|
|||||
UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
|
|
SEVENTH and finally, the most
dramatic and troubling Secretariat innovation of all is the active
participation in the new UN investigations and oversight function by
Secretariat managers, which allows them to focus attention to fraud,
waste, and abuse matters away from themselves and toward their staffs. This shocking evasion
began with the new OIOS under the very active leadership of Mr. Paschke,
and has been continued since by Mr. Annan and the Secretariat leadership,
with the help of Mr. Nair as the second head of OIOS. Mr. Paschke stated
clearly in his first annual report to the General Assembly in 1995 that,
with regard to accountability, he sought not an arms-length and
independent role, but an active partnership with
managers:
"… efforts must be made
to do away with the widespread tendency of staff, even in key
positions, to shun responsibility and accountability. OIOS backs measures taken by the
[DAM] to achieve this goal and will focus its own recommendations to
management accordingly. …
…
Many UN managers are not used to and seem to be
quite reluctant to accept criticism, particularly when it comes to
applying accountability criteria rather than settling for the promise that some
specific problems won't recur.
This feature of the United Nations culture must be
changed if we are ever to develop staff awareness and acceptance
of responsibility and accountability. United Nations managers must stop
being defensive and enter into a critical dialogue with OIOS. In
order to make oversight effective, we offer "Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the [OIOS]", UN document A/50/459, 2 October 1995,
"Preface."
[emphasis added]
Although
Mr. Paschke eventually "talked tough" about uncovering waste and abuse,
and professed responsiveness to whistle-blower reports and protection,
skeptics doubted the public impression that the UN had acquired a
no-nonsense, "crime-fighting" head inspector). A 1996 assessment observed
wryly that: "
… the original conception of Paschke's post was a
combination of Grand Inquisitor and Super Sleuth. The final product, insiders say,
falls far short of either. … "The problem is that half the OIOS
staff do not know anything about the UN" we are told, "and the other half
know everything there is to know but are part of the establishment and
they are not going to make waves."
The results of OIOS's travails are paltry indeed …. There are whispers
that senior staff need not fear their peccadilloes will be exposed.
'Paschke's Finest', it is said, will rake no muck above a certain level of
political or bureaucratic influence."
"Diplomatic
pouch", Diplomatic World Bulletin, July29-August 6, 1996, p.
10.
Mr.Paschke
was working with a tabula rasa, since little thought (and even less
motivation, but much trepidation) had gone into the whole question of an
"inspector general" within the UN Secretariat. In the early 1990s, under pressure
from the General Assembly, the Secretariat had done some initial pondering
on proper management, and recovery of misappropriated funds matters, and
new judicial arrangements, but it was mostly conjectural and defensive and
did nothing to prepare for the actual creation and operations of the
OIOS. These matters are
discussed further under the subsequent subsection on Major ongoing flaws under Where is the Rule of Law? , as
badly-missing components of the UN internal justice system. The investigations
work of the OIOS began very slowly, and it was very understaffed. In April 1996, however, the OIOS
did issue an encouraging Information Circular to all staff on its
investigations work. It
stated that the OIOS is operationally independent under the authority of
the Secretary-General, and assists him in fulfilling his internal
oversight responsibilities. The circular explained that OIOS may initiate,
carry out, and report on "any action" that it believes necessary;
investigate and report on staff reports of violations of UN rules and
administrative issuances; and must protect those staff. It then informed staff of four
categories of activities that they could report to
OIOS: "Misconduct … Activities that would constitute a
failure to maintain the highest standards of integrity include, for
example … (a) Any wilful and unwarranted
disregard of … [UN legislative mandates or … [rules] and any failure to
exercise proper care that is either intended to result in personal benefit
or misappropriation of … [UN] resources; (b) Any act, for example any type
of false certification … [of benefit claims], which demonstrates a failure
to maintain the highest standards of integrity required by the [UN]
Charter … as well as any [misleading statement] resulting in the
misappropriation of … [UN] resources. Unsatisfactory
performance … [staff performance in accordance
with [the UN Charter's call for] 'the highest standards of efficiency
[and] competence", including the following: (a)
Mismanagement, includes, for
example, (i) Any unreasonable failure of a
staff member to perform [efficiently and competently]… all assigned tasks,
duties and management responsibilities; … (b) Waste of
resources includes, for example (i) Any unreasonable failure of a
staff member to ensure that [UN] resources are used … solely, efficiently,
and effectively for [UN purposes or for its
benefit; (ii) Any unreasonable act or
failure to act which, as a direct result of a failure to exercise due
care, causes loss to the organization; (c) Abuse of
authority includes for example, any discharge of management
responsibilities and any act or failure to act, which is not motivated by
the interests or purposes of the UN. " "Terms of reference for investigations by the
[OIOS]: Mismanagement, misconduct, waste of resources and abuse of
authority", ST/IC/1996/29 of 25 April 1996, paras. 6-7.
