|
|||||
UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
|
|
Chronological
quotes "Over 40 years, thinking about the
purposes and justifications of the U.N. has evolved.
. the U.N. was
[originally expected] to be the anchor or a new order of
international law.
. The failure of the U.N. to fulfill this role is so
obvious that everyone now expects the U.N. to ignore wars, invasions, and
acts of terror except in the most selective of cases. Which course is more likely to
deter future international lawlessness: appeal to paper institutions or
self-enforcement?
handling
the problem over to the U.N. is simply a way of tabling it.
.
Camp David shows how utterly
dispensable the U.N. is in its last 'peacekeeping' role. Peacekeeping troops can only
remain in place at the sufferance of both belligerents.
. Belligerents
that want to make war can get rid of the U.N. And belligerents that want to make
peace do not need it. They
can agree on any peacekeeping force they want. Indian troops police northern Sri
Lanka, Syrian troops police Beirut, and a force put together by the United
States polices Sinai. Lebanon
shows that you can have blue helmets without peace. Sinai shows that you can have
peace without blue helmets." Charles Krauthammer, "Let it sink: Why the U.S. should bail out of the U.N.", The New Republic, August 24, 1987, pp. 18-23 [19-20].
"
. With the passing of the cold
war,
. hard cases linger, of which Yugoslavia is currently the most
conspicuous. Now, however,
they are more likely to be brought out into the light of day and assigned
to the United Nations.
. There is visible, too, an
intention to make virtue out of the very process of international
diplomacy.
. Much is said, and in some rapture,
to the effect that finally the United Nations is doing these days what its
high-minded founders had in mind in establishing a body to keep the
international peace.
. Still, in Bosnia the United
Nation's name and prestige adorn a rank political deal. It leaves much Serbian aggression
unreversed and unpunished and much Muslin agony unrequited.
. It is not some abstract
disembodied 'UN' that has brought the organization to this tortured pass.
. It is the collective decisions of the UN membership, especially the top
dogs.
. It will take time to tote up the
costs of using the United Nations as a dumping ground for its members'
political mistakes. What
number of small and not so small nations are going to redouble their
determination not to have to depend on the United Nations for their
ultimate security?" Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Using the United Nations as a dumping ground", International Herald Tribune, March 2, 1993. "The idea behind the [New World
Order] -- an idea never
explicitly formulated, but powerfully present -- was that the United Nations, with
the disappearance of the Soviet veto, had become the chosen instrument of
a global Pax Americana.
. But the United Nations does not
apply anything. It can only
supply blessing to whatever
action its member nations may be prepared to undertake. And the member nations will be
reluctant to risk the lives of their people, in cases where their own
vital interests are not seen to be involved. The New World Order is an
illusion. And it is a dangerous illusion.
. because the world is now
much more dangerous than it was. The best we can do is to
begin to grapple seriously with the two largest of the threats which hang
over us. On the nuclear
front, the most urgent task is to crush the terrorist organizations before
these acquire the means to destroy us. This is mainly a matter for
national governments. If the population explosion is to
be fought at last, the theatre of the United Nations must be used, since
it is largely a matter of mobilizing public information and spreading
information." Conor Cruise O'Brien, "R.I.P. New World Order (1990-1993", Sunday Telegraph (UK), June 13, 1993. [A very prescient observation. The United Nations did "ride to the rescue", but only 11 years later, and even then with only a toothless resolution, see next item and the one of May 2, 2004 following.]
. It is
. hard to believe that
the
. United Nations -- or any imaginable new structure -- will produce
the reliable machinery of judgment, decision and action that so many
people now expect.
. men of goodwill have longed to believe that [in
time] the world as a whole would have what all civilized states now
possess - a legal system to
decide what is right and wrong, an executive to shape the law, a police
force to apply it.
. these things are possible in
civilized states because [their citizens feel a sense of common
identity]. This has not
happened to the world at large.
. the gaps that separate different
segments of humanity are still many, and wide. As long as that is true, there can
be no world rule of law. Is nothing to be done
except when the UN assembles its infrequent
consensus? Of course something has to be done.
But if those who believe in
freedom never fight for other people's right to be free, the world will
never be civilized enough to have a sense of identity
. [and to] ever
have a world government."
Brian Beedham, "The world can't always wait for the UN", International Herald Tribune, July 1, 1993. "
UN officials,
military men, and diplomats sense that the machinery of international
action is not working [to meet the challenge of new peacekeeping roles].
. Therese Gastaut, a
senior [UN public information] official
sums up its task
very well. It is, she says,
the only organization to keep so many issues together 'in a chaotic
harmony.' [Political pressure is transforming
the UN]
from an organization
mainly devoted to arranging conferences into an active body charged with
enforcement, preventive diplomacy, and intervention. This will create as one official
puts it, 'a culture crisis.'
