

## OVERVIEW OF IO WATCH ARCHIVE QUOTES II 1995-2004

75. "Senior U.N. officials have been corrupted: not by power and ambition but by their tax-free salaries and their comfortable lives. Servants and secretaries help them get through the day and perform their non-existent jobs. All they want is for this to continue until they retire ..."

Tom Bethell, National Review (US), **August 28, 1995**.

76. "When it comes to organization and supervision, [43 percent of UN staff responding] consider that their supervisor's performance is inadequate ... or downright bad. Professional staff are the most concerned. ...

... On the whole, staff members want better -- i.e., qualified -- managers, more accountability within the Organization and more personal initiative and responsibility."

"Picture of UN staff: A worldwide survey: Organized by UN staff for UN staff", Geneva, **25 September 1995**, pp. 3, 5, 10, 13-14.

77. "... Efforts must be made to do away with the widespread tendency of staff, even in key positions, to shun responsibility and accountability. OIOS backs measures taken by the Department of Administration and Management to achieve this goal and will focus its own recommendations to management accordingly. ...

... Many UN managers are not used to and seem to be quite reluctant to accept criticism, particularly when it comes to applying accountability criteria rather than settling for the promise that some specific problems won't recur. This feature of the United Nations culture must be changed if we are ever to develop staff awareness and acceptance of responsibility and accountability. United Nations managers must stop being defensive and enter into a critical dialogue with OIOS."

"Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the [OIOS]", UN document

A/50/459, **2 October 1995**, in "Preface", by the first head of the OIOS, Mr. Karl Paschke.

78. "**For years Western governments have complained about the lack of accountability prevailing in UN organizations, but in practice they have tolerated a degree of opacity that would be considered totally unacceptable for any civil service in a democracy. ...**

**[No] amount of exhortation – as the years have proved – can compensate for the lack of routine inspection under established rules of 'open government.'** Evaluation would require ... built-in procedures requiring the UN bureaucracies to respond to criticisms. So ingrained is the **collusion between the permanent representatives to these organizations and the secretariats** that a majority for such an initiative among the UN membership would be difficult though not impossible to muster. But many UN staff members would welcome more rigorous scrutiny ..."

Rosemary Righter, Utopia lost: The United Nations and world order, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, **1995**, pp. 280-281. [emphasis added]

79. "'United Nations management' has been termed an oxymoron, a juxtaposition of incompatibles. **Over the past fifty years, there have been various attempts to strengthen United Nations programmes and improve their management, but they have not been well implemented.**

The General Assembly insisted very forcefully in December 1993 that a new, 'transparent and effective system of accountability and responsibility' be established ...

... The future status and credibility of the United Nations require it to demonstrate that it is a learning organization which will skillfully and flexibly manage its limited resources to produce results ...

**The current effort is undoubtedly the best, and possibly the last, opportunity to establish a strong management culture and performance emphasis in the United Nations.**

... At the same time, this enormous process of change is being done with modest resources, **against entrenched habits of mediocre management**, and in the midst of continuing operational and financial turbulence ..."

Joint Inspection Unit, "Management in the United Nations: Work in progress", UN document A/50/507, 1995, "Executive Summary", p. v. [emphasis added]

80. "The [Integrated Management Information System (IMIS), approved by the General Assembly in 1988.] moved forward with painful slowness for years, due primarily to management indecision and a lack of proper support to the contractor (resulting in significant cost overruns and an expected final total cost of some \$76 million ... Meanwhile, the antiquated existing systems have continued to provide inaccurate, tardy, inconsistent, and inadequate financial and personnel data, which could rarely be used by managers in daily operations. Recently, however, with stronger leadership and following a 'complete reprogramming and rebudgeting exercise' and a review by the Board of Auditors, IMIS may now be ready to reach a 'critical mass' of implementation ..."

"Management in the United Nations: Work in progress", Joint Inspection Unit, UN document A/50/507, 1995, para. 54.

81. Randolph Kent's study of international disaster relief is a considered, compassionate, and pessimistic assessment of the whole sorry history of *ad hoc* expedients and what he politely calls 'institutional insecurities.' He points out that it took the Nigerian civil war (which claimed, without UN intervention as peacekeeper, perhaps a million casualties ...), the Peruvian earthquake, and the combination of war with natural disaster in Bangladesh -- all of which occurred between 1967 and 1971 -- 'to bring the simmering issues of the United Nations' role in emergency operations to the boil.' Unproductively on the boil it has remained. Since 1971, no fewer than ten UN disaster units have been created, each exerting its claim to be treated as contact point, fund-raiser, coordinator, and assessor, each with a mandate in excess of its capacities. Alongside these are at least a dozen national disaster units, and an increasingly sophisticated, relatively well coordinated and flexibly managed assortment of voluntary organizations."

Rosemary Righter, Utopia lost: The United Nations and world order, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1995, p. 290. [Note: The quote is from Randolph C. Kent, Anatomy of disaster relief: The international network in action, Frances Pinter, London, 1987.

82. Introduction: A good idea fallen among thieves

The UN has the media relations of a 1950s state bureaucracy. It doesn't like reporters looking into its inner workings, and it threatens dire penalties to staff found leaking information to the media.

Time and time again, when journalists have exposed scandals in the UN, senior officials set up an enquiry -- into who leaked!"

Ian Williams, The UN for beginners, Writers and Readers Publishing, New York, **1995**, p. 1.

83. "With a budgeting process as antiquated and arcane as the UN's, the dearth of training -- the key to instituting a truly cost-effective management culture -- is shocking. Managers often start out with no notion of how to administer their own office budgets. 'Management training', confined mostly to the UN's Performance Appraisal System, still takes a back seat to language-training programmes which dominate staff improvement time. Managerial expertise is but a faint consideration in the promotion of managers at any level, including the Secretary-General."

Morris B. Abram, "Save the UN", The Geneva Post, No. 9, **May 17-22, 1996**.

84. "Halfway through his term and answerable only to Member States, [Mr. Karl Paschke, the UN's first "Inspector General"] can look forward to a comfortable couple of years ... But United Nations observers are beginning to ask what has been achieved in exchange for ... a free hand for Paschke. The answer is not encouraging.

... the original conception of Paschke's post was a combination of Grand Inquisitor and Super Sleuth. The final product, insiders say, falls far short of either. ... "The problem is that half the OIOS staff do not know anything about the UN" we are told, "and the other half know everything there is to know but are part of the establishment and they are not going to make waves." The results of OIOS's travails are paltry indeed ....

There are whispers that senior staff need not fear their peccadilloes will be exposed. Paschke's Finest, it is said, will rake no muck above a certain level of political or bureaucratic influence."

"Diplomatic pouch", Diplomatic World Bulletin, **July 29-August 6, 1996**, p. 10.

85. "The image of the UN is disastrously bad not only for the public at large, but even among diplomats or delegates to the U.N. who are in constant touch with the Secretariat members. It is extremely bad among the few reasonable and honest 'senior U.N. officers' who remain in the service of the Organization. One of them told Maggie O'Kane, the well-known investigative reporter (who has also won the 'Journalist of the Year' award) that, 'This is the most corrupt organization I have ever worked for; everybody is on the take.'"

Houshang Ameri, Politics of staffing the United Nations Secretariat, Major Concepts in Politics and Political Theory, Vol. 8, Peter Lang, New York, **1996**, p. 399. The concluding quote is from The Guardian (UK), August 26 1993.

