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Archive Introduction

Leadership             

Introductory quotes

"For its friends, of which we are two, …. the problem [at the UN's 40th anniversary is] …. that it is not particularly effective in averting conflict or fighting poverty, [nor ready to reverse] …. these trends, let alone its own genteel deterioration. 

[Among other things], the Secretary-General must have the basic authority to manage his own organization; to hire and fire according to the highest professional standards and thereby provide overall tone and leadership to the system.  There must also be a higher caliber of appointments at the top.  There is nothing wrong with political appointments if appointees have a distinguished and relevant career record.  But governments have too often considered comfortable United Nations sinecures a dumping ground for mediocre diplomats.  A board of independent, eminent people should be constituted to establish the desirable qualifications for each senior vacancy as it comes up.  If individual governments still insist on sending poorly qualified time-servers, at least their actions would be recognized for what they are."

Sadruddin Aga Khan and Maurice F. Strong, "Proposals to reform the U.N., 'limping' in its 40th year, New York Times, October 8, 1985.

"Another week, another UN scandal ….

Why are scandals so frequent in [global] institutions …. ?  What ….  makes them so vulnerable to corruption, inefficiency, and  …. personal aggrandisement? ….

The first problem is leadership.  Leaders are selected by an inefficient and labyrinthine process from a pool of poor quality talent. ….

Second, the waste and inefficiency can only be reduced if they are visible to public opinion. …. [but] international institutions [lack] …. accountability ….

The third problem is the weakness of a law-governed culture. ….

 ….  The UN Charter [Article 100] focuses on the Secretary-General and staff as …. international officials accountable only to the Organization.….

Here, rooted in idealism, lie the clues in what can go wrong.  All too often the heads of UN agencies signaled their autonomy through grandeur ….

 …. The agency's task …. became subordinate to old bureaucratic instincts of self-perpetuation and resistance to outside scrutiny. ….

Sir Brian Urquhart has [suggested that] no secretary-general should serve more than one term in office.

Extended throughout the [UN system, this] …. would remove electioneering and diminish the incentive to patronage.  It may not be much, but it would be a start."

"Perri 6 and Michael Sheridan, "A world order of scandal and graft:  What is it about international agencies that invites corruption ….", The Independent (UK), May 11, 1995.

Note, For reference purposes:

Secretary--Generals of the UN

Name                            Nationality         Term of Office        Born                                                                        

Trygve Lie                        Norway              1946-1953           1896

Dag Hammarskjöld           Sweden             1953-1961           1905              

U Thant                           Burma               1961-1971            1909            

Kurt Waldheim                 Austria              1972-1981            1918

Javier Péréz de Cuellar      Peru                 1982-1991            1920

Boutros Boutros-Ghali      Egypt                1992-1996            1922

Kofi A. Annan                  Ghana               1997-                   1938

All, except Mr. Annan, are taken from Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, A world in need of leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations: A fresh appraisal, rev. 2d ed., Dag Hammarskjold Foundation and Ford Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1996, Table 8, p. 93.

Chronological quotes

"During his first year in office, [Secretary-General Dag] Hammarskjöld sought and largely obtained from the General Assembly administrative powers that, invested in the Secretary-General, were at variance with the intentions of the [United Nations] Charter toward the international civil service. (His attempt to modify the authority of the Administrative Tribunal was acceded to only in part, but the standing and importance of that body declined.)  [These] actions were condemned in a searching study, by Claude Julien, of erosion of rights at the United Nations [in 1953] --  a study that may be read with much interest today, when history has exposed the inadequacies of successive Secretaries-General. ….

The renewed insistence on unconditional loyalty to a personality, whose requirements are equated with those of the United Nations, again illustrates the remoteness of the U.N. service from democratic procedures. ….

