-- First, an independent, in-depth assessment in early 2004 showed that the UN management reforms of the past decade are still very incomplete;

-- Second, a June 2004 worldwide survey of UN staff revealed serious doubts about UN leadership, integrity, and corruption-fighting efforts;

-- Third, the UN external auditors reported in mid-2004 that the UN lacks a sound corruption and fraud prevention plan and processes; 

-- Fourth, UN staff representatives expressed serious concerns in the autumn of 2004 about the lack of concrete accountability measures in the Secretariat;

-- Fifth, powerful allegations of very serious and multi-billion dollar corruption and mismanagement emerged from the UN-administered oil-for-food programme in Iraq;

-- Sixth, further serious problems during 2004 included major security program mismanagement, refugee sexual abuse, and anti-harassment cases in the Secretariat; and

-- Seventh, there were mounting expressions of doubt in late 2004 about the UN's operations and reputation and Secretary-General Annan's leadership, in light of the oil-for-food scandals and "all of the above.""

FIRST, the Secretary-General's soothing management reform progress reports of 2000 through 2004 must be balanced against the only in-depth and independent assessment ever made of these reforms, as performed by the US General Accounting (now Accountability) Office in 2000 and again in 2004.

The Secretariat reports from 2000 through 2004 show the steady disappearance of management accountability actions as a topic for the Secretariat, if not the General Assembly.  One of the Secretariat reports on management reform report of 2000, apparently the last Secretariat report ever made to the General Assembly on accountability as a topic, had concluded that

" … the Secretary-General is confident that the comprehensive  system of accountability now in place ensures that accountability mechanisms are effectively used, are seen to be used, and ensure that staff at all levels are held accountable for their actions and inaction."     

"Accountability and responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General", A/55/270 of 3 August 2000, Summary, paras. 1-2, 47-48.            

In 2002, Mr. Annan's annual report on the work of the Organization very briefly stated that OIOS was working with managers to build accountability.  His 2003 annual report referred briefly to the unpleasantness of some mismanagement and abuse problems but then summarized the gradual efforts toward establishing performance management systems.

"Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization," UN document A/57/1, 2002, paras. 193-200.

"Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization," UN document A/58/1, 2003, paras. 207-211

Mr. Annan's annual report for 2004 provided a new and even more diminished equation:  actual UN accountability work merely equals OIOS work. Its brief section on "Accountability and oversight" was all about OIOS, first outlining its comfortable self-review in 2004 of its first decade of work, and then its monitoring, evaluation and consulting; internal audit; and investigation activities. While the text mentioned that OIOS trains Secretariat staff in results-based management, makes reviews, and assists Secretariat departments through consulting assignments, there was no analysis, assessment, or results of the accountability systems and efforts supposedly "in place" throughout the Secretariat since 2000.

"Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization", UN document A/59/1, 20 August 2004, paras. 246-254.

In the next section, "Strengthening the Organization," Mr. Annan concluded that

"The implementation of my agenda for further change, submitted to the General Assembly two years ago [i.e., his 2002 reforms], is now largely complete."

"Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization", UN document A/59/1, 20 August 2004, para. 255

[Note: in fact, other than outlining some restructurings and "activities", he subsequently admitted that implementation was only, and still, "in progress." with considerable work to be done on field staff contracts, delegation of authority, better monitoring, reconfiguring the "Accountability Panel", and giving "more attention" to management training, see in particular  para. 261.]

One need only compare these blithe and cursory conclusions presented to the General Assembly with the concurrent "sea of troubles" that increasingly battered the UN Secretariat in the last half of 2004. In fact, a series of major problems gravely undermine the above confident self-portrait of a fully-accountable UN Secretariat (and especially its managers), despite the Secretariat's efforts to play down or ignore them.

The US GAO reports of May 2000 and February 2004 on UN management reform had clearly emphasized the slow reform progress and how much remained to be done:

The United Nations has substantially restructured its leadership and operations and partly implemented a merit-based and performance-oriented human capital system … However, … the overall objectives of the reform have not yet been achieved. Specifically, the United Nations has not yet implemented reforms to focus its programming and budgeting on managing the Secretariat's performance. These initiatives would enable Member States to hold the Secretariat accountable for results and are key to the success of the overall reform because they institutionalize a shift in the organization's focus from carrying out activities to accomplishing missions.  … the U.N. reform is an interrelated process and requires that all core elements be in place to succeed."

