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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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Overview
of IO Watch Archive Quotes I 1943-1994 1.
"In
1943
Mr. C. W. Jenks
emphasized that quality of leadership would dominate the effectuality of a
future United Nations Organization; and listed as the desirable attributes
of an international civil servant
'integrity, conviction, courage, imagination, drive, and technical
grasp -- in that order.'" Shirley Hazzard,
Defeat of an ideal: A study of the self-destruction of the United
Nations, Atlantic-Little, Brown, Boston-Toronto, 1973, p. 132.
2.
"Article 100.
2. Each Member of the United Nations
undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the
responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to
influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. Article
101. 1. The staff shall be appointed by
the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General
Assembly.
3. The paramount consideration
in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions
of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of
efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the
importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as
possible." Charter of the United Nations, 1945,
Articles 100 and 101.
[emphasis added0
3.
"All
but a tiny minority [of the new UN staff of about 3,000 people] had been
appointed by the end of August [1946], and most were appointed
between April and July. Where
did this swarm come from?
Some of them had, like most Assistant Secretaries-General, been
delegates or on delegation staffs in the early days. Some were friends of delegates,
and got through [by] what is known in international secretariats as
political pressure -- which can easily be repulsed if the authorities have
the will. Some -- and
possibly the largest number -- found their way through the friendship of a
senior officer." Walter R. Crocker, "Some notes on the United
Nations Secretariat", International Organization, Vol. IV, No. 4,
November 1950, pp.
609-610. 4.
"In the Secretariat
. there is no unifying directive on the
functions of management.
. The need to keep subordinates informed of what
is going on; the need to convey just praise and blame; the need for the
impartial award of privilege and promotion; the need for discipline; the
need to avoid unnecessary impositions on the time and energy of
subordinates; the need to set a personal example do not seem to be
appreciated as well as they should be.
. These major shortcomings
. are
accompanied by the less important but nevertheless tiresome defects in
working conditions
. Add to this the insecurity implicit in staff
reductions and in the adjustments required to achieve proper geographic
distribution
The staff feels the need for a
lead from the top to combat these disrupting
factors." A confidential analysis in April 1947 of the UN Secretariat's morale, as quoted in Stephen Baldwin, "Good management in the United Nations", Secretariat News (New York), January 31, 1986, pp. 11-12.
5.
"[In 1950]
the General Assembly
stressed the need for careful programme reviews to effectively
use available resources.
Subsequently in 1953, the Secretary-General made a comprehensive
review of the work and structure of the Secretariat. This 'evaluation process' and the
subsequent reform actions sought to concentrate efforts and resources on the priority
programmes which an international organization could 'perform efficiently
and effectively,' avoid a 'dangerous' dispersion of these resources over a
widespread 'miscellany' of projects, and launch 'a continuing
self-criticism as to the way in which various tasks are carried
out.'" "Concentration of effort and resources," General Assembly resolution 413 (V) of 1 December 1950, "Organization of the Secretariat," UN document A/2554 of 12 November 1953, para. 5, "Annual report of the
Secretary-General on the work of the organization," UN document A/2663, 1954, pp. xiv-xv, as discussed in
Joint Inspection Unit, "Reporting on the
performance and results of United Nations programmes", UN document A/43/124,
1988, Annex I, para. 2. [emphasis added]
6.
"[Secret political screening of US staff at the UN by the US
Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1949, which ultimately led to the
resignation of Secretary-General Trygve Lie was]
the ascertainable point
at which the [the UN Secretariat] conclusively delivered
itself into the hands of national interest
in direct violation of the
[UN Charter insistence on] a scrupulous independence from national
pressures.
Staff
representatives who [spoke out]
were among the earliest and least
ceremonious departures
accompanied by intimidating and abusive
statements from the administration to those remaining.
