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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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Closely related to the neglected PPBE monitoring and evaluation problems
are the UN processes (they
are so disorderly that one cannot possible call them true systems) for
overall management reporting to the General Assembly and other
intergovernmental decision-making bodies. Secretariat reports have long been
the subject of weary and often angry criticism from Member States and the
General Assembly as a whole, for their sheer volume, wordiness, lack of
meaningful content, and tardiness.
The JIU produced a
series of reports during the 1984-1995 period analyzing these entrenched
serious weaknesses in Secretariat management reporting processes. A first report found that, despite
repeated requests to reduce the volume of documentation, ECOSOC
was: "in danger of being suffocated,
instead of informed, by [108 reports with 4,000 pages of "pre-session
documentation" alone, plus some 2,500 pages of sessional documents --
draft resolutions, summary records, official statements, etc]
… … presentation has not improved
despite [many resolutions] calling for conciseness … The documentation is
always distributed so late that many reports cannot be taken into account
during the debate. And above
all, a more thorough examination of the content of the documents shows
shows that the conception of many of them should be completely renewed …
[and] genuinely adapted to the needs of the Council." Joint Inspection Unit,
"Reporting to the Economic and Social Council", UN document A/39/ 281, 1984, p. 2.
The report
carefully analyzed the weaknesses of specific reports. It concluded that
the overall situation greatly hampered ECOSOC policy formulation and
required urgent corrective actions. The Secretary-General
subsequently: " agreed that too many Secretariat
documents were descriptive rather than analytical, did not always identify
key policy issues, and lacked policy recommendations. He also noted that while
Secretariat reports tended to rely cautiously on established views,
intergovernmental bodies often requested routine reports as a substitute
for a search among members for compromise, concession and agreement. However, he endorsed JIU's
conclusions and stated that efforts would continue to make documents more
analytical, highlight policy issues, and prepare more concise and
consolidated reports." "Reporting to the Economic and Social Council" Further comments of the Secretary-General, UN document A/40/284, 1985, paras. 7-8, as
summarized in Joint Inspection Unit,
"Advancement of the status of women in the United Nations Secretariat in
an era of 'human resources management' and 'accountability'": A new
beginning?, JIU/REP/94/3, A/49/176, 1994, para. 95.
As noted at
various places in this website, in 1985 a rebellion in the General
Assembly's Fifth Committee, which expressed strong dissatisfaction with
poor UN oversight and performance reporting, marked a very short-lived
"high-water mark" in Secretariat aspirations to improve Secretariat
management reporting. The
sharp criticisms of poor reports led the UN's top manager to agree, and to
state quite clearly that: "Member States have …
stressed the need to be told, more clearly and more extensively
…. what has been the programmatic
performance of the Secretariat, which outputs have been delivered, and
with which result…. Let us strengthen the
monitoring and evaluation functions …
Let us say clearly and dispassionately what has been done and with
which result, and equally what has not been done and
why…. Let us produce more analytical performance reports
…. I find the essential
problem one of better and more transparent information, thus permitting
better decisions."
"Statement", Response to the
above criticisms by UN Under-Secretary-General for Management Patricio
Ruedas 12 November 1985, as quoted in UN Joint Inspection Unit,
"Reporting on the Performance and Results of United Nations Programmes:
Monitoring, evaluation and management review components", UN document A/43/124,1988, p. 5.
However, since
then not much has changed. In 1988, a JIU report on overall UN programme
performance reporting cited the above 1985 discussion, but found that UN
performance reporting was still
incomplete, awkwardly timed, and lacked sound methodology and
analytical content. The JIU concluded that "For almost 40 years,
the General Assembly and the Secretariat have been working to establish an
orderly system of planning and review of United Nations programmes.
… but the system
remains incomplete -- and
seriously weakened -- because
an essential element is still missing: there is no regular, systematic
[UN] reporting on programme performance and results to top management and
intergovernmental bodies. …
… an interim
'programme performance report' …[established in 1980
provides] only a very mechanistic tabulation of the thousands of programme
'outputs' produced, which tells intergovernmental bodies almost nothing
about actual programme results, efficiency and effectiveness relative to
the objectives which were set. Substantive,
comprehensive performance reports would finally integrate monitoring and
evaluation as normal working tools for programme decision-making
… and strengthen
programme formulation and implementation by providing timely progress and
results information … and
clearer accountability and programme
transparency." "Reporting on the performance and
results of United Nations programmes: Monitoring, evaluation and
management review components", UN document A/43/124, 1988,
paras. 1-5.
The 1988 report
also provided an in-depth analysis of major problems with current
Secretariat "programme performance" reports. They
included: "1.
Incomplete coverage 2.
Awkward report timing 3.
Fragmented programme review structure 4.
Continuous programme changes 5.
Identification of priorities 6.
Marginally useful activities 7.
