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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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No aspect of UN management systems has received so much attention, and
generated so much frustration over the last four decades, as the critical
need to better organise and assess decision-making processes. Massive
energies and efforts have been invested in this quest, and particularly in
what eventually came to be the planning, programming, budgeting, and
evaluation system (hereinafter "PPBE"). As early as 1950,
the General Assembly sought sound management and evaluation of the
Secretariat's work and use of the funds made
available: "[In 1950]
the General Assembly stressed the
need for careful programme reviews to effectively use available
resources. Subsequently in
1953, the Secretary-General made a comprehensive review of the work and
structure of the Secretariat.
This 'evaluation process' and the subsequent reform actions sought
to concentrate efforts and resources on the priority programmes which an
international organization could 'perform efficiently and effectively,'
avoid a 'dangerous' dispersion of these resources over a widespread
'miscellany' of projects, and launch 'a continuing self-criticism as to
the way in which various tasks are carried
out.'" "Concentration of effort and resources," General Assembly resolution 413 (V) of 1 December 1950, "Organization of the Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/2554 of 12 November 1953, para. 5, and "Annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organization 1 July 1953-30 June 1954," UN document A/2663, 1954, pp. xiv-xv, all as
discussed in Joint Inspection Unit, "Reporting on the performance and results
of United Nations programmes: Monitoring, evaluation, and management
review components", Joint Inspection Unit, UN document A/43/124, 1988, Annex I, para.
2.
However, the
struggle to get UN managers to accept and use programming and evaluation
has ground along ever since with little success, as illustrated first by
the litany of well-intentioned Member State efforts to prod the
Secretariat into effective action during the 1958-1993 period. IO Watch
apologizes for such a tedious list, but finds it essential to show the
General Assembly's determination to deal with this central matter, the
equally-determined Secretariat resistance, and the resulting, constant
frustrations and disappointments. "1958: After the General Assembly
called for concentration on the highest-priority tasks and 'the utmost
economy' in resource use, the
United Nations budget was reformed to concentrate on objects of
expenditure and consolidated staffing tables. 1961-1962: A committee of experts
appointed by the General Assembly recommended budgetary stabilization,
enforcement of programme priorities, closer scrutiny of budgets by
governing bodies, and greater administrative control and analysis of the
budget: the General Assembly responded by calling for an integrated budget
policy. 1966:
Another group of experts called on the United Nations and the
system to deal with a financial crisis through integrated planning,
programming, budgeting and evaluation systems; clear objectives and
strategies; strengthened evaluations and internal reviews. 1969 (and 1974): JIU studies noted that the
United Nations had fallen behind the large specialized agencies in
installing medium-term planning and programme budgeting
systems. 1972a: The ACABO criticized
cumbersome United Nations legislative machinery and fragmented
decision-making, and urged review of the budget format to allow Member
States to relate inputs to outputs and determine whether they were getting
their moneys worth. 1972b: The Secretary-General
acknowledged the decades delay in establishing an integrated programme
planning system (see 1961-1962): he proposed such a system to greatly aid
governing-body decision-making with coordinated information on past
performance, present proposals, and implications for the
future. 1973: After criticism from the CPC
and ACABO. the Secretary-General acknowledged that evaluation had not yet
begun, but would be an essential part of future budget
procedures. 1974: The first biennial programme
budget was initiated (for 1974-1975). and the first medium-term plan (for
1974-1977, subsequently changed to a six-year plan for the 1984-1989
period). 1975a: The Secretary-General
acknowledged that there was still no systematic evaluation of results,
which was the key problem which the medium-term plan did not yet
cover. 1975b: Yet another group of
experts, and a working group, recommended strengthening CPC for planning.
