

2005: REAL MANAGEMENT CULTURE CHANGE, OR JUST MORE UN "SMOKE AND MIRRORS"?

The many negative events of 2004 highlighted UN Secretariat performance issues as never before. They suggested that past efforts at overall reform, or new management systems, or more earnest rhetoric, would not suffice. Instead, the Secretariat requires a fundamental reform in its overall management culture of impunity and non-accountability. But can the UN shake off its entrenched management culture? The tipping point is there, but will it bring much-needed reforms, or just more of the usual UN "smoke and mirrors"?

This subsection examines the possibilities that, this time, UN management culture change might just be "for real." It begins with some more overall warnings from outside analysts about the need for decisive UN management change (IO Watch finds the words "management reform" so tainted in the UN that it hesitates to use them any more.) It then briefly surveys the most troubling and dramatic problem -- the UN oil-for-food programme in Iraq, followed by the many other problem areas of UN effort being sharply criticized in 2005.

The subsection ends with an extended analysis of the ways in which the UN Secretariat responded to these challenges during early 2005. After some hasty reexaminations, it first offered some reasonable *mea culpa*s and acknowledgement that major management culture changes are needed.

Regrettably, however, the Secretariat rather quickly settled into its old lines of defense and gamesmanship. The games included, in sequence:

- asserting that "modernists", including Mr. Annan, were now ready to begin taking over;
- blaming Member States (as always) for the situation;
- looking resolutely ahead rather than at the current

mess;

-- rather aggressively belaboring major UN member states for their shortcomings;

-- and last, and worst of all, arguing that a severely mismanaged UN Secretariat should continue its own self-regulation, and indeed should free its senior managers even more from accountability processes, to "allow them to manage."

In early 2005, however, the initial emphasis was on the overall urgent need to rebuild the UN's credibility and reputation, as damaged by the many operational problems of 2004, and as reflected in the three following quotes.

"Isolated diplomatically over Iraq, beset with financial and sexual scandals and manifestly failing to halt genocide in Sudan, the UN must prove its mettle in dealing with the humanitarian crisis in South-east Asia or face a threat to its very existence. ...

... Two interrelated crises ... have now brought the UN not only to impotence (a regular occurrence), but to institutional meltdown under Kofi Annan.

The 9/11 attacks ... created a new kind of threat to world order ... The UN Security Council is a forum for the big players to settle their differences, eyeball to eyeball. You can't do that with Osama bin Laden. ...

The other new crisis is the descent of the permanent UN bureaucracy into wholesale corruption. There has always been petty sleaze, but it was accelerated vastly by the UN's oil-for-food programme ...

Annan is the first secretary general to be recruited from the ranks of the UN permanent staff. As such, he ... is more prone to defend his bureaucrats from outside criticism. ...

The best solution is a new secretary general ... perhaps a former prime minister or president -- who carries respect in the major world capitals."

George Kerevan, "Has impotent UN finally outlived its usefulness?", The Scotsman, 5 January 2005.

"Can Kofi Annan survive? The secretary-general of the United Nations has just finished what he himself admits was an annus horribilis for his organization. Now an American-led campaign to unseat him is probably closer to its goal than ever. ...

... Although Mr. Annan is unlikely to be directly implicated in any personal corruption [in the UN's much-criticised oil-for-food programme in Iraq], some of his staff could well be. As the overall boss, he could be culpable of negligence at least. ...

More troubling could be his son's links to Cotecna, a Swiss-based company that monitored imports of humanitarian aid into Iraq. ...

Meanwhile, ... there are grumbles from America about the UN's alleged mishandling of relief for the tsunami disaster. Wrangles [continue] ... about the UN's role in Darfur, [and] charges of rape and sexual abuse of children by UN peacekeepers in Congo ...

This week [Mr. Annan] announced that Mark Malloch Brown, the media-savvy head of the [UNDP] ... is to take over as his chief of staff ... But he will need to draw on all Mr. Malloch Brown's presentational skills if he is to mount an effective defense to the Volcker report."

"Kofi creamed: The secretary-general is under increasing pressure to quit", The Economist, **January 8th, 2005**, pp. 44-45.

" ... [Secretary-General Kofi] Annan is doing the right thing by planning further management changes ... Major shakeups are needed in critical areas like peacekeeping and refugee assistance.

.... Helping the poor and desperate ... demands strengthening the management of peacekeeping operations. Some kind of appalling nadir was reached last month with reports that members of an international contingent of UN peacekeepers in Congo had been raping the young girls they had been sent to protect. Annan and his staff must spare no effort to see that these crimes are prosecuted and punished

Sweeping changes are also needed at the UN refugee agency ... Not only has the current high commissioner, Ruud Lubbers, performed uninspiringly, but his relations with his staff have been embittered by a charge of sexual harassment. ... The complainant withdrew formal charges and Lubbers says he intends to finish his term, which ends in December. He should be asked to leave now.

Given the unremitting hostility of the Bush administration, the survival of the United Nations as an effective organization cannot be taken for granted. Annan will have to challenge the self-protective bureaucracy more radically than it has ever been challenged."

"Housecleaning at the UN", International Herald Tribune, **January 12, 2005**.

The most powerful factor in the continuing heavy pressure for UN management change was, and will probably continue to be, the steadily-emerging findings and scandals concerning the UN-administered oil-for food programme in Iraq, especially in two rather negative interim reports by the Volcker inquiry, as summarized in the following five quotes.

"[The Volcker preliminary report] ... has sharply criticized the United Nations for insufficiently auditing operations [of the oil-for-food program, especially] ... at its New York headquarters.

'There were no examinations of the oil and humanitarian contracts ... during the OFFP. ... Oil contracts were not examined [closely] ... despite the fact that UN officials had contract-approval responsibilities.'

It was also 'unclear' why the audits ... 'focused on areas and operations peripheral to or ... away from, headquarters operations of the OIP.'

Even where audits of the programme were done, there was often no follow-up. ...

The UN has explained many of the programme's problems in terms of political games between powerful countries, but the audits reveal that the UN secretariat itself failed to exert necessary oversight.

The report said more comprehensive monitoring could have deterred the surcharge scheme on Iraqi oil contracts, ... as well as undercutting the Iraqi government's kickback scheme for goods purchases. ...

[It found] ... no examination of the processing of letters of credit by the ... bank that handled the oil-for-food account, 'even though UN officials were overseeing the work of the BNP and had approval roles in oil sales and payments to vendors.'

