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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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Despite
the very strong General Assembly resolution on establishing a system of
management accountability and Mr. Niazi's very perceptive warning of 1994,
the UN then began its familiar, multi-year pattern of ever-so-slow
"implementation" of the Assembly's demands for improved management. In
accord with the Assembly's own leisurely biennial calendar for considering
"personnel" (and management) issues, the Secretariat provided cautious
enthusiasm in 1994, a "busy" period of various "intentions and activities
underway" in 1996, and sober warnings in 1998 that "a long time" would be
needed to implement the reforms. However, in 2000
Secretary-General Annan suddenly declared victory and, beginning in 2001,
managerial accountability issues were largely relegated to a rhetorical
afterthought. This very disappointing sequence of events, as outlined below, was punctuated with
reminders of just how fundamentally flawed UN "management reform"
processes continue to be. The sudden
insistence by the General Assembly on a new UN management accountability
system by the first of January 1995 made 1994 a year of hasty adjustment
for the Secretariat. A first report on establishing the new system in
August outlined a framework for the new system, related reform activities,
and new accountability mechanisms to be established. It also contained a surprising
mea culpa about the severe UN managerial defects of the past half
century and the need for ensuring accountability: "
[UN staff and managers'
capacity and expertise at all levels] must correspond to the
responsibility assigned and authority delegated and must be balanced by
full accountability through appropriate accountability
mechanisms. An efficient
organizational oversight machinery will monitor the operation of the
system and conduct audits, inspections, evaluations and investigations
The systematic control of the interrelated processes
will provide the
key to success
and contribute to the Organization's
effectiveness and efficiency. "In the establishment of [the new
system one must consider the difficulties involved]
in particular the
need to change attitudes and established and well-entrenched bureaucratic
habits.
the
Organization must transform itself. In so doing, the utmost care
should be taken to develop a real 'management culture', to put measures in
place that will encourage improved performance and higher levels of
productivity and ensure quality work.
In short, the objective
should be the creation of a mission-driven and result-oriented
Organization
" "Establishment of a transparent and effective
system of accountability and responsibility: Report of the
Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/49/1 of 5 August 1994, paras. 12 and 109.
[emphasis added]
This sharp focus
on the General Assembly's accountability reforms was immediately blurred,
however, by other "reform business". Each Secretary-General has had his
own set of grand "reforms" to pursue, by reshuffling the complex UN
organizational structure and adjusting the "focus" of UN work. An acerbic
summary in September 1994 by a sharp long-time observer of UN goings-on,
the International Documents Review, assessed Mr. Butros Ghali's
reform efforts and observed that "[The Secretary General's report
says it seeks] 'to improve and enhance the Secretariat's ability to meet
[Member States'] strategic objectives and priorities', but does not say
what these
are, nor put the changes that have been made into any overall
historical perspective.
Later sections of the report
provide more descriptive detail (but little analysis).
The report is extremely tentative
in drawing conclusions. The [reform] process being assessed 'is by its
nature a continuing one,' aimed at adapting the organization
As such, it is an effort
[alternating] periods of restructuring with periods of consolidation. In the circumstances, the assessment exercise is best
approached, like restructuring itself, as a learning
process.' To translate that unkindly,
restructuring is being undertaken without clear aims or a strategic sense
of direction." "S-G's 'initial' assessment of Secretariat reform sets out no strategy, sees process continuing", International Documents Review (New York), 5 September 1994, pp. 1-3. [Note:
the report referred to is "Restructuring
of the United Nations Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General", UN
document A/49/336 of 24 August 1994.]
Nonetheless, an
October 1994 Secretariat report went even further in acknowledging the
past grave failures of overall UN personnel (henceforth "human resources")
management, under heavy pressure from a strong General Assembly resolution of
April 1993. The report stated
that: "[it] outlines a strategy to
modernize and re-energize human resources management in the [UN
Secretariat]
[While the UN's role and mandates
have expanded], commensurate changes and modernization in human resources
management have not occurred.
