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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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Management improvement and management training actions are considered
vital signs of organizational health and dynamism in modern
organizations. In the UN,
however, management improvement prospered (relatively speaking) during a
series of initiatives during
the 1970s and 1980s before fading away, while management training only
made a very modest and tardy appearance in the early 1990s. Management
improvement Once again JIU
reports have provided the only overall chronology of such efforts. In 1988
the JIU found that various UN units were devoting more attention to
management efficiency and performance. In 1968 an expert group had called
for a strong management review service, and in 1981 JIU had recommended
regular reporting to governing bodies on savings achieved and improvements
made in administrative units.
Unfortunately, as in so many other areas, promises of effective
staff utilization, intensified management improvement efforts, and
technological innovations had been made, but there were no subsequent
reports on whether these admirable aims had been achieved. The JIU then noted a performance
reporting void in five areas: (a) establishing
and reporting on performance indicators for support
activities; (b) an
Administrative Management Service (AMS), established by the General
Assembly in 1976 as an essential need with regular reports to ACABQ, was
downgraded in 1985 and stopped reporting; (c) in 1984 the
Secretary-General announced a comprehensive Management Improvement
programme and a "Staff Incentive Programme" to encourage dynamism, but its
results were modest and by 1987 it was fading away; (d) JIU had urged
effective computerized information system planning in 1985, but only in
1987 did a Secretariat evaluation confirm that the Secretariat had neither
identified new opportunities nor assessed the status and results of
existing systems [and a comprehensive performance management information
system was still not installed more than a decade-and-a-half
later]; (e) Finally, the
Secretariat had not been very responsive to requests to establish the
internal evaluation system that the General Assembly had repeatedly
required, to reorganize existing management information systems, to
strengthen management systems at non-headquarters units (where the AMS did
not operate), and to better manage interpretation and meetings
services. From Chapter IV.F, "Management
improvement," in "Reporting on the performance and results of United
Nations programmes: Monitoring, evaluation and management review
components", UN document A/43/124, 1988, paras. 165-177.
The JIU summed up
the management improvement situation in 1988 as
follows: " … there is at present very
little systematic reporting to intergovernmental bodies on the programme
performance of [support] activities. … As a result, legislative bodies
presently know very little about
[the results of] the $US 660 million of biennial support services
expenditures … amounting to almost half the UN regular budget. … 'output reporting' is still
fragmented and superficial … Internal audit [does] not report at all … and
AMS reports have ceased. The Inspector recommends that …
the ACABQ, Fifth Committee, and Committee on Conferences consider
requesting an annual in-depth review report on management improvement
actions and results in a specific support services area. … such studies
would be a powerful, systematic stimulus to continuing improvement and
greater efficiency of the extensive United Nations administrative and
conference activities." Chapter IV.F, "Management
improvement," in "Reporting on the performance and results of United
Nations programmes: Monitoring, evaluation and management review
components", UN document
A/43/124, 1988, paras. 178-180. The 1993 JIU
report on accountability and oversight found once more that little
progress had been made: " … A 1992 status report noted
that [the 1984 "Staff Incentive Programme"] had been very modest, with
only about 40 proposals yearly from some 15,000 staff, of which only 3 or
4 a year are accepted and not all are actually implemented. The report recommended … a broader
focus, more support and visibility … and perhaps a report by the
Secretary-General each year …
In early 1993 … a small model
project [initiated by consultants, helped] staff in the Diplomatic Pouch
Unit analyze their work processes and tasks … to improve their
productivity. Similar
projects [assisted by AMS] are expected … in any other DAM units that wish
to participate. The General Assembly showed its
concern with the vast untapped potentials in this area when it called on
the Secretary-General in late 1992 'to introduce appropriate measures
[with the ICSC] to enhance the motivation of the staff in order to increase
creativity and productivity.' The Inspectors believe … that [a] good
further step could be to resurrect the 1984 proposal of the
Secretary-General, never implemented, to help make management improvement
a priority measure by reporting on it regularly to the General Assembly."
Joint Inspection Unit,
"Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN
document A/48/420, 1993,
paras. 107-109.
