Opacity and dissembling, not transparency

If corruption is the most dangerous black hole of UN non-accountability, and whistle-blower suppression the most deep and dark one, non-transparency is the most pervasive.  It  has permeated UN relations with the outside world for some six decades.

Transparency is increasingly recognized worldwide as a key attribute of healthy organizations, and has been increasingly demanded, especially in light of the vast increase in information availability through the Internet.  An excellent report of global scope in 2002 made two key observations:

"[The OECD] … uses the term 'governance' -- and public governance in particular -- to describe how authority is distributed in the governmental system and how those who hold such authority are held to account.  When it comes to the notion of good governance, we recognize a number of generally agreed principles, including:

?            Accountability, meaning that it is possible to identify and hold public officials to account for their actions.

?            Transparency, meaning that reliable, relevant and timely information about the activities of government is available to the public.

?            Openness, meaning governments that listen to citizens and businesses, and take their suggestions into account when designing and implementing public policies. …"

"Public scrutiny of state affairs and access to information are key phases in the current debate on the development of democracy … The two concepts are interdependent, since one cannot play its part under the rule of law without the other.  There can be no public scrutiny without access to information. …

 Legislation of this type must overcome the huge temptation to control access to information … It must also overcome a culture of blatant isolation, behind which administrations have long sheltered in an effort to avoid 'undesirable' interference in their affairs."

The UN Secretariat, however, has battled diligently for 60 years against General Assembly efforts to establish transparent operations. In 1950 the Assembly first stressed the need for careful programme reviews to effectively use available resources. In the 1960s it argued that Member State criticism and public disillusionment would increase unless systematic reviews were instituted.  During the 1970s, new programming and evaluation efforts were slowly introduced, but by 1985 the Assembly was in rebellion, citing no information or critical analysis from the Secretariat on programme implementation to allow enlightened decisions.  This led the UN's top manager to state, quite reasonably, that:

 "Member States have … stressed the need to be told, more clearly and more extensively …. what has been the programmatic performance of the Secretariat, which outputs have been delivered, and with which result….

Let us strengthen the monitoring and evaluation functions …

Let us say clearly and dispassionately what has been done and with which result, and equally what has not been done and why….

Let us produce more analytical performance reports ….

I find the essential problem one of better and more transparent information, thus permitting better decisions."

Unfortunately, this simple standard of transparency has still never been achieved, in part because the General Assembly has not demanded transparent reporting, but mostly because Secretariat resistance is so deeply-ingrained in its weak management culture.  The following quotes, from 1973 through 2001, show this overpowering desire for secrecy, which has consistently led to opacity and dissembling in Secretariat reporting.

"Of all the regrettable legacies from the moral collapse of the United Nations in the early 1950s, the most insidious has been timorousness. … A group of leading officials who stood by … while scores of their subordinates were … made victims of a national reign of terror … could hardly have been expected to grow braver with the years; nor have they.  And their attitudes have permanently affected the entire UN body -- gathering momentum, so to speak, as they merged with the … bureaucracy."  [a 1973 retrospective]

"[Recently, as President of the Staff Union], I met with …. senior UN officials, [who warned me] that the staff must be extremely careful about its actions because the UN was on the verge of collapse and the tiniest upset might bring the whole structure crumbling down.  I asked ….  'Gentlemen, do you really believe that the UN is such a fragile flower?'  A solemn yes was the reply I received.  (This, I might say, is [a line] used rather consistently over the years to silence criticism and unrest.  [1979]

"Accountability, that source of institutional health, had been excluded from United Nations experience; and, along with it, indivisibly, the stimulus of direct public engagement and response. ... In offering itself as the mere creature of its member governments, the United Nations system entered a state of arrested moral development, marked by the habitual emblems of immaturity: demands for approval, and incapacity for individual or collective self-questioning."

"Any new organization … [for] the conduct of world affairs … will depend, as the United Nations has not done, on quality: on accountability to human reason and accessibility to public involvement …" [1989]

"… Always an opaque organization, it is not easy to understand the UN's workings, and almost impossible to follow the threads of its myriad activities.  Sometimes it seems more like a church for the faithful, with its attendant mysteries, than a political institution run by rational individuals.

