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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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Introductory
quotes "WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold
sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
to establish conditions under
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and
other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote
social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
Article 97. The Secretariat shall comprise a
Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require.
The Secretary-General
shall be
the chief administrative officer of the Organization.
Article
100. 1. In the performance of their duties
the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions
from any government or from any other authority external to the
Organization. They shall
refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as
international officials responsible only to the
Organization. 2. Each Member of the United Nations
undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the
responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to
influence them in the discharge of their
responsibilities. Article
101. 1. The staff shall be appointed by
the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General
Assembly.
3. The paramount consideration
in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions
of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of
efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the
importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as
possible." Charter of the United Nations, 1945, initial phrases, and Articles 97, 100, and 101. [emphasis added] At an early stage in
[my]
study, the late Sir Robert Jackson remarked to me that of course I should
never understand the United Nations, in the sense that insiders who have
spent many years in its service understand it. And the insiders, he said, would
join forces to reject an aliens perspective. Certainly any outsider must defer
to such experience and knowledge as Jacksons, a man who had made a
systematic effort to think through the problems and possibilities of the
UN institutions with a view to their better functioning. But the thought
necessarily follows: if the UN is only intelligible from within, how can
it be useful, let alone accountable, to those it was created to
serve? No organization sealed
off from informed scrutiny can claim to be representative. Closed cultures are not
dynamic. And an evaluation of
the effectiveness of the global organizations must in any case be set
within a larger perspective, one that considers the problems with which
they are intended to deal. Rosemary Righter, Utopia lost: The United Nations and world order, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1995, p. ix. Chronological
quotes
"In the Secretariat
. there is no
unifying directive on the functions of management.
. The need to keep
subordinates informed of what is going on; the need to convey just praise
and blame; the need for the impartial award of privilege and promotion;
the need for discipline; the need to avoid unnecessary impositions on the
time and energy of subordinates; the need to set a personal example do not
seem to be appreciated as well as they should be.
. These major shortcomings
. are
accompanied by the less important but nevertheless tiresome defects in
working conditions
. perennial irritants that would be tolerated if
morale were high, but which count for much when it is low. Add to this the insecurity
implicit in staff reductions and in the adjustments required to achieve
proper geographic distribution and a balanced budget and you have a most
unhappy conglomeration of forces making for discomfiture of the
staff.
The staff feels the need for a
lead from the top to combat these disrupting factors.
." A
confidential analysis in April 1947 of the UN Secretariat's morale,
as quoted in Stephen Baldwin, "Good management in the United Nations",
Secretariat News (New York), January 31, 1986, pp. 11-12.
"[In 1950]
the General Assembly stressed the
need for careful programme reviews to effectively use available
resources. Subsequently in
1953, the Secretary-General made a comprehensive review of the work and
structure of the Secretariat.
This 'evaluation process' and the subsequent reform actions sought
to concentrate efforts and resources on the priority programmes which an
international organization could 'perform efficiently and effectively,'
avoid a 'dangerous' dispersion of these resources over a widespread
'miscellany' of projects, and launch 'a continuing self-criticism as to
the way in which various tasks are carried
out.'" "Concentration of effort and resources," General Assembly resolution 413 (V) of 1 December 1950, "Organization of the Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/2554 of 12 November 1953, para. 5, and "Annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organization 1 July 1953-30 June 1954," UN document A/2663, 1954, pp. xiv-xv, all as
discussed in Joint Inspection Unit, "Reporting on the performance and results
of United Nations programmes: Monitoring, evaluation, and management
review components", UN document
A/43/124, 1988, Annex I, para. 2.
"Confronted in 1965 with a
financial crisis caused by disputed peacekeeping operations, the General
Assembly established another group of experts (known as the "Committee of
14") to examine the financial situation and procedures for preparing,
approving, and overseeing the implementation of budgets.
The Committee
stressed the need for programme planning and budgeting to provide a clear
picture of objectives and strategies for using the organizations' limited
resources. It also urged a
corresponding effort to strengthen evaluation processes and internal
reviews of operations, with timely reporting every year to governing
bodies and Member States on progress made and results obtained."
