

DISAPPEARING WHISTLE-BLOWERS II

Other troubling events suggest that the OIOS was (and still is) dragging its feet on hotline and whistle-blower processes, just as the Secretariat did with the overall management accountability reforms. For example, OIOS decisions to quickly dismiss staff reports on wrongdoing may be understandable for "crank" or poorly documented complaints, but the proportion of reports that OIOS rejected for these reasons seems quite high (even though its annual reporting is too vague to determine this precisely).

It must also be recognized that all documentation on UN whistle-blowing activity is locked away in OIOS files to "protect" staff, a legitimate process but also one that forever removes the cases from any scrutiny of how they were handled -- or ignored -- by OIOS officials, whose public reporting of investigation results and patterns achieved within its mysterious "black box" has already been noted as being quite non-transparent.

In his own whistle-blower confrontation, Mr. Paschke angrily and flatly refused to respond to serious anonymous charges made about his decisions in staffing his Office, while threatening whichever OIOS staff had made them. Yet in an appearance before the Fifth Committee just months before, and under some pressure concerning his relationship with staff and commitment to investigations matters, he responded, again testily, to a delegate's questions that:

" ... I categorically reject the suggestion that I would in any way discriminate against a staff member who reports problems or uncovers fraud."

"Statement to the Fifth Committee by Karl Th. Paschke, [USG for OIOS],"
December 2, 1996, and

"Dear colleagues" letter from Mr. Paschke of **31 March 1997**.

[Note: UN staff members who had been or were being "sold out" by Mr. Paschke even as he made the very public December statement were not impressed.]

The UN staff grapevine, as already noted, contains many stories of failed reporting to OIOS, or information fed back to bosses on "someone" making allegations about problems in their unit, with quite unpleasant results. And a 1995 book on the "real

UN" observed sagely that

"Introduction: A good idea fallen among thieves

The UN has the media relations of a 1950s state bureaucracy. It doesn't like reporters looking into its inner workings, and it threatens dire penalties to staff found leaking information to the media.

Time and time again, when journalists have exposed scandals in the UN, senior officials set up an enquiry -- into who leaked!"

Ian Williams, The UN for beginners, Writers and Readers Publishing, New York, 1995, p. 1.

A careful reading of the OIOS annual reports also indicates a persistent bias toward managers, particularly in the steadily-repeated desires to work closely and supportively with them, but also in an eagerness to assuage any managerial fears. The Preface to Mr. Paschke's 1999 OIOS annual report stated that there had been "misapprehension and fear" about OIOS, and emphasized again his desire to be a partner rather than an adversary of management.

In that final 1999 report Mr. Paschke then gave a rather detailed account of a manager whom OIOS cleared of the accusations made, concluding that staff (read "managers") should realize the "valuable" OIOS investigations function of clearing those individuals who have been wrongly accused.

"One [OIOS investigation of field operations] concerned a report alleging that ... from 1992 to 1998, two UNHCR staff members accepted kickbacks from vendors in exchange for the disbursement of inflated payments and the procurement of excessive quantities of rice seeds ... and [that] ... a false United Nations audit report [thereon] ... had been circulated to a local newspaper. [OIOS determined] that the investigation ... did not substantiate the allegation of the acceptance of kickbacks, ... [and] the staff members accused [were cleared.] On the other hand, [OIOS established that] a purported United Nations document was false and that it had been circulated to a newspaper by a former UNHCR staff member *male fide*.

The Investigations Section considers that [such a case] highlights a function of the Section that is valuable, but often overlooked. Through its recommendation to clear staff members, the Investigations Section affords protection to those individuals who have been either wrongly accused or against whom sufficient evidence does not exist."

"Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services" A/54/393 of **23 September 1999**, paras. 56-57.

[Note: the concern for managers' rights expressed here is impressive, but in this case the other party was a UN auditor, who was fired. There appears never to have been a corresponding OIOS declaration of an instance in which it upheld a whistleblower, and sanctioned the manager involved.]

However, despite the many doubts expressed about OIOS investigatory zeal, Secretary-General Annan made only very soothing general comments on, and no real analysis of, the first few OIOS annual reports to the General Assembly. In introducing his transmittal letter for the 1998 OIOS report, he stated that

OIOS reports were an "extremely valuable" source of reference and guidance" on UN reform and that he would "continue to support ... full and timely implementation by programme managers" of OIOS recommendations. And, as Mr. Paschke finished his five-year term, Mr. Annan provided a very strong integrity testimonial for Mr. Paschke in 1999, stating that he:

"concur with the observations of [Mr. Paschke] that the independence of the Office has never been compromised during his tenure. He has enjoyed the complete support of the Secretary-General."

"Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services: Note by the Secretary-General", UN document A/53/428 of **23 September 1998**, transmittal note and Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services: Note by the Secretary-General", UN document A/54/393 of **23 September 1999**, transmittal note.

A very pointed draft General Assembly assessment resolution on the OIOS in 1998 had "encouraged" the Secretary-General to act to ensure that UN auditors and investigators involved in uncovering corruption matters are protected from reprisals, and that any complaints by such auditors are promptly investigated.

However, in 2000, after a year of consultations, the General Assembly passed a final resolution, containing its required "evaluation" of OIOS work after its first five years of operation. [It is scheduled to make, or at least begin, another such "evaluation" in 2004.] The Assembly stressed, concerning investigations, that the Secretary-General should provide procedures to protect individual rights of staff, including whistle-blowers, and called on him to submit a report to the Assembly on OIOS procedures to ensure fairness and avoid possible abuse in the investigation process. This had already been done in detail by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, and the OIOS during the 1994-1997 period, but at least the request suggested Assembly awareness that something was seriously wrong with UN investigation work.

"Review of the implementation of General Assembly 48/218 B," General Assembly resolution 54/244 of **31 January 2000**.

[The resulting report was "Rules and procedures to be applied for the investigation functions performed by the Office of Internal Oversight Services," UN document A/55/469 of **11 October 2000**. It merely reiterated the existing OIOS protective procedures, but did help open a whole "can of worms" about bizarre new Secretariat investigations, as discussed in the preceding subsection on Unleashed managers/investigators.]

Although the 2000 OIOS annual report cited the most vigorous investigation work and processing of criminal cases ever provided, the 2001 report was suddenly much more discrete. In 2002 the OIOS annual report did not include a separate commentary

on the Investigations Section. Indeed, although some "crowd-pleasing" investigation results were featured prominently in the preface, the word "investigations" was nowhere to be found in the report's table of contents.

"Report of the OIOS", UN document A/55/436 of **2 October 2000**,

"Report of the OIOS", UN document A/56/381 of **19 September 2001**,

and "Report of the OIOS", UN document A/57/451 of **4 October 2002**.

The 2003 OIOS annual report provided more stories of "hot cases," but only one item on investigation work, "Rationalizing the services of investigations and prioritization of cases." It was not very reassuring, since it stated that the [newly upgraded] Investigations Division had received some 630 "new matters" to be investigated, and had a standing backlog of some 200 items. It assured readers that it evaluated them all carefully.

"Report of the OIOS", UN document A/58/364 of **11 September 2003**, paras. 136-139.

Sadly, after a decade of OIOS investigative activity, IO Watch's research has been able to find only one example of a successful whistle-blower (even though she was fired.) How did she succeed? Because she was employed by a UN contractor, not the UN. Thus she could sue in a court of law like anyone else, and avoid the clutches of the feckless UN internal justice system.

"A British tribunal has ruled that a former member of the UN police force in Bosnia was unfairly fired after she reported to her superiors that colleagues in the police force used women and children as sex slaves in connivance with Balkan traffickers. ...

... the whistle blower, Kathryn Bolkovac, an American citizen ... charged that she was fired in 2000 for sending e-mails to her employer, DynCorp, [charging links with] ... prostitution rings.

... the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina said the mission was not commenting because it was not a party to the British legal action. ...

Kofi Annan, the secretary-general of the UN, has said that there would be zero tolerance for such acts.

Bolkovac said she was delighted with the tribunal's findings because it would help her gain more international exposure for the problem posed by corrupt peacekeepers."

Barry James, "Whistleblower upheld in UN Bosnia police case: Firing of former officer unfair, court rules," International Herald Tribune, **August 8, 2002**.

With this one lone "victor" in mind, **SIX VERY IMPORTANT POINTS** should be cited about the importance of the disappearing UN whistle-blowers for UN corruption-fighting, integrity, and management accountability, and the strong need to reverse this situation.

FIRST, whistle-blowers present a direct and real integrity

issue for daily life and for UN staff responsibility at all levels, which has become lost in all the hubbub of the UN Integrity Initiative and the new UN Anti-Corruption Convention. The OIOS Investigations Manual, and an excellent book on integrity, summarize just what a whistle-blower is:

"As a general definition, a 'whistle blower' is a staff member who refused to engage in and/or reports illegal or wrongful activities of his/her employer or fellow staff member; ...