Only four groups of people [diplomats, journalists, academics, and members of the secretariat] are familiar with its arcane ceremonies, and all of them usually conspire to sing its praises. ... [They] all have such a vested interest in the UN ... that they rarely question the organization's existence."   [1993]

“For years Western governments have complained about the lack of accountability prevailing in UN organizations, but in practice they have tolerated a degree of opacity that would be considered totally unacceptable for any civil service in a democracy.  … Inadequate internal auditing and slipshod evaluation procedures have deprived the UN’s member states of the information they need to identify the organizations’ weaknesses -- and strengths. …

… [No] amount of exhortation – as the years have proved – can compensate for the lack of routine inspection under established rules of ‘open government.’ … So ingrained is the collusion between the permanent representatives to these organizations and the secretariats that a majority for such an initiative among the UN membership would be difficult though not impossible to muster.  But many UN staff members would welcome more rigorous scrutiny …”    [1995]

"Conventionally 'internationalist' administrations … are too inclined to see the IMF and the World Bank as ends in themselves, as signs of enlightenment and virtue, however much a mess they make of things.  It is quite right to ask … whether these bodies need to exist at all, exactly what purpose they are intended to serve, and just how well they are discharging their duties, whatever these may be."    [2001]

The UN Secretariat has three key areas in which it must improve its transparency (as progressive governments and organizations must also do):

--  First, by establishing and maintaining transparency and accountability processes in its own internal management systems;

--  Second, by strengthening its management reporting on its performance and results to the General Assembly, other intergovernmental bodies, and the public, as nicely summarized by the above top manager's statement to the General Assembly in 1985; and

--  Third, by building an effective and believable public information machinery to credibly convey the UN's work, blemishes and all, to the outside world.

The first major area of Secretariat transparency efforts requiring enhanced transparency is its management systems.  UN financial management, internal control, and management information systems have struggled for years, without much success, to provide timely and informative operations data.  The UN staff rules were first criticized by the "Group of 18" report in 1986, but changed little until very recently.  "Human resources" management has also been chastised for decades, but even after the Secretariat acknowledged years of poor planning and management in 1994, there are still many continuing doubts.

The most egregious example of Secretariat foot-dragging, however, has been in UN programme planning and budgeting systems (PPBE). When the General Assembly insisted on these systems in the 1970s for better decision-making, the Secretariat constructed a tedious, cumbersome, and incomplete system.  It focused almost entirely on inputs, provided little training, and encountered the continuous resistance of managers to apply it over the next 30 years. The seven quotes which follow illustrate vividly just how, from the 1970s to 2006, the UN Secretariat can evade serious, much-needed UN management and transparency reforms. 

" Concern with capacity and performance [in the United Nations system] reaches its highest peak when draft programmes and budgets are discussed and seems to evaporate when reports on the execution of the approved programmes are reviewed. … This dichotomy … [is] one of the major causes of the shortfalls of the performance of the system."   [1973, an expert UN system observer]

"In 1990 … the ACABQ stated that much remained to be done to make the [medium-term] plan of real use to Member States and the Secretariat, and observed that evaluation had largely not been integrated into the process, while the programme performance reports were also of little use.

In 1993 the Secretary-General convened a technical seminar of experts … [which concluded] that 'Much more time is spent on reviewing plans and budgets than on implementation and evaluation' and that 'This imbalance needs to be corrected.'  Unfortunately, the resulting Secretary- General's report proposed no noticeable changes … "    [retrospective, in a 1995 external report]

"The current  [UN] budgeting process [is]  … almost surreal. …

'Priorities' are constantly skewed and distorted by activities and expenditures by United Nations entities outside the Secretariat.  … The net effect is that some 70 percent of the Organization's expenditures, for example, in … social and economic development, are made without any reference to the intricate budgetary processes …