As a result, [such] management has been fragmented, bureaucratic
and incapable of dealing expeditiously with ever-changing demands
The Office of Human Resources
Management has been largely
unable to address properly [its essential] planning and management
functions.
[This in turn has] partially contributed to the slow
deployment of field missions, inadequate people management, low staff
morale, and insufficient mobility.
Thus, the time is overdue
to introduce changes to maximize the
contribution of [UN] human resources." "A strategy for the management of the human
resources of the Organization: Revised estimates
: Report of the Secretary-General ", UN document
A/C.5/49/5 of 21 October 1994, paras. 1 and
23. [Note: The General Assembly document mentioned
is "Personnel questions," resolution
47/226 of 30 April 1993.]
However, the rest
of the report labored to explain and expand upon this frank mea
culpa. Another incisive
assessment by the IDR stated that "A strategy was presented to the
General Assembly in a document of atrociously low quality, even by UN
standards. The writing is
crusty with jargon, repetitive, and structured like a multi-jointed
creature out of Dr. Seuss.
It makes the rather startling
revelation that [OHRM] does not have a planning component. It does not
explain why this is so, or how the Office has managed to operate for
nearly five decades without planning its activities. As if enunciating a new discovery,
the report says that 'Planning is essential
" [Its] absence
has contributed
significantly to current OHRM management weaknesses.
' [The report then states that] 'It
is intended that [UN] senior management be involved in the planning
process and party to all important decision-making relating to human
resources planning and change.' (Traditionally, senior management has
considered OHRM a generally unnecessary encumbrance, to be called into
action only to fend off unsuitable offerings of personnel from pushy
ambassadors. Its powers of
locating competent staff for recruitment are held in such low esteem that
no senior manager in his right mind would initiate a request without
having someone already identified, or even on board as a consultant or
short-term contract employee.)" "Strategy to improve UN staff management and quality explained in atrociously written report," International Documents Review (New York), 7 November 1994, pp. 4-5.
In 1995 the Joint
Inspection Unit provided two more reports on accountability issues. The
first examined accountability and oversight in the UN system, noting that
the System's functions and tasks had rapidly expanded, that expenditures
had risen to more than $12 billion per year, and
that: "There has never been a
comprehensive review of accountability, management improvement, and
oversight activities within the United Nations system. Such a review seems particularly
timely now in light of
performance pressures, new initiatives underway,
and calls for improvement from many sources.
it seems increasingly
urgent that the organizations clearly demonstrate wise resource use and
programme responsiveness, because the pressures for high-quality
performance will quite probably only
intensify. This report is only an initial
'baseline' survey [to help each organization consider strengthening
actions for]: A strategic and integrated
approach. Internal oversight units.
Management
systems. Human resources
management. Inter-agency
activities. External system-wide oversight
bodies. Oversight governing
bodies." Joint Inspection Unit,
"Accountability, management improvement, and oversight in the
United Nations system", Part I "Overview and analysis", Part II
"Comparative tables", UN document A/50/503, 1995, "Executive
Summary". A second JIU
report explored the UN Secretariat's progress in management reform in
light of General Assembly resolution 48/218 A of 1993. It examined ten reform areas,
assessing "progress made" in six areas and "progress required" in four
others. It stated in general
that "'United Nations management' has
been termed an oxymoron, a juxtaposition of incompatibles. Over the past fifty years, there
have been various attempts to strengthen United Nations programmes and
improve their management, but they have not been well implemented.
the General Assembly insisted
very forcefully in 1993 that [a new system of managerial accountability]
be installed by 1 January 1995 . The task is daunting.
Such a major
redirection
evokes
powerful fears of, and resistance to, any changes in comfortable ways of
doing things. However, the future status and
credibility of the United Nations require it to demonstrate that it is a
learning organization which will skillfully and flexibly manage its
limited resources to produce results
The current effort is undoubtedly
the best, and possibly the last, opportunity to establish a strong management culture and
performance emphasis in the United Nations.