"Second report of the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies," UN document A/6343 of 19 July 1966, paras. 1, 68-79. as
discussed in Joint Inspection Unit, "Reporting on the performance and results
of United Nations programmes: Monitoring, evaluation, and management
review components", UN document A/43/124, 1988, Annex I, para. 5. "The CPC [Committee for Programme
and Coordination] reported in 1969 that the rapid proliferation of United
Nations system programmes would encounter increasing criticism from Member Governments and increasing
public disillusionment,
unless greater efforts were made through effective review and
evaluation to ensure that these programmes met Member State needs and
provided concrete benefits. The Committee stressed the need for
intergovernmental programming bodies to provide detailed and systematic
review and evaluation
" "Enlarged Committee for Programme and Coordination: Final report," UNB document E/4748 of 2 October 1969, paras. 5-19, as discussed in Joint Inspection Unit, "Reporting on the performance and results
of United Nations programmes: Monitoring, evaluation, and management
review components", UN document A/43/124, 1988, Annex I, para. 7.
"
concern with
capacity and performance [in the United Nations system] reaches its
highest peak when draft programmes and budgets are discussed and seems to
evaporate when reports on the execution of the approved programmes are
reviewed.
This dichotomy [between budgetary
concentration and performance neglect] is in itself one of the major
causes of the shortfalls of the performance of the system." Mahdi Elmandjra, The United
Nations System: An Analysis, Faber and Faber, London, 1973, pp.
228-229.
"[In 1975] A group of 25 experts
recommended strengthening CPC
and the establishment of a mechanism for
continuing supervision and evaluation of programme implementation. These experts observed
that 'An essential element of programme
budgeting is effective monitoring of programme implementation and
appraisal of programme accomplishments, since policy-making bodies need
such data in order to be able to make informed and intelligent decisions
As things stand now, new
activities keep being added to existing ones
To a great extent, this
state of affairs may be attributed to the fact that 'work on evaluating
the results achieved
still lies within the realm of theory, and that
no real check is kept on the secretariats.'" "A new United Nations structure for global economic co-operation: Report of the Group of Experts on the Structure of the United Nations System, UN document E/AC.62/9 of 28 May 1975, para. 131, as discussed in Joint Inspection Unit, "Reporting on the performance and results
of United Nations programmes: Monitoring, evaluation, and management
review components", UN
document A/43/124, 1988,
Annex I, para. 13. "There was general agreement that
the United Nations system is facing a major challenge
The executive heads of
organizations which are responsible for operational activities emphasized
that while improvements can always be made, their activities have a proved
record of effectiveness and efficiency. While many of the charges of
waste, inefficiency, duplication, etc., are not accurate, it will be
necessary to refute these charges by clear evidence to the
contrary.
The ACC [Administrative Committee
on Coordination] also recognizes its responsibility to improve the image
of the United Nations so as to reassure Governments and the general public
that it is an efficient and effective mechanism for dealing with the
important issues of concern to the international
community." "International co-operation and co-ordination within the United
Nations system: Annual overview report of the ACC for 1981/82," UN
document E/1982/4 of 18 May 1982, paras. 16, 18, and 72.
"[In 1981] the General Assembly
requested the Secretary-General to propose official regulations and rules
to govern the entire programme planning system, taking into account its
many prior resolutions on an integrated planning, programming and
evaluation system. During the next two years, the Secretary-General made
proposals which were extensively discussed, and
[In 1984] the
Regulations and Rules were
adopted by the General Assembly and
issued. [They] state as their
very first aim: '(a) to subject all programmes of
the Organization to periodic and thorough reviews,' [and
also] '(h) to establish an independent
and effective system for monitoring implementation and verifying the
effectiveness of the work actually done;
(i) to evaluate periodically the
results achieved
' [In 1985] the third JIU reports on
the status of evaluation [in the UN system]
found that most organizations had made
considerable progress in systematically using
evaluation.
