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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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During the long, drawn-out period from 1993-2000 the General Assembly's
management accountability resolution was supposedly being "implemented" by
the Secretariat, but without much
evidence to demonstrate that it was actually being applied and
enforced. In fact, a counter-reform of great significance was also underway,
at first firmly and specifically objected to by the General Assembly, but
then eventually put in place by the Secretariat. The precise
origins of the idea to free UN managers from their supposed bureaucratic
bondage is not easy to trace, but it may well have come literally as a
'half-baked idea" from the pressures of the pivotal "Thornburgh report" of
1993. Toward the end of his
discussion of the UN's severe budget, finance and management problems, and
ways to overcome it, he mentioned that: "
More flexibility should
be granted to managers to manage, while they are, of course, held
strictly accountable for their adherence to clear policy goals and
priorities properly established by Member States through the General
Assembly." Dick Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations" ["The Thornburgh report"], 1 March 1993, p. 16. [emphasis added] [Note:
the remainder of the sentence is
-- of course -- the crucial missing half of Mr.
Thornburgh's point]
As discussed in
the earlier subsection on Dissatisfaction with management performance
,
the
UN Secretariat had already
attempted in 1992 to deflect Assembly pressures for more accountability by
arguing that the existing "framework" for accountability was quite
sufficient. But the
Thornburgh report, and related reports by the UN Board of Auditors and the
JIU during 1993, and pressure from the US Congress, forced the Secretariat
to try a new tack. A rambling
Secretariat report in October 1993, which came only after four Assembly
resolutions requesting it, tried casually to pontificate only on general
considerations and policy-level issues. It did, however, begin a strong
push for Thornburgh's managerial "flexibility," but without his emphasis
on being "strictly accountable." The report argued
that: "
many heads of departments and
offices feel that the financial and personnel management procedures of the
Organization are unduly cumbersome and hinder expeditious response[s]
Many United Nations programme
managers consider that they are held accountable to Member States for
programmes which they may not have sufficient authority or resources to
deliver.
A recurrent theme is that managers in the Secretariat must be
given sufficient discretion to manage, and
entrusted with considerable
discretionary control over the resources, human and financial, required to
produce them.
[programme managers' concerns]
must be balanced by
other considerations focused on the issue of
accountability, considerations that have given rise over the years to the
centralized controls under which managers now chafe.
"The more complicated
and increased demands by Member States, coupled with greater managerial
discretion, may require adjustments in [Secretariat regulations and rules}
in the context of
the new realities. The balance between centralized controls and the
legitimate concerns for a more decentralized style of management will have
to be rethought.
ad hoc adjustments will not
address the central problem of [balancing] the need for a greater degree
of managerial discretion by senior staff and
the ultimate
responsibilities
to Member States." "Accountability and responsibility of programme
managers in the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General", UN
document A/48/452 of October 5, 1993. , paras.
49-52, 57, 59.
The Secretariat
report thus gave heavy emphasis to the wishes of UN managers "chafing"
under the yoke of heavy centralized controls (including the same group of
officials cited in the immediately preceding subsections for their lack of
managerial skills, their often reckless and abusive performance, and their
ability to easily evade those controls.) It gave far less emphasis to
their management responsibilities, and to the Assembly's concern with
assuring firm accountability throughout the UN Secretariat. In fact, the
concurrent 1993 JIU report on accountability and oversight noted that in
the absence of strong oversight and management improvement units,
organizations like the UN must rely heavily on staff members themselves,
supported by training not only in management skills but in implementing
programmes. Yet it found that
in 1993: "Observers have consistently noted
the problems of poorly-designed UN programmes, poorly-stated objectives,
and unsatisfactory evaluation reports,
in considerable part because
programme managers have not had proper training
Similarly, [a 1990 JIU report]
noted, and the Secretary-General concurred, that
programme managers did
not know the rules and procedures on acceptance and use of extrabudgetary
funds, leading to uncertainties, confusion, and vague reporting on [this]
major funding source for United Nations
programmes. The Secretary-General reported in
late 1992 that he would implement a comprehensive
[training system for
staff at all levels.] The report noted
[a] 'serious gap' between what
almost 15,000 staff would need and the resources available for
training. For instance, the
priority programme -- supervisory training -- reached only 120 people in the
1991-1992 training year and only 550 people since its inception. The United Nations presently
spends only 0.29 percent of its staff costs for occupational and
management training, well below the comparable 2 to 3 percent that
comparable United Nations entities and some governments
spend." Joint Inspection Unit,
"Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat",
JIU/REP/93/5, UN document A/48/420, 1993, paras.