The Inspector believes that
additional specific actions in four areas are essential to maintain the
momentum that has been generated
Accountability for
accountability. Clear responsibility for programme
delivery. Related issues of Secretariat
management reform. Intergovernmental body oversight
and leadership." Joint Inspection Unit, "Management in the United Nations: Work in progress", UN document A/50/507, 1995, "Executive Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations."
The first
biennial progress report on the new managerial reforms in 1996, and the
last set of reports provided by Secretary-General Butros Butros-Ghali, was
very disappointing. It highlighted the dynamism of his reform initiatives,
but meandered through a variety of challenges, expectations, and
activities. It concluded with
a grandiose sentence (that did at least toss in the word "accountability)"
that: "The Secretary-General's strategy
for modernizing the management of the Organization's human resources
has
been the corner stone on which the Secretariat has worked to build a
performance-driven, service-oriented culture and supportive work
environment that encourages improved managerial skills, increased
managerial responsibility and effectiveness through increased delegated
authority, responsibility and accountability as well as optimal individual
staff performance and, thereby, improved organizational
performance." "Implementation of the strategy for
the management of the Organization's human resources: Report of the
Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/51/1 of 16 August 1996,
Summary.
In an angry
resolution in early 1997, the General Assembly called for an extensive set
of further and more specific reports. 'Recalling' the
Secretary-General's strategy, the Assembly stated that
it "I.2. Regrets with
deep concern that further progress in the implementation of the adopted
strategy has not been achieved, and urges the Secretary-General to
take the necessary action to ensure its full implementation
; 3.
Regrets the unsuccessful efforts to develop a management
environment and culture in the Organization that enables staff members
to contribute their maximum potential, effectiveness, and
efficiency; 4.
Calls on the Secretary-General to pursue the full implementation of
his strategy as soon as possible;
II. Reaffirming its resolution
48/218A of 23 December 1993, in particular the request therein for a
mechanism ensuring that programme managers are accountable for the
effective management of human resources allocated to
them,
2.
Requests the Secretary-General to enhance managerial
accountability with respect to human resources management decisions,
including imposing sanctions in cases of demonstrated mismanagement
of staff and willful neglect of or disregard for established rules and
procedures, while safeguarding the due process rights of all staff
members, including managers; 3.
Also requests the Secretary-General to issue specific
administrative instructions to establish clearly the
responsibility and accountability of programme managers for proper use of
human resources, as well as sanctions in accordance with staff rule
112.3 for any financial loss suffered by the United Nations as a result of
gross negligence, including improper motivation, willful violation
of or reckless disregard for the staff Regulations and Rules and
established policies regulating recruitment, placement and
promotion; 4.
Deplores the high number of exceptions to the established
procedures for the recruitment, placement, and promotion of staff, in
particular in the Office of Human Resources
Management;
6.
Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to streamline
administrative procedures and eliminate duplication, in relation to human
resources management, through delegation of authority to programme
managers, and requests him to ensure, before delegating such
authority, that well-designed mechanisms of accountability,
including the necessary internal monitoring and control procedures, as
well as training, are put in place, and to report to the General
Assembly
[in1998]
" "Human resources management",
General Assembly resolution 51/226 of 25 April 1997, Part I, paras.
2-4, Part II, first preambular and paras. and 2-4, and 6. [emphasis
added]
This clear lack
of effort to implement the 1993 management accountability resolution
continued on. The following
excerpt of a January 1997 Secretariat procedural document illustrates both
the typical mind-numbing Secretariat prose [for which IO Watch apologizes
to the reader], and the seemingly perpetual delays and disorder in UN
decision-making. "In its
resolution 45/254 A of 21 December 1990, the General Assembly decided to
continue considering annually the administrative,structural and other
aspects of the improvement of the efficiency of the Organization, and
requested the Secretary-General to report
accordingly. At its thirty-fourth session the Committee [for Programme and Coordination] endorsed the measures on the establishment of a transparent and effective system of accountability and responsibility to be taken by 1 January 1995 and recommended that future proposals should be submitted as appropriate to the General Assembly through the Committee for Programme and Coordination and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. At its
thirty-fifth session
the Committee recognized the need to pay more
in-depth attention to its coordinating role, which should be based on
substantive issues.
