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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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Overview
of IO Watch Archive Quotes I 1943-1994 1.
"In
1943
Mr. C. W. Jenks
emphasized that quality of leadership would dominate the effectuality of a
future United Nations Organization; and listed as the desirable attributes
of an international civil servant
'integrity, conviction, courage, imagination, drive, and technical
grasp -- in that order.'" Shirley Hazzard,
Defeat of an ideal: A study of the self-destruction of the United
Nations, Atlantic-Little, Brown, Boston-Toronto, 1973, p. 132.
2.
"Article 100.
2. Each Member of the United Nations
undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the
responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to
influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. Article
101. 1. The staff shall be appointed by
the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General
Assembly.
3. The paramount consideration
in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions
of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of
efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the
importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as
possible." Charter of the United Nations, 1945,
Articles 100 and 101.
[emphasis added0
3.
"All
but a tiny minority [of the new UN staff of about 3,000 people] had been
appointed by the end of August [1946], and most were appointed
between April and July. Where
did this swarm come from?
Some of them had, like most Assistant Secretaries-General, been
delegates or on delegation staffs in the early days. Some were friends of delegates,
and got through [by] what is known in international secretariats as
political pressure -- which can easily be repulsed if the authorities have
the will. Some -- and
possibly the largest number -- found their way through the friendship of a
senior officer." Walter R. Crocker, "Some notes on the United
Nations Secretariat", International Organization, Vol. IV, No. 4,
November 1950, pp.
609-610. 4.
"In the Secretariat
. there is no unifying directive on the
functions of management.
. The need to keep subordinates informed of what
is going on; the need to convey just praise and blame; the need for the
impartial award of privilege and promotion; the need for discipline; the
need to avoid unnecessary impositions on the time and energy of
subordinates; the need to set a personal example do not seem to be
appreciated as well as they should be.
. These major shortcomings
. are
accompanied by the less important but nevertheless tiresome defects in
working conditions
. Add to this the insecurity implicit in staff
reductions and in the adjustments required to achieve proper geographic
distribution
The staff feels the need for a
lead from the top to combat these disrupting
factors." A confidential analysis in April 1947 of the UN Secretariat's morale, as quoted in Stephen Baldwin, "Good management in the United Nations", Secretariat News (New York), January 31, 1986, pp. 11-12.
5.
"[In 1950]
the General Assembly
stressed the need for careful programme reviews to effectively
use available resources.
Subsequently in 1953, the Secretary-General made a comprehensive
review of the work and structure of the Secretariat. This 'evaluation process' and the
subsequent reform actions sought to concentrate efforts and resources on the priority
programmes which an international organization could 'perform efficiently
and effectively,' avoid a 'dangerous' dispersion of these resources over a
widespread 'miscellany' of projects, and launch 'a continuing
self-criticism as to the way in which various tasks are carried
out.'" "Concentration of effort and resources," General Assembly resolution 413 (V) of 1 December 1950, "Organization of the Secretariat," UN document A/2554 of 12 November 1953, para. 5, "Annual report of the
Secretary-General on the work of the organization," UN document A/2663, 1954, pp. xiv-xv, as discussed in
Joint Inspection Unit, "Reporting on the
performance and results of United Nations programmes", UN document A/43/124,
1988, Annex I, para. 2. [emphasis added]
6.
"[Secret political screening of US staff at the UN by the US
Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1949, which ultimately led to the
resignation of Secretary-General Trygve Lie was]
the ascertainable point
at which the [the UN Secretariat] conclusively delivered
itself into the hands of national interest
in direct violation of the
[UN Charter insistence on] a scrupulous independence from national
pressures.
Staff
representatives who [spoke out]
were among the earliest and least
ceremonious departures
accompanied by intimidating and abusive
statements from the administration to those remaining.
Each department
had its informers, and its victims. The total of United
Nations employees affected
undoubtedly runs into the hundreds
[but is
difficult to determine]
since employees were permitted to resign with
extra indemnities,
[or in] terminations disguised as 'economies,' or
deportations to the field, or careers shunted [permanently] into sidings
[or] a secret blacklisting
Above all, there is
no accounting for the deterrent effect of Trygve Lie's policies on those
who might have wished to serve a differently administered United Nations
secretariat." Shirley Hazzard on the situation in the UN
Secretariat in the early 1950s, in Chapter
Two, "The purgatory of the investigations," in her Defeat of an ideal: A study of the self-destruction
of the United Nations, Atlantic-Little, Brown, Boston-Toronto, 1973, pp.
15, 23, 34-35.
7.
"An end must be put to everything that seems to make
the Secretary-General's post an autocratic one, to everything that tends
to make the staff subject to the whims and caprices of their superiors and
makes careers
--
and even employment -- dependent on blind obedience to such
absolute power." chief French Delegate
Henri Hoppenot, during a debate in the U.N. General Assembly in March 1953, as quoted in Shirley Hazzard, "Breaking faith: II", The New Yorker, October 2, 1989, p
86.
8.
"During his first year in office, [Secretary-General
Dag] Hammarskjφld sought and largely obtained from the General Assembly
administrative powers that, invested in the Secretary-General, were at
variance with the intentions of the [United Nations] Charter toward the
international civil service.
[These] actions were condemned in a
searching study, by Claude Julien, of erosion of rights at the United
Nations [in 1953] -- a study that may be read with much
interest today, when history has exposed the inadequacies of successive
Secretaries-General. .
The renewed
insistence on unconditional loyalty to a personality, whose requirements
are equated with those of the United Nations, again illustrates the
remoteness of the U.N. service from democratic procedures.
." Shirley Hazzard, "Breaking Faith, Part I", The New Yorker, September 25, 1989, pp. 63-99, [
86].
9.
"The uncontested establishment of [US government screening and
approval of US personnel for UN service in the 1950s inflicted]
untold
damage on the potential of the United Nations. Other
governments would thenceforth [and aggressively] also install their
nominees in virtually all significant, and in many insignificant, U. N.
posts.
Hundreds of meaningless and costly positions would be created
throughout the leadership of the U. N. system for the sole purpose of
accommodating national candidates -- some of whom [were] devoid of
qualifications
. unwanted in their homelands
. [or] trailing rumors of
incompetence or scandal.
By the
nineteen-eighties, the [New York] Times would
report the view of 'one Western ambassador' that 'You try to get as many
posts as possible for your own nationals. This is wrong, but everybody does
it.'"
Shirley Hazzard on the UN in the 1950s, in "Breaking Faith, Part I", The New Yorker, September 25, 1989, pp. 63-99, p.
74.
10.
"Based on its studies
the committee reiterates the
vital importance above all others of selecting well qualified personnel
and not letting standards deteriorate because of the difficulties and
complexities of recruitment. The ability of the United Nations to
carry out its essential and urgent work depends in the final analysis on
the quality of its personnel." Committee on the
Reorganization of the Secretariat, document A/7359 of
November 27, 1968, p. 37, as quoted in Housang
Ameri, Politics of staffing
the United Nations Secretariat, Peter Lang, New York,
1996, p. 549.
11.
"The Capacity Study is finished We have diagnosed the [sickness of the UN development
system of technical co-operation] and written a
prescription.
.
. Governments created this
machine - which [has become] probably the most complex organization in the
world.
. At the headquarters level, there is
. no central co-ordinating organization [to exercise
effective control]
. [and] an extraordinary complex of regional and
sub-regional offices, and
. field offices in over ninety developing
countries.
. Who controls this
'machine'?