Conor Cruise O'Brien …. likened the meetings between Hammarskjöld and his senior officers to those 'between a youngish headmaster and a bright sixth form.'  …. The analogy of a school --  still ingenuously invoked on occasion by the organization's spokesmen -- remains pertinent to the pervasive immaturity, the petty ascendancies and tyrannies of Secretariat life."

Hazzard, Shirley, on Hammarskjöld's leadership style in the 1950s, in "Breaking Faith, Part I", The New Yorker, September 25, 1989,  pp. 63-99, [ 86].

Note: Ms. Hazzard worked at the UN for ten years, resigning in 1962 to become a [very successful] full-time writer.  She is also the author of an excellent 1973 book about the UN, cited elsewhere in this archive,  Defeat of an ideal.]                                                   

"An end must be put to everything that seems to make the Secretary-General's post an autocratic one, to everything that tends to make the staff subject to the whims and caprices of their superiors and makes careers  --  and even employment  --  dependent on blind obedience to such absolute power."

chief French Delegate Henri Hoppenot, protesting abuses threatening the creation of a valid international service, during a debate in the U.N. General Assembly in March 1953, as quoted in Hazzard, Shirley, "Breaking faith: I", The New Yorker, October 2, 1989, pp. 74-96,  [86].

"I have been intrigued …. by the question of who is in charge at the UN; who sets the standards and values of the Organization?  Who says what the UN is, what it does, what it cannot do?  ….

Events …. indicate [that there is no] monolithic power structure at the UN.  ….  The Secretary-General …. is constrained by the political clout of his closest collaborators, particularly the Department Heads. ….  further complicated by [growing exercise by the] Fifth Committee and General Assembly of managerial responsibility because [they are unable to ensure] that managers in fact do [their jobs.]  In an environment of shifting power relationships, where it is increasingly difficult to fix responsibility, it is important that staff have a strong voice,  lest it be forgotten by those whose only interest is self-interest.

 …. policy derives from an accretion of small decisions and actions up and down the management line.  ….  There is no thread of coherence running through the whole.  At any given time, a special assistant …. may be as important in establishing values and policies as is … the Secretary-General himself.  Such people define the Organization through our failure to do so, through our acquiescence."  

Lowell Flanders, "The future of the UN …. In whose hands?", address [by the President of the Staff Union] at a preparatory meeting of the United Nations Community Forum,  Secretariat News (NY), April 16, 1979, p. 10.                                                                

" …. guilty [managers] can get away with …. irresponsible performance more readily in the bureaucratic system of the UN than in any foreign office, however small.

When appointees to a post up the hierarchical ladder are voted politically into place by the concerned Member States group, they have a fiefdom bestowed upon them which they value for all its perquisites. …. independence spreads through all their activities as long as they hold office.  Needless to say, in such political appointments, knowledge of the subject field, previous experience and quality of performance in the job are peripheral considerations.  The result is absence of continuity in the work of the unit, questioning of the ability of the incumbents and a continuing decline in the institutional image of the UN organization in international affairs."

Donald Dunham, "Management by personnel action", Secretariat News (New York), November 30, 1984, p. 11.

"I have read [the article] 'Who knew about Waldheim's cover-up' … [mentioning] American and British discussions of ways to stop Mr. Waldheim's appointment as Secretary-General in the early 1970s.

In 1971, the Security Council adopted the resolution proposing Mr. Waldheim by unanimous secret ballot.  The General Assembly appointed him by acclamation.  So …. if the United States and Britain tried to stop Mr. Waldheim's appointment, it was by voting in his favor.

 …. Flora Lewis writes …. that Mr. Waldheim contributed greatly to the deterioration of the United Nations, and many people would agree.  But in 1976 the Security Council recommended to the General Assembly that it reappoint Mr. Waldheim for a second five-year term (again by unanimous secret ballot).  The General Assembly appointed him by acclamation, expressing appreciation for his 'effective and dedicated service.'

There is something more.  In 1971 the General Assembly increased the salary of the secretary-general by unanimous vote [with eight abstentions].  In 1976 a new increase was approved, this time by consensus and without a vote and on an oral proposal by the chairman of the Administrative and Budgetary Committee."