Mark Turner, "UN criticized by Iraq oil-for-food inquiry", Financial Times (UK), **January 11, 2005**.

"[The Volcker panel interim report] ... investigating the [UN] oil-for-food program in Iraq severely criticizes its director and depicts the program as 'tainted' for failing to follow the organization's own procedures.

In an essay Thursday in *The Wall Street Journal*, Volcker ... said the report accused Benon Sevan, the Cypriot who had headed what was once the world body's largest humanitarian effort, of 'irreconcilable conflict of interest.' ...

An official [said that the report] ... also criticized ... Joseph Stephanides, a senior official on the Security Council staff, for failing to ensure that the organization's own rules for buying oil, selling goods and selecting contractors were followed. ...

In his essay, Volcker said that ...

'The findings do not make for pleasant reading' ...

... The interim report concluded that the auditing system was 'underfunded and undermanned' and hence, 'unable to meet effectively the challenge posed by a really unique, massive and complex program of humanitarian assistance.' ...

.... The auditing system ... lacked 'clear reporting lines and the management responsiveness critical to achieving a fully effective auditing process.'

... [Further, he wrote,] the commission ... found what he called 'a clear lapse from disciplined judgement.'"

Judith Miller, "Panel calls oil-for-food program 'tainted'", International Herald Tribune, **February 4, 2005**.

"...[Investigator, Mark Pieth ... rejected [Kofi] Annan's declaration that the [Volcker] report ... exonerated him on the matter of Cotecna winning a \$10 million a year UN contract, while he was secretary-general, and while it employed his son, Kojo.

'We did not exonerate Kofi Annan', Pieth said in an interview. 'We should not brush this off. A certain *mea culpa* would have been appropriate.' ...

Annan, when asked if he planned to step down, replied 'Hell, no' ... 'After so many distressing and untrue allegations ... made against me, this exoneration ... is a great relief.'

But the report clearly faulted [his] management ... and his oversight of the scandal-ridden oil-for-food program ...

[Concerning Cotecna,] 'It's a continuous history of us confronting them, their owning up to something and then backtracking,' said Pieth, a professor of criminal law and criminology at the University of Basel, in Switzerland.

[He cited an April 2004 Cotecna letter, not included in the report, which stated] ... that after Kojo Annan left the company in 1998, it paid him no more money.

But the report issued Tuesday concluded that Kojo Annan was paid as much as \$484,000 after he left the company."

"Firm in UN scandal draws harsh criticism: Investigator disputes Annan comments", Associated Press, in the International Herald Tribune, **March 31, 2005**.

"[The Volcker panel] ... has delivered a mixed verdict on Secretary General Kofi Annan. On the most explosive issue, the panel largely exonerated Annan of personal corruption in ... [awarding an oil-for-food contract to Cotecna.] ...

But the panel faulted Annan for failing to begin a serious investigation six years ago when his son's involvement became known. This was a grievous lapse, for which the United Nations is now paying the price as critics accuse it of conflicts of interest and corruption in high places. ...

The Volcker panel argues persuasively that the secretary-general should have referred the matter to UN investigators for a more thorough inquiry. Had it done so, the

panel believes, Cotecna's contract would not have been renewed repeatedly. ...

This latest report cites a lot of questionable practices at UN headquarters. Annan's former chief of staff authorized the destruction of files. ...

Even worse behaviour was shown by Kojo Annan and Cotecna, who strove mightily to deceive [everyone] I ...

... [After] a cavalier response ... Kofi Annan needs to demonstrate that he has learned from past mistakes and can still by the strong, effective leader the United Nations needs so badly at this time."

"The verdict on Kofi Annan", International Herald Tribune, **March 31, 2005**.

"Kofi Annan, the United Nations' embattled secretary general, claims to have been 'exonerated' by the Volcker committee's second report into the organisation's oil-for-food scandal. He was not. The committee ... did indeed find no evidence of impropriety by Mr. Annan in the UN giving a hefty contact to Cotecna, a Swiss firm that employed his son Kojo. But the report is riddled with unanswered questions and ambiguities.

Kojo, in particular, comes in for damning criticism ... accused of repeatedly lying, of seeking to conceal the true nature of his relationship with Cotecna ... and of refusing to co-operate fully with the committee. The committee will continue to investigate his role ... and his 'financial dealings ...'

[and, *inter alia*, it] ... point[s] out that Kojo had close contacts in the UN's procurement office ...

The committee's main conclusion is carefully worded, not to say opaque. ...

This is hardly the full exoneration that Mr. Annan wanted. Some of his many American critics are once again baying for his blood. Asked this week if he would resign, Mr. Annan's answer was clear: 'Hell, no!' But his reputation has been besmirched, his credibility undermined and his moral authority badly eroded."

"Kofi, Kojo and a lot of shredded documents: There are still too many unanswered questions at the United Nations", The Economist, **April 2d, 2005**.

[Note: For much more detail on this topic, see this archive's subsection on Iraq oil-for-food programme .]

However, in early 2005 many other sharp criticisms of UN performance in its major areas of operation, some of them quite devastating, also suddenly blossomed -- or came to light. They include (at least) the following ten items.

"The United Nations controversial peacekeeping operation in eastern Congo has received a further blow ...

[An internal report,] ... obtained by the *Financial Times*, charged that UN troops had not been tough enough in defending against renegade Congolese Army commanders ... It said this inaction called into question the 'very purpose of the mission' and 'emboldened potential enemies of Monuc [the peacekeeping mission]' ... [which] threatened the shaky peace process ...

Among its criticisms, the report cited poor leadership, misleading statements by the mission and the failure of a commander to follow orders ...

The failure of the mission to use force during the crisis 'smeared the mission with the taint of impotence and cowardice', said the internally-commissioned report, and gave the perception 'that it had again failed the Congolese people at a critical moment.'

Monuc is the UN's most expensive peacekeeping operation, yet it has been widely criticized for incompetence, for failing to protect civilians, and becoming mired in sex scandals. ...

A number of senior officials have since left Monuc, but William Swing, the

political head, remains in place. In February there were reports that he would resign, but the UN later said he would complete his term."

Andrew England, "UN report accuses peacekeepers of failing the Congolese people", Financial Times (UK), **March 23, 2005**.

[Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsection on [Peacekeeping](#) .]