The JIU concluded,
however, that the United Nations was still locked into the initial stages
of evaluation system development, had fallen even further behind the other
organizations than it was in 1981, and had not achieved 'integrated
management' because results were not being assessed in order to improve
future programmes and decision-making." "Programme planning," General Assembly resolution 36/228 of 18 December 1981, "Regulations and rules governing programme planning, the programme aspects of the budget, the monitoring of implementation and the methods of evaluation," UN document ST/SGB/204 of 14 June 1984, Joint Inspection Unit, "Third report on evaluation in the United Nations system: Integration and use," Joint Inspection Unit, UN document A/41/202, and "Status of internal evaluation in organizations of the United Nations system," UN document A/41/201, both of 1986, paras. 21-22, 29-30, all as
discussed in Joint Inspection Unit, "Reporting on the performance and results
of United Nations programmes: Monitoring, evaluation, and management
review components", UN document
A/43/124, 1988, Annex I, paras. 18-19, 23. "On the occasion of the 40th
anniversary, the Secretary-General suggested a critique 'of the weaknesses
of the Organization and their cause or
causes.' The shortcomings [are broadly two:
those] of a predominantly political or structural nature [which are beyond
the Secretary-General's control]
. [and those which are] the result of a
chronic mismanagement of the Secretariat
. [which] the Secretary-General
can put right. [As the latter shortcomings have
increased], the patience of Member States
. began to wear thin
.
[prompting several States] to serve notices of withdawal on [certain UN
system organizations.
. This malaise is due to a wide
range of causes, which include
.: the Secretariat's submissiveness
towards influential governments; the failure to [properly]
. balance the
principles of merit and geographic distribution; extremely poor personnel
management; passive and defective recruitment policies
.; politicization
of
. selection, appointment and promotion of staff; lack of a career
development plan;
. etc. Acknowledging the Secretariat's
shortcomings -- and the
breathtaking deterioration of both performance and the public image of the
UN -- would be the first step toward finding answers
[But] the attitude
of many top [UN] officials is still characterized by indifference
."
Houshang Ameri, "Shortcomings of the United Nations", Secretariat News (New York), October 16, 1985, pp.22-23.
"Member States have
stressed the need to be told, more clearly and more extensively
. what has been the programmatic
performance of the Secretariat, which outputs have been delivered, and
with which result
. Let us strengthen the
monitoring and evaluation functions
Let us say clearly and dispassionately what has been done and with
which result, and equally what has not been done and
why
. Let us produce more analytical performance reports
. I find the essential
problem one of better and more transparent information, thus permitting
better decisions."
"Statement", by UN
Under-Secretary-General for Management Patricio Ruedas 12 November
1985, as quoted in Joint Inspection Unit, "Reporting on the
Performance and Results of United Nations Programmes: Monitoring,
evaluation and management review components", UN document A/43/124,1988,
p. 5.
"
. any respect for the
institution of management within the UN has largely disappeared.
[Unavoidable staff cynicism] thankfully does not affect
. their belief in
the value of what the organization does,
. [but] centers on the
perception that there is little or no relationship
. between the value of
the work one performs and the rewards, psychic or tangible, likely to be
received
. Cynicism is a corrosive quality.
. it ultimately becomes very difficult indeed to maintain an increasingly
abstract pride in an Organization's ideals and purposes when you despise
many of its nominal leaders, and most of its standards for selecting those
leaders. As was the case
40 years ago
.
the U.N. has no 'unifying directive on the functions of management.
. All it would take is the
implementation of a meritocratic standard for advancement at all levels of
staff employment. Do this
.
and virtually all other problems would fade away
. Make quality leadership and good
management qualities the hallmarks for praise and promotion, and at the
very least we will have, finally, a mature United Nations
. with a proud,
strong, unified staff to do the work." Stephen Baldwin, "Good management in the United Nations", Secretariat News (New York), January 31, 1986, pp. 11-12. [Note" see also the April 1947 analysis above on management inadequacies which was quoted in this same article.]
"Accountability, that source of institutional health, had been
excluded from United Nations experience; and, along with it, indivisibly,
the stimulus of direct public engagement and response. 'It is not a United Nations
Organization', Aleksander Solzhenitsyn was to say, in his Nobel address of
1970, 'but a United Governments Organization.' In offering itself as the mere
creature of its member governments, the United Nations system entered a
state of arrested moral development, marked by the habitual emblems of
immaturity: demands for approval, and incapacity for individual or
collective self-questioning." Shirley Hazzard, "Breaking
Faith: I", The New Yorker, September 25, 1989, pp. 63-99,
[76]. [Note:
Ms. Hazzard worked at the UN for ten years, resigning in 1962 to become a
very successful full-time writer.]