The above shows
clearly that the heaviest responsibility for proper performance, and the
greatest potential for abuse, centers on managers rather than staff. The misconduct item indeed applies
to all staff, but managers have the most opportunity, power and (in the
UN) impunity to engage in it.
The other three items, mismanagement (self-explanatory), waste of
resources, and abuse of authority, all clearly concern behaviors,
mechanisms, and power over resources that managers have, and can misuse,
against their staff subordinates. In fact, in-depth
surveys reveal not only that employee theft soared worldwide during the
1990s, but that workplace theft is costliest when committed by
high-ranking employees. According to the worldwide professional
anti-fraud organization ACFE, the median loss from crimes by managers is
estimated to be $250,000, four times that of employees. Much of
that, of course, as well as the above waste and abuse, comes because of
their positions of authority and broad powers (which have been greatly
expanded by Secretary-General Annan.) "Taking at the office: Thieves get
bolder", International Herald Tribune, 13 July 2000, p.
12, and the Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners, The OIOS
Investigations Section (now a Division) also emphasizes that its staff are
highly trained professionals who investigate allegations of employee
misconduct, abuse of authority, payment of kickbacks, embezzlement of
funds, and waste and mismanagement of UN resources, "with a caseload that
rises every year." The Section also developed an Investigations Sections
Manual, which details its very careful and specific operating
procedures. "United Nations Internal Oversight", p. 14-17 [14], at
Investigations Section Manual, OIOS.
The system thus seems
well formulated, permitting UN staff to exercise their own integrity and
ensure that of others, by
reporting waste and abuse in a protected process, to
highly-qualified professional staff who are responsible for investigating
such matters. Implementation, of course, is another
matter. The Investigations
Sections started very slowly and with very few staff. But it was Mr. Paschke
who distorted its operations from the very beginning, with his
above-stated priority on "working closely with managers" of 1995, rather
than insisting on implementing the General Assembly's 1993 resolution
requiring a firm management accountability system and sanctions for
managers (which thereby properly recognized them as the most risky target
group for fraud, waste, and abuse problems) in the UN Secretariat.
Instead, in 1998 Mr. Paschke reported to the General Assembly that it was
the managers themselves who were deciding, with his support, on who,
whether, when, and how to conduct investigations in their own operations,
including whether to seek criminal prosecutions: "It is
…
my observation that the [Investigations Section] is increasingly seized
with more and more complex investigation matters, many of which are
raised with us by programme managers …
This year
…
major commitments to investigate [criminal cases] were made by the
Governments of Kenya and Switzerland. There is also substantive and
consistent commitment to such cases by the concerned programme managers in
… Geneva and Nairobi. …
These decisions by programme managers to seek criminal
prosecutions, in order to send a message that criminal conduct can
result in criminal prosecution …
represent hard evidence of the realization of the
Secretary-General's determination to increase accountability as part of
his reform programme. " "Report of the Secretary-General on the
activities of the OIOS", A/53/428, 23 September 1998, Preface, p. 5, last para., and para. 121.
Mr. Paschke went on to state that " … the
[Investigations] Section produced 35 reports and communications … [with] findings and
recommendations to programme managers; this represents an average
of one report every 10 calendar days. The trend for programme managers to
seek the assistance of the Section has continued. … The volume of work
and the demand for rapid response has led to … [developing an OIOS consultative function to provide]
advice to programme managers who wish to avail themselves of the Section's
expertise.