So far the evidence suggests that governments do not, and also that
the machine is incapable of intelligently controlling
itself. This is not because it lacks
intelligent and capable officials, but because it it is so organized that managerial
direction is impossible. In other words, the machine as a whole
has become unmanageable in the strictest sense of the word. As a result, it is becoming slower and more unwieldy,
like some prehistoric monster." A study of the capacity
of the United Nations development system, 2 vols., DP/5, United
Nations, Geneva, 1969, Vol. 1, pp. i-iii. [emphasis
added]
12.
"Recruitment for the international civil service must [consider
specific factors without] parallel in any national administration: first,
the need to ensure balance at every stage between the nationalities
representing the growing number of member states; second, the importance
of maintaining balance between permanent and fixed-term appointments; and
third, the need to bring about better balance in the use of the working
languages.
. [Equitable
geographical distribution efforts] deal neither with the shortage of
competent personnel in [member] countries
. nor with [general personnel
recruitment problems]. In the current system,
. each vacancy is
advertised as and when it occurs
. no provision is made for periodic
examination of all posts
., nor for a systematic review of all the
staff members in a service -- measures which would permit concerted
plans for recruitment."
Tien-Cheng Young, "The
international civil service reexamined", Public
Administration Review (US), May/June 1970,
pp. 217-224 [220, 224].
13.
"
the question remains: how in practice to revitalize
a flagging organization which is somehow out of tune with the needs and
moods of the times?
I believe that a shock treatment is called for and
the present moment provides an unique opportunity to apply that treatment
I have come to the conclusion that the only
practical way to revitalize the organization is through a major
consolidation and regrouping. This must be no mere cosmetic
surgery.
It would require some drastic staff reduction -- up to 50 percent
in some areas -- and a major redeployment of UN resources in those tasks
in which it can be most useful to its members and the world
community." Maurice Strong, then head of the UN environment
conference, in UN document A/C.5/SR 1433, 9
November 1971, as quoted in Shirley Hazard, Defeat of an ideal: A study of the self-destruction
of the United Nations, Macmillan, London, 1973, pp. 112-113. 14.
"Few would dispute the fact that conditions of
service in the Secretariat are no longer adequate to secure a reasonable
supply of staff of the quality described in the UN Charter. In addition
there have been weaknesses in the recruitment process itself: inattention
to candidates' levels of training, responsibility and experience,
artificially restricted choice of candidates, failure to use properly the
probation period
submission to pressure from delegations, personal bias,
delay and uncertainty in offers to candidates, absence of a coherent
career policy and of effective in-service training. All these
factors are prejudicial to high quality recruitment. Internal
selection committees have tended to fall into disrepute and have permitted
practices to flourish which encourage the view of the staff that the
International Civil Service is in a process of decline." Recommendations for the
reform of UN staff conditions made by the Council of the Federation of
International Civil Servants Associations in December 1971, as quoted in Shirley Hazzard, Defeat of an ideal: A study of the self-destruction
of the United Nations, Macmillan, London, 1973, p. 113.
15.
"The siting of the United Nations headquarters in a city that
sometimes perceives luxury and prominence as an index of achievement had
encouraged the organization's excesses. [A town house at No. 3 Sutton Place]
became a permanent official New York residence for the U.N.'s chief
officer and his family, and Waldheim was the first occupant [in July
1972].
This well-intended gift conclusively defined the
Secretary-General's position as one of wealth and social prominence. Waldheim's
three predecessors had lived at private addresses of their own choosing
that provided some association with normal life.
. By contrast,
in the Waldheim era the Secretary-General's house became the culminating
point of the social and material aspirations now associated with the
United Nations.
. the organization's senior officials chose to assume that a show
of wealth supported by public funds in no way impaired their claim to
speak for the destitute and suffering throughout the world." Shirley Hazzard, "Breaking
Faith: I", The New Yorker, September 25,
1989, pp. 63-99, [89].
16.
"[Secretary-General Kurt] Waldheim's tenure was to be dense with
irreproachable statements on global peril, and punctuated by referrals of
critical questions to governmental bodies whose inaction was assured
. In
1972, the
first year of his incumbency, Waldheim called on the General Assembly to
discuss the question of terrorism. (In December, 1985, having considered
the matter for thirteen years, the Assembly agreed -- as the New York Times reported -- to the adoption of 'a
landmark resolution
that condemns all acts of terrorism as 'criminal.'')
In 1973,
theTimes noted that a U.N. body 'has been
trying to find a definition for the word 'aggression' for 23 years.' The
Times article concluded, however, by endorsing a favored U.N. view: 'In
the words of Charles Yost
a former representative here, 'just existing
is perhaps the most important quality of the United Nations." Shirley Hazzard,
"Breaking faith -- Part II",The New Yorker, October 2,1989, p, 74.
17.
"
Concern with capacity and
performance [in the United Nations system] reaches its highest peak when
draft programmes and budgets are discussed and seems to evaporate when
reports on the execution of the approved programmes are reviewed.
This dichotomy [between budgetary
concentration and performance neglect] is in itself one of the major
causes of the shortfalls of the performance of the
system." Mahdi Elmandjra, The United Nations System: An Analysis, Faber and
Faber, London, 1973, pp. 228-229. [emphasis
added] 18.
"The myth that the annual United Nations budget runs around $200
million was circulated for so long that even UN leaders appeared to
believe it.
A recent schizophrenic UN press release [containing that figure]
[later remarks that] 'Member States are contributing about $870 million
a year to the United Nations system
References to waste
are cheerful -- 'I'd be satisfied,' one official declares, 'if what
we're doing is fifty per cent effective.' Achievements are cited, and
re-cited, with triumph and even with wonder -- as if an organization that
has, over nearly three decades, employed tens of thousands of persons at a
cost of tens of billions of dollars could scarcely have been expected to
have much to show.
An attempt at public discussion of
United Nations financing will bring the Pavlovian and often belligerent
reply 'Only a fraction of what nations spend on armaments'
" Shirley Hazzard, Defeat of an ideal: A study of the
self-destruction of the United Nations, Macmillan, London, 1973, pp. 118-120.
19.
"Social justice [to which international agencies are
committed] stops short for one segment of mankind -- the international
civil servant, a member of a virtually unprotected minority. The existing system of due process suffers from an
absence of important elements
All too often, the appeals procedure,
which is conceived of as an instrument to raise a staff member's hopes,
buries it instead.
The machinery of due process is slow and ponderous,
and thus fails to provide a true safeguard against administrative
absolutism and arbitrariness
" "Appeals procedures for international civil
servants," Federation of Civil Servants Associations (FICSA), FICSA
Studies and Policies No. 2, of 1974.
20. "
Recently there appears to have occurred a marked decline in the
number of requests for legal opinions from the Secretary-General and
various departments, including the Office of Personnel Services. This may be
another indication of the politicization of the Secretariat, of the
diminishing role of law in the Organization, and of the increasing power
of the various departments that want to be free to establish policy
"
Theodor Meron, The United
Nations Secretariat: The Rules and the Practice, Chapter 4, "Selected
legal questions", D.C. Heath, Lexington, Mass., 1977, p. 83. 21.
"Some members of the [UN] staff have great ability and
commitment but they support a great many parasitic 'deadwood' employees and
employees serving primarily the political interests of their
government.