Each department
had its informers, and its victims. The total of United
Nations employees affected
undoubtedly runs into the hundreds
[but is
difficult to determine]
since employees were permitted to resign with
extra indemnities,
[or in] terminations disguised as 'economies,' or
deportations to the field, or careers shunted [permanently] into sidings
[or] a secret blacklisting
Above all, there is
no accounting for the deterrent effect of Trygve Lie's policies on those
who might have wished to serve a differently administered United Nations
secretariat." Shirley Hazzard on the situation in the UN
Secretariat in the early 1950s, in Chapter
Two, "The purgatory of the investigations," in her Defeat of an ideal: A study of the self-destruction
of the United Nations, Atlantic-Little, Brown, Boston-Toronto, 1973, pp.
15, 23, 34-35.
7.
"An end must be put to everything that seems to make
the Secretary-General's post an autocratic one, to everything that tends
to make the staff subject to the whims and caprices of their superiors and
makes careers
--
and even employment -- dependent on blind obedience to such
absolute power." chief French Delegate
Henri Hoppenot, during a debate in the U.N. General Assembly in March 1953, as quoted in Shirley Hazzard, "Breaking faith: II", The New Yorker, October 2, 1989, p
86.
8.
"During his first year in office, [Secretary-General
Dag] Hammarskjφld sought and largely obtained from the General Assembly
administrative powers that, invested in the Secretary-General, were at
variance with the intentions of the [United Nations] Charter toward the
international civil service.
[These] actions were condemned in a
searching study, by Claude Julien, of erosion of rights at the United
Nations [in 1953] -- a study that may be read with much
interest today, when history has exposed the inadequacies of successive
Secretaries-General. .
The renewed
insistence on unconditional loyalty to a personality, whose requirements
are equated with those of the United Nations, again illustrates the
remoteness of the U.N. service from democratic procedures.
." Shirley Hazzard, "Breaking Faith, Part I", The New Yorker, September 25, 1989, pp. 63-99, [
86].
9.
"The uncontested establishment of [US government screening and
approval of US personnel for UN service in the 1950s inflicted]
untold
damage on the potential of the United Nations. Other
governments would thenceforth [and aggressively] also install their
nominees in virtually all significant, and in many insignificant, U. N.
posts.
Hundreds of meaningless and costly positions would be created
throughout the leadership of the U. N. system for the sole purpose of
accommodating national candidates -- some of whom [were] devoid of
qualifications
. unwanted in their homelands
. [or] trailing rumors of
incompetence or scandal.
By the
nineteen-eighties, the [New York] Times would
report the view of 'one Western ambassador' that 'You try to get as many
posts as possible for your own nationals. This is wrong, but everybody does
it.'"
Shirley Hazzard on the UN in the 1950s, in "Breaking Faith, Part I", The New Yorker, September 25, 1989, pp. 63-99, p.
74.
10.
"Based on its studies
the committee reiterates the
vital importance above all others of selecting well qualified personnel
and not letting standards deteriorate because of the difficulties and
complexities of recruitment. The ability of the United Nations to
carry out its essential and urgent work depends in the final analysis on
the quality of its personnel." Committee on the
Reorganization of the Secretariat, document A/7359 of
November 27, 1968, p. 37, as quoted in Housang
Ameri, Politics of staffing
the United Nations Secretariat, Peter Lang, New York,
1996, p. 549.
11.
"The Capacity Study is finished We have diagnosed the [sickness of the UN development
system of technical co-operation] and written a
prescription.
.
. Governments created this
machine - which [has become] probably the most complex organization in the
world.
. At the headquarters level, there is
. no central co-ordinating organization [to exercise
effective control]
. [and] an extraordinary complex of regional and
sub-regional offices, and
. field offices in over ninety developing
countries.
. Who controls this
'machine'?
