against the organization. "Financial reports
and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of
Auditors,"
General Assembly resolution 46/183 of 20
December 1991 , para. 17 (b), and "Financial reports
and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of
Auditors,"
General Assembly resolution 47/211 of 23
December 1992. Despite this set of requests, the Secretariat opposed
any such action. In its report, which appeared in late
1992, it argued against disturbing the status
quo, including intimations that it would be quite difficult to protect
UN staff from vengeful managers. "United Nations
staff members [especially managers in administration and finance]
are required to report to
senior management any inappropriate uses of [UN resources].
ample provision exists both
in the Financial Rules and the Staff Rules for assigning personal
responsibility
for any financial loss incurred
Such
provisions
have been invoked when required
[and] serve as a
deterrent to the potential misuse of the Organization's resources.]
[Whistleblower]
programmes are thus far to be found in only a few Member
States. At the national
level
those who report
abuses have frequently been the target of retaliation since
it has been
difficult to guarantee confidentiality
[also there are problems of]
extensive due process requirements
and unfounded and malicious
reports
[establishing] an administrative structure, with the
associated costs
would
be compounded in
[a global] organization [like the UN.] The difficulties
[of such a system] might therefore outweigh the potential benefits
It
seems
best
[to apply] strict adherence to the existing UN provisions
and the
enhancement of existing internal controls. The matter will,
however, be kept under active review. Should developments warrant in the
future, ,,, additional measures would be reconsidered and the General
Assembly would be so informed. The Secretary-General
attaches great importance to his fiduciary responsibility vis-ΰ-vis Member
States for the prudent management of resources entrusted to the
Organization. Care is taken to ensure that these resources are
utilized for the purposes for which they were provided, that they are
spent with all due regard for economy and that there is accountability at
all stages for their use." "Measures to facilitate
reporting by staff members of inappropriate uses of the resources of the
organization:
. : Report of
the Secretary-General", UN document A/47/510 of October 8, 1992, paras. 9-14. [emphasis
added.] [Note: The Secretariat, as
usual, gave no data on how many, or how few, times the existing punitive
sanctions had been invoked. Its dire statements about how difficult
it would be to protect those who report wrongdoing in the UN, however,
have proven to be very true, as discussed below.]
The principles and staff responsibilities which
underlie the reporting of wrongdoing have also long been "on the books" in
UN staff guidance, the UN rules, and especially in the UN Charter: -- the UN standards of conduct for
UN staff of 1954, 1965 and 1982 obliged staff
to set out the relevant facts of an irregular situation; gave them the
right to record their views in the official files; called on supervisors
to exercise scrupulous care
in allowing the views of their junior
officers to be heard, particularly where those views are opposed to their
own"; and stated that "the subordinate official
has the right , which
should be safeguarded, to record his views in the official files
"
"Report on the
standards of conduct in the international civil service 1954",
International Civil Service Advisory Board, COORD/CIVIL SERVICE/5, October
1954, reprinted May 1986, United Nations,
paras. 12-16,
also was
reprinted in full as Annex V in "Status, basic rights and duties of United Nations
staff members", ST/SGB/1998/19 of 10 December 1998. [Note: The revised
UN Staff Rules issued in December 1998 and in November 2002 unfortunately
and regrettably omit this clear and forceful prior language about staff
integrity and responsibility from the new rules (and omit whistle-blower
rights entirely), despite much general discussion and commentary on proper
staff conduct and integrity. This grave omission by the UN
Secretariat is discussed further at the conclusion of this
subsection.]
-- Staff Regulation 1.2(e) states that "By accepting
appointment, UN staff members pledge themselves to discharge their
functions and regulate their conduct with the interests of the
Organization only in view.
"Status, basic
rights and duties of United Nations staff members", ST/SGB/2002/13 of 1 November 2002. [Note: This staff
guidance was revised in 1998 to add more specific emphasis on basic staff
obligations to former staff regulations 1.1 and 1.9]
-- most important of all,
Article 101, paragraph 3 of the UN Charter, which underlies the Staff
rules and regulations, emphasizes that "the paramount consideration" in
staff matters "shall be the necessity of securing
the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity, all
core values which are certainly involved in the new procedure allowing
staff to report allegations of waste and mismanagement. "Status, basic
rights and duties of United Nations staff members", ST/SGB/2002/13 of 1 November 2002.