Although such a procedure would not be appropriate in all cases,
particularly those which involve the gathering of evidence of
criminal conduct, this
initiative allows … the expertise of the Section to be used even when it is not possible
to provide investigators to conduct inquiries." A total amount of
$0.4 million has been recovered subsequent to
investigations." "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", A/53/428, 23 September 1998, Preface, paras. 124-127.
[emphasis added.] [Note: the enormously heavy Investigation Section
workload, which sometimes requires several years of further investigation
and legal work to finalize cases, did not lead Mr. Paschke to request more
professional investigation resources and increase the measly savings
obtained,
instead of giving managers free rein. Instead, he
decided, after "scrupulous" reflection, to add additional posts to the
Audit and Management Consulting Division. (Preface to the above
report)
In fact, there were indications in 1997 and 1998 that
a lot of hidden investigative and punitive activity was going on deep in
the Secretariat. A staff journal article cited the
disruptive and unexplained investigations (and even summary dismissals)
going on throughout the Secretariat, including very aggressive actions by
the UN security officers. "Abuse of
authority", UN Staff Report (New York), September 1997, p. 6.
In addition, an odd and very cryptic two-page report,
supposedly on actions against staff resulting from findings of the Board
of Auditors, concluded abruptly that "of the 61 cases of possible
misconduct submitted in 1997 to …[OHRM, only] 7 were referred as a result
of an audit/OIOS investigation." This pattern of manager/investigators
investigating (and punishing staff) is discussed in more detail in the
following subsection entitled Behind the Scenes under Where is the Rule of Law? ,
since it has gained tremendous momentum during the late 1990s and
since.
"Actions taken
against staff resulting from findings of malpractice discovered by the
Board of Auditors", UN document A/52/864 of 2
April 1998.
In his required 1998 report on human resources
management reform the Secretary-General reported further developments. As
part of his "vision … for change comprising objectives to be obtained over
the next three to five years [i.e., by 2001-2003]," he only briefly
mentioned accountability as integral to "an organizational culture of
empowerment." He then apparently ignored the OIOS and the Board of
Auditors, and stated that: “staff members at all levels in [a culture of ...
accountability] must be held accountable for delivering assigned outputs
on a timely and cost-effective basis in accordance with prescribed
organizational mandates and predetermined standards of quality, and for
upholding the values and principles of the Organization. The prime responsibility for taking action to remedy
accidental and intentional performance failures will lie with supervisors
and managers at all levels.
Technical and advisory assistance, training and
support will be
provided by the Department of Management and oversight
bodies.”. … In addition
the Department of Management is considering the setting up of transparent
accountability mechanisms and will
define the policy framework within which the line managers and staff
are to exercise their responsibilities."
"Human resources management reform: Report of
the Secretary-General",
UN document A/53/414 of 13 October
1998, paras. 6-8. [emphasis
added]
These actions by OIOS
and the Secretary-General to turn over investigations of waste, fraud,
abuse and misconduct to the very UN managers who are the most likely to
commit these violations, instead of strengthening the small, professional
Investigations Unit, seems to IO Watch to be terribly wrong. As the
excellent OECD guidance on public sector accountability makes clear, it is
external institutions [and in the UN instance the OIOS itself is not
really external] that should properly investigate and prosecute public
service malfeasance.
"Taking action against wrongdoing "Taking action against violation of standards is the
shared responsibility of managers and external investigative
bodies. OECD countries recognize that
disciplinary actions against a breach of public service standards should
be taken within the organization where the breach occurred. All
governments have developed a general framework for disciplinary procedures
that both allows managers to impose timely and just sanctions and
guarantees a fair process for the public servants. … Although public service managers have the primary responsibility for initiating disciplinary measures in their agencies in a timely manner, they may also receive assistance from specific external institutions. These external institutions are the primary instruments for investigating and prosecuting misconduct in the public service. These bodies have the power to bring suspected cases of corruption directly to court in all OECD countries. Moreover, two-thirds of countries have procedures and mechanisms to enable the public to signal wrongdoing to bodies exercising independent scrutiny on public service activities." "Annex I: OECD public management policy brief on building public trust: Ethics measures in OECD countries," in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Public sector transparency and accountability: Making it happen, OECD, Paris, 2002, p. 192. [emphasis added]
The General Assembly, if no one else, seemed
disturbed by Mr. Paschke's relaxed and very collegial attitude. Based
on
forceful reporting on fraud problems by the Board of Auditors (ie.,
the external
auditors) in 1997, it stated that: "The General
Assembly, … Expressing deep concern about the persistence of
problems and defects observed by the Board of Auditors in the financial
administration and management of the United Nations; … 11. Notes with deep concern the incidents of fraud
and presumed fraud reported by the Board of Auditors; 12. Requests the Secretary-General and the executive
heads … to take the disciplinary actions necessary in cases of proven
fraud and to enhance the individual accountability of United Nations
personnel, including through stronger managerial control; … "Financial reports and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors," General Assembly resolution 51/225 of 16 May 1997.