107-109. [Note:
the second report referred to is Joint Inspection Unit, "Extrabudgetary
resources of the United Nations: Towards transparency of presentation,
management, and reporting", UN document A/45/797, 1990. Not surprisingly,
the Assembly was not impressed with the managers' complaints in the
October 1993 report. It "regretted" the inadequacy of the report, and in a
very unusual, decisive, and specific demand, called for the establishment
of the transparent and effective system of management accountability no
later than 1 January 1995. "Review of the
administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations", General
Assembly resolution 48/218 A, 23 December 1993, paras. I.E.
2-5. In 1994, the
Secretary-General's report solemnly agreed on the long-overdue need for
OHRM to finally address its essential planning and management functions
and overcome inadequate "people management." It also acknowledged the need
for full accountability as called for by the Assembly resolution, and even
stated that efficient oversight machinery and systematic control would
provide "the key to success" in achieving UN effectiveness and efficiency.
It admitted further that much work was needed to revise and formalize
related UN policy guidance and rules. At the same time, however, the
Secretariat had already begun to forge ahead with plans and actions
to delegate authority away
from the highly-centralized administrative system, and especially to
"empower managers to make decisions and take actions."
"Establishment of a transparent and effective
system of accountability and responsibility: Report of the
Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/49/1 of 5 August 1994, paras. 12, 22-27, 47, 55.
The Secretariat
report stated that "the basics" of a
transparent and effective system of accountability and responsibility for
the UN would be in place by January 1 1995. However, it then complained about
the vast and annoying rules and ever-increasing reporting requirements
which kept managers from implementing programmes, and stated
that: "There is now an urgent need
for considerable
deregulation in the Secretariat
to enhance the capacity of
managers, to allow them greater flexibility
[and encourage them]
-- in brief to manage better.
the utmost care should be taken
to develop a real 'management culture'
Managers must have the
flexibility they need,
incentive
to achieve economies, and
then
the freedom to utilize the resources released
In short, the
objective
should be the creation of a mission-driven and result-oriented
Organization in which the Secretariat and the intergovernmental
bodies interact, but have the confidence to concentrate
on
their respective functions: execution
and programme implementation in
the case of the Secretariat, and in the case of the
intergovernmental bodies, the provision of mandates
and overall policy guidance."
"Establishment of a transparent and
effective system of accountability and responsibility: Report of the
Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/49/1 of 5 August 1994, paras. 105-109.
The Secretariat's
evident great enthusiasm for this new, dynamic world of managerial
flexibility, incentives, and freedom rather than burdensome rules and
reporting to governing bodies, grew ever stronger. In 1995, the JIU found
that the first management reform area requiring much work was policy
guidance and instructions.
The Secretariat had identified many specific areas which needed revision, including a
long-outdated official Organizational Manual, but it was very vague about
any actions being taken. In contrast, it had forged ahead to issue new
guidance to major duty stations on delegating authority in human resource
management matters. Similar delegation in financial management was
prevented by the need stressed by Member States to first greatly improve
and strengthen UN rules procedures, and measures in this area. Joint Inspection
Unit, "Management in the United Nations: Work in progress", UN document
A/50/507, 1995, paras. 58-66.
In a 1996 progress
report on human resources reform, the Secretariat reported that it had
focused strategy implementation on "a managed system of increased
delegation of human resources and benefits administration authority to
programme managers
" Then, in March 1997 the new
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, also reported that: "Previous
management measures Programme Managers [now in
capitals!] have been empowered to take action in their areas of
responsibility, thus reducing layers of centralized
administration." "Implementation of
the strategy for the management of the Organization's human resources:
Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/C.5/51/1 of 16 August 1996, Summary, para. 4, and "Executive summary
of the measures outlined in the letter of 17 March 1997 from the
Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly," UN document
A/INF/51/6 of 17 March 1997, p. 3.
The General Assembly
was well aware of what was going on. In an angry resolution in April 1997
it called for further and more specific reports, and stated that it
regretted with deep concern that further progress in implementing the
Strategy had not been achieved. It also stated very pointedly that
it: II.
