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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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Before discussing the ineffective struggles of the 1990s to establish UN
management accountability and strengthen UN internal management systems,
broader overall UN reform attempts must be briefly noted, because they
help to explain why serious UN management reform is so difficult. They also tend to obscure UN management
difficulties in the smoke of the grand (but so far, and for almost 60
years, futile) reform and restructuring of the entire Organization. The general need
for reform, the complex architecture, and the varied views which are
involved are succinctly summarized by a mid-1990s analysis by James
Paul: "The UN needs reform.
But people
disagree sharply on what kind
and for what purpose. NGO leaders aim for a more
democratic UN
Technocrats seek more productivity and efficiency
Delegates favor reforms that conform to national interests
Idealists
offer plans for a greatly expanded body
conservatives push for a
downsized UN
Agreement is exceedingly hard to come by.
The founders of the UN designed it
to be highly decentralized, with power shared
Even in the core programmes of the
UN, there is rarely a clarity of purpose or unity of structure. Decision-making bodies have proliferated along with administrative
ones.
Approaches to UN
reform vary widely.
[which helps] explain why there are so many
different approaches.
Most observers
recognize that the reform battle is a battle over policy, not simply a
management upgrade.
Because of these
deep policy differences, the reform process has no clear agreed-on goal
Like all conflict-driven politics, it is a complex process of bargaining,
jostling, posturing and outright threats, reconciling very divergent
interests, as well as different views of the world and preferences on how
global society should be organized." James Paul, "UN reform: An analysis," UN Reform, Global Policy Forum, www.global policy.org/reform/analysis pp. 1, 2, 4.
A recent and timely
overview by Edward Luck of lessons learned in UN reform observed that "by
the sheer quantity of deliberations, debates, studies, and resolutions
devoted to it, reform has become one of the enduring pastimes and primary
products of the UN system." He suggested six factors to explain this
apparently irresistible impulse for reforming the United Nations: "1) Public
institutions depend on recurring processes of criticism [and] reassessment
Reform is a sign of institutional health and dynamism
2) Highly complex,
decentralized, and multi-faceted institutions, like the UN system, offer
more targets for criticism and more opportunities for change
3) The diversity of
[UN] membership and the ambitious nature of its mandates make it highly
likely that some constituencies will be seriously disappointed
at any
point in time.
4) As the world
changes, so do the politics of the United Nations and the priorities of
its Member States.
proposals for reform usually follow. 5) Critics keep
calling for reform, in part, because the United Nations has been so slow
in delivering it.
The concerns about UN management and finance voiced by
[the US] Congress in the late 1940s
were echoed
in the late 1990s. 6) The universality
of the United Nations has fueled a dual pattern
frequent calls for
change by one Member State or group or another, followed by blocking moves
by others with divergent interests or perspectives
[which] differ so
markedly as to make consensus on the direction reform should take hard to
achieve." Edward C. Luck, Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a history
in progress, Occasional Papers, 2003 No. 1, Academic Council on the
United Nations System, Yale, 2003, pp.
1-2.
Maurice Bertrand has
cited important concerns about the difficulties of establishing meaningful
decision processes in UN programme planning which extend to general reform
activities.
He reflected on the work of two UN reform groups in 1986, quoting
observations on such deliberations made by de Tocqueville in 1851 on the
drafting of the constitution of the Second French Republic: "Considering the
Commission as a whole, it was easy to see that one should not expect it to
accomplish anything really remarkable.
there was no time for lengthy
discussions, nor any inclination for them. The immensity and the complicated
nature of the subject were daunting and exhausting; most had not even
tried to study it or had gleaned only some very vague ideas of it, and
those who had formed clearer ideas felt reluctant to express them.
Furthermore,
members feared that endless conflict and violence might result from any
attempt to get to the heart of the matter, and they preferred to maintain
an appearance of agreement by keeping to superficial subjects. We went on in
this way to the end, explicitly adopting grand principles with regard to
small details
" Alexis de
Tocqueville, as quoted in Maurice Bertrand, The third generation world organization, Martinus
Nijhoff, Dordrecht, the Netherlands, 1989, p.
108.