programming, coordination, and programme review, as a mechanism to
effectively evaluate programme implementation and
results. 1978-1979: The Secretary-General
acknowledged again that there was no systematic evaluation and that
improved budgeting procedures and better budget submissions and workplans
were needed to enhance performance monitoring and the identification of
marginal activities. 1981: JIU found that, despite a
small evaluation unit finally established in 1980, the United Nations had
fallen behind most other United Nations system organizations in developing
and using evaluation. 1982: The General Assembly
established programming regulations and rules, inter alia to
subject all programmes to periodic and thorough reviews and periodically
evaluate the results achieved. 1983a: A report to the General
Assembly which acknowledged slow progress in establishing even a minimal
evaluation system was sharply criticized by the CPC and deplored by the
General Assembly. 1983b: Secretariat officials
blamed tardy programme budget issuance on the complexity of the process,
and launched a long, slow search for new budgetary processes, procedures,
and formats. 1985a: As suggested by yet another
outside expert group, an internal task force, and pressure from the
General Assembly, CPC, and the JIU. the Secretary-General established
small central evaluation and monitoring units. but JIU found the United
Nations to be lagging even further behind other System agencies in the
assessment of results to improve future
programmes. 1985b: The General Assembly
strongly criticized programme performance reporting and repeated the
necessity of strengthening monitoring and evaluation, and the Secretariat
promised more transparent and analytical reports on performance and
results. 1988: The JIU found major problems
with disorderly programme budgeting processes and programme performance,
evaluation, and management reports; the General Assembly twice endorsed
the JIU call for reports emphasizing programme results and quality, but
the Secretariat argued that the evaluation system was still too weak to
provide such reporting and settled for minor performance reporting
adjustments. 1990: The ACABQ expressed real
doubts about the value of the medium-term plan, its verbosity and length,
the quality of intergovernmental reviews, the lack of relevant evaluation
activities, and programme performance reports that were of little
use. 1993: A group of experts
considered a new programme planning format and approach and concluded
bluntly that Much more time is spent on reviewing plans and budgets than
on implementation and evaluation and that This imbalance needs to be
corrected. "Management in the United Nations: Work in progress", Joint
Inspection Unit, UN document
A/50/507,1995,
Annex. Perhaps the pivotal
period in this long sequence of activities was the early
1980s: "[In 1981] the General Assembly
requested the Secretary-General to propose official regulations and rules
to govern the entire programme planning system, taking into account its
many prior resolutions on an integrated planning, programming and
evaluation system. During the next two years, the Secretary-General made
proposals which were extensively discussed, and
[In 1984] the
Regulations and Rules were
adopted by the General Assembly and
issued. [They] state as their
very first aim: '(a) to subject all programmes of
the Organization to periodic and thorough reviews,' [and
also] '(h) to establish an independent
and effective system for monitoring implementation and verifying the
effectiveness of the work actually done;
(i) to evaluate periodically the
results achieved
' [In 1985] the third JIU reports on
the status of evaluation [in the UN system]
found that most organizations had made
considerable progress in systematically using
evaluation.
