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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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If the internal controls just discussed seem lax, financial management
systems have for many years been even worse. A 1986 assessment of UN
financial decision-making outlined the unique, complex, and tortured
nature of basic UN processes for financing its
operations: " In drawing up [budgets]
, the
Secretary-General must calculate the costs involved in carrying out the
many activities that the U.N.'s intergovernmental bodies have
approved. At the same time,
he tries to ensure that the total budget does not exceed what member
states, and particularly the main contributors, are prepared to pay.
it
is not easy to find a generally acceptable balance
[In addition]
the regular
budget controls only a fraction of the total [UN] expenditures. As much as 70 percent of the
U.N.'s outlays are funded by other means
the various peacekeeping forces
most of the humanitarian and development activities
and the main
voluntary funds
Finally,
the power to initiate and in
effect authorize program activities is shared among [many]
intergovernmental organs.
Eventually
all adopted proposals are consolidated in the biennial program budget
where they tend to be lost in the mass of program detail in small print.
Since all the
many [approved] activities cannot be adequately carried out
there is a
good deal of uncertainty as to which of them will in fact be pursued and
with what degree of due diligence. The latitude that this leaves to
lower-level intergovernmental organs and to Secretariat officials may have
certain advantages, but it increases the difficulty of setting central
priorities and of allocating limited financial resources in a rational
way. This great dispersion of
programming power prevents the Assembly from taking full charge
a
situation
that concerns (or should concern) all the U.N.'s members, whether
big or small." Frederick K.
Lister, ,
Fairness and accountability in U.N. financial
decision-making, United Nations Management and Decision-Making Project
UNA-USA, by the United Nations Association of the United States of
America, New York, 1986, pp. 13 16,
22-24..
[emphasis added.]
The question of just how much money the UN receives,
let alone how and where it spends it, has been a mystery for a long time,
as established in both the late 1970s and late 1980s: Press reports
concerning the United Nations regular budget refer mainly to funds
committed for administrative needs, and exclude the far greater
operational costs of the U.N. System. The annual over-all budget of the
U.N., has, of recent years, been informally estimated at six billion
dollars. However, I find it impossible to establish a reliable yearly
total for the U.N.s attestable over-all expenditures, which appear to be
vastly in excess of that sum. The organization informs me that no
comprehensive figure can be provided. And piecemeal calculation cannot
hope to include the costs of every affiliate, subsidiary, and ad-hoc
undertaking of the U.N. system.
.
It is my impression that no one knows even the
approximate cost, to world citizenry, of the United Nations
enterprise. in June of 1979, [an
article by Ronald Kessler, in the Washington
Post] dealing with the U.N.s finances
brought denunciation from both the United Nations arid the U.S. State
Department, [The latter] ,,,.
conceded that the Posts
figures were accurate, but claimed, according to the Post, that the intricate
nature of the United Nations system
cumbersome administrative structure,
jealously
guarded in [many agencies,]
precluded assessment by outsiders. Shirley Hazzard, on a 1979 attempt to track UN finances, and her own inability to do so 12 years later, in Breaking Faith I, The New Yorker, September 25, 1989, pp. 63-99, [89]. [Note: Ms. Hazzard
worked at the UN for ten years, resigning in 1962 to become a very successful full-time
writer.] In 1988,a JIU
historical survey found many other basic UN financial decision-making
information problems, which stretched back more than two decades: "An essential programme budgeting function is to
clearly identify programmes and projects with their costs, to allow
intergovernmental bodies to effectively allocate scarce financial
resources and then assess how they are used. CPC observed in 1967
that
because programme formulation and budget preparation were separate
processes, programme and
financial data were not integrated. ACABQ stated in 1972
that the existing 'hybrid' budget prevented Member States from directly
relating inputs to outputs and determining if they were 'getting their
money's worth.'
A report in 1978
identified allotment control and certification procedures as the main
budget implementation problems.
A 1977 Board of Auditors
special report called for a system of United Nations financial
reporting down to the project element cost level, to make programme managers
accountable for performance.
And the Secretariat acknowledged in
1978 that the lack of cost estimates and expenditure data
were important
'gaps' in the integration of planning and budgetary processes.