Bertrand found that
the "Group of 18" deliberations of 1986 largely followed this pattern. A
method of work was not clearly defined, the members were experts but in
other fields, and they were ambassadors more familiar with politics than
with budget and financial problems and UN programmes and machinery. The "around
the table" approach led to some 150 "ideas," often contradictory, but
nevertheless chosen as the basis for the report. The only area
of consensus was criticism of the Secretariat. With better
organization of work and more courage, new directions could have been
identified, but this was not possible. In contrast, the work of a Ford Foundation group in
1986-1987 relied on relevant in-depth studies, several lengthy plenary
meetings, and thee work of sub-panels. It went further in the difficult tasks
of reflecting on changes in the international system, without supplying
answers, but at least leading to three fundamental conclusions: "
first
the
solutions being proposed for [global problems] were inadequate and had not
been elaborated by all those concerned
several matters of an
unquestionably global character -- such as
forecasting of future
problems
-- were not being dealt with by any world organization. Second, the work
required
should be done on a permanent basis and [combine]
the research
capacities of all the world organizations. In an increasingly fast-changing world
the task of [assessing] risks should be the fundamental task of a
restructured and better-equipped system of organizations. This led to
[the idea of] a reflection and analysis group, consisting of independent
and qualified individuals, with an adequate interdisciplinary staff
third
"weighted voting" was not the right solution
what was needed was not
simply
a majority capable of taking decisions but
a representative
system of partners interested in discussing matters together in order to
arrive at a consensus
[the report recommended] a Ministerial Board,
in
which the most important states would have one seat each, while others
would be grouped, preferably on a regional basis, so as to have collective
representation
"
Maurice Bertrand, The third
generation world organization, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, the
Netherlands, 1989, pp. 108-123. [Note: the two reports referred to are the "Report of the group of high-level intergovernmental experts to review the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations", General Assembly, Official Records, forty-first session, Supplement No. 49 (A/41/49), United Nations, New York, 1986, and United Nations Management & Decision-Making Project UNA-USA, A successor vision: The United Nations of tomorrow, United Nations Association of the United States of America, Final Panel Report, New York, September 1987, and related reports.] Despite these very
constructive ideas, the traditional "revolving door" of successive, and
failed, overall Secretariat reform attempts has continued to spin, as
sharply revealed in two articles in a UN journal in early 1992. The first
dealt with paeans to UN productivity and reform success at the end of
Secretary-General Javier Pιrιz de Cuellar's terms (1981-1991), the second
with a quite different (but not new) reassessment of urgent needs for
change as Secretary-General Butros Butros-Ghali began his term: "Mr. Pιrez de
Cuιllar summed up his 10 years
as 'a most productive decade.' The UN had
'moved from the periphery to near the centre of international
relations'. '
a slow but
meticulous process of institutional self-analysis, combined with efforts
to 'streamline' the Secretariat, had resulted in a rejuvenated UN,' he
stated. Activity, not
argument, had thus answered
questions about the UN that had 'troubled
the public through much of its existence'
he continued.
'The
effectiveness of the United Nations can no longer be in doubt.'" "Goodbye to Pιrez de Cuιllar: A 'most productive decade at the UN," UN Chronicle, March 1992, pp. 6-8. "With a new
Secretary-General, reform of the United Nations is in the air at
[UN]
Headquarters.
Since September,
intensive discussions have taken place on reforming the work and structure
of the world body. Under scrutiny was a plan worked out by
22 industrial and developing countries, including the five permanent
Security Council members, intended to strengthen the Secretariat and
increase the Secretary-General's authority. The new plan
disapproves of
the Organization's 'top-heavy' administration, under
which 30 to 40 high-ranking officials report directly to the Secretary
General.
That structure grew over the years in a series of 'ad hoc responses
to specific problems.' The plan speaks of 'a
widespread consensus' that the UN must be restructured
" "Reform proposals
circulate during 46th Assembly: UN faces 'dangerously precarious'
financial situation,' UN
Chronicle, March 1992, pp. 9-10.
As these reform efforts ground slowly along, Childers
and Urquhart added to Bertrand's efforts in analyzing (and offered
detailed corrective recommendations concerning) the "Purposes and pitfalls
in UN reform" in 1994: "It is seldom
possible to use the word 'new' about proposals for reorganization or
better coordination in the UN system. They are almost always repetitions from
an earlier round.