86. "In **1996**, Andre Sirois, a legal translator at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, found himself surrounded by rampant kickbacks, bribes, and mismanagement. ... He reported it all to ... [the OIOS. Its] representatives came out to investigate, and Sirois encouraged his colleagues to speak with them. In short order, he and the other complainers were effectively fired ... despite good performance reviews and a shortage of qualified staff ....

When the firings began, Sirois and two colleagues flew secretly to New York City ... [at their own expense, but no senior UN officials] would listen to them. Eventually, the OIOS substantiated the corruption at the ICTR and the entire senior administrative staff was fired, but it was too late for the whistle-blowers -- their job contracts had expired. Sirois appealed the nonrenewal of his contract, and seven years later, he won. But there was a catch: ... his contract carried no expectation of renewal."

Corine Hegland, "Whistle-blowing at the United Nations", National Journal (US), March 12, 2005.

87. "Real reform requires an ongoing search for excellence ... above all, in the performance of our staff. In this I [new Secretary-General Kofi Annan] will not compromise. I expect from each and every staff member, at all levels, a total commitment to excellence. I expect the Secretariat to work together and at all times to function properly. ...

I pledge to you today that we will develop a new management culture in the Organization. Our senior managers across the world must understand their obligation to properly manage the staff -- the human resources -- entrusted to their care. It is my intention to hold my managers accountable for providing the full range of career support to their staff in their day-to-day work. ...

... We are the United Nations, and we believe our organization can fulfil the vision of our Charter ... The excellence of our performance will turn our detractors into supporters. We all know [that] ... nobody argues with success."

"Secretary-General urges staff to strive for excellence, stressing UN performance will turn detractors into supporters", SG/SM/6140 of **9 January 1997**, pp. 3-5. [Note: See, however, the entry below on accountability deficiencies eight years later, of 17 May 2005.]

88. "Sins of member states:

Secretariat staff resent ...member state interference in ... their daily work ... [their micromanagement of] the hiring and promotion of Secretariat personnel. .... [and of] Secretariat budgeting, .... too often ...seeking to control the minor details of spending allocations. ....

Sins of the Secretariat:

.... Member states contend that ineffective -- some would say nonexistent -- managerial practices throughout the Secretariat have led to inefficient use of the [UN resources] ...; a staff unaccountable for its actions and prone to delegate upwards; ... a lack of transparency in Secretariat decision making [on] policy issues, personnel, and budget expenditures. ... much of the information that is provided is not timely or readable. ... Overall, inefficiency and lack of accountability within the Secretariat, whether perceived or real, have invited member state micromanagement. "

"Making UN reform work: Improving member state-Secretariat relations", Report of the twenty-eighth United Nations issues conference, The Stanley Foundation, **February 21-23, 1997**, pp. 2, 14-16.

89. **"The General Assembly ...**

1.2. **Regrets with deep concern that further progress in the implementation of the adopted [human resources] strategy has not been achieved ...;**

3. **Regrets the unsuccessful efforts to develop a management environment and culture** in the Organization ...

II. Reaffirming its resolution 48/218A of ... [1993], in particular ... ensuring that programme managers are accountable for the effective management of human resources allocated to them, ...

2. **Requests the Secretary-General to ... [impose] sanctions in cases of demonstrated mismanagement of staff and willful neglect of or disregard for established rules and procedures ...**

3. **...to issue specific administrative instructions ... [including] sanctions ...for any financial loss suffered by the United Nations as a result of gross negligence ...;**

4. **Deplores the high number of exceptions to the established procedures for ... [human resource decisions], in particular in the [personnel office, OHRM];**

6. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to streamline [administration] ... through delegation of authority to programme managers and **to ensure, before delegating such authority, that well-designed mechanisms of accountability, including the necessary internal monitoring and control procedures..., are put in place ...**"

"Human resources management", General Assembly resolution 51/226 of **25 April 1997**, Part I, paras. 2-4, Part II, first preambular and paras. and 2-4, and 6. [emphasis added]

90. **"The General Assembly, ...**

Expressing deep concern about the persistence of problems and defects observed by the Board of Auditors in the financial administration and management of the United Nations; ...

11. **Notes with deep concern the incidents of fraud and presumed fraud reported** by the Board of Auditors;

12. **Requests the Secretary-General** and the executive heads ... **to take the disciplinary actions necessary in cases of proven fraud and to enhance the individual accountability** of United Nations personnel, including **through stronger managerial control**; ..."

"Financial reports and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors," General Assembly resolution 51/225 of **16 May 1997**. [emphasis added]

91. "UN employees -- who request anonymity because they fear they will suffer more professional harm than the corrupt officials they want to expose -- have provided numerous accounts of officials' being transferred rather than dismissed after being caught breaking the rules.

This happens frequently in cases of sexual harassment, nepotism, and occasionally violence, according to these accounts. Whistle-blowers are neither encouraged nor rewarded."

Barbara Crossette, "In war on corruption and waste, UN confronts well-entrenched foe", International Herald Tribune, **3 November 1997**.

92. "OHRM will convene ... a task force of experts [to make a] 'clear delineation of responsibilities' [which] is expected to lead to a reduction in micro-management.

[The *IDR* then notes that] *Micromanagement by intergovernmental bodies is an index of the lack of trust between the majority of delegations and the UN Secretariat. ... [If this trend is to be reversed] there must be a much clearer conceptualization of change, a balanced explanation of implications, and an absolute sincerity of purpose. The current perception of the Secretariat among many delegations is that in terms of personnel policy it is confused, does not understand the full implications of what is proposed, and has a hidden agenda. ...*

In pushing for reorientation, Ms. Salim speaks some home truths... 'there is 'widespread staff distrust of management' and the UN's 'organizational culture is one in which advancement is generally expected on the basis of longevity rather than performance.'"

"UN personnel chief reviewing all aspects of management in bid to simplify controls, delegate authority," International Documents Review, **16 February 1998**, p. 2.

93. "In a rather scathing [1998] report, the General Assembly's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Financial Questions (ACABQ) has dismissed the 'concept paper' ... submitted by the Secretariat on 'Reducing and refocusing of non-programme costs.' ...

Rather than call for yet another report, the ACABQ suggests that a practical move at this stage might be to 'set aside a preoccupation with concept and theory ... to concentrate on ...

specific new measures to increase the efficiency and confirm the results arising out of the implementation of new measures as well as those initiated prior to the current exercise."

"Advisory Committee rejects "non-programme costs" report", International Documents Review, **16 March 1998**, page 5.

94. "The job of secretary-general at the United Nations is not unlike that of a medieval pope. ... Until recently [Kofi Annan] ... seemed to have momentum on his side. But his successful diplomatic crusade in Iraq ... [is] unraveling ... the UN's monitors have been hustled out of Congo ... the hard-won peace in Angola is at vanishing point ... [and] the ... [UNHCR] faces unexpected allegations of corruption. ...

Sooner or later ... the UN will have to change ... into the 'narrower and deeper' organization reformers have always wished it would be.

Mr. Annan is nervous about the idea of a much narrower UN ...

[Yet]... the failure by most popes to face up to the abuses within their own organizations opened up the way to reformation of a more devastating type. Or as one insider puts it: "If the UN's friends do not reform it, its enemies will."

"Reforming the United Nations: Pope Kofi's unruly flock", The Economist, **August 8th, 1998**, pp. 17-19.

95. " ... The [1998 OIOS annual] report is a guide to a variety of UN scandals ...