A 1987 Secretary-General's [reform report] cited the
need to 'address the development of
an overall framework for administrative and financial systems, which is
greatly needed to ensure that accurate, timely information is available to
decision-makers
'" Joint Inspection
Unit, "Reporting on the performance and results of United Nations
programmes: Monitoring, evaluation, and management review components", UN
document A/43/124, 1988, paras. 86, 87 (d), 90
and 95. [emphasis added.] The same JIU report
found that, as of 1988, there were many serious continuing problems with
transparency of UN resource use, both human and financial. "The programme planning regulations and rules state
that all United Nations activities, whether financed from regular budget
or extra budgetary resources, shall be subject to 'periodic and thorough
reviews'
however, the programme performance reports systematically cover only a
small portion of total United Nations activities.
Almost half the regular budget -
20 per cent of total [biennial] expenditures - is spent on administration
conference and library services.
[but] these activities are included only partially and very superficially
in the programme performance reports. They are also not providing any other
regular performance or review reports to intergovernmental bodies
ACABQ and CPC have [urged clearer presentation and
control]
over the extrabudgetary resources and staff posts in most United Nations
programmes.
[which]
have considerably outgrown total regular
budget resources.
[24 per cent of]
the total United Nations budget is applied to extrabudgetary humanitarian
assistance administered by
UNHCR
[Yet] the 1986 programme performance
report provided [few] 'significant performance indicators' for UNHCR's
more than $900 million of total expenditures. Technical co-operation and other extrabudgetary
activities
comprise 20 per cent of total United Nations resources
[but] the performance
report acknowledged that technical co-operation projects could not be
considered "programmed outputs." Joint Inspection
Unit, "Reporting on the performance and results of United Nations
programmes: Monitoring, evaluation, and management review components", UN
document A/43/124, 1988, paras. 30, 37-39,
42-43. A 1990 JIU report focused specifically on UN extra
budgetary resources, and weak accountability for their use. The Inspectors
found that: "The extrabudgetary resources made available to the
[UN for 1990-1991]
are estimated at more than $US 2.5 billion, and present complex and
unexplored policy issues which require urgent solutions. [Proper information should]
allow all Member States to judge whether the relevant activities are
efficiently carried out and do not distort
priorities
[and] provide accountability to donor countries and organizations for the
funds which they have made available.
the Inspectors have [made recommendations to] provide a proper start
towards transparency of the UN financial and programming documentation on
extrabudgetary resources. Member States
have a long-standing concern about insufficient financial control over
extra budgetary resources. External as well as internal auditors
have observed [this] lack of financial and substantive control
the Inspectors were concerned to note that a number of
officials dealing with extra budgetary resources did not have sufficient
knowledge of the existence and content of [Secretariat rules and
instructions governing their use]
The Secretary-General acknowledged that "the major problems
include the lack of awareness of the existing rules on the part of all
concerned
governing the acceptance and utilization of voluntary funds." [This]
has led to (a) considerable uncertainties as to
[extrabudgetary resource management], [b] serious confusion about the
appropriate procedures to be followed, and (c) resulted in vagueness in
reporting on the use and management of [this $2.5 billion!] of funds." Joint Inspection
Unit, "Extrabudgetary resources of the United Nations: Towards
transparency of presentation, management, and reporting", UN document
A/45/797, 1990, Executive summary and paras. 5
and 96. The General Assembly repeatedly urged action to obtain
more stringent oversight and assurance of compliance with financial
controls, stating, for instance, that it: "13. Requests the
Secretary-General
(c) To implement stringent
inventory controls on non-expendable property and to report thereon
[in 1991], (d) To institute without delay more
effective control on the payment of all allowances and benefits to staff
members and to report on measures taken in this regard
[in 1991]; 14. Reaffirms the importance of
strict compliance with financial regulations and rules on the subject of
unliquidated obligations, and requests
a thorough report
[in 1991];" "Financial reports
statements,
reports of the
Board of Auditors," General Assembly resolution 45/235 of
21 December 1990.
"13. Emphasizes
the need to continue to ensure overall efficient and prudent management by
the Secretary-General of all the resources entrusted to the UN by Member
States for the implementation of all its mandates and, in particular,
stresses the need to ensure full accountability and responsibility in the
management and use of these resources; 14.
