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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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Other
troubling events suggest that the OIOS was (and still is) dragging its
feet on hotline and whistle-blower
processes, just as the Secretariat did with the overall management
accountability reforms. For example, OIOS decisions to quickly dismiss
staff reports on wrongdoing may be understandable for "crank" or poorly
documented complaints, but the proportion of reports that OIOS rejected
for these reasons seems quite high (even though its annual reporting is
too vague to determine this precisely). It
must also be recognized that all documentation on UN whistle-blowing
activity is locked away in OIOS files to "protect" staff, a legitimate
process but also one that forever removes the cases from any scrutiny of
how they were handled -- or
ignored -- by OIOS officials, whose public
reporting of investigation results and patterns achieved within its
mysterious "black box" has already been noted as being quite
non-transparent. In
his own whistle-blower confrontation, Mr. Paschke angrily and flatly
refused to respond to serious anonymous charges made about his decisions
in staffing his Office, while threatening whichever OIOS staff had made
them. Yet in an appearance
before the Fifth Committee just months before, and under some pressure
concerning his relationship with staff and commitment to investigations
matters, he responded, again testily, to a delegate's questions
that: " … I categorically
reject the suggestion that I would in any way discriminate against a staff
member who reports problems or uncovers fraud." "Statement to the Fifth
Committee by Karl Th. Paschke, [USG for OIOS]," December 2, 1996 ,
and "Dear colleagues"
letter from Mr. Paschke of 31 March 1997. [Note: UN staff
members who had been or were being "sold out" by Mr. Paschke even as he
made the very public December statement were not impressed.]
The UN staff grapevine, as already noted, contains
many stories of failed reporting to OIOS, or information fed back to
bosses on "someone" making allegations about problems in their unit, with
quite unpleasant results. And a 1995 book on the "real UN" observed sagely
that "Introduction: A good
idea fallen among thieves The UN has the media
relations of a 1950s state bureaucracy. It doesn't like reporters
looking into its inner workings, and it threatens dire penalties to staff
found leaking information to the media. Time and time again, when journalists have exposed
scandals in the UN, senior officials set up an enquiry -- into who
leaked!" Ian Williams, The UN for beginners, Writers and Readers
Publishing, New York, 1995, p. 1.
A careful reading of the OIOS annual reports also
indicates a persistent bias toward managers, particularly in the steadily-
repeated desires to work closely and supportively with them, but also in
an eagerness to assuage any managerial fears. The Preface to Mr. Paschke's
1999 OIOS annual report stated that there had been "misapprehension and
fear" about OIOS, and emphasized again his desire to be a partner rather
than an adversary of management. In that final 1999 report Mr. Paschke then gave a
rather detailed account of a manager whom OIOS cleared of the accusations
made, concluding that staff (read "managers") should realize the
"valuable" OIOS investigations function of clearing those individuals who
have been wrongly accused. "One [OIOS
investigation of field operations] concerned a report alleging that … from
1992 to 1998,
two UNHCR staff members accepted kickbacks from vendors in exchange
for the disbursement of inflated payments and the procurement of excessive
quantities of rice seeds … and [that] … a false United Nations audit
report [thereon] … had been circulated to a local newspaper. [OIOS
determined]
that the investigation … did not substantiate the allegation of the
acceptance of kickbacks, … [and] the staff members accused [were
cleared.]
On the other hand, [OIOS established that] a purported United
Nations document was false and that it had been circulated to a newspaper
by a former UNHCR staff member male fide. The Investigations
Section considers that [such a case] highlights a function of the Section
that is valuable, but often overlooked. Through its recommendation to clear
staff members, the Investigations Section affords protection to those
individuals who have been either wrongly accused or against whom
sufficient evidence does not exist." "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services" A/54/393 of 23 September 1999, paras.
56-57.