The Medium Term Plan, in my view, is simply useless. … The tremendous effort and resources expended to produce a document which no one does (or, in all candor, should) read or refer to is simply a gross misallocation of scarce talent within the Organization."  [1993, the UN's departing top manager]

"Since a key aspect of accountability for results is transparency of performance information, management information systems would need to be able to provide improved analytical tools for the monitoring and evaluation of outputs and outcomes …

The creation of a results-based budgeting framework would … shift away from input control … It would also require a shift in the management culture of the Organization as a whole."  [1997, Secretary-General Annan]

"In many [Secretariat] departments and offices, there is still inadequate commitment to oversight, and, consequently no … [routine assessment of] progress made and results achieved. … [Progress requires that programme managers recognize] … such systems as basic management tools for improving efficiency and effectiveness of implementation."  [1998, OIOS annual report] 

"The present United Nations programming and budgeting system is complex and labour-intensive. …

Measures will be taken to streamline peacekeeping budgets, and to improve the management of the large number of trust funds through which Member States provide voluntary contributions to supplement the regular budget."    [2002, Secretary-General Annan, Note: these two improvement improvement measures are still unachieved in 2006.]

"In 2002, the … [OIOS] found that program managers and department and office heads were not complying with U.N. regulations.  … nearly half of program managers were not regularly monitoring and evaluating program performance.  In addition, program managers were not held accountable for meeting program objectives because U.N. regulations prevent linking program effectiveness and impact with program managers' performance.  U.N. officials told us that a more mature program monitoring and evaluation system is needed before program managers can be held responsible for program performance. …

The Secretary-General tasked the … OIOS to develop a strategy to systematically evaluate and monitor programme results and to introduce information systems needed … and expects to have a complete system by 2006."    [2004, an external report (emphasis added.)  In 2006, Mr. Annan merely renewed the promise for the future.]

The second major area requiring more transparency is performance reporting to the General Assembly and other intergovernmental bodies so they can fulfill their policy-making and oversight responsibilities.  Yet this area too has produced decades of foot-dragging, as shown by a series of external reports from 1984 through 2004.

--    A 1984 report found that the UN Economic and Social Council was in danger of suffocation under some 6,500 pages of session documents.  The Secretariat agreed that too many reports were descriptive rather than analytical, lacked recommendations, and should highlight policy issues and be more concise and consolidated.

--   A 1988 report found that, after 40 years, the UN had no regular systematic performance reporting to top management and intergovernmental bodies.  Existing reports were incomplete, not timely, did not identify priorities, could not integrate programme and financial data, had methodological shortcomings, and, worst of all, were not analytical.

--   A 1993 report observed that many reports did not summarize past reports, glossed over rather than pinpointed problems, and still lacked summaries, analysis, and firm conclusions and recommendations.  Such reports tied up staff resources, clogged reporting channels with such documents, and deprived management and governing bodies of the information they needed.

--    A 1994 report found that the General Assembly, at its 1993 session, complained about documents issued late, "regretted" a non-analytical report and called for it to be redone, regretted that another report requested in 1991, 1992, and 1993 was inadequate, and regretted that another report requested in 1990 had still not been prepared and should be provided in 1994.

--   A 1995 external report concluded that Secretariat reports to the General Assembly were still inadequate. The Secretary-General agreed that monitoring reports were too mechanistic, untimely, and uninformative, and evaluation reports too slow and too few to provide the needed performance reporting and analysis [still true today, as already  outlined above.]

--    The 1995 report also found that reports lacked basic elements (summaries, tables of contents), were very tardy, not action-oriented, contained almost no meaningful citations to past reports, and provided few if any graphics to make the reports more attractive and understandable.  [Again, these criticisms are still often true.] 

--   Most egregiously, another external report in 2004 observed that the Secretary-General did not periodically and comprehensively report on the impact of the many recent UN management reforms, making it hard to hold staff accountable for implementing these reforms and leaving their impact unclear.  The reports also did not provide goals and expected time frames to increase the transparency and accountability of the reform process itself.

