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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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SUBSECTION TABLE OF CONTENTS:
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Late 2004: A "tipping point" for the
UN?
For six decades, the
"old boy" senior officials of the UN Secretariat have enjoyed a very nice
game. Over and over again, as
detailed in the five-page chronology of reform events which opens this
archive's subsection on Management Systems,
the General Assembly has repeatedly called for more transparent,
analytical and results-oriented processes to build Secretariat managerial
accountability.
The Secretariat
leadership, when thus pressed, responds with many ringing statements of
good intentions and many activities leading ever so slowly toward the
reforms called for. After a
few years, however, the efforts dwindle away without serious
implementation of the reforms ever having taken place. After a lull, the General Assembly
bestirs itself and demands reform action, and the cycle begins all over
again. In 2004 and 2005,
however, the situation seems to have drastically changed, as multiple
allegations, scandals, and -- especially -- critical reports have
highlighted grave UN Secretariat mismanagement, on a scale never before
encountered. Two introductory quotes (many others follow in the next three
subsections) give the tenor of these criticisms, one on the mounting
scandals, the other on the UN management culture
crisis: "The United Nations, which extols
the virtues of 'good governance', is not practising what it preaches, say
[many long-time observers.] … The complaints … come amidst
several recent scandals, including accusations of bribery, nepotism,
sexual harassment, and mismanagement of peacekeeping operations
overseas. 'The underlying problem is a lack
of transparency and accountability" says Hillel Neuer, [one close
observer.] .. … in 2003 the OIOS cleared the
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime in … Senior U.N. officials in
[Neuer said] 'if some of the
things that happen at the United Nations took place in a big corporation,
people would have been fired.' [A UN shortcoming, Neuer added, is
that the investigation results emerge very slowly] … are mostly
'white-washed' … [and occur] only after 'a lot of prodding from the media
and NGOs.' [A
reporter asked spokesman Fred Eckhard if there is] 'a record that shows
that the United Nations, under Kofi Annan, has taken allegations of
mismanagement and misbehaviour seriously and fired people as a
result?' [Eckhard
replied] … 'I will certainly ask for you …" Thalif Deen, "Corruption: U.N.
failing to practice 'good governance', IPS Inter Press Service,
[Note: No such record seems to exist, but
it definitely should, as a clear measure to confirm that the UN indeed
takes accountability seriously.]
"[The UN integrity survey] is of
course just one of the UN's various investigations into itself.
… Does anyone see a problem
here? The basic flaws are simple. Any time you create a large
institution, accord it great privileges of secrecy, give it a big budget
and have it run immune from any sane standard of accountability, you are
likely to get a corrupt organization. … The problem with the Secretariat
isn't "tone" at the top. It's
accountability at the top and secrecy throughout.
… Someone needs to help this
institution, and it's not a consulting team hired by the same institution,
nor is it a batch of investigators operating under terms defined by the
U.N, nor is it a grand gathering of staff members being urged to risk
reprisals by telling tales of earlier
reprisals. A better place to start is to …
withhold part of the U.N.'s budget … [or] tackle the system that
engendered Oil-for-Food … For now, I'm [starting to believe] that in …
reforming the UN, the only thing worse than having the U.N. ignore a
problem is to have the U.N. investigate it." Claudia
Rosett, "The problem with the Secretariat", The Wall Street
Journal,
There is increasing agreement by
all concerned that something drastic must be done, and that -- this time
-- management reforms must succeed. In March 2005, Secretary-General
Annan, who had taken an increasing buffeting in the global media, rushed
to the front of the parade.
He stated that: "Today I shall be presenting my report, "In Larger
Freedom" to the United Nations General Assembly.
… I
wanted to remind the governments of the world, who put me in my job and to
whom I am accountable,
that they are in the UN to represent not themselves but their peoples, who
expect them to work for the [UN Charter's] … aims
These aims can be summarized as
peace, human rights, justice and development
… Of course, the UN often falls far
short of these noble aspirations, since it reflects the realities of world
politics … The UN … can be a much more
effective instrument if its governing body, the General
Assembly, is better organized and gives clearer directives to
us in the secretariat, with the flexibility to carry them out, and holds us clearly accountable for
how we do it. … I
shall today propose decisions
in all … areas, and challenge world
leaders to respond
with action at the
UN summit in September. … ... If world leaders rise to their
responsibilities, the
rebirth and renewal of the UN will be just
beginning - and with it, renewed hope for a freer, fairer, and
safer world." Kofi
Annan, "An aspiration to a larger freedom", Financial Times
(
Even Mr. Annan's
supporting proposals were short on details of management reform
(particularly on exactly how the ringing declaration that the General
Assembly must hold the Secretariat clearly accountable should be
implemented.) But the need
for such reforms has long been clear and pressing. The home page of this
IO Watch website presents two wise warnings about pragmatic oversight of
UN operations, which may now finally begin to get the fundamental emphasis
that they deserve: "Conventionally 'internationalist'
administrations … are too inclined to see the IMF and the World Bank as
ends in themselves, as signs of enlightenment and virtue, however much a
mess they make of things.