In 1993 a JIU report on accountability and oversight
observed (contrary to the October 1992 Secretariat report) that the UN
Secretariat was not well equipped to deal with corruption problems. It made some
useful observations on the value of staff reporting of wrongdoing and the
negative Secretariat response: "One of the most
important ways to combat waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption problems is
through
the vigilance and co-operation of those most knowledgeable about
programme operations. Staff and other people involved in
United Nations programmes (especially in the field) can play a very
important role by reporting possible violations through 'hotlines'
maintained by independent oversight units. This process requires rigorous
confidentiality and protection of the rights of the people under
investigation, and of the 'whistleblowers' who submit the allegations from
immediate or subsequent reprisals.
The Inspectors
are concerned, however, at a central message in the Secretary-General's
(October 1992 report, cited above], namely that protecting staff who
report abuses from retaliation is too difficult
The Inspectors
believe that the
Secretariat should not imply or assert its helplessness to protect staff
from vengeful managers. Instead, top management should actively
encourage and protect confidential staff reporting
to combat the
debilitating effects of
corruption in the [UN Secretariat.] "
Joint Inspection
Unit, "Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN
document
A/48/420, 1993, paras. 80, 84-86.
[emphasis
added]
The General Assembly, for
its part, did not give up on the need for a strong anti-fraud programme in
the Secretariat. In its resolution 48/218 A of December
1993 establishing the new management accountability system, it stated that
it: "E.II., Recognizing also the need for an enhanced
oversight function to ensure the effective implementation of [UN]
activities
; 9. Resolves that the decision to establish an
additional independent entity
to enhance oversight functions
11.
shall continue
at the earliest possible opportunity
; III.
Determined to
address alleged cases of fraud in the United Nations in an impartial
manner, in accordance with due process of law and full respect for the
rights of each individual
2. Also decides to this end to establish
an ad hoc
working group of experts
to report to the General Assembly [in 1994]." "Review of the
administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations", General
Assembly resolution 48/218 A, 23 December
1993, sections II. And III. [Note: The work of
this group is described further in the subsecition on Major ongoing flaws .]
A year later, General Assembly resolution 48/218 B established the
OIOS. It quite expressly and specifically called for permitted and
protected staff reporting of misconduct, due process for all concerned,
and disciplinary proceedings where necessary. These
provisions are central to this section and to the UN's "disappeared
whistle-blowers": "[The General
Assembly] Requests the
Secretary-General to ensure that the [OIOS] has procedures in place that
provide for direct confidential access of staff members to the
Office and for protection
against repercussions, for the purpose of suggesting improvements
for programme delivery and reporting perceived cases of misconduct; Also
requests the Secretary General to ensure that procedures are also in place
that protect individual rights, the anonymity of staff members, due
process for all parties concerned and fairness during any
investigations, that
falsely accused staff members are fully cleared and that disciplinary and/or
jurisdictional proceedings are initiated without undue delay in
cases where the
Secretary-General considers it justified: such procedures shall
include any necessary
amendments to the Staff Regulations and Rules of the United
Nations and, to the extent possible, should take into account the relevant
recommendations, approved by the Assembly, of the intergovernmental group
established under resolution 48/218 A;" "Review of the
administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations", General
Assembly resolution 48/218 B of 29 July 1994,
paras. 6-7. The Secretary-General issued an official Bulletin
elaborating on these matters, and they were also reflected in an OIOS
mission pamphlet, a detailed Investigations Section Manual, and a
1996
circular to all staff on OIOS investigations of "mismanagement,
misconduct, waste of resources, and abuse of authority". "Establishment
of the Office of Internal Oversight Services", Secretary-General's
Bulletin, ST/SGB/273 of 7 September 1994, "The Office of
Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations: Its genesis, its
mission, its working methods, its impact", UN Dept. of Public Information,
February 1996, "United Nations
[OIOS] Investigations Section, Manual", "Terms of reference
for investigations by the [OIOS]: Mismanagement, misconduct, waste of
resources and abuse of authority", ST/IC/1996/29 of 25 April 1996.
The OIOS investigation functions and detailed
guidance thus provide for its professional, in-depth investigations; a
system for staff reporting of wrongdoing; and the dramatic new possibility
(and reality) of criminal charges against UN staff before national court
systems.