One more key example of gross non-transparency in UN Secretariat reporting is the fundamental issue of how much money the UN spends, and how many staff it has. The following four quotes from 1973 to 2003 trace the fuzziness, defensiveness, and extreme non-transparency which surround this straight-forward topic.

"The myth that the annual United Nations budget runs around $200 million was circulated for so long that even UN leaders appeared to believe it.  Declaring the United Nations' cost to be 'less than that of the Fire Department of New York City,' Kurt Waldheim echoed, in 1972, the UN's favorite, and unfounded, slogan. A recent schizophrenic UN press release [containing that figure] … [later remarks that] 'Member States are contributing about $870 million a year to the United Nations system …

References to waste … are cheerful -- 'I'd be satisfied,' one official declares, 'if what we're doing is fifty per cent effective.' Achievements are cited, and re-cited, with triumph and even with wonder -- as if an organization that has, over nearly three decades, employed tens of thousands of persons at a cost of tens of billions of dollars could scarcely have been expected to have much to show.  [1973]

"The regular budget controls only a fraction of the total [UN] expenditures.  As much as 70 percent of the U.N.'s outlays are funded by other means …

The power to initiate and in effect authorize program activities is shared among [many] intergovernmental organs. …

  … Since all the many [approved] activities cannot be adequately carried out … there is a good deal of uncertainty as to which of them will in fact be pursued … [and how diligently.] The latitude that this leaves to lower-level intergovernmental organs and to Secretariat officials …  increases the difficulty of setting central priorities and of allocating limited financial resources in a rational way.  This great dispersion of programming power prevents the Assembly from taking full charge … a situation  that concerns (or should concern) all the U.N.'s members, whether big or small."    [1986]  

“Press reports concerning the United Nations’ ‘regular budget’ … exclude the far greater operational costs of the U.N. System.  However, I find it impossible to establish a reliable yearly total for the U.N.’s attestable over-all expenditures … It is my impression that no one knows even the approximate cost, to world citizenry, of the United Nations enterprise.

[In 1979 the U.S. State Department had] claimed, according to the Washington Post, that the intricate nature of the United Nation’s system['s] …  cumbersome administrative structure, … jealously guarded in [many agencies,] … precluded assessment by outsiders.’    [1989]

            "The United Nations, with a $1.2 billion budget … supports more than 9,000 employees worldwide and dozens of peacekeeping and relief missions."   [a New York Times article on the opening of the General Assembly, 2003]

This persistent and erratic picture of the finances of the "poor little UN" over the years (with the "UN system", which is the UN plus the "specialized agencies", often muddled in), has now been cleared up, sort of.  In recent years, the UN had actually deferred to an NGO for public estimates of its total expenditures (about $6 to $10 billion annually.)  But in 2006, Secretary-General Annan presented a first-ever chart, showing a total annual UN budget of $9.2 billion for 2005 (including regular budget, extra-budgetary, and peacekeeping categories.) However, the report then stated that this did not include an additional $10 billion per annum for "United Nations funds and programmes" such as UNICEF (which are not the "specialized agencies.")  So, it concluded, "The United Nations therefore spends almost $20 billion per year overall."  Clear?

The dissonance on UN staffing is even worse.  Instead of the 9,000 staff cited above for 2003, the UN's annual report on "Secretariat composition" in June 2005 stated that "the United Nations Secretariat" had a total of 40,047 full-time staff with appointments of one year or more (thus excluding many other shorter-term staff not tabulated). If it is this hard to merely learn how "big" the UN is, what other critical information about UN performance and accountability is lacking in its flood of public reports?

The third and final major area of required Secretariat action to enhance transparency and accountability is its "public information" activities.  The UN has been very slow to break out of its secretive habits and inform the world's citizens of what it does.  Even as late as the mid-1990s, a veteran journalist at the UN observed that "the UN has the media relations of a 1950s state bureaucracy," and another stated that

"Many studies on the UN are produced in academia, and governments conduct their own enquiries, but from a journalist's point of view the UN is one of the world's most under-reported organisations. So much is taken at face value and so little is known. A fog of misinformation envelops the Secretariat, a situation which ideally suits its member governments.  It is not always possible to keep some matters secret for ever …

The world of international diplomacy is a closed shop and curious outsiders are often dismissed.  The covert behaviour practised in this twilight zone helps to ensure that information is reserved for those with an inside track.  There is an ever-present inclination toward cover-up."  