"A U.N. report on peacekeeper sex abuse released Thursday describes the U.N. military arm as deeply flawed and recommends withholding salaries of the guilty and requiring nations to pursue legal action against perpetrators.

[The report] said abuses had been reported in missions ranging from Bosnia and Kosovo to Cambodia, East Timor, West Africa and Congo. While allegations of abuse have dogged peacekeeping missions since their inception 50 years ago, the issue was thrust into the spotlight after the United Nations found [renewed problems in the Congo] earlier this year. ...

One of the tasks of [Prince Zeid al Hussein, Jordan's U.N. ambassador and author of the report], was finding ways to hold peacekeepers more accountable ...

With the United Nations burdened by scandals ... in the [Iraq] oil-for-food program and allegations of sexual harassment by U.N. staff, officials have sought to deal with the peacekeeper sex abuse issue quickly. ...

Zeid set 2007 as a target date to complete many of his recommendations ...

"Parliaments, and especially those legislatures of the largest contributors to the U.N. peacekeeping budget, may feel ill at ease over continuing to extend support to peacekeeping in the absence of any significant change,' Zeid said."

"U.N. report: Peacekeeping ops troubled," Associated Press, **March 24, 2005**.

[Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsection on [Refugee sexual abuses](#) .]

"The United Nations Human Rights Commission, the UN's principal forum for promoting human rights, opens its annual six-week session today amid unprecedented criticism of its competence and credibility.

For years human rights groups have complained of growing politicisation and double standards that have stifled debate and allowed countries responsible for egregious abuses to escape condemnation. ...

... The authoritative high-level panel on UN reform ... last December said the reputation of the UN itself was threatened by the commission's 'legitimacy deficit' and 'eroding credibility and professionalism.'

Kenneth Roth, head of New York-based Human Rights Watch, reckons that about half the 53 members are there 'not to promote human rights but to undermine them.' ...

If there is general agreement that the commission is broken, there is less accord on how to fix it. ...

... [Mr. Roth] and others argue that countries with the worst human rights records should not be allowed to serve on the commission.

In addition, he says, countries seeking membership should promise to promote human rights, for instance by ratifying the main human rights treaties and issuing a standing invitation for visits by UN human rights envoys. Only 50 countries have done this so far."

Frances Williams, "Double standards on human rights 'undermining UN'", Financial Times (UK), **March 14, 2005**.

[Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsection on [Human Rights](#) .]

"Ever since [Secretary-General] Kofi Annan ... put far-reaching political reform on the [UN] agenda ... there has been a danger that ... enlargement of the UN Security Council -- would dominate the agenda. It is by far the most divisive issue, creating rivalry between leading members. It threatens to split the UN into factions, and cause a deadlock that would bring the whole reform debate to a standstill. ...

The UN must be more effective, but it also needs to be more legitimate in the eyes of all its members. That is the case for enlarging the Security Council and its permanent membership to include important developing countries, such as India and Brazil, and the biggest contributors, such as Germany and Japan, plus two more from Africa to keep a global balance.

Africa has yet to agree on its candidates ... the other four are competing vigorously for the 128 votes they need ... [and countries excluded] such as Italy and Mexico ... want a more flexible arrangement ... The stage is set for deadlock ...

... Progress is urgent if the UN is not to become a lame duck. If necessary, Security Council reform will have to wait."

"Saving the UN: Enlargement of the Security Council may have to wait", Financial Times (UK), **April 18, 2005**.

[Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsection on the [Security Council](#) .]

"Ruud Lubbers told Secretary General Kofi Annan on Sunday that he was resigning as the high commissioner for refugees because of a lack of confidence in him over sexual harassment charges.

'The complaint of sexual harassment could not be substantiated', Lubbers wrote [in his letter of resignation.] ...

[Earlier], Annan said there were insufficient grounds to dismiss him.

But on Friday, Annan consulted lawyers, clearly angered at the resurgence of sexual harassment allegations after a newspaper report that included graphic details. ...

[The] article appeared in the London newspaper *The Independent* citing previously unpublished details from the UN report last summer that confirmed the sexual harassment charges. ...

Diplomats at the United Nations said ... Lubbers ... had fought the charges with a battery of prominent lawyers and that Annan, consulting employment lawyers outside the United Nations, was advised that Lubbers would win a legal test."

"Embattled Lubbers resigns UN post", *Associated Press*, Warren Hoge, in the International Herald Tribune, **February 21, 2005**.

[Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsection on UN [Anti-harassment efforts](#) .]

"This week the United Nations published its annual assessment of progress toward its Millennium Development Goals -- targets established in 2000 for advancing welfare in the developing countries. The record, as you might expect, is mixed. ... It remains questionable, in fact, whether the MDG exercise, with its unimpeachably good intentions and its proliferating bureaucratic overhead, has done any good at all on balance. ...

... The weakness of the whole MDG concept is that it wills the ends without willing the means -- something which the UN, perforce, has come to specialize in. A plan to spend a specific allocation of aid on specific interventions ... could be judged for cost-effectiveness and ranked alongside alternative ways of expending resources ... A

statement of good intentions is unfortunately just that.

The UN seems especially proud of the progress [toward the goal] ... in which it has a vested interest ... greater global co-operation on development. ... Conferences, working groups, declarations, strategies, and programmes ... swearing allegiance to the MDG idea, are multiplying fantastically. In this sense, at least, the concept is a runaway success. However, what this is actually doing for the putative poor country beneficiaries is harder to say."

"Ends without means: The United Nations has set benchmarks for progress in poor countries. Are these any use?", *The Economist*, **September 11th, 2004**, p. 78.

[Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsections on [Lack of a strategy](#), [Grand lack of focus](#), and [A true global strategy](#) .]

"To hear Kofi Annan, the reforms he recommended this week are some sort of make-or-break last chance to repair the United Nations. On this, however, the UN's secretary-general is surely wrong. Of two near-certainties about the future of the organization, one is that it will continue to exist, not least because most big powers, including habitual critics such as the United States, will continue at times to find it useful ... The other certainty is that no reforms, however well-intentioned will turn the UN into the perfect instrument millions of people seem to want -- one capable, that is, of ordering international relations so that all states obey the same rules, and especially rules that govern the use of force.

These ideas ... do not -- indeed cannot -- solve the underlying problem. ... the absence of [political] will, not some legal quibble ...

None of this means that Mr. Annan's ideas ought to be rejected, or that the UN is not worth improving. ... [For instance,] it would be wonderful if Mr. Annan's proposal to buy out some of the UN's existing staff ended up producing a secretariat that was selected on merit rather than nationality."