The OIOS
was thus poised to have a much greater impact on UN operations,
staff conduct, and oversight than the weak internal audit efforts of the
past (but starting with the same staff), and to become the Organization's
main "corruption fighter". The Secretary-General's Bulletin of 1994 made it
clear that the new OIOS hotline mechanism and staff reporting processes
were a very serious matter. The guidance deserves to be noted in
some detail: "18. The Office may receive and investigate
reports from staff and other persons
suggesting improvements
and reporting perceived
cases of possible violations of rules or regulations, mismanagement,
misconduct, waste of resources or abuse of authority.
staff members and others
can make directly to the Office suggestions and reports which shall be received and handled in
complete confidence. Further procedures
and related arrangements
are designed to protect individual rights, the anonymity of staff and
others, due process for all parties concerned and fairness during any
investigation, as well as to protect against
reprisals. (a)
Investigations shall respect the individual rights of staff members and be
conducted with strict
regard for fairness and due process for all concerned
" (b) The
[USG of OIOS] shall designate the officials authorized to receive such
suggestions and reports
[who] shall be responsible for safeguarding
[them]. Unauthorized
disclosure
shall constitute misconduct
(e) The transmittal
of suggestions or reports to the Office with knowledge of their falsity or
with willful disregard of their truth or falsity shall constitute
misconduct, for which disciplinary measures may be imposed. (f) No action shall be taken
against staff or others as a reprisal or making a report or disclosing
information to, or otherwise cooperating with, the Office. Disciplinary
proceedings shall be initiated and disciplinary action shall be taken in respect of any
staff member who is proven to have retaliated against a staff member
or other person who has submitted suggestions or reports to the
Office or otherwise cooperated with the Office." "Establishment of
the Office of Internal Oversight Services", Secretary-General's Bulletin,
ST/SGB/273 of 7 September 1994, section D,
"Investigation,." para. 18.
[emphasis added] Central participants and observers at the UN
underscored the importance of the new OIOS investigation functions and of
firm leadership efforts to properly apply them, as expressed by a UN
manual for Member States, the outgoing UN top manager, Richard Thornburgh,
in 1993, and by Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart in 1994: '
the sine qua non is a power
figure dedicated to independent investigation of an allegation on its
merits, who will protect the anti-corruption
authority from improper pressures or will allow it
to resist and ignore
threats of career retaliation.'" "Crime prevention
and criminal justice in the context of development:
Practical measures
against corruption: Manual", Eighth United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba,
A/CONF.144/8 of 29 May 1990.
[emphasis added.]
"The United Nations presently is almost totally
lacking in effective means to deal with fraud, waste and abuse by staff
members [as]
recently highlighted in
the news media.
The chronically fragmented and inadequate
[UN internal oversight structure] is currently so
ineffective that, time and again, we have been called on to create ad hoc teams to carry out investigations of
serious wrongdoing. The delay [in organizing]
these teams often allows the trail to 'grow cold" [and]
deprives the investigation of the vitality
professionalism and impartiality [of]
more regularized procedures. Dick Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations", 1 March 1993, pages 29-31.
"With the vast
increase in United Nations activities and expenditures resulting from the
organization's newfound status as a global 911 emergency number, its
capacity for ensuring the integrity of its operations is more important
than ever. The recent report
by the UN Financing Advisory Group, led by Paul Volcker and Shijuro Ogata,
noted specifically that 'support for improved financing will be dependent
upon a perception that funds are economically managed and effectively
spent.
What is needed is
an Office of Inspector General, staffed to audit, investigate and lay the
basis for remedial action in serious cases of conflict of interest,
misappropriation of funds or other corrupt practices. The inspector general's
office is the centerpiece of [the] agenda for reform that I
presented to Secretary-General Butros Butros-Ghali upon completion of my
one-year assignment at the United Nations." Dick Thornburgh, "How to clean up the United Nations", International Herald Tribune, March 26, 1993. [emphasis added]
"Internal procedures to enable
staff to report palpable misconduct without fear [and on the other hand
without creating an atmosphere of witch-hunting] should be improved. The
UN's ability to pursue miscreants through national jurisdictions needs to
be strengthened. After decades of periodic suggestions
for an Inspector General to be attached directly to the Office of the
Secretary-General, this issue is now being actively pressed. This may, on
balance, be helpful but not really effective if the IAD remains so grossly
understaffed.
To carry maximum
credulity and universal confidence the appointee must be of impeccable
repute and with top-calibre qualifications for such work." Erskine Childers,
with Brian Urquhart, "Renewing the United Nations system", Development Dialogue, 1994:1, Dag Hammarskjold
Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1994, pp.