'It seems to me that the identity of the UN, which started as a
means to deal with conflicts between governments, has not been properly
questioned,' argues Sir Brian Urquhart, 'and there is no basic discussion
on the role of the UN.' 'It
is' he says, 'something of a miracle' that the Secretariat functions at
all. Harmonious chaos is
an elegant description of the natural state of things, but it is not
desirable for an organization guiding the world into a new century.
the maintenance of
'chaotic harmony' awaits its transforming genius. Will he, or she, step
forward?" Michael Sheridan, "United
Nations: What's gone wrong? Structural defects: Chaotic harmony or just
chaos?", The Independent, London, 1 November
1993.
"What has happened in Gorazde in
Bosnia was not simply a failure of the international community.
. It was a demonstration that the
international community is a phantom. Even today, were [the Security
Council to agree] on defending the remaining safe havens in Bosnia, they
would inevitably fall into disagreement about how to do it, or
. what to
do afterward.
. [There is] an important body of
international law and inspired international agreement in a great many
technical and regulatory areas of common international
interest.
. liberal internationalism
[assumes] that enlightened people agree on the values that should govern
international society
.
[However,] what makes a better world is a matter of moral
conviction and philosophy of history, on which agreement is limited even
among the democracies.
. The fiasco is apparent to all
. The new world order thus
reveals itself to be the old one in which individual nations pursue their
national well-being, cooperating in areas of clear mutual advantage but
governed on all matters involving risk and sacrifice by national or
domestic political interest alone.
. This is an unpleasant reality to
face, but such is life." William Pfaff, "There is no world community", International
Herald Tribune, April 20, 1994.
"In [eastern Rwanda, I went to
with two Canadian officers]
. to a church, where [many] Tutsis were
slaughtered in 1994
.
[In a parish classroom] At least
fifty mostly decomposed cadavers covered the floor, wadded in clothing,
their belongings strewn about and smashed.
. They were dead. They will be with me forever, I
suspect, which was why I had felt compelled to come look
.
The killers killed all day
and
at night
. went off to eat behind the church, roasting whole stolen cows
in big fires, and then in the morning, still drunk on banana beer
they
went back and killed again.
For [several] days
. they worked like that.
So I had to imagine a lot, even as
I entered the room and stepped carefully between the remains.
. Standing there, I heard a
crunch. The old Canadian
colonel stumbled [and did] not notice that his foot had rolled on a skull
and broken it.
. I felt
. a small but keen anger
at this man. Then I heard
another crunch and felt a vibration underfoot. I had stepped on one, too."
Philip Gourevich, "Among the dead", Harper's Magazine, February 1998, pp. 24-26, from an essay in the Winter issue of Doubletake (US).
[Note: Mr. Gourevich subsequently wrote We wish to inform you that tomorrow we
will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda, Farrar, Straus, &
Giroux, New York, 1998, and Picador, London, 1999, Winner of the Guardian
(UK) First Book Award.]
"For the first decade since the
Cold War's end, the atmosphere in the United Nations Security Council was
decidedly improved
. But then the initial optimism
.
turned sour
. During the past 12 months, it has been particularly
dismaying to watch as the council has been bypassed, defied and abused.
.
. To fix it, two key areas must be
addressed urgently. First, is the veto, which has been
abused by permanent members in defense of their interests, client states
and ideological concerns
. Arms control is the second area.
. The Council is the custodian of
non-proliferation.
. [But its authority] is deeply
challenged when objective cases of treaty violation [such as North Korea
and Iraq]
. end up being judged on a narrow, subjective political basis
by veto-wielding permanent members. [If this becomes] the council's
standard way of dealing with weapons proliferation, it would amount to a
profound and, I suspect, mortal failure. If the permanent members could
make reforms in the area of arms control and veto power, it might help the
Security Council get over its 'annus horribilis" --- as well as serve the interests of
the international community in the 21st century."
Richard Butler, " United Nations: The Security Council isn't performing", International Herald Tribune, August 6, 1999. [Note: Mr. Butler was Australia's permanent representative to the UN, then chairman of the special body charged with disarming Iraq, and is the author of The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Growing Crisis of Global Security, Public Affairs, New York, 2000.] "A long-awaited internal
investigation
[concludes] that the United Nations appeased and
unwittingly abetted the Bosnian Serb military in 1995 as it carried out
the worst mass murder in Europe since World War II.
. The 155-page report
. is a
chilling play-by-play of one
of the UN's darkest episodes.
. The blame for the fall of
Srebrenica was not the UN's alone, according to the report. It says the 15-nation UN Security
Council was the chief architect of a policy that was doomed to fail from
the start. The outgunned,
lightly armed Dutch peacekeepers also come under criticism for failing to
[fight] or to warn of the enormous danger facing the enclave.
. But the report reserves its
harshest criticism for the UN leadership
. The use of force, not diplomacy,
is the only appropriate way to confront a determined aggressor, the report
says, a lesson that was [however] repeated
.. 'In Bosnia and Kosovo, the
international community tried to reach a negotiated settlement with an
unscrupulous and murderous regime' it says. 'In both instances, it required
the use of force to bring a halt to the planned and systematic killing and
expulsion of civilians.'" Colum Lynch, "UN admits it appeased Bosnian Serbs in '95", International Herald Tribune, November 16, 1999. "Secretary-General Kofi Annan has
made an extraordinary apology for the United Nations' failure to prevent
the massacre of nearly 8,000 Bosnian Muslims by local Serbs at Srebrenica
in the summer of 1995. It is
an accusation against the underlying UN policy of 'impartiality and
non-violence', which Mr. Annan calls a 'totally improper philosophy in the
Bosnian conflict.' This is something new, this
re-examination of what has been done, or rather not done, and the
admission of a terrible mistake. The candor is startling in an
international context usually given to self-serving justification,
hypocrisy, and therefore a habit of cynicism, which pervades and
undermines the whole idea of maintaining peace. The familiar excuses are pared
away, and the unwillingness to react to impending tragedy is laid bare.