Separation of programme and financial
data 8.
Methodological shortcomings 9.
[and, last and most importantly] Lack of
analysis" Chapter III.B., "Major problems with current reports," in "Reporting on the performance and results of
United Nations programmes: Monitoring, evaluation and management review
components", UN document
A/43/124, 1988, paras. 29-120.
The 1993 JIU report on
UN accountability and oversight needs found that the quality of general UN
"assessment" reporting seemed to have changed slowly, if at all. "A clear illustration … was the
Secretary-General's 1989 'final report' on the … report of the 'Group of
18' experts. Although it
'encompasse[d] all actions' and 'illustrate[d] progress accomplished', it was
only an information report … [that had to be] supplemented in 1990 with an
expressly analytical report which followed a specific framework
established by the General Assembly. [Too many] recent
Secretariat reports are … still of the 'on the one hand … on the other
hand … very difficult … others have failed … one might try … will keep
under careful review' type. Reports nominally of the
"Secretary-General' … are in fact prepared by anonymous authors whose
experience and competence … is unspecified. They usually contain no
explanation of scope or methodology used, and do not crisply document and
summarize past reporting on the topic … They gloss over rather than
pinpoint problems, and still lack summaries, analysis of options, and firm
conclusions and recommendations. This vast amount of 'assessment
reporting' thus severely hampers United Nations accountability and
oversight. It ties up scarce
staff resources for trivial rather than useful reporting, clogs reporting
channels with documents of limited value, and deprives top management and
governing bodies of the substantive information they need to make
effective policy decisions." Joint Inspection Unit,
"Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN
document A/48/420,
1993, paras. 118-119.
The JIU report
also noted it and others had often raised the possibility of external
reviews of Secretariat performance, but that the Secretary-General had
flatly disagreed in 1985 and had raised procedural objections, and the CPC
had been ambivalent on this issue.
However, the situation seemed to be changing in the early
1990s: " … the Secretary-General has …
enlisted a series of external consultants, often working 'pro bono,' to
deal with important management reform and improvement matters in the
Secretariat. … Unfortunately,
however, governing bodies and Member States do not see the work, the
reports, or the results of these consultants. They thus do not benefit from
expertise and fresh perspectives which could stimulate and inform their
own decision-making responsibilities and deliberations on management
matters. … The Inspectors still believe that
the General Assembly and ECOSOC should be able to establish at least some
independent management consultant reviews and reporting for priority
topics, [since a JIU report a decade before had found that more than
one-third of the UN system organizations had had some type of external
evaluation study made recently] to complement the Secretary-General's own
use of such consultants and existing external review efforts." Joint Inspection Unit,
"Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN
document A/48/420, 1993, paras. 113-114, [Note: the second report
referred to is Joint Inspection Unit, "Third report on evaluation in the United
Nations system: Integration and use," UN document A/41/202, 1985, paras.
11(c) and Annex 1.]
In 1994, a JIU
report chapter examining the "new era" of human resources management found
that because there had been no regular comprehensive reporting on
substantive human resources matters, the General Assembly had relied on
requests for ad hoc reports.
Unfortunately, this pattern of serious requests, feeble responses,
and Assembly dissatisfaction was becoming an epidemic, as shown by
reporting problems in 1993, as the General Assembly:
" … expressed concern at problems of late issuance of
documentation, inadequate implementation of some Assembly mandates, and …
stressed again the importance of sustained, timely and substantive
dialogue and consultations between the Member States and the
Secretary-General;
regretted that a report of the Secretary-General on restructuring
and efficiency did not provide an analysis … as called for, and requested
a new, analytical report;
regretted that a report on the accountability and responsibility of
programme managers did not provide an adequate response to [Assembly
requests of 1991, 1992, and 1993];
urged the Secretary-General to make 'without delay' a complete
review of the existing performance evaluation system … to develop it into
an effective system ..; and
regretted that a report on the administration of justice in the
Secretariat, called for in 1990, had not been submitted, and requested a
comprehensive review and report thereon no later than
1994." United Nations personnel policy,
reporting, and dialogue have thus gone full circle, returning to the
unfortunate situation that JIU found 23 years ago in 197l: a strong
dissatisfaction among Member States, senior officials, and staff at
seemingly endless personnel discussions, and a lack of actions to
establish and use modern personnel management techniques in the
Secretariat." Joint Inspection Unit,
"Advancement of the status of women in the United Nations Secretariat in
an era of 'human resources management' and 'accountability'": A new
beginning?, UN document
A/49/176, 1994, paras. 103-104. A final JIU
report on Secretariat management reporting in 1995 concluded that:
" … It appears that many, if not
most, Secretariat management reports are still as vague and uninformative
as they were a decade ago, and far short of … clear reporting on programme
performance. … Another fundamental management
reporting problem is the weakness of the primary reporting tools --
monitoring and evaluation reports. The 1988 JIU report on programme
performance reporting analyzed in detail the biennial monitoring reports,
particularly their tardy, untimely, and mechanistic tabulation of
thousands of programme 'outputs', which told intergovernmental bodies
little about actual programme results and efficiency. Similarly, programme evaluation
reports were often of good quality but covered only a few programmes, and
self-evaluation was under-developed and essentially for internal use by
programme managers. In addition, neither the internal audit nor the
management services unit did any external reporting. Thus, intergovernmental bodies did
not have the information on programme performance and results they needed
to help determine future programmes and improve
operations. The Secretary-General's 1994
report on the new accountability and responsibility system finally agreed that the programme
performance report is a mechanical summation of a wide mixture of outputs
with 'not necessarily meaningful' implementation ratios, and that in-depth
evaluation studies are too slow and too few. He announced plans to use
self-evaluation to focus the programme performance report more on
assessing results, increase the pace and problem-solving content of
in-depth evaluations, and to make the financial data in the programme
budget performance report more analytical. However, … it appears that
monitoring and evaluation … will continue to provide only a small portion
of the performance reporting and analysis that the Fifth Committee
requires." Joint Inspection Unit,
"Management in the United Nations: Work in progress", UN document A/50/507, 1995,
paras. 156-158.