[Note: the concern
for managers' rights expressed here is impressive, but in this case the
other party was a UN auditor, who was fired. There appears
never to have been a corresponding OIOS
declaration of an instance in which it upheld a whistleblower, and
sanctioned the manager involved.]
However, despite the many doubts expressed about OIOS
investigatory zeal, Secretary-General Annan made only very soothing
general comments on, and no real analysis of, the first few OIOS annual
reports to the General Assembly. In introducing his transmittal letter
for the 1998 OIOS report, he stated that OIOS reports were an "extremely
valuable" source of reference and guidance" on UN reform and that he would
"continue to support … full and timely implementation by programme
managers" of OIOS recommendations. And, as Mr. Paschke finished his
five-year term, Mr. Annan provided a very strong integrity testimonial for
Mr. Paschke in 1999, stating that he: "concurs with the observations of [Mr. Paschke] that
the independence of the Office has never been compromised during his
tenure. He has enjoyed the complete support of the Secretary-General."
"Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services: Note by the Secretary-General", UN document A/53/428 of 23 September 1998 , transmittal note and Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services: Note by the Secretary-General", UN document A/54/393 of 23 September 1999, transmittal note.
A very pointed draft General Assembly assessment
resolution on the OIOS in 1998 had "encouraged" the Secretary-General to
act to ensure that UN auditors and investigators involved in uncovering
corruption matters are protected from reprisals, and that any complaints by
such auditors are promptly investigated. However, in 2000, after a year of consultations, the
General Assembly passed a final resolution, containing its required
"evaluation" of OIOS work after its first five years of operation. [It is
scheduled to make, or at least begin, another such "evaluation" in 2004.]
The Assembly stressed, concerning investigations, that the
Secretary-General should provide procedures to protect individual rights
of staff, including whistle-blowers, and called on him to submit a report
to the Assembly on OIOS procedures to ensure fairness and avoid possible
abuse in the investigation process. This had already been done in detail
by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, and the OIOS during the
1994-1997 period, but at least the request suggested Assembly awareness
that something was seriously wrong with UN investigation work. "Review of the
implementation of General Assembly 48/218 B," General Assembly resolution
54/244 of 31 January 2000. [The resulting report
was "Rules and procedures to be applied for the investigation
functions performed by the Office of Internal Oversight Services," UN
document A/55/469 of 11 October 2000. It merely
reiterated the existing OIOS protective procedures, but did help open a
whole "can of worms" about bizarre new Secretariat investigations, as
discussed in the preceding subsection on Unleashed
managers/investigators.]
Although the 2000 OIOS annual report cited the most
vigorous investigation work and processing of criminal cases ever
provided, the 2001 report was suddenly much more discrete. In 2002 the
OIOS annual report did not include a separate commentary on the
Investigations Section. Indeed, although some "crowd-pleasing"
investigation results were featured prominently in the preface, the word
"investigations" was nowhere to be found in the report's table of
contents.
"Report of the OIOS",
UN document A/55/436 of 2 October 2000, "Report of the OIOS",
UN document A/56/381 of 19 September 2001,
and"Report of the OIOS", UN document A/57/451 of 4
October
2002.
The 2003 OIOS annual report provided more stories of "hot cases," but only one item on
investigation work, "Rationalizing the services of investigations and
prioritization of cases." It was not very reassuring, since it stated that
the [newly upgraded] Investigations Division had received some 630 "new
matters" to be investigated, and had a standing backlog of some 200 items.
It assured readers that it evaluated them all carefully.
"Report of the OIOS", UN document A/58/364 of 11 September 2003, paras. 136-139.