A very detailed analysis of the experience of the Secretariat's Department of Information (DPI) in past decades found that it was characterized by bureaucratic ineptitude. It therefore suffered through continuous institutional reviews because of concern over its waste of resources and mismanagement, its long search for a clear group of target audiences, and, overall, an identity crisis exacerbated by the UN's long-standing image problems with the public.

Secretary-General Annan, however, was the UN's most media-sensitive and high-profile leader ever.  He concluded in 2002 that the DPI must be restructured and modernized. An external review in 2004 found that DPI had reorganized into divisions of "outreach", "news and media", and "strategic communications." The "new" DPI had sought to "achieve greater public impact", bolster the "flagging image" of the UN in the Middle East, and "generate support for new and expanding [peacekeeping] operations. The results of its recent reforms are still unclear.

This new UN and DPI outreach efforts, however, occur amidst powerful and complex cross-currents in the global media, especially with the new transparency provided by the Internet.

--  The UN currently budgets some $2.7 billion billion a year for extra-budgetary (that is, voluntary) funding, plus $4.7 billion for peacekeeping funds and forces.  It must aggressively compete with many NGOs and other international organizations vying for funds for these and all other global economic, social, security, human rights, and other priority programmes.  As many observers have noted, staying "in the spotlight" of publicity means the UN and the others risk "distorting their principles and alienating their constituencies for the sake of appealing to self-interested donors in rich nations."

--  The UN Charter's founding principles are still of critical importance in all areas of global affairs, but UN leaders tend too often to merely preach moral values and rectitude for others, as in Mr. Annan's Global Compact. Again, conscientious observers and participants have warned that organizations that do not adhere to international human rights (and other) standards increasingly risk their reputations (and jeopardize their self-interest). The UN, unfortunately, increasingly falls into this "at risk" category, rather than leading by example.

--   There are an unending, and expanding, series of valuable "public goods", which all internationally-active organizations want to provide  --  with "other people's money", of course.  Yet the enormous range of worthy international crisis choices leads repeatedly to "donor fatigue," which only increases fund-raising pressures and the trumpeting of one's own causes and services over others, which leads, of course, to even more pressures that compromise transparency.   

--   The UN still has a severe lack of focus in its strategic thinking, and has repeatedly been urged to wisely concentrate on the things it can do best.  But the Secretariat, and Member States, have insisted that "the world organization" must do a little bit of everything in almost every conceivable area, including international taxation, human cloning, control of the Internet, and Mr. Annan's own "global agenda." The practical result is much effort and funding devoted to fuzzy reports on grand topics where the UN purports to lead, but provides little analysis or constructive action (yet such efforts do create new UN bureaucratic structures, prestigious new high-level posts, and new excuses for conferences and meetings.)

Finally, for the past decade the UN has also had its most public Secretary-General ever. He and other top officials provided many "op-ed" pronouncements on global policy issues and UN operations in the print media, appeared often on worldwide TV news shows, and greatly expanded UN websites. Mr. Annan put on extravagant celebrations in New York at several General Assembly sessions, and there were several international rock concerts. In 2001, an international article glowingly profiled "The five virtues of Kofi Annan," and he was also cited by the international diplomatic community as being "saint-like", having "great moral stature", and as "the best Secretary-General ever." 

In addition, Mr. Annan also assembled a group of some 90 celebrity "Goodwill Ambassadors" to publicly represent UN causes around the world, and another 90 high-level (mostly retired) dignitaries who serve as his "special and personal representatives and envoys" worldwide.  What are the annual travel, per diem, and support costs for this 180-person phalanx?   Well, at least the media roster of "expert sources" who are available to provide positive media commentary on the UN and Mr. Annan's efforts do so at no charge.