"Kofi Annan's reform plan: Some good ideas, but no revolution in the running of the world", *The Economist*, **March 26th, 2005**.

[Note: IO Watch believes this succinct summation has much extra weight, because no media source has followed the UN so closely over the past few decades as has *The Economist*.

[Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsection on [Overall UN Reform Attempts](#) .]

" ... The United States and the European Union should seize the opportunity presented by [Secretary-General Annan's report on reforming and revitalizing the UN] ...

Some will want to start with some of the report's bolder proposals ... but ... it is precisely on these issues that agreement is likely to be most elusive. Therefore, it will be important not to neglect or postpone other urgent aspects of the reform agenda where near-term progress can and must be made. ...

... Promises of assistance to developing countries -- Annan is calling for the world's richest nations to set aside 0.7 percent of their gross national incomes by 2015 for aid to the developing world -- will be meaningless so long as the many UN offices and departments continue to operate in a disjointed and uncoordinated fashion. Both Europe and the US should be able to agree on an agenda for improving the effectiveness of the UN's own development efforts, as well as the mechanisms for coordination with other international assistance agencies."

George Moose, Edward W. Gnehm, and Karl F. Inderfurth, "UN reform: A crucial task for Europe and the U.S.", *International Herald Tribune*, **April 9-10, 2005**.

[Note: for further information on this topic, see this archive's subsection on [Development Assistance](#) .]

"Two lawyers for U.N. whistle-blowers urged the United Nations on Wednesday to protect staffers who want to disclose corruption at the world body, including the oil-for-food program for Iraq.

One of the lawyers said 'five or six' U.N. employees including a high-level employee had contacted him for advice on how to reveal evidence of wrongdoing in [that] ... programme without jeopardizing their careers. ...

Andre Sirois -- himself a U.N. staff member and former whistle-blower --- said ...

'In one case it was something big, that definitely would make the front page ...'

But based on his advice, none of [them] ... have gone public, he said. 'I know them. They won't. They are very quiet and under a lot of stress.' ...

While U.N. rules call for wrongdoers to be punished, they do nothing to shield staff members from reprisals when they come forward with evidence, [Tom] Devine and Sirois said.

'There is irreparable harm when freedom of speech is canceled, irreparable harm to the institution,' Devine said. 'The message is, 'Do not say anything to investigators.' ...

An independent U.N. inquiry led by [Paul Volcker is investigating] ... whether any U.N. employees received bribes or allowed kickbacks."

Irwin Arief, "Lawyers call on U.N. to shield whistle-blowers", Reuters, **December 15, 2004**.

[Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsections on [Disappearing Whistle-blowers](#) and [Suppressed whistle-blowers](#) .]

"The only thing we've gotten is small packets of food and supplies', says ... [an Indonesian tsunami victim.] 'Where the money is, we don't know. It's just meetings, meetings, meetings.' ...

Last week, Indonesia's state auditing agency said it was having difficulty accounting for portions of more than \$4 billion it has received so far ...

As the months have passed, government action has been delayed. [A draft plan] ... is a daunting thing; it comes in twelve volumes. ...

The government faces a huge and complex task. It .. must rebuild ... entire economic and social environments.

But none of this seems to explain the silence of the barren city landscape ... [and] many fishing villages have simply disappeared. ...

As recovery inches forward ... it will encounter conflicts over inheritance and land ownership, bureaucratic inefficiency, competition among aid groups and among government departments and, with so much money flooding in, the possibility of corruption on a gigantic scale. ...

Torn by unending war and political repression, battered by a natural disaster that may strike again, paralyzed by a reconstruction effort that just cannot seem to get started, Aceh today is not a place of hope."

Seth Mydans, "Months after disaster, smashed Indonesian city is still a ghost town: Paralyzed by a reconstruction effort that has yet to get off the ground", [International Herald Tribune](#), **April 6, 2005**.

[Note: For further information on this topic, see this archive's subsection on the [UN coordination of tsunami aid?](#) .]

The initial UN Secretariat responses by Mr. Annan and senior UN officials in the winter and early spring of 2004-2005

to all these emerging allegations of UN mismanagement, weak impact, and poor performance, were initially fairly reasonable as the damage control effort began.

"Two of the world's most impressive spin machines are locked in deadly conflict. On the one side is [the so-called] ... 'vast right-wing conspiracy', a bunch of conservative US senators and congressmen, ... [plus several major media organizations], all calling for the head of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

On the other side is the huge amorphous mass of the global great and good, all clucking in unison that Kofi Annan is the best UN secretary-general since Dag Hammarskjold ... although a list that includes Kurt Waldheim and Boutros Boutros-Ghali is not much competition. Led by [some political leaders, reinforced by some major governments, newspaper editorial boards, and news bulletins] ..., the international establishment has rallied to Annan as the first African to run the world body, and as the first secretary-general to bring forward thoughtful and even bold plans for UN reform.

Kofi Annan must stay, they all cry, most of them thrilling to the symbolism of a clash between President George Bush, who proudly sports a small American flag on his lapel, and Nobel peace prize laureate Kofi Annan, whose equally well-tailored lapel sports a discreet dove, tastefully wrought in white enamel."

Martin Walker, "Gunning for Kofi", The Spectator, **December 11, 2004**.

"Secretary-General Kofi Annan said Tuesday [at his year-end news conference] that allegations of corruption in the oil-for-food programme had 'cast a shadow' over the United Nations and made 2004 an especially troubled year for the international organization. But he said he was optimistic for the future.

'No doubt that this has been a particularly difficult year, and I am relieved that this annus horribilus is coming to an end', he said ...

'There has been lots of criticism against the UN, particularly with allegations surrounding the oil-for-food program,' he said. 'These are serious allegations, we take them seriously and this is why we are doing everything we can to get to the bottom of this. ...

Asked if he would accept personal blame or admit to mistakes, he said he preferred to await the outcome of the Volcker investigation before commenting.

'On the question of my possible resignation,' he said, 'let me say that I have quite a lot of work to do and, as you have indicated, I have the confidence and the support of the member states.'

Warren Hoge, "'A particularly difficult year' for the UN, Annan says", International Herald Tribune, **December 22, 2004**.

[Note" See also , in more detail, Mark Turner, "UN puts its future up for debate in biggest challenge yet: The international organization has been through a testing period but even tougher battles lie ahead", Financial Times (UK), **December 21, 2004**.]