Stefano D'Amico, "Secretary-General Waldheim: Unanimously twice", letter from the International Herald Tribune, May 15, 1986, as quoted in UN Special (Geneva) May, 1986, p. 30.

"The siting of the United Nations headquarters in a city that sometimes perceives luxury and prominence as an index of achievement had encouraged the organization's excesses.  [A town house at No. 3 Sutton Place] … became a permanent official New York residence for the U.N.'s chief officer and his family, and Waldheim was the first occupant [in July 1972].  This well-intended gift conclusively defined the Secretary-General's position as one of wealth and social prominence.  Waldheim's three predecessors had lived at private addresses of their own choosing that provided some association with normal life. The Burmese schoolmaster and diplomat, U Thant, … had largely avoided U.N. festivities, preferring his domestic privacy….  By contrast, in the Waldheim era the Secretary-General's house became the culminating point of the social and material aspirations now associated with the United Nations.  …. the organization's senior officials chose to assume that a show of wealth supported by public funds in no way impaired their claim to speak for the destitute and suffering throughout the world."

Shirley Hazzard, "Breaking Faith: I", The New Yorker, September 25, 1989, pp. 63-99, [89].

"As [Kurt] Waldheim began his decade [as Secretary-General] at the U.N., he had asserted to the General Assembly that the 'unwritten moral responsibility which every Secretary-General bears does not allow him to turn a blind eye when innocent civilian lives are placed in jeopardy on a large scale.'  By 1974, however, Amnesty International had presented innumerable cases, in diverse lands, of official torture and unlawful imprisonment to U.N. humanitarian organs with little response."

Shirley Hazzard, "Breaking Faith: II", The New Yorker, October 2, 1989, pp. 74-96, [75].

"One can … do worse than leave a high post in the UN.  Its ordinary staffers have seen their wages fall hard over the past decade, as the rich countries have withheld funds, in an attempt to impose some austerity.  But the holders of top posts, some of them politically-created sinecures, can still live very well  --  and leave very well.  On his recent retirement one under secretary-general received a $500,000 handshake, a pension of $50,000 a year  -- and a $125,000 contract as a consultant."

"The United Nations agencies: A case for emergency treatment", The Economist, December 2, 1989, pp. 27-28, [30].                                                       

"[Kurt Waldheim] certainly didn't run down the UN single-handedly.  Many contributed to what has been called  its 'organizational arthritis.'  But his legacy was an important factor in the degeneration and mismanagement [that occurred] ….

A recent report by the Stanley Foundation on 'The United Nations: Structure and leadership for a new era,'  bluntly states that if change isn't started now, the chance will be gone for another decade.  Its authors, mostly UN officials and diplomats, said the new leader should be named by October so as to provide an orderly transition period.

That leaves just a few months to establish criteria and winnow candidates.  The first decision must be to jettison the custom of geographical rotation, the idea that it's Africa's turn, in favor of qualifications.  Number one must be managerial competence.

The report recommends …. that a candidate's diplomatic skills are 'important but secondary to management ability.'   …. everything depends on choosing a first-rate, strong-minded leader.

And that depends on the political will of five powers."

Flora Lewis, "A UN chief isn't found overnight", International Herald Tribune,  July 1, 1991.

[Note: Butros Butros-Ghali was chosen as the next Secretary-General: a diplomat, [technically] an African, definitely not a manager, but certainly strong-minded.]

" …. the United Nations [increasingly supervises] elections in Third World countries …. [but] who is scrutinizing electoral practices at the United Nations itself?  There have been far too many allegations recently of the misuse of the powers of incumbency and questions of managerial style during election campaigns at certain U.N. agencies.

The U.N. family has more than 55 organizations …. [and their heads] have mind-boggling powers of patronage. ….

Here are some [reform] suggestions from inside the arena, where this observer has watched the deal making take place.