So far the evidence suggests that governments do not, and also that
the machine is incapable of intelligently controlling
itself. This is not because it lacks
intelligent and capable officials, but because it it is so organized that managerial
direction is impossible. In other words, the machine as a whole
has become unmanageable in the strictest sense of the word. As a result, it is becoming slower and more unwieldy,
like some prehistoric monster." A study of the capacity
of the United Nations development system, 2 vols., DP/5, United
Nations, Geneva, 1969, Vol. 1, pp. i-iii. [emphasis
added]
12.
"Recruitment for the international civil service must [consider
specific factors without] parallel in any national administration: first,
the need to ensure balance at every stage between the nationalities
representing the growing number of member states; second, the importance
of maintaining balance between permanent and fixed-term appointments; and
third, the need to bring about better balance in the use of the working
languages.
. [Equitable
geographical distribution efforts] deal neither with the shortage of
competent personnel in [member] countries
. nor with [general personnel
recruitment problems]. In the current system,
. each vacancy is
advertised as and when it occurs
. no provision is made for periodic
examination of all posts
., nor for a systematic review of all the
staff members in a service -- measures which would permit concerted
plans for recruitment."
Tien-Cheng Young, "The
international civil service reexamined", Public
Administration Review (US), May/June 1970,
pp. 217-224 [220, 224].
13.
"
the question remains: how in practice to revitalize
a flagging organization which is somehow out of tune with the needs and
moods of the times?
I believe that a shock treatment is called for and
the present moment provides an unique opportunity to apply that treatment
I have come to the conclusion that the only
practical way to revitalize the organization is through a major
consolidation and regrouping. This must be no mere cosmetic
surgery.
It would require some drastic staff reduction -- up to 50 percent
in some areas -- and a major redeployment of UN resources in those tasks
in which it can be most useful to its members and the world
community." Maurice Strong, then head of the UN environment
conference, in UN document A/C.5/SR 1433, 9
November 1971, as quoted in Shirley Hazard, Defeat of an ideal: A study of the self-destruction
of the United Nations, Macmillan, London, 1973, pp. 112-113. 14.
"Few would dispute the fact that conditions of
service in the Secretariat are no longer adequate to secure a reasonable
supply of staff of the quality described in the UN Charter. In addition
there have been weaknesses in the recruitment process itself: inattention
to candidates' levels of training, responsibility and experience,
artificially restricted choice of candidates, failure to use properly the
probation period
submission to pressure from delegations, personal bias,
delay and uncertainty in offers to candidates, absence of a coherent
career policy and of effective in-service training. All these
factors are prejudicial to high quality recruitment. Internal
selection committees have tended to fall into disrepute and have permitted
practices to flourish which encourage the view of the staff that the
International Civil Service is in a process of decline." Recommendations for the
reform of UN staff conditions made by the Council of the Federation of
International Civil Servants Associations in December 1971, as quoted in Shirley Hazzard, Defeat of an ideal: A study of the self-destruction
of the United Nations, Macmillan, London, 1973, p. 113.
15.
"The siting of the United Nations headquarters in a city that
sometimes perceives luxury and prominence as an index of achievement had
encouraged the organization's excesses. [A town house at No. 3 Sutton Place]
became a permanent official New York residence for the U.N.'s chief
officer and his family, and Waldheim was the first occupant [in July
1972].
This well-intended gift conclusively defined the
Secretary-General's position as one of wealth and social prominence. Waldheim's
three predecessors had lived at private addresses of their own choosing
that provided some association with normal life.
. By contrast,
in the Waldheim era the Secretary-General's house became the culminating
point of the social and material aspirations now associated with the
United Nations.
. the organization's senior officials chose to assume that a show
of wealth supported by public funds in no way impaired their claim to
speak for the destitute and suffering throughout the world." Shirley Hazzard, "Breaking
Faith: I", The New Yorker, September 25,
1989, pp. 63-99, [89].
16.