"The crisis meeting of veteran foreign policy experts in a Manhattan apartment one recent Sunday was held in agreed-upon secrecy.

The high-profile guest of honor [Kofi Annan] came unaccompanied by his usual retinue of aides ... The mission, in the worlds of one participant, was clear -- 'to save Kofi and rescue the UN.'

[Annan] ... listened quietly to three and a half hours of bluntly worded counsel from a group united in their regard for him and support for the United Nations, but deeply concerned that lapses in his leadership over the past two years had eclipsed the accomplishments of his first term and were jeopardizing chances of making the remaining two years of his term meaningful.

They began by arguing that Annan had to refresh his top management team. ...
The larger argument ... [addressed the need] to move aggressively to repair relations with Washington ... [and] to restore his relationship with his own bureaucracy, where workers felt his office protected high-level officials accused of misconduct.

One participant, who requested anonymity, said that Annan ... made no promises -- nor was asked to -- at its end."

Warren Hoge, "Frank words for Annan in effort to revitalize UN", International Herald Tribune, **January 11, 2005**.

[Note: Interestingly, almost all the other attendees at the meeting were Americans.]

"Mark Malloch Brown has spent the past few days hopping from one disaster-struck region in Asia to the next. Meanwhile, [he] ... is also charged with seeing the United Nations through one of the most trying periods in its 59-year history. Plagued by allegations of corruption, inefficiency and even irrelevance, the world body will need urgent attention ...

... [He said] 'The United Nations needs to take a good hard look at itself and go through a series of management reforms to make ourselves more effective. ...

I think people acknowledge the UNDP is a very successful example of U.N. reform. ...

... [Mr. Annan] made it clear in appointing me ... that it was that kind of management turnaround success [that we had] at UNDP ... that he wants to see brought into the United Nations proper. And the emphasis ... on communications. ... We will see if we can repeat the trick at the United Nations. ...

Now ... the critics are a lot tougher and meaner, and the standard of the bar set a lot higher. I know my lines, I know the part, and we'll see what the critics have to say in the morning."

"The last word: Mark Malloch Brown", Newsweek International, **January 17, 2005**.

"The man appointed to oversee a management shake-up at the United Nations has warned that it must brace itself for wide-ranging reform ...

'The crisis is still building,' [Mark] Malloch Brown said. 'It's very hard after [last] week's revelations to believe there isn't going to be some pretty tough stuff on management.'

Paul [Volcker's group] last week criticized the UN for its limited response to internal audits showing irregularities in the \$65 billion [Iraq oil-for-food] programme.

... Mr. Malloch Brown also warned that it was no longer only the institution's traditional, conservative critics that were calling for a shake-up.

Mr. Volcker also claimed the volume of allegations surrounding the former [head of the Iraq] programme, Benon Sevan, suggested there must have been some 'monkey business.'

At the end of January Mr. Volcker will issue his preliminary findings. 'That may be a transition point', Mr. Malloch Brown said ...

'It should be a mainstream preoccupation of every government share holder of the UN.' ...

A reshuffle of Mr. Annan's cabinet would take place within six weeks, maybe sooner, he said. ...

... The management shuffle would be followed by 'human accountability' reforms addressing other recent scandals."

Mark Turner, "UN warned to get ready for sweeping reforms", Financial Times (UK), **January 17, 2005**.

"Reaffirming his pledge to act resolutely on any findings of staff misconduct in connection with the United Nations Oil-for-Food programme for Iraq, Secretary-General Kofi Annan today announced ... disciplinary proceedings against officials involved in the operation and ... broader management measures in response to the [release of the Volcker panel report on] ... the management of the now-defunct relief effort.

'Should any findings of the Inquiry give rise to criminal charges, the United Nations will cooperate with national law enforcement authorities pursuing those charges, and ... I will waive the diplomatic immunity of the staff member concerned,' Mr. Annan said in the statement ...

... The statement noted the [Volcker panel's] intention to publish a further interim report dealing with [his son Kojo's involvement, which Mr. Annan awaited] ... 'with a clear conscience' ...'

[Spokesman Mark] Malloch Brown acknowledged that 'we're dealing with critical and vital breakdowns in the management of the UN' ...

[On the inadequate UN auditing process, he stated that] 'we'll have to look again at what we can do to strengthen the external independence of audit, to strengthen the assurance that it will have the resources it needs to do the task' ..."

"Acting on Oil-for-Food report, Annan takes disciplinary action, further management steps", UN News Service, **3 February 2005**.

"No one at the United Nations doubts that big change is necessary for the institution to regain its footing and restore its name. ...

Under prodding, [Kofi] Annan is shedding most of his inner circle ... [to replace these 'traditionalists' with 'modernists.']

Shake up a bureaucracy as entrenched as the United Nations, and people get nervous. ...

[Long-time observer Edward Luck said] ... 'In the early '90s the UN got too ambitious on the operational scale. ... [Then and since] ... it got overly zealous in building norms, setting international law and trying to regulate state behavior.'

He also faulted the United Nations for developing a sense of moral superiority over the pursuit of national ambitions. 'It was as if national interests are by definition base and narrow and mean-spirited,' he said.

'Somehow if you're a global citizen, that's superior to being a patriot,' said [former US ambassador to the UN] Richard Holbrooke. He said the United Nations had erred in placing itself above its member states. ' ... that's not acceptable to the big powers, and not just the U.S. The Chinese and the Russians and countries like India also won't accept the UN as senior to them.'"

Warren Hoge, "For the beleaguered UN, a dance of reinvention", International Herald Tribune, **February 25, 2005**.

[Note: this important point about UN officials' self-righteousness and arrogance as "global guardians" during the past decade is an important one, not least because the quotes which follow below suggest that a lot of Secretariat (and loyal supporter) arrogance is still left in 2005. See also this archive's subsections on [The UN and Global Governance](#) , [UN Moral Values and Rectitude - For Others](#) , and many subsections of [The UN, Alone and UNaccountable](#) .]

So far, not bad. However, the old patterns of UN defensive response to outside pressure for management reform then began to

assert themselves, in a steadily more aggressive fashion.

A first, nuanced defense of Mr. Annan, as a forward-looking "modernist" trying to drag an entrenched UN culture into the world of modern management, was made by John Ruggie, an academic who served for several years as an assistant-secretary general under Mr. Annan (and who attended the "crisis" advisory meeting with Mr. Annan in December 2004.) It was, in turn, firmly rebutted by David Rieff.