The principle of merit can in the long run be protected only by
fair and objective procedures and safeguards, which are subject to law and
to effective grievance procedures. But
should the present trends continue
the staff would probably be suspected of lacking neutrality and might lose the
confidence of some Member States. The result might be paralysis of the
Secretariat , which would be unable to play an effective role in
situations of crisis." Theodor Meron, The United Nations Secretariat: The Rules and the
Practice, Chapter 4, "Selected legal questions", D.C. Heath,
Lexington, Mass., 1977, pp. 83-84. [emphasis
added.]
22.
"
[in 1978].
a former justice of the [International
Court of Justice reviewed a staff dispute with management]
[He
found that]
. 'The [UN internal justice] problems
have accumulated over
a long period
[because the existing machinery fails]
to find and implement solutions to staff grievances.' '
complaints pile up, and staff members become increasingly bitter and
resentful.
. a formal grievance procedure
should be speedy,
encourage
settlement .. , [have clear and publicized procedures]
be a process of
negotiation
[with] any bargain
or agreement
. equally binding
.
. dealing on a basis of equality with
staff representatives will
[be difficult for some management]
officials
.'
How
long are we going to pretend that the United Nations is so different from
the rest of the world that we cannot learn and profit from others'
experience?" "Bill Bailey", [a UN
senior official], in "Appeals or redress of grievances?", Secretariat News [New York], November 1984, pp.
8-9.
23.
"In the late 1970s, the U.N. staff union in New York
engaged the American labor negotiator Theodore Kheel to represent it in
its dealings with the U.N. administration. His
experience with the U.N.
hierarchy
-- which he likens to 'the court of Henry VIII' --- [focused in
particular on] its propensity for abrogating formal agreements on basic
matters of staff rights
. 'The thing that
utterly
amazed me' Kheel said recently, 'was the position taken by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations [then Kurt Waldheim] to disregard
the elementary established rights of employees; that the agency
created to maintain standards of human decency and to bring about peace by
negotiated settlement would violate its own agreements and see no
necessity for compliance with its own word.'" Hazzard, Shirley, "Breaking faith: II", The New Yorker, October 2, 1989, p
86.
24. "I
have been intrigued
. by the question of who is in charge at the UN; who
sets the standards and values of the Organization? Who says what
the UN is, what it does, what it cannot do?
. Events
. indicate
[that there is no] monolithic power structure at the UN.
. The
Secretary-General
. is constrained by the political clout of his closest
collaborators, particularly the Department Heads.
. further
complicated by [growing exercise by the] Fifth Committee and General
Assembly of managerial responsibility because [they are unable to ensure]
that managers in fact do [their jobs.]
. Policy derives from
an accretion of small decisions and actions up and down the management
line.
.
There is no thread of coherence running through the whole. At any given
time, a special assistant
may be as important in establishing values and
policies as is
the Secretary-General himself. Such people
define the Organization through [staff]
failure to do so, through our
acquiescence." Lowell Flanders, "The
future of the UN
. In whose hands?", address [by the President of the
Staff Union] at a preparatory meeting of the United Nations Community
Forum,
Secretariat News (NY), April 16, 1979, p. 10.
25. The annual
over-all budget of the U.N. [system], has, of recent years, been
informally estimated at six billion dollars. However, I find it impossible
to establish a reliable yearly total for the U.N.s attestable over-all
expenditures
The organization informs me that no comprehensive figure
can be provided.
. It is my impression
that no one knows even the approximate cost, to world citizenry, of the
United Nations enterprise. in June of 1979, [a
Washington Post article] dealing with the
U.N.s finances brought denunciation from both the United Nations arid the
U.S. State Department, [The latter] ,,,. conceded that the
Posts figures were accurate, but claimed,
according to the Post,
that the intricate
nature of the United Nations system
[and its] cumbersome administrative
structure,
jealously guarded in [many agencies,]
precluded
assessment by outsiders. Shirley Hazzard, on a
1979 attempt to track UN finances, and her own
inability to do so 12 years later, in Breaking Faith I, The New Yorker, September 25, 1989, p
89.
26.
"The United Nations staff union has called for an independent
investigation into allegations of corruption and maladministration in UN
internal affairs. Longstanding
discontent among the 2,700 professional staff at the New York headquarters
burst into the open when a senior UN official was allowed to resign
quietly although serious allegations had been made about his financial
affairs and staff appointments.
Staff morale
is low.
Most staff members indulge in place-seeking and status preferment
rather than the original spirit of dedication to UN principles. Finding jobs
for one's own group, or for those sharing ideologies, is a major
pre-occupation." Colin Legum, "UN staff
call for corruption probe", The Observer (UK),
November 2, 1980
27.
"
[A 1981 expert consultant report on
continuing
crises in Secretariat administration of justice and remedies stated
that:] 'The delays in the Joint Appeals Board at
Headquarters are now so serious that they cast doubt on the willingness
and ability of the United Nations to provide effective means for settling
disputes with the staff. The
situation has already had a bad effect on staff morale
The
United Nations enjoys immunity from the jurisdiction of
States
[but has undertaken] to provide effective means of settling disputes to
which it is a party
a failure to do so could have grave effects. It is
therefore vitally important and urgent to remedy the present
situation. It
is evident that at present the JAB is quite unable to cope with the large
backlog and the unprecedented influx of new cases ... All told, it would
not be surprising to find that the man-hours consumed by even a simple
case cost the Organization over $50,000.'" As cited in Mark A.
Roy, "Administration of justice in the United Nations Secretariat",
Secretariat News (New York), 19 June 1984, pp. 5-6.
[emphasis added]
28.
"There was general agreement that the United Nations system is
facing a major challenge
The executive heads
of organizations which are responsible for operational activities
[believe]
their activities have a proved record of effectiveness and
efficiency.
While many of the charges of waste, inefficiency, duplication,
etc., are not accurate, it will be necessary to refute these charges by
clear evidence to the contrary.
The ACC also
recognizes its responsibility to improve the image of the United Nations
so as to reassure Governments and the general public that it is an
efficient and effective mechanism for dealing with the important issues of
concern to the international community." "International co-operation and co-ordination within the United Nations system: Annual overview report of the Administrative Committee on Coordination for 1981/82," UN document E/1982/4 of 18 May 1982, paras. 16, 18, and 72. 29.
"
. Guilty [managers] can get away with
.
irresponsible performance more readily in the bureaucratic system of the
UN than in any foreign office, however small. When appointees to
a post up the hierarchical ladder are voted politically into place by the
concerned Member States group, they have a fiefdom bestowed upon them
which they value for all its perquisites.
. independence spreads through
all their activities as long as they hold office. Needless to say, in such
political appointments, knowledge of the subject field, previous
experience and quality of performance in the job are peripheral
considerations.
The result is absence of continuity in the work of the unit,
questioning of the ability of the incumbents and a continuing decline in
the institutional image of the UN organization in international
affairs." Donald Dunham,
"Management by personnel action", Secretariat
News (New York), November 30, 1984, p.
11.
30.
"In the 13 years that I have been with DTCD, formerly
OTC, formerly BTAO, formerly etc., we have been reassessed, redefined,
reoriented, readjusted, rearranged, reordered, reduced and, of course,
reorganized.
We've been aligned and realigned, maligned, streamlined and
asinined.
All in the name of progress and increased efficiency. It seems to
be the curse of bureaucracy that every new situation is met by
reorganization.
Where's accountability in the United Nations? Who takes
responsibility?
Where does the buck stop?
at the UN it does not seem to matter
how severe the financial mismanagement or how erratic and bungling the
reorganizations
--
no one in management either at the Departmental or central level is
held accountable. Perhaps the most cruel and bitter irony in this
entire masquerade is that in October 1984 the Fifth Committee approved $86
million to build lavish new conference facilities in Addis Ababa. This in the
face of overwhelming human misery and starvation.