"The Second UN Conference on Human Settlements ... is perhaps the crown jewel ... [with] ... an uncovered deficit in the range of \$2 million ... The Conference 'never submitted a cost plan for the use of the \$8.2 million in voluntary contributions ... and accounting for donor contributions was incomplete. [OIOS does not address the question of how this situation developed and was allowed to continue.]

"OIOS has investigated ... an UNCTAD staff member ... who bilked the agency of over \$600,000 by claiming travel and per diem expenses for non-existent experts attending imaginary meetings. [OIOS does not ... mention] that this imaginative individual was caught only because he was hospitalized for a time and could not keep up the charade. This is surely material for a Hollywood comedy.]"

"Reviewing 3+ years of work, [OIOS] sees continuing problems - but reforms are afoot," International Documents Review, **2 November 1998**, pp. 1-4.

96. "**The General Assembly**

IV. Delegation of authority and accountability ...

3. ... **notes that no comprehensive system of accountability and responsibility has been established;** ...

10. **Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General** [of 25 April 1997] **to enhance managerial accountability** with respect to human resources management decisions, **including imposing sanctions in case of demonstrated mismanagement of staff and willful neglect of or disregard for established rules and procedures**, while safeguarding the right of due process of all staff members, including managers."

"Human resources management," General Assembly resolution 53/221 of **23 April 1999**. [emphasis added]

97. "The United Nations of today ... is a better Organization in many respects than, say, five years ago, and enhanced oversight has played its part in that change.

However, further improvement within the United Nations is still necessary in many ways. Internal controls are not strong enough yet; accountability continues to be blurred and misunderstood; delegation of authority must be effectively executed; and human resources management is in need of further reform, particularly in ... the system of personnel assessment. ... The operational and psychological distance between Headquarters and the field, that is, the other duty stations ... remains a problem."

Karl T. Paschke, Under-Secretary-General and first head of the OIOS, in "Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services" A/54/393 of **23 September 1999**, Preface.

98. "It is not easy to admit the truth of Srebrenica, the Bosnian town where [in 1995] thousands of Muslim men were executed and hundreds buried alive ... But in its report on Monday, the United Nations accepts its share of the blame. ....

.... In the recent case of East Timor, the council supported the idea of a UN referendum on independence but refused to send troops to deter a bloodbath that was widely predicted.

Sometimes the United Nations' failure is built into its structure. Where a permanent member of the Security Council opposes intervention, no action will be authorized ... But in cases where the Security Council does approve action, it is fair to insist that it be serious. The UN member states need to embrace force to secure peace; they need to shove neutrality aside and denounce evil in order to combat it. ...."

"The UN apologizes", *The Washington Post*, International Herald Tribune, **November 19, 1999**.

99. "After the humiliating failures of United Nations peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Rwanda there was a consensus .... that new ways of undertaking them [needed urgently to be] developed. That is what makes the recent decision to deploy 5,500 U.N. peacekeepers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo so incomprehensible. ....

As the United Nations itself now concedes, [the efforts] in Rwanda and Bosnia ... never had either the means or the mandate to accomplish anything more than a bit of marginal humanitarian relief. [Yet in] the proposed Congo deployment .... the identical mistakes are being made once again. The fact that they are being made with the best of intentions alters nothing ... Instead, it will seem as if the world tried to do something for Africa, but nothing could be done. Such a conclusion helps nobody, least of all those Africans who deserve so much better from the rest of the world."

David Rieff, "Making the same mistakes: Memo to the United Nations: A peacekeeping mission to Congo may do more harm than good", Newsweek, **March 20, 2000**.

100. "In recent years, the United Nations has had fundamental problems. In 1994, the U.N.'s inability to procure goods and services fairly and on time reached a crisis. Also there was an overall failure of its human resources system to staff critical posts with the right people. Peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia failed to accomplish their mission.

"[In 1997] The Secretary General proposed a reform program ... [and] set the end of 1999 as the target to put the reforms in place. ...

The United Nations ... has not yet implemented reforms to focus its programming and budgeting on managing the Secretariat's performance. These initiatives would enable Member States to hold the Secretariat accountable for results and are key to the success of the overall reform ... The U.N. reform is an interrelated process and requires that all core elements be in place to succeed."

US General Accounting Office, "United Nations: Reforms are progressing, but overall objectives have not been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-169, **May 10, 2000**, pp. 2-3, and

"United Nations: Reform initiatives have strengthened operations, but overall objectives have not been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-150, **May 2000**.

101. "After the .... chaos in Sierra Leone, [many people have urged changes in UN peacekeeping]. But such demands assume that the UN is capable of reform. Unfortunately, that may not be the case.

The UN is always short of the personnel it needs for peacekeeping operations. First World countries with first-rate armies are usually unwilling to put their troops at risk. Thus, these operations are often left to Third World countries, and the UN sends some of the worst soldiers in the world off to situations where it can only hope they are not called on to do anything.

When peacekeepers perform badly, it is too politically embarrassing to remove them. This is particularly true of senior officials since they were often given their jobs not because of their ability but because of the country they represent. For instance, as the situation in Sierra Leone began to melt down, UN officials in New York, who usually micromanage things, began to blame the officials in Africa for the failure."

Dennis C. Jett, "The UN's peacekeeping failures are built in and intractable", International Herald Tribune, **May 23, 2000**. [Note: Mr. Jett is the author of Why peacekeeping fails, St. Martins, New York, 2000.]

102. "While there is currently **a comprehensive system of [UN internal] justice in place**, its highly formalized nature **leads to protracted and lengthy proceedings that are in the interest of neither justice nor of the staff or management**. At present, the decision makers whose administrative decisions are questioned are very rarely directly involved in defending the cases. **This has resulted in the perception that the system shields managers from being held accountable for their decisions.**"

"Human resources management reform: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/55/253 of **1 August 2000**, para. 51. [emphasis added]

103. **"The jurisdictional immunity of the [United Nations] legally obligates it to have just and effective internal processes to deal with grievances and appeals by staff, and with disciplinary cases ... [as] an indispensable aid to maintaining staff morale, as well as enforcing accountability."**

"Accountability and responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General", A/55/270 of **3 August 2000**, Summary, para. 39. [emphasis added]

104. "The present report ... presents the elements of an integrated and effective system of accountability. It outlines the progress made ... and outlines changes ... which will allow for the effective implementation of the comprehensive system of accountability now established. ...

... In conclusion, the Secretary-General is confident that the comprehensive system ... now in place ensures that accountability mechanisms are effectively used, are seen to be used, and ensure that staff at all levels are held accountable for their actions and inaction."

The General Assembly may wish to take note of the mechanisms ... which together constitute the comprehensive system of accountability for the Organization."

"Accountability and responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/55/270 of **3 August 2000**, Summary, paras. 1-2, 47-48.

105. "Challenges to implementation

... No amount of money or resources can substitute for the significant changes that are urgently needed in the culture of the Organization.

... People everywhere are fully entitled to consider that [the United Nations] is *their* organization, and as such to pass judgement on its activities and the people who serve in it.

Furthermore, wide disparities in staff quality exist and those in the system are the first to acknowledge it; better performers are given unreasonable workloads to compensate for those who are less capable. **Unless the United Nations takes steps to become a true meritocracy, it will not be able to reverse the alarming trend of qualified personnel, the young among them in particular, leaving the Organization. Unless ... the Secretary-General and his senior staff ... seriously address this problem on a priority basis, reward excellence and remove incompetence, additional resources will be wasted and lasting reform will become impossible.**

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [the "Brahimi report"], UN document A/55/305 -- S/2000/809 of **August 21 2000**, p. xiv. [emphasis added]

106. "The United Nations has been hit by an unprecedented wave of fraud, waste and corruption. Officials at its antifraud investigation unit say they are expecting to have to run more than 350 inquiries by the end of the year. Thousands of staff, contractors, and consultants have been interviewed in scores of countries. ...