[Note: The Secretary-General's
1994 report referred to is "Establishment
of a transparent and effective system of accountability and
responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/49/1
of 5 August 1994,
paras. 70-75.
The JIU did find some
positive examples of change.
The new OIOS was starting to provide some reports to the General
Assembly (see the OIOS section following). The Secretariat had issued a
"lessons learned" report on UN humanitarian aid in Rwanda [but it fell far
short of the later highly-critical "genocide" reports thereon], and the
Secretary-General had agreed to allow the European Communities "certain
forms" of audit access on projects that they financed. And an external review of UN
much-criticized procurement processes was published in 1994, with a
Secretariat report in June 1995 on corrective actions being
taken. Joint Inspection Unit,
"Management in the United Nations: Work in progress", , UN document
A/50/507, 1995, para. 159.
[Note:
The outside procurement review cited is the "Procurement study: Report",
High-level Procurement Group, United Nations, December 1994.
The JIU also observed, however,
that the Fifth Committee was sinking (as was ECOSOC a decade before) under
a flood of documentation, and that certain basic reporting reforms could
help stem this flood. It
recommended that the Fifth Committee require the following changes for
reports made to it (which could apply to the General Assembly and other
intergovernmental bodies as well): "Summary :
Secretariat reports should emulate [most other UN system
organizations and] … require that every document have a brief summary at
the front … [to assist] busy readers. Contents:
The many Secretariat reports which omit a table of contents are a
great disservice, and almost an insult, to readers … all reports should contain
[one]. On time:
[many reports are very tardy] … the 'six-weeks rule' for
circulating documents to Member States before discussion should be much
more firmly enforced, with sanctions …. Action-oriented: … Cautious and bland overviews of past
efforts and current conditions should be replaced with specific (and
time-limited) proposals for corrective
action. Accountability: … [Under the new
accountability system reports should clearly identify] … the specific unit
… responsible for preparing each report … References: Present
Secretariat reports contain almost no endnotes, and only vague text
mention of a 'prior report' [or a cursory and obscure bibliographic
notation] … appropriate citations, with document titles, dates, and
paragraph references should be added [to show a professional, complete,
credible, and objective report] … Graphics:
Most Secretariat management reports provide very few, if any,
charts and graphs … and tables are often [endless pages of details] …
instead of succinct quantitative summaries. One good picture continues to be
worth a thousand words. In an era of 'desktop publishing,' the Secretariat
should join other System organizations in providing … many more report
tables and graphs that clearly and concisely show major trends, patterns
and status. … Question period: … much more impact can sometimes
be achieved by periodic appearances of key officials before the Fifth
Committee for a dialogue … this practice occurs widely in national
governments … Necessary and substantive: …
intergovernmental bodies must do their parts … not request 'a report' as a
way to postpone or avoid their responsibilities for negotiations and
discussions … but require instead only those reports [essential to help]
fulfill their oversight and policy-making
functions. Focused:
[In addition] … the intergovernmental bodies should state as
clearly and specifically as possible the substantive issues which the
requested Secretariat report should address."
Joint Inspection Unit,
"Management in the United Nations: Work in progress", JIU/REP/95/8, UN
document A/50/507, 1995,
paras. 164165.
The above list appears
to provide a reasonable list of what any public organization should expect
as management reporting for efficient policy and decision-making. While there seems to have been no
other overall assessment of Secretariat reporting since this 1995 effort,
however, the most recent reports indicate that that old habits of bad reporting
die hard. Some progress has
been made in adopting more attractive report formats and more concise
presentations, but Secretariat reports still do not always include
summaries or tables of contents.