A 1995 JIU report
on accountability and oversight throughout the UN system identified
management improvement units and programmes that were established or being
established in about half the organizations. The UN was not represented,
however, since its Staff Incentive Programme had faded away. The AMS had undergone many
organizational reshufflings and a general decline, and then it too was
phased out and absorbed by the new OIOS in 1994. The JIU report on
management reform progress in late 1995 concluded
that: "The General Assembly expressed
its concern in 1976 that 'an effective and continuing management
improvement programme is essential.' and 'requires a competent central
internal machinery' with the necessary mandate, senior management support,
and resources to enhance management improvement efforts. In a 1991 review of [AMS,by then
retitled as MAS], the JIU urged that it be revitalized to aid in
managerial analysis and problem-solving, developing productivity
standards, streamlining operations, determining staffing requirements, and
enhancing organizational and administrative analysis and review. [In the Secretariat] … an [AMS/MAS] unit is still
clearly needed. The lack of
such a unit is a disturbing 'hole' in the new system of
accountability." Joint Inspection Unit, "Management in the United Nations: Work in progress", JIU/REP/95/8, UN document A/50/507,1995, paras. 164-165. [Note:
the first report mentioned above is Joint Inspection Unit, "Accountability,
management improvement, and oversight in the United Nations System", Parts
I and II, A/50/503, 1995, Part I, paras. 116-126, and Part II, tables 4
and 8.
Management improvement efforts were renewed for a time in the mid-1990s by a widely-publicized and enthusiastic, but apparently temporary, "Efficiency Board" programme. Subsequently, the OIOS has become more and more involved with consulting work and improvement efforts with managers, which is useful but presents problems because it detracts from the unique and major OIOS responsibilities for auditing and investigation, and creates a basic conflict of interest problem if the Office must later independently audit a process that it helped create. "UN 21: Better service, better value, better management," Progress Report of the Efficiency Board to the Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, September 1996. However, a quite
positive new management improvement effort emerged in a Secretariat report
in April 2003. The report,
the first one in what the Committee for Programme and Coordination has
requested as a regular biennial exercise, presents a systematic overview
of management improvement measures across the UN global Secretariat, "as a
first step to reorienting the Organization's reporting to address the
Member States focus on results."
It is an initial phase in developing a progress and impact
reporting system for analytical reporting and to promote the sharing of
good practices, using a new UN online tool for tracking management
reforms, the Progress and Impact Reporting System (PIRS.) The CPC wants it to progress "both
as a monitoring tool and as a means of assessing more rigorously the
impact of management improvement measures." It hopefully will lead toward a
new UN management improvement strategy and become an important, and long
overdue, part of UN management reporting. "Progress and impact assessment of management improvement measures:
Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/58/70 of 15 April
2003, summary and paras. 1-4, 68-71.
Why can such an effort
get up and running while other areas, such as PPBE or other performance
management requirements, are a major struggle to implement? IO Watch believes that it is
because management improvement activity is voluntary. It is something for UN
"self-starters" and good managers, who want to improve their programmes
and the Secretariat's processes. Weak or bad managers, in this instance,
can just observe, or ignore the whole thing and go about their own
preoccupations.
Management
training If management
improvement was almost disappearing in the UN Secretariat in the
mid-1990s, management training was finally making a first timid
appearance, after several decades in which the UN Secretariat almost
totally ignored this essential organizational process. The 1988 JIU report on performance
reporting had found that the rather weak management improvement efforts of
the 1980s left only a reliance on UN staff members themselves. But the Secretariat had a
long-acknowledged management skills problem: "In [1978 comments on an earlier
Management Improvement programme], ACABQ noted with some concern the
difficulties of establishing in-house management training courses to
'create and sustain a management climate' in the Secretariat. Unfortunately, in 1986 the
Secretary-General once again had to cite the need for improved Secretariat
management 'at all levels.'
He stated that a 'principal task' for him would be to 'ensure that
management skills are given high priority in recruitment and in training.
In 1987 he further acknowledged the need for effective training in such
areas as computer systems and 'modern management skills.'" "Reporting on the performance and
results of United Nations programmes: Monitoring, evaluation and
management review components", UN document A/43/124, 1988, para.
175.
As evidence of
the severe damage done to UN management systems by the lack of even
narrowly-focused management training, the 1988 JIU report also found a
very sorry record of training managers to employ the supposedly
high-priority PPBE system:
"The [Secretariat] stated in 1978
that it was obvious that each programming unit must have people adequately
trained in [PPBE] techniques in order to make the programme planning
system work effectively. [Yet
eight years later the 1986 medium-term plan] … states that organized
training activities will be used to help program managers learn how to use
self-evaluation, ideally as part of overall training in programme
planning, budgeting and monitoring. Unfortunately, [only minimal
training sessions were held in 1987, but anything more is] uncertain
because [such] training has not been accepted as a formal part of the
United Nations training programme.
… the Secretariat has now prepared
nine programme budgets and five medium-term plans, [but multiple outside
reviews] have all criticized poor design during this period. … A
significant portion of United Nations activities is still not 'precisely
programmed,' and the Secretariat has acknowledged the inadequate
involvement and lack of experience of at least some Secretariat officials.