The revelations will embarrass Kofi Annan... [ahead of] ... the 'Millenium Summit' in New York ... [where he hopes] to convince skeptical heads of state that the UN has provided value for money and that its role should be expanded. ...

One senior investigator said last week that the UN investigations unit's workload was greater than ever. "We are seeing more and more frauds and abuses of authority. ...

The OIOS's annual report, due out next month, will reveal cases of sloppy management, lax enforcement, harassment and outright criminality. ... OIOS is working with dozens of international police forces -- including Scotland Yard -- on inquiries into the activities of UN personnel."

Jason Burke, et. al., "UN rocked by flood of fraud cases: Officials were 'addicted to luxury'", The Observer International (UK), **September 3, 2000**.

[Note: no similar report on UN corruption has been issued before or since.]

107. "A former [senior UN human rights official] ... told *The Observer* that the UN has 'an absurd and unaccountable system of abuse, embezzlement and ineptitude.'

[He said] 'It's very difficult to dig out and punish abuse in an organization where it is the norm. ...

[He] ... described a series of cases that included: assistants to a senior official based in another country not realizing for more than a year that their superior had died; [and] an official report on the human rights situation in Czechoslovakia, written by an overworked official by 'cutting and pasting' a report from Columbia. ... The words 'Czech Republic' had just been pasted in,' he] said.

He also criticized 'an addiction to perks and luxury.' When one UN official in Rwanda had wanted to interview the Canadian general [who had been] in charge of peacekeeping forces there he had been told to arrange an itinerary with stays on the way out and back in Brussels, Paris and Geneva, [he] claimed."

Jason Burke, et. al., "UN rocked by flood of fraud cases: Officials were 'addicted to luxury,'" The Observer International (UK), **September 3, 2000**.

108. "The UN Sexual Harassment Policy, although in some respects reading well on the surface, is deficient when measured against standards presently applicable under host country [US] law. ...

The UN Policy is remarkable for its complete failure to mention retaliation. In addition, it [seems to involve] ... disciplinary procedures which are confusing, cumbersome, bureaucratic and painfully slow. . . .

... We believe... that the [UN policy] would not meet [US] current standards for an effective anti-sexual harassment policy. ... the 'four P's' are either not sufficiently present or are lacking entirely, i.e., Policy in writing, Prompt investigation, Protection of the victim, Punishment of the harasser."

"Report commenting on United Nations sexual harassment policy", Chadbourne & Park LLP, New York, **March 2001**. [Note: to be found at [www.un.org/staff/panelofcounsel/shrep.htm](http://www.un.org/staff/panelofcounsel/shrep.htm) .]

109. "*How do you ensure that DPI [the UN Department of Public Information] isn't seen as a propaganda tool, yet that it serves the UN's objectives?*

By telling the truth! Information isn't propaganda unless you doctor it to distort reality or hide inconvenient facts. We don't do that.

I think you'll admit that under Secretary General Kofi Annan we have the most transparent United Nations imaginable ..."

Pranay Gupte, "Q & A: Shashi Tharoor: 'Why information matters at the UN'," Earth Times, **May 2001**, p. 16.

110. "In the five years since international police officers were sent to Bosnia to help restore law and order, the United Nations police mission there has faced numerous charges of misconduct, corruption and sexual impropriety.

But in virtually every case, the allegations have been hushed up ... often without full investigations, according to internal UN reports and interviews ...

International police officers have diplomatic immunity from prosecution in Bosnia, and unless their governments waive that immunity, the most severe punishment the United Nations can impose on renegade officers is to send them home.

'The top ten percent of the American contingent were fantastic' said a former [officer]. 'But the bottom 10 percent made your eyes water.'

Colum Lynch, "UN police in Bosnia: Who's watching: Allegations of abuse by international officers are said to be hushed up", International Herald Tribune, **May 30, 2001**.

111. "Kofi Annan's election to a second and last term should normally allow him to help establish the United Nations as the centerpiece of an emerging system of global management that is efficient, just and accepted as legitimate by all peoples and nations.

Decisive action should not continue to be postponed in regaining the motivation and professional quality of the United Nations in its early years."

Enrique ter Horst, "A re-elected secretary-general can give the world the facts", International Herald Tribune, **July 6, 2001** .

112. "Pino Arlacchi, head of the [UN crime programme] has been told to step down.

Kofi Annan ... told Mr. Arlacchi that he must leave ... when his contract finishes at the end of February [i.e. in 2002].

The move follows months of controversy ...

Several European donors, including the Netherlands, cut off their funding of the [Office] following allegations of Mr. Arlacchi's mismanagement [in a] ...damning UN investigation released last month. ...

Mr. Annan is said to have been studying a second report concerning more serious allegations of misconduct by Mr. Arlacchi ... Diplomats who have seen the report say that it is even more damning than the first."

... [Mr. Annan's spokesman] said: We know [he] is studying the reports and I've not been informed that he's yet made a final decision."

Carola Hoyos, "Annan orders head of UN drugs agency to step down", Financial Times (UK), **July 25, 2001**.

113. "The [UNHCR] has sent a team of investigators into refugee camps in west Africa following [a report by the UNHCR and the British-based charity Save the Children] ... that large numbers of children have been sexually exploited by aid workers there. ...

An unspecified number of interviewees complained that they or their children had to have sex in order to get food and favours.

Over 40 aid agencies -- including the UNHCR itself -- were implicated, and 67 individuals -- mostly local staff -- [were] named by the children. ...

'The very people who are meant to be providing services are the exploiters themselves' said [an NGO country director there.] ...

The charity has already sacked three employees.

A [UNHCR] spokesman said the accusations ... were so far unsubstantiated. "

"Child refugee sex scandal", BBC News, **26 February, 2002**.

114. "New Yorkers, competing to lure Kofi Annan to their dinners and benefits, are making him the most sociable, plugged-in United Nations secretary general the city has ever known. Sometimes that ... [amounts to] five nights out a week, he says. That is on top of all those official lunches, diplomatic receptions and traveling: 20 countries so far this year. ...

One close friend described Mr. Annan as 'the rock star of international relations.' ...

[He] has a striking partner in his wife, Nane Lagergren, a lawyer and artist ... "She's just blossomed to be the first lady of the world" [said a friend.] ...

"I think he believes, quite rightly," Sir Brian [Urquhart] said, 'that the UN ... needed to reach out to people beyond the diplomatic circle. All of that diplomatic wining and dining is a relic of a completely different time."

Barbara Crossette, "Outside UN, a secretary so social", New York Times, **May 30, 2002**.

115. "The U.N. report was a bombshell. In a survey [in three West African countries last fall,] ... the writers ... alleged a 'chronic and entrenched pattern' of sex abuse in [refugee] camps, adding that government and U.N. field managers acknowledged the problem.

The response of the UN has been almost as controversial. First, officials sat on the study for four months. When the paper leaked to the press, ... the [UN] ordered an investigation. But the ... [head of UNHCR], Ruud Lubbers, disparaged the study, claiming it was based on 'heresy' -- even as the U.N. investigation secretly turned up 20 new allegations of sex abuse. ... Two weeks ago, UNHCR quietly [fired] U.N. researcher Asmita Naik, the only ... [staff-member/author] of the original study. Lubbers told *Newsweek* ... 'She will find good jobs in the world.' [He] said that the sexual exploitation of refugees is 'not widespread', adding 'Other studies like this are superfluous ... We are done now.'"