Notes with concern the lack of cash reserves and the cash flow
problems [of the Organization]
;" "Improving the
financial situation of the United Nations," General Assembly resolution
47/215 of 23 December 1992.
The UN Board of Auditors also reported very serious
management problems. An article thereon cited: "Mismanagement,
waste, abuse and in some cases fraud. These are among the findings by the
U.N. Board of Auditors in its examination of Secretariat operations
The [U.S.
representative] stated that the Secretariat 'has not made significant
progress' in addressing these problems.
Referring to the
current audit report [and affirming his status as a U.N. supporter, he]
said it led to the conclusion that "existing mechanisms alone are unable
to administer and safeguard funds entrusted to the organization.' The Board's report
identified serious deficiencies and abuses in program management, use of
staff, payment of staff allowances and benefits and in procurement and
property management, he said." "Auditors' report
blasts U.N. for waste, fraud", Diplomatic World
Bulletin (New York), October 19-26, 1992,
p. 1.
The March 1993 Thornburgh report emphasized that the
chaotic status of financial and programme decision-making and budgetary
controls, as described by Lister above for 1986, had continued to expand
and worsen under the pressure of new, major peacekeeping
missions: "The current [UN]
budgeting process [is]
almost surreal. It is overly
complicated
A great detail of effort, for example, is extended to ensure
that the Secretariat carries out
[General Assembly] priorities." [In fact,] these
'priorities' are constantly skewed and distorted by activities and
expenditures by United Nations entities outside the Secretariat.
some 70
percent of the Organization's
social and economic development
expenditures, for example, are made without
the intricate [regular]
budgetary processes
Ironically, the
problems
in the regular budgeting process are nearly reversed in the
peacekeeping area which now well exceeds the regular budget.
Peacekeeping funding is still much like a financial 'bungee jump', often
undertaken strictly in blind faith that timely appropriations will be
forthcoming.
The irony is that far more vast and costly operations are
undertaken and appropriated for in the peacekeeping area on a more or less
ad hoc basis, than those pursued in such
meticulous detail in the regular budget process. The answer, it
seems to me, is
far less scrutiny of the minutae of the regular budget
and for more attention to the
process utilized in financing peacekeeping
budgets." Dick Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations" ["The Thornburgh report"], 1 March 1993, pp. 15, 17-18. Mr. Thornburgh also observed that disorderly UN
funding processes required major changes to respond to Member State
requirements. "The United Nations
is perpetually short of cash due to the late and uneven payments by Member
States of their assessments. The term 'financial crisis' has become
so overworked as to be a permanent description of the Organization's
financial status.
[because] most of the United Nations' problems in the areas of
budget and finance derive from the precarious day-to-day financial
situation
we asked the Ford Foundation to undertake a study of UN
finances
As noted in the
Volcker-Ogata report, 'support for improved financing will be
dependent upon a perception that funds are economically managed and
effectively spent.' Major donors, and indeed all Member States, deserve
the reassurance that their assessed and voluntary contributions are being
wisely and prudently utilized by the Organization so that they, in turn
can convey such reassurances to their taxpayers, the ultimate supporters
of United Nations activity. This reassurance
can only come
from the prompt and effective activation of a strong
Inspector General's office
a common set of accounting principles and
standards
amendments to the code of conduct for staff members
full
financial disclosure by senior management
and a [better] administration
of justice system
" Dick Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations" ["The Thornburgh report"], 1 March 1993, pp. 13-14, 20, 31-32.
The "Volcker-Ogata report" mentioned by Mr.
Thornburgh, on the UN financing crisis, emphasized that the financial
struggles were not just a matter of drumming up short-term funds for UN
operations.
It concluded wisely that: "The future credibility of
the U.N. will depend in large measure on the effectiveness of its
management, on the quality of its staff, and on improvements in its
structure and administration." Financing an effective United Nations: A report of the Independent Advisory Group on UN Financing, Ford Foundation, New York, February 1993, p. 3.
A
1993 JIU review noted other areas where financial management systems and
oversight required improvement: "
DAM [the
Department of Administration and Management] reviews, updates, and
coordinates financial policies, procedures and control systems as
necessary
the reports of the Board of Auditors have identified an
increasing number of problems in
financial procedures and controls [and]
the accounting system,
as well as the need to strengthen these
controls. The General
Assembly has responded to these problems with great concern and has urged
the Board of Auditors and the ACABQ to give increased attention to
internal controls.