Furthermore, it should be recalled
that at its resumed forty-ninth session, the General Assembly in its
decision 49/489, decided to defer the consideration of the documents relating to the review of the
efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United
Nations and requested the Secretary-General to update his report on the
restructuring of the Secretariat [A/49/336], and to apprise the Assembly
of the measures taken to implement the recommendations taken in his report
on the establishment of a transparent and effective system of
accountability and responsibility [A.C.5/49/1]. In its decision 50/503, the
General Assembly decided to defer, once again, the consideration of the
documents relating to the review of the efficiency of the administrative
and financial functioning of the United Nations to its fifty-first
session. At its 36th session, the
Committee, in view of the absence of a report of the Secretary-General on
the administrative, structural and other aspects of improvement of the
efficiency of the Organization as a whole, as mandated in General Assembly
resolution 45/254 of December 1990, decided to defer to its thirty-seventh
session the consideration of the question of review of the efficiency of
the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations." "Adoption of the agenda and organization of work: Provisional agenda," Committee for Programme and Coordination, Thirty-seventh session, 9 June-3 July 1997, UN document E.AC.51/1997/1 of March 1997, item 3. "Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations."
The above
complications and acrimony in UN decision-making are unfortunately
typical, as analysed by a blue-ribbon
expert group of UN "insiders" in 1997. They feared that various practices,
habits, attitudes, and misperceptions on the part of both the Secretariat
and Member States had fueled an "us versus them" mentality that could well
undermine the mid-1990s UN reform attempts. The group described the"
"Sins of member
states: Secretariat staff resent
member
state interference in
their daily work
[their micromanagement of] the hiring and promotion of
Secretariat personnel.
. [and of]
Secretariat budgeting,
. too often
seeking to control the minor
details of spending allocations.
. Secretariat staff members are also
frustrated by lack of clear direction from intergovernmental bodies. Too
often member states fail to agree on how best to confront global
problems
. Moreover,
mandates are frequently assigned to the Secretariat with little thought as
to the resources needed for their
implementation. Sins of the
Secretariat:
. Member states contend that
ineffective -- some would say nonexistent -- managerial practices throughout
the Secretariat have led to inefficient use of the [UN resources]
; a
staff unaccountable for its actions and prone to delegate upwards;
insufficient program coordination
; and wasteful duplication of
efforts. There has been a
lack of transparency in Secretariat decision making [on] policy issues,
personnel, and budget expenditures.
much of the information that is
provided is not timely or readable.
Overall, inefficiency and lack of
accountability within the Secretariat, whether preceived or real, have
invited member state micromanagement. " "Making UN reform work: Improving member state-Secretariat relations", Report of the twenty-eighth United Nations issues conference, The Stanley Foundation, February 21-23, 1997, pp. 2, 14-16. Even more
significantly, the management accountability reform was pushed far into
the background by the sweeping reform plans announced by the new
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in July 1997. His report considered management
reforms as only one small reform area in a major UN "reconfiguration",
which focused not on management accountability but on efficiency measures
to cut staff posts and costs.
As he stated:
"I am pleased to submit
what I
believe to be the most extensive and far-reaching reforms in the fifty-two
year history of the Organization.
the
Organization needs to be significantly reconfigured to do better
also so
realize significant administrative efficiencies.
The report seeks
on my own initiative, nothing less than to transform the leadership and
management structure of the Organization.
it also
includes complementary measures that reside within the jurisdiction of
Member States
and several more fundamental proposals
for possible
action in the longer term." "Renewing the
United Nations: A programme for reform: Report of the Secretary-General,"
UN document A/51/950 of 14 July 1997, Letter
of transmittal. Member states were
not pleased with the accumulation of reform plans and ideas. In a "rather
scathing report" in early 1998, the ACABQ dismissed a Secretariat "concept
paper" on reducing administrative costs in order to free up $195 million
for a proposed new UN "Development Account." The Committee
criticized the 'lack of a clear concept," and "was disbelieving of the
claims made about efficiency gains and their impact." It suggested
that it might be better if the Secretariat would "
set aside a preoccupation
with concept and theory
to concentrate on
specific new measures to
increase the efficiency and confirm the results arising out of the implementation of new
measures as well as those initiated prior to the current
exercise." "Advisory Committee rejects
'non-programme costs' report", International
Documents Review, 16 March 1998, page
5.