Sadly, after a decade of OIOS investigative activity,
IO Watch's research has been able to find only one example of a successful
whistle-blower (even though she was fired.) How did she succeed? Because she
was employed by a UN contractor, not the UN. Thus she could
sue in a court of law like anyone else, and avoid the clutches of the
feckless UN internal justice system. "A British tribunal
has ruled that a former member of the UN police force in Bosnia was
unfairly fired after she reported to her superiors that colleagues in the
police force used women and children as sex slaves in connivance with
Balkan traffickers. … … the whistle blower,
Kathryn Bolkovac, an American citizen … charged that she was fired in 2000
for sending e-mails to her employer, DynCorp, [charging links with] …
prostitution rings. … the UN Mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina said the mission was not commenting because it was not a
party to the British legal action. … Kofi Annan, the
secretary-general of the UN, has said that there would be zero tolerance
for such acts. Bolkovac said she was
delighted with the tribunal's findings because it would help her gain more
international exposure for the problem posed by corrupt
peacekeepers." Barry James, "Whistleblower upheld in UN Bosnia police case: Firing of former officer unfair, court rules," International Herald Tribune, August 8, 2002. With this one lone "victor" in mind, SIX VERY IMPORTANT POINTS should be cited about
the importance of the disappearing UN whistle-blowers for UN
corruption-fighting, integrity, and management accountability, and the
strong need to reverse this situation. FIRST,
whistle-blowers present a direct and real integrity issue for daily life
and for UN staff responsibility at all levels, which has become lost in
all the hubbub of the UN Integrity Initiative and the new UN
Anti-Corruption Convention. The OIOS Investigations Manual, and an
excellent book on integrity, summarize just what a whistle-blower
is: "As a general
definition, a 'whistle blower' is a staff member who refused to engage in
and/or reports illegal or wrongful activities of his/her employer or
fellow staff member; … More precisely, a
'whistle blower' in the UN is a UN staff member who renders information to
the [Investigations Section] on misconduct, mismanagement, waste of
resources and/or abuse of authority … within the UN, reflecting sincerity
and honesty and thus revealing his/her good faith in the allegations
he/she makes …" "Investigation
section manual", Operating Procedure M, "Definition and handling of
whistle blower complaints/Issues of retaliation," p. 20, OIOS, New
York. "Integrity is like
the weather: everybody talks about it but nobody knows what to do about
it.
Integrity is that stuff we always say we want more of. …. When I refer to
integrity, I have something very simple and very specific in mind. Integrity …
requires three steps:
(1) discerning what is right and what is
wrong;
(2) acting on what you have discerned,
even at personal cost; and
(3) saying openly that you are acting
on your understanding of right from wrong. … A person of
integrity lurks somewhere inside each of us: a person we feel we can trust
to do right, to play by the rules, to keep commitments. …. Indeed, one reason to
focus on integrity as perhaps the first among the virtues that make for
good character is that it is in some sense prior to everything else: the
rest of what we think matters very little if we lack essential integrity,
the courage of our convictions, the willingness to act and speak in behalf
of what we know to be right." Stephen L. Carter, Integrity, 1996, Basic
Books, New York, pp. 6-7. [Note: Mr. Carter is
the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law at Yale University, and the
author of several critically-acclaimed books on related topics.]
In
the day-to-day operating world of the UN -- not the rhetorical one -- it
appears that the Secretariat has confirmed its initial warning in October
1992 that it would have difficulty operating a proper whistle-blower
programme.
However, a new UN-wide staff survey, released in June 2004,
suggests that UN staff recognize this shameful performance. The staff
responses criticized the way that the "ingrown" UN leadership handles
reporting of corruption: "A new survey [as part of a
UN campaign against global corruption] of internal perceptions of integrity of
]UN] officials shows that while structures for reporting and corruption
exist, most staff members are either unaware of how to use them or afraid
to do so for fear of high-level retaliation. 'The UN has a 'phone
book' of rules and regulations which are totally useless as they are never
practiced',
a staff member is quoted as saying in the report. 'Senior leaders
caught in serious breaches of ethics should be punished, not promoted as
usual.' another says. … 'Get rid of the old boy network,' one staff member is
quoted as saying. 'That network is wide, tenacious and
powerful.