Reaffirm[s] its resolution 48/218A of 23 December 1993, in
particular the request therein for a mechanism ensuring that programme
managers are accountable for the effective management of human resources
allocated to them,
2.
Requests the Secretary-General to enhance managerial accountability with
respect to human resources management decisions, including imposing sanctions
in cases of demonstrated mismanagement of staff and willful neglect of or
disregard for established rules and procedures, while safeguarding
the due process rights of all staff members, including managers; 3.
Also requests the
Secretary-General to issue specific administrative instructions to
establish clearly the responsibility and accountability of programme
managers for proper use of human resources, as well as sanctions
in accordance with staff rule 112.3 for any financial loss suffered by the
United Nations as a result of gross negligence, including improper
motivation, willful violation of or reckless disregard for the staff
Regulations and Rules and established policies regulating recruitment,
placement and promotion;
6.
Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to streamline
administrative procedures and eliminate duplication, in relation to human
resources management, through delegation of authority to programme
managers, and requests him to ensure, before delegating such authority, that
well-designed mechanisms of accountability, including the necessary
internal monitoring and control procedures, as well as training, are put
in place, and to report to the General Assembly at its fifth-third
session;
" "Human resources
management", General Assembly resolution 51/226 of 25 April 1997, Part I, paras. 2-4, Part II, paras. 2-3,
6.
[emphasis added]
A blue-ribbon expert
group of UN "insiders" had reported in 1997 that acrimony in UN
decision-making, based on old habits and attitudes, was fueling an
"us versus them" mentality that could well undermine
the reform attempts underway. The group observed the "Secretariat staff
resent
member state interference in
their daily work
[their
micromanagement of] the hiring and promotion of Secretariat
personnel.
. [and of] Secretariat budgeting,
. too often
seeking to control the minor details of spending allocations.
.
. Member states contend that
ineffective
--
some would say nonexistent -- managerial practices throughout the
Secretariat have led to inefficient use of the [UN resources]
; a staff
unaccountable for its actions and prone to delegate upwards;
insufficient program coordination
; and wasteful duplication of
efforts.
There has been a lack of transparency in Secretariat decision
making [on] policy issues, personnel, and budget expenditures.
much of
the information that is provided is not timely or readable.
Overall,
inefficiency and lack of accountability within the Secretariat, whether
preceived or real, have invited member state micromanagement. " "Making UN reform
work: Improving member state-Secretariat relations", Report of the
twenty-eighth United Nations issues conference, The Stanley Foundation, February 21-23, 1997, pp. 2, 14-16. [emphasis
added] This "us versus them" attitude was clearly
underscored by the explicit and provocative Secretariat statement in the
August 1994 report cited above that governing bodies should "have the
confidence" to confine themselves to providing mandates and policy
guidance, while leaving execution and programme implementation to the
Secretariat.
In other words, no annoying and intrusive external oversight and,
god forbid, sanctions for misbehaving or non-performing managers. In short, the
old game of self-regulation and "trust me," rather than the much more
sound admonition, "trust, but verify" that is central to true
accountability.
These conflicts were
also revealed in an International Documents
Review article in early 1998 about a project which the new head of
OHRM was undertaking for a "thorough review" of UN staff matters. The
article observed that she sought delegation of 'maximum responsibility' to
line managers, because central control is 'excessive.' She stated
that: "OHRM will convene
a task force of experts [to make a] 'clear delineation of
responsibilities' [which] is expected to lead to a reduction in
micro-management. [The IDR then notes that] Micromanagement by intergovernmental bodies is an
index of the lack of trust between the majority of delegations and the
UN Secretariat.
[If this trend is to be
reversed] there must be a much clearer conceptualization of change, a
balanced explanation of implications, and an absolute sincerity of
purpose.
The current perception of the Secretariat among many delegations is
that in terms of personnel policy it is confused, does not understand the
full implications of what is proposed, and has a hidden agenda.
In pushing for
reorientation, Ms. Salim speaks some home truths
'We can no longer assume
that a [20-year] staff member has developed the necessary managerial and
supervisory skills'
there is 'widespread staff distrust of management'
and the UN's 'organizational culture is one in which advancement is
generally expected on the basis of longevity rather than
performance.'" "UN personnel chief
reviewing all aspects of management in bid to simplify controls, delegate
authority,", International Documents Review,
16 February 1998, p. 2. [emphasis
added.]