The General Assembly
remained skeptical in its resolution on the Secretary-General's 1998
reports.
It repeated its insistence from resolution 51/226 of April 1997 on
ensuring, "before delegating … authority, that well-designed mechanisms of
accountability … are put in place." It stated further that it "IV. Delegation of authority and
accountability … 3.
Also notes that no
comprehensive system of accountability and responsibility has been
established; …
10. Reiterates its
request to the Secretary-General [see para. II.2 of resolution 51/226] to
enhance managerial accountability with respect to human resources
management decisions, including imposing sanctions in case of demonstrated
mismanagement of staff and willful neglect of or disregard for established
roles and procedures, while safeguarding the right of due process of all
staff members, including managers." "Human resources
management," General Assembly resolution 53/221 of 23 April 1999. [emphasis added]
In early 2000 the Secretary-General presented a
report requested specifically by the General Assembly, on "procedures for
determining gross negligence" and "preventive measures to identify the
risk factors that expose the Organizations to management
irregularities". He concluded that: "
… the Secretary-General is in
the process of establishing procedures to [allow preliminary
investigation of allegations of 'gross negligence' by] heads of
departments/offices or [the OIOS], [followed up where
necessary] …
under revised Joint Disciplinary Committee procedures … [a]s part of his programme
for management reform … measures to to establish a more effective
accountability system … The
Secretary-General believes that a comprehensive approach to
accountability, backed up by all these measures, will
contribute significantly to detecting and preventing management
irregularities." "Follow-up report
on management irregularities causing financial losses to the Organization:
Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/54/793 of 13 March 2000, para. 25. [emphasis added]
The body of the report went into more detail. He stated
that in preliminary investigations, and in later stages: "Given the possible
seriousness of the consequences for staff members, where there is an
allegation of "gross negligence" …a preliminary investigation would be
appropriate. … Since heads of departments/offices have been
conducting preliminary investigations in connection with allegations of
misconduct, they are familiar with the methods of conducting such
investigations … and investigations of allegations of gross negligence by
managers should be conducted by them as well. Since [this]
requires legal guidance, [it] should be made available by [OHRM] and the
Office of Legal Affairs if necessary …. [or] a request may also be made to
the [OIOS] to conduct a preliminary investigation. After the
preliminary investigation is completed, the heads of departments/offices would report
to the Secretary-General as to whether the allegation appears to be
substantiated … Based on the
recommendations … the Secretary-General will consider appropriate action
…: … Allegation not
substantiated … no further action is required. The case would therefore be
closed. … Gross negligence
… the Secretary-General will decide on the most
appropriate course of action, which may include referring the case to the Joint
Disciplinary Committee for a recommendation. In this
regard, the mandate of the JDC should be expanded; … and an
experienced legal officer will [help] the expanded [JDC] to guide the
members in the proceedings." Follow-up report on management irregularities causing financial losses to the Organization," UN document A/54/793 of 13 March 2000., paras. 25, 12-14. [emphasis added.] [Note: an Annex to this report, inter alia, cited a staff regulation (1.2 (r)) sternly requiring staff to cooperate fully with all such investigations by all "authorized" staff members and other UN officials.]