146-147. [emphasis
added]
Despite all these observations and quite firm and
specific operational guidance from the General Assembly on whistle-blowers
and the conduct of investigations, however, the new head of OIOS, Mr. Karl
T. Paschke, made his position clear shortly after his arrival as the new
head of the OIOS. He expressed his limited interest in
the UN staff (meaning non-managers), proclaiming after only four months
that they should be reduced by up to 20 percent. But his most
controversial and awkward step was to express his strong distaste for
staff who might use the new OIOS "hotline" mechanism, which the General
Assembly had insisted on in considerable specific detail. He told the
Fifth Committee of the General Assembly in early 1995 that: "As part of the investigation function, we now have
procedures for receiving confidential information
I will guarantee complete confidentiality to all those who wish to provide
us with information on problems.
Having said this I must
add immediately that I am not comfortable with receiving anonymous
messages, and will certainly do nothing to encourage this
practice. In any case, this should be seen as a system of last
resort.
The first, and by far the most important way, for staff to voice
complaints and make suggestions must be to and through their immediate
supervisors. When I was told I would have to take anonymous tips
into account in my new job I was reminded of
Hamlet,
who was given a suggestion by a ghost
[and] then proceeded to procrastinate. He was a rational man and had his
doubts about acting on the advice of ghosts. I hope I am
not put in a similar situation myself too often." "Statement by Karl
Th. Paschke
to the Fifth Committee," 5
December 1994, pp. 11-12 , [emphasis added]
and "Paschke speaks his
mind: Calls for staff reduction," UN Staff
Report (NY), March 1995, p. 3.
Mr. Paschke picked the wrong image -- of staff who
report waste and misconduct as cowardly "sneaks" -- instead of
law-abiding, responsible people who report wrongdoing in good faith. IO Watch
believes that his outspoken views were highly improper for an
inspector-general expressly responsible for a protected hotline function.
They also undermined the above clearly-stated UN staff obligations, and
his role as an authority figure that UN staff could trust. As a close
observer of UN goings-on in New York acerbically assessed it: "Karl T. Paschke's
introductory remarks to the Fifth Committee reveal a man curiously laid-back for
a job that requires cracking down on waste, abuse, and
corruption. Could it be that Paschke is
finessing? True, coming on like gangbusters would have been a
mistake, given the well-known misgivings in the higher echelons of the
Secretariat about the whole enterprise. So Paschke went out of his way to
acknowledge that Butros Boutros-Ghali still is boss in the house, although
his emphasis on his own role as 'adviser' may have been a bit exaggerated.
Paschke does not invite anonymous tips and would
prefer that staffers go through their immediate supervisors with
complaints.
If meant seriously, that's perhaps a little naοve. Supervisors
like to have a tidy shop and who among them would look kindly on a
subordinate whistleblower. As long as guarantees of
confidentiality can be maintained, far better
[that staff] pass it along through the dedicated telephone
line
" "Diplomatic pouch"
by Petronius, Diplomatic World Bulletin (NY), December 12, 1994.
[emphasis added.] [Note: as discussed
at the
end of the subsection Investigation efforts: Is OIOS a fig
leaf? , Mr. Paschke was also, unfortunately,
very much a man of his culture: as recently as May 2004, a German
court strengthened employers' rights to fire whistleblowers for "breach of
loyalty". ]
Mr. Paschke later realized that his stated distaste
for whistleblowers, plus his oft-expressed strong intent to "work closely
with managers", undermined his direct and specific oversight
responsibilities and thus the credibility which "inspector generals"
anywhere must have. He made various corrective public
statements about staff reporting misconduct, assuring that
he would "protect them fully", "would not hesitate to intervene
personally" with difficult managers, would not tolerate violation of UN
rules, and would seek criminal prosecutions in national courts "even for
lesser cases". "Statement by Karl
Th. Paschke to the Fifth Committee", 5
December 1994, pp. 4-5, 7-8, 11-12, "Press briefing by
OIOS", 29 Oct 1995, 8
February 1996, and 31 October 1996, "Interview with
USG/OIOS", What's New, Staff Journal (New
York), WN/3 of 21 August 1996, p. 4,
"Answer of Mr. Karl Th.
Paschke", UN Special,
December 1996, p. 42, "L'ONU continue de souquer ferme pour
tenir la cadence des rιformes", Tribune de
Geneve, April
1997, p. 14, "UN investigating
more fraud cases", Reuters, International Herald
Tribune, 4 September 1997, and
"L'ONU enquκte sur
plusieurs cas de fraude", Tribune de Geneve,
3 Octobre 1997, p. 14.
IO Watch has attempted to work systematically through
all the OIOS annual reports, various topical reports, public statements of
Mr. Paschke and his successor, Mr. Dileep Nair, staff reactions, media
reports, and other documentation on OIOS work and especially its
investigations.