"US General Accounting Office, "United Nations: Reforms are progressing, but overall objectives have not been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-169, 15 pages, of  May 10, 2000,  especially summary and pp. 2-3 and 9-15, and

"United Nations: Reform initiatives have strengthened operations, but overall objectives have not been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-150, May 10, 2000, 84 pages.                           [emphasis added]

The U.N. Secretary General launched two reform agendas, in 1997 and 2002, to address the U.N.'s core management challenges -- poor leadership of the Secretariat, duplication among its many offices and programs, and the lack of accountability for staff performance.  … In 2000, GAO reported that the reforms were not yet complete.

What GAO found

… First, the Secretariat has taken positive steps to strengthen its human capital management, but reforms in this area are ongoing and additional challenges remain.  Second, the U.N. has begun to adopt results-oriented budgeting, but its monitoring and evaluation system does not measure program impact. …

UN reform faces several challenges.  For example, the Secretariat does not conduct comprehensive assessments of the status and impact of U.N. reforms.  In addition, the reform agendas lack clearly stated priorities, interim goals, and target dates for overall completion.  Other challenges include resistance to change from program managers and possible resource constraints.

U.S. General Accounting Office, United Nations: Reforms progressing, but comprehensive assessments needed to measure impact, GAO 04-339, February 2004, "Highlights" page.                        [emphasis added]

[Note: the complete report is available at

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-339 

Also, and regrettably, the GAO reports of 2000 and 2004 did not discuss or even note the critical 1993 management accountability reform mandate given by the General Assembly and its failure, concentrating instead on Mr. Annan's 1997 and 2002 reforms.]

In response to these straightforward conclusions, the Secretary-General's August 2004 annual report noted the existence of the 2004 GAO report, but only to casually state that

"It is encouraging to note that, at the time of its review, the [GAO] estimated that 85 percent of the reforms proposed in the 1997 and 2002 reform packages had been either fully or partly implemented."

"Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization", UN document A/59/1, 20 August 2004, para. 262.

IO Watch was unable to actually locate this "85 percent" statistic in the GAO report, and it was definitely not in the "Highlights" and "Results in Brief" sections that summarize the  key GAO findings and conclusions.  And while GAO did provide some statistics on 1997 and 2002 reform initiatives "in place", it emphasized that:

"However, the outputs of many reforms, such as developing a written plan or establishing a new office, are only the first step in achieving the Secretary General's overall reform goals. … departments and offices in the Secretariat are still institutionalizing these new plans to improve U.N. operations in the long term." 

U.S. General Accounting Office, United Nations: Reforms progressing, but comprehensive assessments needed to measure impact, GAO 04-339, February 2004, p. 8.       [emphasis added]
                                                    

A more detailed discussion of the GAO findings on UN management reform in 2000 and 2004 is presented in the preceding  subsection. It demonstrates that Mr. Annan's 1997 and 2002 management reforms (let alone the forgotten 1993 management accountability mandate) are clearly incomplete and require very extensive and serious follow-up actions, despite his August 2004 assertions that all is well and management reform work is by and large complete.

SECOND, a worldwide survey of UN staff attitudes on perceptions of integrity and corruption issues that was issued in June 2004 produced some quite negative findings. 

"A new survey  of  … [UN integrity perceptions]  has found that while structures for reporting and combating  corruption exist, most staff members are either unaware of how to use them or afraid to do so for  fear of  high-level retaliation.

'The UN has a 'phone book' of rules and regulations which are totally useless as they are never practiced',  a staff member is quoted as saying …  [Another says,]  'Senior leaders caught in serious breaches of ethics should be punished, not promoted as usual.'

… [The study] is being made public at a time when Secretary-General Kofi Annan has been forced by the widespread publicity [about corruption in the Iraq oil-for-food program] to appoint a high-level panel to look into them. …

The new study records relatively high levels of worker satisfaction … but its most negative findings have to do with ingrown leadership and the lack of response to reports of corruption.

'Get rid of the old boy network,' one staff member … [says.]  'That network is wide, tenacious and powerful.  … So long as you can wind your way into that network, you are OK. … Opposing the network is certainly the end of a UN career.'"

Warren Hoge, "Report criticizes the way UN fights corruption", International Herald Tribune, June 16, 2004.                                [emphasis added.]

[Note: The actual survey, based on responses from some 6,000 UN staff,  is  "United Nations organizational integrity survey", Final Report, prepared by Deloitte Consulting LLP, June 2004.

It can be found at

 www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/index.shtml.]    