Few UN reforms have
been complete enough to work. The negotiation process has often left only
slivers of what were originally integrated recommendations. Negotiated
compromise may be the stuff of diplomacy
But if compromises on structure
turn out to be unwise or unworkable, correcting them may be extremely
difficult and may take years.
Equally disastrous
are the temptations of mechanistic change, [carelessly] moving boxes on an
organizational diagram
Reorganization proposals need a comprehensive
scrutiny in the same way that a heart specialist must look at the entire
blood-circulation system.
If governments make
indifferent choices of executive heads, no amount of reform will
compensate for the lack of leadership.
Good organizational
decisions can be, and have been, wrecked by overlooking the staff
requirements to make them effective
[this has] invariably been neglected
by governments and most executive heads in UN system reforms, with the
result that five years later delegates usually wonder why the reforms are
not producing significant improvement." Childers, Erskine, with Urquhart, Brian, "Renewing the United Nations System", Development Dialogue, 1994:1, Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1994, pp. 34-37. [Note: the related recommendations are found on pages 37-38 and 188.]
Similar good advice
was offered by yet another long-time and astute observer in a 1996 report
on reforming "the UN tangle." Leon Gordenker stated that "the
organizational translations of the tasks assigned to the UN had "resulted
in a web of structures whose formlessness even the sloppiest spider would
reject." A wide stream of complaints and reports, many of them
indisputable,
had been recently been presented about the UN, and "all of them
have in one way or another aimed at simplifying, rationalizing, and
economizing."
He found that the organization as a whole was defensible and worth
preserving, but he took a primarily critical approach as a means of making
a reconnaissance of organizational difficulties and problems. He stated
that: "Posing the
question of what parts of the UN system -- some lurking in obscurity --
may be scrapped, promptly leads to other, indeed more profound,
queries.
An initial question as to common elements leads to sorting
organizational types
[to grasp] the main strands in the sticky web. It precedes
an explanation of how old organizational construction burdens the present
[and provides] some examples of what could be done in reorganizing,
eliminating, or adapting some of the web.
The causes of the
organizational tangle, in any case, are to be found in the diplomacy of
creating organizations, assigning them tasks, and supervising their
work.
Some of the decisional organs
suffer from the same organizational
cumbersomeness as their products. If the representatives of member
governments
continue to approach organizational issues
with their
customary selfish logic, wholesale change is unlikely, however desirable
it may be.
" Leon Gordenker, The UN tangle: policy formation, reform, and reorganization, WPF Reports number 12, The World Peace Foundation, Cambridge, Mass., 1996, pp. 1-3. Gordenker also
presented and discussed a complex but very useful typology to help
comprehend the extraordinary UN organizational types (rather than merely
presenting a phone-book type listing of all of them), and to allow further
analysis and judgments about specific organizations as representatives of
these types.
A brief listing gives the flavor: "Intergovernmental treaty organizations
(referred to as convention-organizations or COs) created
by treaties
; Organizations based on specific decisions of
COs
(referred to as decision-based agencies, or DBAs)
; Interorganizational entities
(
IEs, created by COs or DBAs); Intergovernmental deliberative bodies (
IDBs]
created in the constitutional documents of COs or DBAs
[as
their main organs]; Process-assisting bodies (
PABs)
created by COs or DBAs
[to prepare or assist with] the taking of
decisions in IDBs; Interbureaucratic entities (
IBEs) formed by
agreement among two or more COs or DBAs); Other
" Leon Gordenker, The UN tangle:
policy formation, reform, and reorganization, WPF Reports number 12,
The World Peace Foundation, Cambridge, Mass., 1996, pp. 4-8.
All this wise advice
did not deter the UN from forging ahead with still more grand attempts at
reform during the mid- and late 1990s. As Luck summarized it: "
during the last
broad-based reform drive, from 1995 to 1997, the General
Assembly was consumed with no less than five working groups on different
aspects of reform, its President was engrossed in developing his own
reform package, [ECOSOC] adopted new procedures for relating to [NGOs],
and the new Secretary-General [Kofi Annan] offered a comprehensive
plan
Before
the dust had settled from these battles, the US-led drive to have
Member State assessment scales revised took center stage at the Assembly
from 1998-2000, and
in mid-2002 the Deputy Secretary-General is heading
yet another drive for internal reform." Edward C. Luck, Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a history in progress, Occasional Papers, 2003 No. 1, Academic Council on the United Nations System, Yale, 2003, p. 2. [Note: the major reports were "Report of the Open-Ended High-level Working Group on the Strengthening of the United Nations System," General Assembly, UN document A/50/24, 1996, and "Renewing the United Nations: A programme for reform: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/51/950 of 14 July 1997.