… The lack of staff training is of
extra concern now that programme managers are adding self-evaluation work
to their responsibilities … [and because of a broad discretionary loophole
that allows] programme managers themselves [to] decide whether to evaluate
… or not and in what depth … depending inter alia on 'the existing
level of evaluation experience' … and because evaluation units will be
phasing out as programme managers take over self-evaluation. This would
eliminate a major source of advisory support, training, and especially
quality control …
[UN] training … is difficult
because so little training money is available. … Nevertheless … since
training in design and evaluation will be essential for self-evaluation,
and … to complete the programme planning system and make it operational,
the Inspector believes that [such] training should be the top management
training priority." "Reporting on the performance and
results of United Nations programmes: Monitoring, evaluation and
management review components", UN document A/43/124, 1988, paras. 148-152.
The
Thornburgh report of March 1993 to Secretary-General Butros-Ghali was,
characteristically, blunt on the UN problems in this
area. "In your
November speech to the Fifth Committee you called for the rapid
implementation of a comprehensive career development system. … As you have stated, 'it is now
time for action.' In one area, a
significant change is already under way. Thanks to the efforts of OHRM's
Training Service and the financial support of the Japanese government, a
long-awaited management training initiative is currently in the process of
implementation. This will
address one of the major shortcomings of the United Nations identified by
nearly everyone who has examined its operations - the shortage of
qualified managers, especially at the middle management
level." Dick Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations" ["The Thornburgh report"], 1 March 1993, pp. 11-12. The 1993 JIU
report on accountability and oversight noted that in the absence of strong
oversight and management improvement units, organizations like the UN must
rely heavily on staff members themselves, supported by training not only
in management skills but in implementing programmes. Yet in 1993: "Observers have consistently noted
the problems of poorly-designed UN programmes, poorly-stated objectives,
and unsatisfactory evaluation reports, … in considerable part because
programme managers have not had proper training
… Similarly, [a 1990 JIU report]
noted, and the Secretary-General concurred, that … programme managers did
not know the rules and procedures on acceptance and use of extrabudgetary
funds, leading to uncertainties, confusion, and vague reporting on [this]
major funding source for United Nations
programmes. The Secretary-General reported in
late 1992 that he would implement a comprehensive … [training system for
staff at all levels.] The report noted … [a] 'serious gap' between what
almost 15,000 staff would need and the resources available for
training. For instance, the
priority programme -- supervisory training -- reached only 120 people in the
1991-1992 training year and only 550 people since its inception. The United Nations presently
spends only 0.29 percent of its staff costs for occupational and
management training, well below the comparable 2 to 3 percent that
comparable United Nations entities and some governments
spend." Joint Inspection Unit,
"Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN
document A/48/420, 1993,
paras. 107-109. [Note:
the second report referred to is Joint Inspection Unit, "Extrabudgetary
resources of the United Nations: Towards transparency of presentation,
management, and reporting", UN document A/45/797, 1990.
Despite all these
pitfalls, the Secretariat report of 1994 on establishing the system of
accountability and responsibility stated with much enthusiasm that: "Programme managers and
supervisors must be clear not only about their authority, but also how to
use it … [and therefore must be] provided with training … related to
management skills development. Programme managers and supervisors …could
derive benefit from practical training in … the concepts of
decision-making processes … The major objective … is to empower programme
managers and supervisors to see the benefits of employing the full
resources available to them, particularly through their
staff. … The Training Service has
delivered a number of integrated courses with a specific focus on
empowering managers … and has planned others
… [The Service will also conduct] a
special orientation programme for under-secretaries-general and assistant
secretaries-general on programme planning, financial management and the
budget process, human resources management and other current management
issues … [and] develop an orientation guide or handbook for [them] …" "Establishment of a transparent and effective
system of accountability and responsibility: Report of the
Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/49/1 of 5 August 1994, paras. 60-62.
At the same time,
many initiatives were beginning
throughout the UN system to utilize management development as a
powerful instrument for change.
They emphasized the need for top management support and visible
commitment; integration with larger strategies; establishing a "learning
climate;" and highlighting new management skills and techniques. Two
significant efforts were also undertaken to begin to establish a
"performance management culture" throughout the UN system, and an
inter-agency training center for UN system field representatives at the
ILO International Training Center in Turin, Italy. Joint Inspection Unit,
"Accountability, management improvement, and oversight in the United
Nations System", Parts I and II, UN document A/50/503, 1995, paras.
107-115.