In comparing this 2004 survey with a similar one in 1995, one finds that things have indeed gone downhill -- staff in both surveys sought better management, but in 2004, even after a decade of "management reform", UN staff were even more concerned with, and disturbed by, senior management accountability issues.]

These quite surprising survey findings led Secretary-General Annan to issue the integrity survey results with a placating cover letter, which stated inter alia that:

" … According to the survey, staff generally perceive that breaches of integrity and ethical conduct are insufficiently and inequitably addressed by the disciplinary system.  At the same time, they voice concern about the consequences of 'whistle-blowing' or reporting on misconduct, and certainly about the mechanisms for such reporting. … Clearly … these need to be better known and made more accessible to staff at large.  We will inform all staff about the means available to them for reporting on suspected misconduct.  We will also develop measures to reinforce formal protection for whistle-blowers, while ensuring that they are not used to cloak false accusations.

… it is interesting to note that, while the great majority of staff believe that their own immediate supervisors demonstrate integrity and uphold the United Nations' values, the general view of senior leaders is less positive.  The survey rightly emphasizes the need for senior leaders to lead by example, living up to the commitments they make in their annual compact with me. … I will therefore be directing my senior colleagues to make much greater efforts in this area …"

Kofi A. Annan, "Dear colleagues", letter of 4 June 2004 , p. 3.      
                            [emphasis added.]                                                         

It is also "interesting to note" that the survey results and Mr. Annan's admissions (a) belie his confident assertions of management reforms now implemented and (b) that Mr. Annan's determination to have leaders make "much greater efforts" of leadership excludes only one person -- himself.  The very serious issue of the true status of recent UN management reform efforts is discussed further under the topics of Management culture deterioration and Corruption Characteristics in the Recent Developments section of this archive. 
                                             

THIRD, in July 2004 the UN external auditors (the Board of Auditors) stated in their annual report on UN operations that because the UN has no comprehensive anti-fraud plan, many of the UN offices, funds, and programmes have little or no effective framework policy and mandates in this area.  It discussed its findings and concluded with a main recommendation that:

"The Administration (i) implement a comprehensive and well-communicated corruption and fraud prevention plan in the United Nations system, (ii) establish a corruption and fraud prevention committee that would serve as an effective framework and coordination point for a United Nations system corruption and fraud prevention mechanism, (iii) conduct ethics, corruption and fraud-awareness training sessions and workshops among managers, international and local employees and other stakeholders, (iv) develop appropriate resolution mechanisms for reported and detected incidents and allegations of corruption and fraud, and (v) review the investigation processes at Offices away from Headquarters."

"Financial reports and audited financial statements for the biennium ended 31 December 2003 and Report of the Board of Auditors", Vol. I, UN document A/59/5 of 22 July 2004, p. 12, item (u), paras. 15(f) and 344-349.  

The Secretariat quickly brushed aside this recommendation, although it buried it deep within a subsequent report.  Noting that it agreed with the Board's recommendation and overall concerns concerning fraud, presumptive fraud, and allegations of corruption, it then stated superciliously that:

"However, some of the Board's comments may give the mistaken impression to the uninitiated reader that the potential for large-scale fraudulent and corrupted activities is widespread.  The Administration assigns high priority to the issues of fraud and corruption and several mechanisms for addressing them are embodied in the Financial Regulations and Rules of the Organization and in established procedures that are all geared towards ensuring adequate internal controls to minimize such occurrences.  

The Under-Secretary for Management is responsible for the implementation of the recommendation."

"First report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Board of Auditors … for the financial period ended 31 December 2003: Report of the Secretary General", UN document A/59/318 of 1 September 2004, paras. 124-126.  [emphasis added]

In fact, the Board of Auditors report section on anti-fraud activities had begun its firm critique by duly noting the existing financial rules and internal controls, and then noting the very unsatisfactory anti-fraud situation that none the less exists. The Board report also gave a summary of the very few (only 14) fraud and presumptive cases reported to it by the Administration for the entire biennium 2002-2003 (which did not, for some reason, include peacekeeping operations and other entities).  The often very audacious corruption activities that were identified involved a mere $707,304 out of some $20 billion which the UN spent during that biennium, of which only a measly $10,183 was recovered (although a further $178,233 of losses were prevented.)

"Financial reports and audited financial statements for the biennium ended 31 December 2003 and Report of the Board of Auditors", Vol. I, UN document A/59/5 of 22 July 2004, paras. 344. 12, item (u), paras. 15(f) and 344-349.  