. The Secretary-General does not
seek to apply the lesson directly to other areas, but he is advancing a
much more robust, active, interventionist kind of peacekeeping than the
United Nations has normally known.
. At the least, if the report does
not bring a change in policy for protecting victims of atrocities, it is a
big breakthrough for simple honesty.
We can hope this is a start." Flora Lewis, "A strong blow to hypocrisy at the
United Nations," International Herald Tribune, November
19, 1999. "It is not easy to admit the truth
of Srebrenica, the Bosnian town where thousands of Muslim men were
executed and hundreds buried alive
But in its report on Monday, the United Nations accepts its share
of the blame.
. The UN Secretary-General, Kofi
Annan, should be commended for this stark admission. The question, however, is whether
his honesty will spur bolder peacekeeping in the future.
.
. In the recent case of East
Timor, the council supported the idea of a UN referendum on independence
but refused to send troops to deter a bloodbath that was widely
predicted. Sometimes the United Nations'
failure is built into its structure.
Where a permanent member of the Security Council opposes
intervention, no action will be authorized -- hence the current UN silence about
war crimes in Chechnya, and its early impotence on Kosovo. But in cases where the Security
Council does approve action, it is fair to insist that it be serious. The UN member states need to
embrace force to secure peace; they need to shove neutrality aside and
denounce evil in order to combat it.
." "The UN apologizes", The Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, November 19, 1999. "American and British officials
have accused the presidents of Liberia and Burkina Faso of taking a
personal role in trading arms for diamonds in violation of a UN arms
embargo. They also said the
two presidents had helped Sierra Leone rebels to continue fighting a
brutal civil war.
. A British diplomat said Monday at
a UN hearing on the role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone war that Mr.
Taylor had personally taken command of rebel forces fighting there against
UN peacekeepers and that he has in recent weeks sent arms to the rebels
and taken smuggled diamonds in payment.
. He also made unusually specific
allegations against President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, saying that
in return for diamonds Mr. Compaore has sent mercenaries from Burkina Faso
to fight with rebels in Sierra Leone against UN peacekeepers
Diplomats from Liberia and Burkina
Faso denied the allegations, demanding that hard evidence be
presented. Monie Captan, Liberia's foreign
minister, categorically denied that Mr. Taylor had been trading arms for
diamonds this year, although he acknowledged that 'in the past' the
president had dealt with the rebels.
. " Blaine Harden, "2 presidents accused of diamond dealing: U.S. and
Britain say Burkina Faso and Liberia are fueling Africa strife",
International Herald Tribune, December 21, 1999.
"A damning report issued Thursday
by an international panel of experts holds both United Nations officials
and leading member countries, primarily the United States, responsible for
failing to prevent or stop the genocide in which hundreds of thousands of
Rwandans were slaughtered in 1994.
. the leader of the investigation,
Ingvar Carlsson, a former Swedish prime minister, said
. it was 'hard to
understand' why the Security Council decimated the peacekeeping force in
Rwanda, reducing it to a few hundred from 2,500 troops when the genocide
began, and then increased the
force to 5,500 when the weeks of massacres were over.
. 'Information
received by a United Nations mission that plans are being made to
exterminate any group of people requires an immediate and determined
response,' the report said.
. The panel found
that a cable from [General Romeo Dallaire of Canada] in January 1994
warning of Hutu plans for massacres of Tutsi was not given to
Secretary-General [Butros Butros-Ghali], whom activists in Europe have
attempted to charge with genocide.
. [That cable] has
become the center of accusations that the United Nations could have
predicted genocide and did nothing.
." Barbara Crossette, "UN
bungled intervention in Rwanda, inquiry says", International Herald Tribune, December 17 , 1999. "[The] release by
the United Nations of results of an internal investigation of its July
1995 conduct at Srebrenica, in Bosnia, was remarkable.
. The report
concludes that 'through error, misjudgment, and an inability to recognize
the scope of evil confronting us, we failed to do our part to save the
people of Srebrenica from the Serb campaign of mass murder.' It is a
handsome apology, if useless to the murdered. It must
surely provoke changed attitudes and bureaucratic practices in the UN
peacekeeping apparatus. It vindicates what the press and
engaged observers of the Bosnian situation were desperately saying at the
time.
. Kofi Annan said in
September that 'unless the Security Council is restored to its preeminent
position as the sole source of legitimacy on the use of force, we are on a
dangerous path to anarchy.' He is mistaken. That is the
path we were on when the United Nations failed Srebrenica. Nations have moral
existence.