The 1995 JIU
report on management reform progress noted Secretary-General Butros-Ghali's
1992 pronouncement that "the quality of [UN] leadership and management is
crucial" to meet new programme challenges, and the ensuing decision to
install a management training programme as the "link between managerial
skills and programme delivery."
Training in "people management skills for top managers began in
1995, and a first catalog of Staff Development Programme courses
appeared. But even the new
programme provided only $3.5 million in funding -- a mere 0.14 percent of the
1996-1997 UN regular budget total, far below the several percent figure
that many other public and private organizations were
spending. Joint Inspection Unit,
"Management in the United Nations: Work in progress", UN document A/50/507, 1995,
paras. 32-35.
In the same
report, the JIU analyzed three categories of the UN's vaguely-defined
"programme managers," responsible for the UN's 24 programmes, 246
subprogrammes, and the many additional and varied extra-budgetary
activities. A first group of good managers included those who entered the
UN with good experience and training, or who are just "natural
managers." A second group,
the largest, was unprepared managers. A 1993 independent analysis of the
UN managerial situation cited the very high frequency with which untrained
people were placed in managerial positions in the secretariat, although
they who were "entirely unfamiliar" with modern management
experience.
Chapter VI, "Who are the
managers?", in Joint Inspection Unit, "Management in the United Nations:
Work in progress", UN document A/50/507,1995, paras. 103-109. Beyond the two
groupings -- the dynamic and accountable, and the unprepared -- was a third category, bad
managers. The study found
widespread support for changing this situation. But it observed that UN management
training must be accompanied by changes in incentives, systems and
procedures (such as the management accountability system) to be
effective.
Chapter VI, "Who are the
managers?", in Joint Inspection Unit, "Management in the United Nations:
Work in progress", UN document A/50/507, 1995, paras.
113-117. [Note: the extraordinary
damage done to UN programmes and staff morale by these bad UN managers is
introduced in the subsection on "The Winner: Free the Managers" which
follows, and then further explored at some length in the next subsection
on "Unleashed
managers" , and then as the first of the
items under Other major problems in Recent Developments .] A long-time observer
of UN operations succinctly underscored the long-standing lack of trained
UN managers in 1996. "With a budgeting process as
antiquated and arcane as the UN's, the dearth of training -- the key to instituting a truly
cost-effective management culture
-- is shocking. Managers often start out with no
notion of how to administer their own office budgets. "Management training', confined
mostly to the UN's Performance Appraisal System, still takes a back seat
to language-training programmes which dominate staff improvement
time. Managerial expertise is
but a faint consideration in the promotion of managers at any level,
including the Secretary-General." Morris B. Abram, "Save the UN", The Geneva Post, No. 9, May 17-22, 1996. Note: Mr. Abram was a former permanent representative of the United States to the UN, and subsequently chairman of "UN-Watch".]
The GAO report of
February 2004 on UN management reforms noted that the UN Secretariat had
"increased the emphasis on training and developing managers' skills" and
cited 'mandatory people management training for supervisory staff" [yet
another attempt, since the Secretariat had said it was emphasizing such
courses a decade ago, see the items of 5 August 1994 and the two of 1995
above.] The GAO also
noted that UN officials acknowledged -- as they have so consistently for
so long -- that "more resources are needed for training." U.S. General Accounting
Office, United Nations: Reforms progressing, but comprehensive
assessments needed to measure impact, GAO 04-339, February
2004, p. 16. In his report on
further management reforms in 2002, Secretary-General Annan stressed that
more attention must be paid to staff training. The UN spends only about one
percent of its total budget on learning activities, which is significantly
less than the amount spent by comparable organizations. "Strengthening of the United Nations: An agenda for further change:
Report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/57/387 of 9 September
2002, para. 187. IO Watch will continue
to follow up on UN management training issues. However, the modest Secretariat
efforts that have gradually been established are only a bandage slapped
over the severe and fundamental problems of somehow turning untrained UN
managers into informed and effective ones; firmly addressing the many
problems caused by domineering and incompetent managers; and overcoming
the decades-old UN managerial climate with its many dysfunctional
processes and systems, as discussed throughout this subsection.
In summary, the
failures of the past decade to firmly install, use, and insist upon the
management accountability system required by the General Assembly in 1993,
and to seriously strengthen
the various weak internal management systems, make real UN management
reform and accountability all the more difficult. In fact, IO Watch finds that this
situation has furthered the ascendancy of the Secretariat's own, and only
successful, management reform effort of the 1990s -- the counter-reform of
"freeing the managers to manage," as discussed in the next
subsection. |
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