In his required 1998
report on human resources management reform, Secretary-General Annan
highlighted delegation of authority issues, with only brief
acknowledgement of the General Assembly's 1993 management accountability
resolution. He provided some conceptual discussion of accountability
aspects, and a statement of his "intention to explore the possibility of
establishing" a panel of senior-managers to consider managerial
sanctions when necessary. This triple layer of imprecision
responded poorly to the Assembly's insistence in its resolution 51/226 of
April 1997 (see above) that he "put in place" the "well-designed
mechanisms of accountability" before
delegating authority to programme managers, which had indeed and obviously
already been taking place. "Human resources management: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/53/342 of 4 September 1998, paras. 6-11, 18-20, 23-30. [emphasis added.] [Note the "triple
qualifiers"
attached to the Secretariat's putative commitment to establishing
sanctions for managers.]
A second 1998 report, on
human resources management reform, emphasized "a shift to embrace a new
culture of empowerment, responsibility, and accountability" with "[maximum
delegation of]
authority, responsibility and accountability for the
day-to-day management of human resources to line managers". A third
report noted that an [essential] new system for rating staff performance
had still not yet been fully established. "Human resources management reform: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/53/414 of 13 October 1998, paras. 5-9,. 25-30, and "Performance
management: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/53/266 of 14 August 1998, paras. 5, 6-9, and 25. The General Assembly remained skeptical, repeating
the insistence in its resolution of 25 April 1997 [see above] on ensuring,
"before delegating authority, that well-designed mechanisms of
accountability
are put in place." It stated further that it: "IV. Delegation of authority and
accountability
3.
Also notes that no
comprehensive system of accountability and responsibility has been
established;
10. Reiterates its
request to the Secretary-General [see para. II.2 of resolution 51/226] to
enhance managerial accountability with respect to human resources
management decisions, including imposing sanctions in case of demonstrated
mismanagement of staff and willful neglect of or disreard for established
roles and procedures, while safeguarding the right of due process of all
staff members, including managers." "Human resources
management," General Assembly resolution 53/221 of 23 April 1999, paras. II.6 and IV. 3, 10.
[emphasis added.]
Two independent
reports in 2000 underscored the failure to implement the new management
accountability system, even as delegation of authority efforts forged
ahead.
In May the US General Accounting Office, in the only overall
independent assessment of the mid-1990s UN management accountability
reforms ever made, stated that: "The
United Nations has substantially restructured its leadership and
operations and partly
implemented a merit-based and performance-oriented human capital
system
However,
the overall objectives of the reform have not yet
been achieved. Specifically, the United Nations has not yet
implemented reforms to focus its programming and budgeting on managing the
Secretariat's performance. These initiatives would enable Member States to hold
the Secretariat accountable for results and are key to the success
of the overall reform because they institutionalize a shift in the
organization's focus from carrying out activities to accomplishing
missions.
the U.N. reform is an
interrelated process and requires that all core elements be in place to
succeed." US General
Accounting Office, "United Nations: Reforms are progressing, but overall
objectives have not been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-169, 15 pages, of May 10, 2000, especially summary and pp. 2-3 and
9-15, and "United Nations: Reform
initiatives have strengthened operations, but overall objectives have not
been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-150, May 10,
2000, 84 pages. Ironically, a JIU report in
October 2000 found that the only factor hindering the Secretariat managers
in their relentless drive for freedom (and self-regulation) was -- bad
Secretariat management. The JIU reported that the delegation of authority was "at the core" of
Secretary-General Annan's vision of reform, but in fact efforts to
implement it had been conducted ad hoc. They
lacked a well-thought-out strategy and amounted mostly to a "dumping
of clerical tasks", with much confusion and a good deal of discontent
among all parties concerned.
The Inspectors therefore recommended a comprehensive
plan of action, strict compliance, revised rules, a culture of clarity,
transparency, and communication, and assistance to "empowered"
managers.
In addition, they stated that an accountability system should be based on firm guidance to managers,
mechanisms to evaluate their performance and sanctions to deal with
failure, and performance indicators. The Inspectors called for central
control and "strict adherence" to perquisites and benchmarks, to keep
systematic efforts toward a modern management culture and delegated
authority on track. Joint Inspection
Unit, "Delegation of authority for the management of human and financial
resources in the United Nations Secretariat", UN document A/ 55/857 of October 2000, especially Summary and para.
93.