Miriam Mahlow, "Investigations: UNHCR refugee abuse", Newsweek International, **June 24, 2002**, p. 5.

116. "A British tribunal has ruled that a former member of the UN police force in Bosnia was unfairly fired ... [for reporting] that colleagues ... used women and children as sex slaves in connivance with Balkan traffickers.

The UN officially has not commented on the ... case in which ... Kathryn Bolkovac ... charged that she was fired in 2000 for ... [reporting to DynCorp, a UN contractor that] ... UN police officers from several countries were linked with prostitution rings. ...

Bolkovac was posted to Sarajevo in 1999 to investigate sex trafficking...

She ... said that UN peacekeepers stood by while girls who refused to take part in sex acts were beaten and raped by pimps and that one police officer paid \$1,000 to a bar owner for a girl he kept captive in his apartment. ...

Bolkovac said she was delighted with the tribunal's findings because it would help her gain more international exposure for the problem posed by corrupt peacekeepers."

Barry James, "Whistleblower upheld in UN Bosnia police case: Firing of former officer unfair, court rules," International Herald Tribune, **August 8, 2002**.

117. "Improving the quality of management was a priority of my first term. I have put great emphasis on establishing clear lines of responsibility and ensuring that managers are held accountable ... I am confident that [our] new system of recruitment, by giving managers primary responsibility for staff selection, will lead to a new level of accountability and empowerment. ...

I intend to adopt additional measures to cut unnecessary layers of bureaucracy. At present, the Organization recruits highly qualified individuals for management functions -- yet its procedures do not allow them to manage a budget, procure what they need for everyday activities or authorize travel for their staff."

"Strengthening of the United Nations: An agenda for further change: Report of the Secretary-General," UN document A/57/387 of **9 September 2002**, paras. 188-190.

[Note: In contrast, see the entry of 17 May 2005 below.]

118. "In **2002**, the ... [OIOS] found that [Secretariat] program managers and department and office heads were not complying with U.N. regulations. ... Nearly half of program managers were not regularly monitoring and evaluating program performance. In addition, program managers were not held accountable for meeting program objectives because U.N. regulations prevent linking program effectiveness and impact with program managers' performance. U.N. officials told us that a more mature program monitoring and evaluation system is needed before program managers can be held responsible for program performance.

We found that there were a variety of problems ... Most programs do not have comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plans ... overall, evaluation findings were not used ...

The Secretary-General tasked the ... OIOS to develop a strategy to systematically evaluate and monitor programme results and to introduce information systems needed ... and expects to have a complete system by 2006."

As discussed in U. S. General Accounting Office, United Nations: Reforms progressing, but comprehensive assessments needed to measure impact, GAO 04-339, February 2004, pp.22-23.

119. "Challenges that must be globally managed keep popping up: genetic engineering, AIDS,

and global terrorist networks. Yet the global landscape has dramatically changed in the last 50 years, but the institutions serving the world have not.

... Two generations of institutional contamination and tenured self-interest ensure that this deadlock continues. ....

It's time for a small group of national leaders to take on the challenge of reforming and rebuilding global governance ... around the issue of the democratic deficit in multilateral institutions. .... Otherwise, endless seminars and conferences will inevitably bog down the process in the name of consensus ...

Similarly, [senior national legislators] should form a democratic caucus to provide systematic oversight of international institutions, focusing particularly on increasing the transparency of these institutions. .... [to] strengthen national governments in their role in holding these agencies to account."

Mike Moore, "Multilateral meltdown", *Foreign Policy*, **March/April 2003**, p. 75. [Note: Mr. Moore was Director General of the World Trade Organization from 1999 to 2002.]

120. **"The General Assembly**

4. ... **regrets the serious delays in the [internal justice] appeals process, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure full cooperation and accountability** in the internal system of justice **of the manager whose decision has been challenged**; ...

9. Requests the Secretary-General ... to submit ... alternatives on **strengthening the administration of justice [ to ensure] ...transparency and fairness** in the provision of justice to staff ...;

24. Reiterates ... its request to ... establish **a clear linkage between the administration of justice and responsibility and accountability** [in the UN Secretariat when decisions of the UNAT result **in losses ... due to management irregularities**] ...;

26. Requests the Secretary-General to **expeditiously finalize and issue an administrative instruction on ... [recovery of financial losses caused to the Organization by wrongful actions or gross negligence of senior officials.]**"

"Administration of justice in the Secretariat," General Assembly resolution 57/307 of **22 May 2003**.

121. "The [UN] Secretariat's administrative environment is not fully leveraging the advantages of technology, nor is it applying modern process management practices adopted by other organizations. Many of the administrative processes are still manual, cumbersome, time-consuming, inefficient and costly to administer. In some cases, layers of control slow down the process without providing any real value."

"Review of duplication, complexity, and bureaucracy in United Nations administrative processes and procedures," UN document A/58/211 of **4 August 2003**, p. 2.

122. "The United Nations, with a \$1.2 billion budget ... supports more than 9,000 employees worldwide and dozens of peacekeeping and relief missions."

Felicity Barringer, "Outlook for UN: Radical overhaul", *International Herald Tribune*, **September 22, 2003**.

[Note: In fact, this image of a "poor little UN" repeatedly put forth by the Secretariat is grossly understated, focusing only on "regular" staff and funds. Actually, a concurrent annual UN status report stated that "As of 30 June 2004, the total number of staff of the UN Secretariat and those units with special status holding appointments of one year of more amounted to **37,598**", which *inter alia* excludes thousands of temporary staff. On the financial side, an NGO's calculations (the UN has none of its own) show total

expenditures (mostly extra-budgetary) that ranged from about \$6.4 billion up to \$10.5 billion per year during the last two decades. See "Composition of the Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/299 of 26 August 2004, para. 11, and "Total UN system expenditures: 1986-2004", compiled by Klaus Hübner, March 2004, *Global Policy Forum* [Note: available at [www.globalpolicy.org/finance/tables/tabsyst.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/tables/tabsyst.htm) .]

123. "An independent panel investigating the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad [on August 19th, which took 22 lives,] said today that the UN's security systems were 'dysfunctional' ... and [need] to be reformed.

What procedures were in place ... were 'sloppy' in observance, and non-compliance with regulations was 'commonplace,' [its report observed.] ...

[Panel head Martti Ahtisaari said] ... "Everyone bears responsibility: the Member States, who are asking the UN ... [to act] and of course the Secretary-General himself -- the buck stops always with the Secretary-General.' ...

... [It] labeled as a major deficiency a 'lack of accountability for the decisions and positions taken by UN managers with regard to the security of UN staff. ... The United Nations ... needs a new culture of accountability in security management.' ...

[Mr. Ahtisaari said] ... "We need a much more professional approach, a professional staff, and resources available ..."

"Iraqi bombing panel finds UN security systems dysfunctional, in need of reform," UN News service, **22 October 2003**.

124. " ... After all these years, the United Nations is still struggling to adjust its human resources policies and practices to the reality that surrounds it. ...

... To function effectively, the UN must be able to attract and retain people with a prominent professional track record ..., ... and, in so doing, demonstrate that the [UN] Charter's insistence on staff of the highest caliber is no hollow phrase.

