UN officials remain comfortably

 outside the law II 

D.  Heightened criticisms of the UN

 rule-without-law situation, 2005 ff.

The continuous dissatisfaction with the poor rule of law situation within the UN, as embodied in the three preceding areas on weak staff rights, internal justice defects, and UN managers’ impunity and hidden punitive actions, finally reached a new crescendo which began in 2005. Such dissatisfaction is not new at the UN.  At present, however, there is much greater public agreement that, just maybe, something can and certainly should be done to allow the UN and its staff to join the rest of mankind under the rule of law. 

The following brief sampling of key, representative quotes from the IO Watch Archive, and especially its Overview Quotes material on the home page, indicate the growing recognition from February 2005 through November 2006 of the grave defects that exist.

"There is a culture of secrecy that characterizes not only the World Bank, but most of the vital international organizations -- including the United Nations.  Unless these public entities establish independent oversight, external auditing of managerial and financial controls and safe channels for reporting wrongdoing, scandalous harm will continue to weaken them and only compound the grief suffered by the billions of needy people they are mandated to serve."

[An accountability expert, February 2005]      

"The issues raised in the … [Secretary-General's October 2004 report on internal justice] had been raised by the [ACABQ] as far back as 1985. … The problems alluded to had persisted over many years … The Committee takes this matter very seriously as it has a significant impact on staff morale and productivity as well as … [organizational efficiency] and could also have a significant financial impact. …

The Committee regrets that the [report  was late and unresponsive] …

The Committee has consistently maintained over the years that the problems besetting the administration of justice … involve much more than a perceived lack of resources; indeed, at the core of the matter lie difficulties with administrative processes and procedures and the culture of staff-management relations.” 

"[The General Assembly’s administrative advisory committee, emphasis added, February, 2005]  

"The United Nations … has its own ways of dealing with whistle-blowers.  Mostly, it fires them. …

Would-be U.N. whistle-blowers are on perilous ground, as they have no legal right to defend themselves.  'All they can do is complain and say the bully should be punished' said Tom Devine, legal director of the Government Accountability Project … The United Nations, Devine says, provides staff with fewer rights to defend themselves than 'any other government agency I've encountered, either on the national or the international level."

[A media investigation report, emphasis added, March 2005] 

"The United Nations Human Rights Commission, the UN's principal forum for promoting human rights, opens its annual six-week session today amid unprecedented criticism of its competence and credibility.

For years human rights groups have complained of growing politicisation and double standards …

The authoritative high-level panel on UN reform … last December said the reputation of the UN itself was threatened by the commission's 'legitimacy deficit' and 'eroding credibility and professionalism.'”

[Article, March 2005] 

"The General Assembly …

"Stressing that the system of justice in the United Nations as a whole should be independent, transparent, effective, efficient and fair, …

Regretting that the present system of administration of justice in the Secretariat continues to be slow, cumbersome, and costly; …

Decides that the Secretary-General shall form a panel of external and independent experts to consider redesigning the system of administration of justice;

[49.(a) … [and]            propose a new model for resolving staff grievances … that is independent, transparent, effective, efficient and adequately resourced and that ensures managerial accountability; …

[49c.] … while acknowledging … in particular the immunity of United Nations staff from national laws and thus the lack of recourse to national courts …"

[Resolution, emphasis added, of April 2005]   

"'Unprecedented challenges' faced by the UN have shown that the world body must immediately reform' …

'The UN must take real action now …

'Perhaps the most obvious shortcomings identified by the Volcker Inquiry and other crises are in the area of oversight and accountability. The current 'control' systems for monitoring management performance and preventing fraud and corruption are insufficient and must be significantly enhanced,' she said."

[UN deputy secretary-general, emphasis added, May 2005]                                                                                                  

"The main conclusions are unambiguous.