The JIU concluded,
however, that the United Nations was still locked into the initial stages
of evaluation system development, had fallen even further behind the other
organizations than it was in 1981, and had not achieved 'integrated
management' because results were not being assessed in order to improve
future programmes and decision-making." "Programme planning," General Assembly resolution 36/228 of 18 December 1981, "Regulations and rules governing programme planning, the programme aspects of the budget, the monitoring of implementation and the methods of evaluation," UN document ST/SGB/204 of 14 June 1984, Joint Inspection Unit, "Third report on evaluation in the United Nations system: Integration and use," Joint Inspection Unit, UN document A/41/202, and "Status of internal evaluation in organizations of the United Nations system," UN document A/41/201, both of 1986, paras. 21-22, 29-30, all as
discussed in Joint Inspection Unit, "Reporting on the performance and results
of United Nations programmes: Monitoring, evaluation, and management
review components", UN document
A/43/124, 1988, Annex I, paras. 18-19, 23. In 1987, Maurice
Bertrand, a major participant in UN reform efforts, provided very
perceptive insights into the underlying significance, problems, and
still-remaining potentials of the PPBE process, and of the struggles to
implement it. Important efforts had led to the not-insignificant steps of
defining a specific programme
structure, a regular biennial cycle, a rationalized process and
procedures, and a programming unit, but there was still much bureaucratic
resistance and the system had
been poorly established: "
because there was no training
program to help professionals [understand this new methodology imposed
from above], the preparation of the plan was not taken seriously
[A 1979 analysis found a
disheartening] plethora of banalities,
vague and general wording .. the
lack of descriptions of policies and objectives
[and] strategies
The definition and measurement of
program impact was made more difficult by the fact that, in many cases,
the U.N.'s role
-- as well as the resources involved -- was marginal. In fact, evaluation studies have
not yet developed to the point of usefulness. [PPBE regulations and rules were
finally codified in 1982, but they]
are widely misunderstood and
incorrectly implemented. They
fail to achieve their real purpose: to facilitate a better agreement among
member states on the content of programs and on the financing of
activities of the United Nations." Maurice Bertrand, Planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation in the United Nations, United Nations Management & Decision-Making Project UNA-USA, United Nations Association of the United States of America, New York, 1987, pp. 1, 7, 13, 19, 22. The report then
reflected on lessons learned from the process: "Everyone acknowledges
that the
system has failed to facilitate a better agreement among member states on
[program content and financing]
Wordiness
is still flourishing in resolutions as in [the]
documents prepared
The efficiency of the Secretariat does not seem much
improved.
Achievements seem meager
.
and a feeling of failure tends to
prevail. Member states insist on
better
implementation of PPBE regulations while overcoming the resistance of the
Secretariat
These efforts certainly have to be pursued vigorously.
The resistance
can be explained
as the usual attitude of bureaucracies toward change.
it is also more
convenient to
give an idealized image of the [U.N.'s] generalized role
rather than try to define [specifically how the U.N. might cope with] the real political, economic, and
social problems of the world.
It is always more pleasant to state grandiose objectives to be
implemented at some indefinite date than to state modest and precise goals
and try to reach them by an assigned date.
The process of education toward
realism, precision, and modesty of approach built into the PPBE process
has not had time yet to develop or to bear results." Maurice Bertrand, Planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation in the United Nations, United Nations Management & Decision-Making Project UNA-USA, United Nations Association of the United States of America, New York, 1987, pp. 23-27. Mr. Bertrand
recommended changes to persevere with the PPBE process, to help improve UN
efficiency and effectiveness and redefine the role of the UN in the modern
world. He reached very
fundamental conclusions: "The main obstacle to overcome is
a conceptual one -- the illusion that there is enough consensus in the
international community to allow the U.N. a central role in the
international system. [There
is still] an exaggerated belief in the ability of the Organization to
maintain peace and security and to 'achieve international cooperation in
solving international problems'
Forty years of experience have
shown how misconceived a role this was
The essential problem
is to find
a system for building progressively better consensus on questions of
common interest.
based on the idea that the low
level of existing consensus can, with patience, be elevated over
time. The development of the PPBE system
could help by showing [the need for]
a better consensus on the nature
and on the solution of world problems and
an attempt to convert [such a
consensus]
into modest but useful results
to make real progress toward
a new and more efficient United Nations." Maurice Bertrand, Planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation in the United Nations, United Nations Management & Decision-Making Project UNA-USA, United Nations Association of the United States of America, New York, 1987, pp. 45-46. As evidence of the
severe damage done to UN management systems by the lack of even
narrowly-focused management training, a 1988 JIU report found a very sorry
record of training managers to employ the supposedly high-priority PPBE
system:
"The [Secretariat] stated in 1978
that it was obvious that each programming unit must have people adequately
trained in [PPBE] techniques in order to make the programme planning
system work effectively. [Yet
eight years later the 1986 medium-term plan]
states that organized
training activities will be used to help program managers learn how to use
self-evaluation, ideally as part of overall training in programme
planning, budgeting and monitoring. Unfortunately, [only minimal
training sessions were held in 1987, but anything more is] uncertain
because [such] training has not been accepted as a formal part of the
United Nations training programme.
the Secretariat has now prepared
nine programme budgets and five medium-term plans, [but multiple outside
reviews] have all criticized poor design during this period.