"
the four main [UN
internal] oversight units
are
foundering: -- internal audit
needs "urgent strengthening", again; -- internal evaluation
is an acknowledged "somewhat sickly child"; -- monitoring spews
out only a flood of tepid numbers; -- management
advisory efforts fall far short of stated objectives. The various other
accountability, control, and oversight processes in the Secretariat fare
little better: -- on-site
inspection work scarcely touches operating units; -- fraud and
abuse investigations are too little, too late; -- "hotlines"
are considered to be too much trouble; -- information
systems work is tied up in one big project; -- financial
control discipline is questioned in many areas; -- management
training will begin, but very late in the day; -- management
improvement potential is scarcely being tapped; -- many other
"assessment reports" often have little to say; -- management
consultants are reserved for internal use; --
reorganizations have brought confusion as well as streamlining; -- needed
programming tools have not developed as expected; and -- effective personal accountability does
not exist."
Joint Inspection
Unit, "Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN
document A/48/420 of 12 October 1993, pp. 2
and
25,
and
Add. 1 of 22 November 1993.
"The General Assembly
4. Endorses the recommendations of the Committee for
Programme and Coordination on the establishment of a transparent and effective
system of accountability and responsibility no later than 1
January 1995
; 5. Requests the
Secretary-General to include in the system of accountability and
responsibility the following elements, taking into account relevant
experience within and outside the United Nations system;
(a) The establishment of clear responsibility for programme
delivery, including performance indicators as a measure of quality
control;
(b) A mechanism
ensuring that programme managers are accountable for the effective
management of the personnel and financial resources allocated to
them;
(c) Performance evaluation for all officials, including
senior officials, with objectives and performance indicators;
(d) Effective training of staff in financial and management
responsibilities." "Review of the
administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations", General
Assembly resolution 48/218 A, 23 December
1993, paras. I.E. 2-5. [emphasis added. ]
["The fact that the [above]
very sound and
well-recognized management principles seem to have been 'discovered' by
the UN [some fifty] years after its creation, and then only implemented in
part in 1994, is a candid admission that, in the past, senior UN managers
have either not been aware of, or have not been seriously concerned with,
the basic need for a strong management base for the Organization's
programmes and operations." Yves Beigbeder,
commenting on the above accountability system requirements, in The internal management of United Nations
Organizations: The Long Quest for Reform, Macmillan,
London,
St. Martins, New York, 1997, p.
127.] "[This report]
outlines a strategy to modernize and re-energize human resources
management in the [UN Secretariat]
[While the UN's
role and mandates have expanded], commensurate changes and modernization
in human resources management have not occurred. As a result,
[such] management has been fragmented, bureaucratic and incapable of
dealing expeditiously with ever-changing demands
The Office of
Human Resources Management [OHRM]
has been largely unable to address
properly [its essential] planning and management functions.
[This in
turn has] partially contributed to the slow deployment of field missions,
inadequate people management, low staff morale, and insufficient
mobility.
Thus, the time is overdue
to introduce changes to maximize the
contribution of [UN] human resources." "A strategy for the
management of the human resources of the Organization: Revised estimates
: Report of
the Secretary-General ", UN document A/C.5/49/5 of 21 October 1994, paras. 1 and 23.
"The [UN]
Secretariat's current personnel procedures are inconsistent with the
development of the competent meritocracy that is required to deal with the
important problems faced by the United Nations. As a
consequence of years of improvised, backward, and careless personnel
practices, staff morale has been severely damaged. Numerous
deficiencies are apparent in the personnel practice of the
Secretariat.
For instance, it lacks a worthwhile staff-evaluation system
Moreover, promotion within the Secretariat is not competitive nor is it
based on merit, and staff discipline is very low in some departments. In addition,
the policies for recruiting new Secretariat personnel are unclear, and
professional training is almost nonexistent. Collusion
between staff members and state delegations seeking to justify the
continued employment of their nationals is quite common, and often leads
to 'requests' by the General Assembly for prolonged studies and reports
that have no purpose and will never be read." Ronald I. Spiers, "Reforming the United Nations," in Roger A. Coate, ed., U.S. policy and the future of the United Nations, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1994, pp. 25-26. [Note: Mr. Spiers
served as a UN Under-Secretary-General in New York in the early
1990s]
"
there appear to be three
broad categories of quality among the vague group of 'programme managers'
in the United Nations Secretariat. First, there are managers who would be
successful in almost any public or private organization.