Several [crippling] dilemmas ..., however, remain unresolved, and this organizational pathology stands in the way of the UN's efforts to remain meaningful. [They include:]

-- the persistent gap between its perennial promises to improve human resources management and its capacity to deliver; and

-- its obsession with cosmetic reforms, hiding the root causes of dysfunctionality.

For most pathologies, there is a cure. For the UN, faith healing will not suffice."

Dirk Salomons, "Good intentions to naught: The pathology of human resources management at the United Nations," in Dennis Dijkzeul, and Yves Beigbeder, eds., *Rethinking international organizations: Pathology and promise*, Berghahn, New York and Oxford, **2003**, pp. 136-137.

125. "Nearly a year after the joint report [on food for sex in West Africa] was first released, not one of the alleged [UN] abusers ... [nor any] supervisory officials [at] ... the West African camps has been held to account, either before a national court or in an internal disciplinary proceeding.

... [UN officials] enjoy immunity from suit (criminal or civil) in national courts for acts performed in the course of their official duties. ... the Secretary-General ... is empowered to [determine if] ... impugned actions fall within the protected sphere of 'official duties.'

... UNHCR [could have] moved forcefully and swiftly against the alleged perpetrators and negligent managers revealed in the joint report ... Sadly, it did not ... [and relied instead on the OIOS conclusion] that the allegations of widespread abuse were not confirmed ...

[Given the UNHCR's] ... abject failure ... one would ... hope that sooner rather than later ... [a court] will decree the obvious -- that functional immunity was never intended to be a shield to be used by international organizations or their officials to avoid legal responsibility for illegal acts clearly outside the scope of their official duties."

Edward P. Flaherty, "Who will police the caregivers?", in "Borderlines", Lawyers Without Borders, **2003**.

126. "Last year ... the World Summit on Sustainable Development ... resulted in the performance by 48 states of a total of 83 treaty actions relating to 39 treaties in the area of economic development and environmental protection. ...

Many States fail to sign or ratify treaties, however, ... because of a simple shortage of technical expertise necessary for the performance of treaty actions. Some also lack the expertise to enact the necessary laws to implement the treaties that they have signed or ratified or to train the personnel required to apply those laws. In order to address those needs, I ... [have sought to offer appropriate technical assistance.]"

"Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization," UN document A/58/1, **2003**, paras. 191-192.

127. "[In 1997 three UN staff became whistle-blowers reporting corruption at the UN war crimes tribunal in Rwanda. They lost their jobs, but finally, six years later, were awarded (but not necessarily paid) damages of from \$130,000 to \$240,000 each.]

... Sirois was unemployed for four years as he tried to clear his name. ...

Lacoste left Arusha shattered and dismayed. She claimed in her application that she had lost four years' income.

[Goddard] ... said his reputation as a chartered accountant has been damaged ... because of the unfair and untrue accusations made against him. Ironically, he says, the only place he could get a job was back at the United Nations, in 2003.

All three of these highly qualified people who tried to right wrongs only to lose faith in the U.N. justice system now praise the [UNAT] for its handling of their cases in the end. But why did it have to take so long and at such terrible human neglect all the way to the top. And will they ever be repaid for their losses?"

Barbara Crossette, "The cost of U.N. whistle blowing", The Atlantic Online, the U.N. Wire, Copyright, National Journal Group, 1994, **February 9, 2004**.

128. "The U.N. Secretary General launched two reform agendas, in 1997 and 2002, to address the U.N.'s core management challenges -- poor leadership of the Secretariat, duplication among its many offices and programs, and the lack of accountability for staff performance. ... In 2000, GAO reported that the reforms were not yet complete.

What GAO found

... The Secretariat has taken positive steps to strengthen its human capital management, but challenges ... remain. Second, ***the U.N.*** has begun to adopt results-oriented budgeting, but it ... ***[does] not measure program impact.*** ...

... ***The Secretariat does not conduct comprehensive assessments of the status and impact of U.N. reforms. ... the reform agendas lack clearly stated priorities, interim goals, and target dates for overall completion. Other challenges include resistance to change from program managers and possible resource constraints.***"

U.S. General Accounting Office, United Nations: Reforms progressing, but comprehensive assessments needed to measure impact, GAO 04-339, **February 2004**, "Highlights" page. [emphasis added]

[Note: Available at [www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-339](http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-339).]

129. " ... Oil-for-Food is not simply a saga of one UN program gone wrong. It is also the tale of a systematic failure on the part of what is grandly called the international community.

**Oil-for-food tainted almost everything it touched. It was such a kaleidoscope of corruption as to defy easy summary, let alone concentration on the main issues. But let us try. ...**

{The UN}, along with its secrecy, ... bureaucrats beholden to the favor of the man at the top, its almost complete lack of accountability, external oversight, or the most elementary checks and balances, ... suffers from an endemic affinity with anti-Western despots ...

Perhaps ... the complicity was ... built in ... as the UN collected the commissions [of about \$1.9 billion] and processed the funds that transformed Oil-for-Food into the sleaziest program ever to fly the UN flag, and the single largest [budget] item ... of all nine UN agencies involved, plus the Secretariat itself. That, in the end, may be the dirty secret at the center of the Oil-for-Food scandal."

Claudia Rosset, "The oil-for-food scam: What did Kofi Annan know, and when did he know it?", *Commentary*, May 2004, pp. 15-22. [emphasis added]

[Note: The full article is available at

[www.commentarymagazine.com/SpecialArticle.asp?article=A11705017\\_1](http://www.commentarymagazine.com/SpecialArticle.asp?article=A11705017_1) .]

130. **"A new survey of ... [UN integrity perceptions] has found that while structures for reporting and combating corruption exist, most staff members are either unaware of how to use them or afraid to do so for fear of high-level retaliation.**

'The UN has a 'phone book' of rules and regulations which are totally useless as they are never practiced', a staff member is quoted as saying ... [Another says,] 'Senior leaders caught in serious breaches of ethics should be punished, not promoted as usual.'

... [The study] is being made public at a time when Secretary-General Kofi Annan has been forced by the widespread publicity [about corruption in the Iraq oil-for-food program] to appoint a high-level panel to look into [it] ...

**'Get rid of the old boy network,' one staff member ... [says.] 'That network is wide, tenacious and powerful. ... So long as you can wind your way into that network, you are OK. ... Opposing the network is certainly the end of a UN career.'**

Warren Hoge, "Report criticizes the way UN fights corruption", *International Herald Tribune*, June 16, 2004. [emphasis added] [Note: The actual survey is "United Nations organizational integrity survey", Final Report, prepared by Deloitte Consulting LLP, June 2004. It is available via "Search" at [www.whistleblower.org](http://www.whistleblower.org).]

131. " ... the UN has [examined the] ... Secretariat's perception of its own integrity. ...

[The report notes that] 'Staff members feel unprotected from reprisals for reporting violations of the codes of conduct. This is not a perception confined to a few staff in remote locales and/or dangerous circumstances. Forty-six percent (46%) gave unfavourable response to this item, while only 12% gave favourable responses.'

"[The UN integrity survey] is of course just one of the UN's various investigations into itself. ...

Does anyone see a problem here?

The basic flaws are simple. Any time you create a large institution, accord it great privileges of secrecy, give it a big budget and have it run immune from any sane standard of accountability, you are likely to get a corrupt organization. ...

The problem with the Secretariat isn't "tone" at the top. It's accountability at the top and

secrecy throughout. ...