The 2001 Nobel Peace Prize gave Mr. Annan even more personal gravitas, and half of the $946,200 prize as well, with the rest to "the U.N."  The Nobel Committee cited him as "pre-eminent in bringing new life to the organization" (a judgment which now seems very awkward in light of the many management scandals under his leadership since 2004.)  The jubilant Indian ambassador in New York said that it would make him "a real global celebrity, like a rock star." But Rwandan genocide survivors criticized the choice, and survivors of the Srebrenica massacre stated that he had won "the Nobel prize for genocide."  Nevertheless, the "rock star" image grew, at least for a while.  As one article in 2002 put it:

"New Yorkers, competing to lure Kofi Annan to their dinners and benefits, are making him the most sociable, plugged-in United Nations secretary general this city has ever known.  Sometimes that translates into as many as five nights out a week, he says.  That is on top of all those official lunches, diplomatic receptions and traveling: 20 countries so far this year.

'He's not bought in completely to the fact that he's the current social star of New York parties', says [one friend].

[One close observer] … says Mr. Annan mixes more in New York society than any of his predecessors. …"

Mr. Annan himself had cited Dag Hammarskjöld's observation that speaking out was "a question not of a man, but of an institution." But one must wonder what his ubiquitous personal media exposure (especially since it is now rather tattered), will do for, or to, his successor as UN Secretary-General.  An old story noted that the UN's top official was "all Secretary, and no General."  Mr. Annan worked his hardest to reverse that situation, but the General Assembly, in May 2006, firmly reemphasized the need for greater accountability of the Secretary-General to Member States.  Will his successor have to suffer a sharp status reversal to restore some sense of balance? 

Nevertheless, after his "annus horribilis" in 2004, Mr. Annan had (and then very much needed) no less than five aides and units to call on to preserve his public image: the head and other officials of the DPI, his enlarged Spokesman's Office, his Assistant Secretary-General for External Affairs, his Communications Director and staff, and a public relations firm, or at least a partner thereof.  They, and other supporters, worked very hard in 2005, as indicated below.

"Two of the world's most impressive spin machines are locked in deadly conflict.  On the one side is [the so-called] … 'vast right-wing conspiracy', a bunch of conservative US senators and congressmen, … [plus several major media organizations], all calling for the head of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

On the other side is the huge amorphous mass of the global great and good, all clucking in unison that Kofi Annan is the best UN secretary-general since Dag Hammarskjold … although a list that includes Kurt Waldheim and Boutros Boutros-Ghali is not much competition. Led by [some political leaders, reinforced by some major governments, newspaper editorial boards, and news bulletins] …,  the international establishment has rallied to Annan as the first African to run the world body, and as the first secretary-general to bring forward thoughtful and even bold plans for UN reform.

Kofi Annan must stay, they all cry, most of them thrilling to the symbolism of a clash between President George Bush, who proudly sports a small American flag on his lapel, and Nobel peace prize laureate Kofi Annan, whose equally well-tailored lapel sports a discreet dove, tastefully wrought in white enamel."

However, the last word. at least in the 2005 image battle, went to Paul Volcker and the Independent Inquiry on the Iraq Oil-for-food programme.  Its final report concluded, with regard to the UN overall, and Mr. Annan in particular, that:

"The main conclusions are unambiguous.

The [United Nations] requires stronger executive leadership, thoroughgoing administrative reform, and more reliable controls and auditing. …

There was corruption within the United Nations at a critical management point.  There was exposure of important administrative and control weaknesses … The consequences? An avoidable loss of assistance to Iraq's population and a grievous loss of credibility to the United Nations. …

The Committee believes: first, 'professional disciplines' at the United Nations are weak and eroded …; second, there appears to be a pervasive culture of responsibility avoidance and resistance to accountability …"

"As the Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations, the Secretary-General carried oversight and management responsibilities for the entire Secretariat.  That particularly included auditing and controls functions that had demonstrable problems …

… The record amply demonstrates a number of instances where there was a lack of support for and oversight of the Programme by the Secretary-General. 