" ... Throughout my own tenure at the UN [I witnessed] ... an ongoing tension between traditionalist and modernist corporate cultures ...

In the traditionalist view, the accountability of the UN begins, and ends, with member states ... The modernist culture, in contrast, appreciates that accountability is also owed to a variety of other internal and external stakeholders: UN staff, national legislatures, civic groups and the general public. Whereas traditionalists treat opaqueness as a strategic asset, for modernists transparency is the key to institutional success.

If any good can come out of the 'horrible year' just passed, it will be the permanent victory of the modernists. ...

Mr. Annan is by instinct a modernist who won the 2001 Nobel Peace Prize for "bringing new life" to the UN. ... He [has] ... acknowledged the need to learn from the oil-for-food debacle and signaled his renewed commitment to institutional reform. As he goes about rebuilding his senior management team, he would be well advised to add to each job description: only modernists need to apply."

John Ruggie, "Modernists must take over the United Nations, Financial Times (UK), **January 24, 2005**.

"... Despite ... what modernizers in the pro-UN reform camp have argued, the UN's problems are not those of management systems ...

The secretary-general, for all his positive innovations, has been a UN traditionalist in his tendency to take credit for the UN's successes and blame failures on member states. ...

If the UN is prepared ... [to accept] real critical analysis ... [and also] deal with its present failures and perceptions of endemic impropriety, this would represent significant progress. ...

Even if the UN secretariat begins to behave with less secrecy and more dispatch, and shows more resolve to tackle corruption, the root causes of ... the UN's *annus horribilis* will remain. The real challenge is defining the UN's role in a post-cold war, post-9/11 world. ...

This is not to say that there is no hope of rescuing the UN, and certainly not that it should be scrapped. It is rather to put the reforms proposed by Mr. Annan ... in their proper perspective. Ultimately, these are positive steps to address some, but by no means all, of the symptoms of an institutional disease that we are likelier to find ways to live with than to cure."

David Rieff, "The UN must plot a new course", Financial Times (UK), **February 21, 2005**.

A second approach used the oldest weapon in the Secretariat's armory -- to blame Member States for the ills of UN

operations, with their destructive dominance of a largely-helpless Secretariat. Two somewhat-new variants on this approach are presented here. More basic insights into this fundamental knee-jerk Secretariat strategy over the years of blaming others are provided in the next subsection on the key entrenched factors underlying the UN management accountability crises of the past six decades.

"Oil-for-Food was a conscious act of diplomacy. And it was on balance, a successful one: The program saved the sanctions, and the sanctions made possible the disarmament of Iraq. But it was also, inevitably, a mess. ...

[The UN] is, if anything, an explicitly subservient body that has grown habituated to serving the interests and the whims of its member states and understands all too well that all decisions are, at bottom, political. This is a pathology [which] ... undermines the organization's good efforts. Whether and to what extent it is curable is an open, and very important, question. ...

Powerlessness breeds passivity. UN officials rail against their dependent status while at the same time taking refuge in it. ... [This] fosters a culture in which no one feels personally accountable.

Is it possible to foster a culture of accountability and professionalism [in such an organization?] People who care about the United Nations will have to demand a change in culture, but also permit a change in culture. The members will, in fact, have to back off on managerial issues. ... If the Oil-for-Food scandal ultimately provokes these changes, the United Nations should be grateful for its enemies."

James Traub, "Why Oil-for-Food worked: The Security Council's role: Off target", New Republic (USA), **February 21, 2005**, pp. 14-17.

[Note: Mr. Traub is writing a book on Kofi Annan and the United Nations.]

" ... The United States and the European Union should seize the opportunity presented by [Secretary-General Annan's report on reforming and revitalizing the UN] ... to enter into a serious dialogue on making the UN the credible and capable institution envisioned by its founders. ...

Some will want to start with some of the report's bolder proposals ... which should indeed command urgent trans-Atlantic attention, but ... it is precisely on these issues that agreement is likely to be most elusive. Therefore, it will be important not to neglect or postpone other urgent aspects of the reform agenda where near-term progress can and must be made. ...

[On UN renewal] ... the institution's accountability watchdog, the Office of Internal Oversight Services, must be strengthened and its mandate extended to include the Security Council, which failed in its responsibility to oversee the oil-for-food programme in Iraq."

George Moose, Edward W. Gnehm, and Karl F. Inderfurth, "UN reform: A crucial task for Europe and the U.S.", International Herald Tribune, **April 9-10, 2005**.

[Note: the authors all served as senior U.S. diplomats at the UN. However, in their otherwise quite reasonable assessments, this last wild idea stands out. How can the UN internal audit unit, which reports to the Secretary-General, who serves the Security Council, sit in judgement on the Member States there, particularly when both the Secretary-General, his Iraq programme unit, and his OIOS bear the major responsibility for the operational, oversight and management failures in that scandal? (See this archive's subsection on the [Iraq oil-for-food programme](#) and

Claudia Rosett, "The oil-for-food scam: What did Kofi Annan know, and when did he know it?", **April 16, 2004**, p. 1, Commentary, May 2004, available at http://www.commentarymagazine.com/SpecialArticle.asp?article=A11705017_1]

In a third attempt at Secretariat redemption, Jan Egeland, the head of UN humanitarian affairs and emergency relief operations, sought to look forward optimistically (and don't look back). He cited the "unbridled generosity of governments" in the Asian tsunami crisis of December 2004, and stated that it showed (the long-standing UN assertion) that "only the UN has the legitimacy, capacity and credibility" to lead in a truly global humanitarian emergency. But, not resting on the UN's (self-proclaimed) "laurels", Mr. Egeland asserted that there is "no alternative" to the UN, and that the UN is credible insofar as it now has an "even greater awareness of the need to prevent acts of mismanagement and abuse by our own managers or staff."

The article is by Jan Egeland, "Sobering lessons for the United Nations", Financial Times (UK), **March 30, 2005**.

[Note: the real test of the credibility of the UN in responding to the tsunami disaster has scarcely begun -- see this archive's ongoing subsection on UN coordination of tsunami aid? .]

However, in a prompt response to these assertions, David Rieff noted that:

" ... If Jan Egeland indeed believes that the UN-led international response to the tsunami disaster really demonstrates the potential for an effective UN ... or proves [its] ... unique legitimacy, the UN system is in even more trouble than already suggested by recent dismal headlines about ... secretary-general Kofi Annan, sex scandals and financial mismanagement ...