Where's the accountability?" Lowell Flanders, "A.D. 65", Secretariat News (New York), December 1984, pp. 10-11. 31.
"For all the champagne and fine words, it should be obvious to
friends and foes alike that the United Nations is in trouble and has
fallen far short of what its founders dreamed of 40 years ago.
.
For
its friends, of which we are two,
. the problem is not so much that the
United Nations fails to meet grandiose expectations of a 'world
government',
but that it is not particularly effective in averting conflict or
fighting poverty. The
[UN presently] is clearly not up to
[reversing]
its own genteel
deterioration.
Officials carry on with their routine business ever more removed
from the politics of the real world.
The entire structure should be rationalized. Its current
organizational shape includes the accumulated whims and false starts of 40
years.
Many programs that have run out of steam linger on. Sometimes
their budgets are consumed by staff costs, leaving them no funds to work
with.
. The United Nations should not try to do everything, only what it
can do well." Sadruddin Aga Khan and
Maurice F. Strong, "Proposals to reform the U.N., 'limping' in its 40th
year,"
New York Times, October 8, 1985. [Both men were very senior UN
officials.]
32.
"'The new proposed programme budget
had been drawn up without the benefit of a critical
analysis of ongoing activities
Member States were therefore unable to form a
precise idea of the efficiency with which the resources were used or of
the quality of the results
' 'more time ought to be spent
on evaluating the application and implementation of
programmes.'
'priority setting
would be useful once monitoring and evaluation
functions had been placed on a sound footing.' '[The General Assembly and relevant bodies] should be
given more information
[to] take
enlightened decisions
' 'A new impetus must
be given to the identification of activities that were obsolete, of
marginal usefulness or ineffective.'" Some of the many critical statements by
UN Member States at the General Assembly in 1985, Fifth Committee document
A/C.5/40/SR.22, and SR.23 , both of 6 November
1985, as quoted in Joint Inspection Unit, "Reporting on the
performance and results of United Nations programmes", UN
document
A/43/124,1988, p. 3. [emphasis
added]
33.
"Member States have
stressed the need to be told, more clearly and more extensively
. what has been the programmatic
performance of the Secretariat, which outputs have been delivered, and
with which result
. Let us strengthen the monitoring and evaluation
functions
Let us say clearly and dispassionately what has been
done and with which result, and equally what has not been done and
why
. Let us produce more analytical performance reports
. I find the essential problem one of better and more
transparent information, thus permitting better
decisions." "Statement", by UN
Under-Secretary-General for Management Patricio Ruedas, 12 November 1985.
[emphasis added]
34.
"
Any respect for the institution of management
within the UN has largely disappeared. [Unavoidable staff cynicism]
thankfully does not affect
. their belief in the value of what the
organization does,
. Cynicism is a
corrosive quality.
. it ultimately becomes very difficult indeed to
maintain an increasingly abstract pride in an Organization's ideals and
purposes when you despise many of its nominal leaders, and most of its
standards for selecting those leaders.
All it would take
is the implementation of a meritocratic standard for advancement at all
levels of staff employment. Do this
. and virtually all other
problems would fade away
. Make quality leadership and good
management qualities the hallmarks for praise and promotion, and at the
very least we will have, finally, a mature United Nations
. with a proud,
strong, unified staff to do the work." Stephen Baldwin, "Good
management in the United Nations", Secretariat
News (New York), January 31, 1986, pp.
11-12. 35.
"[United Nations efficiency depends largely on] the
performance of its Secretariat and other organizations, [which
in turn depends largely] on the quality and dedication of its staff.
Article 97 of the Charter [confers on the Secretary-General]
the responsibility for managing the organization.
Efficient management of the staff should rest upon
clear, coherent and transparent rules and
regulations
[which allow the UN] to secure and retain the
services of staff meeting the highest standards.
. The officials responsible for the management of the
staff [at all levels] must implement these rules and regulations and
create a challenging environment where the staff can and are motivated to
give their best efforts to further the goals of the Organization.
Special responsibility for creating a healthy climate
rests with the senior managers. In this respect, the importance of
selecting high-level officials with the necessary management
skills cannot be over-emphasized." "Report of the group of
high-level intergovernmental experts to review the efficiency of the
administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations" [the
"Group of 18"], General Assembly, Official Records, (A/41/49), United
Nations, New York, 1986, paras. 45-48.
[emphasis added]
36.
"The
[UN] regular budget controls only a fraction of the total [UN]
expenditures.
As much as 70 percent of the U.N.'s outlays are funded by other
means
the various peacekeeping forces
most of the humanitarian and
development activities
and the main voluntary funds
Finally,
the power to initiate and in effect
authorize program activities is shared among [many] intergovernmental
organs.
Since all the many [approved]
activities cannot be adequately carried out
there is a good deal of
uncertainty as to which of them will in fact be pursued and with what
degree of due diligence
[which] increases the difficulty of setting
central priorities and of allocating limited financial resources in a
rational way.
This
great dispersion of programming power prevents the Assembly from taking
full charge
a situation that concerns (or should concern) all
the U.N.'s members, whether big or small." Frederick K. Lister, Fairness
and accountability in U.N. financial decision-making, United Nations
Management and Decision-Making Project UNA-USA, New York, 1986, pp. 13, 16, 22-24.
37.
"
Lamenting that 'Something has gone very wrong with
our [internal justice] processes', [UN Under-Secretary-General for
Administration and Management Martti Ahtisaari] stressed that justice was
not only important in itself, but was also a basic aspect of good
staff-management relations. Justice was a 'primary defense against
the buildup of feelings of arbitrariness and discrimination' which, he warned,
could undermine staff morale and 'finally destroy an international
organization however high its ideals and purposes.'" "Staff-management
meeting to discuss justice administration reform and performance reports",
Secretariat News [New York],
31 August 1987, p. 5. 38. "For almost 40 years, the General Assembly and the
Secretariat have been working to establish an orderly system of planning
and review of United Nations programmes.
but the system remains incomplete -- and seriously
weakened -- because an essential element is still
missing: there is no regular, systematic [UN] reporting on
programme performance and results to top management and intergovernmental
bodies.
an interim 'programme performance report'
[established in 1980 provides] only a very
mechanistic tabulation
which tells intergovernmental bodies almost
nothing about actual programme results, efficiency and effectiveness
relative to the objectives which were set. Substantive, comprehensive performance reports would
finally
provid[e] timely progress and results information
and clearer accountability and programme
transparency." Joint Inspection
Unit, "Reporting on the performance and results of United Nations
programmes ",
UN document A/43/124, 1988, paras. 1-5. [emphasis added]
39. "[A
1987 Secretariat evaluation] found a serious lack of policy planning,
co-ordination and control of information systems development in the United
Nations (repeating criticisms already made by the Board of Auditors in
1984 and JIU in early 1985). It concluded that the 'most serious
problems' of system development were in the administrative area, where
many ineffective, partial, outmoded and/or labor-intensive systems were
operating in isolation from each other
The report noted further that the
need to integrate and complete these systems had been recognized since
1976, but corrective efforts had failed
[due to] lack of internal
co-operation, dispersed EDP staff at Headquarters, the absence of an
overall plan, and outdated programming methods." As discussed in Joint Inspection Unit, "Reporting on
the performance and results of United Nations programmes: Monitoring,
evaluation, and management review components", UN document A/43/124, 1988, paras.