It has found the following disturbing patterns: -- The new and very understaffed and
slowly-developing OIOS Investigations Section quickly piled up a very
large backlog of reports from staff (and in fact that backlog has only
continued to grow, as discussed further at the end of this subsection.)
-- OIOS dismissed many of the reports made
to it as mere "personnel matters" (a categorization decided on by the
Office itself) and then casually passed these sensitive matters on to the
Administration [often without informing the staff member of that action,
and in some cases with disastrous consequences for that person's career.]
-- The Office admitted that it rejects many of the
reports made to it because it judged (again, within its powers but with no
contact with the person reporting and no objection possible) that many of
them provided insufficient evidence for action. -- In addition, and more damaging, many UN staff know
of serious reports that other people have made to the OIOS over the past
decade without ever receiving any (or only a very tardy) reply or
follow-up.
-- Even worse, the OIOS also apparently added a new,
and discreet, category of cases which Mr. Paschke reported back to the
staffs' managers as "internal matters" for them to handle by "normal
procedures." This led some other Administration officials to rightly
request Mr. Paschke's specific guidance on what such "internal matters"
and "normal procedures" might be, but without any apparent success. -- In the few major investigations of mismanagement of
which the OIOS is so proud -- fund misuse in UNCTAD, mismanagement of
the Rwanda war crimes tribunal, a scandal at a UN unit in Nairobi, a
scandal involving the UN top corruption-fighter, and refugee sexual abuse
scandals, the OIOS fails to note that it investigated only after concerned
UN staff or outsiders publicly exposed the situations. In a number
(perhaps most?) of those cases, the OIOS subsequently, conspicuously, and
promptly exonerated any senior officials involved.
-- The OIOS has even recently begun informing at least
some staff rather dismissively that their inquiries on severe misconduct
would more appropriately be handled by appeals through the UN's internal
justice system [knowing fully well the futility of this action, since OIOS
itself has often complained about the laborious and drawn-out JAB
procedures, and also the widely-acknowledged and now much criticized flaws
of the internal justice" system (see the conclusions of the following
subsection on the Inept "Administration of Justice" System
and other related subsections under Where is the Rule of Law? .]
UN staff are not stupid. An early
insider assessment in 1996 noted that OIOS had investigative results that
were "paltry indeed", because its staff were either experienced UN
veterans who would not "make waves", or newcomers woefully innocent about the
UN. It
observed that: "There are whispers
that senior staff need not fear their peccadilloes will be exposed. "Paschke's
Finest", it is said, will rake no muck above a certain level of political
or bureaucratic influence." "Diplomatic pouch", Diplomatic World Bulletin, July29-August 6, 1996, p. 10, and "Wake up, Paschke", Foreign
Report, Jane's, London, Sept. 12th, 1996,
p. 5 . Similarly, a 1997 article on the emerging problems
and serious levels of UN corruption observed that: "UN employees --
who request anonymity because they fear they will suffer more professional
harm than the corrupt officials they want to expose -- have provided
numerous accounts of officials' being transferred rather than dismissed
after being caught breaking the rules. This happens
frequently in cases of sexual harassment, nepotism, and occasionally
violence, according to these accounts. Whistle-blowers are neither encouraged
nor rewarded." Barbara Crossette, "In war on corruption and waste, UN confronts
well-entrenched foe", International Herald
Tribune, 3 November 1997.
The General Assembly also was not impressed by
several years of OIOS talk, and instead was becoming increasingly
concerned at the persistence of corruption problems (based on the forceful
reporting provided to it by the UN external auditors): "The General
Assembly,
Expressing deep concern about the persistence of
problems and defects observed by the Board of Auditors in the financial
administration and management of the United Nations;
11. Notes with deep concern the incidents of fraud
and presumed fraud reported by the Board of Auditors; 12. Requests the Secretary-General and the executive
heads
to take the disciplinary actions necessary in cases of proven
fraud and to enhance the individual accountability of United Nations
personnel, including through stronger managerial control;
15. Emphasizes the need for greater transparency and
stricter controls for trust funds
17. Notes
that further work needs to be done in the
biennium 1996-1997 to bring the financial statements fully in line with
the United Nations common accounting standards, and requests the
Secretary-General and the executive heads
to pursue their efforts to
ensure full compliance with those standards." "Financial reports and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors," General Assembly resolution 51/225 of 16 May 1997.
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