A
second group, quite possibly the largest, is composed of unprepared
managers.
[The] most distinctive finding [of a 1993 consultant survey],
relative to other organizations, was the frequency with which untrained
people were placed in managerial positions in the
Secretariat. A number of
managers interviewed were 'entirely unfamiliar' with contemporary
management experience.
Far
from concentrating on programme performance,
and developing, supporting,
and leading staff, [a third category, of bad managers has]
adapted to,
and often exploited, the disorganized and undisciplined [UN] managerial
climate
They operated in a dictatorial and
sovereign style, insisting on their right to delegate all assignments with
no personal involvement themselves, to interpret the rules as they saw
fit, and in too many cases to treat staff distantly, capriciously, and
abusively.
They prided themselves on their ability to 'get things done'
administratively by backstage maneuvering
but had little interest in
results or the fulfillment of objectives. One
hopes the 'sovereign manager' mentality is fading away.
" Joint Inspection
Unit, "Management in the United Nations: Work in progress", UN document
A/50/507,1995, Chapter III, "Who are
the managers?," paras. 108-109, 113-116.
"Sins of member
states: Secretariat staff
resent
member state interference in
their daily work
[their
micromanagement of] the hiring and promotion of Secretariat
personnel.
. [and of] Secretariat budgeting,
. too often
seeking to control the minor details of spending allocations.
. Secretariat staff
members are also frustrated by lack of clear direction from
intergovernmental bodies. Too often member states fail to agree on how
best to confront global problems
. Moreover, mandates are frequently
assigned to the Secretariat with little thought as to the resources needed
for their implementation. Sins of the
Secretariat:
. Member states
contend that ineffective -- some would say nonexistent -- managerial
practices throughout the Secretariat have led to inefficient use of the
[UN resources]
; a staff unaccountable for its actions and prone to
delegate upwards; insufficient program coordination
; and wasteful
duplication of efforts. There has been a lack of transparency
in Secretariat decision making [on] policy issues, personnel, and budget
expenditures.
much of the information that is provided is not timely or
readable.
Overall,
inefficiency and lack of accountability within the Secretariat, whether
perceived or real, have invited member state micromanagement.
" "Making UN reform work: Improving member state-Secretariat relations", Report of the twenty-eighth United Nations issues conference, The Stanley Foundation, February 21-23, 1997, pp. 2, 14-16. [emphasis added] Note: The above
analysis by an expert group of "insiders" in 1997 sought to illustrate the
strained relationships between member states and the UN Secretariat,
caused by a lack of communication and mistrust, which continue to hamper
the UN's ability to implement reforms.]
"[The General Assembly]
II. Reaffirming its resolution
48/218A of 23 December 1993, in particular the request therein for a
mechanism ensuring that programme managers are accountable for the
effective management of human resources allocated to them,
2.
Requests the Secretary-General to enhance managerial accountability
with respect to human resources management decisions, including imposing sanctions
in cases of demonstrated mismanagement of staff and willful neglect of or
disregard for established rules and procedures, while safeguarding the due
process rights of all staff members, including managers; 3.
Also requests the Secretary-General to issue specific
administrative instructions to establish clearly the responsibility and
accountability of programme managers for proper use of human resources, as
well as sanctions in accordance with staff rule 112.3 for any financial
loss suffered by the United Nations as a result of gross negligence,
including improper motivation, willful violation of or reckless disregard
for the staff Regulations and Rules and established policies regulating
recruitment, placement and promotion;
6.
Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to streamline
administrative procedures and eliminate duplication, in relation to human
resources management, through delegation of authority to programme
managers, and requests him to ensure, before delegating such authority,
that well-designed mechanisms of accountability, including the necessary
internal monitoring and control procedures, as well as training, are put
in place,
" "Human resources
management", General Assembly resolution 51/226 of 25 April 1997, Part II, first
preambular and paras. 2-3, 6. [emphasis
added]
"In a rather scathing [1998] report, the General
Assembly's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Financial Questions
(ACABQ) has dismissed the 'concept paper'
submitted by the Secretariat
on 'Reducing and refocusing of non-programme costs.'