The situation of aggressive investigations by (almost never of) department heads
or their programme managers (see further below) -- and the decision that
they could conduct and make decisions on these quite sensitive, serious,
and sophisticated investigation processes within the UN Secretariat
independently, fairly, and essentially by themselves -- is the old
"diplomats can do anything" approach to UN management. In this case,
however,the dissonance is extreme: it is akin to the idea of airline
"frequent flyers" who assert that they can step into the cockpit and land
a jumbo jet by themselves. Meanwhile, the UN staff are the uneasy victims
sitting nervously back in the coach section. In October 2000 further light was shed on this
shocking unleashing of potentially malevolent managers as amateur
detectives investigating their UN staffs and preparing possible criminal
charges against them. The General Assembly, sensing troubles
in OIOS investigation operations (see the very next subsection on Disappearing
whistle-blowers ) requested a report on the OIOS
rules and procedures for investigations. "Review of the
implementation of General Assembly resolution 48/218 B", General
Assembly resolution 54/244 of 31 January
2000.
The resulting OIOS report essentially restated its
processes as originally laid out in 1994: its role, staff rights and
obligations, confidentiality, and proper investigative processes. With regard
to its work, however, it emphasized in the introduction that: "The work … is
necessarily grounded in the collection of evidence, with due regard for
the rights of alll concerned. The Section, which is not a law office,
conducts investigations within the terms of its mandate. An
investigation, which is a legal, analytical process, is an inquiry
undertaken by specialized professionals to determine whether a wrongful or
illegal act has occurred and,
if so, the person or persons responsible. The findings are based on evidence
which is in a form and of a sufficiency to present to a tribunal or other
decision maker.
… The
investigators are specially selected, highly skilled
professionals from diverse backgrounds, with
one half possessing law degrees and all … having received additional
training on the proper way to conduct inquiries." "Rules and procedures to be
applied for the investigation functions performed by the OIOS
… : Report of
the Secretary-General", A/55/469 of 11 October
2000,
paras. 1-3.
The OIOS report went on to note the important
limitations on OIOS work, namely that " The Section is a recommendatory body only
and cannot take direct action to bring a case before national law
enforcement authorities, institute disciplinary proceedings or take
administrative measures (e.g., issue a reprimand.) After a
preliminary investigation, the programme manager
[reviews and responds] to OIOS … and consultations may
follow.
If the programme manager agrees with a disciplinary recommendation,
[he] forwards that recommendation to OHRM. … If he does not agree …. there may be
further consultations with OIOS. If there is no agreement the matter
[may go to] the Secretary-General for resolution …" "Rules and procedures to be
applied for the investigation functions performed by the OIOS
… : Report of
the Secretary-General", A/55/469 of 11 October
2000,
paras. 20. [emphasis
added.] [Note: others
are clearly involved, but as in all such processes, he who picks and
defines the charge or issue, sets the parameters for the work, and
formulates the basic decision usually is in control of the entire
process.]
Most importantly, however, the OIOS noted in a very
discrete
but revealing footnote on its summary page that: "
… As is the obligation of
all the offices in the UN which are charged with responsibility for
conducting any investigative activity, whether ongoing or ad hoc *, the
Investigations Section operates in conformity with established United
Nations regulations, rules and administrative instructions.
* For
example, investigations
are conducted by, among others, programme managers, by boards of
inquiry … by joint disciplinary committees, none
of which have published their own formal procedures, although they, too operate
within … the [UN regulations and rules." "Rules and procedures to be
applied for the investigation functions performed by the OIOS
… : Report of
the Secretary-General", A/55/469 of 11 October
2000,
"Summary," and "Revised
disciplinary measures and procedures", ST/AI/371 of 1 August 1991. [Note: to
recapitulate, although the investigations are very serious and sensitive,
there are no relevant UN rules and procedures for
this amateur investigative work other than in OIOS, except for a vague
administrative instruction formulated in 1991, well before the new
professional (OIOS) investigation procedures and responsibilities were
established.
The report added one more very interesting detail,
relating to the vague question of who the UN "programme managers" are and
how many exist.
In a section on preventive measures, it stated that mandatory
management development programmes have: "now been attended
by some 95 percent of all staff at the D-1 and D-2 levels, as well as a
majority of staff at the P-4 and P-5 levels who have supervisory or
managerial responsibilities." Follow-up report on management irregularities causing financial losses to the Organization," UN document A/54/793 of 13 March 2000., para. 24. [emphasis added.]