The 'international community' does not. Nations
remain the ultimate agents of moral conscience." William Pfaff, "A
valuable UN apology, but nations were mainly at fault", International Herald Tribune, -- December, 1999.
"Kofi Annan
. was
brave to set up an inquiry [into the Rwanda genocide in 1994]. The report
. does indeed show that Mr. Annan acted as an ultra-cautious bureaucrat,
who urged his staff to stick strictly to their mandate in the midst of
murder, asked for information not action and, worst of all, failed to
follow up a crucial telegram that gave warning of impending planned
genocide.
[However,]
. the
blame is widespread. Mr. Annan has
apologized to the Rwandan people for the UN's failures. Should he
have resigned?
He would certainly have set a new standard in international public
life had he done so. But his resignation alone would not
have been right. First, several other individuals were
also culpable.
Second, he
. has admitted publicly to his errors
. and is
[seeking agreement on new intervention principles for the future]. [The reactions of
the Secretariat and Security Council]
. seem at best like incompetence,
at worst like callous indifference. But the crucial failure of political
will was not the fault of UN officials
. [but] most of all [that of
three] permanent members of the Security Council -- America,
Britain and France." "Rwanda revisited: A look back at the biggest bloodstain on the world's conscience in the 1990s", The Economist, December 23, 1999, pp. 5-6.
"An explosive
report on how sanctions against a rebel army in Angola are being broken,
and by whom, has provoked a heated debate in the Security Council. A dozen or
more African and European nations challenged the investigators' methods
and evidence.
. The report, by 10
international experts working for a [Council committee], implicated two
African presidents as well as the government of Bulgaria and one of the
world's largest diamond exchanges, in Antwerp, Belgium, in the methods
that rebels have used to smuggle Angolan diamonds to buy weapons to
sustain decades of civil war.
.
. the panel
[organizer] intends to press the Security Council to put sanctions on
countries or leaders involved in the illegal arms and diamond trade, as
recommended by the panel.
. Some delegations
are wary of what they see as a trend in the United Nations toward
interfering in countries' internal affairs.
. All countries named
in the allegations denied the allegations against them
. or tried to
explain
. But in almost every case, representatives pledged to cooperate
in closing loopholes if any did exist.
." Barbara Crossette, "Angola report stirs up UN: Inquiry into sanctions violations raises hackles", International Herald Tribune, March 17, 2000.
"
. for almost a
decade [Foday Sankoh's rebels have terrorized Sierra Leone], killing,
raping, and hacking the arms and legs off innocent people. [Yet]
. under last
year's U.S.-blessed Lome Peace accord, Mr. Sankoh [was] granted amnesty, a
share of Sierra Leone's diamond wealth and positions in government.
. Mr. Sankoh chafes
at even these undeservedly generous terms and [has engaged in] further
thuggish deeds.
. This violent
treachery [challenges the wisdom of bargaining with him] and the viability
of UN peacekeeping in Africa as a whole. If [one warlord can block] the
operation in tiny Sierra Leone, what hope is there for the mission
envisioned to help pacify Congo? Sierra Leone may be the last chance to
show that international action still offers some hope to ravaged 'failed
states' in Africa, despite awful failures in Liberia, Somalia and Rwanda.
.
. The United
Nations must recognize that half measures will not do this time. Either the
mission to salvage this brutalized little country is not vital to
international peace and security, in which case it should cease before
more peacekeepers' lives are lost, or [it needs to act swiftly], with a
force to match." "Sierra Leone and
the UN: No half measures", The Washington
Post, International Herald Tribune, May 6, 2000.
"With one United
Nations peacekeeping force under violent attack in Sierra Leone, the
international organization moved ahead Thursday with plans to dispatch
another to Congo. The juxtaposition clearly suggests a
need to improve the planning and execution of such UN missions to ensure
that peacekeeping forces do not become casualties in the conflicts they
are supposed to help end.
. The UN's mistakes
in Sierra Leone should not be repeated in Congo, which agreed to accept a
UN force of 5,500 troops to monitor a tenuous ceasefire there.
. But an
outside force should be called upon to maintain peace, not to make
it. A
mission of this kind is appropriate only when a realistic peace deal is
respected by all sides and a cease fire has been established. An
international force must then be given the financial resources, manpower
and disciplined command needed to protect itself and effectively carry out
its mandate." "Sierra Leone and
the UN: Learn the lessons", The New York Times,
International Herald Tribune, May 6, 2000.
"The Sierra Leone fiasco
. calls into question the will of world powers to
stop atrocities in distant lands and highlights a basic flaw in UN
peacekeeping missions, whose soldiers are often ill-equipped and
ill-prepared for actual fighting.
. Since the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to UN
peacekeepers
. peacekeeping missions have failed in Rwanda,
Angola, Somalia, and, for a lengthy period, Bosnia. Now, [even
with the Sierra Leone crisis, the UN] is being asked to send more troops to
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where 250 peacekeepers were killed
from 1961 to 1963, still the highest number of fatalities ever suffered by
UN peacekeepers. If [diplomacy] fails, then what? UN
peacekeepers, despite their name
. mostly monitor peace. They carry
guns they are never meant to fire. When warring factions violate peace
accords and begin to fight, then UN peacekeepers turn into spectators and,
often, victims.