96-97.
40.
"Accountability, that source of institutional health, had been
excluded from United Nations experience; and, along with it, indivisibly,
the stimulus of direct public engagement and response. 'It is not a United
Nations Organization', Aleksander Solzhenitsyn was to say, in his Nobel
address of 1972, 'but a United Governments Organization.' In offering itself as the mere creature of its member
governments, the United Nations system entered a state of arrested moral
development, marked by the habitual emblems of immaturity: demands for
approval, and incapacity for individual or collective
self-questioning." Shirley
Hazzard,
"Breaking Faith: I", The New Yorker, September 25, 1989, pp. 63-99, [76]. 41. The General Assembly
"[Reiterates]
the
need for the participation of Member States [in programme decision-making]
from an early stage and throughout the process, [Emphasizes] that future programme performance and
evaluation reports should assist Member States in measuring results
against established objectives," "Programme planning", General Assembly resolution
43/219 of 21 December 1988, last preambular
paras. "Renews its request [for an analytical
report on the "Group of 18" report] and the way in which it
has enhanced the efficiency of [UN] administrative and financial
functioning." "Implementation of General
Resolution 41/213", General Assembly resolution 44/200 of 21 December 1989, para. A.
15.. "
"[Emphasizes]
the importance of a reliable methodology for monitoring programme
performance, [Stresses] the importance of
evaluation for the systematic and objective determination of
the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of programmes and
activities in relation to their objectives," "Programme planning", General Assembly resolution
44/194 of 21 December 1989, 8th and 9th
preambular paras.
[emphasis added]
42.
"The crude truth about many of the UN agencies is
that they don't know what they are trying to achieve; and that cronyism,
sloth and incompetence would ensure they could not achieve it even if they
did. The
obstacles to reform are huge, the courage to tackle them nowhere visible.
Accountability must
be improved.
That would at least mean regular and public reports on where and
how the money goes, and on how far pre-stated targets of achievement are
being met.
The quality and morale of professional staff must be
raised
start rewarding merit, not political or personal
connections. Not least, the length of time anyone can run an
agency should be strictly limited.
." "The United Nations agencies:
A case for emergency treatment", The
Economist, December 2, 1989, pp. 27-28, 30
[30]. 43.
"One can
do worse than leave a high post in the UN. Its ordinary
staffers have seen their wages fall hard over the past decade, as the rich
countries have withheld funds, in an attempt to impose some
austerity.
But the holders of top posts, some of them politically-created
sinecures, can still live very well -- and leave very well. On his recent
retirement one under secretary-general received a $500,000 handshake, a
pension of $50,000 a year -- and a $125,000 contract as a
consultant." "The United Nations agencies: A case for emergency treatment", The Economist, December 2, 1989, p. 30.
44.
"A distinguished professor of international law once
deplored the fact that 'the League of Nations has been abandoned to the
diplomats', but the UN Secretariat is much more dependent on the national
diplomatic bureaucracies. They derive invaluable flexibility and
power from having additional posts at their disposal
The incentives
are all the greater because many UN posts, especially the senior ones, are
much sought after because of the [high] scales of pay
and the prestige they carry. A diplomatic ideology has even developed at the UN,
[that] there is no higher dignity than that of Ambassador, holders of this
title being by definition capable of taking up any high-ranking post, even
in a technical field. This naturally generates a bias in
favor of 'generalists' at the expense of other professionals." Maurice Bertrand, "The
recruitment policy of United Nations staff", in de Cooker, Chris, ed., International Administration: Law and Management
Practice in International Organisations, UNITAR, Martinus Nijhoff,
Dordrecht, the Netherlands, 1989, pp. II/2 and
/3. 45.
"The most egregious example of organizational bloat [in the United
Nations system] is the one closest to home for Mr. Butros-Ghali: the U.N.
Secretariat.
. the top echelon of the Secretariat originally consisted of
eight assistant secretaries. Now it has 20 assistant secretaries, a
new super-layer of 27 under secretaries and a director-general -- plus 21
more top-level officers who are not on the regular budget, for a total of
69. Reformers urge clearing out the deadwood and bringing
in officials chosen on merit who can provide the Secretary-General with
background reports, analyses of complex situations, options for decisions
and ideas for future missions." Bonnie Angelo, "United
Nations: Challenges for the new boss," Time,
February 3, 1992, pp. 40-41 [41].
46.
"The images are familiar: blue-bereted U.N. peace keepers
humanitarian relief workers fighting poverty and hunger
But behind these
images lies an enormous, largely uncontrolled bureaucracy
, a nine-month
study by The Washington Post has found.
.
U.N. food
aid and other resources have been pilfered with impunity by governments
and armies for years. Peace-keeping
operations, some of which drag on for decades, have become a source of
soaring costs with minimal oversight.
Top officials
operate with few checks and balances in the absence of [U.N. management]
standards
The system currently has no inspector general, and a Joint
Inspection Unit in Geneva is made up mostly of retired diplomats.
[a senior
official of the human rights group Africa Watch says] "There's a hell of a
lot of shocking things going on
I think there's a great deal of
incompetence, there's a lot of corruption, and there's no
accountability." William Branigin, "The
U.N. empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do
its problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, September 20, 1992, pp. 1-2.
47. "
[The UN programs which eat] up the great bulk of U.N. resources
the
economic, social and humanitarian programs
[get little scrutiny.]
Clearly, the United
Nations employs many hard-working and idealistic people. [But]
parts of
the system are overstaffed and lethargic, while others, particularly field
offices in unpleasant places, are overstaffed and overworked.
Local employees
tend to bear the brunt of disciplinary action
when fraud or abuse are
discovered
while erring international professional staffers often
survive and even advance in the organization. At the same
time, U.N. employees who complain about irregularities [lose promotions or
must transfer elsewhere.] It is a system that
tends to cover up its abuses and discourage whistle-blowers.
A [UN official
who resigned]
in frustration, [said] 'A certain enabling environment
allows {fraud} to happen. The question is not whether you do it
or not, but whether you're stupid enough to be caught." "Basically, there's
a lack of determination to combat the sleaze factor' he said. 'In an
environment where mediocrity has a strong self-protective interest, these
things flourish.'" William Branigin, "The U.N.
empire: polished image, tarnished reality", "As U.N. expands, so do its
problems: Critics cite mismanagement, waste", Washington Post, September 20, 1992, pp. 3-4.
48.
[The Joint Inspection Unit's]
mandate is to check on efficiency in the U.N. system and the proper use of
resources.
[But]
last year it issued [only] four
reports
[One] study, currently being prepared by a Polish
inspector, examines how the U.N. Secretariat takes care of its
artwork. In a meeting with U.N. budget analysts in June,
participants said, the inspectors lobbied for a salary increase."
"[The JIU] was one of those American ideas that went bad,' said a
U.N. delegate who monitors the group. It was originally intended to be like
the U.S. General Accounting Office, he said, but ended up as a body of
mostly elderly retired diplomats or political appointees with 'no special
skills for the job.' The Inspectors, nominated by their governments
[are very highly paid] and serve in a
personal capacity, which means that 'they can do
anything they want,' the delegate said. "Its the job that everyone in the U.N. aspires
to.'" William Branigan, "North and South stand worlds apart on reform: U.N. record on change fuels skepticism," Washington Post, September 23, 1992.
49.
"United Nations staff members [especially managers in
administration and finance]
are required to report to senior management
any inappropriate uses of [UN resources].