  --  Public hearings on candidates' qualifications [and action plans] ….

  --  …. Any incumbents or in-house candidates must …. resign some months before the elections to deny them the powers of patronage.

  --  Change the rules of procedure …. [to avoid] sordid deals that are invariably made in later rounds as the process gets protracted.

  --  …. empanel eminent observers, including journalists, to supervise the elections.  The United Nations spends millions to monitor polls [around the world].  Why not invite observers to its own elections and dispense with hypocrisy?

In the absence of an open system, the United Nations and its agencies run the risk of terminally endangering their credibility."

Pranay Gupte, "United Nations shenanigans: Elections  at U.N. agencies are too often tainted by charges of underhandedness.  Reform is needed",  Newsweek International, May 24, 1993, p. 6.

[Note: Mr. Gupte is executive editor of The Earth Times.]

"… In early July, eight members of the U.N. procurement office [were suspended following alleged procurement irregularities in UN peacekeeping operations]  ….

So why did the U.N. hierarchy suspend the eight staff members?  ….

[Colleagues say] … the suspended and humiliated staff have despaired of getting a fair hearing.  [They made many judgment calls about bidder [performance capabilities], but they were  … responsible for [everything needed by] the 14 U.N. peacekeeping operations and their 87,000 personnel … [and]  worked 12 hours a day and weekends [under extreme pressure], which has redoubled their resentment at the shabby treatment they have suffered.

By contrast, the eight's boss …, who signed many of the documents in question, received a similar job he wanted in Geneva, while no action was taken against the senior officials on the contracts committee who are supposed to approve all deals.

A [staff member] explained '… the unique hierarchical structure of the U.N. which leaves all decisions to the underlings.  When everything works, they take the credit.  When it goes wrong, they wash their hands of it.'   

At the U.N., the presumption of innocence ought to be enhanced, if only because all too often the guilty there are promoted, not punished."

Ian Williams, "Free the U.N. eight!  Travelgate on First Ave.", The New York Observer,  September 13, 1993, pp. 1, 10.

[Note: In 1997 the UN Administrative Tribunal completely exonerated the  eight staff members charged , with blunt criticism of the UN's lack of due process and an apparent knuckling under to outside political pressure.  The eight received $20,000 each, but barely an apology, and the investigation and case cost the UN millions of dollars.  Apparently as well, no hint of a reprimand was given to the senior officials who decided to prosecute.

                                "Skylink case closed", UN Staff Report, March 1997, p. 14.]     
                                  

"Morale is so low at the UN that to complain of the leader is to undermine what little strength the organization can still summon to the struggle with overwork and unpaid dues. ….

First, one cannot blame Mr. Butros-Ghali for his failures without blaming the governments that put him there.  He was a well-known figure when elected …. as the sixth UN leader. …. But he had no reputation for organizing; in fact, he was well known to be bad at it.  He had never been a boss and yet here he was, nearing 70, put in charge of a huge bureaucracy in desperate need of reform and good management.

That Mr. Butros-Ghali was chosen was a measure of how little governments cared about who led the United Nations.  By contrast, when Harvard University needed a new president recently, they spent $3 million on a two-year search to find the man they needed.  When such a search party was suggested for the secretary-general, governments insisted this was an in-house job.  There should be nothing so vulgar as a selection board.

Two years on, the UN secretariat is weak, ineffective and suffers from his autocratic management style."

Peter Pringle, "Lost in a world of trouble", The Independent  (UK), January 31, 1994.

"As always, those who can't get … diplomatic influence subtly find other means.  A former  American ambassador to the UN in Geneva told me that the head of WHO, Hiroshi Nakajima, a Japanese doctor with poor English and little French, was selected as director-general after Japanese diplomats bribed a group of African delegates: this story is repeated everywhere in Geneva, denied by WHO itself, and never investigated or proved."