… the cumulative management performance of the Secretary-General fell short of the standards that the [UN] should strive to maintain."

       *       *       *       *

In Dec 2005, Mr. Annan  optimistically stated that "If there's one thing I would like to hand over to my successor when I leave office next year, it is that it should be a UN that is fit for the many varied tasks and challenges that we are asked to take on today."  He joined his interim management reforms of May 2005 with sweeping new management reform proposals to the General Assembly in May 2006 (just before it decided whether to withhold funds because of the lack of Secretariat management reform action). But Mr. Annan issued these reports as he was departing, for his successor to somehow implement as he could not despite a decade in charge. His last-of four reform proposals (1997, 2002, 2005, 2006) are encouraging.  But they are definitely not as significant as they seem.       

First, the Iraq oil-for-food scandal and the negative findings of the UN staff Integrity Survey forced not only the May 2005 Secretariat mea culpa on accountability and oversight problems, but some generally feeble accountability and transparency actions concerning senior officials. The old game of senior management committees was invoked again, this time with "executive-level decision-making committees", a new Management Performance Board of senior managers to oversee their fellow senior managers, and an Oversight Committee, including a few token "external members", to "follow up on" oversight body recommendations.   

A new, more rigorous system to select senior officials for their management skills was declared, but the jury is still out: for instance, more transparent procedures were strongly urged in 2006 to select Mr. Annan's successor, but then postponed to "wait until 2011."  The Secretariat did announce that, to overcome misconduct problems, in future senior Secretariat officials must be "properly briefed" and given a formal induction programme.  More financial disclosure by senior officials was also touted, but only 80 percent had filed their reports a year later.  The other 20 percent perhaps represent the recalcitrant UN manager clique, and they included Mr. Annan himself, until media pressure forced him into an embarrassing reversal in September 2006.                                       

Second, there were major reform promises on Secretariat management systems, but with important qualifiers.  As discussed above, reform action on programming systems and especially programme monitoring and evaluation, underway for three decades, had already been crippled in 2004 by manager resistance and Secretariat admissions that a "more robust" system was still needed (so Mr. Annan blithely proposed  another such "reform" in 2006.) New International Public Sector Accounting Standards would be adopted, that is, if the General Assembly approved and provided considerable funds for the work (and even then only by January 2010.)   Whistle-blowers will be protected and even allowed to go outside to national authorities or the press (but what will really happen to their careers afterward?) 

Among other proposed reforms, UN procurement would undergo very serious changes (but only because a major peacekeeping procurement scandal that erupted in late 2005 forced the issue.) Human resources reform proposals were postponed to late 2006.  Yet another of the two-decades of efforts to integrate UN management information systems and establish strategic leadership for information technology, would be made, again if funds were provided.  However, Mr. Annan's last reform reports scarcely touched on Secretariat internal controls -- the most important weapon to fight corruption in an organization.  Mr. Annan had decided in 1997 on the gesture of "adopting" international internal control standards, and thereafter gave little if any emphasis to this important area. Happily, an independent expert review of UN governance and oversight in July 2006  (see next para.) insisted on the urgent need for UN top management to develop, maintain, and annually report to the General Assembly on internal controls.  

Third, some much more significant reforms --  perhaps -- on reporting to governing bodies appeared.  In August 2005, Secretary-General Annan acknowledged the need to enhance general transparency, and in his "Investing in the UN' report in March 2006 he admitted the "acute lack of clarity and transparency" in budgeting and decision-making processes, and a public "ill-served" by UN policy on outside access to documentation. An excellent, detailed, independent expert report released in July 2006, however, then provided a  comprehensive -- and ever so long overdue -- review of UN governance and oversight.  It makes a very strong case for a revitalized system of future management reports to enhance UN decision-making, including much greater emphasis on transparency and accountability.