[In the few whistleblower programmes]
at the
national level
those who report abuses have frequently been the target
of retaliation since
it has been difficult to guarantee confidentiality
[There are also problems of] extensive due process requirements
[Establishing] an administrative structure, with the associated costs
would be compounded in a global organization [like the UN.] The difficulties
might therefore outweigh the potential
benefits
It seems
best
[to apply] strict adherence to
the existing UN provisions
The matter will, however, be kept under active
review.
The
Secretary-General attaches great importance to his fiduciary
responsibility vis-ΰ-vis Member States for the prudent management of
resources entrusted to the Organization.
Care is taken to ensure that these resources are utilized for the purposes
for which they were provided, that they are spent with all due regard for
economy and that there is accountability at all stages for their
use." "Measures to facilitate
reporting by staff members of inappropriate uses of the resources of the
organization
: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/47/510 of
October 8, 1992, paras. 9-14. [emphasis
added] [Note: See,
however, inter
alia, the following items of 1 March 1993 (the first one), 29 July
1994, 25 April, 16 May and 3 November 1997, February 9 and
December 15, 2004, and 17 May and September 7 2005.]
50.
"'Given the diffidence accorded 'executive
privilege,' the difficulties of staff organizations in establishing
themselves as a countervailing force to that privilege, and the
disinterest
of those whose help can make a difference-- for instance,
members of delegations and the press -- then, what are the chances for
review and reform of the system of due process?' That question asked
18 years ago [in 1974] needs to be raised again. For, as put
by the distinguished professor of international law, M. N. Akehurst
(University of Paris): 'In the early
days of the 20th century, it may have been possible to regard legal
relations between international organizations and their staff as operating outside any known legal system; such
a view is no longer tenable.'" Peter Ozorio, [citing a
1974
staff working group report] "Legal rights revisited," UN Special (Geneva), October
1992, pp. 24-25.
[emphasis added]
51.
"[Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali]
concluded that the organization had 'been operating
in slow motion.' It required 'optimum use of its human
resources', 'new ways of thinking', 'modern management practices' to
enhance its operations, and introduction of 'an integrated approach to all
the interrelated managerial issues.' But it could not do these things over
the long term without 'fundamental changes in the present outmoded system
of personnel management.'" "Secretary-General's statement to the Fifth
Committee, ST/IC/1992/73 of 12 November 1992,
p. 8, as summarized in Joint Inspection Unit, "Advancement of the status
of women in the United Nations Secretariat
," UN document A/49/176,
1994.
52.
"[Concerning allegations of corruption at UNHCR in the September
1992 articles in the Washington Post] with respect to discipline in UNHCR,
a courageous staff member in Angola immediately brought the Boubakar
wrongdoing to my attention. The case was airtight, and U.N.
headquarters found it impossible to avoid our recommendation for
dismissal. In the more complicated Lukika case in Uganda,
UNHCR's recommendation for dismissal was equally strong. The
Secretary-General's office rejected it (on grounds that the United Nations
lacks precedents in firing for incompetence) and forced UNHCR to take
Lukika back. Threats and intimidation in no way
dampened our efforts in UNHCR to deal with corruption and incompetence.
. The
Secretary-General at the time just did not support us. Ensuing
troubles with Lukika after headquarters directed that he stay in UNHCR
should surprise no one." Arthur E. Dewey, "No
laxity", UN Special (Geneva), November, 1992, p. 31. [Note: Mr.
Dewey was deputy high commissioner of the UNHCR from 1986-1990.]
53.
"Fraud, waste and abuse The
United Nations presently is almost totally lacking in effective means to
deal with fraud, waste and abuse by staff members
[as recently highlighted in]
the news media.
[Internal
oversight]
is currently so ineffective that, time and again, we have been
called upon to create ad hoc teams to carry
out investigations into allegations of serious wrongdoing. The delay
inherent in
[establishing] these teams often allows the trail to 'grow
cold.' [and]
deprives the investigation of its vitality and the
professionalism and impartiality
[Reform is crucial because of ]
major
contributing Member States' [ concern over rising UN] expenditures
in
nearly every area. As noted in the Volcker-Ogata
report, 'support for improved financing will be dependent upon a
perception that funds are economically managed and effectively
spent.'
Major donors, and indeed all Member States, deserve the reassurance
that
their contributions are being wisely and prudently utilized
[to
convey] to their taxpayers, the ultimate supporters of all United Nations
activity. This reassurance
can only come
from the prompt and effective activation of a strong [UN]
Inspector General's office along the lines I have previously suggested."
Dick Thornburgh,
Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations" ["The Thornburgh report"], 1 March 1993, pp. 29-31. [emphasis
added]
54.
"Current problems in
the present outmoded system of personnel
management constitute a major stumbling block to true reform within the
[UN].
The result is too
much 'deadwood' doing too little work and too few good staff members doing
too much, over-extending themselves sometimes to the point where they have
become counter-productive."
The aggregate cost of keeping unqualified,
incompetent or non-productive staff members in place far exceeds, in my
view, whatever termination expenditures might be necessary to 'clean up'
the Organization.
Steps
[to
terminate inadequately performing staff] would have a
positive effect on the morale of that vast majority of dedicated
staff members remaining on the job as well as on the
productivity of the Organization as a whole." Dick Thornburgh,
Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations" ["The Thornburgh report"], 1 March 1993, pp. 8-10.
55.
"The current [UN] budgeting process [is]
almost
surreal.
It is overly complicated
Some 70 percent of
the Organization's
social and economic development expenditures, for
example,
are made without
the intricate [regular] budgetary processes
The Medium Term
Plan, in my view, is simply useless.
Ironically, the
problems
in the regular budgeting process are nearly reversed in the
peacekeeping area which now well exceeds the regular budget.
Peacekeeping funding is still much like a financial 'bungee jump', often
undertaken strictly in blind faith that timely appropriations will be
forthcoming.
The irony is that far more vast and costly operations are
undertaken and appropriated for in the peacekeeping area on a more or less
ad hoc basis, than those pursued in such
meticulous detail in the regular budget process. The answer
is a
process which provides for
more attention to the particulars of the
process used in financing peacekeeping budgets.
" Dick Thornburgh,
Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, "Report to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations" ["The Thornburgh report"], 1 March 1993, pp. 14-15, 17-18.
56.
"... If, in the future, the UN hopes to avoid failures like that in
Somalia, it will need to change on a more fundamental level. Above all, if the UN is going to be effective, it
must be accountable. 'The UN is probably the least
accountable government-based bureaucracy in the world -- a main
reason not only for the cataclysm in Somalia, but for the persistence of
famine throughout Africa' said Alex de Waal, a British anthropologist who has
studied the UN's response to famines. 'Officials who are responsible
for hundreds of thousands of deaths must face the prospect of prosecution,
not promotion.'
There is also the
need for a freedom of information act, so UN officials cannot hide from
the public everything from their salaries to their mistakes to how much
they're spending on public relations. And, finally, or perhaps first, there
must be an independent watchdog organization with full power to
investigate UN agencies. The General Assembly has the authority
to establish a commission of inquiry to examine what went wrong in Somalia, but it has
never examined its own performance." Ray Bonner, "Why we
went": How the United Nations turned its back on Somalia and
subverted the best chance for peace", Mother
Jones, (USA), March-April 1993, pp. 54-60
[60]. 57.