More precisely, a 'whistle blower' in the UN is a UN staff member who renders information to the [Investigations Section] on misconduct, mismanagement, waste of resources and/or abuse of authority ... within the UN, reflecting sincerity and honesty and thus revealing his/her good faith in the allegations he/she makes ..."

"Investigation section manual", Operating Procedure M, "Definition and handling of whistle blower complaints/Issues of retaliation," p. 20, OIOS, New York.

"Integrity is like the weather: everybody talks about it but nobody knows what to do about it. Integrity is that stuff we always say we want more of.

When I refer to integrity, I have something very simple and very specific in mind. Integrity ... requires three steps:

- (1) *discerning* what is right and what is wrong;
- (2) *acting* on what you have discerned, even at personal cost; and
- (3) *saying openly* that you are acting on your understanding of right from

wrong. ... A person of integrity lurks somewhere inside each of us: a person we feel we can trust to do right, to play by the rules, to keep commitments.

Indeed, one reason to focus on integrity as perhaps the first among the virtues that make for good character is that it is in some sense prior to everything else: the rest of what we think matters very little if we lack essential integrity, the courage of our convictions, the willingness to act and speak in behalf of what we know to be right."

Stephen L. Carter, *Integrity*, 1996, Basic Books, New York, pp. 6-7.

[Note: Mr. Carter is the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law at Yale University, and the author of several critically-acclaimed books on related topics.]

In the day-to-day operating world of the UN -- not the rhetorical one -- it appears that the Secretariat has confirmed its initial warning in October 1992 that it would have difficulty operating a proper whistle-blower programme. However, a new UN-wide staff survey, released in June 2004, suggests that UN staff recognize this shameful performance. The staff responses criticized the way that the "ingrown" UN leadership handles reporting of corruption:

"A new survey [as part of a UN campaign against global corruption] of internal perceptions of integrity of [UN] officials shows that while structures for reporting and corruption exist, most staff members are either unaware of how to use them or afraid to do so for fear of high-level retaliation.

'The UN has a 'phone book' of rules and regulations which are totally useless as they are never practiced', a staff member is quoted as saying in the report.

'Senior leaders caught in serious breaches of ethics should be punished, not

promoted as usual.' another says. ...

'Get rid of the old boy network,' one staff member is quoted as saying. 'That network is wide, tenacious and powerful. It is the ruin of UN officers. So long as you can wind your way into that network, you are OK. If not, you are doomed. Opposing the network is certainly the end of a UN career.'

Warren Hoge, "Report criticizes the way UN fights corruption", International Herald Tribune, **June 16, 2004**.

[Note: Can the more than 6,000 staff worldwide who responded to this survey be wrong about this anti-integrity bias of the UN leadership?]

SECOND, the UN leadership seems to have a grave integrity problem of its own. In 1998, the UN Office of Legal Affairs, led by Under-Secretary-General Hans Corell (who inter alia served as the "chief prosecutor" in the UN internal justice system) chose not to include specific provisions on whistle-blower and other staff rights in investigations in a major revision of the UN Staff Regulations and Rules. This was not an oversight, since a closely-related provision on the obligations of staff to cooperate in internal investigations (including those now made by unqualified managers/investigators and security officers) was included. That provision states that:

"Staff members must respond fully to requests for information ***from staff members and other officials*** of the Organization authorized to investigate possible misuses of fund, waste or abuse."

"Status, basic rights, and duties of United Nations staff members",
ST/SGB/1998/19 of 10 December 1998, pages 23-24, Regulation 1.2 (r).
[emphasis added.]

However, the Secretary-General's Bulletin 1998/19, which contains the code of conduct (i.e., the "phone book" mentioned in the above staff survey) for UN staff, totally omits the closely-related rights of all these staff, and especially whistle-blowers, in investigations, and the stated responsibilities of the Secretary-General to ensure due process safeguards and protection in the investigations process.