It is the ruin of UN officers. So long as you can wind your way into
that network, you are OK. If not, you are doomed. Opposing the
network is certainly the end of a UN career." Warren Hoge, "Report
criticizes the way UN fights corruption", International Herald Tribune, June 16, 2004. [Note: Can the more
than 6,000 staff worldwide who responded to this survey be wrong about
this anti-integrity bias of the UN leadership?]
SECOND,
the UN leadership seems to have a grave integrity problem of its own. In 1998, the
UN Office of Legal Affairs, led by Under-Secretary-General Hans Corell
(who inter alia served as the "chief prosecutor" in the UN internal
justice system) chose not to
include specific provisions on whistle-blower and other staff
rights in investigations in a major revision of the UN Staff Regulations
and Rules.
This was not an oversight, since a closely-related provision on the
obligations of staff to cooperate in internal investigations
(including those now made by unqualified managers/investigators and
security officers) was included. That provision states that: "Staff members must respond fully to requests for information from
staff members and other officials of the Organization
authorized to investigate possible misuses of fund, waste or
abuse." "Status, basic
rights, and duties of United Nations staff members", ST/SGB/1998/19 of 10
December 1998, pages 23-24, Regulation 1.2 (r). [emphasis added.] However, the Secretary-General's Bulletin 1998/19,
which contains the code of conduct (i.e., the "phone book" mentioned in
the above staff survey) for UN staff, totally omits the closely-related rights of
all these staff, and especially whistle-blowers, in investigations, and the stated responsibilities
of the Secretary-General to ensure due process safeguards and
protection in the investigations process.
These staff rights were clearly spelled out in General
Assembly resolution 48/218 B of 1994, which even emphasized their eventual
inclusion in the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules, and were then expanded
upon further in an official Secretary General's Bulletin: "[The General
Assembly] Requests the
Secretary-General to ensure that the [OIOS] has procedures in place that
provide for direct confidential access of staff members to the
Office and for protection
against repercussions, for the purpose of suggesting improvements
for programme delivery and reporting perceived cases of misconduct;
Also requests the Secretary
General to ensure that procedures are also in place that protect
individual rights, the anonymity of staff members, due process for all
parties concerned and fairness during any
investigations, that
falsely accused staff members are fully cleared and that disciplinary and/or
jurisdictional proceedings are initiated without undue delay in
cases where the
Secretary-General considers it justified: such
procedures shall include any necessary amendments to the Staff Regulations
and Rules of the United Nations and, to the extent possible,
should take into account the relevant recommendations, approved by the
Assembly, of the intergovernmental group established under resolution
48/218 A;" "Review of the
administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations", General
Assembly resolution 48/218 B of 29 July 1994,
paras. 6-7, and "Establishment of the
Office of Internal Oversight Services", Secretary-General's Bulletin
ST/SGB/273 of 7 September 1994, para. 18. [emphasis added.]
The new (since 1 January 1999) UN Staff Regulations
are quite clear on this point as well. The relevant regulation and its
commentary state that: "Regulation 1.1
(c)
The Secretary-General shall ensure that the rights and duties of
staff members as set out in the Charter and the Staff Regulations and
Rules and in the relevant
resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly are
respected. Commentary 1. Staff
regulation 1.1 (c) is new. 2. The regulation codifies an
implicit duty that falls on the Secretary-General, that is, to
ensure that the rights and duties of staff members are
respected." "Status, basic rights and
duties of United Nations staff members", ST/SGB/2002/13 of 1 November
2002. [emphasis added.]
In
IO Watch's opinion, such a blatant exclusion of a detailed General
Assembly mandate protecting staff while including a provision on rigid
"cooperation" obligations (Regulation 1.2 (r)), not only shows disdain
toward the Assembly's mandates. It has obviously greatly harmed staff
whistleblowers who have been retaliated against over the entire decade
since the OIOS was established, but did not have the express staff rule
guidance to cite in their favor in appeals within the UN internal justice
system.