According to the most recent report on UN staffing,
the Secretariat has at least 40 senior officials above the Director-level,
and 383 at the Director level, i.e., about 423 "senior officials" at the
senior and policy-making levels. They and others lead the 36 UN
departments, ranging in size from 10 to 1,308 staff members (the biggest
being the Department of Management, despite all the recent delegation of
authority to managers.) "Composition of the
Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/58/666 of 9 December 2003, pp. 12-13, Tzble A.9 and Table
2, and pp. 20, 23.
There are also 759 staff at the P-5 (senior
professional level), and 1,423 at the P - 4 professional level. Assuming that
all the top and Director staff are "managers", and half the of P -5's as
well (and ignoring the many P-4's, to be very conservative), it appears
that the UN has more than 800 "program managers," who are eligible to
become manager/investigators if they so wish. That many of
them seem to do so is indicated by statistics reported in 2004, as cited
at the end of this subsection and then discussed as the first item
under Other Major Problems in the
concluding Recent Developments
section. "Composition of the
Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/58/666 of 9 December 2003, pp. 21, 68, 74.
Two other aspects of the manager/investigator
phenomenon must be noted. First, although OIOS recommended some
22 staff cases for criminal prosecution by national law enforcement
authorities in the "banner year" of OIOS crime-fighting in 2000, and
others before and since, it is not clear who these individuals were. It seems in
fact that all or almost all of them were UN "small fry", who were nabbed
while the big ones got away. This supposition is derived from much
evidence already discussed, but especially in examining the investigations
process.
As Mr. Paschke said in his "farewell" annual report in
1999: "The apprehensions
and fear, the misgivings and misperceptions about the [OIOS] were strong
and stubborn in the beginning. I had to wage a confidence-building
campaign early on to convey to our various constituents … that this Office
intended to be a partner rather than an adversary of management, proactive
rather than detective … I believe that in the meantime my basic message
about the OIOS has sunk in. … more and more managers perceive our
oversight activities as an opportunity to reflect about their own methods
of work or as a
certification of sorts for their performance." "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document A/54/393, 1999, "Preface", para. 5.
[emphasis added.] [Note: As always,
Mr. Paschke focused on the UN managers, with no mention whatsoever of the
staff.]
The most recent OIOS and other annual reports,
however, do provide at least a few choice examples of UN senior officials
who got into trouble (mostly, it seems, because the news media pressed the
issue and forced some kind of action, but with very modest sanctions
eventually applied if any): -- The 2000 OIOS annual report discussed an
inspection, an investigation, an audit, and three field audits made of the
UN top crime-fighter's office in Vienna. Despite serious problems,
including 145 audit recommendations, almost half of which were classified
as being "critical," and two detailed overall reports (only one made
public), Secretary-General Annan decided that the incumbent could stay on
the job for another year until his appointment ran out -- his "sanction",
apparently, was not getting reappointed (see Top corruption-fighter
corrupted under Other Major Problems ; -- The 2003 OIOS annual report discussed an
enterprising former representative of the Secretary-General and his
secretary who engaged in serious acts of misconduct. They set up
an unauthorized and informal "trust fund" and received at least $500,000
from donor countries, and apparently also falsified some $380,000 worth of
allowance claims for 26 staff. OHRM decided that there would be no
recovery on the allowances and the matter continued to be "under review"
pending disciplinary proceedings at the representative's parent
organization. -- An ACABQ report in 2000 noted that the UNAT had
made certain very large damage awards to staff during 1999 and invited the
Secretary_General to consider recovering these sums from the managers
involved.
However, in both cases, the officials concerned had retired or left
UN service and the Secretariat smoothly concluded that "therefore the
issue of recovery does not arise." "Report of the
OIOS", UN document A/55/436, 2000, paras.
80-89, "Report of the
OIOS", UN document A/55/436, 2003, paras.
40-41, and "Administration of justice in the United Nations: Report of the [ACABQ]", UN document A/55/514 of 23 October 2000., p. 10.