Since 1948, 1,631 peacekeepers have lost their lives, with the
biggest losses coming in Congo, the former Yugoslavia, and Lebanon. 'Peacekeepers go in as a symbolic presence' [a] New
York diplomat said.
. When one of the parties [starts fighting again]
. then the peacekeepers are in trouble." Steven Mufson, "West African fiasco renews doubts on UN missions", International Herald Tribune, May 6, 2000.
"Just before a
United Nations Security Council delegation arrived [in Kinshasa, Congo] to
[consider] sending 5,500 peacekeepers to Congo, violence erupted in
[Sierra Leone]
. [where] at least 92 UN officials are being held hostage
[despite the signing of] a peace accord last July. Those events
immediately raised doubts about a peacekeeping mission in Congo in
particular, and in Africa in general.
. The current trouble
in Sierra Leone seems to [be] largely because the rebels were never really
interested in peace.
. And so it is a fair
question to ask whether the warring parties in Congo are really interested
in peace. Here in Kinshasa,
the capital, the signs have not been encouraging. The
government of
. President Laurent Kabila has continually [obstructed
certain visits] of about 100 UN monitors
.
. there is
pressure [on other countries fighting in Congo], particularly
Zimbabwe,
to stop their war efforts. But
. all are busy profiting from
Congo's vast mineral resources. [A knowledgeable
former Congolese official] says 'Rwanda and Uganda, or the
government's allies, Zimbabwe and Angola -- all of them have been enriching
themselves on our diamonds. So it is not in their interest to stop
the war.'" Norimitsu Onishi, "Events in Sierra Leone make UN intervention in Congo less likely", International Herald Tribune, May 8, 2000.
"The United Nations
[peacekeeping efforts] in Sierra Leone
. have failed in part because the
isolated and impoverished nation of Burkina Faso has provided a key
lifeline in the rebels' procurement of weapons, intelligence sources and
diplomats say.
.
. Angola's
UNITA rebels and the Liberian government of Charles Taylor, both
. under
international arms embargoes, are also recipients, according to sources
and a recent hard-hitting report to the UN Security Council. These groups'
.
payoffs and friendships with often-ignored countries are a key obstacle to
finding lasting peace, diplomats say. 'That is what makes
it so difficult'
. said a long-time diplomat in the region. 'You are
touching the lucrative livelihood, not just of rebel groups but of the
states that support them. That reality should give us all pause.'
. The Sierre Leonan
and Angolan rebels make millions of dollars a year by selling diamonds.
. In Congo, where UN
troops [are preparing] to monitor another fragile cease fire, all sides
.
finance their activities through the mining of diamonds and gold.
.
. Burkina
Faso
. often, for a price, signs papers saying the weapons are being
brought by its government, the sources said.
." Douglas Farah,
"Defying embargo, Burkina Faso ships arms to African rebels", International Herald Tribune, May 8, 2000.
"Nine days ago, a
Security Council delegation went to Africa to assess] small hopes for
lasting peace
. A lot was at stake,
they thought: the political and economic stability of at least six
countries; the fabulous wealth of Democratic Republic of the Congo itself
. and the future of United Nations peacekeeping. [When they returned
to New York]
. Congo had all but receded to the background. But broader
concerns about Africa and its evolving political leadership had
mushroomed.
[A US official
assessed ] the costs of African wars: 'Of the 4 to 5 million people who
have died in communal and regional conflicts worldwide over the past
decade, more than 3 million have died on this continent.
. The most
obvious threat to peace comes from the barrel of a gun or the blade of a
machete
. But insecurity can also come from corrupt politicians; it can
come from crime lords and narcotics syndicates. It can come
from diamond mines as well as land mines.'
. buffeted by
events, several of the diplomats spoke at they headed home about the
profound unease they felt about Africa's future, given the demonstrated
willfulness of key leaders." Barbara Crossette, "A continent is seething: No remedy for Africa", International Herald Tribune, May 11, 2000.
"After nearly a
yearlong lull in fighting, two of the world's poorest countries, Eritrea
and Ethiopia, are at war again. It is hard to think of a more pointless
and wasteful international conflict.
. Some 270,000 people
have been displaced by the fighting. The war compounds the danger of a
looming famine in southeast Ethiopia
. The leaders of the
two countries
. bear responsibility for perpetuating the war. They are both
able men and erstwhile allies
. But they have been
obstinate in defense of their own narrow agendas and heedless of the
suffering that the war has caused. [Ethiopia] began this latest offensive
just two days after a United Nations Security Council team failed to
bridge minute differences in a proposed peace accord.
. On Monday the
Security Council discussed an American proposal to impose a long overdue
arms embargo on both countries. That may be difficult to clear with
Russia and China, both of which are profiting from arms sales to the
impoverished antagonists. But Washington should pursue [such
pressures] to make clear to the two leaders that international legitimacy
and development assistance depend on good faith negotiations and a
cessation of military adventures." Ian Fischer, "A ruinous war", International Herald Tribune, May 15, 2000.