JIU recommended in 1988
that DAM and the Department of Conference Services, which together consume
almost half the regular United Nations budget, should also be subject to
regular reports which examine their efficiency, service quality, and
productivity.
The Secretary-General declined, arguing that current
Secretariat reporting was adequate. The Inspectors, however, believe that
this major area of Secretariat activity and this recommendation deserve
re-examination." ""Accountability and
oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN document A/48/420 of 12
October 1993 and Add. 1 of 22 November 1993,
paras. 95-97. The JIU Inspectors
also cited a telling example of lax Secretariat financial control
attitudes: "
recent General
Assembly resolutions have called for strict compliance with financial
regulations and rules, and actions to ensure that expenditures do not
exceed allotments and that disciplinary measures to enhance accountability
and budgetary discipline are enforced. Yet
a February 1993 memorandum
from the Controller to Department heads stated that the 1990-1991 biennium
produced an 'unacceptable level of overspending.' He
observed that 1992 was not much better, that recent audits had shown
increasingly frequent cases of overspending, and that some offices clearly
were not observing the allotment limitations. [He] called
for 'active cooperation' to ensure better control over expenditures,
because Member States will 'collectively be less and less tolerant with
[such]
practices.' The Inspectors note that overexpenditure of allotted
funds is
a very serious violation subject to severe sanctions in at least some
member countries. They believe that the only acceptable level of overspending by United
Nations Secretariat programme managers is zero, and that this principle should be
very firmly enforced." "Accountability and
oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN document A/48/420 of 12
October 1993 and Add. 1 of 22 November 1993,
paras. 98-99. [emphasis
added]
[The memorandum referred to
was "Allotments for 1993," Interoffice Memorandum from Controller to Heads
of Departments and Offices, 5 February 1993.] Two very expert UN observers, Childers and Urquhart,
had noted
in a 1994 overview on UN renewal that: "The financing and
management of the United Nations have been under evaluation and reform of
one kind or another for most of its life. Member-governments have initiated
eight, and Secretaries-General three of eleven major exercises at scarcely
five-year intervals [1955, 1961, 1964, 1965, 1968, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1983,
1985-1987, 1992- ]. Most of these
exercises took place in the midst of financial crises
The effect of all this has
been seriously to debase the coinage of UN management reform rather than
to address the UN system's real problems in this area. The UN
remains in deep financial crisis. It certainly also needs improved
management." Erskine Childers
with Brian Urquhart, "Renewing the United Nations System", Development Dialogue, 1994:1, Dag Hammarskjold
Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1994, p.
142.
The Secretariat was forced to admit in late 1994
that, indeed, basic Secretariat management skills and management
information resources were indeed in a quite perilous condition. The report
asserted that the information situation would be rescued by
installation of the new IMIS system (see the next subsection), which in
fact was not fully installed until years later. "Information on
available resources Taking advantage of
the facilities offered by the new [IMIS] as they become available, managers] will have
at their disposal, on a routine basis, up-to-date information on the
resources available to them and
how the resources allocated to their
programmes are being deployed. The necessary infrastructure will be put into
place for them
to access available information directly
This concerns in
particular staffing and financial information as well as other management
tools.
management training courses
.will [explain] how this
information is to be used for analysis and planning purposes. This plan entails a
rethinking of the role of the executive offices and divisions of
administration
which have been
the privileged if not the only
counterparts of central administration in the handling of most matters
pertaining to administration of the programme budget and extra budgetary
resources
IMIS, once in place, would
provide [DAM] with reliable information with which to
monitor the personnel and financial situation of the Organization
effectively
" "Establishment of a
transparent and effective system of accountability and responsibility:
Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/49/1 of 5 August 1994, paras. 42-46. [emphasis
added] This all sounds very nice, and conveys an impressive
picture of alert, effective managers sagely using key information at their
fingertips to accomplish their programme objectives. The reality
was otherwise, however. Later in the report, the Secretariat
admitted that UN managers had a long, long way to go to master even the
basics of management: "Programme managers
and supervisors must be clear not only about their authority, but also how
to use it
[and therefore must be] provided with training
related to
management skills development. Programme managers and supervisors
could
derive benefit from practical training in
the concepts of
decision-making processes
The major objective
is to empower programme
managers and supervisors to see the benefits of employing the full
resources available to them, particularly through their staff.