[emphasis added] In his 1998 report to
the General Assembly on human resources management, Secretary-General
Annan did not mention management accountability at all in his summary of
eighteen personnel items included. He did, however, note still more
conceptual principles and intentions for managerial accountability
processes within a discussion of the delegation of authority. He stated
that:
"A comprehensive
and effective system of delegation of authority rests on three premises:
responsibility
resources and authority
and accountability being
established at all levels through appropriate mechanisms.
Clearly
there are many levels of accountability in the Organization.
Mechanisms of
accountability provide tools that foster informed, well-documented and
reasoned decisions
[which] should address the following questions
and
take into account the following principles
[and include] periodic
management review or follow-up
[and] regular reporting derived from
monitoring and follow-up. With regard to sanctions
it is the intention of the Secretary-General to explore the
possibility of establishing a management review panel
for
reviewing specific cases of non-compliance
[and to] make recommendations
to the Secretary-General for action
to meet the General Assembly's
concerns
in paragraph 3 of section II of resolution 51/226." "Human resources
management: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/53/342 of 4 September 1998, paras. 9-11, 24-30. [emphasis
added] In a second 1998
report on human resources management reform the Secretary-General
presented a "vision
for change comprising objectives to be obtained over
the next three to five years" [i. e., between 2001-2003]. He mentioned
accountability only briefly, as being integral to "an organizational
culture of empowerment," and stated that "
Staff members
at all levels
must be held accountable for delivering assigned outputs
on a timely and cost-effective basis
and for upholding the values and
principles of the Organization
. The prime responsibility for
taking action to remedy accidental and intentional performance failures
will lie with supervisors and managers at all levels.
In addition
the Department of Management is considering the setting up of transparent
accountability mechanisms
"
"Human resources management reform: Report of
the Secretary-General",
UN document A/53/414 of 13 October
1998, paras. 6-9. [emphasis
added]
The General Assembly
remained skeptical in its resolution on these reports. It not only
repeated its insistence on ensuring, "before delegating
authority, that
well-designed mechanisms of accountability
are put in place" [see para. II.6 of the resolution
51/226 of 25 April 1997 above.] It stated further that it "IV. Delegation of authority and
accountability
3.
Also notes that no
comprehensive system of accountability and responsibility has been
established;
10. Reiterates its
request to the Secretary-General [see para. II.2 of resolution 51/226] to
enhance managerial accountability with respect to human resources
management decisions, including imposing sanctions in case of demonstrated
mismanagement of staff and willful neglect of or disregard for established
roles and procedures, while safeguarding the right of due process of all
staff members, including managers." "Human resources
management," General Assembly resolution 53/221 of 23 April 1999. [emphasis added]
In late 2000 the
Secretary-General presented the next round of reports on Secretariat
progress in the midst of a growing mass of his own management reform
activities. In a first report, requested specifically by the General
Assembly, he stated that, with regard to management irregularities causing
financial loss: "
the Secretary-General is in the process of
establishing procedures to
[allow preliminary investigation of allegations of 'gross negligence'] by
heads of departments/offices or [the OIOS], [followed up where
necessary]
under revised Joint Disciplinary Committee procedures
[and] As part of his
programme for management reform
measures to to establish a more effective
accountability system
such as [a] programme management plan, [an]
Accountability Panel and monitoring of delegated authority
. The
Secretary-General believes that a comprehensive approach to
accountability, backed up by all these measures, will contribute significantly to
detecting and preventing management irregularities." "Follow-up report
on management irregularities causing financial losses to the Organization:
Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/54/793 of 13 March 2000, para. 25. [emphasis added]
In a second report in
2000 on overall human resources management reform, the Secretary-General
announced that "The
present report presents a series of building blocks for human resource
management reform
as integrated elements in the drive to improve the
Organization's work
The specific proposals represent a
process of evolution
The Secretary-General views the mechanisms of
accountability, the monitoring processes and the control procedures as an
integral part of the initiatives he is putting forward.