The [United Nations] requires stronger executive leadership, thoroughgoing administrative reform, and more reliable controls and auditing. …

There was corruption within the United Nations at a critical management point.  … The consequences? An avoidable loss of assistance to Iraq's population and a grievous loss of credibility to the United Nations. …

There appears to be a pervasive culture of responsibility avoidance and resistance to accountability …”

[Volcker inquiry report on UN oil-for-food programme, emphasis added, September 2005]   

"The [General Assembly’s Fifth Committee discussed] … the proposed framework on new contractual arrangements within the United Nations. …

Jamaica's representative, speaking on behalf of the 'Group of 77' developing countries and China … stated that the Group was prepared to consider the proposed system of continuing, fixed-term and temporary contracts … but also emphasized the importance of job security for staff members, saying that it was vital to ensure impartiality, independence and integrity of the staff."

[UN document, emphasis added, October 2005]  

"In a sense, the alleged irregularities in peacekeeping procurement [recently reported], involving possible waste and fraud of up to $300 [million], do more damage to the UN's reputation than the larger abuse of the UN oil-for-food programme for Iraq. … The UN Secretariat could rightly put some of the blame on the Security Council [in oil-for-food] …The secretariat has no such plausible scapegoat in its mismanagement of peacekeeping procurement."

[Article, emphasis added, January 2006] 

“A [new] report by the [US] Government Accountability Office … describes the procurement office [that spent about $1.6 billion last year] as understaffed, poorly trained and badly lacking the oversight that would uncover corruption, fraud and waste.

Eight senior staff members were suspended with pay earlier this year … [They] likely have diplomatic immunity, but [the UN's top manager] said Secretary-General Kofi Annan would lift that protection if authorities request it. …

'U.N. resources are unnecessarily vulnerable to mismanagement, waste, fraud and abuse', the GAO report says …”

 [Article on a major external expert report, emphasis added, April 2006] 

"The United Nations was bracing itself [yesterday] for a potentially major budget crisis, after the developing world rejected entreaties by rich countries and the UN secretariat, and was expected to press ahead with a resolution many fear could sink efforts to reform the organization. …

At the heart of the showdown lay a power struggle for control of the UN, between developing nations, which constitute the majority of its membership, the developed world, which pays most of the UN's bills, and the UN Secretariat, which wants more autonomy."

[Article, emphasis added, April 2006] 

            "Despairing of a [malfunctioning UN 'internal justice'] system …, [UN staff member Cynthia] Brzak, who two years ago … [alleged] sexual harassment, is now … [asking] for a hearing at the U.S. Supreme Court.

The pleadings highlight the fundamental problem that senior U.N. officials enjoy the privileges of sovereign immunity, but because the U.N. is not a sovereign state, they are spared the accountability that tends to come … [in a democratic] national government.

Brzak alleges that U.N. officials retaliated for her whistle-blowing by inflicting an array of punishing measures … [and] includes the allegation, for example, that [Secretary-General Kofi] 'Annan ignores the investigation report [in her favor] and U. N. procedures, which is manifestly illegal.'

[Article, emphasis added, May 2006] 

"The General Assembly this afternoon adopted a resolution [which] … highlighted … strengthened accountability in the Organization and … ensuring greater accountability of the Secretary-General to Member States.  It requested the Secretary-General to specifically define accountability, as well as clear accountability mechanisms, in the context of a series of reports requested in the resolution, and to propose clear parameters for its applications and instruments for its rigorous enforcement -- without exception -- at all levels."

[UN document,  emphasis added, May 2006] 

            "Secretary-General Kofi Annan himself is now instructing the U.S. on how to treat the corruption-plagued, unreformed and unrepentant U.N.

If the US will only [cooperate] … says Annan, everyone … can 'turn down their rhetoric' and 'engage in serious negotiations' which will be used 'as a basis for more fundamental change,' which will happen 'later.'

For Kofi Annan, of course, there's not a lot of 'later' left. But there has been no major reform. …

The U.N.'s real problem today is … that one after another, allegations of U.N. misconduct, mismanagement, conflicts of interest, and corruption have turned out to be true.”

[Article by expert UN observer, emphasis added, June 2006] 

"Far from being a beacon of justice to the countries of the world, the United Nations is 'in breach of its own human rights standards because of the unfair way it treats its own employees.' according to a … [new] report by an independent panel … appointed after staffers repeatedly complained about abuse by their superiors in the organization and the lack of accountable bodies in which to air their grievances.