IO
Watch believes that this highly biased and selective revision of the Staff
Rules by the UN's top legal official is very damaging, and hardly an
expression of senior UN leadership integrity. Various words
from the UN's legal mumblings on such matters, such as the possibilities
of "gross negligence" and "dereliction of duty" come to mind. However, in
this case as in many others, Mr. Corell and some key associates left the
organization in 2004, allowing the case once again to be "closed" before
it ever opens. Nevertheless, the situation appears to require urgent
revision, particularly since the Administration's actions seem also to
directly violate the UN Charter provisions that: “1. The staff
shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the
General Assembly. … 3. The paramount consideration
in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the
conditions of service shall
be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency,
competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the
importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as
possible." Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Article 101. [emphasis
added.]
IO
Watch certainly hopes that the General Assembly will insist that this
matter (and any other staff rights also "overlooked" in preparing the 1998
code of conduct) be corrected. This issue is discussed further in the
subsections which follow on the UN Code of Conduct and Revision of the Code of Conduct
under Where is the Rule of Law? THIRD,
continuous weak staffing in the OIOS investigations unit has led to a
flood (and backlog) of staff reports. The Secretary-General's own
pronouncements in 1994 had laid out the conditions for success: "… [UN staff and
managers' capacity and expertise at all levels] must correspond to the
responsibility assigned and authority delegated and must be balanced by
full accountability through appropriate accountability mechanisms. An efficient
organizational oversight machinery will monitor the operation of the
system and conduct audits, inspections, evaluations and investigations …
The systematic control of the interrelated processes … will provide the
key to success … and contribute to the Organization's
effectiveness and efficiency. "Establishment of a
transparent and effective system of accountability and responsibility:
Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/49/1 of 5 August 1994, paras. 12 and 109.
[emphasis added.]
In fact, as discussed throughout IO Watch's analysis
of OIOS work, the OIOS has been continually preoccupied with consulting
and audit work, aid to other investigation units, working with programme
manager/investigators and security officers, and special initiatives for
integrity and broader oversight policy-making, rather than increasing the
tough business of proper staffing for serious work on a flood of staff
reports of wrongdoing. A rare chart in the 2001 OIOS annual
report showed that since 1994 OIOS cases received had risen from 95 in
1994-95 to 433 in 2000-2001, and the cumulative backlog (held below 15
cases for the 1994-1997 period) had shot up to 274 by June 2001.
"Report of the OIOS",
UN document A/56/381 of 19 September 2001, p.
44
The 2003 OIOS annual report stated that OIOS was
"Rationalizing the services of investigations and prioritization of
cases." It was not very reassuring, since it stated that the [newly
upgraded] Investigations Division had received some 630 "new matters" to
be investigated, and had a standing backlog of some 200 items. It stated
(not very convincingly) that a few new posts would be added in
peacekeeping and the new UN tribunals, but billions of dollars of
expenditure were still flowing by, and the investigators' processing of
reports and requests seemed not speeding up at all.
"Report of the OIOS", UN document A/587/364 of
11 September 2003, p. 44.
IO
Watch believes that with such an increasing backlog of incoming
cases, the staff whistleblowers putting themselves on the line and the UN
as well, if it is indeed seeking to fight corruption, are losing
badly.
Instead of receiving "careful assessment," IO Watch suspects that
many of the reports submitted may go, figuratively or actually, into the
wastebasket.
Much more investigation staff is needed, not least because of the
paltry OIOS cost savings realized relative to the $6 to $10 billion that
the UN spends every year. Whistleblowers are a critically
important, knowledgeable, and "free" resource for fighting fraud, but they
are not being used except to provide impressive OIOS statistics of "cases
received". The OIOS annual reports have never provided any
analysis of the nature, patterns, success rates, and impact of all these
reports that flow to it. What is more, an audit of OIOS processes
in 2002 by the Board of Auditors showed that it needed to better document
its reviews, and -- in particular -- "define the criteria when reports should
be prepared in respect of closed investigation cases." This suggests
that one may never see an analysis of OIOS handling of such
reports over the years, and also raises the very real issue for UN staff
of whether it is worth taking the risk of submitting whistle-blower
reports now. "Report of the OIOS", UN
document A/57/451 of 4 October 2002, p.