In view of the importance
ascribed by all parties [Member States, the Secretary-General and his
management team, and the staff) to the need for well-designed mechanisms
of accountability
each section of the present report contains concrete
elements of accountability relevant to human resources
management." "Human resources
management reform: Report of the Secretary-General", A/55/253 of 1 August 2000, Summary and paras. 6-7. [Note: the summary
of this report scarcely mentions the topic of "accountability" in its
summary, and the various specific "building block" sections "on a variety
of subjects" in this 44-page report seem to provide mostly accountability
"intentions," or activities contemplated, or those only just beginning
.] In his third and
concluding report in August 2000, Secretary-General Annan summarized the
status of accountability and responsibility reform actions since 1994, and
-- quite abruptly -- declared "victory": "The
present report delineates the continuum between responsibility, authority
and accountability and presents the elements of an integrated and
effective system of accountability. It outlines the progress made
highlights the recent
changes introduced to enhance or supplement existing accountability
mechanisms, and outlines changes in the policy and management culture of
the Organization which will allow for the effective implementation
of the comprehensive system of accountability now established.
In
conclusion, the
Secretary-General is confident that the comprehensive system of
accountability now in place ensures that accountability mechanisms are
effectively used, are seen to be used, and ensure that staff at all levels
are held accountable for their actions and inaction." The General
Assembly may wish to take note of the mechanisms in place since 1994,
including those discussed in the present report, which together constitute
the comprehensive system of accountability for the Organization." "Accountability and
responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General", A/55/270 of 3 August 2000, Summary, paras. 1-2, 47-48.
[emphasis added.]
This report would
have done well to have examined its own Annexes before making this
vigorous conclusion. Annex I identified four clear "steps to
ensuring accountability," of which the UN -- at that time
and arguably ever since -- has only done perhaps one or
one-and-a-half.
More directly, the Secretariat has never given the General Assembly
any systematic report on steps 3 and 4, especially on the results obtained
and follow-up measures being taken: "1. Specifying responsibility, authority
and results to be achieved 2.
Providing guidance and support 3.
Monitoring and assessing the exercise of responsibility and
authority 4.
Taking appropriate
action Follow-up must be capable of
distinguishing between and dealing appropriately with the
following: (a) Excellent or
satisfactory execution of responsibility and authority; (b)
Unsatisfactory execution of responsibility and authority as a
result of carelessness or
ignorance; c) Unacceptable exercise of
responsibility and authority due to deliberate flouting of policies,
rules and regulations, or exceeding the limits of authority. (d) Misconduct or fraud."
"Accountability and
responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General", A/55/270 of 3 August 2000, Annex I, "Four steps to ensuring
accountability.'
[emphasis added.] [Note: Annex II,
"The chain of accountability," is equally informative in detailing all the
mechanisms which must be in place (and fully functioning)]
An even more emphatic
and substantive rebuttal to Secretary-General Annan's insistence that
accountability mechanisms were then in place and being effectively used
came only a month later. A damning article, reporting on the
status of work in his own OIOS, stated that: "The
United Nations has been hit by an unprecedented wave of fraud, waste and
corruption.
Officials at its antifraud investigation unit say they are
expecting to have to run more than 350 inquiries by the end of the year --
nearly twice the total for 1998, and a 50 per cent increase on last
year.
Thousands of staff, contractors, and consultants have been
interviewed in scores of countries.
The
revelations will embarrass Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, who is to
welcome national leaders
to the 'Millenium Summit' in New York next week.
Annan is
hoping to convince skeptical heads of state that the UN has provided value
for money and that its role should be expanded.
One
senior investigator said last week that the UN investigations unit's
workload was greater than ever. "We are seeing more and more frauds and
abuses of authority.