A
significant portion of United Nations activities is still not 'precisely
programmed,' and the Secretariat has acknowledged the inadequate
involvement and lack of experience of at least some Secretariat officials.
The lack of staff training is of
extra concern now that programme managers are adding self-evaluation work
to their responsibilities
[and because of a broad discretionary loophole
that allows] programme managers themselves [to] decide whether to evaluate
or not and in what depth
depending inter alia on 'the existing
level of evaluation experience'
and because evaluation units will be
phasing out as programme managers take over self-evaluation. This would
eliminate a major source of advisory support, training, and especially
quality control
[UN] training
is difficult
because so little training money is available.
Nevertheless
since
training in design and evaluation will be essential for self-evaluation,
and
to complete the programme planning system and make it operational,
the Inspector believes that [such] training should be the top management
training priority." "Reporting on the performance and
results of United Nations programmes: Monitoring, evaluation and
management review components", UN document A/43/124, 1988, paras. 148-152.
The General
Assembly did indeed attempt, for several years at the end of the 1980s, to
press the Secretariat to improve the PPBE system and, in particular, to
finally make monitoring and evaluation meaningful: "[Emphasizing] the importance of a reliable methodology for
monitoring programme performance, [Stresses] the
importance of evaluation for the systematic and objective determination of
the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of programmes and
activities in relation to their objectives," "Programme planning", General
Assembly resolution 44/194 of 21 December 1989, 8th and 9th
preambular paras.
"I.1. Adopts the proposed medium-term
plan for the period 1992-1997
; 7. Requests the Secretary-General
to improve the
quality of his proposals to [bodies reviewing the plan] as well as the
timeliness and procedure of their submission; 8. Also requests the
Secretary-General to pursue his efforts to achieve greater concision,
clarity, analytical rigour and prospective orientation of the
plan;" II.3.
Requests the Secretary-General to submit
a report on the
methodology for monitoring and reporting on the programme performance of
the United Nations;" III.2
urges the
Secretary-General to develop methods and procedures to ensure that
evaluation is fully integrated into the programme planning cycle of the
Organization;" "Programme planning",
General Assembly resolution 45/253 of 21 December 1990.
Unfortunately,
determination to refine and reform the PPBE system then waned, and no
serious changes were made. A blistering assessment three years later in
the Thornburgh report stated that: "The current [UN] budgeting process [is]
almost surreal. It is overly complicated,
reflective of a strong tendency on the part of the General Assembly to
micro-manage and, in many ways, out of touch with reality. A great detail of effort, for
example, is extended in the framing of the six-year medium term plan, the
budget estimates, the biennial budget itself and revised estimates to
reflect changes made during the biennium [each of which is submitted to
various governing bodies] to ensure that the Secretariat carries out
[General Assembly] priorities." What is ignored is the fact that
these 'priorities' are constantly skewed and distorted by activities and
expenditures by United Nations entities outside the Secretariat.
The net effect is that some 70
percent of the Organization's expenditures, for example, in
social and
economic development, are made without any reference to the intricate
budgetary processes engaged in by the Secretariat and the General
Assembly."
What is called for, in my view,
is a central policy-making mechanism to establish priorities for the
United Nations as a whole in this area and to ensure that the expenditure
of funds effects those priorities within all components." Dick
Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management,
"Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations" ["The Thornburgh
report"], 1 March 1993, pp. 14-16.
Mr. Thornburgh was
even tougher on the massive effort invested in preparing the UN
medium-term plan:
"The Medium Term Plan, in
my view, is simply useless.