Secretary-General Annan's own detailed report on reporting mechanisms in May 2006 proposed "an annual report that links policy priorities, programme activities, and resources and management challenges … to better assess [UN] performance."  In addition, streamlined, strategic, and more analytical management-related and financial reports would also be made to enhance UN decision-making.  Further, the UN would demonstrate good governance through enhanced transparency, "by increasing the Secretariat's capacity to implement information disclosure proposals" [this tortured and obtuse phrase is not a promising start toward future UN clarity and transparency in its communications.]   

Fourth and finally, little was said in 2006 about DPI in the above dramatic management reform proposals.  But the Secretariat did conduct a public relations "main event" during 2005 and especially in 2006, as Mr. Annan and his new Deputy Secretary-General, Mark Malloch Brown, sought to establish much more autonomy and discretionary freedom for Secretariat managers.

As Mr. Malloch Brown aggressively put it, Member States should "back off and allow us to manage this organization."  This belligerent attitude hardly contributed to the managerial accountability that the General Assembly has sought since 1993, and it is certainly not very convincing when it comes right after the Iraq oil-for-food, peacekeeping procurement, field staff security, peacekeeping and other sexual harassment, and other recent UN management scandals.  Member States did not react warmly to it in 2006.  This very important confrontation, going back more than a decade, is discussed in detail in the next Black Holes subsection, "Free the [incompetent] managers".

IO Watch is particularly concerned about much more transparent performance reporting by the Secretariat to the General Assembly, Member States, and the public, which, like everything else at the UN, has been urged for years.  The content of Mr. Annan's proposed new annual report is not yet very clear, and for years the Secretariat's approach to budgetary, financial, and  operational decision-making has been encapsulated in the nifty phrase "just leave the money on a tree stump in a clearing in the middle of the forest in the moonlight at midnight."  IO Watch thus offers proposals on what transparent annual Secretary-General's reports on resource status and results should look like, in this website's subsections on Annual results reporting to the General Assembly and Annual status reporting to the General Assembly.

Clearly, the UN needs reform action on many fronts to strengthen its transparency and accountability.  Some significant actions have been proposed, but the Secretariat has repeatedly failed to implement such actions in the past.  IO Watch wishes to note just one awkward priority.  In 2006, the UN budgeted $89 million a year (and 759 staff) for the DPI, but only $41 million (and 234 staff) for the OIOS.  Thus, it can be argued that the UN was spending more than twice as much to gloss over and distract from UN corruption as it spent to combat and prevent that corruption through an overworked and understaffed OIOS.

Such continuing UN lack of commitment to transparent assessment of its performance problems is further illustrated by an extreme assertion about UN transparency made by Shashi Tharoor, the head of DPI, in 2001 (now decisively negated by the many Secretariat mismanagement scandals since 2004.)  It stands in stark contrast to the wise concluding comment of a media consultant's report, which the UN still ignores at its peril.                    

"[Question:]  How do you ensure that DPI isn't seen as a propaganda tool, yet that it serves the UN's objectives?

[Mr. Tharoor's answer]  By telling the truth!  Information isn't propaganda unless you doctor it to distort reality or hide inconvenient facts.  We don't do that.

I think you'll admit that under Secretary General Kofi Annan we have the most transparent United Nations imaginable --- one that has officially authorized all staff to speak to the press within their areas of competence, one that has openly admitted its failures and mistakes (on issues as major as Srebrenica and Rwanda), one that has encouraged media access at all levels.  That's the spirit that will animate everything that DPI does …"     

"The image of the United Nations must stand up to the increased scrutiny that greater public awareness will place it under. Image-making is about communicating the positive truth and being honest and open about fundamental problems in a positive way.  It is not about hiding failings or scandals because they have an unfortunate habit of surfacing in the media. … 

That is why, ultimately, the image of the United Nations can only benefit  from a thorough reform of its management system, which should help make its operations more effective and simpler to understand. This reform would also create a marvelous opportunity for the United Nations to be seen as implementing the changes necessary to spruce up its image. Reform of the system is, therefore, the ideal opportunity for the United Nations to look again at the elements that compose its collective being in order to create a more focused identity. …"  (emphasis added.)

Pace-UK  International  Affairs,  Making  the  United Nations a winner,
London, 1987, p. 77.