It is quite right to ask … whether
these bodies need to exist at all, exactly what purpose they are intended
to serve, and just how well they are discharging their duties, whatever
they may be." "Reforming the Sisters", The
Economist, [Note: As the most astute
chronicler of UN successes and problems over the years, The
Economist would surely extend this wise advice to the UN as
well.]
"It is precisely those committed to struggling for a better world
who stand most in need of abandoning the fantasy of an idealized
international system."
David Rieff, "Goodbye, new
world order", Mother Jones, July/August 2003, pp.
37-41. It is also interesting
to consider three opinions about UN performance, which were buried deep in
a comprehensive book on international politics in 2001. They were provided by a cautious
optimist, a determined reformist, and a pragmatic skeptic. It seems, in
light of all UN management crisis events of 2004 and 2005, that the
balance of these assessments has now shifted quite noticeably away from
the center of the second quote, and much closer to the content of the
third than the first. "In the many
conflicts and crises of the post-1945 era the UN's record has been
mixed. … Despite its many weaknesses
and perennial financial crises, the UN has become the first genuinely
global international organization, bringing almost all sovereign states
under one set of principles."
Adam Roberts, pp. 868, 874, "Despite a less than perfect
record … the UN has served an irreplaceable function.
A robust United Nations … has great
potential to address the complex problems of today's world. Translating that potential into
reality, however, means that the deficiencies of the UN system must be
remedied. … Enhancing the capacity of the
United Nations … also means finding a new way of structuring the
Organization to increase its effectiveness and make it more
accountable."
Lloyd Axworthy, pp. 868-869, "The United Nations
is a deeply flawed institution that has, nonetheless, served foreign
policy interests from time to time.
… The most likely
future role for the UN will be an approximate continuation of its muddled,
incoherent, and marginally important present status. … Any international
organization that purports to assert governmental power, even indirectly,
and certainly one that embodies no indicia of democratic accountability,
is automatically (and properly) viewed as suspect. … [Its history]
unambiguously demonstrates that the UN is a forum for the conflict of
national interest, not a place of worship for what some believe are
humanity's higher ideals."
John R. Bolton,
p. 871. All three of the above
articles are in Joel Krieger, ed., "United
Nations", The This section of the IO
Watch archive explores in some detail the mounting analyses and criticisms
of UN operations and management in 2004 from many authoritative sources;
the further "sea of troubles" that emerged in early 2005 and the halting
efforts of the UN leadership to "take arms … and by opposing [hopefully]
end them"; and some reflections from the "real world" to try to put this
new UN management crisis into longer-term perspective. IO Watch will continue
to report on the situation as new developments emerge, both in the run up
to the "grand reform" deliberations at the 60th session of the General
Assembly in the autumn of 2005, and subsequently. Meanwhile, 2005 has
also uncovered a very pragmatic new approach to drifting global
development efforts. It has a very direct and relevant message for actions
by the purported "masters", the Member States, to finally take action to
correct a faltering UN Secretariat as well. "The new … [American foreign aid
program, the Millennium Challenge Account, draws on World Bank arguments
which command] a broad consensus:
aid may do some good even in basket cases, but it certainly works
better in countries with honest governments and sound policies.
… The MCA is based on … 16 different
indicators of a country's honesty and soundness …
A [donor] … picky about which
countries it helps need not be as fastidious about how its money is spent
… demanding only new ideas and measurable results. …
Giving aid in a systematically
selective way … maximises the return to the aid that is given. But it also encourages governments
to reform so as to qualify for aid in the future. This second effect might be most
powerful in countries denied money. The success of the MCA will be
measured not by the number of dollars it hands out, but by the changes it
brings about in the countries that it supports. Sometimes in the aid
industry, withholding money can be as important as bestowing it."
"Economics focus: A choosier approach to aid", The
Economist, The above "selective
funding" principles certainly can and should be applied as well to the
United Nations and its many, incredibly scattered programmes and
initiatives, especially since much of the UN's $6 to $10 billion of annual
expenditures now comes through voluntary funding.
As discussed in the concluding section of this archive on Answers: A Starting
Point and
Geneva group 'due diligence'
failure, if UN Member States
insist firmly and consistently on UN accountability through demonstrated
results and transparency for funds provided, it would not only improve
recent weak UN management performance, but greatly expand the value of UN
funding provided. The
benefits would accrue both to the taxpayers of major donor countries who
pay the bills, and even more to the people worldwide whose very lives may
well depend in part on prompt and effective UN
services.
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