Nor were these
attempts, and particularly those of the Secretary-General, free from the
battles of the past: "Secretary-General
Kofi Annan's plans to make major changes in the way the United Nations
works have run into serious trouble in General Assembly committees, where
they are being buried in a blizzard of questions and objections.
the measures
-- totaling more than 70 large and small ones
are being dissected by
national delegations. The fate of Mr.
Annan's plans, which critics in Congress have dismissed as not bold
enough, will reflect on [his] reputation as an insider who knows how to
get things done.
what is
happening now in the General Assembly shows the near-impossibility of
quick action from the 185-member body, where every proposal is scrutinized
for any number of reasons by one or more national delegations or groups of
countries.
Pakistan's
representative
said
that there 'wide divergences' among countries on
the dozens of measures they are considering." "UN leader's grand
plans for reform hit obstacles," International
Herald Tribune, November 3, 1997.
In addition, in 1997
a massive compendium of key UN reform proposals over the years was
published in a three-volume set which amounts to some 3,400 pages. It covered 50
such proposals, originating inside and outside the United Nations, plus 67
resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly, Security Council, and
ECOSOC on the approval and monitoring of UN reform efforts. Although the
period covered reached back to the 1960s, the vast majority of the
proposals were from the 1990s. At a price of $US 536 or £337, it is
not easily obtainable, but it does show the overwhelming amount of groups
and proposals constantly competing with ideas for overall UN reform. Joachim Mueller,
ed., Reforming the United Nations: New initiatives
and past efforts, 3 vols., United Nations and Kluwer Law
International, The Hague, Boston, 1997.
Luck observed that
all this institutional change at the UN is subtle, complex, and
uneven.
The reform and adaptation phenomena are still not widely studied
or well understood. But he found some lessons to be learned: "1) Reform does not
come easily to the UN system. The Secretary-General has little
leverage, the system is diffuse, and the Member States are rarely united
2) On the other
hand, the process of reform is a constant
At times, process seems more important
than results, while at other times process is the desired result. 3) Those unaware of
the history of reform may indeed be condemned to repeat it
4) The key to UN
reform, in that sense, may lie less in trying to be innovative than in
understanding why past initiatives have failed and how the strategies and
tactics for achieving them could be improved.
5) More study is
needed of how independent scholars and commissions have helped to shape
the UN reform process.
6) When it comes to
moving an agenda for reform in the United Nations, it is not always clear
where power dwells
7) Change happens
even if reform doesn't.
Sometimes formal reform follows (it
never leads.) 8) The course of
reform tends to be decidedly unpredictable.
9)
the temptation
to mistake modest and short-term adjustments for epochal change has proven
irresistible
" Edward C. Luck, Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a history in progress, Occasional Papers, 2003 No. 1, Academic Council on the United Nations System, Yale, 2003, pp. 47-49. Luck concluded that
the pace of UN reform has become markedly skewed: "There have been
repeated incremental refinements to the United Nations' response to the
question, 'Who implements?'
Likewise, the struggle over 'Who
pays?' never ends.
There has been no answer, however, to the core
question of 'Who decides?' for the past three decades. The ongoing
debate about Security Council reform, in particular, revolves around
complaints about the inequity of the current system.
The question of 'Who
decides?' raises a related dilemma. Should the goal of UN reform be to make
its decision-making processes more reflective of the membership as a whole
or more in line with the prevailing balance of power and capacity outside
its halls?" Edward C. Luck, Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a history
in progress, Occasional Papers, 2003 No. 1, Academic Council on the
United Nations System, Yale, 2003, pp.
47-49.