8.
FOURTH, in all the OIOS and Secretariat literature which IO
Watch has examined of the past decade, there is no mention of the word
"whistle-blowing." Mr. Paschke discussed the process in
other words, such as reports from staff, in the mid-1990s after he had to
reverse his earlier contempt for whistle blowing, but otherwise it is
simply a "non-word" in the UN. If whistle-blowing does not even exist
as a concept, then the whistle-blowers are invisible too, which seems very
much the way the Administration wants it. [A similar and closely related
phenomenon is that "waste, fraud and abuse" also are almost never
mentioned in official UN documents. Particularly when forced to face up to
the peccadilloes of its managers, the UN always prefers the more
ambiguous, bureaucratic, and mild "management irregularities".]
FIFTH,
the above OIOS report discussions noted the strong OIOS interest in
working closely with -- and not frightening -- managers, as indicated by
the relatively detailed "story" in the 1999 annual report (already noted,
paragraphs 56-57.)
In contrast, in all the OIOS reporting, IO Watch could
find only one tiny mention of the important area of whistleblower
protection.
In 1997, pressed for details for details by Member States on
retaliation matters, Mr. Paschke's 1997 report responded that: "The [OIOS] mandate
provides specific protection against retaliation for cooperation provided
to OIOS.
To date, OIOS has found and reported on one case of retaliation;
disciplinary action is pending." "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document A/52/426 of 2 October 1997, para. 111.
In
view of well over 2,000 cases received by the OIOS Investigations Division
(1,300 from 1994 to 2000, more since, and 630 for the 2002-2003 year
alone), it is hard to believe that there was one lone case (that is, a
rate of less than one-tenth of one percent) of a whistle-blower being
retaliated against (and perhaps there were no sanctions in that one case,
either.) IO
Watch believes that the UN record of an entrenched and weak management
culture, too many unprepared and abusive managers, lack of good management
systems and controls, diplo/inspector generals, and an "old boy" network
to be zealously protected have in fact created a rather bloody battlefield
of failed whistleblowers, but scarcely a finger lifted by OIOS to deal
with the retaliation that many UN staff know exists. This will be
discussed further in the following archive subsection on Suppressed
whistle-blowers. SIXTH
and finally, there is also a conspicuous silence at the top of the UN
about staff involvement in corruption-fighting (or indeed about UN
corruption-fighting at all), except for a "leave it to the OIOS" (and the
zealous investigating managers) attitude. In the past, the UN has tried on various
occasions to have a management improvement programme, or an incentives
awards system, or even the old-fashioned suggestion box. This time the
stakes of staff expression are much higher for managers than a proposed
cost savings idea, and there is only silence. Two key quotes go to the heart of what is involved
here. The
first underscores the well-known fact that no organizational reform can
succeed unless top leadership provides a clear, strong, visible, and
continuing support and example. The second is a reminder of the
blunt underlying reality -- that the UN Secretary-General, despite all the
diplomatic and policy-making glamour, is the UN's chief administrative
officer, under Article 97 of the UN Charter. "The United Nations presently is almost totally
lacking in effective means to deal with fraud, waste and abuse by staff
members [as]
…
recently highlighted in …
the news media. … … I believe
that few of the reports [presently] … produced will be taken seriously by
the auditees until the 'muscle' of your office is placed firmly behind a
consolidated effort carried out by a strong Inspector General's
office." Dick Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations", 1 March 1993, pages 29-31. [Note: The articles
referred to are those by William Branigin, "The UN empire: Polished image,
tarnished reality," a four part series, Washington Post, Sept.