"The conventional wisdom in Third World upmarket employment circles
is that the best job opportunities in these recessionary days are still
available in the United Nations system -- a bewildering alphabet soup rich in
countless commissions, subcommissions, fact-finding missions, agencies,
expert groups, blue-ribbon panels and blue-helmet peacekeeping
operations.
For the most part, it is a sprawling secretive system, where many
modern-day rajahs reign with conspicuous disregard for accountability
." Pranay Gupte, "United
Nations shenanigans", Newsweek International,
May 24, 1993, p. 6.
58.
"The [UN Secretariat] performance evaluation system absolutely must
be changed.
I can't even find a polite word to describe it. It's an
insult to both the people rating and the people being rated." "Former staffer comes in as
UN's top manager", Secretariat News (New York),
July-August 1993, page 7, as described in "Toward a new
system of performance appraisal in the United Nations Secretariat", Joint
Inspection Unit, UN document A/49/219, 1994,
para 66.
59.
"The Staff Council in UNHCR agrees with the thrust of the
criticisms
[of a critical British newspaper investigation report on UN
mismanagement.]
The staff wants to weed out corruption,
mismanagement, nepotism, double-dippers, desk-warmers, and all other
irregularities
Staff representatives have been
tirelessly pointing out unsavory management tendencies and reported to the
governing body of UNHCR
on how to strengthen the organization and to
ensure the effective use of its human resources. The question
is: what do these government representatives do with these reports when
they return to their capitals
UNHCR
staff on
the gound work with dedication and have twice won the Nobel Peace Prize,
but they are demoralized when subjected to unjustified criticism. UNHCR staff
needs the help of the media to further strengthen its humanitarian
commitment to work for refugees." Nasr Ishak, "HCR staff replies", UN Special (Geneva), October 1993, p. 20.
60.
"The [widespread] and rising
criticisms directed at [UN] Secretariat accountability and oversight
[show the need for urgent and far-reaching corrective action. To recapitulate
the four main oversight units
are foundering: -- internal
audit needs "urgent strengthening", again; -- internal
evaluation is an acknowledged "somewhat sickly child"; -- monitoring
spews out only a flood of tepid numbers; -- management
advisory efforts fall far short of stated objectives. The various other
accountability, control, and oversight processes in the Secretariat fare
little better: -- on-site
inspection work scarcely touches operating units; -- fraud and
abuse investigations are too little, too late; -- "hotlines"
are considered to be too much trouble; -- information
systems work is tied up in one big project; -- financial
control discipline is questioned in many areas; -- management
training will begin, but very late in the day; -- management
improvement potential is scarcely being tapped; -- many other
"assessment reports" often have little to say; -- management
consultants are reserved for internal use; --
reorganizations have brought confusion as well as streamlining; -- needed
programming tools have not developed as expected; and -- effective personal accountability does
not exist."
Joint Inspection Unit,
"Accountability and oversight in the United Nations Secretariat", UN document
A/48/420 of 12 October 1993 and Add. 1 of 22
November 1993, p. 25. [emphasis added]
61.
"The General Assembly
4. Endorses
[recommendations for]
the
establishment of a transparent and effective system of accountability and
responsibility no later than 1 January 1995
; 5. Requests the
Secretary-General to include in the
system
; (a) The
establishment of clear responsibility for
programme delivery, including performance indicators as a
measure of quality control; (b) A mechanism ensuring that programme
managers are accountable for the effective
management of the personnel and financial resources allocated
to them; (c) Performance evaluation for all officials, including
senior officials, with objectives and performance
indicators; (d) Effective training of staff in financial and
management responsibilities." "Review of the administrative and financial
functioning of the United Nations", General Assembly resolution 48/218, 23 December 1993, paras.
I.E. 2-5. [emphasis added]
62.
["The fact that the [above General Assembly
resolution's]
very sound and well-recognized management principles seem
to have been 'discovered' by the UN [some fifty] years after its creation,
and then only implemented in part in 1994, is a candid admission that, in
the past, senior UN managers have either not been aware of, or have not
been seriously concerned with, the basic need for a strong management base
for the Organization's programmes and operations." Yves Beigbeder, commenting on the above
accountability system requirements, in The internal
management of United Nations Organizations: The Long Quest for
Reform,
Macmillan, London, St. Martins, New York, 1997, p.
127.] 63. "The General Assembly, III.
Determined to address alleged cases of
fraud in the United Nations in an impartial manner, in accordance with due
process of law and full respect for the rights of each individual
concerned, especially the rights of defense
2. Also decides to this end to [consider
new mechanisms.
] "Review of the administrative and financial
functioning of the United Nations", General Assembly resolution 48/218 A,
23 December 1993, sections II. and
III.
[emphasis added] [Note: The Group did not propose new
mechanisms, but the OIOS was created in July 1994-- see below.] 64. A
1993
independent consultant study of serious UN management culture problems
found that they arise from]:
(b) an organizational culture that increasingly values control over
facilitation, "process" over outcomes, hierarchy over collaboration, and
personal power over collective purpose, all in a highly sensitive
multicultural context;
(c) complex and cumbersome managerial systems [that]
nevertheless
permit abuses of authority;
(g) a lack of the clearly understood standards and measurements
required to establish accountability for
performance;
"
Findings of an independent
consultant study in 1993, as cited in Joint Inspection Unit, "Management
in the United Nations: Work in progress", UN document A/50/507, 1995, para.
113. 65. "The General Assembly
4.
Decides to establish an Office of
Internal Oversight Services under the authority of the Secretary-General
(a)
to initiate,
carry out, and report on any action which it considers necessary
with regard to monitoring, internal audit, inspection
and evaluation and investigations
(c) (iv) Investigation The
Office shall investigate reports of violations of
[UN rules and
guidance
and report results and recommendations] to guide the Secretary-General in
deciding on jurisdictional or disciplinary action to be taken;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the [OIOS] has procedures in
place that provide for direct confidential access of staff members
to the Office and for protection against
repercussions, for the purpose of
reporting perceived cases of
misconduct; 7. Also
requests the Secretary General to ensure that procedures are also in place
that protect individual rights, the anonymity of staff members, due
process for all parties concerned and fairness during any
investigations,
that falsely accused staff members are fully cleared and that disciplinary and/or
jurisdictional proceedings are
initiated without undue delay where the Secretary-General considers it
justified
Such procedures shall include any necessary
amendments to the [UN staff rules]
" "Review of the
administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations", General
Assembly resolution 48/218 B of 29 July
1994.
[emphasis added] 66
"
[UN staff and managers' capacity and expertise at all levels]
must correspond to the responsibility assigned and authority delegated and
must be balanced by full accountability through appropriate
accountability mechanisms. An efficient organizational oversight
machinery will monitor the operation of the system and conduct audits,
inspections, evaluations and investigations
The systematic control of
the interrelated processes
will provide the key to success
and
contribute to the Organization's effectiveness and efficiency.
The Organization must transform itself
to
develop a real 'management culture', to put measures in place that will
encourage improved performance and higher levels of productivity and
ensure quality work.
In short, the objective should be the creation of a
mission-driven and result-oriented Organization
" "Establishment of a
transparent and effective system of accountability and responsibility:
Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/C.5/49/1 of 5 August 1994, paras. 12 and 109. 67.
"The effectiveness of an oversight office depends to
a large extent on how senior officers perceive their roles. The concept
of management accountability in the United Nations has not been
consistently applied.
No system of
accountability will be effective without the assurance that sanctions will
be promptly applied when violations occur. I strongly recommend that any new
system of accountability and responsibility include specific penalties or
sanctions for United Nations managers and other staff who disregard United
Nations regulations and rules or who are negligent in the conduct of their
duties and responsibilities.