... The tsunami, he argues, showed that 'the world' (whatever that may be) wants the UN 'to act -- swiftly, boldly and decisively -- in times of crisis to mobilize political will and harness resources from around the world.' The sad reality is that nothing could be further from the truth, as UN dithering on Darfur over the past year has amply demonstrated.

Of course, ... there is widespread international support for UN-led responses to a natural disaster ... [but] precisely because such events are non-controversial in political terms.

In short, [the tsunami response is not a lesson in how to think about] ... the man-made catastrophes that afflict our world ... That a senior UN official could suggest otherwise ... testifies to the culture of complacency and self-delusion that still reigns within that organization."

David Rieff, "Culture of self-delusion still reigns at the UN", Financial Times (UK), **April 1, 2005**.

A fourth attempt at Secretariat followed the dictum that "the best defense is a good offence". For instance, Secretariat officials aggressively criticised the "stinginess" of major UN member states (and expanded Security Council candidates) such as Japan, Germany, and India, and lectured them on accountability (to their regions.) This certainly belies the Secretariat's oft-

stated image of itself as humble servants of those member states. Such remarks, in particular by Mark Maloch Brown in various recent articles, but beginning with his days as head of the UNDP, are now delivered with much more force in his role as the new chief of staff and apparent chief public spokesman for Secretary-General Annan.

"Japan, the second largest financial contributor to the United Nations, plans to cut its support by one-quarter in coming years ...

Japanese diplomats calculate that Japan's gross domestic product is only 14.4 percent of the global economy. But Japan pays 19.5 percent of the United Nations budget ... By contrast, the United States figures [are 30 percent of global GDP, but it pays only 22 percent ...]

'Japan cannot just give sweet faces to everybody,' [said a spokesman.]

Moving on programs with weak constituencies, politicians have cut Japan's overall foreign aid budget ... by 15.5 percent ...

"We should get a seat on the Security Council ..." said a spokesman. 'No taxation without representation is the basic idea.'

Japan's \$1 billion slice of the United Nation's [biennial] budget is more than the combined payments of four out of five ... permanent members of the Security Council: Britain, China, France and Russia."

One United Nations official here who asked not to be identified said that cutting support would not help ..., arguing 'If their quest is for the Security Council seat, it is not smart politics. They are not creating an image that Japan is a team player.'"

James Brooke, "Japan to cut its financial support to U.N.", New York Times, **January 20, 2003.** [emphasis added.]

"Japan risks damaging its campaign to win a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council if it continues to cut its budget for overseas development aid, a senior UN official said yesterday.

'Japan needs to polish up its ODA credentials', said Mark Maloch Brown, head of the [UNDP], in an interview ... 'We are not saying, 'Give more ODA or there will be no club membership.' But Japan's case is going to be hugely enhanced if it is playing with a quiver full of arrows rather than empty.'

There has been a public backlash in Japan against ODC because of economic stagnation ... Some politicians have advocated cutting Japan's UN contributions, which are proportionately higher than many other countries, in protest at Tokyo's perceived lack of influence.

[Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi cites Japan's increased role in peacekeeping operations,] ... but Mr. Maloch Brown ... said sending troops 'was not a plausible substitute.'

Japan needed to woo poorer countries, especially in Africa, by convincing them it 'was an ODA champion', he said. ' ... Japan's case has to be sufficiently compelling to huge numbers of countries.'

He said Japan should not let 'bean counters' drive its foreign policy."

David Pilling, "Tokyo warned over cuts to aid budget", Financial Times (UK), **October 15, 2004.**

"The UN expects an improvement in relations with the US this year and believes hostility to the world body in Washington has 'peaked', according to ... Mark Moluch

Brown. ' ... I do think there's been a peaking of the really visceral rightwing 'destroy the UN' mode and it has pulled back, even among that constituency, to a more moderated 'reform the UN.' ...

While acknowledging that there were 'huge problems ahead' ..., Mr. Malloch Brown argued that even Washington's most conservative politicians -- including those who recently called for Mr. Annan's resignation -- now recognized the "basic utility of the UN' for peacekeeping, development efforts and disaster relief.

Commenting on another controversial US appointment, Mr. Malloch Brown said he expected Paul Wolfowitz, the new president of the World Bank, to have to 'reach out' to the UN in order to 'quickly distance himself from [policy] prescriptions that were too unilaterally American.' [Brown] added, 'We'll be waiting.'

Referring to Germany's bid for a permanent Security Council seat, he said Berlin would have to pledge to increase its aid to 0.7 percent of gross national product if it wants to succeed. Germany spends 0.28 percent now."

Hugh Williamson, "Washington's hostility to the UN has peaked, says Annan aide", Financial Times (UK), **April 13, 2005**.

"Mark Malloch Brown, chief of staff to [Secretary-General] Kofi Annan, ... warned yesterday that tensions between China and Japan could derail plans for far-reaching UN reforms to be agreed by September. ...

The tensions 'are indicative of a core uneasiness about ... an enlargement [of the Security Council] that creates an even more entrenched group of big states with no accountability to their regions,' he said. ...

"[Chinese demonstrations] against the Japanese embassy and consulates reminds one that far away from Europe there is a China-Japan dimension to which Germany's [potential Security Council] membership is hostage.'

'Germany and Japan and India really need to listen to their regions and give ... assurance that they are not going to use their membership to settle scores within the region, but to genuinely accept a sense of accountability to their region.'

Hugh Williamson and Ray Marcelo, "China-Japan row threatens Security Council Reform, warns Annan aide", Financial Times (UK), **April 13, 2005**.

"As the date rapidly approaches for a big meeting where leaders of the rich world are supposed to come up with a plan to help lift Africa's poor, tired and huddled masses out of poverty, things are starting to get interesting.

Last week, Japan announced that it would double its aid to Africa. Granted, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is doing so to better Japan's chances of getting a seat on the UN Security Council ... [says a Japanese newspaper.] ...

And after weeks of hinting, Germany publicly announced that it would meet the UN target of increasing foreign assistance to poor countries to 0.7 percent of the gross national product by 2014. ...

British prime minister Tony Blair ... [seeks] to pry money out of rich countries for Africa ... [He] has staked his chairmanship of the G-7 this year on a Marshall Plan for Africa, and we are hard-pressed to think of a more worthy goal. "

"Meeting aid promises", International Herald Tribune, **April 15, 2005**.