These staff rights were clearly spelled out in General Assembly resolution 48/218 B of 1994, which even emphasized their eventual inclusion in the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules, and were then expanded upon further in an official Secretary General's Bulletin:

"[The General Assembly] Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the [OIOS] has procedures in place that provide for direct confidential access of staff members to the Office and for protection against repercussions, for the purpose of suggesting improvements for programme delivery and reporting perceived cases of misconduct;

Also requests the Secretary General to ensure that procedures are also in place that protect individual rights, the anonymity of staff members, due

process for all parties concerned and fairness during any investigations, that falsely accused staff members are fully cleared and that disciplinary and/or jurisdictional proceedings are initiated without undue delay in cases where the Secretary-General considers it justified: **such procedures shall include any necessary amendments to the Staff Regulations and Rules of the United Nations** and, to the extent possible, should take into account the relevant recommendations, approved by the Assembly, of the intergovernmental group established under resolution 48/218 A;"

"Review of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations", General Assembly resolution 48/218 B of **29 July 1994**, paras. 6-7, and "Establishment of the Office of Internal Oversight Services", Secretary-General's Bulletin ST/SGB/273 of 7 September 1994, para. 18.
[emphasis added.]

The new (since 1 January 1999) UN Staff Regulations are quite clear on this point as well. The relevant regulation and its commentary state that:

"Regulation 1.1 (c)

The Secretary-General shall ensure that the rights and duties of staff members as set out in the Charter and the Staff Regulations and Rules and in the relevant resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly are respected.

Commentary

1. Staff regulation 1.1 (c) is new.
2. The regulation codifies an implicit duty that falls on the Secretary-General, that is, to ensure that the rights and duties of staff members are respected."

"Status, basic rights and duties of United Nations staff members", ST/SGB/2002/13 of 1 November 2002. [emphasis added.]

In IO Watch's opinion, such a blatant exclusion of a detailed General Assembly mandate protecting staff while including a provision on rigid "cooperation" obligations (Regulation 1.2 (r)), not only shows disdain toward the Assembly's mandates. It has obviously greatly harmed staff whistleblowers who have been retaliated against over the entire decade since the OIOS was established, but did not have the express staff rule guidance to cite in their favor in appeals within the UN internal justice system.

IO Watch believes that this highly biased and selective revision of the Staff Rules by the UN's top legal official is very damaging, and hardly an expression of senior UN leadership integrity. Various words from the UN's legal mumblings on such matters, such as the possibilities of "gross negligence" and "dereliction of duty" come to mind. However, in this case as in many others, Mr. Corell and some key associates left the organization in 2004, allowing the case once again to be "closed" before it ever opens. Nevertheless, the situation appears to require urgent revision, particularly since the Administration's actions seem also to directly violate the UN Charter provisions

that:

"1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly. ...

3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible."

Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Article 101.

[emphasis added.]

IO Watch certainly hopes that the General Assembly will insist that this matter (and any other staff rights also "overlooked" in preparing the 1998 code of conduct) be corrected. This issue is discussed further in the subsections which follow on the UN Code of Conduct and Revision of the Code of Conduct under Where is the Rule of Law?

THIRD, continuous weak staffing in the OIOS investigations unit has led to a flood (and backlog) of staff reports. The Secretary-General's own pronouncements in 1994 had laid out the conditions for success:

"... [UN staff and managers' capacity and expertise at all levels] must correspond to the responsibility assigned and authority delegated and must be balanced by full accountability through appropriate accountability mechanisms. An efficient organizational oversight machinery will monitor the operation of the system and conduct audits, inspections, evaluations and investigations ... The systematic control of the interrelated processes ... will provide the key to success... and contribute to the Organization's effectiveness and efficiency.

"Establishment of a transparent and effective system of accountability and responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/49/1 of 5 August 1994, paras. 12 and 109. [emphasis added.]

In fact, as discussed throughout IO Watch's analysis of OIOS work, the OIOS has been continually preoccupied with consulting and audit work, aid to other investigation units, working with programme manager/investigators and security officers, and special initiatives for integrity and broader oversight policy-making, rather than increasing the tough business of proper staffing for serious work on a flood of staff reports of wrongdoing. A rare chart in the 2001 OIOS annual report showed that since 1994 OIOS cases received had risen from 95 in 1994-95 to 433 in 2000-2001, and the cumulative backlog (held below 15 cases for the 1994-1997 period) had shot up to 274 by June 2001.

"Report of the OIOS", UN document A/56/381 of 19 September 2001, p. 44

The 2003 OIOS annual report stated that OIOS was

"Rationalizing the services of investigations and prioritization of cases." It was not very reassuring, since it stated that the [newly upgraded] Investigations Division had received some 630 "new matters" to be investigated, and had a standing backlog of some 200 items. It stated (not very convincingly) that a few new posts would be added in peacekeeping and the new UN tribunals, but billions of dollars of expenditure were still flowing by, and the investigators' processing of reports and requests seemed not speeding up at all.