The Training
Service has delivered a number of integrated courses with a specific focus
on empowering managers
and has planned others
[The Service will also
conduct] a special orientation programme for under-secretaries-general and
assistant secretaries-general on programme planning, financial management
and the budget process, human resources management and other current
management issues
[and] develop an orientation guide or handbook for [them]
" "Establishment of a
transparent and effective system of accountability and responsibility:
Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/49/1 of 5 August 1994, paras. 60-62. A
1995 article profiled Joseph Connor, a very experienced financial manager
who was serving as the UN Under-Secretary-General for Aministration and
Management, and trying to "impose fiscal sanity on an organization
tottering on the brink of insolvency", thanks to the refusal of member
countries, and especially the United States to pay their dues. A chart
summarized the elements of the UN's: "Midlife Crisis: ?
No
liquidity The organization suffers from a chronic
shortage of cash. A $250 million reserve fund was cleaned out long
ago. ?
Inability to raise capital The U.N. lacks
standing in the financial markets. The World Bank says it cannot lend to
the U.N. ?
Unpredictable cash flow A majority of
the 185 member states have stopped paying their dues on time. ?
No
write-off of bad debt The biggest
member, the United States, owes more than $1 billion and will not pay. ?
Declining revenue Smaller
peace-keeping assessments cannot cover unpaid expenses or reimbursements
to countries that contribute troops. ?
Lack of
financial management expertise The U.N. does
not have an executive training program. Hiring and promotions are sometimes
guided by politics instead of management skills." Christopher S. Wren, "The U.N.'s master juggler: An accountant copes with deadbeats and bad debt," New York Times, December 8, 1995. [Note: IO Watch
wishes to note its belief that Mr. Connor worked very diligently to keep
the UN financially afloat until the United States subsequently settled its
disagreements and paid up its assessments. The financial administration and
programme management difficulties of the UN cited below, and in the
subsection on programme planning systems, were not Mr. Connor's doing, or
his to solve, but the results of the defective managerial
culture entrenched throughout the UN Secretariat worldwide. As observed
by a UN veteran elsewhere in this archive, "guilty [managers] can get away
with
. irresponsible performance more readily in the bureaucratic system
of the UN than in any foreign office, however small."]
As this financial
balancing act continued, a 1995 JIU analysis of policy guidance reforms
needed concluded that, in line with the last element mentioned above, and
despite the preceding three decades of effort: "The area in which the most work remains to be done
is financial management. In two 1994 reports Member States and
an intergovernmental working group stressed the need to improve and
strengthen United Nations financial administration and disciplinary rules,
procedures, and measures." Joint Inspection
Unit, "Management in the United Nations: Work in progress", UN document
A/50/507,
1995, para. 65 (d).
As far back as 1991, the General Assembly had called
on the Secretary-General to 'propose a set of accounting standards' for
common application to the UN system of organizations, and the Thornburgh
report had urged them again in 1993. In 1995, the organizations finally
developed a UN system framework for accounting and financial reporting,
reflecting generally accepted accounting principles (while allowing for
variations), and intended to promote consistency between the
organizations. A related paper of the Administrative Committee on
Coordination stated that underlying the objective of these standards were
the [essential and very basic] needs: "
for governments and other
contributors to the organizations to have the means to judge the manner in
which resources made available by them are used, and for the management of
each organization to demonstrate that they have fulfilled their
responsibility for stewardship and accountability in respect of such
resources. Accounting and
financial reporting in accordance with the standards should among other
things assist those concerned: (i) To ensure
consistent and transparent treatment and disclosure of financial
transactions; (ii) To assess the
financial position and its evolution over time; (iii) To ascertain
the sources from which income has been derived and the ways in which it
has been used; and (iv) to judge financial
performance under approved budgets." "United Nations system accounting standards: Revision I," Annex III of UN document ACC/1995/20, 1995, pp. 31-33. [emphasis added.]