Six year projections in times of change
are especially
unrealistic. Moreover, the
tremendous effort and resources expended to produce a document which no
one does (or, in all candor, should) read or refer to is simply a gross
misallocation of scarce talent within the Organization. Unless the
Plan is altered
substantially in both format and substance, you should recommend its
discontinuation to the General Assembly." Dick
Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management,
"Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations" ["The Thornburgh
report"], 1 March 1993, pp. 16-17.
The 1993 JIU report on
accountability and oversight noted that in the absence of strong oversight
and management improvement units, organizations like the UN must rely
heavily on staff members themselves, supported by training not only in
management skills but in implementing programmes. Yet in 1993: "Observers have consistently noted
the problems of poorly-designed UN programmes, poorly-stated objectives,
and unsatisfactory evaluation reports,
in considerable part because
programme managers have not had proper training
Similarly, [a 1990 JIU report]
noted, and the Secretary-General concurred, that
programme managers did
not know the rules and procedures on acceptance and use of extrabudgetary
funds, leading to uncertainties, confusion, and vague reporting on [this]
major funding source for United Nations
programmes. The Secretary-General reported in
late 1992 that he would implement a comprehensive
[training system for
staff at all levels.] The report noted
[a] 'serious gap' between what
almost 15,000 staff would need and the resources available for
training. For instance, the
priority programme -- supervisory training -- reached only 120 people in the
1991-1992 training year and only 550 people since its inception. The United Nations presently
spends only 0.29 percent of its staff costs for occupational and
management training, well below the 2 to 3 percent that comparable United
Nations entities and some governments spend." Joint Inspection Unit,
"Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat",
JIU/REP/93/5, UN document A/48/420, 1993, paras.
101-103. [Note:
the second report referred to is Joint Inspection Unit, "Extrabudgetary
resources of the United Nations: Towards transparency of presentation,
management, and reporting", UN document A/45/797, 1990. The Secretariat report
of 1994 on establishing the system of accountability and responsibility
stated with abounding
enthusiasm the revealing admission that: "Programme managers and
supervisors must be clear not only about their authority, but also how to
use it
[and therefore must be] provided with training
related to
management skills development. Programme managers and supervisors
could derive benefit from practical training in
the concepts of
decision-making processes
The major objective
is to empower
programme managers and supervisors to see the benefits of employing the
full resources available to them, particularly through their
staff.
The Training Service has
delivered a number of integrated courses with a specific focus on
empowering managers
and has planned others
[The Service will also
conduct] a special orientation programme for under-secretaries-general and
assistant secretaries-general on programme planning, financial management
and the budget process, human resources management and other current
management issues
[and] develop an orientation guide or handbook for [them]
" "Establishment of a transparent and effective
system of accountability and responsibility: Report of the
Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/49/1 of 5 August 1994, paras. 60-62. [emphasis
added]
Other
knowledgeable experts, from both inside and outside the UN, echoed these
concerns, but little subsequent action was taken: "In 1990
the ACABQ stated that
much remained to be done to make the [medium-term] plan of real use to
Member States and the Secretariat, and observed that evaluation had
largely not been integrated into the process, while the programme
performance reports were also of little use. In 1993 the Secretary-General
convened a technical seminar of experts to assist the Secretariat in
drafting a new format and approach to programme planning. The group concluded
that 'Much
more time is spent on reviewing plans and budgets than on implementation
and evaluation' and that 'This imbalance needs to be corrected.' Unfortunately, the resulting
Secretary- General's report proposed no noticeable changes to the existing
programming cycle to overcome the present, and fundamental, monitoring and
evaluation weaknesses." "Management in the United Nations: Work in progress", Joint
Inspection Unit, UN document
A/50/507,1995,
paras. 127-128. Note: the 1993 group of
experts only emphasized the same point that Elmandjra had already
precisely identified in 1973 (see the initial quote in the subsection
preceding on The General Assembly's "lost resolution" of 1993 ),
thereby underscoring the UN's incredibly slow reform impulses, and how
little of substance has happened in the decades since.]