The
OIOS's annual report, due out next month, will reveal cases of sloppy
management, lax enforcement, harassment and outright criminality.
OIOS is working with
dozens of interntional police forces -- including Scotland Yard -- on
inquiries into the activities of UN personnel." Jason Burke, et.
al., "UN rocked by flood of fraud cases: Officials were 'addicted to
luxury",
The Observer International (UK), September 3, 2000. [Note: any press such
interviews with OIOS staff seem to have come to an abrupt end after this
article appeared, as discussed in the section on OIOS which follows.]
There is more. A very
detailed and expert assessment of the Secretary-General's reform plan had
been made by the United States General Accounting Office in May 2000. The GAO
observed that: "In
recent years, the United Nations has had fundamental problems. In 1994
there was an overall
failure of its human resources system to staff critical posts with the
right people.
"[In
1997] The Secretary General proposed a reform program consisting of three
[integrated] core elements: (1) restructuring U.N. leadership and
operations; (2) developing a performance-based human capital system; and
(3) introducing
programming and budgeting processes based on results.
[He] set the end of 1999
as the target to put the reforms in place.
The
United Nations has substantially restructured its leadership and
operations and partly
implemented a merit-based and performance-oriented human capital
system
However,
the overall objectives of the reform have not yet
been achieved. Specifically, the United Nations has not yet
implemented reforms to focus its programming and budgeting on managing the
Secretariat's performance. These initiatives would enable Member States to hold
the Secretariat accountable for results and are key to the success
of the overall reform because they institutionalize a shift in the
organization's focus from carrying out activities to accomplishing
missions.
the
U.N. reform is an interrelated process and requires that all core elements
be in place to succeed." "US General
Accounting Office, "United Nations: Reforms are progressing, but overall
objectives have not been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-169, 15 pages, of May 10, 2000, especially summary and pp. 2-3 and
9-15, and "United Nations:
Reform initiatives have strengthened operations, but overall objectives
have not been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-150, May 10,
2000, 84 pages.
[emphasis added]
In 2001, the General Assembly did not directly
endorse the Secretary-General's confident assertions about a comprehensive
system of accountability (and mechanisms) in place and being effectively
used. It
repeated for the third time that the Secretary-General should ensure that
well-designed mechanisms of accountability were in place before delegating
authority to programme managers. It repeated for the third time that he
should enhance managerial accountability and impose sanctions for
demonstrated mismanagement. It also added some new fundamental
cautions that are rather unusual (and would not seem necessary) for an
organization that had already been operating for 55 years: "VII.2
Emphasizes that the administrative and managerial discretionary
powers of the Secretary-General should be in conformity with the relevant
provisions of the Charter; 3.
Reiterates that every staff member
shall be responsible and accountable to the Secretary General, in
accordance
with financial rule 114.1 and staff 112.3; 4.
Emphasizes that any delegation of authority should be in accordance
with the Charter and the regulations and rules
; 5.
Stresses that rules and regulations governing separation from
service shall be followed strictly; 7.
Requests the Secretary-General to continue to improve
accountability and responsibility
and monitoring and control mechanisms
and report on the implementation of his proposals [in 2002]
8.
Report
[in 2002] on the progress achieved, including with regard to management
irregularities;; 10.
Decides to further consider the issue of a robust monitoring
capacity in the Office of Human Resources Management
and [requests] an analytical and thorough report thereon [in 2002].
" "Human resources
management," General Assembly resolution 55/258 of 14 June 2001, "Section VII., Delegation of
authority and accountability." Yet, in an interview
in May 2001, Shashi Tharoor, head of the UN Department of Public
Information, responded to a question on UN information activities: "How do you ensure
that DPI isn't seen as a propaganda tool, yet that it serves the UN's
objectives? By telling the
truth!