The flurry of new
reform efforts from 1995-2000, however, has already been buried by demands
for far more fundamental change. In September 2003, Secretary-General
Annan delivered a drastic call for even more urgent UN reforms: "In unusually
strong language that reflected strains over the crisis in Baghdad, Annan
suggested that the credibility of the Security Council, the General
Assembly, and other UN bodies was at stake. 'If they are to
regain their authority, they may need radical reform,' Annan said
'We can no longer
take it for granted that our multilateral institutions are strong enough
to cope with all these challenges,' Annan added, saying UN members should
ask themselves whether the existing structure is 'adequate for the task we
have before us.'
He also criticized
the 191-member General Assembly for lacking priorities, the Security
Council for being undemocratic, the UN trusteeship Council for failing to
perform, and financial institutions for not adequately involving the
developing nations that the measures are meant to serve." "UN needs big
changes, Annan says," International Herald
Tribune, September 9, 2003.
In November Mr. Annan
announced a new 16-member group for a far -reaching review of the role of
the United Nations: "
[Mr. Annan said
that] 'The aim of the high-level panel is to recommend clear and practical
measures for ensuring effective collective action.'
the team
numbers a host of former politicians
Gareth Evans, the
Australian panelist, former foreign minister, and head of the
International Crisis Group, said 'None of us have any illusions about the
degree of difficulty involved in saying anything that will be both
compelling and achievable.' Mr. Evans said the
panel faced three main challenges: to address the international order's
rules, institutions, and strategies; to examine the rules governing the
use of force such as preemptive actions, and to look at regional
organizations such as Nato." Mark Turner, "Annan
sets up review of UN's global role," FT.com, November 4, 2003.
In December 2004 (amid calls from US Congressional
investigators for Mr. Annan to resign because of the steadily mounting
flood of serious allegations and revelations about the UN-administered
oil-for-food programme in Iraq), he released the report of his high-level
panel.
A more secure world: Our shared responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Changes, United Nations, 2004. The full report is available at www.un.org/secureworld/ Reactions to the panel's report -- in declining order
of enthusiasm and expectations -- can be offered from Mr. Annan himself,
from a panel member, and from an observer of UN reform attempts in
general. "
A year ago I
appointed a panel of 16 people from [many regions and differing fields of
expertise]
to assess the threats facing humanity today and to recommend
how we need to change, in both policies and institutions, in order to meet
those threats.
[The report's] 101 recommendations are the most
comprehensive and coherent set of proposals for forging a common response
to common threats that I have seen.
If governments
follow [the panel's] lead -- as I hope they will -- it will be much easier
for the UN to develop a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, and for
me to take the lead in promoting it, as the report asks me to do. The report also
contains a welter of practical proposals to prevent a cascade of nuclear
proliferation, to improve bio-security and to make the UN itself more
effective, notably in prevention and peace-building.
The report tells us
how to do it
It puts the ball firmly in the court of the world's political
leaders.
It is for them to negotiate the details, but I strongly urge them
to act on the main thrusts of the recommendations." Kofi Annan, "A way forward on global security", International Herald Tribune, December 3, 2004. "The report of the
United Nations secretary-general's High Level Panel
is perhaps the most
comprehensive and ambitious review undertaken since the organization was
set up.
The onus is now on
the UN's 191 member states to use the report to build the new consensus
and take effective collective action
Otherwise, [the report] will, like
so many reports before it, just gather dust on the shelves of the UN's
library, a reminder of the gap between aspirations and performance that
has dogged the organization throughout its history. The panel
identifies a dauntingly broad range of threats
The panel has also
called for a comprehensive strategy
The threads will
need to be drawn together by the heads of state and government when they
meet in New York next September. But that meeting will not succeed if
the building blocks for a new consensus are not in place by then. Only if tough
decisions are taken in the coming months will the maxim 'the UN is
indispensable' become a reality, rather than an empty slogan, finally
providing the organization with the capacity for effective and equitable
action that it has lacked." David Hannay,
"Global threats require a global response", The
Financial Times (UK), December 2,
2004. [Note: Mr. Hannay
was a member of Mr. Annan's panel and former British ambassador to the
European Union and the UN.]
"Until it cleans up
its act, the U.N. can never be as influential as its boosters would like.
Last week came the
umpteenth report on reform, this one from the [High Level Panel]
Its
criticisms are as scathing as anything written by the (US) Heritage
Foundation.