Despite these noble aims and intentions, the General
Assembly provided a blunt reminder in 1997 of its serious concerns about
UN financial performance and accountability problems: "The General
Assembly,
Expressing deep concern about the persistence of
problems and defects observed by the Board of Auditors in the financial
administration and management of the United Nations;
11. Notes with deep concern the incidents of fraud
and presumed fraud reported by the Board of Auditors; 12. Requests the Secretary-General and the executive
heads
to take the disciplinary actions necessary in cases of proven
fraud and to enhance the individual accountability of United Nations
personnel, including through stronger managerial control;
15. Emphasizes the need for greater transparency and
stricter controls for trust funds
17. Notes
that further work needs to be done in the
biennium 1996-1997 to bring the financial statements fully in line with
the United Nations common accounting standards, and requests the
Secretary-General and the executive heads
to pursue their efforts to
ensure full compliance with those standards." "Financial reports and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors," General Assembly resolution 51/225 of 16 May 1997.
In 2002, as part of his "second wave" of reforms, Mr.
Annan proposed some major process adjustments to the PPBE system. Under the
theme of "Allocating resources to priorities", he called for further
adjustments including, once again, promises to improve the management of
voluntary funds. "The present United
Nations programming and budgeting system is complex and
labour-intensive. It involves three separate committees,
voluminous documentation and hundreds of meetings. The budget
document itself would be less detailed and more strategic, and would give
the Secretary-General some flexibility to move resources according to
needs.
Measures will be taken to streamline
peacekeeping budgets, and to improve the management of the large number of
trust funds through which Member States provide voluntary contributions to
supplement the regular budget." "Strengthening of
the United Nations: An agenda for further change: Report of the
Secretary-General," UN document A/57/387 of 9
September 2002, "Summary, section V," p. 3.
The US General Accounting Office report of February
2004 found that the Secretariat still has far to go in the decades-old
attempt at clarifying, implementing, and reporting on its overall
management reform goals, and in assessing performance and measuring
programme impact and results. The GAO reported that the Secretariat Office of
Program Planning, Budget and Accounts had taken various steps to aid in
preparing budget proposals in a results-based format. However, the
two other essential elements -- an effectively functioning monitoring
and evaluation system, and procedures for shifting resources to meet
program objectives -- were inadequate in the case of the
former and simply lacking for the latter. (See the more detailed assessment
quotation of UN problems in initiating a performance-oriented budgeting
framework in the subsection on the Programme Planning System (PPBE)
which follows. U.S. General
Accounting Office, United Nations: Reforms
progressing, but comprehensive assessments needed to measure impact,
GAO 04-339, February, 2004, pp. 19-25.
The information on UN financial management systems
presented above is somewhat patchy, episodic (and admittedly rather boring
to laymen).
This is because the way that the UN actually uses its resources,
both human and financial, is in fact a very mysterious business. There are
good intentions and encouraging words, and in the financial realm some
progress is certainly being made to "get a handle on things" using modern
information technology. But the Secretariat reporting to the General
Assembly and the public on its overall use of resources and the
effectiveness with which they are applied is still very sketchy. The GAO assessment of February 2004 shows that the
Secretariat is still struggling with these matters, just as it has been
for many years. The basic principles and issues of transparent and
effective reporting on resource receipt, use, and results, are still as
unsatisfactory today as they were in the quotations cited above of 1979
and 1988, two and one decade ago. This archive will return to the very important issues
of the transparency and accountability of UN financial management (and
controls, and public reporting, and "due diligence" stewardship of the
funds entrusted to it) in the concluding major section of this archive, Recent Developments : -- in the
subsection on The UN, Alone and UNaccountable ,
which explores the extreme difficulty of determining what the UN is
spending, where, and to what effect, under the topics of resource
ambiguities, reporting evasiveness, and is the UN another Enron?; -- in the
subsection on Other Major Problems ,
particularly in terms of the "Poor little UN" regularly presented to the
public even as the UN spends $6 to $10 billion of public and voluntary
funds each year, now set against the multi-billion dollar scope and
scandals of the UN's "oil-for-food programme" in Iraq, which is also
discussed in this subsection; and -- in the
concluding sub section of "Answers", under no less than four topics: on
the need for a
real anti-fraud campaign; and for a General Assembly audit
subcommittee, Annual status reporting on resources to the General
Assembly, and to related "due diligence" shortcomings of the "Geneva
Group" of major donor countries. |
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