Intriguingly, one searches
this JIU report in vain for any serious emphasis on implementing the
General Assembly's managerial accountability system of 1993, or citations
of its subsequent resolutions of 1997 and 1999 deploring the poor
implementation and lack of mechanisms and sanctions, as noted above. Neither
Assembly resolution 48/218 A nor any of the JIU's own three reports in
1993-1995 on UN accountability and oversight were even included in the
October 2000 report's footnotes. Essentially, the JIU report focused, de novo, on haphazard Secretariat implementation
of a delegation of authority process which, they vaguely urged, really
should include some firm accountability processes. Yet in the next reform status reports that the
Secretary-General's provided in August 2000, and counter to the two above
outside reports on inadequate implementation, Mr. Annan "declared victory"
and buried the management accountability reform process. His first report, on reform progress in ten "building
block" reform areas, included laundry lists of "issues of accountability
and the mechanisms needed" to underpin delegation of authority. A second
report, entitled "Accountability and responsibility," rehashed
modifications to existing [and much criticized] Secretariat management
processes (adding only a new "Accountability Panel" of senior managers to
meet annually -- or on an ad hoc basis), and
expressed his firm opinion that these adjustments "will allow for the
effective implementation of the comprehensive accountability system now
established."
"Human resources
management reform: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/55/253 of
1 August 2000, especially summary and para. 6
and 14-19,
and "Accountability and
responsibility:
Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/55/270 of
3 August 2000, especially Summary and paras.
1-6 and 23-43.
The Secretary-General ended the second report with
the ringing statement that: "In
conclusion, the Secretary-General is confident that the comprehensive system of
accountability now in place ensures that accountability mechanisms are
effectively used, are seen to be used, and ensure that staff at all levels
are held accountable for their actions and inaction. The General
Assembly may wish to take note of the mechanisms in place since 1994,
including those discussed in the present report, which together constitute
the comprehensive system for the Organization." "Accountability and
responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General", A/55/270 of 3 August 2000, paras. 47-48.
[emphasis added] Three very important
reservations must be noted about this sweeping conclusion. First, the
Secretary-General was simply saying "Trust me" -- not a valid stance on a
fundamental accountability issue. Second, he sweepingly asserted that the
mechanisms "are effectively used, are seen to be used, and ensure" staff
accountability -- without presenting any evidence or analysis of results
to substantiate his contentions. Third, he made a very misleading
statement about "the mechanisms in place since 1994," implying six years
of operation. In fact, the Secretariat had only told the Fifth Committee
in 1994 that the "basic elements" would be in place by January 1995, then
immediately qualified this assertion by admitting that: "some of the elements essential
are already planned [but] it is necessary to develop [them] further or
refine them, to add others and to integrate them into a coherent,
interactive system.
the process of establishing the transparent system must not downplay the
magnitude of the problems in the culture of the United Nations
the utmost care must be taken to develop a real 'management
culture' [and]
ensure high-quality work." "Basic elements for
transparent system of accountability and responsibility in UN to be
established by January, Fifth Committee is told," UN document GA/AB/2954
of 24 October 1994, pp. 1-2.
In 2001 the General Assembly
dutifully recalled its exhortations of 1997 and 1999 for ensuring that
well-designed mechanisms of accountability and control were in place
before delegating authority, and that sanctions should be imposed in case
of demonstrated mismanagement of staff. It took the trouble to emphasize that
the Secretary-General's powers of managerial discretion should conform
with relevant provisions of the UN Charter, and expressed doubts about the
existence of a "robust monitoring capacity" in OHRM. Otherwise,
and apparently growing tired of the accountability struggle with the
Secretariat, the Assembly only called on Mr. Annan to continue to improve
accountability, and related monitoring and control mechanisms, and to
report again in 2002 on progress achieved. "Human resources
management," General Assembly resolution 55/258 of 27 June 2001, Section
VII, "Delegation of authority and accountability".
However, as already noted in the preceding discussion
of the 1993 resolution, the US General Accounting Office issued a
follow-up report in February 2004, which updated its May 2000 report cited
above.
With regard to the issue of freeing the managers, it found that
they were doing "just fine" in resisting reform: "Why GAO did this
study The U.N. Secretary
General launched two reform agendas, in 1997 and 2002, to address the U.N.'s core management challenges -- poor
leadership of the Secretariat, duplication among its many offices and
programs, and the lack of
accountability for staff performance.