The paper was
meant to show how reductions in the UN's administrative costs, estimated
at 38 per cent of the regular budget, would result in savings of $195
million, to be channeled into a proposed 'Development Account.' The ACABQ says that
the report is 'flawed by the lack of a clear concept
' The committee is
equally disbelieving of the claims made about 'efficiency
gains' and their impact. The measures described are 'not
sufficiently detailed or specific enough' and no 'satisfactory
explanations or performance indicators are provided' to support
the target mentioned. Rather than call
for yet another report, the ACABQ suggests
that a practical move at this stage might be to
'set aside a preoccupation with concept and theory
to concentrate on
specific new measures to increase the efficiency and confirm the results
arising out of the implementation of new measures as well as those
initiated prior to the current exercise." "Advisory Committee rejects
"non-programme costs" report", International
Documents Review, 16 March 1998, page
5. [emphasis
added] "
Staff members
at all levels
must be held accountable for delivering assigned outputs
on a timely and cost-effective basis
and for upholding the values and
principles of the Organization
. The prime
responsibility for taking action to remedy accidental and intentional
performance failures will lie with supervisors and managers at all levels.
In addition
the Department of Management is considering the setting up of transparent
accountability mechanisms
" "Human resources management reform: Report of the
Secretary-General",
UN document A/53/414 of 13 October
1998, paras. 6-9. [emphasis added]
"IV. Delegation of authority and
accountability
3.
[The General Assembly] Also notes that no comprehensive system of accountability and
responsibility has been established;
10. Reiterates its
request to the Secretary-General [see para. II.2 of resolution 51/226 of
25 April 1997 preceding] to enhance managerial accountability with respect
to human resources management decisions, including imposing sanctions in
case of demonstrated mismanagement of staff and willful neglect of or
disregard for established roles and procedures, while safeguarding the
right of due process of all staff members, including
managers." "Human resources
management," General Assembly resolution 53/221 of 23 April 1999. [emphasis added]
"In
recent years, the United Nations has had fundamental problems. In 1994
there was an overall
failure of its human resources system to staff critical posts with the
right people.
"[In
1997] The Secretary General proposed a reform program consisting of three
[integrated] core elements: (1) restructuring U.N. leadership and
operations; (2) developing a performance-based human capital system; and
(3) introducing
programming and budgeting processes based on results.
[He] set the end of 1999 as the target to put the
reforms in place.
The
United Nations has substantially restructured its leadership and
operations and partly
implemented a merit-based and performance-oriented human capital
system
However,
the overall objectives of the reform have not yet
been achieved. Specifically, the United Nations has not yet
implemented reforms to focus its programming and budgeting on managing the
Secretariat's performance. These initiatives would enable Member States to hold
the Secretariat accountable for results and are key to the success
of the overall reform because they institutionalize a shift in the
organization's focus from carrying out activities to accomplishing
missions.
the
U.N. reform is an interrelated process and requires that all core elements
be in place to succeed." US General
Accounting Office, "United Nations: Reforms are progressing, but overall
objectives have not been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-169, 15 pages, of May 10, 2000, especially summary and pp. 2-3 and
9-15, and "United Nations:
Reform initiatives have strengthened operations, but overall objectives
have not been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-150, May 10,
2000, 84 pages.
[emphasis added] "The
present report delineates the continuum between responsibility, authority
and accountability and presents the elements of an integrated and
effective system of accountability. It outlines the progress made
highlights the recent
changes introduced to enhance or supplement existing accountability
mechanisms, and outlines changes in the policy and management culture of
the Organization which
will allow for the effective implementation of the comprehensive
system of accountability now established.
In
conclusion, the Secretary-General is confident that
the comprehensive system of accountability now in place
ensures that accountability mechanisms are effectively used, are
seen to be used, and ensure that staff at all levels are held accountable
for their actions and inaction." The General
Assembly may wish to take note of the mechanisms in place since 1994,
including those discussed in the present report, which together constitute
the comprehensive system of accountability for the Organization." "Accountability and
responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General", un document A/55/270 of
3 August 2000, Summary, paras. 1-2,
47-48. [emphasis
added.] "The Brahimi report
implicitly criticizes the appointment of key peacekeeping personnel on
geopolitical grounds, rather than on merit, and details how UN senior
peacekeeping staff in the field -- civilian and military -- should prepare
for duties.