Additionally, not content with all the management
participation in investigations work, Mr. Nair's OIOS has worked to
involve UN security officers as well. A 1998 OIOS audit of the UN Security
and Safety Service had shown inadequate staffing and funding for this $25
million programme, and the need to improve the quality of officers hired
and security enforcement over the next three to five years. Security
officers had also been accused of improper and heavy-handed interventions
in investigations in New York. Nevertheless, the OIOS has since
launched a very active campaign to enhance investigative capacities by
training security officers to handle "less complex" investigations at
various UN duty stations.
"Report of the Secretary-General on the
activities of the OIOS", UN document
A/53/428, 1998, para. 95,
"Abuse of authority", UN
Staff Report (New York), September 1997,
p. 6
"Report of the OIOS", UN document A/53/428, 2001, para. 219, "United Nations Internal Oversight", p. 16, at www.un.org/Depts/oios/ and "Report of the OIOS", UN document A/58/364, 2003, para. 138.
Most importantly, however, the rest of the UN has
been gradually waking up to the bizarre manager/investigators process
created by OIOS and the Secretary-General. In August 2001 a JIU report on
strengthening investigation work in the UN system recommended that
managers involved in investigations should be trained for this task. The
CEB admitted in March 2002 that this was indeed a "common inter-agency
concern" in the UN system. And in January 2003 a General Assembly
resolution noted the issue and requested at least that: " … the
Secretary-General … ensure that United Nations programme managers
implicated in incidents, crimes or irregularities leading to
investigations are not involved, in any way, in conducting those
investigations; [and that] the
Secretary-General review the practice of involving United Nations
programme managers in investigative processes so as to ensure their
independence in administrative and managerial functions and to establish
proper guidelines … and to report thereon … " "Report of the
[JIU] on strengthening the investigations function in United Nations
system organizations: Note by the Secretary-General, Joint Inspection
Unit, UN document A/56/282 of 9 August
2001, Recommendation 2, "Addendum",
[comments of the CEB], UN Document A/56/282/Add. 1, of 19 March 2002, and
"Programme planning," General Assembly resolution 57/282 of 19 January 2003, Section IV. [Note: in its resolution on "Programme planning," 58/268 of 4 March 2004, the General Assembly decided to consider the report of the Secretary-General on "the practice of involving United Nations programme managers in investigative processes" at its resumed 58th session.
To summarize "the story so far", IO
Watch has found that the General Assembly's 1993 insistence on a
transparent accountability system for programme managers has been turned
on its head.
UN managers, who have little if any legal training and are bound by
no specific procedures, can now act very recklessly to enforce
accountability on others, i.e. the "free the managers to manage" theme has
now been unleashed in its fullest form. The UN managers can now initiate,
design, and conduct "investigations" themselves, and then decide on what
to do with the results, although they clearly lack the professional
investigative skills, independence, and objectivity required for this very
sensitive work. IO Watch concludes that this situation presents grave
hazards for UN corruption- fighting, which was already a dubious
process.
The key element of the new OIOS was its investigation
capacity, but for a decade now OIOS has made UN investigation and
anti-corruption efforts a mysterious, expert "cult process", a "black box"
hidden away from public view, with weak staffing and performance reporting
using ad hoc stories of fraud and abuse, but
no systematic approach, as evidenced in its annual reports to the General
Assembly.
Instead of the critical investigation work that only
the OIOS can properly do, the OIOS spreads its limited resources far too
generously over management consulting, partnerships, oversight services to
other UN programmes, and integrity initiatives, while giving away "lesser"
investigation work to amateur managers and security staff, all instead of
dealing decisively with the very serious problems of UN waste, fraud and
abuse in its worldwide programmes. The doubts about OIOS performance are
underscored by its weak reporting, its apparently highly-selective
criminal case record, and the feeble cost savings obtained from
its investigation (and indeed its entire) work (see Internal Oversight: The
OIOS in the section on Inadequate UN Oversight .
2004 has brought some very important new developments
in this situation, and may indicate that concern with the dubious UN
internal investigative processes might finally be coming to a head,
although the Secretariat impedes the process with
determiination:
-- the requested OIOS report on programme managers' involvement in investigations was issued in February 2004. It | |||