Someone needs to help this institution, and it's not a consulting team hired by the same institution ...

For now, I'm [starting to believe] that ... the only thing worse than having the U.N. ignore a problem is to have the U.N. investigate it."

Claudia Rosett, "The problem with the Secretariat", The Wall Street Journal, **June 16, 2004**.

132. "The United Nation's anti-corruption department has been rocked by accusations that the office itself is corrupt.

The head of the [OIOS] ... , Dileep Nair, has been accused of promoting and recruiting people in ways that are not consistent with U. N. rules and regulations.

The scrutiny ... comes at a delicate time, as the UN is under intense scrutiny for alleged abuse of the Iraqi oil-for-food program. ...

Nair, who is currently on sick leave from his position, denied all the accusations to Fox News.

Other allegations of impropriety include charges that some inside the OIOS received financial kickbacks in return for promoting people and that some people were promoted in exchange for sexual favors.

Nair, a former banker and civil servant from Singapore, was picked by Annan in 2000."

Jonathan Hunt, "Watching the UN's watchdog", Fox News, **June 16, 2004**. [Note: Mr. Nair was subsequently dismissed, see entry of April 4, 2005 below.]

133. **"Fraud awareness, prevention plan and policy**

... **The United Nations** has, to some extent, an established framework on this issue. ... [but **lacks**] ... **a comprehensive internal anti-fraud and anti-corruption infrastructure, ... [and] anti-corruption and anti-fraud elements in the various rules, procedures and internal controls** ...

A large number of United Nations system offices, funds and programmes have:

(a) No sufficient framework for prevention, detection, resolution, and reporting;

(b) No decentralized corruption and fraud risk-assessment mechanisms and no corruption and fraud-prevention committee;

(c) No appropriate resolution mechanisms for reported and detected incidents and allegations of corruption and fraud (although reliance is placed on the [OIOS] in this regard."

[The Board recommended implementing a comprehensive corruption and fraud corruption plan and committee, training sessions, mechanisms to respond to reported corruption, and review of field investigation processes.]"

"Financial reports and audited financial statements for the biennium ended 31 December 2003 and Report of the Board of Auditors", Vol. I, UN document A/59/5 of **22 July 2004**, p. 12, item (u), paras. 15(s), 344-346, and 349. [emphasis added]

134. "Some of the Board's comments [cited immediately above] may give the mistaken impression to the uninitiated reader that the potential for large-scale fraudulent and corrupted activities is widespread. The Administration assigns high priority to the issues of fraud and corruption ..."

"First report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Board of Auditors ... for the financial period ended 31 December 2003: Report of the Secretary General", UN document A/59/318 of **1 September 2004**, paras. 124-126. {Note: However, see item of 17 May 2005 below.]

135. "[Sergio Vieira de Mello's death a year ago in the UN headquarters bombing in Baghdad] ... along with 22 of his colleagues ... stunned the United Nations and its staff ...

Why is the United Nations short on competent personnel to lead complex peacekeeping and political missions? ...

The answer is that there is a human resources crisis in the United Nations. An entrenched bureaucracy, fueled by counterproductive quotas, nepotism and outlandishly generous tenure policies, impedes the rise of talent and excellence through the ranks. ...

... This is why Annan was repeatedly compelled to rely on de Mello ...

[The UN needs outstanding staff] .. with the requisite experience, competence, stature and charisma to manage the UN's presence in situations where thousands if not millions of lives and livelihoods are at stake.

With the support of the Security Council, Annan must thoroughly reshape his work force to improve its caliber and reward talent. Only then could he be sure of a reliable pool of crisis managers ..."

Ludovic Hood, "Remembering de Mello: The UN must let talent rise", International Herald Tribune, **August 13, 2004**.

136. "This week the United Nations published its annual assessment of progress toward its Millennium Development Goals — targets established in 2000 for advancing welfare in the developing countries. The record, as you might expect, is mixed. ... It remains questionable, in fact, whether the MDG exercise, with its unimpeachably good intentions and its proliferating bureaucratic overhead, has done any good at all on balance. ...

... The weakness of the whole MDG concept is that it wills the ends without willing the means — something which the UN, perforce, has come to specialize in. ...

The UN seems especially proud of the progress [toward the goal] ... in which it has a vested interest ... greater global co-operation on development. ... Conferences, working groups, declarations, strategies, and programmes ... are multiplying fantastically. ... However, what this is actually doing for the putative poor country beneficiaries is harder to say."

"Ends without means: The United Nations has set benchmarks for progress in poor countries. Are these any use?", The Economist, **September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2004**, p. 78.

137. "[UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan] appealed to world leaders yesterday to rally behind the rule of international law, warning that global standards were being shamelessly disregarded and selectively applied. ... 'Today the rule of law is at risk around the world,' he told the UN General Assembly in New York. 'This [international] framework is riddled with gaps and weaknesses. ...

'It lacks the teeth that turn a body of law into an effective legal system. Many feel that it is not always used fairly or effectively; those invoking it do not always practice what they preach.'

... Mr. Annan warned that the system's legitimacy was at stake. 'Just as within a country respect for the law depends on the sense that all have a say in making and implementing it, so it is in our global community. All must feel that international law belongs to them, and protects their legitimate interests.'

His speech reflected an organisation facing a sense of crisis. ... "

Mark Turner, "Annan says global rule of law at risk." Financial Times (UK), **September 22, 2004**.

138. "... Confronted with the murder of 50,000 in Sudan, ... the great hum of diplomacy signaled that the global community was whirring into action. ...

... The multilateral process moved along in its dignified way. The UN secretary general [prepared] ... to set up a commission. Preliminary UN resolutions were passed, and the mass murderers were told they should stop ...

Finally, a week ago the Security Council passed a resolution threatening to 'consider' sanctions against Sudan at some point. ... The resolution passed and it was a good day ... Every time there is an ongoing atrocity, we watch the world community go through ... (1) shock and concern (2) gathering resolve (3) fruitless negotiation (4) pathetic inaction (5) shame and humiliation (6) steadfast vows to never let this happen again.

... It's a pity about the poor dead people in Darfur. Their numbers are still rising, at 6,000 to 10,000 a month."

David Brooks, "Another triumph for the UN," International Herald Tribune, **September 27, 2004**.

139. "Rosemarie Waters, [the UN Staff Union President], said that ... in the last six years, [UN] ... management had been reforming itself and increasing managerial authority, while reducing accountability. The Staff Union ... could not support, however, the erosion of staff rights and dissolution of oversight mechanisms as a means of implementation ...

The [integrity survey] ... revealed that staff ... feared reprisals for exposing breaches of ethics, and they perceived that the disciplinary process was applied unevenly. Their view of integrity among senior managers was less than positive..

The Organization had yet to establish concrete measures for individual accountability, she continued. It was essential that [expanded delegations of personnel authority] ... be carefully examined and, if abuses were found, such delegation should be revoked. ... The [OHRM] had informed staff representatives of its inability to enforce accountability because they lacked central authority. The Fifth Committee may wish to recommend that concrete individual accountability be developed, in consultation with staff representatives, on a priority basis."

"UN staff committee representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in management reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of **29 October 2004**, pp. 2-3.

140. "James O. C. Jonah, ... [who worked at the UN for three decades] ... and served as head of personnel from 1979 through 1982, ... [said that the Fifth] Committee should also have a serious look at the results of the integrity study. Never had the staff perception of integrity been so low. ... In some respects, the reforms had weakened the Secretariat considerably.