By 1997 the
Secretariat was at least finally ready to reconsider the important topic of
performance management information as the General Assembly had urged in
the 1980s and the JIU had recommended in 1989. In 1997 Secretary-General
Annan proposed an attempt at "results-based budgeting" to move away from a
fixation on inputs and toward managers' accountability for outputs and
consequent outcomes: "Since a key aspect of
accountability for results is transparency of performance information,
management information systems would need to be able to provide improved
analytical tools for the monitoring and evaluation of outputs and outcomes
to support results-based performance reporting
The creation of a results-based
budgeting framework would represent a substantial shift away from input
control
It would also require a shift in the management culture of the
Organization as a whole. The Secretary-General believes
that this proposed change would provide Member States with increased
transparency in the delivery of mandated outputs, using measurable
performance indicators, as well as providing a sound basis for in increase
in efficiencies in their implementation. Should a policy decision be agreed
in principle by the General Assembly
any prospective procedures would
need to be presented for approval prior to their
introduction." "Renewing the United Nations: A programme for reform: Report of the
Secretary-General; Addendum: Results-based budgeting," UN document
A/51/950/Add. 6 of 12 November 1997, paras. 10-11, 20-23.
Meanwhile,
the OIOS found in 1998 that the Secretariat's confidence that managers
could (and would) develop and apply their own performance and monitoring
systems was misplaced. Just
as in past decades, the OIOS reported that: "The quality of
departmental submissions received by OIOS for the 1996-1997 programme
performance period clearly indicates that, in many departments and
offices, there is still inadequate commitment to oversight, and,
consequently no coordination or managerial mechanism that collects and
analyses on a routine basis information on the progress made and results
achieved under the various activities and programmes. Many departments still do not have
either a senior planning and coordination function
or a unit to provide
coordinated feedback on the success and shortfalls in programme
implementation.
[Progress requires that programme managers recognize]
such systems as
basic management tools for improving efficiency and effectiveness of
implementation." "Report of the Secretary-General on the
activities of the OIOS", UN document
A/53/428, 23 September 1998, Preface, para. 184.
[emphasis added]
A thought-provoking
analysis of the UN experiment with results-based budgeting and planning,
in a 2002 JIU report, made a detailed exploration of the shortcomings
encountered by not adapting the process to the needs and realities of
international organizations.
It urged constant review of the methodology of the process, and
further adaptation and precision, to achieve a much more serious,
integrated, and focused approach. Joint
Inspection Unit, "Report
on the results approach in the United Nations:
Implementing the United Nations Millenium Declaration," UN document
A/57/372, of 3 September
2002.
In 2002, as part of
his "second wave" of reforms, Mr. Annan did propose some process
adjustments to the PPBE system, although not in the systematic way
suggested in the JIU report.
Under the theme of "Allocating resources to priorities", he
admitted that : "The present United Nations
programming and budgeting system is complex and labour-intensive. It involves three separate
committees, voluminous documentation and hundreds of meetings. Changes proposed
include a
medium-term plan covering only two years (rather than four)
The budget document itself would
be less detailed and more strategic, and would give the Secretary-General
some flexibility to move resources according to needs. [Also]
intergovernmental review
of plans and budgets should henceforth be conducted exclusively in the
Fifth Committee of the General Assembly [rather than shared with the CPC]
Measures will be taken to
streamline peacekeeping budgets, and to improve the management of the
large number of trust funds through which Member States provide voluntary
contributions to supplement the regular budget." "Strengthening of the United Nations: An agenda for further change:
Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/57/387 of 9 September
2002, "Summary, section
V," p. 3.