"Report of the OIOS", UN document A/587/364 of **11 September 2003**, p. 44.

IO Watch believes that with such an increasing backlog of incoming cases, the staff whistleblowers putting themselves on the line and the UN as well, if it is indeed seeking to fight corruption, are losing badly. Instead of receiving "careful assessment," IO Watch suspects that many of the reports submitted may go, figuratively or actually, into the wastebasket. Much more investigation staff is needed, not least because of the paltry OIOS cost savings realized relative to the \$6 to \$10 billion that the UN spends every year. Whistleblowers are a critically important, knowledgeable, and "free" resource for fighting fraud, but they are not being used except to provide impressive OIOS statistics of "cases received".

The OIOS annual reports have never provided any analysis of the nature, patterns, success rates, and impact of all these reports that flow to it. What is more, an audit of OIOS processes in 2002 by the Board of Auditors showed that it needed to better document its reviews, and -- in particular -- "define the criteria when reports should be prepared in respect of closed investigation cases." This suggests that one may never see an analysis of OIOS handling of such reports over the years, and also raises the very real issue for UN staff of whether it is worth taking the risk of submitting whistle-blower reports now.

"Report of the OIOS", UN document A/57/451 of **4 October 2002**, p. 8.

FOURTH, in all the OIOS and Secretariat literature which IO Watch has examined of the past decade, there is no mention of the word "whistle-blowing." Mr. Paschke discussed the process in other words, such as reports from staff, in the mid-1990s after he had to reverse his earlier contempt for whistle blowing, but otherwise it is simply a "non-word" in the UN. If whistle-blowing does not even exist as a concept, then the whistleblowers are invisible too, which seems very much the way the Administration wants it. [A similar and closely related phenomenon is that "waste, fraud and abuse" also are almost never mentioned in official UN documents. Particularly when forced to face up to the peccadilloes of its managers, the UN always prefers the more ambiguous, bureaucratic, and mild "management

irregularities".]

FIFTH, the above OIOS report discussions noted the strong OIOS interest in working closely with -- and not frightening -- managers, as indicated by the relatively detailed "story" in the 1999 annual report (already noted, paragraphs 56-57.) In contrast, in all the OIOS reporting, IO Watch could find only one tiny mention of the important area of whistleblower protection. In 1997, pressed for details for details by Member States on retaliation matters, Mr. Paschke's 1997 report responded that:

"The [OIOS] mandate provides specific protection against retaliation for cooperation provided to OIOS. To date, OIOS has found and reported on one case of retaliation; disciplinary action is pending."

"Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the OIOS", UN document A/52/426 of 2 October 1997, para. 111.

In view of well over 2,000 cases received by the OIOS Investigations Division (1,300 from 1994 to 2000, more since, and 630 for the 2002-2003 year alone), it is hard to believe that there was one lone case (that is, a rate of less than one-tenth of one percent) of a whistle-blower being retaliated against (and perhaps there were no sanctions in that one case, either.)

IO Watch believes that the UN record of an entrenched and weak management culture, too many unprepared and abusive managers, lack of good management systems and controls, diplo/inspector generals, and an "old boy" network to be zealously protected have in fact created a rather bloody battlefield of failed whistleblowers, but scarcely a finger lifted by OIOS to deal with the retaliation that many UN staff know exists. This will be discussed further in the following archive subsection on Suppressed whistle-blowers.

SIXTH and finally, there is also a conspicuous silence at the top of the UN about staff involvement in corruption-fighting (or indeed about UN corruption-fighting at all), except for a "leave it to the OIOS" (and the zealous investigating managers) attitude. In the past, the UN has tried on various occasions to have a management improvement programme, or an incentives awards system, or even the old-fashioned suggestion box. This time the stakes of staff expression are much higher for managers than a proposed cost savings idea, and there is only silence.

Two key quotes go to the heart of what is involved here. The first underscores the well-known fact that no organizational reform can succeed unless top leadership provides a clear,

strong, visible, and continuing support and example. The second is a reminder of the blunt underlying reality -- that the UN Secretary-General, despite all the diplomatic and policy-making glamour, is the UN's chief administrative officer, under Article 97 of the UN Charter.