As this last quote shows, the Secretariat can have some great success in manipulating Member States who want a greater role on the UN stage. However, IO Watch would note that most of this Secretariat lobbying, coaxing, and playing Member States and

regional groupings off against each other goes on continually in the back corridors and "informal consultations" surrounding the General Assembly and day-to-day diplomatic life in New York. Secretariat officials, particularly after decades of practice, are not at all helpless in advancing their own interests in any discussions of Secretariat "reform" processes.]

In fact, this continuous process of Secretariat "interaction" with Member State delegations to the UN is most noticeable in the last and most disturbing of the five approaches which IO Watch notes in this section. Far from installing an effective UN management accountability system over the past decade, IO Watch concludes that Mr. Annan and other UN senior officials have had quite considerable success in doing the opposite. They have argued that controls restrain managers from doing their job, and have worked steadily to remove such restraints.

These critical developments are discussed at length in the following sub-sections of this archive on The Winner: "Free the Managers", Unleashed Managers, and Disappearing Whistle-blowers, as well as in many parts of the Recent Developments section on The UN, Alone and Unaccountable .

The amazing thing which IO Watch wishes to note here, as shown by the following sequence of quotes, is that even in the face of all the current UN mismanagement embarrassments and scandals of 2004 and 2005, the Secretariat leadership clings stubbornly to the idea (along with other sweeping internal changes, see last quote following) that the only real solution to the UN's management accountability crisis is to give UN managers more freedom to manage -- that is, to continue and actually expand the failed routine of old-boy self-regulation.

"Previous management measures **Programme Managers have been empowered** to take action in their areas of responsibility, thus reducing layers of centralized administration."

"Executive summary of the measures outlined in the letter of 17 March 1997 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly," UN document A/INF/51/6 of **17 March 1997**, p. 3. [emphasis added]

"Kofi Annan's election to a second and last term should normally allow him to help establish the United Nations as the centerpiece of an emerging system of global management that is efficient, just and accepted as legitimate by all peoples and nations.

...

Decisive action should not continue to be postponed in regaining the motivation and professional quality of the United Nations in its earlier years ...

Also, **much would be achieved if UN programme managers were allowed to manage -- yes, manage** -- their own budgets and personnel. Not only would their motivation increase immediately, but **they could be held accountable for failure** to achieve agreed objectives."

Enrique ter Horst, "A re-elected Secretary-General can give the world the facts," International Herald Tribune, **6 July 2001**. [emphasis added]

[Note: Mr. ter Horst was a former UN Assistant-Secretary-General, who served under several UN Secretary-Generals, including Mr. Annan]

"One of my priorities in my first term was to improve the Organization's professional capacity and **to promote a new culture of performance, accountability and trust. We have made significant strides ...**

I am confident that the new system of recruitment, by giving managers primary responsibility for staff selection, will lead to a new level of accountability and empowerment. ...

I intend to adopt additional measures to cut unnecessary layers of bureaucracy. **At present, the Organization recruits highly qualified individuals, for management functions -- yet its procedures do not allow them to manage** a budget, procure what they need for everyday activities or authorize travel for their staff."

"Strengthening of the United Nations: An agenda for further change: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/57/387 of **9 September 2002**, paras. 174, 188-190. [emphasis added]

"[After the release of the first interim Volcker report on oil-for-food program mismanagement, Mr. Annan's chief of staff, Mark Malloch Brown] ... was asked if the report should be read as 'an indictment of United Nations culture.' Malloch Brown was candid enough to concede that 'the culture of political complicity' was a serious problem. **Members, he said, should 'back off and allow us to manage this organization.'**

Powerlessness breeds complicity: UN officials rail against their dependent status while at the same time taking refuge in it. ... The members micromanage the budget ... but it fosters a culture in which no one feels personally accountable.

Is it possible to foster a culture of accountability and professionalism in an organization that must be so acutely responsive to the wishes of its masters? Is it possible, for example, to fill jobs with the best candidates so long as the principle of 'equitable national distribution' must be honored? If the answer is no, then we need to envision other kinds of organization. People who care about the United Nations will have to demand [but also permit] ... a change in culture. **The members will, in fact, have to back off on managerial issues.**"

James Traub, "Why Oil-for-Food worked: The Security Council's role: Off target", New Republic (USA), **February 21, 2005**, pp. 14-17. [emphasis added]

[Note: Mr. Traub is writing a book on Kofi Annan and the United Nations.

Note: IO Watch finds this to be an amazingly blunt statement of Secretariat leadership arrogance in defiance of fundamental management accountability, and a *non sequitur* -- we have gravely mismanaged, but now just [give us the money,] back off and let us manage.]

"C. The Secretariat

184. A capable and effective Secretariat is indispensable to the work of the United Nations. ... In 1997 I launched a package of structural reforms ... and followed up with a further set of managerial and technical improvements in 2002 ...

185. ... But **these reforms do not go far enough**. If the United Nations is to be truly effective the Secretariat will have to be completely transformed.

186. ... **The Secretary-General and his or her managers must be given the discretion, the means, the authority and the expert assistance that they need to manage [the] organization** ... 190. ... I therefore request the General Assembly to provide me with the authority and resources to pursue **a one-time staff buyout so as to refresh and realign the staff** to meet current needs.

191. ... I ask Member States to work with me to undertake **a comprehensive review of the budget and human resources rules** under which we operate.

192. ... We must continue to improve the transparency and accountability of the Secretariat. ..."

"In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/2005 of **21 March 2005**.
[emphasis added]

The next archive subsection seeks to place all these UN management reform issues of mid-2005 in a broader and longer-term perspective and context, with:

-- in its Part I, a specific, summary chronology of Secretary-General Annan's concerted efforts since 1997 to free UN managers to manage, in the midst of a purported period of ensuring management accountability;

-- in its Part II, key insights as to how the unaccountable UN management culture became so deeply entrenched in the UN over six decades;

-- comparison of the perpetual immunity and impunity of the UN's senior managers with the dramatic recent developments in the corporate world, where major corruption cases are being quite firmly addressed through civil and criminal legal processes and sanctions;

-- and several very lucid reflections on how, **this time**, Member States must finally insist on proper UN management accountability and performance, if the Organization is ever to reestablish its tainted integrity and status as an effective element of global governance.