"[Secretary-General Kurt] Waldheim's tenure was to be dense with
irreproachable statements on global peril, and punctuated by referrals of
critical questions to governmental bodies whose inaction was assured
. In
1972, the
first year of his incumbency, Waldheim called on the General Assembly to
discuss the question of terrorism. (In December, 1985, having considered
the matter for thirteen years, the Assembly agreed -- as the New York Times reported -- to the adoption of 'a
landmark resolution
that condemns all acts of terrorism as 'criminal.'')
In 1973,
theTimes noted that a U.N. body 'has been
trying to find a definition for the word 'aggression' for 23 years.' The
Times article concluded, however, by endorsing a favored U.N. view: 'In
the words of Charles Yost
a former representative here, 'just existing
is perhaps the most important quality of the United Nations." Shirley Hazzard,
"Breaking faith -- Part II",The New Yorker, October 2,1989, p, 74.
17.
"
Concern with capacity and
performance [in the United Nations system] reaches its highest peak when
draft programmes and budgets are discussed and seems to evaporate when
reports on the execution of the approved programmes are reviewed.
This dichotomy [between budgetary
concentration and performance neglect] is in itself one of the major
causes of the shortfalls of the performance of the
system." Mahdi Elmandjra, The United Nations System: An Analysis, Faber and
Faber, London, 1973, pp. 228-229. [emphasis
added] 18.
"The myth that the annual United Nations budget runs around $200
million was circulated for so long that even UN leaders appeared to
believe it.
A recent schizophrenic UN press release [containing that figure]
[later remarks that] 'Member States are contributing about $870 million
a year to the United Nations system
References to waste
are cheerful -- 'I'd be satisfied,' one official declares, 'if what
we're doing is fifty per cent effective.' Achievements are cited, and
re-cited, with triumph and even with wonder -- as if an organization that
has, over nearly three decades, employed tens of thousands of persons at a
cost of tens of billions of dollars could scarcely have been expected to
have much to show.
An attempt at public discussion of
United Nations financing will bring the Pavlovian and often belligerent
reply 'Only a fraction of what nations spend on armaments'
" Shirley Hazzard, Defeat of an ideal: A study of the
self-destruction of the United Nations, Macmillan, London, 1973, pp. 118-120.
19.
"Social justice [to which international agencies are
committed] stops short for one segment of mankind -- the international
civil servant, a member of a virtually unprotected minority. The existing system of due process suffers from an
absence of important elements
All too often, the appeals procedure,
which is conceived of as an instrument to raise a staff member's hopes,
buries it instead.
The machinery of due process is slow and ponderous,
and thus fails to provide a true safeguard against administrative
absolutism and arbitrariness
" "Appeals procedures for international civil
servants," Federation of Civil Servants Associations (FICSA), FICSA
Studies and Policies No. 2, of 1974.
20. "
Recently there appears to have occurred a marked decline in the
number of requests for legal opinions from the Secretary-General and
various departments, including the Office of Personnel Services. This may be
another indication of the politicization of the Secretariat, of the
diminishing role of law in the Organization, and of the increasing power
of the various departments that want to be free to establish policy
"
Theodor Meron, The United
Nations Secretariat: The Rules and the Practice, Chapter 4, "Selected
legal questions", D.C. Heath, Lexington, Mass., 1977, p. 83. 21.
"Some members of the [UN] staff have great ability and
commitment but they support a great many parasitic 'deadwood' employees and
employees serving primarily the political interests of their
government.
The principle of merit can in the long run be protected only by
fair and objective procedures and safeguards, which are subject to law and
to effective grievance procedures. But
should the present trends continue
the staff would probably be suspected of lacking neutrality and might lose the
confidence of some Member States. The result might be paralysis of the
Secretariat , which would be unable to play an effective role in
situations of crisis." Theodor Meron, The United Nations Secretariat: The Rules and the
Practice, Chapter 4, "Selected legal questions", D.C. Heath,
Lexington, Mass., 1977, pp. 83-84. [emphasis
added.]
22.