Anne Applebaum, "An anarchy of abounding acronyms", The Spectator (UK), 12 November 1994, pp. 9-11.

[Note: Ms. Applebaum, is also the author of, inter alia, a very well-received new book, Gulag: A history, Doubleday, New York, 2003.] 
                                                                                                                    

"[The UN Charter gives the five Great Powers right of veto over certain matters].  At the very least the veto over the selection of the Secretary-General should be relinquished.  Even small [organizations] carry out organized searches for new executive heads.  …for choosing a new Secretary-General, [however, there is] only a semi-secret asking around in the diplomatic old-boy network that makes the Vatican's procedures for finding a pope seem almost populist.  If this incestuous old-boying were replaced by a proper search in the real world, we might surprise ourselves by finding an eminently qualified woman to be the next secretary-general.  From 1945 to 1994, male-dominated governments have managed to appoint just four women to some 140 vacancies in top UN executive posts."

Erskine Childers, "Midlife crisis", World Press Review, [originally from London Review of Books, August 18, 1994], June 1995, pp. 8-11 [9].

[Note: Mr. Childers was a UN civil servant for 22 years.]

"There is no shortage of blame …. for the diplomatic fiasco that has left the International Monetary Fund leaderless despite months of warning that a crisis was brewing.

Most directly at fault is Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany, who proposed an inadequate candidate for the IMF's top job and then stubbornly refused to consider mounting evidence that his nominee was unacceptable. ….

 …. Accepting that Germany should nominate a candidate …. is not the same thing as agreeing to accept anyone Germany proposes without regard to his suitability for the job. ….

  …. The rest of the world is not impressed by European solidarity in a poor cause, as other countries showed by taking the unprecedented step of putting up rival candidates to challenge Mr. Koch-Weser. ….

 …. The heads of the international organizations should be appointed on merit, regardless of their countries of origin.

It should not be impossible to devise a relatively neutral and transparent selection process to ensure that the best-qualified candidates are found.  All the world's major governments must share some of the blame for having failed to set up such a sorely needed system before."

Reginald Dale, "Lessons of the IMF succession debacle", International Herald Tribune, March 7, 2000.   

"The highest-ranking UN official responsible for refugees plans to retire at the end of the year, and a race is on to find a replacement within the next month or two.

Several candidates seem willing to take the job, even though it is being redefined by an era of civil wars whose combatants have often turned their guns on aid workers.

With more than 30 million people driven from their homes and needing help in Europe, Africa and Asia, the job of the UN high commissioner for refugees has become one of the world's most difficult.

For almost a decade -- through conflicts from Bosnia to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to East Timor --  the job has been held by Sadako Ogata of Japan.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan will choose Mrs. Ogata's replacement after he consults with various governments.  The General Assembly will then consider his choice. 

UN officials and diplomats said Mr. Annan hoped to have a candidate by early October but was still seeking nominees.

Although there is no formal list of candidates, …. half a dozen people are considered serious contenders. …. "

Barbara Crossette, "UN weighs nominees for refugee post", International Herald Tribune, August 14, 2000.                                                

"I'm a Wilsonian internationalist, mugged by reality and hard labor in the cynical international bureaucracy.  What breaks my heart is that I know leaders who can change things. 

…   Who is going to [act], so that the world community can audit and renew not only its objectives but also the mechanisms and institutions by which to manage new global challenges?"

Mike Moore, "Multilateral meltdown", Foreign Policy, March/April 2003, p. 75.

[Note: Mr. Moore was Director General of the World Trade Organization from 1999 to          2002 and is a former Prime Minister of New Zealand.  He is the author of A world without walls: Freedom, development, free trade, and global governance, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK, 2003.]

"All international jobs need to be put in place together  --  like dominos, if you take one out, they all collapse.

International positions are traditionally given to retired or failed politicians who need a job  --  and some who need to be sidelined from national politics, usually because they pose a threat to the incumbent government.