They still make very poor use of graphics and summary charts, and
are not submitted in a timely fashion. One very key development is that,
beginning with the year 2000, reports and resolutions of the General
Assembly and the Security Council, and selected other documents are now
online and available to the public, rather than buried deeply in one of
the limited number of UN depository libraries as in the past.
[These
documents are available from the UN Documentation Center at www.un.org/documents
.] The most serious
continuing problem is that most Secretariat reports still merely discuss
ongoing activities, including reform initiatives, in sweeping terms and
with many assurances of good intentions and expectations. They do not yet frankly address
problems, set target dates for corrective actions, or assess results
obtained and specific progress made.
Further, there have been some significant external reports, such as
the "Brahimi report" in 2001 on peacekeeping difficulties, and the Ahtisaari report on serious UN security management
lapses in the Baghdad bombing of UN facilities in late 2003. But otherwise little has been done
to follow the very promising precedent of the 1994 Procurement Study and
follow-up report that were noted above. In 2002, as part of
his continuing reform efforts, Secretary-General Annan made what seems to
have become something of a ritual promise about stemming the flood of
Secretariat documents to the multiple UN intergovernmental bodies. "After years of major cost cuts
and staff reductions to streamline the United Nations bureaucracy,
Secretary-General Kofi Annan today proposed a program of more modest
changes to make it 'a more effective
instrument.' Mr. Annan laid out a strategy for
fewer talk sessions and reports on back-burner issues, noting that the
United Nations secretariat held 15,484 meetings and produced 5,879
reports -- many translated
into several languages -- in 2000 and 2001. He promised to review all United
Nations activities 'to make sure we are doing what matters, and not
wasting time or money on out-of-date or irrelevant tasks.'" Julia Preston, "Annan proposes fewer reports and less talk for a better U.N.," New York Times, September 24, 2002. In light of Mr.
Annan's subsequent calls for drastic and fundamental reform of the UN in
September 2003 (cited elsewhere in this archive), it would appear that the
problem of overwhelming and disorganized UN documentation and management
reporting continues relentlessly on, and that the same assurances that
were made about improving such reporting in 1984 and 1985(see above) are
still being made two decades later, without any real appreciable change
ever having occurred. As with other UN
management systems of the 1990s, the form of management reporting is
present, and somewhat improved, but the critical elements of substantive
content, well-focused analysis, and corrective actions and new directions
are still missing. The UN is not keeping up with comparable organizations
and governments around the world in strengthening its decision-making
processes, and providing transparent, readable, and action-oriented
management reports to the General Assembly and the public.
The UN Secretariat
recognizes the pressure to do a better job of reporting on results and
impact, particularly concerning its management reforms, rather than merely
discussing "mechanisms" installed or policies promulgated. In 2002 and 2003 it attempted
several such reports, but only one, on management improvement measures
(see next subsection) seems to be systematic and action-oriented. The General Assembly has thus
increased the pressure, stating in a May 2003 resolution that
it: "Requests the Secretary-General to
report to the General Assembly in a comprehensive manner on the
achievements of the human resources management reform
… Further requests the
Secretary-General to ensure that all future reports on the implementation
of the human resources management reform focus on the results of such
measures." "Human resources management reform," General Assembly resolution
57/305 of 1 May 2003, Part II, paras. 4 and 6.
Similarly, the 2004 US
GAO follow-up report on UN reforms stated that the
Secretariat: "does not periodically and
comprehensively assess the impact of reforms on the effectiveness of U.N.
operations. Given that the
Secretary-General does not provide regular, comprehensive reports on the
overall status and impact of reforms, it is difficult to hold staff
accountable for implementing these reforms and their impact is unclear. In
addition, the 2002 reform agenda did not specify short- and long-term
goals or establish expected time frames for their completion -- practices
that increase the transparency and accountability of the reform process.
Adopting key practices in management, oversight, and accountability for
reforms, such as systematic monitoring and evaluation, could facilitate
the achievement of the Secretary-General's overall reform goals."
U. S. General Accounting
Office, United Nations: Reforms progressing, but comprehensive
assessments needed to measure impact, GAO 04-339, February 2004, p 36.
This very important
issue of poor management reporting, and the lack of accountability and
transparency which it produces, is discussed further in the concluding
major section of this archive, Recent Developments
: -- in the subsection
on The UN, Alone and UNaccountable , under
the topics of resource ambiguities, public relations rather than
performance, reporting evasiveness, and whether the UN is another
Enron?; -- in the subsection on Other Major Problems , under the topic of
a Grand lack of focus; and -- in the concluding section on Answers: A Starting Point, under the
topics of a true global strategy, establishing a General Assembly audit
subcommittee, and annual results reporting and annual resource status
reporting to the General Assembly. |
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