These very serious current discrepancies between UN anti-corruption problems as viewed by the external auditors and the Secretariat are discussed further in various parts of this archive.  The earlier subsections of this UN Management Accountability Struggles contain informative material under Corruption in the UN and Accountability and Transparency in the UN .  So do the subsections which follow here on The Winner: "Free the Managers" , Unleashed Managers , Disappearing Whistle-blowers (and Staff Self-Defense ). UN corruption and corruption-fighting issues are also emphasized in Investigation efforts: Is the OIOS a fig leaf? under Inadequate UN Oversight ; and especially in A real UN fraud prevention programme under Answers: A Starting Point, in the Recent Developments section.  

FOURTH, UN staff representatives have become increasingly concerned with these UN accountability and oversight trends and problems, as indicated by the following three quotes:

"Rosemarie Waters, [the UN Staff Union President], said that … in the last six years, [UN] … management had been reforming itself and increasing managerial authority, while reducing accountability.  The Staff Union [had great respect for the Secretary-General's vision and reform programme goals.] … It could not support, however, the erosion of staff rights and dissolution of oversight mechanisms as a means of implementation, [or legitimize] … actions in which staff, through their elected representatives, had no meaningful role to play. …

The [integrity survey] … revealed that staff … feared reprisals for exposing breaches of ethics, and they perceived that the disciplinary process was applied unevenly.  Their view of integrity among senior managers was less than positive.. 

The Organization had yet to establish concrete measures for individual accountability, she continued.  It was essential that areas with expanded delegation of authority for personnel decisions should be carefully examined and, if abuses were found, such delegation should be revoked. … The [OHRM] had informed staff representatives of its inability to enforce accountability because they lacked central authority. The Fifth Committee may wish to recommend that concrete individual accountability be developed, in consultation with staff representatives, on a priority basis."

"UN staff committee representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in management reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of 29 October 2004, pp. 2-3.          [emphasis added]                              

"James O. C. Jonah, … [who worked at the UN for three decades] … and served as head of personnel from 1979 through 1982, … recalled that [when the Fifth Committee initiated reforms in the late 1970s],  … a staff-management consultation process was established, and it was decided that staff representatives should be allowed to appear before the Committee. Now, it was sad to see the erosion of the international civil service in the United Nations.  That had serious implications.  The Committee should also have a serious look at the results of the integrity study.  Never had the staff perception of integrity been so low. … In some respects, the reforms had weakened the Secretariat considerably.

When he served as head of personnel, his biggest fight had been with programme managers, who were most resistant to reform …. He could not believe that such measures as giving authority to programme managers would strengthen the international civil service.  What had been said about the lack of authority of the OHRM was true.  Without a strong personnel office, however, there would be no uniformity of rules and fairness in the system.  Governments should not take what was happening lightly."

"UN staff committee representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in management reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of 29 October 2004, p. 4.              [emphasis added]                                

"Integrity sponsor unit 35:

The staff council:

[Recalling its April 2004 request that the Secretary-General establish an independent investigation of violations of the delegation of authority in the OIOS] …

Regrets the decision of the Secretary-General to accept the findings of an incomplete investigation; …

Further considers that the failure to fully investigate the allegations … upholds the findings of the [staff integrity survey] that there is a lack of integrity particularly at the higher levels of the organization;

Recalls that the Secretary-General declined to accept the honourable action of the deputy Secretary-General who tendered her resignation as a result of the Baghdad bombing of a UN compound that resulted in 22 staff members perishing, to hold accountable the head of UNHCR for alleged sexual harassment and to hold accountable the chef de cabinet whose son was employed by the Secretariat in contravention of staff rules;

Decides that the senior management no longer displays the level of integrity expected of all employees of the organization;

Requests:

i.  The president to convey this vote of no confidence to the Secretary-General and president of the General Assembly …

iv. to the staff at large and;

v.  to issue a press release."

"Raw data: U.N. staff resolution", Fox News (US) website, November 19, 2004.

[Note: Fox News stated that the above was the text of a UN staff resolution which it received, calling for a vote of no confidence in Kofi Annan.]  
                                                                                       

IO Watch believes that these pressing issues of integrity and management-staff relationships -- more than ever before -- are at the heart of UN Secretariat operating problems in the 21st century.  They are discussed further in the following subsections on

"The Winner: Free the Managers" , Unleashed Managers , Disappearing Whistle-Blowers , and Staff Self-Defense ;

under Where is the Rule of Law in its subsections on Staff Rights , Inept "Administration of Justice" System , Behind the Scenes , and Major Ongoing Flaws ;

under OHR (Mis)Management and Internal Oversight: The OIOS in the section on Inadequate UN Oversight ;

and especially in the Recent Developments section, particularly in the 20 subsections under The UN: Alone and UNaccountable and Other Major Problems .