"People are
literally dancing in the streets in
. Sierra Leone. Foday Sankoh,
leader of the brutal [rebels], was captured by pro-government forces on
Wednesday and turned over to British forces. [His]
soldiers had violated a cease-fire and were holding as many as 340 United
Nations peacekeepers hostage. His arrest offers hope for Sierra Leone
after its nightmarish nine-year civil war.
. Yet as
recently as Tuesday, the Clinton administration seemed to be encouraging
another deal with Mr. Sankoh.
. A hard line entails
risk.
Back in 1997 Mr. Sankoh was captured and sentenced to death [which
provoked a rebel invasion] of Freetown that
. a Nigerian intervention
force [repelled]. Under international pressure
[President] Kabbah consented to release Mr. Sankoh and sign the cease-fire
deal that Mr. Sankoh shredded earlier this month. But that history
suggests that nothing is to be gained by giving Mr. Sankoh yet another
chance.
. Mr.
Sankoh's front has murdered, maimed, robbed and enslaved thousands of
Sierra Leoneans, many of them children. It has done all of this for the sake of
no coherent political agenda -- in pursuit only of illicit
enrichment.
Negotiations with these thugs is not the way to peace." "Sankoh in custody", The Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, May 19, 2000.
"The women
. peer
tentatively at the massive bound volume, studying photographs of jewelry,
shoes, socks,
. There is no art here, merely suffering. They are searching
for some evidence of their loved ones, missing and believed dead in the
massacre of Srebrenica, the 1995 murder by the Bosnian Serbs of up to
7,000 men.
. who thought they were under the protection of the United
Nations. [The Red Cross
financed the book to help] forensic scientists
make positive
identifications, [and because, for most families] 'not knowing is worse
than knowing the worst.'
. Srebrenica has
become a metaphor for many big topics: the worst atrocity of the Bosnian
war; the empty promises of a West in love with its own moralizing; the
bureaucratic, murderous failure of a United Nations trying to make peace
without fighting; the cowardice of Dutch troops serving with the United
Nations who let Bosnian Serbs overrun Srebrenica and watched them march
the men away.
. Of the
20,000 people reported missing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Red Cross has
been able to resolve the fate of only 3,000, even five years years [after
the war ended.]" Steven Erlanger, "A
book confirms Bosnians' worst fears," International Herald Tribune, July 31, 2000.
"[For a decade,
world politicians have marked the cold war's end but act as if it still
exists]. In 2001, they may at last have to face up to [the radical
changes].
. [First]
. New powers
are [emerging, as]
. are new areas of potential conflict
[Second is] the
break-up of some of the countries which [the cold war's] ice
unnaturally held together.
.
. The global
tally of separate countries -- 74 in 1946, around 190 now -- could
[sometime soon approach] the 300s. [Third]
the cold
war also artificially prolonged the old definition of 'sovereignty', which
said that what went on inside a country's borders, no matter how
dictatorially brutal, was nobody else's business.
. [but now
modern media and new technology give the world awareness of what a
dictator is doing, and]
. the means of trying to stop him.
.the rules of
legitimate intervention have still to be clearly spelled out so that
[ordinary people
can understand and support them]. But the
dangers are smaller than the possible outcome -- the end of
dictatorial immunity, the worldwide elimination of the old baronial
principle
." Brian Beedham, "It really is a new world now", The world in 2001, The Economist, 2000, p. 33. "There was always
an air of unreality about the UN Security Council debate on Iraq.
Why would the
Security Council spend two months deciding to authorize the use of force
if its decision was not binding? How can the council's decision bind
Iraq but not the United States?
It is hard to
avoid the conclusion that the charter provisions governing use of force
are simply no longer regarded as binding international law.
Since 1945,
dozens of member states have engaged in well over 100 inter-state
conflicts that have killed millions of people. This record of
violation is legally significant.
A treaty can lose its binding effect
if a sufficient number of parties engage in conduct that is at odds with
the constraints of the treaty. Of course, it
remains politically useful to act with the backing of the Security
Council.
But the charter was supposed to be about more than politics. The urgent issue
today is the breakdown once again of international rules of force. Until that
problem is addressed, the Security Council's deliberations will continue
to seem surreal." Michael J. Glennon,
"The rule of law is breaking down", International
Herald Tribune, November 22, 2002.
"The
multilateralists have failed dismally to make a case for their approach to
solving the world's problems. The truth is that the institutions and
procedures of multilateralism don't work very well. They rarely
have.
And it isn't just the Bush administration, with its unilateral
impulses, that thinks so.
. Despite the French
efforts to make the U.N. an arbiter of legitimacy in global conflicts, it
has played no such role in its history. Indeed, France itself has been a serial
preemptor in French-speaking Africa for decades, with no by-your-leave
from the U.N.
It has 3,000 troops in the Ivory Coast today, protecting its
economic interests. The U.N., for its
part, was paralyzed throughout the entire Cold War because of the veto
power of the five permanent members
. The European Union,
too, failed to act. At [Davos in February 2003 many
condemned] America for
. what many considered an immoral war. The Grand
Mufti of Bosnia reminded the mostly European audience that "[it and the
world] stood by for two years, and 10,000 of my people died."