21-24, 1992.
"The Secretary-General
attaches great importance to his fiduciary responsibility vis-à-vis Member
States for the prudent management of resources entrusted to the
Organization. Care is taken to ensure that these resources are utilized
for the purposes for which they were provided, that they are spent with
all due regard for economy and that there is accountability at all stages
for their use." "Measures to facilitate
reporting by staff members of inappropriate uses of the resources of the
organization:
…. : Report of
the Secretary-General", UN document A/47/510 of October 8, 1992, paras. 9-14. The OIOS investigation function did not really gather
momentum until about 1996, the last year of Mr. Butros Butros-Ghali's
tenure as UN Secretary-General. The eight subsequent years of OIOS
operation have been under Secretary-General Annan, but except for his
strong testimonial to the virtues of Mr. Paschke in 1999, he has chosen
largely only to "note with appreciation" the OIOS annual reports that he
passes along to the General Assembly. Mr. Annan has made many appeals for accountability and
integrity in general and in the UN Secretariat. But he seemed
never to have spoken out on the need to ensure that the UN's resources are
prudently overseen and that the Organization will be firm and proactive in
cracking down on fraud. Now, under the dark cloud of a
multi-billion dollar loss from the UN-administered oil-for-food programme
in Iraq; the June 2004 staff doubts about top-leadership interest in
corruption fighting; and not least his fundamental fiduciary
responsibility to Member States to use their billions of dollars worth of
funds properly, it may finally be time for Mr. Annan and his senior
officials to break their silence, and speak up for a real UN anti-fraud
campaign. One small chart in a recent article helps wrap up
nicely the value of whistle-blowing and aggressive action against fraud,
waste, and abuse in the real world, instead of the UN approach of "see no
whistle-blowing, hear no whistle-blowing, allow no whistle-blowing." The article
notes that: " …'whistle-tooting'
is … gaining credibility in the private sector as a management
strategy. Increasingly,
companies are devising formal channels, like reporting help lines, to
listen to the knowledgeable in their midst, according to an Erenst &
Young study last year on global fraud trends. … It's 'like an early
warning system', said an adviser with Public Concern at Work, a British
charity.
Public
concern offers company counseling to better use whistle-blowing as a
corporate resource and deterrent. …
For every [punished
whistle-blower] Public Concern insists that there are legions of unsung
whistle-blowers who effectively raise their concerns without repercussions
for themselves.
Gary Brown … a former
executive at Abbey National in Britain who reported suspicions about kickback
schemes … received a £25,000 reward from Abbey, a series of promotions,
and satisfaction that he did the right thing [after a bank executive was
convicted of a scheme to defraud the company of more than £2 million.]
'I'm always astounded
by how many negative stories are out there about whistle-blowers' Brown
said.
'Companies can do a lot to negate that by simply having a policy
that provides a friendly set of ears.'" Doreen Carvajal, The
workplace: Firms value whistle-blowers," International Herald Tribune, June 23, 2004.
The chart accompanying the above article, from the
Ernst & Young 2003 survey on global fraud trends, is a very simple
one: "What works
FACTOR
RANK
Internal controls 1 Whistle-blowing 2 Internal audit 3
Management review 4 Accident
5 External audit
6" Doreen Carvajal, The
workplace: Firms value whistle-blowers," International Herald Tribune, June 23, 2004.
Whistle-blowing in fact ranks as the number 2 method
to combat company fraud, but for a decade the UN has turned it into a
non-process. (Interestingly, the UN more or less controls items 1 and 4
above, and can moderate number 3 or number 5. The only one
beyond its control is the lowest ranked one, the work of the [part time]
external auditors.) It is time to put the powerful
whistle-blowing tool to work in the UN Secretariat, to respect and
publicly support its central integrity element, and to ensure that those
UN staff who do report wrongdoing and waste are protected, not
punished.
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