"
[in 1978].
a former justice of the [International
Court of Justice reviewed a staff dispute with management]
[He
found that]
. 'The [UN internal justice] problems
have accumulated over
a long period
[because the existing machinery fails]
to find and implement solutions to staff grievances.' '
complaints pile up, and staff members become increasingly bitter and
resentful.
. a formal grievance procedure
should be speedy,
encourage
settlement .. , [have clear and publicized procedures]
be a process of
negotiation
[with] any bargain
or agreement
. equally binding
.
. dealing on a basis of equality with
staff representatives will
[be difficult for some management]
officials
.'
How
long are we going to pretend that the United Nations is so different from
the rest of the world that we cannot learn and profit from others'
experience?" "Bill Bailey", [a UN
senior official], in "Appeals or redress of grievances?", Secretariat News [New York], November 1984, pp.
8-9.
23.
"In the late 1970s, the U.N. staff union in New York
engaged the American labor negotiator Theodore Kheel to represent it in
its dealings with the U.N. administration. His
experience with the U.N.
hierarchy
-- which he likens to 'the court of Henry VIII' --- [focused in
particular on] its propensity for abrogating formal agreements on basic
matters of staff rights
. 'The thing that
utterly
amazed me' Kheel said recently, 'was the position taken by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations [then Kurt Waldheim] to disregard
the elementary established rights of employees; that the agency
created to maintain standards of human decency and to bring about peace by
negotiated settlement would violate its own agreements and see no
necessity for compliance with its own word.'" Hazzard, Shirley, "Breaking faith: II", The New Yorker, October 2, 1989, p
86.
24. "I
have been intrigued
. by the question of who is in charge at the UN; who
sets the standards and values of the Organization? Who says what
the UN is, what it does, what it cannot do?
. Events
. indicate
[that there is no] monolithic power structure at the UN.
. The
Secretary-General
. is constrained by the political clout of his closest
collaborators, particularly the Department Heads.
. further
complicated by [growing exercise by the] Fifth Committee and General
Assembly of managerial responsibility because [they are unable to ensure]
that managers in fact do [their jobs.]
. Policy derives from
an accretion of small decisions and actions up and down the management
line.
.
There is no thread of coherence running through the whole. At any given
time, a special assistant
may be as important in establishing values and
policies as is
the Secretary-General himself. Such people
define the Organization through [staff]
failure to do so, through our
acquiescence." Lowell Flanders, "The
future of the UN
. In whose hands?", address [by the President of the
Staff Union] at a preparatory meeting of the United Nations Community
Forum,
Secretariat News (NY), April 16, 1979, p. 10.
25. The annual
over-all budget of the U.N. [system], has, of recent years, been
informally estimated at six billion dollars. However, I find it impossible
to establish a reliable yearly total for the U.N.s attestable over-all
expenditures
The organization informs me that no comprehensive figure
can be provided.
. It is my impression
that no one knows even the approximate cost, to world citizenry, of the
United Nations enterprise. in June of 1979, [a
Washington Post article] dealing with the
U.N.s finances brought denunciation from both the United Nations arid the
U.S. State Department, [The latter] ,,,. conceded that the
Posts figures were accurate, but claimed,
according to the Post,
that the intricate
nature of the United Nations system
[and its] cumbersome administrative
structure,
jealously guarded in [many agencies,]
precluded
assessment by outsiders. Shirley Hazzard, on a
1979 attempt to track UN finances, and her own
inability to do so 12 years later, in Breaking Faith I, The New Yorker, September 25, 1989, p
89.
26.
"The United Nations staff union has called for an independent
investigation into allegations of corruption and maladministration in UN
internal affairs. Longstanding
discontent among the 2,700 professional staff at the New York headquarters
burst into the open when a senior UN official was allowed to resign
quietly although serious allegations had been made about his financial
affairs and staff appointments.
Staff morale
is low.