In 2000,
GAO reported that the reforms were not yet complete. What GAO found
UN reform faces
several challenges. For example, the Secretariat does not
conduct comprehensive assessments of the status and impact of U.N.
reforms.
In addition, the reform agendas lack clearly stated priorities,
interim goals, and target dates for overall completion. Other challenges include
resistance to change from program managers and possible resource
constraints. U.S. General
Accounting Office, United Nations: Reforms
progressing, but comprehensive assessments needed to measure impact,
GAO 04-339, February 2004, "Highlights" page.
[emphasis added] [Note: the complete
report is available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04339.pdf , and see again the GAO's report of May
10, 2000 cited above.]
In a later report section entitled on
factors impeding full implementation of the reforms, the GAO cited the
lack of systematic Secretariat follow-up on the reforms to assess how they
are working and of time frames or milestones for completion of reform
actions.
The report then stated that: "Third, according
to [UN]
officials, some program managers and staff have resisted
implementing certain reform initiatives.
OIOS reported that about half of program
managers across the Secretariat have not complied with U.N.
regulations to monitor and evaluate the performance of program
activities
[and that] The Secretariat lacks clear rules and
procedures for conducting [such]
exercises.
Some managers also stated
that they lacked resources to support this work and were concerned that
these evaluation requirements would detract time and money from their
regular work responsibilities.
Because of the resistance, and lack of guidance and resources for
implementing the reforms]
the Secretariat is providing training to all departments to
assist managers and staff in conducting self-monitoring and evaluation
exercises to comply with performance-oriented budgeting and overcome resistance.
Managers' support is critical for the institutionalization of reforms in
the long term." U.S. General
Accounting Office, United Nations: Reforms
progressing, but comprehensive assessments needed to measure impact,
GAO 04-339, February, 2004, pp. 35, 36. The GAO observations highlight several harsh truths.
Bad (but influential) UN managers continue to evade management
accountability measures and sanctions simply by sabotaging their
implementation. And, while the GAO emphasizes that managers' support is
critical in the long term", many UN managers quite simply have not and
will not support the reforms, at least not until Member States finally
exercise their "due diligence" and insist on it. The General Assembly's 1993 management accountability
reform initiative is officially dead and buried, and "free the managers"
is indeed the winner, with only the much more vague 1997 and 2002 reforms
still "in play." IO Watch has already stated its belief (in
the preceding subsections) that the accountability situation in 2004
is, in fact, even worse than in the old "baronial" days. The UN
"barons" at present not only hide behind their wall of soothing rhetoric
about management accountability, but actually disguise four major and very
disturbing anti-accountability processes which further undermine effective
UN operations: -- a continuing process of "freeing the
managers;"
-- a grossly defective "internal justice" system
which protects managers; -- a very weak personnel monitoring system to further
protect them; and -- allowing managers to become very amateurish
"investigators" of perceived wrongdoing by their staff, as discussed in
the following archive subsections. The grand 1993
General Assembly plan to establish "a transparent and effective system of
accountability and responsibility and sanction managers if necessary has
thus faded quietly away. Only the first half of the Thornburgh
prescription of 1993 -- delegation of authority -- but now isolated from
strict accountability and expanded to "free the managers" -- continues
on in full force. A former senior UN
official, celebrating Mr. Annan's reelection in 2001 as Secretary-General,
urged freeing the managers even further as a needed morale booster, which
could also -- no less -- let these newly freed UN managers
become the recognized managers of global governance: "Kofi Annan's
election to a second and last term should normally allow him to help
establish the United Nations as the centerpiece of an emerging system of global
management that is efficient, just and accepted as legitimate by
all peoples and nations.
Decisive action
should not continue to be postponed in regaining the motivation and
professional quality of the United Nations in its earlier years
Also, much would be
achieved if UN programme
managers were allowed to manage -- yes, manage -- their own
budgets and personnel. Not only would their motivation
increase immediately, but they could be held accountable for failure to
achieve agreed objectives." Enrique ter Horst, "A re-elected Secretary-General can give the world the facts," International Herald Tribune, 6 July 2001. [emphasis added] [Note: Mr. ter
Horst was a former UN Assistant-Secretary-General, who served under
several UN Secretary-Generals, including Mr. Annan] This formulation not
only changed the Secretary-General's theme of "Trust me" to one of "Reward
me first, and then, maybe, I'll perform better." It also clearly stated
(whether candidly or recklessly) that UN managers in fact continued not to
be held accountable. In 2001 the Secretary-General's annual report had
indicated that the control processes intended to ensure managerial
accountability had become an "old boy" process of self-regulation: "
the Office of Internal
Oversight Services [is]
working in partnership with managers at all
levels to instill accountability and best management practices
throughout the Organization." "Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization." UN document A/57/1, 2001, paras. 185-186, 193. [emphasis added] Note: Discussion of the OIOS, which has proved to be
much more a lapdog than the intended watchdog, begins in the following
subsection on Internal Oversight: The OIOS and
continues in Recent Developments .]