When he served as head of personnel, his biggest fight had been with programme managers, who were most resistant to reform .... He could not believe that such measures as giving authority to programme managers would strengthen the international civil service. What had been said about the lack of authority of the OHRM was true. Without a strong personnel office, however, there would be no uniformity of rules and fairness in the system. Governments should not take what was happening lightly."

"UN staff committee representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in management reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of **29 October 2004**, p. 4.

141. "The lawyer for the [UN] staff member who brought sexual harassment charges [at UNHCR] ... has said that [Secretary-General Annan's admission] ... of having overruled his own investigators in clearing [high commissioner for refugees Ruud] Lubbers would spur an appeal ...

The [OIOS] annual report ... [issued this week restored this damning disclosure in a last-minute restoration] ...

**When he cleared Lubbers of the formal charges in July, Annan ... did not reveal the**

**negative findings of his own investigators ... and said that the complaint against Lubbers 'could not be sustained.' ...**

[The lawyer, Edward Patrick] Flaherty, argued that the doctored document strengthened his client's case ...

**'This demonstrates that there are two sets of [UN] rules ...' Flaherty said. 'One for the protected class and one for the rest. Mr. Lubbers is part of the protected class. My client is not.'**

**The appeal also cites 12 instances of Lubber's alleged attempts to intimidate the complainant ...** “

Fiona Fleck and Warren Hoge, “Appeal is expected in UN sex case: Lawyer cites Annan’s overruling of his own investigators”, International Herald Tribune, **November 1, 2004**. [Note: see the followup item of February 22, 2005 below.]

142. "U. N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said yesterday he was disappointed in his son for accepting payments from a key contractor in the oil-for-food programme for more than four years longer than ... previously acknowledged. ...

[But] while the organization scrambles to respond to oil-for-food inquiries, other troubles are piling up at the organization's doorstep. ...

The U.N. peacekeeping program is wracked by accusations of rape, sexual harassment and extortion by blue helmets and civilians in the U.N. mission in Congo. ...

International pressure also is building on the United Nations and the Security Council to do more to protect civilians in Darfur, Sudan. ...

Internally, a [staff] ... group seeks to reopen an investigation of [the head of the OIOS] ... over charges of sexual harassment and favoritism ...

The U.N. staff union also has criticized Mr. Annan's willingness to exonerate Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette for failing to protect U.N. staff members in Iraq ...

[Mr. Annan] also threw out an internal report finding merit in a [recent] sexual harassment complaint against ... [UNHCR head] Ruud Lubbers."

Betsy Pisik, "Another oil-food scandal emerges", The Washington Times, **November 29, 2004**. [Note: Much more information on Mr. Annan's son's activities is available at "Google search", under "Kojo Annan" .]

143. "Imagine if U.S. troops were accused of sexually exploiting children in impoverished nations ... a U.S. Cabinet Secretary were accused of groping a female subordinate, [but then exonerated] ... by the president .... [an agency head] ... and the president's own offspring stood accused of complicity in [a massive embezzlement racket] ...

... [These things happened in the UN this year.]

Where's the outrage? ... Why didn't the mainstream ... devote more attention to these scandals? Far from demanding high-level resignations, they are circling the wagons. ...

[Yet] all the *reformistas'* efforts founder on the rocks of apathy and inertia. ... Most of the U.N.'s 191 member states ... [and] 49,000 employees ... have other priorities. ...

Leaving the U.N. ... is unrealistic. But it will never live up to the grandiose expectations of its starry-eyed supporters, unless they get mad enough to demand real change. So far there's no sign of that happening."

Max Boot, "Why U.N. stays mired in its defects: Start with too-friendly media, apathy and members' entrenched interests", Los Angeles Times, **December 9, 2004**.

144. "The United Nations, which extols the virtues of 'good governance', is not practising what it preaches, say [many long-time observers.] ...

The complaints ... come amidst several recent scandals, including accusations of bribery, nepotism, sexual harassment, and mismanagement of peacekeeping operations overseas.

'The underlying problem is a lack of transparency and accountability' says Hillel Neuer, [one close observer.] ..

... In 2003 the OIOS cleared the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna of charges of corruption and mismanagement. ...

[Neuer said] 'if some of the things that happen at the United Nations took place in a big corporation, people would have been fired.'

[A UN shortcoming, Neuer added, is that the investigation results emerge very slowly] ... are mostly 'white-washed' ... [and occur] only after 'a lot of prodding from the media and NGOs.'

[A reporter recently asked UN spokesman Fred Eckhard if there is] 'a record that shows that the United Nations, under Kofi Annan, has taken allegations of mismanagement and misbehaviour seriously and fired people as a result?'

[Eckhard replied] ... 'I will certainly ask for you ...'

Thalif Deen, "Corruption: U.N. failing to practice 'good governance', [IPS Inter Press Service](#), **December 9, 2004**. [Note: the Vienna office mentioned above leads the UN global anti-corruption programme, despite having been twice accused of corruption and mismanagement, and twice 'white-washed' by the OIOS and Secretary-General Annan. See [Top corruption fighter corrupted](#) in this archive.]

145. "Two of the world's most impressive spin machines are locked in deadly conflict. On the one side is [the so-called] ... 'vast right-wing conspiracy', a bunch of conservative US senators and congressmen, ... [plus several major media organizations], all calling for the head of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

On the other side is the huge amorphous mass of the global great and good, all clucking in unison that Kofi Annan is the best UN secretary-general since Dag Hammarskjold ... although a list that includes Kurt Waldheim and Boutros Boutros-Ghali is not much competition. ... The international establishment has rallied to Annan as the first African to run the world body, and as the first secretary-general to bring forward thoughtful and even bold plans for UN reform.

Kofi Annan must stay, they all cry, most of them thrilling to the symbolism of a clash between President George Bush, who proudly sports a small American flag on his lapel, and Nobel peace prize laureate Kofi Annan, whose equally well-tailored lapel sports a discreet dove, tastefully wrought in white enamel."

Martin Walker, "Gunning for Kofi", [The Spectator](#) (UK), **December 11, 2004**.

146. "Two lawyers for U.N. whistle-blowers urged the United Nations on Wednesday to protect staffers who want to disclose corruption at the world body, including the oil-for-food program for Iraq.

One of the lawyers said 'five or six' U.N. employees including a high-level employee had contacted him for advice on how to reveal evidence of wrongdoing in [that] ... programme without jeopardizing their careers. ...

But based on his advice, none of [them] ... have gone public, he said. 'I know them. They won't. They are very quiet and under a lot of stress.' ...

While U.N. rules call for wrongdoers to be punished, they do nothing to shield staff members from reprisals when they come forward with evidence, [Tom] Devine and Sirois said.

'There is irreparable harm when freedom of speech is canceled, irreparable harm to the institution,' Devine said. 'The message is, 'Do not say anything to investigators.'"

Irwin Arief, "Lawyers call on U.N. to shield whistle-blowers", [Reuters](#), **December 15, 2004**.

147. **"The General Assembly ...  
Emphasizes the importance of establishing real, effective and efficient  
mechanisms for responsibility and accountability;**

**Regrets that despite previous information provided by the Secretary-General on  
the establishment of accountability mechanisms ... such mechanisms are not in place,  
thereby affecting the efficient and effective functioning of the Organization ..."**

"Review of the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 48/218B and 54/244",  
General Assembly resolution 59/272 of **23 December 2004**, paras. 6 and 7.

This chronology continues in  
Overview of IO Watch Archive Quotes III