A vast amount of work remains to be done before the
United Nations has management structures and a management culture adequate
to the great tasks entrusted to it
. " Mohamed Ali Nyazi,
Assistant-Secretary-General, longtime UN internal auditor and head of the
transitional UN oversight office, "Report of the Office of Inspections and
Investigations", UN document A/49/449, 28
September 1994, pages 5-6.
68. "A
[Secretariat]strategy was presented to the General Assembly
The writing
is crusty with jargon, repetitive, and structured like a multi-jointed
creature out of Dr. Seuss.
It makes the rather
startling revelation that [OHRM] does not have a planning component. It
does not explain why this is so, or how the Office has managed to operate
for nearly five decades without [it.] As if enunciating a new discovery, the
report says that 'Planning is essential
' [Its] absence
has contributed
significantly to current OHRM management weaknesses.
' [The report further
states that] 'It is intended that [UN] senior management be involved in
human resources planning and change.' (Traditionally, senior management
has considered OHRM a generally unnecessary encumbrance, to be called into
action only to fend off unsuitable offerings of personnel from pushy
ambassadors.
Its powers of locating competent staff for recruitment are held in
such low esteem that no senior manager in his right mind would initiate a
request without having someone already identified, or even on board as a
consultant or short-term contract employee.)" "Strategy to improve UN
staff management and quality explained in atrociously written report," International Documents Review (New York), 7 November 1994, pp. 4-5. The report
itself is "A strategy for the management of the human resources of
the Organization
: Report of the Secretary-General ", UN document
A/C.5/49/5 of 21 October 1994. 69. "
Both the Security Council and the UN Secretariat had compiled an entirely
inglorious record in the months preceding the [Rwanda] genocide [in 1994.]
The Secretariat did
not exercise its right to function as an advocate with the Security
Council by [urging members]
to take more positive action.
Their record
is a dark stain on the UN and themselves.
[In mid-1998],
Secretary-General Annan [ a direct participant]
traveled to Kigali and
apologized
[He said] 'Looking back now
we see the signs
what we did was
not nearly enough
' Rwandan officials
were furious with
the Secretary-General's performance. The price of the [international] betrayal was paid by
countless Rwandans
In contrast,
[of the key Security Council or Secretariat actors]
no one has resigned
Many of their careers have flourished
greatly
Instead of international accountability, it appears that international
impunity is the rule of the day." Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, Report of The International
Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda
and the Surrounding Events, Organization of African Unity, , 7 July
2000, Chapter 15, paras. 15.1, .35-.36, and .41. [Note: Available at www.aegistrust.org/ ] 70. "The [UN
Secretariat] has attempted to evaluate/appraise the performance of its
staff for many years, but
[all groups] have expressed strong
dissatisfaction with the process.
There have been
five different attempts to create a
[proper] system during the past 17
years.
They all failed because the Secretariat was unable to implement them.
[and] because they
subjectively measure the characteristics and traits of staff, rather than
their actual performance and work accomplished.
'Excellent' or 'very
good' ratings to almost all staff
[mean that they move steadily] through
their careers
unaffected by the work they actually do.
This system is
dysfunctional.
It provides no reward or recognition for excellent performance, and
no sanctions or corrective actions for ineffective, mediocre or apathetic
staff.
It has taken
steadily increasing pressure from the General Assembly [from 1986 up to a
January 1, 1995 deadline] to force a new system. The Secretariat
must now demonstrate convincingly that, this time, it can establish
accountability
Now, performance,
results, and fulfillment of work programme mandates and objectives must
become the central elements of the work of staff at all levels." "Toward a new system of performance appraisal in the United Nations Secretariat: Requirements for successful implementation", Joint Inspection Unit, UN document A/49/219, 1994, ""Executive summary".
71.
"The United Nations has a record of considerable achievement in the
field of human rights even if [too often] marred by double standards and
the influence of power-politics.
The greater the
UN's involvement in peace-enforcement and other operations that may employ
force, the more vital it becomes to have transparent and independent human
rights supervision
as much to protect the organization from false or
inflated charges of human rights abuse as to ensure that if these occur
they are properly investigated and reported.
The General
Assembly should appoint an independent Ombuds-Panel (or equivalent title)
on the Human Rights Performance of the United Nations System.
On every major UN field mission comprising military
and/or police units, one Ombudsman (with staff as may be needed) should independently monitor its work in
relation to necessary human rights standards; intervene when and if necessary; [and] report
on incidents, [periodically]
during long Missions, and
on their termination." Erskine Childers, with Brian
Urquhart, in Chapter X, "The international civil service", in "Renewing
the United Nations System", Development
Dialogue, 1994:1, Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1994, pp. 105, 111, 202-203. [Note: This
excellent, ignored reform proposal has finally become a very major issue a
decade later.] 72.
The
issue of 'deadwood and mediocrity':
The General Assembly should request the
Secretary-General to organize an independent commission of
[respected
and top-flight human resource specialists.]
It should carry out a thorough screening of the actual competence for
their designated posts of officials at mid-professional and above grades
[to] reliably establish how many existing staff actually have a useful
function in UN service. Responsibility for the costs of the
termination of those who do not must be shared by member-governments.
.
Sweeping talk of
'mediocrity' is unprofessional and misleading.
. The potential of a significant number of staff is
simply not known because of poor job assignment, indifferent supervisors
(themselves inadequately supervised by poorly chosen department heads),
and the lamentable paucity of in-service training and
retraining. The real extent of irredeemable
'mediocrity' can only be identified by proper, independent
screening." Erskine Childers,
with Brian Urquhart, "Renewing the United Nations System", Development Dialogue, 1994:1, Dag Hammarskjold
Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1994, p.
165.
[emphasis added] [Note: Both men were top UN
officials for many years.] 73.
The debilitating atmosphere and the rise of cronyism
have sapped staff confidence in [internal] justice within
secretariats.
Even peer appeal boards lack full trust because no staff member
seeking redress can feel confident any longer that he or she may not be
intimidated.
This state of affairs has been well known.
[There should be] a resort system
whereby staff can report malfeasance without fear, staff seeking redress
can have proper counsel, and all staff can have the requisite measure of
protection from imperious behavior by poorly-chosen superiors.
" Erskine Childers, with Brian Urquhart, "Renewing the United
Nations System", Development Dialogue, 1994:1,
Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1994, pp. 169-170.
74.
"The [UN] Secretariat's current personnel procedures are
inconsistent with the development of the competent meritocracy that [the
UN needs.]
As a consequence of years of improvised, backward, and careless
personnel practices, staff morale has been severely damaged. Numerous
deficiencies are apparent in the personnel practice of the
Secretariat.
For instance, it lacks a worthwhile staff-evaluation system
Moreover, promotion within the Secretariat is not competitive nor is it
based on merit, and staff discipline is very low in some departments. In addition,
the policies for recruiting new Secretariat personnel are unclear, and
professional training is almost nonexistent. Collusion
between staff members and state delegations seeking to justify the
continued employment of their nationals is quite common, and often leads
to 'requests' by the General Assembly for prolonged studies and reports
that have no purpose and will never be read." Ronald I. Spiers,
"Reforming the United Nations," in Roger A. Coate, ed., U.S. policy and the future of the United Nations,
Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1994, pp.
25-26.
[Note: Mr. Spiers was a UN Under-Secretary-General.]
This chronology continues in Overview of IO Watch Archive Quotes II |
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