And Secretary-General
Annan's new round of management reforms for his second term then included
another new slogan, "investing in excellence," with higher salaries
included, as he presented: "
proposals
designed to ensure that the United Nations can count on an able, versatile
and well managed-work force. These new initiatives are intended to:
rejuvenate
the Organization; further empower managers;
better resolve internal disputes between management and staff; and enable the United Nations
to offer more competitive rates of pay and benefits." The measures described
add up to a very different way of doing business
The Secretary-General
is seeking a strong endorsement from Member States for the entire
package." "Strengthening of the United Nations: An agenda for further change: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/57/387 of 9 September 2002, p. 4. [emphasis added] In the same report, under a heading of "Continuing
efforts to improve management," he went on to say: "One
of my priorities in my first term was to improve the
Organization's professional capacity and to promote a new culture of
performance, accountability and trust. We have made significant
strides
I am confident that
the new system of recruitment, by giving managers primary responsibility
for staff selection, will lead to a new level of accountability and
empowerment.
I intend to adopt
additional measures to cut unnecessary layers of bureaucracy. At
present, the Organization recruits highly qualified individuals, for
management functions -- yet its procedures do not allow them to
manage a budget, procure what they need for everyday
activities or authorize travel for their staff." "Strengthening of the United Nations: An agenda for further change: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/57/387 of 9 September 2002, paras. 174, 188-190. [emphasis added] The long-standing UN management reform bias toward
freeing UN managers to "do their thing" continues relentlessly on.
Unfortunately, there are only passing references to ensuring that they are
held accountable, in part because the mechanisms cited are still
perpetually "under construction", as reaffirmed in the Secretary-General's
reform reports of 2004. [The UN management
programme] is oriented principally toward fully meeting client needs and
taking a proactive approach to implementing the Secretary-General's
management reform measures
Through a constructive dialogue, the status
quo
will be challenged, client priorities identified and management
policies developed or improved to ensure that [UN]
work is carried out
in a more timely, efficient and effective manner. The capacity
of managers to deliver mandated programmes will be strengthened through
management training and
greater delegation of authority, with accountability
ensured through systematic monitoring, evaluation and greater
transparency in decision-making.
Human resources
management reform will
be implemented to empower staff, increase their
flexibility and mobility, and [help make their work more effective.]
offices away from
headquarters
will be given greater authority to respond to the
requirements of their offices.
The Department [of
Management]'s leadership role within the United Nations system will be
maintained
The Department will
provide strategic policy guidance to all entities in
broad management
areas. "Proposed strategic framework for the period 2006-2007: Part Two: biennial programme plan: Programme 24: Management and support services", UN document A/59/6 (Prog. 24), 19 May 2004, paras. 24.3-24.9. [emphasis added] [Note: the two
words on accountability are highlighted because otherwise they would be
lost in all the continuing gush about freeing UN managers around the
world, with only this fleeting mention of holding them accountable. Also, the UN
seems very confident in its self-proclaimed management leadership role
vis-ΰ-vis other UN system agencies, although many of these agencies quite
simply perform better than the UN does.]
IO Watch believes that the great "sell-out" of UN
management accountability by the managers' ongoing and self-serving
"freedom" campaign thus continues on. They remain unencumbered by annoying
issues of internal controls, results assessment, accountability, and
sanctions.
This sorry situation is further illustrated by three more citations
from the new UN strategic framework for the period 2006-2007: -- the strategy set out for the Department of
Management concerns management services (and administration of justice)
programme inputs and accounts, human resource management, and support
services [no accountability mention there], and its lead items are: "Expected accomplishments of the
Secretariat:
"(a) Enhanced
capacity of programme managers to manage and administer their own
department's human, financial and material resources, through adoption of
new policies and procedures.