In the case of Sierra Leone, there is little evidence of any
preparation at all. As the report states, 'Put simply, the UN is far
from being a meritocracy today, and unless it takes steps to become one,
it will not be able to reverse the alarming trend of qualified staff
leaving the organization.' These are fighting words at the UN,
where turf, national advantage, and every job are fought over and
preserved with a vigor that belies the public image of UN torpor in most
other respects.
The UN is urged by the panel to create a standing pool of civilian
personnel specializing in field service
, in the absence of which
inexperienced and untrained staff must start afresh in every peacekeeping
operation, thus inevitably making many avoidable mistakes early on." David M. Malone and
Ramesh Thakur, "UN peacekeeping: Lessons learned?", Global Governance, 7 (2001), 11-17 [14].
[emphasis added] [Note: The report
referred to is the Report of the Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations [the "Brahimi report"], UN document A/55/305
--
S/2000/809 of August 21 2000, which is
available at www.un.org/documents/
under the A document number]
"The
United Nations has been hit by an unprecedented wave of fraud, waste and
corruption.
Officials at its antifraud investigation unit say they are
expecting to have to run more than 350 inquiries by the end of the year --
nearly twice the total for 1998, and a 50 per cent increase on last
year.
Thousands of staff, contractors, and consultants have been
interviewed in scores of countries.
The
revelations will embarrass Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, who is to
welcome national leaders
to the 'Millenium Summit' in New York next week.
Annan is
hoping to convince skeptical heads of state that the UN has provided value
for money and that its role should be expanded.
One
senior investigator said last week that the UN investigations unit's
workload was greater than ever. "We are seeing more and more frauds and
abuses of authority.
The
OIOS's annual report, due out next month, will reveal cases of sloppy
management, lax enforcement, harassment and outright criminality.
OIOS is working with
dozens of interntional police forces -- including Scotland Yard -- on
inquiries into the activities of UN personnel." Jason Burke, et.
al., "UN rocked by flood of fraud cases: Officials were 'addicted to
luxury",
The Observer International (UK), September 3, 2000. [Note: Mr. Annan
may or may not have been embarrassed: in any event, reporting of
UN anti-corruption activities and findings has been extremely subdued ever
since, as discussed in the following sections of this website]
"How do you ensure that DPI [the UN Department of
Public Information] isn't seen as a propaganda tool, yet that it serves
the UN's objectives? By telling the
truth!
Information isn't propaganda unless you doctor it to distort
reality or hide inconvenient facts. We don't do that. I think you'll
admit that under Secretary General Kofi Annan we have the most transparent
United Nations imaginable
" Question to and answer from Shashi Tharoor, head of the DPI and "an established novelist, columnist and nonfiction author also a highly sought-after figure on the lecture circuit", in Pranay Gupte, "Q & A: Shashi Tharoor: 'Why information matters at the UN'," Earth Times, May 2001, p. 16. "An extraordinary
thing is happening this week at the United Nations.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan is to be re-elected virtually by
acclamation.
Outside [the] UN
few knew much about him. But in the early 90's he had become
head of the UN peacekeeping department and came to the attention of the
major powers, particularly in Bosnia
. Within the UN
system his reforms have been important although limited by the perennial
self-interest of the members.
The personnel system is still a disaster, which he
must now tackle resolutely.
" William Shawcross,
"Another five years at the UN helm for Annan, of course," International Herald Tribune, June 27, 2001. [emphasis added] "Kofi Annan's
election to a second and last term should normally allow him to help
establish the United Nations as the centerpiece of an emerging system of
global management that is efficient, just and accepted as legitimate by
all peoples and nations. Decisive action should not
continue to be postponed in regaining the motivation and professional
quality of the United Nations in its early years.
. Enrique ter Horst,
"A re-elected secretary-general can give the world the facts", International Herald Tribune, July
6, 2001 .
[emphasis added]
"Chapter V Enhancing
management Administration and
management
Accountability and
oversight The Office of
Internal Oversight Services is working in partnership with managers at all
levels to instill accountability and best management practices in the
Organization.
" "Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization," General Assembly, Official Records, UN document A/57/1 of 2002.
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