Information isn't propaganda unless you doctor it to distort
reality or hide inconvenient facts. We don't do that. I think you'll
admit that under Secretary General Kofi Annan we have the most transparent
United Nations imaginable
" Pranay Gupte, "Q & A: Shashi Tharoor: 'Why information matters at the UN'," Earth Times, May 2001, p. 16. [Note: the article began by citing Mr. Tharoor as "an established novelist, columnist and nonfiction author, a familiar byline in many of the world's top publications, also a highly sought-after figure on the lecture circuit. Hus new novel, 'Riot', is scheduled for publication and is already generating considerable buzz." One wonders how Mr.
Tharoor ever finds time for his weighty responsibilities as a senior
Department head and top publicist for the UN.]
As this very
optimistic self-assessment indicates, the interest of UN management in
actually implementing the 1993 "management accountability" reform of the
General Assembly, now a decade back in history, is gone. In 2002, the
brief "accountability and oversight" discussion in the Secretary-General's
annual report, under the topic of "enhancing management," was summarized
as follows: "The Office of Internal
Oversight Services is working in partnership with managers at all levels
to instill accountability and best management practices throughout the
Organization." "Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization," UN document A/57/1, 2002, paras. 193-200.
Another 2002 report,
on human resources management reform, stated that several years would be
needed to "institutionalize" the reforms, and that the "mechanisms in
place," and in particular monitoring by OHRM, would help ensure this. The
Secretary-General's 2003 annual report also focused its accountability
summary on OIOS oversight activities, with little mention of specific
progress toward performance management or ensuring management
accountability, although it did mention that there were "increased
allegations" of misconduct, mismanagement and abuse, and waste. "Human resources management reform: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/57/293 of 8 August 2002, paras. 12, 87-89, and "Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization," UN document A/58/1, 2003, paras. 207-211..
Actually, in the
autumn of 2002 Secretary-General Annan had already concluded that the 1997
reforms had had "some important achievements," and he forged ahead on a
new agenda for further change. The General Assembly, however, pressed
in early 2003 for comprehensive reporting and requested that all future
reports on human resources management reform measures should focus on the
results and achievements. The Secretariat subsequently provided
three more reports in 2002-2003, but they were confined to OHRM monitoring
(which was starting quite slowly), other reform changes underway in OHRM,
and the status of implementation of the Secretary-General's 2002 proposals
a year later. "Strengthening of the United Nations: An agenda for further change: Report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/57/387 of 9 September 2002, "Human resources management," General Assembly resolution 57/305 of 1 May 2003, "Monitoring capacity in the Office of Human Resources Management: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/57/226 of 17 September 2002, "Implementation of all provisions of General Assembly resolution 55/258 on human resources management," UN document A/57/726 of 10 February 2003, and "Status of actions described in the report of the Secretary-General entitled 'Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change: Report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/58/351 of 5 September 2003.
Well, the Secretariat had stated in 1998 that
installing the major management accountability and other performance
management reforms might take some time, running on for three to five
years, i.e., perhaps as late as 2003. So, looking back, did the
Secretariat get the job done? IO Watch believes the answer is No, and a detailed study underscores this
conclusion. In February 2004, the US General Accounting Office
reported on an extensive and systematic exam of the status of Mr. Annan's
1997 and 2002 reforms (but not the now-forgotten management accountability
system).
It found that not only were the reforms still incomplete, but that
general reform actions, targets, interim goals and completion dates were
very muddled or nonexistent, and that regular reporting should be provided
to clearly inform Member States of the status and impact of reform
measures. "Why GAO did this
study The U.N. Secretary
General launched two reform agendas, in 1997 and 2002, to address the U.N.'s core management challenges -- poor
leadership of the Secretariat, duplication among its many offices and
programs, and the lack of
accountability for staff performance.
In 2000,
GAO reported that the reforms were not yet complete. What GAO found
First, the
Secretariat has taken positive steps to strengthen its human capital
management, but reforms in this area are ongoing and additional challenges
remain.
Second, the U.N. has begun to adopt results-oriented budgeting, but
its monitoring and evaluation system does not measure program impact.
UN reform faces several challenges. For example, the Secretariat does not conduct comprehensive assessments of the status and impact of U.N. reforms. In addition, the reform agendas lack clearly stated priorities, interim goals, and t | |||