.
Multilaterialism that leads to paralysis is not inherently moral; any more
than multilateralism in service to good is necessarily immoral." Bruce Nussbaum,
"Building a new multilateral world", Business Week
International, April 21, 2003, p. 34.
The Council's flaws
have long been apparent. It is secretive, dominated by the
Permanent Five [of its 15 members], and weighted toward the industrialized
world.
. The existence of vetoes irritates many member states.
. A larger Council
with more countries from the developing world would widely be considered
more legitimate. But decision-making is already tough
with 15 delegations and only five potential vetoes. Could a
results-oriented culture that is beginning to emerge in the Council
survive the addition of a dozen new members and several additional vetoes?
Most members do not
want further vetoes.
. More broadly, none
of the Permanent Five has pressed strongly for Council reform, while
Russia and China openly oppose it. Most members have
developed schemes for reform aimed to maximize their own access to the
Council
. or to favor the status quo. Although the logic
of evolving international relations should, some day, produce a better
tailored Council in which veto threats become largely academic, there's
not much energy in this debate today, even after the Council's shocking
performance on Iraq." David M. Malone, "Changing the Security Council: Calls for UN reform face many vetoes", International Herald Tribune, September 22, 2003. [Note: Mr. Malone
is a former Canadian ambassador to the UN, and president of the
International Peace Academy in New York.]
"During [the 1990s
I spent some time] .
in stately European palaces with diplomats,
parliamentarians and multilateral men who used the word 'modalities' a
lot, and we'd discuss the post-Cold-War international order.
. Far from mastering
events, the poor souls
. found history moving in unfathomable
directions.
Their careful negotiations
. often had nothing to do with reality.
. [The UN
deliberations on reconstruction of Iraq]
. face a series of tortuous
problems: it's neighborhood building in all its granular specificity. But the talk at the
Security Council is 8,000 miles above all that.
. There are lofty and
vapid formulations about moving from the 'logic of occupation' to the
'logic of sovereignty.'
. The more you look
at the Security Council negotiations, the more they resemble one of those
horrible divorces in which the children get ignored because the parents
are caught up in the psychodrama of each other's perfidies.
.
. we need to
focus on serving the Iraqis first, second and last. We don't need
to get caught up in a distracting round of lofty debates among the world's
. Metternichs, who treat the Iraqi people as pawns in their great game
power struggles." David Brooks, "All the lofty policy talk ignores Iraqi's needs", International Herald Tribune, September 24, 2003. "Just as the
nuclear standoff between the U.S. and the Soviet Union defined an age, so
too may the emerging era of [nuclear weapons] proliferation.
. the 'axiom
of proliferation' is still operative -- as long as any state possesses nuclear
weapons (or any weapon of mass destruction), others will seek to acquire
them.
. The problem
.is
that the ultimate [preventive] power
. is supposed to be the UN Security
Council.
And as [former UN chief weapons inspector] Richard Butler concedes,
'deep concern about the Security Council's unreliability' in enforcing its
nonproliferation treaties is 'reasonable.'
. Despite the UN's
inadequacies, [some think] now is precisely the time for the Security
Council to show it has teeth on this, the most pressing issue it
faces.
[But] If, despite a UN-ordered embargo, North Korea or Iran
continues to flout the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT), what
then?
Does the UN accede to [or the US undertake] military action to
defang the violator? If [they don't], it would mean the end
of arms control as we know it.
. What other options
are there?
Anyone have any ideas? If not, last one into the bomb shelter shut
the door, thank you." Bill Powell, "The
end of the world: Is there any way to stop the spread of nuclear weapons",
Fortune, October 27,
2003, p. 72.
"The Security
Council has unanimously approved a resolution to keep chemical, biological
and nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists.
First proposed in a
UN General Assembly speech by resident George W. Bush in September, the
resolution extends the reach of nonproliferation treaty power beyond
states to 'nonstate actors,' meaning terror groups.
The 15-to-0 vote
followed months of negotiating and redrafting to win over one reluctant
permanent member [China] and several non-permanent ones [the last holdout
being Pakistan.] The resolution
compels all 191 UN members to draw up legislation and strengthen laws to
prevent terrorists and black market agents from being able to
'manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport or use nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.' The measure asks
countries to report on their compliance within six months, and it
establishes Security Council monitoring for two years. No specific
enforcement power was included in the resolution, though UN rules allow
for sanctions against no cooperating countries. Joining the United
States as drafters of the resolution were France, the Philippines,
Romania, Russia and Spain." Warren Hoge,
"Security Council passes ban on weapons for terrorists," International Herald Tribune, May 2, 2004. [Note: The effort is certainly a good thing. But the achingly slow response (see the two quotes of June 13 and July 1, 1993 above, and of course 9/11 and all subsequent tragedies), and the complexity of getting all 191 Member States to eventually act on this complex matter (especially since some of the weakest states are the most vulnerable to terrorist activities) do underscore doubts about Security Council ability to provide global leadership responses to urgent 21st century problems.] U.S. allies
defended the legal basis for the invasion of Iraq and their military roles
there Thursday after Secretary General Kofi Annan of the United Nations
reignited the debate over its legitimacy.