The report noted that the General Assembly 'often fails to focus
effectively on the most compelling issues of the day', that the Commission
on Human Rights (which includes among its members gross human-rights
violators) suffers from a 'legitimacy deficit', that the Security Council
has responded with 'glacial speed' to 'massive human rights violations in
Darfur' and elsewhere, and that the U.N. Secretariat is filled with
bureaucrats who have 'little or no expertise for tackling many of the new
or emerging threats' that confront the world.' All true, but note
that these problems have persisted despite all the past reform efforts.
All of the reformistas' efforts founder on the rocks of
apathy and inertia. The reality is that most of the U.N.'s
191 member states
[and] its 49,000 employees,
usually have other
priorities.
" Max Boot, "Why U.N.
stays mired in its defects: Start with too-friendly media, apathy and
members' entrenched interests", Los Angeles
Times, December 9, 2004. In March 2005, Mr. Annan weighed in with his own
sweeping proposals for reforms of all aspects of UN operations, including
major structural changes, presented as a "grand bargain" for the world,
and containing much emphasis on enhanced accountability and improved
management within the UN Secretariat. The initial response, however, was
mixed, with indications of many difficulties to be overcome, and also a
strong feeling of dιjΰ vu. "
Today, I shall
be presenting my report "In larger freedom" to the United Nations General
Assembly
I wanted to remind
the governments of the world who put me in my job and to whom I am
accountable that they are in the UN to represent not themselves but their
peoples, who expect them to work for the aims set out in the
organisation's charter.
The UN is a forum
where sovereign states can work out common strategies for tackling global
problems, and an instrument for putting those strategies into effect. But it can be
a much more effective instrument if its governing body, the General
Assembly, is better organized and give clearer directives to us in the
secretariat, with the flexibility to carry them out, and holds us clearly
accountable for how we do it. I shall today
propose decisions in all these areas, and challenge world leaders to
respond with action at the UN summit in September.
if world leaders rise
to their responsibilities, the rebirth and renewal of the UN will be just
beginning -- and with it, renewed hope for a freer, fairer, and safer
world." Kofi Annan, "An aspiration to a larger freedom", Financial Times (UK), March 21, 2005. "Secretary general
Kofi Annan of the United Nations proposed sweeping reforms Sunday,
recommending the expansion of the Security Council
, the restructuring of
the discredited Human Rights Commission
, and the adoption of a
definition of terror
Annan will make the
recommendations in a speech Monday to the General Assembly aimed at
restoring confidence in the UN that has seriously lapsed because of bitter
divisions over the war in Iraq, charges of mismanagement and corruption in
the oil for food program and revelations of sexual misconduct by
blue-helmeted peacekeepers. His proposals,
drawn from the conclusions of a high-level panel
in November, will be
the subject of a special General Assembly gathering in September that
hopes to reinvigorate the United Nations at a time when its worth and
relevance are being so widely questioned.
The speech on
Monday
will also be seen as a bid by Annan to shore up his stewardship
of the institution in his last two years in office. While he has
maintained much of his once-vaunted reputation abroad, he has come under
pointed criticism in Washington where some members of Congress have called
on him to resign
" Warren Hoge, "UN
chief seeks huge reforms of world body", International Herald Tribune, March 21, 2005.
"C. The
Secretariat 184. A capable and
effective Secretariat is indispensable to the work of the United
Nations.
In 1997 I launched a package of structural reforms
and followed
up with a further set of managerial and technical improvements in 2002
185.
But these
reforms do not go far enough. If the United Nations is to be truly
effective the Secretariat will have to be completely transformed. 186.
The
Secretary-General and his or her managers must be given the discretion,
the means, the authority and the expert assistance that they need to
manage [the] organization
Similarly, Member States must have the
oversight tools they need to hold the Secretary-General truly accountable
for his/her strategy and leadership. 190.
I therefore
request the General Assembly to provide me with the authority and
resources to pursue a one-time staff buyout so as to refresh and realign
the staff to meet current needs. 191.
I ask
Member States to work with me to undertake a comprehensive review of the
budget and human resources rules under which we operate. 192. Thirdly, we
must continue to improve the transparency and accountability of the
Secretariat.