(After all this, IO Watch does propose a set of accountability and oversight solutions under Answers: A Starting Point in Recent Developments, and in Hope for the Future? under Where is the Rule of Law?.  These suggestions are grounded in the many sensible and "doable" UN accountability reforms proposed during the past decade.)

FIFTH, as discussed in some detail in the subsection on the UN-administered Iraq oil-for-food programme , problems began with an ominous note in 1998 and early warnings in  2002, but only multiplied into multiple investigations inside and outside the UN during 2004.  The situation has become  an emerging major crisis for the UN, as the scale of bribery and corruption involved -- estimated at some $10 billion dollars -- may prove to be of the largest corruption cases in international financial history.  It is of course all the more troubling because it occurred in a major important UN humanitarian assistance programme.

The Secretariat, as in other areas, has sought to minimize and downplay the Iraq scandals and indicate that things are “under control.” The Secretary-General's 2004 annual report section on "Accountability and oversight", for instance, highlighted decisive OIOS-led actions to clean up a fraudulent $4.3 million fund diversion in Kosovo. But it then mentioned the multi-billion dollar Iraq oil-for-food quagmire (roughly 2,500 times as big) only as “allegations of impropriety”.  Mr. Annan noted his appointment of the Volcker group “to ensure a thorough and meticulous inquiry”, expressed his appreciation for Security Council support of his action, and called on all Member States and their regulatory authorities to cooperate with the Volcker group.

“Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization”, UN document A/59/1, 2004, paras. 253-254.

The very slow pace of the Volcker investigation contrasts with the many allegations and disclosures made in other investigations, which have moved much more rapidly. IO Watch will continue to add new material, particularly since the investigations and their follow-up may well drag on for years (see also the seventh item below).

SIXTH, there are still other UN Secretariat scandals and problems emerging (or glossed over) that thrust into deepest question the management accountability and transparency of UN operations. They are nicely summarized in a recent article:

"U. N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said yesterday he was disappointed in his son for accepting payments from a key contractor in the oil-for-food programme for more than four years longer than … previously acknowledged. …

But the appearance of a payoff to the Secretary-General's son was just the latest … of revelations about the Iraqi oil-for-food program …

While the organization scrambles to respond to oil-for-food inquiries, other troubles are piling up at the organization's doorstep. ...

The U.N. peacekeeping program is wracked by accusations of rape, sexual harassment and extortion by blue helmets and civilians in the U.N. mission in Congo. …

International pressure also is building on the United Nations and the Security Council to do more to protect civilians in Darfur, Sudan. …

Internally, a [staff] … group seeks to reopen an investigation of [the head of the OIOS] … over charges of sexual harassment and favoritism …

The U.N. staff union also has criticized Mr. Annan's willingness to exonerate Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette for failing to protect U.N. staff members in Iraq …

[Mr. Annan] also threw out an internal report finding merit in a [recent] sexual harassment complaint against … [UNHCR head] Ruud Lubbers."

Betsy Pisic, "Another oil-food scandal emerges", The Washington Times, November 29, 2004.                                                                       

More detailed information on all these problems, and more, can also be found elsewhere in this archive:

-- long-standing problems of abuses in UN peacekeeping and other field missions are found under Refugee Sexual Abuses  in Where is the Rule of Law? ;

 -- weak or tardy UN responses to situations of genocide are discussed in Worst of all, never-ending genocides under Other Major Problems, and in the subsection on the Security Council under UN Performance Problems ;

-- continuing problems of weak Secretariat action on sexual harassment cases, particularly for senior officials, is found in the subsection on Anti-harassment efforts under OHR (Mis-)Management ;

-- serious mismanagement of security for UN staff in field operations is discussed under Baghdad headquarters bombing ; 

-- information on senior UN officials exonerated by Mr. Annan and the OIOS on serious corruption allegations (in the UN's own global anti-corruption program) are found in the subsection on Top corruption fighter corrupted ;

--  more general and deeply-entrenched patterns of UN evasiveness and hypocrisy in reporting and transparency matters are found in the subsection on UN Moral Values and Rectitude - For Others ;

-- in the subsections under The UN, Alone and UNaccountable , especially on Resource ambiguities , Public relations, not performance , Reporting evasiveness , and on Is the UN another Enron? ;