"The United Nations presently is almost totally lacking in effective means to deal with fraud, waste and abuse by staff members [as] ... recently highlighted in ... the news media. ...

... I believe that few of the reports [presently] ... produced will be taken seriously by the auditees until the 'muscle' of your office is placed firmly behind a consolidated effort carried out by a strong Inspector General's office."

Dick Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations", **1 March 1993**, pages 29-31.

[Note: The articles referred to are those by William Branigin, "The UN empire: Polished image, tarnished reality," a four part series, Washington Post, **Sept. 21-24, 1992**.

"The Secretary-General attaches great importance to his fiduciary responsibility vis-à-vis Member States for the prudent management of resources entrusted to the Organization. Care is taken to ensure that these resources are utilized for the purposes for which they were provided, that they are spent with all due regard for economy and that there is accountability at all stages for their use."

"Measures to facilitate reporting by staff members of inappropriate uses of the resources of the organization: : Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/47/510 of **October 8, 1992**, paras. 9-14.

The OIOS investigation function did not really gather momentum until about 1996, the last year of Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's tenure as UN Secretary-General. The eight subsequent years of OIOS operation have been under Secretary-General Annan, but except for his strong testimonial to the virtues of Mr. Paschke in 1999, he has chosen largely only to "note with appreciation" the OIOS annual reports that he passes along to the General Assembly.

Mr. Annan has made many appeals for accountability and integrity in general and in the UN Secretariat. But he seemed never to have spoken out on the need to ensure that the UN's resources are prudently overseen and that the Organization will be firm and proactive in cracking down on fraud. Now, under the dark cloud of a multi-billion dollar loss from the UN-administered oil-for-food programme in Iraq; the June 2004 staff doubts about top-leadership interest in corruption fighting; and not least his fundamental fiduciary responsibility to Member States to use their billions of dollars worth of funds properly, it may finally be time for Mr. Annan and his senior officials to break their silence, and speak up for a real UN anti-fraud campaign.

One small chart in a recent article helps wrap up nicely the value of whistle-blowing and aggressive action against fraud, waste, and abuse in the real world, instead of the UN approach of "see no whistle-blowing, hear no whistle-blowing, allow no whistle-blowing." The article notes that:

"... 'whistle-tooting' is ... gaining credibility in the private sector as a management strategy.

Increasingly, companies are devising formal channels, like reporting help lines, to listen to the knowledgeable in their midst, according to an Erenst & Young study last year on global fraud trends. ...

It's 'like an early warning system', said an adviser with Public Concern at Work, a British charity.

Public concern offers company counseling to better use whistle-blowing as a corporate resource and deterrent. ...

For every [punished whistle-blower] Public Concern insists that there are legions of unsung whistle-blowers who effectively raise their concerns without repercussions for themselves.

Gary Brown ... a former executive at Abbey National in Britain who reported suspicions about kickback schemes ... received a £25,000 reward from Abbey, a series of promotions, and satisfaction that he did the right thing [after a bank executive was convicted of a scheme to defraud the company of more than £2 million.]

'I'm always astounded by how many negative stories are out there about whistle-blowers' Brown said. 'Companies can do a lot to negate that by simply having a policy that provides a friendly set of ears.'

Doreen Carvajal, The workplace: Firms value whistle-blowers," International Herald Tribune, **June 23, 2004**.

The chart accompanying the above article, from the Ernst & Young 2003 survey on global fraud trends, is a very simple one:

"What works

FACTOR	RANK
Internal controls	1
Whistle-blowing	2
Internal audit	3
Management review	4
Accident	5
External audit	6 "

Doreen Carvajal, The workplace: Firms value whistle-blowers," International Herald Tribune, **June 23, 2004**.

Whistle-blowing in fact ranks as the number 2 method to combat company fraud, but for a decade the UN has turned it into a non-process. (Interestingly, the UN more or less controls items 1 and 4 above, and can moderate number 3 or number 5. The only one beyond its control is the lowest ranked one, the work of the

[part time] external auditors.) *It is time to put the powerful whistle-blowing tool to work in the UN Secretariat, to respect and publicly support its central integrity element, and to ensure that those UN staff who do report wrongdoing and waste are protected, not punished.*

IO Watch will return to the problems of (and some promising very recent developments to counter) a soft OIOS, unleashed manager/investigators, and suppressed whistle-blowers with the first and second of the Other Major Problems and the very first of the Answers: A starting point , both under the final archive section of Recent Developments.