" "In larger freedom:
towards development, security and human rights for all" Report of the
Secretary-General", UN document A/59/2005 of 21
March 2005.
"Kofi Annan, United
Nations secretary general, yesterday proposed the most wide-reaching
reforms ever in the UN's 60-year history, but warned they would work only
if countries accepted his ideas as a comprehensive package.
Mr. Annan's
officials say the package basically proposes a bargain whereby rich
countries help the poor to develop by promoting the Millennium Development
Goals, while poor countries help alleviate rich countries' security
concerns.
In both cases, Mr. Annan says, action must be underpinned by
respect for human rights. But almost every
proposal faces opposition from some quarter, whether Arab concern at Mr.
Annan's stance on terrorism, US objections to the International Criminal
Court or Chinese reluctance to allow the Security Council to intervene in
countries such as Sudan, which is accused of genocide." Mark Turner and
Bertrand Benoit, "Annan warns over UN reform package", Financial Times (UK), March 22, 2005.
"To hear Kofi
Annan, the reforms he recommended this week are some sort of make-or-break
last chance to repair the United Nations. On this, however, the UN's
secretary-general is surely wrong. Of two near-certainties about the
future of the organization, one is that it will continue to exist, not
least because most big powers, including habitual critics such as the
United States, will continue at times to find it useful
The other
certainty is that no reforms, however well-intentioned will turn the UN
into the perfect instrument millions of people seem to want -- one
capable, that is, of ordering international relations so that all states
obey the same rules, and especially rules that govern the use of
force. These ideas
do
not -- indeed cannot -- solve the underlying problem.
the absence of
[political] will, not some legal quibble
None of this means
that Mr. Annan's ideas ought to be rejected, or that the UN is not worth
improving.
[For instance,] it would be wonderful if Mr. Annan's proposal
to buy out some of the UN's existing staff ended up producing a
secretariat that was selected on merit rather than nationality." "Kofi Annan's
reform plan: Some good ideas, but no revolution in the running of the
world", The Economist, March 26th, 2005. [Note: IO Watch
believes this succinct summation has much extra weight, because no media
source has followed the UN so closely over the past few decades as has The Economist.]
"A grass roots
Chinese campaign to keep Japan out of the United Nations Security Council
has gathered about 22 million signatures [in China], increasing the
chances that China would block Japan's bid to join the group, organizers
and analysts said Thursday.
As one of the five
existing permanent members, China has the power to veto the proposal. Beijing has
not said how it planned to vote. Relations between
the two countries have deteriorated sharply in recent weeks, strained by
competition for energy resources [and other issues]
[Kofi Annan has]
appeared to signal that Japan and Germany would be prime candidates for a
revised Security Council when he discussed plans to remake the governing
structure last week. The council should
'increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most
to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically'
he
told reporters. Japan and Germany
are by far the largest contributors that do not have permanent council
seats.
Japan has said it will cut its contributions if it did not get a
seat.
North and South
Korea, which were colonized by Japan, have already said that they oppose
Japan's bid." Joseph Kahn, "China
tries to block Japan at UN: Beijing's effort to bar Security Council seat
set up confrontation", International Herald
Tribune, April 1, 2005. [Note: This is just
the first of many serious disagreements between countries, and between and
within regional groupings, that quickly emerged over seats in an expanded
UN security council.]
The discussions of this latest grand set of UN
reforms, in a long list of such reforms, will undoubtedly go on over the
summer of 2005, and at the General Assembly in September. Particularly
since UN reform now seems to have elements of a debate over, and fight
for, the UN's very relevance and importance as a central element in global governance, it
will probably continue for months and years beyond. IO Watch concludes that the barriers to effective
reform raised by the UN's consensual, bumbling, and politically-charged
processes are very strong and persistent. And Secretary-General Annan does
not make it easier by now launching his third major management reform
programme, without having successfully implemented the two preceding ones,
as discussed throughout this section on Management
Accountability Struggles. Will there be a real breakthrough in 2005,
or just more "blue smoke and mirrors" leading to further disappointment
about UN inability to better assist in meeting urgent global
challenges? IO Watch will continue to track the overall UN reform
developments. Meanwhile, please see also the archive subsection on The UN and Global
Governance under Recent Developments. |
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