In an
interview
Annan said the invaders had needed permission from the United
Nations Security Council. From the point of view of the UN
charter, it was illegal, Annan said. Since the Gulf
crisis in 1990-1991, the Security Council had adopted a number of
resolutions
the last in November 2002
warning Baghdad of serious
consequences if the country was found in breach of earlier
resolutions. Annan ,,, said that
it had been up to the Security Council to approve or determine what those
consequences should be. [A British
spokeswoman said] We spelled out at the time our reasons for believing
the conflict in Iraq was indeed lawful
[but] conceded that
international lawyers disagreed about the wars legality. [Australian] Prime
Minister John Howard not only rejected Annans remarks but criticized the
United Nations as a paralyzed body, incapable of acting on major crises,
such as the current one in Sudans Darfur region.
[Polish, Bulgarian, and Japanese spokespeople also disagreed or
expressed doubts.] U.S. allies argue
war was legal: Britain and 4 others attack Annans claim that it wasnt
justified, Agence France-Press, International
Herald Tribune, September 17,
2004.
Confronted with
the murder of 50,000 in Sudan,
calls were issued and exhortations were
made
The great hum of diplomacy signaled that the global community was
whirring into action.
But the
multilateral process moved along in its dignified way. The UN
secretary general was making preparations to set up a commission. Preliminary
UN resolutions were passed, and the mass murderers were told they should
stop
And meanwhile 1.2
million were driven from their homes in Darfur.
Finally, a week ago
the Security Council passed a resolution threatening to consider
sanctions against Sudan at some point.
The resolution passed and it was a
good day
for the burden of doing nothing was shared equally by all. And we are by
now used to the pattern. Every time there is an ongoing
atrocity, we watch the world community go through the same series of
stages (1) shock and concern (2) gathering resolve (3) fruitless
negotiation (4) pathetic inaction (5) shame and humiliation (6) steadfast
vows to never let this happen again.
Its a pity
about the poor dead people in Darfur. Their numbers are still rising, at
6,000 to 10,000 a month. David Brooks,
Another triumph for the UN, International Herald
Tribune, September 27, 2004. "[The recent UN
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Changes'[
central
conclusion is that, without Security Council approval, no state should use
force to defend itself against a threat that is not imminent.
If the
Council dallies, too bad: the target state must ask again. The same applies
when genocide occurs. 'Genocide anywhere
', the Panel
declares, '
should never be tolerated.' But [the panel asserts]
armed force
cannot be used to stop genocide
unless the Security Council permits it.
The central problem
is that the 'global order' posited by the panel is largely
non-existent.
Notions of justice vary from one culture to another.
[The Panel]
makes no effort to assess the effectiveness of the [UN] Charter's rules,
whether the benefits of saving them are worth the costs, whether they
still command international support, or whether alternatives such as
strengthening regional peacekeeping organizations might work better. A little empirical
spadework, coupled with a little more disinterestedness, would have gone a
long way in lighting the way toward a more peaceful and just world. That is the
issue -- not how the Security Council can get a bigger piece of the
action." Michael Glennon, "A
stronger Security Council is no solution", Financial Times (UK), December 13, 2004. [Note: Mr. Glennon,
a professor of international law, is the author of Limits of law, prerogatives of power: Interventionism
after Kosovo, Palgrave, New York, 2001. Useful Sources
Glennon, Michael J., "Why the Security Council failed", Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003, at www.foreignaffairs.org . Malone, David M., "Eyes on the prize: The quest for nonpermanent seats on the UN Security Council", Global Governance 6(2000), 3-23. Hurd, Ian, "Legitimacy, power, and the symbolic life of the UN Security Council", Global Governance 8(2002), 35-51. Global Policy Forum, material on Security Council Reform www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/index.htm Laurenti, Jeffrey, "Reforming the United Nations Security Council: Will its time ever come?", United Nations Association of the USA, March 17, 2003. O'Neill, Barry, "Power and satisfaction in the
Security Council," in Diehl, Paul F., ed.,
The politics of global governance: International
organizations in an interdependent world, 2d ed., Lynne Rienner,
Boulder CO (USA), and London, 2001, pp.. 117-137.
Barnett, Michael,
Eyewitness to a genocide: The United Nations and
Rwanda, Cornell University, Ithaca and London, 2002. McCarthy, Patrick A., "Positionality, tension, and instability in the U.N. Security Council", Global Governance, 3(1997), 147-169. Wallensteen, Peter, Ch. 7,
"Representing the world: A Security Council for the 21st century", in Diehl,
Paul F., ed., The politics of global governance:
International organizations in an interdependent world, Lynne Rienner,
Boulder CO (USA), 1997, pp. 103-115.
Claude, Inis L., Jr., Ch. 4, "The Security Council", in Luard, Evan, ed., The evolution of international organizations, Thames and Hudson, London, 1966, pp. 68-91.
|
|||