[The panel head described] … a system where everything is conducted 'under wraps and in secret,'. …[and] said justice is all but impossible for [UN] employees.  The existing structure 'is a sclerotic system that dates back to the League of Nations', he said …”

[Report by experts for UN staff union, emphasis added, June 2006] 

"The United Nations' efforts to seek justice for the 1999 atrocities in East Timor were plagued by mistakes and missteps, abandoned prematurely, and have contributed to the fragile state of the tiny country's fledgling judiciary, according to [a detailed report by] a leading expert on international war crimes tribunals …

The report accuses the UN of a 'massive institutional failure … to create a judicial enterprise worthy of the values and standards that the United Nations represents.'"

[Article on expert report, emphasis added, June 2006] 

“Failing seismic amendments to the [UN] Charter, there is still a lot that can be done to improve today's rather sorry state of affairs: … regarding standards when applying … UN policies.  They … also apply to the Secretary General's office itself; like Caesar's wife, it has to be above suspicion, a house of rectitude, efficiency, and fairness. … The Secretariat needs to have a record that is spotless and unchallengeable."

[An eminent historian’s new book on the UN, emphasis added, June 2006] 

"Oil-for-Food has had its first airing in [a US federal court in New York, and a South Korean businessman was found guilty] …

The U.N. itself operates immune to any system of justice ... but at least … [its] location puts within reach of the law some of the private players who feed illicitly off the U.N. stew of money, secrecy, diplomatic immunity, and privilege. …

The jury saw … [exhibits and heard witnesses questioned] in open court -- unlike the [private interviews conducted] by Paul Volcker's secretive probe, commissioned by the U.N.  … We now have a verdict that begins to cut through the massive haze that has surrounded the U.N. Oil-for-Food scandal, in which, at the U.N. itself, not a single official has even been fired, let alone required to face a prosecutor in open court. “

 [An expert observer of the UN, emphasis added, July 2006]   

"[A panel of experts today made] recommendations for overhauling the … [United Nations'] system of internal justice … [stating that] a 'fundamental overhaul' is needed for managerial reform at the UN to succeed. … The current appeals system 'doesn't work', said [Redesign Panel member Diego Garcia-Sayan.

… Another panel member said the experts had found that staff members in the field had 'no clue' about their rights, about internal justice. 'A lot of frustrations, but nobody knows where to go, what to do.' …

The … [current system], the experts said … 'is costly, in terms of time, staff dissatisfaction and the reputation of the Organization.'"

"[Mr. Annan’s “independent panel”, emphasis added, July 2006: see also the staff union’s panel report, second June 2006 item above.]  

"The United Nations has failed to … [act on some] key recommendations of an investigation into corruption in its oil-for-food program in Iraq, …[Mark Pieth, one of three members of the inquiry team, said in an interview.] … They're not really taking us seriously," he said. …

Volcker's probe … castigated top U.N. officials for tolerating corruption and the Security Council for ignoring $11 billion in smuggled oil and other illicit earnings outside the program …

The inquiry also said the United Nations needed to weed out and remove incompetent employees, but this has not been done.  'Its very difficult, it goes against the spirit of the institution, but that's what we are demanding,' Pieth said. …

[He also observed that] some 500-1,000 cases mentioned in the Volcker Inquiry's final report are clear-cut cases of corruption …"

[Article, emphasis added, September, 2006]      

"As Annan now says he will disclose, when and whether it will be to the public and why it took so long go unasked", September 2006.

"Kojo's Mercedes", September 2006

“Mercedes mystery: More awkward questions at the UN",  November 2005.

"UN admits to errors in its report on destruction of Congolese village of Kazana, Safeguards not in place", September 2006.

"Annan family ties with purchaser from Compass, embroiled in UN scandal, raise unanswered ethical questions", August 2006.

"It is against the rules,  Does Annan have a 'dog in that fight'?",  July 2006.

"Kofi Annan's conflicts of interest must be investigated", May 2006.

"Old ties resurface in new Annan project at U.N.", March 2006.