Indicators of
achievement: (a)
benefits
deriving from the introduction of new policies and procedures, reflected
in: (i) Progress
toward corporate management targets
(ii) Increase in the percentage of
programme managers indicating satisfaction with delegated authority and support
provided." "Proposed strategic framework for the period 2006-2007: Part Two: biennial programme plan: Programme 24: Management and support services", UN document A/59/6 (Prog. 24), 19 May 2004, p. 5. [emphasis added.] [Note: IO Watch
believes that the slogan here, briefly stated, is "Happy managers!" Staff
involvement and effectiveness are not an item on the agenda.] -- the UN objective for human resources
management, and its expected accomplishment (c) (after improved staff
selection and administration, and improved geographical and gender
balance) are just more "super-soft" [from an accountability viewpoint]
intentions: "Objective of the
Organization: "To ensure that the
Organization selects the best-qualified staff and deploys them at the
right time to the right place"
Expected
accomplishments:
(c) "Improved human
resources planning and monitoring of delegated authority; Indicators of
achievement:
(c) An increase in
the percentage of departments/offices successfully implementing their
human resources action plans, for the Secretariat as a whole." "Proposed strategic
framework for the period 2006-2007: Programme 24: Management and support
services", UN document A/59/6 (Prog. 24), 19 May
2004, p.11. -- finally, the brief list of overall legislative
mandates presented for UN Secretariat management work cites the General
Assembly resolutions concerning: -- the "Group of 18"
reform efforts of 1986 (primarily on budgetary consensus); -- results-based
budgeting in 2000; -- Secretary-Annan's
"strengthening" and "quiet revolution" reform proposals of 1997 and
2002; -- and the programme
budget for 2004-2005. The 1993 General Assembly resolution insisting on
management accountability (see again the preceding subsection on 1993 Management Accountability
Attempt ) is not mentioned. It remains, now and
forever, the General Assembly resolution where, in the UN Secretariat,
"none dare speak its name." "Proposed strategic
framework for the period 2006-2007: Programme 24: Management and support
services", UN document A/59/6 (Prog. 24), 19 May
2004, p. 33. IO Watch is very much in accord with the strong
warnings and concerns about the evolving, self-serving management takeover
of UN accountability processes stated by a UN staff representative before
the Fifth (Administrative) Committee of the General Assembly in October
2004. "Rosemarie Waters,
President of the United Nations Staff Union, said that the measures
introduced in the past six years had had a profound and sometimes
deleterious effect on the staff of the Organization.
management
had been reforming itself and increasing management authority, while
reducing accountability. The Staff Union had the greatest
respect for the Secretary-General's vision for the Organization and had
supported the goals of his reform programme. It could not,
however, support the erosion of staff rights and dissolution of oversight
mechanisms as a means of implementation, and it could not continue
legitimizing actions in which staff, through their elected
representatives, had no meaningful role to play.
The organization
had yet to establish concrete measures for individual accountability, she
continued.
It was essential that areas with expanded delegation of authority
for personnel decisions
should be carefully examined, and, if abuses
were found, such delegation should be revoked. The
[OHRM]
had informed staff representatives of its inability to enforce
accountability because they lacked central authority. The Fifth
Committee may wish to recommend that concrete individual accountability be
developed, in consultation with staff representatives, on a priority
basis." "UN staff committee representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in management reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of 29 October 2004, pp. 2-3. This archive details
the many grave and entrenched UN management problems which exist. With the
mere creation of some pro forma accountability
"building blocks" and a few short management training courses, the UN top
management asserts (or at least did until late 2004) that it has
miraculously erased its deep-seated management deficiencies, poor
management climate, defective management systems, inadequate and
incomplete performance management processes, and complex and flawed
management structures and decision-making processes. And these
same UN managers are now enjoying further liberation measures. IO Watch believes that the "game" of increasing UN
managerial power without firm accountability may continue in this fashion
for years and years to come, or until the UN collapses from erratic
mismanagement, whichever comes first.
IO Watch concludes that, at the UN, the foxes (also
known as the UN barons) are now more firmly in charge of the chicken coop
than ever before in UN history. The next three subsections conclude this
discussion of UN management accountability struggles by examining the
disturbing current actions of the newly-freed UN managers, the
disappearance of the UN's [supposedly] encouraged and protected
whistleblowers, and staff self-defense mechanisms within this new
Secretariat environment of sweeping managerial freedoms. |
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