Talent, academic qualifications or professional experience often do not seen to [matter] …

Nations' honor must be satisfied, the international order must be preserved, dominos must be put in place.  Let the haggling begin."

Ilana Bet-El, "Lord Robertson starts the dominos falling", International Herald Tribune, July 16, 2003.

[Note: the UN differs from the European Commission in that it has many more countries to please, and it therefore arranges job battles by regions of the globe, and  because its "battlers", both sponsors and job-seekers, come primarily from diplomatic services, and especially those at the UN, rather than from national ministries.]

"An independent panel [appointed by Secretary-General Annan and led by Martti Ahtisaari, a former president of Finland] said today that the UN's security systems were 'dysfunctional'  …

 Mr. Ahtisaari said, 'Everybody bears responsibility, the Member States, who are asking the UN … [to act] and of course the Secretary-General himself -- the buck stops always with the Secretary-General.'

[The report said] … UN management and staff [failure] to comply with standard security regulations and directives left the UN open and vulnerable …

… [and] failed adequately to analyze and utilize [threat] information  … [performance was] sloppy and non-compliance with security rules commonplace.'

'The main conclusion … is that the current security management system is dysfunctional.  It provides little guarantee of security to UN staff in Iraq or other high-risk environments and needs to be reformed,' the panel said.

The panel labelled as a major deficiency a 'lack of accountability for the decisions and positions taken by UN managers with regard to the security of UN staff.'

'The United Nations', it said, 'needs a new culture of accountability in security management.' …

In his briefing, Mr. Ahtisaari said … "We need a much more professional approach, a professional staff …'"

"Iraqi bombing panel finds UN security systems dysfunctional, in need of reform," UN News Service, 22 October 2003.      [emphasis added]

[Note: Mr. Ahtisaari is a former UN Under- Secretary-General for management and served the UN in the field as well.]
                                                                                                                                                      

"Acting on a damning report of UN security failures in the bombing of its Baghdad headquarters last August, Secretary-General Kofi Annan fired his chief of global security, demoted a second senior official, penalized three staff members and received  --  but did not accept --  the resignation of his own deputy, according to his spokesman.

The deputy secretary general, Louise Frechette of Canada, offered her resignation in response to a letter to her from Annan expressing disappointment over the security lapses, the spokesman, Fred Eckhard, said Monday.  But Annan declined it, deeming the failures 'collective and not the responsibility of any one individual.' …

The report, from an outside panel commissioned by Annan, said UN officials had been 'blinded by the conviction that UN personnel and installations would not become a target of attack, despite the clear warnings to the contrary.'"

Warren Hoge, "UN security chief fired over Iraq bombing", International Herald Tribune,  March 31, 2004.                 [emphasis added]

[Note: See again the article of 22 October 2003 above.]

“The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, has declared that the violence in Iraq could threaten the elections in January and that the March 2003 invasion was in violation of international law.  But as we ask whether Annan’s comments were made out of naïveté or spite, our memory reels off the long list of Annan’s own failures  --  he was the one who refused forces to protect the UN administration in Iraq, making it easy for the perpetrators of last year’s attack on the UN headquarters.  And the fact that, months before the genocide in Rwanda, he ignored evidence of what was about to happen, reminds us of what is happening in Darfur  -- where his Security Council is revealing itself once again to be a regime of self-interests.  Annan is, of course, not personally responsible for all of this.  But his comments do not sound like a genuine  expression of interest in helping the situation.”

“Koti Annan’s comments on Iraq”, Die Welt, Berlin, in “Other views: opinions from around the world”, International Herald Tribune, September 20, 2004.
                                                                                 

Thailand’s foreign minister, Surakiart Sathirathai, a U.S.-educated lawyer with a background in politics, finance, and international economics, has emerged as an early favorite to succeed Kofi Annan as secretary general when his term ends in 2006.

Surakiart, 46, became the front runner after the Association of Southeast Asian Nations endorsed his candidacy in a meeting on the fringes of the General Assembly session.  There is wide agreement at the UN that Asia deserves the choice this time.