[A very small sampling of investigative articles on the UN, 2006]

"[As the UN chooses a new Secretary General] … we need someone who will be the un-Kofi …

Two patterns … exemplify what is wrong with the United Nations culture -- self-protection and self-importance. …

Failure during Kori Annan's regime has been rewarded with promotions as long as the UN insiders … protect the UN organization where they work from the real consequences of each others' actions. 

The next Secretary-General must be a role model, who has zero tolerance for corruption, nepotism and mismanagement.”

[Article, emphasis added, September 2006] 

"[An expanded UN has failed to] … operate effectively or efficiently, [one expert says] … 'and part of that is because Kofi Annan has not been an effective and efficient manager.'

That view, widely held among Annan admirers and detractors alike, has led many analysts to conclude that what the UN needs most now … is a [strong] manager.  …

'What is needed … is someone who is tremendously focused on reforming a highly flawed institution', says another expert. …  'You need someone who won't just preside over a deep well of corruption but will dig in and do something about it.'

 [Article, emphasis added, September 2006]

"In his book UN corruption 101, Edwin Nhliziyo lays bare the … tales of rampant fraud, waste and abuse that he saw during the 22 years he spent [at the UN.]

Nhliziyo says graft has been business as usual under Secretary-General Kofi Annan. … He knew about the problems and he did nothing to stop it' …

Rarely is anyone punished for misappropriating U.N. funds, Nhliziyo said.  'If they catch you with the money, even though they lost money, they don't know what to do with you," he said.  …

'I love the UN,' [he] said.  'You feel a sense of helplessness about an organization that can do so much, but there's a frustration that no one does anything."       

[A veteran UN auditor, emphasis added, October 2006] 

"The UN-appointed … [$35 million Volcker Oil-for-Food investigation led to no punishment or prosecution of a single UN staffer, but] the US Attorney of the Southern District of New York … has had somewhat different results.

[They include the indictment of a former UN commodity procurement head for swinging UN contracts] to Indian companies; an indicted 44-member alleged international narcotics-trafficking organization including a Somali UN employee who used the UN diplomatic pouch to smuggle khat into the United States; the indictment last September of the head of the UN General Assembly budget oversight committee for money-laundering; and the guilty plea of a former UN procurement official to conspiracy, wire fraud and money laundering charges.]

Is all this a sign of a thorough cleanup at the UN?  Or a mere sample of what lies beneath the surface?  For the $5.3 billion or so the U.S. is now spending every year on the UN … we deserve much clearer insights and answers than UN 'transparency' allows."

[An expert UN observer, emphasis added, November 2006] 

*        *          *          *

The preceding four subsections of this last Black Holes analysis highlight the lengthy struggles to establish the rule of law and accountability in United Nations operations in the critical areas of staff rights, internal justice, and impunity, especially during the last decade.  As summarized by two “benchmark” quotes from the 1980s versus three more from 2005-2006, and as described in much more detail in the IO Watch archive subsections on The UN Old Boys’ Last Hurrah?,  things have not gone well.

“Many of the [current] charges of [UN] waste, inefficiency, duplication, etc., are not accurate … it will be necessary to refute these charges by clear evidence to the contrary.

 … [The ACC] recognizes its responsibility to improve the image of the United Nations so as to reassure Governments and the general public that it is an efficient and effective mechanism for dealing with the important issues of concern to the international community."

[UN system executive heads, 1982]                                                                                   

“Article 97 of the Charter [confers on the Secretary-General] … the responsibility for managing the organization. …

… Efficient management of the staff should rest upon clear, coherent and transparent rules and regulations … [which allow the UN] to … [meet] the highest standards. ….

The officials responsible for the management of the staff [at all levels] must implement these rules and regulations.  Special responsibility … rests with the senior managers.  In this respect, the importance of selecting high-level officials with the necessary management skills cannot be over-emphasized."

[High-level expert group report, emphasis added, 1986]

"The main conclusions are unambiguous.

The [United Nations] requires stronger executive leadership, thoroughgoing administrative reform, and more reliable controls and auditing. …

There was exposure of important administrative and control weaknesses … There appears to be a pervasive culture of responsibility avoidance and resistance to accountability; … and an absence of adequate and independent control and auditing capacity."