Most staff members indulge in place-seeking and status preferment
rather than the original spirit of dedication to UN principles. Finding jobs
for one's own group, or for those sharing ideologies, is a major
pre-occupation." Colin Legum, "UN staff
call for corruption probe", The Observer (UK),
November 2, 1980
27.
"
[A 1981 expert consultant report on
continuing
crises in Secretariat administration of justice and remedies stated
that:] 'The delays in the Joint Appeals Board at
Headquarters are now so serious that they cast doubt on the willingness
and ability of the United Nations to provide effective means for settling
disputes with the staff. The
situation has already had a bad effect on staff morale
The
United Nations enjoys immunity from the jurisdiction of
States
[but has undertaken] to provide effective means of settling disputes to
which it is a party
a failure to do so could have grave effects. It is
therefore vitally important and urgent to remedy the present
situation. It
is evident that at present the JAB is quite unable to cope with the large
backlog and the unprecedented influx of new cases ... All told, it would
not be surprising to find that the man-hours consumed by even a simple
case cost the Organization over $50,000.'" As cited in Mark A.
Roy, "Administration of justice in the United Nations Secretariat",
Secretariat News (New York), 19 June 1984, pp. 5-6.
[emphasis added]
28.
"There was general agreement that the United Nations system is
facing a major challenge
The executive heads
of organizations which are responsible for operational activities
[believe]
their activities have a proved record of effectiveness and
efficiency.
While many of the charges of waste, inefficiency, duplication,
etc., are not accurate, it will be necessary to refute these charges by
clear evidence to the contrary.
The ACC also
recognizes its responsibility to improve the image of the United Nations
so as to reassure Governments and the general public that it is an
efficient and effective mechanism for dealing with the important issues of
concern to the international community." "International co-operation and co-ordination within the United Nations system: Annual overview report of the Administrative Committee on Coordination for 1981/82," UN document E/1982/4 of 18 May 1982, paras. 16, 18, and 72. 29.
"
. Guilty [managers] can get away with
.
irresponsible performance more readily in the bureaucratic system of the
UN than in any foreign office, however small. When appointees to
a post up the hierarchical ladder are voted politically into place by the
concerned Member States group, they have a fiefdom bestowed upon them
which they value for all its perquisites.
. independence spreads through
all their activities as long as they hold office. Needless to say, in such
political appointments, knowledge of the subject field, previous
experience and quality of performance in the job are peripheral
considerations.
The result is absence of continuity in the work of the unit,
questioning of the ability of the incumbents and a continuing decline in
the institutional image of the UN organization in international
affairs." Donald Dunham,
"Management by personnel action", Secretariat
News (New York), November 30, 1984, p.
11.
30.
"In the 13 years that I have been with DTCD, formerly
OTC, formerly BTAO, formerly etc., we have been reassessed, redefined,
reoriented, readjusted, rearranged, reordered, reduced and, of course,
reorganized.
We've been aligned and realigned, maligned, streamlined and
asinined.
All in the name of progress and increased efficiency. It seems to
be the curse of bureaucracy that every new situation is met by
reorganization.
Where's accountability in the United Nations? Who takes
responsibility?
Where does the buck stop?
at the UN it does not seem to matter
how severe the financial mismanagement or how erratic and bungling the
reorganizations
--
no one in management either at the Departmental or central level is
held accountable. Perhaps the most cruel and bitter irony in this
entire masquerade is that in October 1984 the Fifth Committee approved $86
million to build lavish new conference facilities in Addis Ababa. This in the
face of overwhelming human misery and starvation.
Where's the accountability?" Lowell Flanders, "A.D. 65", Secretariat News (New York), December 1984, pp. 10-11. 31.
"For all the champagne and fine words, it should be obvious to
friends and foes alike that the United Nations is in trouble and has
fallen far short of what its founders dreamed of 40 years ago.
.
For its friends, of which we are two, . the problem is not so much that the United Nations fails to meet grandiose expectations of a 'world government', but that it is not particularly effective in averting conflict or fighting poverty. | |||