“Thai emerges as choice for Annan’s Successor”, United Nations, New York, International Herald Tribune, October 2-3, 2004.             

"Surakiart Sathirathai's résumé alone makes him a contender for the top spot at the United Nations after Kofi Annan's term ends in 2006.  Like the other seven … [secretary-generals], he cut his teeth as a high-level diplomat from a relatively small country, serving as Thailand's foreign minister since 2001. He has the right background in law and international affairs … His personality fits the profile - seemingly innocuous.  Remember, says [a UN veteran] …  'when you're trying to satisfy the desires of so many countries, you end up with the lowest common denominator.'

Most U.N. diplomats agree it's Asia's turn … [Burma's U Thant ended his term in 1971.]  But the rumor mill has yielded up other candidates, including Kishore Mahbubani, Singapore's former ambassador to the United Nations.  Many Eastern Europeans say its actually their turn, and have floated names - perhaps Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski or Assistant Secretary-General Danilo Turk of Slovenia.  … But whoever does … will be forced to deal with corruption charges from the oil-food scandal, low public support, mounting costs from peacekeeping operations and mending the fractures with the United Nations' largest supporter, the United States.  It's a wonder anyone wants it."

Michael Hastings, "The least common candidate", Issues 2005, Newsweek Special Edition, December 2004-February 2005, p. 10.

[Note: The edition's theme is "Leadership," and its first section, on "Leaders to watch in 2005", begins with the statement

"The turmoil of our time raises the stakes for leaders, whether the task is calming China, uniting Europe or clearing up scandals at the United Nations …" (p. 8.)    
                                                              

Useful Sources   
 

(Note: informally assembled by IO Watch, roughly ranked from "most useful" on down, and subject to change as new sources are added) 

Meron, Theodor, Ch. 5, "Erosion of the powers of the Secretary-General: The new barons and national preserves", in  The United Nations Secretariat: The rules and the practice, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath, Lexington, MA and Toronto, 1977, pp. 85-102.   
 

Urquhart, Brian and Childers, Erskine, A world in need of leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations: A fresh appraisal, revised second edition, Dag Hammarskjold Foundation and Ford Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1996.                      

Franck, Thomas M., Ch. 7, "The Secretary-General invents himself," and Ch. 8, "Filling the void: Action by the Secretary-General in the face of inaction by everyone else", in his  Nation against nation: What happened to the U.N. dream and what the U.S. can do about it, Oxford University, New York and Oxford, 1985, pp. 134-160.                   

Péréz de Cuellar, Javier, Ch. 6, "The role of the Secretary-General", in Diehl, Paul F., ed., The politics of global governance: International organizations in an interdependent world, Lynne Rienner, Boulder CO, 1997, pp. 91-101.                  

Gourevich, Philip, "The optimist: Kofi Annan's U.N. has never been more important and more imperiled", The New Yorker, March 3, 2003, pp. 51-73.

Newman, Edward, The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the new era, Palgrave (USA), 2002.                                                            

Pitt, David, Ch. 4., "Power in the UN superbureaucracy: A modern Byzantium?", in Pitt, David and Weiss, Thomas G., eds., The nature of United Nations Bureaucracies, Croon Helm, London & Sydney, 1986, pp. 23-38.                   

Boutros -Ghali, Butros, Unvanquished: A U.S.-UN saga, Random House, New York, 1999.

Barnett, Michael, "UN vanquished", Global Governance, 5(1999), 513-520.      
       

Rivlin, Benjamin, and Gordenker, Leon, eds., The challenging role of the UN Secretary-General: Making "the most impossible job in the world" possible, Praeger, Westport, CN (USA), 1993.                  

Naim, Moisés, "Missing in Monterey: How big egos and small arms can tip the balance in the war on global poverty", Foreign Policy, May/June 2002, pp. 103-104.