Some of these changes
could help mitigate the worst of the process problems of the existing UN
PPBE system. But they still
do not address the basic issues raised by Bertrand in 1986: the need to
establish meaningful General Assembly decision-making processes, related
to realistic and accountable UN programme proposals and follow-up, that
are useful in the "real world." The US General
Accounting Office concluded in its report on UN management reform progress
of February 2004 that performance-oriented budgeting was beginning to
being adopted, linking budgeted activities to performance
expectations. However, two
other essential elements -- a monitoring and evaluation system, and
procedures for shifting resources to meet program objectives, did not
exist. Although the
Secretariat has been making gestures at systematic evaluation for decades
the GAO reported that
"In 2002, the
[OIOS] found that
program managers and department and office heads were not complying with
U.N. regulations.
nearly half of program managers were not regularly monitoring and
evaluating program performance.
In addition, program managers were not held accountable for meeting
program objectives because U.N. regulations prevent linking program
effectiveness and impact with program managers' performance. U.N. officials told us that a more
mature program monitoring and evaluation system is needed before program
managers can be held responsible for program
performance. We found that there were a variety
of problems
Most programs do not have comprehensive monitoring and
evaluation plans
managers
did not directly review
[evaluation
results] in [more than half of the] programmes surveyed in 2001
overall,
evaluation findings were not used
The Secretary-General tasked the
OIOS to develop a strategy to systematically evaluate and monitor
programme results and to introduce information systems needed
and
expects to have a complete system by 2006." U. S. General Accounting Office, United Nations: Reforms progressing, but comprehensive assessments needed to measure impact, GAO 04-339, February 2004, pp. 19-23 [22-23]. IO Watch finds this
brazen behaviour by many or most UN managers amazing:
?
Half the managers
ignored UN regulations, and no one said "Do it!?" ?
UN regulations somehow
prevent linking managers' programme results with their performance, and no
one said "Change that, now!" (let alone asking how such a thing could ever
have happened)? ?
UN officials say a
"more mature" monitoring and evaluation system is needed before managers
can be held accountable, after FORTY YEARS OF PRESSURE from expert groups and the General
Assembly on this issue? [see the 1966, 1972a, 1975a, and subsequent
entries in the third paragraph of this subsection.] ?
UN managers didn't
have evaluation plans, or review evaluation results, or use evaluation
findings, and no one objects or cracks the whip? Please! Worst of all, the old
UN Secretariat "shell game" of reform implementation seems now to be back
in full force. Despite all the foot-dragging history of pretending to
prepare to properly use monitoring and evaluation, OIOS is to develop "a
strategy" and introduce "information systems needed" so that one can
"expect" (not promise) a complete system BY 2006. Thereafter, the Secretariat can
surely "test" the system for a few years, before unleashing some other
delaying routine, or burying it in new grand management reforms from a new
Secretary-General? If ever evidence was
needed that the UN Secretariat managers and senior officials at all levels
will never allow themselves to be held accountable for their performance,
the above GAO report provides it. IO Watch finds it very sad that NO ONE
PROTESTS, at least among the Member State diplomatic missions, that are
supposed to provide "due diligence" and fulfill a fiduciary responsibility
(alongside the Secretary-General) for the billions of dollars provided to
these managers every year. As
a wonderfully wry description of prevailing UN funding processes
states: "just leave the money on a tree
stump in a clearing in the middle of the forest in the moonlight at
midnight." As the UN struggles to
(perhaps) close its major performance management gaps, the General
Assembly, once again, as in so many prior decades, has dutifully
emphasized the need to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation system. It
requested the Secretary- General to entrust the OIOS, in collaboration
with the JIU, to prepare another report on this topic for the General
Assembly to consider at its sixtieth session in
2005. "Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change," General Assembly resolution A/58/269 of 3 March 2004.
The UN "diplo/manager"
culture still seems as powerful as ever. The archive sections that
follow provide more information on just how far this current situation has
deteriorated, beginning with the next subsection on The winner: "free the managers" .
The concluding section on Recent Developments will revisit
this sorry situation, beginning with the topics of Management culture deterioration
and Corruption characteristics in the
subsection on The UN, Alone and UNaccountable ,
before moving on to corrective actions that can and must be taken to end
this perpetual performance and management systems
shortfall. |
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