[The Volcker inquiry report, emphasis added, September 2005] 

"A radically expanded range of activities calls for a radical overhaul of the United Nations Secretariat -- its rules, structure, systems, and culture.  Up to now, that has not happened. …

We have too few skilled managers …  Our management system … lacks the capacity, controls, flexibility, robustness and indeed transparency [required] …

Perhaps above all the management culture … has not changed significantly since at least the 1970s.  Indeed, systems have continued to weaken as challenges have grown." 

[Secretary-General Annan, “Investing in the United Nations”, emphasis added, March 2006]

"The General Assembly … adopted resolutions on … the Secretary-General's management reform proposals …

[It] … highlighted the importance of strengthened accountability in the Organization and of ensuring greater accountability of the Secretary-General to Member States.  It requested the Secretary-General to specifically define accountability, as well as clear accountability mechanisms … and to propose clear parameters for its applications and instruments for its rigorous enforcement -- without exception -- at all levels."

[UN press release on a General Assembly Resolution, emphasis added, May 2006]

In fact, Mr. Annan and his predecessors have failed by their own criteria to protect and enhance the rule of law in the UN, as clearly enunciated in two official commitments.

"United Nations staff members [especially managers in administration and finance] … are required to report to senior management any inappropriate uses of [UN resources].  … Ample provision exists [in the Staff Rules and Financial Rules] for assigning personal responsibility … for any financial loss incurred … 

The Secretary-General attaches great importance to his fiduciary responsibility vis-à-vis Member States for the prudent management of resources entrusted to the Organization. Care is taken to ensure that these resources are utilized for the purposes for which they were provided, that they are spent with all due regard for economy and that there is accountability at all stages for their use." 

[Secretary-General’s report on reporting “inappropriate resource use”,  emphasis added, 1992] 

"The jurisdictional immunity of the [United Nations] legally obligates it to have just and effective internal processes to deal with grievances and appeals by staff, and with disciplinary cases … [as] an indispensable aid to maintaining staff morale, as well as enforcing accountability."   

[ Secretary-General Annan’s report on the administration of justice, emphasis added, August 2000]    

This continuing failure to ensure fundamental human rights and the rule of law in the UN Secretariat leaves its senior officials, and the incoming secretary-general, in a very awkward position, once again as eloquently described by Mr. Annan.

“The United Nations has a special stake, and a special responsibility, in promoting respect for human rights worldwide …

One of my priorities as secretary general has been to try … [to make] human rights central to all the UN’s work. …

We must put an end to impunity. … We must fight terrorism in conformity with international law … [including] … the right to due process and the judgement of a court.

Once we adopt a policy of making exemptions to these rules or excusing breaches of them, no matter how narrow, we are on a slippery slope.

… It is [the] individual person whose rights must be preserved and respected.  The task of ensuring that that happens lies at the very heart of the UN’s mission.”

Kofi Annan, “Human rights: We must do better”, International Herald Tribune, December 9-10, 2006. [emphasis added]

Current UN operations, which continue to permit almost total impunity for senior officials and make many exemptions to the UN rules for them, are of course a grave flaw and undermine UN credibility.  They lead to two frank and final observations about the UN Secretariat’s current defective “rule without law” situation, one scholarly, the other a “bare-knuckle, street-corner” assessment.

"One of the fundamental concerns of the modern state is the manner in which power and authority are wielded by those who govern in the name of pursuing societal goals and objectives. …  It is obvious that the more society is administered, the more power is concentrated in the hands of ministers and public servants. 

Generally, public officials and their organizations are considered accountable only to the extent that they are legally required to answer for their actions. …

Within [a global context of public concern and political responsibility] … public accountability is] … a [broader] strategy to secure compliance with accepted standards and as a means to minimize the abuse of power and authority.”   

Joseph G. Jabbra  and O. P. Dwivedi, eds., Public service accountability: A comparative perspective, Kumarian, West Hartford, CN (USA), 1989, pp. 1, 5.   [emphasis added.]